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{{#Wiki_filter:i     ,
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                                                          UNITE] STATES
,
                ( g neev k                    NUCLEA] RE20LATr.Y COMMISSION
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              .[     ,
UNITE] STATES
                            g                               [E! ION ll
NUCLEA] RE20LATr.Y COMMISSION
              3             g                     101 MARIETTA STREET N.W.
.[
              *           *                       ATI.ANTA, GEORGIA 30303
,
                %,...../
g
                Report Nos.: 50-327/84-31 and 50-328/84-31
[E! ION ll
                Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
3
                            500A Chestnut Street
g
                            Chattanooga, TN 37401
101 MARIETTA STREET N.W.
                Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328                         License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79
*
                Facility Name:       Sequoyah
*
                Inspection Condu ted:       ctob                 1984
ATI.ANTA, GEORGIA 30303
                Inspector           -
%,...../
                                                                    -
Report Nos.: 50-327/84-31 and 50-328/84-31
                                                                                          O' Eb
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
                          W. H. Miller, Jr.                                               Date Signed
500A Chestnut Street
                Approved by
Chattanooga, TN 37401
                              T. E. Conlon, Section Chief
Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328
                                                                                          //-  P-N
License Nos.:
                                                                                            Date Signed
DPR-77 and DPR-79
                              Engineering Branch
Facility Name:
                              Division of Reactor Safety
Sequoyah
                                                              SUAMARY
Inspection Condu ted:
                Scope:   This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 27 inspector-hours on site
ctob
                in the areas of fire protection / prevention, followup on the licensee's
1984
                compensatory actions regarding Confirmation of Action Letter on Appendix R fire
O' Eb
                protection' discrepancies, and review of corrective actions on previously
Inspector
                identified NRC and licensee identified items.
-
                Results: Of the areas inspected, two apparent violations were found (all fire
W. H. Miller, Jr.
                brigade members are not respirator qualified - paragraph 6.a. and no maintenance
-
                program provided for fire protection strainers - paragraph 6.c.             One apparent
Date Signed
                deviation was Lfound (fire protection system containment isolation valves are not
Approved by
            -
//- P - N
                provided with statu lights in the main control room - paragraph 3.e).
T. E. Conlon, Section Chief
      , ,
Date Signed
  .d
Engineering Branch
    1
Division of Reactor Safety
                        8507230091 841114
SUAMARY
                        PDR     ADOCK 05000327
Scope:
                        G                     PDR
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 27 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of fire protection / prevention, followup on the licensee's
compensatory actions regarding Confirmation of Action Letter on Appendix R fire
protection' discrepancies, and review of corrective actions on previously
identified NRC and licensee identified items.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, two apparent violations were found (all fire
brigade members are not respirator qualified - paragraph 6.a. and no maintenance
program provided for fire protection strainers - paragraph 6.c.
One apparent
deviation was Lfound (fire protection system containment isolation valves are not
provided with statu lights in the main control room - paragraph 3.e).
-
, ,
.d
1
8507230091 841114
PDR
ADOCK 05000327
G
PDR
l
l
                                  \
\\
                                                                                                          . .J
. .J


                                                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _     __- _
_ _ _ _ _ _
      .
__-
  .
_
i                                   -
.
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i
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f
f
                                          REPORT DETAILS
REPORT DETAILS
      1.   Licensee Employees Contacted
1.
          J. Alexander, Shift Engineer
Licensee Employees Contacted
        *W. H. Baker, Fire Protection Engineer
J. Alexander, Shift Engineer
        *J. Blankenship, Information Officer
*W. H. Baker, Fire Protection Engineer
        *L. Bush, Operations Group
*J. Blankenship, Information Officer
        *S. Butler, QA Supervisor.
*L. Bush, Operations Group
        *M. R. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
*S. Butler, QA Supervisor.
        *D. E. Crawley, Health Physics Supervisor
*M. R. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
        *J.   T. Dills, Jr., Asst. Health Physicist
*D. E. Crawley, Health Physics Supervisor
        *V. L. Dudley, Fire Protection Engineer
*J. T. Dills, Jr., Asst. Health Physicist
        *R. W. Fortenbury, Engineering Section Supervisor
*V. L. Dudley, Fire Protection Engineer
        *M. R. Harding, Engineering Group Supervisor
*R. W. Fortenbury, Engineering Section Supervisor
        *G. B. Kirk, Compliance Engineer
*M. R. Harding, Engineering Group Supervisor
        *J. B. Krell, Plant Superintendent (Maintenance)
*G. B. Kirk, Compliance Engineer
        *J. D. McCamy, Engineering and Testing
*J. B. Krell, Plant Superintendent (Maintenance)
          R. Moore, DQA/QAB
*J. D. McCamy, Engineering and Testing
        *L.M. Nobles, Superintendent (0&E)
R. Moore, DQA/QAB
        *R. W. Olson, Modification Manager
*L.M. Nobles, Superintendent (0&E)
        *D. L. Paul, Senior Engineer, Site Service
*R. W. Olson, Modification Manager
        *M. A. Purcell, Mechanical Engineer
*D. L. Paul, Senior Engineer, Site Service
        *J. H. Sullivan, Appendix R. Project Manager
*M. A. Purcell, Mechanical Engineer
        *J. M. Qualls, Operations
*J. H. Sullivan, Appendix R. Project Manager
        *P. R. Wallace, Plant Manaser
*J. M. Qualls, Operations
        *J. E. Wills, Licensing Engineer
*P. R. Wallace, Plant Manaser
        *G. G. Wilson, Assistant Ops Supervisor
*J. E. Wills, Licensing Engineer
          NRC Resident Inspector
*G. G. Wilson, Assistant Ops Supervisor
          E. Ford
NRC Resident Inspector
        * Attended exit interview
E. Ford
      2.   Exit Interview
* Attended exit interview
          The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 26, 1984, with
2.
          .those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the
Exit Interview
          following inspection findings:
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 26, 1984, with
          a.   Inspector Followup Item (327 and 328/84-31-01), Fire Detectors Over
.those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the
                ERCW Pumps are Not Included in the Technical Specifications - paragraph
following inspection findings:
                3.a.
a.
          b.   Deviation Item (327 and 328/84-31-02), Fire Protection System
Inspector Followup Item (327 and 328/84-31-01), Fire Detectors Over
                Containment Isolation Valves Are Not Provided with Status Lights in the
ERCW Pumps are Not Included in the Technical Specifications - paragraph
                Main Control Room - paragraph 3.e.
3.a.
  .,               - - -   .-.       - .           . . - --, _.             . _ _ - -       , -- -
b.
Deviation Item (327 and 328/84-31-02), Fire Protection System
Containment Isolation Valves Are Not Provided with Status Lights in the
Main Control Room - paragraph 3.e.
.,
- - -
.-.
- .
. . -
--,
_.
. _ _ - -
, -- -


