ENS 41140: Difference between revisions
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StriderTol (talk | contribs) Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) Created page by program invented by StriderTol |
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| event date = 10/19/2004 17:30 EDT | | event date = 10/19/2004 17:30 EDT | ||
| last update date = 10/26/2004 | | last update date = 10/26/2004 | ||
| title = Standby Emergency Electrical Power Paths Inoperable | | title = Standby Emergency Electrical Power Paths Inoperable for 41 Minutes | ||
| event text = The Keowee Hydro Units provide the emergency power source for the Oconee Units. At 0357 on 10/19/04, Keowee Unit 1 (and the overhead emergency power path) was declared inoperable in order to perform scheduled maintenance. At 1730, Keowee Unit 2 (and the underground emergency power path) was declared inoperable due to the loss of breaker control power associated with Keowee Unit 2 auxiliaries. At 1811, as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1 condition I, both standby buses were energized from a Lee Combustion Turbine via an isolated power path. At 1828, a Operability Verification of Keowee Unit 2 to the overhead emergency power path was performed with all acceptance criteria met. At 1904, Keowee Unit 2 to the overhead emergency power path was declared operable. Technical Specification 3.8.1 condition I was exited. | | event text = The Keowee Hydro Units provide the emergency power source for the Oconee Units. At 0357 on 10/19/04, Keowee Unit 1 (and the overhead emergency power path) was declared inoperable in order to perform scheduled maintenance. At 1730, Keowee Unit 2 (and the underground emergency power path) was declared inoperable due to the loss of breaker control power associated with Keowee Unit 2 auxiliaries. At 1811, as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1 condition I, both standby buses were energized from a Lee Combustion Turbine via an isolated power path. At 1828, a Operability Verification of Keowee Unit 2 to the overhead emergency power path was performed with all acceptance criteria met. At 1904, Keowee Unit 2 to the overhead emergency power path was declared operable. Technical Specification 3.8.1 condition I was exited. | ||
Initial Safety Significance: Between times 1730 to 1811, both on site emergency power paths were inoperable. During this time period a condition existed that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | Initial Safety Significance: Between times 1730 to 1811, both on site emergency power paths were inoperable. During this time period a condition existed that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:22, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Oconee  South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+4.08 h0.17 days <br />0.0243 weeks <br />0.00559 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | David Younge 01:35 Oct 20, 2004 |
| NRC Officer: | Mike Ripley |
| Last Updated: | Oct 26, 2004 |
| 41140 - NRC Website
| |
Oconee with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |