ML20133G592

Insp Rept 50-482/85-19 on 850401-30.Violation Noted: Failure to Properly Update Procedure Manuals & to Respond to Control Room Annunciator

ML20133G592
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	07/08/1985
From:	Bruce Bartlett, Bundy H, Cummins J, Martin L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133G582	List: ML20133G581 ML20133G584 ML20133G592
References
50-482-85-19, NUDOCS 8508080762
Download: ML20133G592 (11)

See also: IR 05000482/1985019

Text

g

,

.

>

w

APPENDIX B

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

NRC Inspection Report:

50-482/85-19

LP:

NPF-32

Docket:

50-482

Licensee:

Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)

Post Office Box 208

Wichita, Kansas 67201

Facility Name:

Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

Inspection At:

Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas

Inspection Conducted:

April 1 to 30,1985

Inspectors:

f

f/f/f4

J. Ef Cummins, S'

for~1sactor Inspector,

/Dpfe

~

-

Operations,-

(pars. 2 and

Yf

$

gBFL< Bartlett,'R(s

e'nt' Reactor Inspector,

[DAe

Operations,

(pars

2, 3, 4,

, 6, and 7)

/'-26~ W

H. F. Bundy, Resident Reactor InTpector,

Date

Operations,

(pars. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8)

Approved:

7

fc5

,

. ET MarTiri, Chid ,' Project Section A

/Dge

Reactor Project

anch 2

,

8508080762 850726

PDR

ADOCK 05000482

O

PDR

7

E

'

.

-

+'

-2-

.

inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted April 1-to 30, 1985 (Report 50-482/85-19)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including licensee actions on

previous inspection: findings; compliance with Technical Specifications; event

followup; startup test witnessing.and observation; plant tours; precritical

testing data review; and document control.

The inspection involved 342 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors

including 56 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.

Results: Within the seven areas inspected, two violations were identified

(failure to properly ~ update procedure manuals, paragraph 8 and failure to

respond to control room annunciator, paragraph 4). One open item is

identified in paragraph 7).

1

r.

.

.

-3-

DETAILS

- 1.

Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

• R. M. Grant, Director-Quality

• F. T. Rhodes, Plant Manager

• C. C. Mason, Director-Nuclear Operations

• M. G. Williams, Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and

Administrative Services

• K. Peterson, Licensing

• C. E. Parry, Superintendent of Quality Systems Engineer

• C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist

V. MacTaggart, Results Engineering Supervisor

J. Johnson, Chief of Security

D. Smith, Plant Support Supervisor

J. Zell, Operations Superintendent

l

T. Gardner, Startup

'

O. Maynard, Licensing Manager

K. Ellison, Assistant to the Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and

Administrative Services

l

• Denotes those attending the exit interview on April 30, 1985,

t

2.

Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings

(0 pen) Open Item (482/8515-01):

Ruskin Fire Dampers:

The licensee's

testing and rework of the Ruskin fire dampers has not been completed.

By

letter dated May 1, 1985, the licensee made a 10 CFR Part 21 Report to the

g

'

NRC Region IV office concerning the installation of some of the fire

i

dampers with less than the designed clearance between the fire damper

!

frame and the penetration sleeve.

This insufficient clearance could cause

'

the fire damper to warp and become inoperative during a fire.

This item

will remain open.

i

(Closed) Open Item (482/8511-08):

This item involved Preoperational Test

Deficiency Deferral (RO) #40 concerning retesting of a condensate

'

i.

demineralizer outlet sample throttling valve following rework.

The NRC

l

inspector reviewed appropriate test documentation including Work Request

(WR) 14140-84 and found test data for the reworked valve acceptable.

(Closed) Open Item (482/8511-13):

This item involved RD #61 concerning an

inability to perform Section 7.8 of Test SU3-HA01 due to equipment

problems with the hydrogen and oxygen analyzers in the purge line from the

,

e-

--

n

,,.. ,,

,

-

---

,-w-,-

- - - _ . - , - - -

. - - - -

e-

n-

e

,

p

-

.

.

-4-

l

1

volume control tank (VCT) to the gaseous radwaste system.