(                                                       _ _ . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _         _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(
    .
_ _ . ._
  .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                            2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
      c.   Violation Item (327 and 328/84-31-03), All Fire Brigade Members Are Not
.
            Respirator Qualified - paragraph 6.a.
.
      d.   Violation item (327 and 328/84-31-04), No Maintenance Program Provided
2
            for Fire Protection System Strainers - paragraph 6.c.
c.
    3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
Violation Item (327 and 328/84-31-03), All Fire Brigade Members Are Not
      a.   (Closed) Deviation Item (327/81-14-03), Fire Detection Is Not Provided
Respirator Qualified - paragraph 6.a.
            Over ERCW Pumps.     Fixed temperature type fire detectors have been
d.
            provided over each ERCW pump.     These detectors are not included in
Violation item (327 and 328/84-31-04), No Maintenance Program Provided
            Technical Specifications as required. This is identified as Inspector
for Fire Protection System Strainers - paragraph 6.c.
            Followup Item (327 and 328/84-31-01), Fire Detectors Over ERCW Pumps
3.
            are not Included in the Technical Specifications, and will be reviewed                                           i
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
            during a subsequent NRC inspection.
a.
,      b.   (Closed) Unresolved Item (328/81-14-03), Fire Detection is Not Provided
(Closed) Deviation Item (327/81-14-03), Fire Detection Is Not Provided
            Over ERCW Pumps. Refer to abw e item 3.a.
Over ERCW Pumps.
      c.   (0 pen) Deviation Item (327/80-10-01), Substandard Fire Protection
Fixed temperature type fire detectors have been
            Administrative Procedures. As previously reported in Report Nos.
provided over each ERCW pump.
            327/80-17 and 328/80-10, the licensee revised the plant procedures to
These detectors are not included in
            comply with the NRC guidelines for fire brigade training and drills.
Technical Specifications as required.
            Subsequently, procedure PHYSI 13, Section 4.5.1, has been revised to
This is identified as Inspector
            require wood used in safety-related areas of the plant to be of the
Followup Item (327 and 328/84-31-01), Fire Detectors Over ERCW Pumps
            pressure fire retardant type unless an exemption is granted by the
are not Included in the Technical Specifications, and will be reviewed
            plant safety staff for use of other types of materials.                           This appears
i
            to meet the intent of the NRC guidelines. Fire fighting procedures for
during a subsequent NRC inspection.
            all safety-related areas have not yet been prepared. The licensee
b.
            stated that approximately five procedures for safety-related areas and
(Closed) Unresolved Item (328/81-14-03), Fire Detection is Not Provided
            20 for nonsafety-related areas remain to be prepared. This item is to
,
            . remain open until these procedures are prepared.
Over ERCW Pumps. Refer to abw e item 3.a.
      d.   (Closed)DeviationItem(327/80-10-02), Substandard Supervision of Fire
c.
            Protection Control Valves. The licensee has established Procedure
(0 pen) Deviation Item (327/80-10-01), Substandard Fire Protection
            SI 654, Fire Protection Header Valve Seal Inspection (Weekly), and is
Administrative Procedures.
            inspecting the control valves to the automatic sprinkler systems
As previously reported in Report Nos.
            weekly. These valves are maintained sealed in the correct alignment.
327/80-17 and 328/80-10, the licensee revised the plant procedures to
            This arrangement meets the applicable NFPA criterion and is acceptable,
comply with the NRC guidelines for fire brigade training and drills.
            but does not meet the TVA commitments to lock the valves in the open
Subsequently, procedure PHYSI 13, Section 4.5.1, has been revised to
            position. The commitments should be reviewed and revised as required.
require wood used in safety-related areas of the plant to be of the
            However, for Region II's inspection program, this item is closed,
pressure fire retardant type unless an exemption is granted by the
      e.   (Closed) Unresolved Item (327/80-10-07), Supervision of Containment
plant safety staff for use of other types of materials.
            Isolation Fire Protection Valves. TVA has taken no corrective action
This appears
l           on this item.     FSAR, Section 6.2.4.2.2, states that the safeguard
to meet the intent of the NRC guidelines.
,            position of automatic containment isolation valves is indicated by
Fire fighting procedures for
l           status lights in the main control room. The position of the contain-
all safety-related areas have not yet been prepared.
j           ment isolation valves in the fire protection piping which penetrates
The licensee
stated that approximately five procedures for safety-related areas and
20 for nonsafety-related areas remain to be prepared. This item is to
. remain open until these procedures are prepared.
d.
(Closed)DeviationItem(327/80-10-02), Substandard Supervision of Fire
Protection Control Valves.
The licensee has established Procedure
SI 654, Fire Protection Header Valve Seal Inspection (Weekly), and is
inspecting the control valves to the automatic sprinkler systems
weekly.
These valves are maintained sealed in the correct alignment.
This arrangement meets the applicable NFPA criterion and is acceptable,
but does not meet the TVA commitments to lock the valves in the open
position.
The commitments should be reviewed and revised as required.
However, for Region II's inspection program, this item is closed,
e.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (327/80-10-07), Supervision of Containment
Isolation Fire Protection Valves.
TVA has taken no corrective action
l
on this item.
FSAR, Section 6.2.4.2.2, states that the safeguard
position of automatic containment isolation valves is indicated by
,
l
status lights in the main control room.
The position of the contain-
j
ment isolation valves in the fire protection piping which penetrates
!
!


  . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _     __                                                                                             _ _ _ _ _
. - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                        .
__
  .
_ _ _ _ _
                                                                          3
.
                                  the containment is not provided with status lights in the control room.
.
                                Therefore, this unresolved item is closed, but this FSAR discrepancy
3
                                which is applicable to both units is identified as Deviation Item (327
the containment is not provided with status lights in the control room.
                                  and 328/84-31-02), Fire Protection System Containment Isolation Valves
Therefore, this unresolved item is closed, but this FSAR discrepancy
                                Are Not Provided With Status Lights in the Main Control Room.
which is applicable to both units is identified as Deviation Item (327
                        4. Unresolved Items
and 328/84-31-02), Fire Protection System Containment Isolation Valves
                            Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
Are Not Provided With Status Lights in the Main Control Room.
                        5. Review of Appendix R Confirmation of Action Commitments (92703)
4.
                                                                        16 - 20, 1984, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R inspec-
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Review of Appendix R Confirmation of Action Commitments (92703)
following the NRC Reg (ion II July16 - 20, 1984, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R inspec-
,
,
                            following
tion of Watts Bar
                            tion       the NRC
Report Nos. 50-390/84-55 and 50-391/84-43), TVA
                                  of Watts   Bar Reg  (ion Nos.
identified a number of cable interaction deficiencies at Sequoyah.
                                                    Report  II July50-390/84-55 and 50-391/84-43), TVA
On
                            identified a number of cable interaction deficiencies at Sequoyah.                       On
August 10, 1984, NRC Region II issued a Confirmation of Action Letter to TVA
                            August 10, 1984, NRC Region II issued a Confirmation of Action Letter to TVA
identifying the action to be taken by TVA to implement a complete review of
                            identifying the action to be taken by TVA to implement a complete review of
the Appendix R program at Sequoyah, the compensatory measures to be
                            the Appendix R program at Sequoyah, the compensatory measures to be
established for the identified deficiencies, and an established
                            established for the identified deficiencies, and an established                       time
time
                            schedule for submission of status reports.
schedule for submission of status reports.
                            TVA's review continues to identify Appendix R deficiencies. The final TVA
TVA's review continues to identify Appendix R deficiencies.
                            report is scheduled to be submitted to Region II prior to January 1,1985,
The final TVA
                            at which time the appropriate enforcement action will be determined.
report is scheduled to be submitted to Region II prior to January 1,1985,
                            This inspection reviewed the following deficiencies as identified by TVA's
at which time the appropriate enforcement action will be determined.
                            report dated October 15, 1984, and the compensatory action taken for the
This inspection reviewed the following deficiencies as identified by TVA's
                            deficiencies:
report dated October 15, 1984, and the compensatory action taken for the
                            a.   TVA Appendix R Review Team
deficiencies:
                                TVA has established a team consisting of 51 (38 full-time and 13 part-
a.
                                  time) engineers, technicians, and operational personnel to reevaluate
TVA Appendix R Review Team
                                  the Sequoyah plant for com                                                         TVA
TVA has established a team consisting of 51 (38 full-time and 13 part-
                                Design Engineering (ENDES)            has 11pliance
time) engineers, technicians, and operational personnel to reevaluate
                                                                                peoplewith  Appendix
Design Engineering (ENDES) pliance with Appendix R requirements.
                                                                                      on site   and 27 in requirements.
the Sequoyah plant for com
                                                                                                              the design
TVA
                                office in Knoxville and operations has assigned 13 personnel to assist
has 11 people on site and 27 in the design
                                  in the site review. The team appears well managed, organized and is on
office in Knoxville and operations has assigned 13 personnel to assist
                                schedule to meet the established review completion schedule.
in the site review. The team appears well managed, organized and is on
                            b.   Fire Shutdown Logic Diagram
schedule to meet the established review completion schedule.
                                The shutdown logic diagram continues to be revised to reflect the
b.
                                actual "as built" plant conditions and systems currently considered to
Fire Shutdown Logic Diagram
                                be required for safe shutdown. This item wiil be reviewed during a
The shutdown logic diagram continues to be revised to reflect the
                                future NRC inspection,
actual "as built" plant conditions and systems currently considered to
                            c.   Cable Interaction Evaluation
be required for safe shutdown.
                                As of October 15, 1984, TVA has produced over 90 drawings which
This item wiil be reviewed during a
                                  indicate the cable routing in the plant.                 Approximately 75% of these
future NRC inspection,
                                drawings had been field verified. Field verification is scheduled to
c.
                                be completed by October 29, 1984. A total of 34 cable interactions
Cable Interaction Evaluation
                                                                                                              -.
As of October 15, 1984, TVA has produced over 90 drawings which
                                          -.   ..            .__ _ _                 __           . _ _
indicate the cable routing in the plant.
Approximately 75% of these
drawings had been field verified.
Field verification is scheduled to
be completed by October 29, 1984.
A total of 34 cable interactions
-.
..
.__ _ _
__
. _ _
-.


--
--
    .
.
  .
.
                                          4
4
          which violate Appendix R, Section III.G.2 criteria have been identified
which violate Appendix R, Section III.G.2 criteria have been identified
          by TVA. The NRC inspector toured each of these interaction areas and
by TVA.
          noted that all of these interactions are in areas provided with
The NRC inspector toured each of these interaction areas and
          automatic sprinkler protection and a fire detection system, except
noted that all of these interactions are in areas provided with
          interactions above the ceiling of the counting room and RWST pipe
automatic sprinkler protection and a fire detection system, except
          tunnel in Unit I which consist of a bank of 36 conduits, and inter-
interactions above the ceiling of the counting room and RWST pipe
          actions in the Units 1 and 2 pipe chases at 690' elevation. However, a
tunnel in Unit I which consist of a bank of 36 conduits, and inter-
          temporary temperature monitor system has been installed in the Units 1
actions in the Units 1 and 2 pipe chases at 690' elevation. However, a
          and 2 pipe chases and ERCW pipe tunnel (Refer to paragraph 5.g below).
temporary temperature monitor system has been installed in the Units 1
          The installed sprinkler systems have some minor obstructions from
and 2 pipe chases and ERCW pipe tunnel (Refer to paragraph 5.g below).
          cable trays, ducts, hangers, structural support, etc.       The more
The installed sprinkler systems have some minor obstructions from
          critical obstructions are located on the 714' elevation of the
cable trays, ducts, hangers, structural support, etc.
          auxiliary building.     The inspector suggested that TVA review the
The more
          entire sprinkler system installation and verify that the systems
critical obstructions are located on the 714' elevation of the
          would meet the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G., i.e.,
auxiliary building.
          the system must be capable of assuring that in the event of a fire
The inspector suggested that TVA review the
          et least one train of hot shutdown system is maintained free of fire
entire sprinkler system installation and verify that the systems
          damage.
would meet the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.,
      d. Associated Circuit Analysis
i.e.,
          The associatet circuit analysis is being conducted in TVA's Knoxville
the system must be capable of assuring that in the event of a fire
          design office This analysis is approximately 55 percent complete for
et least one train of hot shutdown system is maintained free of fire
          auxiliary powti cables and 95 percent complete for control power
damage.
          cables.   The analysis is required to be completed and submitted to NRC
d.
          Region II by December 21, 1984. A review of this analysis will be made
Associated Circuit Analysis
          by the NRC during a subsequent NRC inspection.
The associatet circuit analysis is being conducted in TVA's Knoxville
      e. Reactor Coolant Pump 011 Collection
design office
          The oil collection systems for the reactor coolant pumps were
This analysis is approximately 55 percent complete for
          identified by TVA as being of insufficient capacity to hold the oil
auxiliary powti cables and 95 percent complete for control power
          resulting from the largest spill due to a single failure.     Modifica-
cables.
          tions which had been made since the initial design of the system to
The analysis is required to be completed and submitted to NRC
          satisfy other commitments and safety issues had reduced the volume
Region II by December 21, 1984. A review of this analysis will be made
          available for oil collection.     TVA's evaluation indicated that the
by the NRC during a subsequent NRC inspection.
          drain piping system plus a portion of the collection sump would be
e.
          sufficient to hold the oil from a single failure if sufficient capacity
Reactor Coolant Pump 011 Collection
          was available for oil collection.       Therefore, TVA has revised
The oil collection systems for the reactor coolant pumps were
          annunciator procedure No. 501-55-1MS, Annunciator Response, (Change No.
identified by TVA as being of insufficient capacity to hold the oil
          84-1475) and issued a " Night Order" to require the operator to verify
resulting from the largest spill due to a single failure.
          that the reactor building pocket sump is maintained at less than 45%
Modifica-
          full in the event of a high or low level alann in either the upper or
tions which had been made since the initial design of the system to
          lower bearing oil reservoir for the reactor coolant pumps.       The
satisfy other commitments and safety issues had reduced the volume
          inspector verified that these procedures were properly filed within
available for oil collection.
          the control room.
TVA's evaluation indicated that the
drain piping system plus a portion of the collection sump would be
sufficient to hold the oil from a single failure if sufficient capacity
was available for oil collection.
Therefore, TVA has revised
annunciator procedure No. 501-55-1MS, Annunciator Response, (Change No.
84-1475) and issued a " Night Order" to require the operator to verify
that the reactor building pocket sump is maintained at less than 45%
full in the event of a high or low level alann in either the upper or
lower bearing oil reservoir for the reactor coolant pumps.
The
inspector verified that these procedures were properly filed within
the control room.
!
!
L
L


