ENS 41132: Difference between revisions

v t e ENS Event
08:50 Aug 22, 2004
Title	60 Day Report - Invalid Actuation of Specified System
Event Description	This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). During TSM 158 work associated with W/O 98686671 a SPOC Relief Supervisor inadvertently caused a ground when disconnecting test meter leads from an energized circuit. This ground resulted in an unplanned RN [Nuclear Service Water] swap to the SNSWP [Standby Nuclear Service Water System]. At 0450 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937) The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2B started; 1A and 2A were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-53B and 1RN 54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B. Flow was manually initiated through all four NS Heat Exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for existing plant conditions. This event was entered into the site corrective action program for resolution (PIP C04-04056). At 1629 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937). RN system response was as expected. The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2A started; 1A and 2B were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-47A and 2RN-47A closed as expected, and return header isolation valves 1RN-53B and 1RN-54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B. Flow was manually initiated through all four NS heat exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. The reasons for the inadvertent actuation was a blown fuse. Performed Troubleshooting Plan to I/R Cause of Fuse HA-1 in 1EATC6 blowing under W/O #98686856-01 and 03. No cause for the fuse blowing on 2004-08-22 could be found. All data obtained under the plan were well within normal values. Thermography data indicate the fuse temperature was about 3 Deg F above ambient. The current through the fuse is 1.3 Amps. (Fuse HA-1 is a FLQ-3) Current alarm HF in 1EATC6 was calibrated, and was found in tolerance. No change in current through the fuse was noted during the calibration of the current alarm. The current alarm was cycled 5 times. This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for the existing plant conditions. This event has been entered into the site specific corrective action program for resolution. (C04-4060). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 41132 +/-
Where
Catawba South Carolina (NRC Region 2)
Reporting

10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1392 h58 days <br />8.286 weeks <br />1.907 months <br />)
Opened:	Wallace Judd 08:50 Oct 19, 2004
NRC Officer:	Bill Gott
Last Updated:	Oct 19, 2004
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v • d • e

v t e Emergency Notification System
Catawba with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER
WEEKMONTHYEAR2013-05-28T17:39:00 [Table view]
[ENS list for Catawba]

@@ Line 16: / Line 16: @@
 | event date = 08/22/2004 04:50 EDT
 | last update date = 10/19/2004
-| title = 60 Day Report - Invalid Actuation Of Specified System
+| title = 60 Day Report - Invalid Actuation of Specified System
 | event text = This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS).
 During TSM 158 work associated with W/O 98686671 a SPOC Relief Supervisor inadvertently caused a ground when disconnecting test meter leads from an energized circuit.  This ground resulted in an unplanned RN [Nuclear Service Water] swap to the SNSWP [Standby Nuclear Service Water System].

v t e Unit 1
W-4-LP
Reactor critical	Critical
Scram	No
Before	Power Operation (100 %)
After	Power Operation (100 %)

v t e Unit 2
W-4-LP
Reactor critical	Critical
Scram	No
Before	Power Operation (100 %)
After	Power Operation (100 %)

ENS 41132: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 21:22, 1 March 2018

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ENS 41132: Difference between revisions

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