TXX-4350, Interim Deficiency Rept SDAR-154 Re Safe Shutdown Analysis Evaluations Which Did Not Consider Effects of Potential Fire on Control Room Hvac.All Essential Cables & Components Afforded Protection,Per 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2.c: Difference between revisions
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TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY | TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY Marway rowen. ion souru in.ive -ru ext. i..n... na u.AM, TEXAM Wol | ||
: m..e..t.t.y n.. cte. u rur.s.,... | |||
: m. .e..t.t.y | November 5, 1984 i | ||
... m TXX-4350 M@30MM A Mr. D.R. Hunter, Chief | |||
November 5, 1984 TXX-4350 M@30MM | ! I NOV - 61984 Reactor Project Branch 2 j | ||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Docket No.: | |||
50-445 Arlington, TX 76012 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION CONTROL ROOM HVAC QA FILE: CP-84-29, SDAR-154 FILE NO.: | |||
10110 | |||
==Dear Mr. Hunter:== | ==Dear Mr. Hunter:== | ||
In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding the safe shutdown analysis evaluations which did not consider a potential fire which could effect habitability of control room and alternate shutdown capability. We have submitted an interim report logged TXX-4335 dated October 12, 1984. | In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding the safe shutdown analysis evaluations which did not consider a potential fire which could effect habitability of control room and alternate shutdown capability. We have submitted an interim report logged TXX-4335 dated October 12, 1984. | ||
Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspector's review. | Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspector's review. | ||
Very truly yours, | Very truly yours, | ||
, h'~ C0l$ inn BRC:tlg Attachment cc: NRC Region IV - (0 + 1 copy) | |||
Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies) | Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies) | ||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 3411160619 841105 | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 3411160619 841105 | ||
{DRADOCK 05000445 PDR r | {DRADOCK 05000445 PDR r | ||
A DEVEMON OF TEXAR VTil.lTIEN ELECTNGC COMi'ANY | A DEVEMON OF TEXAR VTil.lTIEN ELECTNGC COMi'ANY l | ||
1 | |||
; + | |||
t e | o t | ||
TXX-4350 | e TXX-4350 November 5, 1984 3 | ||
ATTACHMENT | ATTACHMENT 7 | ||
Control Room HVAC Description Review by site engineering has revealed an unreviewed fire scenario. | 4 Control Room HVAC Description Review by site engineering has revealed an unreviewed fire scenario. | ||
The effect of the unpostulated fire could preclude control room habitability due to environmental conditions. | |||
In addition, several equipment functions | |||
.necessary to control the plant from the hot shutdown panel (HSP) could be rendered inoperable by the same fire. | |||
Safety Implications In the event the conditions had remained undetected, the ability of the operator, the safety monitor and control plant functions would be adversely affected. | Safety Implications In the event the conditions had remained undetected, the ability of the operator, the safety monitor and control plant functions would be adversely affected. | ||
Corrective Action In order to mitigate the consequences of the fire, all essential cables and components will be afforded protection by the installation of one-hour fire barrier material and fire detection and suppression capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c and approved CPSES deviations. | Corrective Action In order to mitigate the consequences of the fire, all essential cables and components will be afforded protection by the installation of one-hour fire barrier material and fire detection and suppression capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c and approved CPSES deviations. | ||
.}} | .}} | ||
Latest revision as of 01:32, 13 December 2024
| ML20108C566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1984 |
| From: | Clements B TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | Hunter D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| SDAR-154, TXX-4350, NUDOCS 8411160619 | |
| Download: ML20108C566 (2) | |
Text
T..
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY Marway rowen. ion souru in.ive -ru ext. i..n... na u.AM, TEXAM Wol
- m..e..t.t.y n.. cte. u rur.s.,...
November 5, 1984 i
... m TXX-4350 M@30MM A Mr. D.R. Hunter, Chief
! I NOV - 61984 Reactor Project Branch 2 j
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Docket No.:
50-445 Arlington, TX 76012 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION CONTROL ROOM HVAC QA FILE: CP-84-29, SDAR-154 FILE NO.:
10110
Dear Mr. Hunter:
In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding the safe shutdown analysis evaluations which did not consider a potential fire which could effect habitability of control room and alternate shutdown capability. We have submitted an interim report logged TXX-4335 dated October 12, 1984.
Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspector's review.
Very truly yours,
, h'~ C0l$ inn BRC:tlg Attachment cc: NRC Region IV - (0 + 1 copy)
Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 3411160619 841105
{DRADOCK 05000445 PDR r
A DEVEMON OF TEXAR VTil.lTIEN ELECTNGC COMi'ANY l
1
- +
o t
e TXX-4350 November 5, 1984 3
ATTACHMENT 7
4 Control Room HVAC Description Review by site engineering has revealed an unreviewed fire scenario.
The effect of the unpostulated fire could preclude control room habitability due to environmental conditions.
In addition, several equipment functions
.necessary to control the plant from the hot shutdown panel (HSP) could be rendered inoperable by the same fire.
Safety Implications In the event the conditions had remained undetected, the ability of the operator, the safety monitor and control plant functions would be adversely affected.
Corrective Action In order to mitigate the consequences of the fire, all essential cables and components will be afforded protection by the installation of one-hour fire barrier material and fire detection and suppression capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c and approved CPSES deviations.
.