    .
.
  .
.
                                        5
5
        The present arrangement of the oil collection system for the reactor
The present arrangement of the oil collection system for the reactor
        coolant pumps does not meet the requirements of Appendix R,
coolant pumps does not meet the requirements of Appendix R,
        Section III.0 since the drainage system will not handle an oil break
Section III.0 since the drainage system will not handle an oil break
        from all of the lubrication systems simultaneously following a safe
from all of the lubrication systems simultaneously following a safe
        shutdown earthquake. This discrepancy requircs a formal deviation
shutdown earthquake.
        request.   NRC Region !! will review this system in detail during a
This discrepancy requircs a formal deviation
        subsequent inspection.
request.
      f. Emergency Lighting
NRC Region !! will review this system in detail during a
        TVA has identified a number of additional plant areas where operator
subsequent inspection.
        action is required to bring the plant to hot shutdown.         These
f.
        additional areas are not provided with the 8-hour emergency lighting
Emergency Lighting
        units required by Appendix R. Section III.J.         Approximately 75
TVA has identified a number of additional plant areas where operator
        additional 8-hour type lighting units will be required. Also, some of
action is required to bring the plant to hot shutdown.
        the existing lighting units were found by TVA to have 25 watt lamps in
These
        lieu of 10 watt lamps which are needed for the units to provide eight
additional areas are not provided with the 8-hour emergency lighting
        hours of illumination. The correct lamps are to be instelled for these
units required by Appendix R. Section III.J.
        units. As an interim measure, TVA has supplied 12 portable lanterns to
Approximately 75
        the operation staff for use in the event of the failure of the normal
additional 8-hour type lighting units will be required. Also, some of
        and other emergency lighting systems. The inspector verified that
the existing lighting units were found by TVA to have 25 watt lamps in
        these portable lanterns were provided. Nine lanterns were provided in
lieu of 10 watt lamps which are needed for the units to provide eight
        a cabinet adjacent to the auxiliary control room and three lanterns
hours of illumination.
        were in a cabinet adjacent to the shift engineer's office in the
The correct lamps are to be instelled for these
        control building.     Additional flashlights and batteries were also
units. As an interim measure, TVA has supplied 12 portable lanterns to
        provided.
the operation staff for use in the event of the failure of the normal
      g. Firewatch
and other emergency lighting systems.
        Following identification of the Appendix R.     Section III.G, cable
The inspector verified that
        interaction discrepancies, the licensee initiated three roving and one
these portable lanterns were provided.
        fixed firewatch per shift to provide continued sur eillance of selected
Nine lanterns were provided in
        areas in the auxiliary, control, turbine, diesel generator, and
a cabinet adjacent to the auxiliary control room and three lanterns
        essential raw cooling water pumping station buildings in which the
were in a cabinet adjacent to the shift engineer's office in the
        interaction discrepancies had been identified. Each roving firewatch
control building.
        is required to cover his assigned areas once each hour per shift.
Additional flashlights and batteries were also
        Checklists have been provided to document the time each room or area
provided.
        is visited. The one stationary firewatch monitors the temperature
g.
        indicators provided for the two pipe chases and ERCW pipe tunnel. TVA
Firewatch
        has implemented a procedure which identifies the firewatch duties and
Following identification of the Appendix R.
        assignments.
Section III.G, cable
        The inspector verified that all of the current personnel assigned
interaction discrepancies, the licensee initiated three roving and one
        firewatch duties had completed the required training, appropriate
fixed firewatch per shift to provide continued sur eillance of selected
        firewatch records were provided and that the program was being imple-
areas in the auxiliary, control, turbine, diesel generator, and
        mented. No discrepancies were noted, except the firewatch checklists
essential raw cooling water pumping station buildings in which the
        for two shifts, August 13 (2300 to 0700) and September 24, (0700 to
interaction discrepancies had been identified.
        1500) 1984, were not available. However, the daily control room
Each roving firewatch
        journal log indicated that the firewatch duties were performed for
is required to cover his assigned areas once each hour per shift.
        these dates. This problem occurred following the initial implementa-
Checklists have been provided to document the time each room or area
        tion of this firewatch program. At that time, a portion of the fire
is visited.
The one stationary firewatch monitors the temperature
indicators provided for the two pipe chases and ERCW pipe tunnel. TVA
has implemented a procedure which identifies the firewatch duties and
assignments.
The inspector verified that all of the current personnel assigned
firewatch duties had completed the required training, appropriate
firewatch records were provided and that the program was being imple-
mented.
No discrepancies were noted, except the firewatch checklists
for two shifts, August 13 (2300 to 0700) and September 24, (0700 to
1500) 1984, were not available.
However, the daily control room
journal log indicated that the firewatch duties were performed for
these dates.
This problem occurred following the initial implementa-
tion of this firewatch program.
At that time, a portion of the fire
<
<


                      .
.
                    .
.
                                                                                                          6
6
                                watch personnel was supplied by two management groups. To improve the
watch personnel was supplied by two management groups. To improve the
                                management of this program, TVA assigned all firewatch personnel under
management of this program, TVA assigned all firewatch personnel under
                                the supervision of the operations supervisor. Presently, this program
the supervision of the operations supervisor.
                                appears to be satisfactorily implemented.
Presently, this program
                          h.   QA Program
appears to be satisfactorily implemented.
                                The licensee stated that all modifications accomplished as a result of
h.
                                this Appendix R reevaluation are to be accomplished under the normal
QA Program
                                operations QA/QC program.                                         The inspector reviewed work plan 11192
The licensee stated that all modifications accomplished as a result of
                                (ECN-L6209) for the installation of some of the fire barriers and
this Appendix R reevaluation are to be accomplished under the normal
                                verified that appropriate OA/QC hold points were designated.
operations QA/QC program.
                          Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
The inspector reviewed work plan 11192
                          However, as noted above, enforcement action on the licensee identified items
(ECN-L6209) for the installation of some of the fire barriers and
                          is being deferred pending completion of TVA's evaluation.
verified that appropriate OA/QC hold points were designated.
                      6.   Fire Protection / Prevention Program Implementation (64704)
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
                          A review was made of the following fire protection features to verify that
However, as noted above, enforcement action on the licensee identified items
                          the licensee was implementing a program for fire protection and prevention
is being deferred pending completion of TVA's evaluation.
                          that was in conformance with NRC requirements, consnitments to the NRC, and
6.
                          site procedures:
Fire Protection / Prevention Program Implementation (64704)
                          a.   Fire Brigade
A review was made of the following fire protection features to verify that
                                The fire brigade is composed of personnel from the operations group.
the licensee was implementing a program for fire protection and prevention
                                The team leader is an assistant shift engineer and the brigade members
that was in conformance with NRC requirements, consnitments to the NRC, and
                                are auxiliary unit operators. There are 16 designated brigade leaders
site procedures:
                                and 79 members.                                       The training, drill and medical review records for
a.
                                four team leaders and ten members were reviewed to verify that these
Fire Brigade
                                personnel had attended the basic and/or leadership training, quarterly
The fire brigade is composed of personnel from the operations group.
                                classroom training, two drills within the past year, medical review
The team leader is an assistant shift engineer and the brigade members
                                within the past year, and were respirator qualified. From the record
are auxiliary unit operators.
                                data reviewed, the only discrepancy noted was that four of the brigade
There are 16 designated brigade leaders
                                members were not respirator qualified. One member had never received a
and 79 members.
                                respirator fit test, one member was five months overdue for a whole
The training, drill and medical review records for
                                body count, and two were slightly over due (24 and 4 days) for medical
four team leaders and ten members were reviewed to verify that these
                                review.
personnel had attended the basic and/or leadership training, quarterly
                                A cursory document review indicated that a number of other fire brigade
classroom training, two drills within the past year, medical review
                                members were also not respirator qualified.                                                                             Radiation Control
within the past year, and were respirator qualified.
                                Instruction RCI-14, Section V.A. states that respirator protection is
From the record
                                required for conditions involving airborne contamination and that the
data reviewed, the only discrepancy noted was that four of the brigade
                                workers must have a current whole body count, respiratory fit and
members were not respirator qualified. One member had never received a
                                training and current medical review. Technical Specification, Section
respirator fit test, one member was five months overdue for a whole
                                6.8.1.a. requires written proccudres to be established, implemented and
body count, and two were slightly over due (24 and 4 days) for medical
review.
A cursory document review indicated that a number of other fire brigade
members were also not respirator qualified.
Radiation Control
Instruction RCI-14, Section V.A. states that respirator protection is
required for conditions involving airborne contamination and that the
workers must have a current whole body count, respiratory fit and
training and current medical review.
Technical Specification, Section
6.8.1.a. requires written proccudres to be established, implemented and
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_ _ _ - _ - _ _ -
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ . -
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      .
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    .
.
                                          7
7
            maintained covering the applicable procedures listed in Appendix A of
maintained covering the applicable procedures listed in Appendix A of
            Regulatory Guide 1.33. This guide requires procedures for radiation
Regulatory Guide 1.33.
            protection. The failure of brigade members to meet the respiratory
This guide requires procedures for radiation
            qualification program is identified as Violation Item (327 and 328/
protection.
            84-31-03), All Fire Brigade Members are Not Respirator Qualified.
The failure of brigade members to meet the respiratory
        b. Fire Brigade Equipment
qualification program is identified as Violation Item (327 and 328/
            The fire brigade equipment is stored in a locked storage area on 706'
84-31-03), All Fire Brigade Members are Not Respirator Qualified.
            elevation of the service building which is readily accessible to the
b.
            auxiliary and control buildings.     A total of ten self contained
Fire Brigade Equipment
            breathing apparatus with ten spare cylinders, ten sets of turnout gear
The fire brigade equipment is stored in a locked storage area on 706'
            (boots, helmets, coats, gloves, etc.), hand lights, fire hose, nozzles,
elevation of the service building which is readily accessible to the
            two portable exhaust fans and miscellaneous equipment were provided.
auxiliary and control buildings.
            An equipment trailer with additional fire hose, extinguishers and
A total of ten self contained
            miscellaneous equipment is located outside the plant structure near the
breathing apparatus with ten spare cylinders, ten sets of turnout gear
            main security entrance gate. An additional 82 breathing apparatus and
(boots, helmets, coats, gloves, etc.), hand lights, fire hose, nozzles,
            72 spare cylinders are available to the fire brigade from health
two portable exhaust fans and miscellaneous equipment were provided.
            physics, which is adequate to meet the required six-hour supply for the
An equipment trailer with additional fire hose, extinguishers and
;           brigade. The fire brigade equipment appeared satisfactorily maintained,
miscellaneous equipment is located outside the plant structure near the
        c. Fire Protection Systems
main security entrance gate.
            The completed surveillance inspection and test records for the
An additional 82 breathing apparatus and
            following systems at indicted dates were reviewed to verify that these
72 spare cylinders are available to the fire brigade from health
            systems were inspected and tested within the frequency established by
physics, which is adequate to meet the required six-hour supply for the
            the Technical Specifications:
;
            (1) SI 167, Fire Header Valve Lineup Inspection (Monthly)
brigade. The fire brigade equipment appeared satisfactorily maintained,
                January 5 through September 15, 1984
c.
            (2) SI172,FireSystemTestableValveCycling(12 months)
Fire Protection Systems
                August 10, 1982 through August 24, 1984
The completed surveillance inspection and test records for the
            (3) SI 173, Fire System Nontestable Valve Cycling (18 months)
following systems at indicted dates were reviewed to verify that these
                July 29, 1983 through October 13, 1984
systems were inspected and tested within the frequency established by
            (4) SI 174, Fire System Sprinkler System Testable Valves (12 months)
the Technical Specifications:
                                                          *
(1) SI 167, Fire Header Valve Lineup Inspection (Monthly)
                August 9, 1983 through August 8, 1984
January 5 through September 15, 1984
            (5) SI 176 Fire Suppression Water Sprinkler System Functional Test
(2) SI172,FireSystemTestableValveCycling(12 months)
                  (18 months)
August 10, 1982 through August 24, 1984
                September 12, 1982 through March 2, 1984
(3) SI 173, Fire System Nontestable Valve Cycling (18 months)
                                                                          .
July 29, 1983 through October 13, 1984
(4) SI 174, Fire System Sprinkler System Testable Valves (12 months)
August 9, 1983 through August 8, 1984
*
(5) SI 176
Fire Suppression Water Sprinkler System Functional Test
(18 months)
September 12, 1982 through March 2, 1984
.


    .
  ,-
                                            8
            (6) SI 180, Fire Pump Start Test
                  January 9 through September 15, 1984.    Pump 1AA was removed from
                  service on July 18, 1984, for major repairs.  Pump was restored to
                  service on August 24, 1984.
            (7) SI 190, Fire Hose Inventory (Monthly)
                  January 13, 1984 through October 15, 1984
            (8) SI 234.2, Fire Detection System - 714' of Auxiliary Building,
                  Intake Pumping Station and ERCW Pumping Structure (6 months)
                  July 2, 1983 through July 16, 1984
            In reviewing the licensee's surveillance inspection and test program
            for the fire protection automatic water spray and sprinkler system,
            it was noted that the strainers in the supply piping to these systems
            were not included in periodic maintenance inspection and cleaning
            programs required by NFPA-15, Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire
            Protection, Section 6012 (1973 Edition).      FSAR, Section 9.5.1.4,
            states that fixed water suppression systems are periodically tested
            in accordance with the applicable NFPA code requirements to ensure
            operability and inspected at regular intervals to ensure that all
            equipment is in good operating condition. Technical Specification,
            Section 6.8.1.f requires written procedures to be established, imple-
            mented and maintained for the fire protection program implementation.
            The lack of a maintenance program for these strainers is identified as
            Violation Item (327 and 328/84-31-04), No Maintenance Program Provided
            for Fire Protection System Strainers.
      d.  Annual Full-Scale Fire Drill With Offsite Fire Fighting Organization
            The annual full-scale fire drill was conducted on November 3,1983,
            with the site brigade and the Soddy-Daisy Fire Department. A total of
            approximately 19 site fire brigade and 15 fire department personnel
            participated. The inspector reviewed the drill report and evaluation
            and had no further questions.
      c.  Plant Tour
            During the plant tour to review the Appendix R cable interaction
            discrepancies, the plant's fire prevention and protection features were
            observed.    As a whole, the housekeeping and control of combustible and
            flammable liquids and gases within the areas toured were satisfactory.
            A welding operation was noted in which an approved " hot work" permit
            had been issued and appropriate safety precautions were being observed.
            The fire protection systems within the areas toured were found to be in
            service and appeared to be satisfactorily maintained.
.
.
,-
8
(6) SI 180, Fire Pump Start Test
January 9 through September 15, 1984.
Pump 1AA was removed from
service on July 18, 1984, for major repairs.
Pump was restored to
service on August 24, 1984.
(7) SI 190, Fire Hose Inventory (Monthly)
January 13, 1984 through October 15, 1984
(8) SI 234.2, Fire Detection System - 714' of Auxiliary Building,
Intake Pumping Station and ERCW Pumping Structure (6 months)
July 2, 1983 through July 16, 1984
In reviewing the licensee's surveillance inspection and test program
for the fire protection automatic water spray and sprinkler system,
it was noted that the strainers in the supply piping to these systems
were not included in
periodic maintenance inspection and cleaning
programs required by NFPA-15, Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire
Protection, Section 6012 (1973 Edition).
FSAR, Section 9.5.1.4,
states that fixed water suppression systems are periodically tested
in accordance with the applicable NFPA code requirements to ensure
operability and inspected at regular intervals to ensure that all
equipment is in good operating condition.
Technical Specification,
Section 6.8.1.f
requires written procedures to be established, imple-
mented and maintained for the fire protection program implementation.
The lack of a maintenance program for these strainers is identified as
Violation Item (327 and 328/84-31-04), No Maintenance Program Provided
for Fire Protection System Strainers.
d.
Annual Full-Scale Fire Drill With Offsite Fire Fighting Organization
The annual full-scale fire drill was conducted on November 3,1983,
with the site brigade and the Soddy-Daisy Fire Department. A total of
approximately 19 site fire brigade and 15 fire department personnel
participated.
The inspector reviewed the drill report and evaluation
and had no further questions.
c.
Plant Tour
During the plant tour to review the Appendix R cable interaction
discrepancies, the plant's fire prevention and protection features were
observed.
As a whole, the housekeeping and control of combustible and
flammable liquids and gases within the areas toured were satisfactory.
A welding operation was noted in which an approved " hot work" permit
had been issued and appropriate safety precautions were being observed.
.
The fire protection systems within the areas toured were found to be in
service and appeared to be satisfactorily maintained.
'
'
      Within the areas examined, except as noted above, no additional violations
Within the areas examined, except as noted above, no additional violations
      or deviations were identified.
or deviations were identified.
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 11:33, 12 December 2024

Insp Repts 50-327/84-31 & 50-328/84-31 on 841023-26. Violation Noted:All Fire Brigade Members Not Respirator Qualified & Lack of Maint Program for Fire Protection Strainers
ML20132A560
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  
Issue date: 11/08/1984
From: Conlon T, Miller W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20132A500 List:
References
50-327-84-31, 50-328-84-31, NUDOCS 8507230091
Download: ML20132A560 (9)


See also: IR 05000327/1984031

Text

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UNITE] STATES

NUCLEA] RE20LATr.Y COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET N.W.

ATI.ANTA, GEORGIA 30303

%,...../

Report Nos.: 50-327/84-31 and 50-328/84-31

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

500A Chestnut Street

Chattanooga, TN 37401

Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328

License Nos.:

DPR-77 and DPR-79

Facility Name:

Sequoyah

Inspection Condu ted:

ctob

1984

O' Eb

Inspector

-

W. H. Miller, Jr.

-

Date Signed

Approved by

//- P - N

T. E. Conlon, Section Chief

Date Signed

Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUAMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 27 inspector-hours on site

in the areas of fire protection / prevention, followup on the licensee's

compensatory actions regarding Confirmation of Action Letter on Appendix R fire

protection' discrepancies, and review of corrective actions on previously

identified NRC and licensee identified items.

Results:

Of the areas inspected, two apparent violations were found (all fire

brigade members are not respirator qualified - paragraph 6.a. and no maintenance

program provided for fire protection strainers - paragraph 6.c.

One apparent

deviation was Lfound (fire protection system containment isolation valves are not

provided with statu lights in the main control room - paragraph 3.e).

-

, ,

.d

1

8507230091 841114

PDR

ADOCK 05000327

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PDR

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_ _ _ _ _ _

__-

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.

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f

REPORT DETAILS

1.

Licensee Employees Contacted

J. Alexander, Shift Engineer

  • W. H. Baker, Fire Protection Engineer
  • J. Blankenship, Information Officer
  • L. Bush, Operations Group
  • S. Butler, QA Supervisor.
  • M. R. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
  • D. E. Crawley, Health Physics Supervisor
  • J. T. Dills, Jr., Asst. Health Physicist
  • V. L. Dudley, Fire Protection Engineer
  • R. W. Fortenbury, Engineering Section Supervisor
  • M. R. Harding, Engineering Group Supervisor
  • G. B. Kirk, Compliance Engineer
  • J. B. Krell, Plant Superintendent (Maintenance)
  • J. D. McCamy, Engineering and Testing

R. Moore, DQA/QAB

  • L.M. Nobles, Superintendent (0&E)
  • R. W. Olson, Modification Manager
  • D. L. Paul, Senior Engineer, Site Service
  • M. A. Purcell, Mechanical Engineer
  • J. H. Sullivan, Appendix R. Project Manager
  • J. M. Qualls, Operations
  • P. R. Wallace, Plant Manaser
  • J. E. Wills, Licensing Engineer
  • G. G. Wilson, Assistant Ops Supervisor

NRC Resident Inspector

E. Ford

  • Attended exit interview

2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 26, 1984, with

.those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the

following inspection findings:

a.

Inspector Followup Item (327 and 328/84-31-01), Fire Detectors Over

ERCW Pumps are Not Included in the Technical Specifications - paragraph

3.a.

b.

Deviation Item (327 and 328/84-31-02), Fire Protection System

Containment Isolation Valves Are Not Provided with Status Lights in the

Main Control Room - paragraph 3.e.

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c.

Violation Item (327 and 328/84-31-03), All Fire Brigade Members Are Not

Respirator Qualified - paragraph 6.a.

d.

Violation item (327 and 328/84-31-04), No Maintenance Program Provided

for Fire Protection System Strainers - paragraph 6.c.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

a.

(Closed) Deviation Item (327/81-14-03), Fire Detection Is Not Provided

Over ERCW Pumps.

Fixed temperature type fire detectors have been

provided over each ERCW pump.

These detectors are not included in

Technical Specifications as required.

This is identified as Inspector

Followup Item (327 and 328/84-31-01), Fire Detectors Over ERCW Pumps

are not Included in the Technical Specifications, and will be reviewed

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during a subsequent NRC inspection.

b.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (328/81-14-03), Fire Detection is Not Provided

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Over ERCW Pumps. Refer to abw e item 3.a.

c.

(0 pen) Deviation Item (327/80-10-01), Substandard Fire Protection

Administrative Procedures.

As previously reported in Report Nos.

327/80-17 and 328/80-10, the licensee revised the plant procedures to

comply with the NRC guidelines for fire brigade training and drills.

Subsequently, procedure PHYSI 13, Section 4.5.1, has been revised to

require wood used in safety-related areas of the plant to be of the

pressure fire retardant type unless an exemption is granted by the

plant safety staff for use of other types of materials.

This appears

to meet the intent of the NRC guidelines.

Fire fighting procedures for

all safety-related areas have not yet been prepared.

The licensee

stated that approximately five procedures for safety-related areas and

20 for nonsafety-related areas remain to be prepared. This item is to

. remain open until these procedures are prepared.

d.

(Closed)DeviationItem(327/80-10-02), Substandard Supervision of Fire

Protection Control Valves.

The licensee has established Procedure

SI 654, Fire Protection Header Valve Seal Inspection (Weekly), and is

inspecting the control valves to the automatic sprinkler systems

weekly.

These valves are maintained sealed in the correct alignment.

This arrangement meets the applicable NFPA criterion and is acceptable,

but does not meet the TVA commitments to lock the valves in the open

position.

The commitments should be reviewed and revised as required.

However, for Region II's inspection program, this item is closed,

e.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (327/80-10-07), Supervision of Containment

Isolation Fire Protection Valves.

TVA has taken no corrective action

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on this item.

FSAR, Section 6.2.4.2.2, states that the safeguard

position of automatic containment isolation valves is indicated by

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status lights in the main control room.

The position of the contain-

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ment isolation valves in the fire protection piping which penetrates

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the containment is not provided with status lights in the control room.

Therefore, this unresolved item is closed, but this FSAR discrepancy

which is applicable to both units is identified as Deviation Item (327

and 328/84-31-02), Fire Protection System Containment Isolation Valves

Are Not Provided With Status Lights in the Main Control Room.

4.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Review of Appendix R Confirmation of Action Commitments (92703)

following the NRC Reg (ion II July16 - 20, 1984, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R inspec-

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tion of Watts Bar

Report Nos. 50-390/84-55 and 50-391/84-43), TVA

identified a number of cable interaction deficiencies at Sequoyah.

On

August 10, 1984, NRC Region II issued a Confirmation of Action Letter to TVA

identifying the action to be taken by TVA to implement a complete review of

the Appendix R program at Sequoyah, the compensatory measures to be

established for the identified deficiencies, and an established

time

schedule for submission of status reports.

TVA's review continues to identify Appendix R deficiencies.

The final TVA

report is scheduled to be submitted to Region II prior to January 1,1985,

at which time the appropriate enforcement action will be determined.

This inspection reviewed the following deficiencies as identified by TVA's

report dated October 15, 1984, and the compensatory action taken for the

deficiencies:

a.

TVA Appendix R Review Team

TVA has established a team consisting of 51 (38 full-time and 13 part-

time) engineers, technicians, and operational personnel to reevaluate

Design Engineering (ENDES) pliance with Appendix R requirements.

the Sequoyah plant for com

TVA

has 11 people on site and 27 in the design

office in Knoxville and operations has assigned 13 personnel to assist

in the site review. The team appears well managed, organized and is on

schedule to meet the established review completion schedule.

b.

Fire Shutdown Logic Diagram

The shutdown logic diagram continues to be revised to reflect the

actual "as built" plant conditions and systems currently considered to

be required for safe shutdown.

This item wiil be reviewed during a

future NRC inspection,

c.

Cable Interaction Evaluation

As of October 15, 1984, TVA has produced over 90 drawings which

indicate the cable routing in the plant.

Approximately 75% of these

drawings had been field verified.

Field verification is scheduled to

be completed by October 29, 1984.

A total of 34 cable interactions

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which violate Appendix R,Section III.G.2 criteria have been identified

by TVA.

The NRC inspector toured each of these interaction areas and

noted that all of these interactions are in areas provided with

automatic sprinkler protection and a fire detection system, except

interactions above the ceiling of the counting room and RWST pipe

tunnel in Unit I which consist of a bank of 36 conduits, and inter-

actions in the Units 1 and 2 pipe chases at 690' elevation. However, a

temporary temperature monitor system has been installed in the Units 1

and 2 pipe chases and ERCW pipe tunnel (Refer to paragraph 5.g below).

The installed sprinkler systems have some minor obstructions from

cable trays, ducts, hangers, structural support, etc.

The more

critical obstructions are located on the 714' elevation of the

auxiliary building.

The inspector suggested that TVA review the

entire sprinkler system installation and verify that the systems

would meet the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.,

i.e.,

the system must be capable of assuring that in the event of a fire

et least one train of hot shutdown system is maintained free of fire

damage.

d.

Associated Circuit Analysis

The associatet circuit analysis is being conducted in TVA's Knoxville

design office

This analysis is approximately 55 percent complete for

auxiliary powti cables and 95 percent complete for control power

cables.

The analysis is required to be completed and submitted to NRC

Region II by December 21, 1984. A review of this analysis will be made

by the NRC during a subsequent NRC inspection.

e.

Reactor Coolant Pump 011 Collection

The oil collection systems for the reactor coolant pumps were

identified by TVA as being of insufficient capacity to hold the oil

resulting from the largest spill due to a single failure.

Modifica-

tions which had been made since the initial design of the system to

satisfy other commitments and safety issues had reduced the volume

available for oil collection.

TVA's evaluation indicated that the

drain piping system plus a portion of the collection sump would be

sufficient to hold the oil from a single failure if sufficient capacity

was available for oil collection.

Therefore, TVA has revised

annunciator procedure No. 501-55-1MS, Annunciator Response, (Change No.

84-1475) and issued a " Night Order" to require the operator to verify

that the reactor building pocket sump is maintained at less than 45%

full in the event of a high or low level alann in either the upper or

lower bearing oil reservoir for the reactor coolant pumps.

The

inspector verified that these procedures were properly filed within

the control room.

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The present arrangement of the oil collection system for the reactor

coolant pumps does not meet the requirements of Appendix R,

Section III.0 since the drainage system will not handle an oil break

from all of the lubrication systems simultaneously following a safe

shutdown earthquake.

This discrepancy requircs a formal deviation

request.

NRC Region !! will review this system in detail during a

subsequent inspection.

f.

Emergency Lighting

TVA has identified a number of additional plant areas where operator

action is required to bring the plant to hot shutdown.

These

additional areas are not provided with the 8-hour emergency lighting

units required by Appendix R.Section III.J.

Approximately 75

additional 8-hour type lighting units will be required. Also, some of

the existing lighting units were found by TVA to have 25 watt lamps in

lieu of 10 watt lamps which are needed for the units to provide eight

hours of illumination.

The correct lamps are to be instelled for these

units. As an interim measure, TVA has supplied 12 portable lanterns to

the operation staff for use in the event of the failure of the normal

and other emergency lighting systems.

The inspector verified that

these portable lanterns were provided.

Nine lanterns were provided in

a cabinet adjacent to the auxiliary control room and three lanterns

were in a cabinet adjacent to the shift engineer's office in the

control building.

Additional flashlights and batteries were also

provided.

g.

Firewatch

Following identification of the Appendix R.

Section III.G, cable

interaction discrepancies, the licensee initiated three roving and one

fixed firewatch per shift to provide continued sur eillance of selected

areas in the auxiliary, control, turbine, diesel generator, and

essential raw cooling water pumping station buildings in which the

interaction discrepancies had been identified.

Each roving firewatch

is required to cover his assigned areas once each hour per shift.

Checklists have been provided to document the time each room or area

is visited.

The one stationary firewatch monitors the temperature

indicators provided for the two pipe chases and ERCW pipe tunnel. TVA

has implemented a procedure which identifies the firewatch duties and

assignments.

The inspector verified that all of the current personnel assigned

firewatch duties had completed the required training, appropriate

firewatch records were provided and that the program was being imple-

mented.

No discrepancies were noted, except the firewatch checklists

for two shifts, August 13 (2300 to 0700) and September 24, (0700 to

1500) 1984, were not available.

However, the daily control room

journal log indicated that the firewatch duties were performed for

these dates.

This problem occurred following the initial implementa-

tion of this firewatch program.

At that time, a portion of the fire

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watch personnel was supplied by two management groups. To improve the

management of this program, TVA assigned all firewatch personnel under

the supervision of the operations supervisor.

Presently, this program

appears to be satisfactorily implemented.

h.

QA Program

The licensee stated that all modifications accomplished as a result of

this Appendix R reevaluation are to be accomplished under the normal

operations QA/QC program.

The inspector reviewed work plan 11192

(ECN-L6209) for the installation of some of the fire barriers and

verified that appropriate OA/QC hold points were designated.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

However, as noted above, enforcement action on the licensee identified items

is being deferred pending completion of TVA's evaluation.

6.

Fire Protection / Prevention Program Implementation (64704)

A review was made of the following fire protection features to verify that

the licensee was implementing a program for fire protection and prevention

that was in conformance with NRC requirements, consnitments to the NRC, and

site procedures:

a.

Fire Brigade

The fire brigade is composed of personnel from the operations group.

The team leader is an assistant shift engineer and the brigade members

are auxiliary unit operators.

There are 16 designated brigade leaders

and 79 members.

The training, drill and medical review records for

four team leaders and ten members were reviewed to verify that these

personnel had attended the basic and/or leadership training, quarterly

classroom training, two drills within the past year, medical review

within the past year, and were respirator qualified.

From the record

data reviewed, the only discrepancy noted was that four of the brigade

members were not respirator qualified. One member had never received a

respirator fit test, one member was five months overdue for a whole

body count, and two were slightly over due (24 and 4 days) for medical

review.

A cursory document review indicated that a number of other fire brigade

members were also not respirator qualified.

Radiation Control

Instruction RCI-14,Section V.A. states that respirator protection is

required for conditions involving airborne contamination and that the

workers must have a current whole body count, respiratory fit and

training and current medical review.

Technical Specification, Section 6.8.1.a. requires written proccudres to be established, implemented and

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maintained covering the applicable procedures listed in Appendix A of

Regulatory Guide 1.33.

This guide requires procedures for radiation

protection.

The failure of brigade members to meet the respiratory

qualification program is identified as Violation Item (327 and 328/

84-31-03), All Fire Brigade Members are Not Respirator Qualified.

b.

Fire Brigade Equipment

The fire brigade equipment is stored in a locked storage area on 706'

elevation of the service building which is readily accessible to the

auxiliary and control buildings.

A total of ten self contained

breathing apparatus with ten spare cylinders, ten sets of turnout gear

(boots, helmets, coats, gloves, etc.), hand lights, fire hose, nozzles,

two portable exhaust fans and miscellaneous equipment were provided.

An equipment trailer with additional fire hose, extinguishers and

miscellaneous equipment is located outside the plant structure near the

main security entrance gate.

An additional 82 breathing apparatus and

72 spare cylinders are available to the fire brigade from health

physics, which is adequate to meet the required six-hour supply for the

brigade. The fire brigade equipment appeared satisfactorily maintained,

c.

Fire Protection Systems

The completed surveillance inspection and test records for the

following systems at indicted dates were reviewed to verify that these

systems were inspected and tested within the frequency established by

the Technical Specifications:

(1) SI 167, Fire Header Valve Lineup Inspection (Monthly)

January 5 through September 15, 1984

(2) SI172,FireSystemTestableValveCycling(12 months)

August 10, 1982 through August 24, 1984

(3) SI 173, Fire System Nontestable Valve Cycling (18 months)

July 29, 1983 through October 13, 1984

(4) SI 174, Fire System Sprinkler System Testable Valves (12 months)

August 9, 1983 through August 8, 1984

(5) SI 176

Fire Suppression Water Sprinkler System Functional Test

(18 months)

September 12, 1982 through March 2, 1984

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(6) SI 180, Fire Pump Start Test

January 9 through September 15, 1984.

Pump 1AA was removed from

service on July 18, 1984, for major repairs.

Pump was restored to

service on August 24, 1984.

(7) SI 190, Fire Hose Inventory (Monthly)

January 13, 1984 through October 15, 1984

(8) SI 234.2, Fire Detection System - 714' of Auxiliary Building,

Intake Pumping Station and ERCW Pumping Structure (6 months)

July 2, 1983 through July 16, 1984

In reviewing the licensee's surveillance inspection and test program

for the fire protection automatic water spray and sprinkler system,

it was noted that the strainers in the supply piping to these systems

were not included in

periodic maintenance inspection and cleaning

programs required by NFPA-15, Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire

Protection, Section 6012 (1973 Edition).

FSAR, Section 9.5.1.4,

states that fixed water suppression systems are periodically tested

in accordance with the applicable NFPA code requirements to ensure

operability and inspected at regular intervals to ensure that all

equipment is in good operating condition.

Technical Specification, Section 6.8.1.f

requires written procedures to be established, imple-

mented and maintained for the fire protection program implementation.

The lack of a maintenance program for these strainers is identified as

Violation Item (327 and 328/84-31-04), No Maintenance Program Provided

for Fire Protection System Strainers.

d.

Annual Full-Scale Fire Drill With Offsite Fire Fighting Organization

The annual full-scale fire drill was conducted on November 3,1983,

with the site brigade and the Soddy-Daisy Fire Department. A total of

approximately 19 site fire brigade and 15 fire department personnel

participated.

The inspector reviewed the drill report and evaluation

and had no further questions.

c.

Plant Tour

During the plant tour to review the Appendix R cable interaction

discrepancies, the plant's fire prevention and protection features were

observed.

As a whole, the housekeeping and control of combustible and

flammable liquids and gases within the areas toured were satisfactory.

A welding operation was noted in which an approved " hot work" permit

had been issued and appropriate safety precautions were being observed.

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The fire protection systems within the areas toured were found to be in

service and appeared to be satisfactorily maintained.

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Within the areas examined, except as noted above, no additional violations

or deviations were identified.