The licensee

requested and the NRC granted an extension of the completion of this item

t

from prior to Mode 4 entry to prior to Mode 2 entry.

The analyzers as

presently installed meet Technical Specifications (TS) requirements due to

their ability to be operated in manual; however, due to equipment procure-

ment problems they are not presently able to be run in automatic which

would be required in order to clear the test deficiencies.

This section

of the test can be deferred until prior to entry into Mode 2 for the

reasons stated above.

This will be tracked as an open item.

(482/8519-03)

(Closed) Open Item (482/8511-04):

This item involved installation of the

essential service water chlorination system prior to Mode 4.

The NRC

' inspector walked down parts of the installed chlorination system,

questioned plant operators on the operability of the chlorination system,

reviewed Interim Design Change Package (IDCP) M-142KT, reviewed Field

Change Work Plan 1-FJ-108-034, reviewed Field Change Request

(FCR) 1-0303-H, and reviewed WRs on the installation and testing of the

chlorination system.

(Closed) Open Item (482/8511-21):

This item involved RD #65 concerning

computer calculation problems of. determining leakage rates into the

auxiliary building and residual heat removal pump room (RHR) sumps.

The

NRC inspector reviewed the documentation of the retest to SU3-88158, Test

Deficiency Reports (TDR) 01 and 02 and found it acceptable.

(Closed) Open Item (482/8511-14):

This item involved RD #66 concerning-

computer calculation problems of determining leakage rates into the

containment normal sumps.

The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation of

the retest to 503-B8158, TDR-04 to the Test Deficiencies (TD) 010 and 017

and found it acceptable.

(Closed) Open Item (482/8511-07):

This item involved completion of the

reapplication of the concrete coatings removed on the 2000' elevations of

containment as a result of 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report TE53564-K159.

After the

NRC inspector was informed by the licensee, the reapplication was

complete, he toured the 2000' elevation of containment and reviewed

appropriate WRs and found them acceptable.

(Closed) Open Item (842/8427-06): This item tracked licensee evaluation

of excess reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakage on the Number 1 seals of

C and D RCPs

This evaluation was performed.

It concluded that the seal

surfaces had rubbed, but no cause could be definitely established.

Foreign material contamination was ruled out.

The seals were replaced and

performed satisfactorily.

This item was incorrectly referenced as

482/8427-01 in Inspection Report 50-482/85-04.

l

l

- . . -

. . - -

- _ _ -

- --

-

--

- _. _-

{

-

!

'.

-5-

3.

Compliance With TS

.Through in plant inspections of system lineups, control room valve and

breaker indications, review of control room logs, calibration data, and

plant records,.the NRC. inspectors verified compliance with the following

TS:

3.1.1.1 - Boration Control-Shutdown Margin

-

3.1.1.2 - Boration Control-Shutdown Margin

-

3.1.2.1 - Boration Control-Shutdown Flow Path

-

-

3.1.2.3 - Boration Control-Charging Pump

3.1.2.5 - Boration Control-Borated Water Source

-

3.4.1.2 - Reactor Coolant System-Hot Standby

-

~3.4.1.3 - Reactor Coolant System-Hot Shutdown

-

3.4.1.4.1 - Reactor Coolant System-Cold Shutdown

' - -

3.4.4 - Reactor Coolant System-Relief Valves

-

3.4.9.3 - Reactor Coolant System-Overpressure Protection Systems

-

3.5.4 - Emergency Core Cooling Systems-ECCS Subsystem

-

3.5.5 - Emergency Core Cooling Systems-Refueling Water Storage Tank

-

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Event Followup

a.

The NRC inspector reviewed selected Wolf Creek events to determine:

Adequacy of response

-

-

Adequacy of analysis to determine cause

Adequacy of corrective action to prevent recurrence

-

The following Wolf Creek Event Reports were reviewed:

85-15 - Manual Aux. Transformer Deluge With Failure Of

-

Electric Fire Pump To Start

85-16 - Inadvertent Closing Of EJ HV8701B While RHR Pump B Was

-

Running

85-25 - Procedural Noncompliance

-

85-31'--Failure of GK RE-4

-

85-34 - Administrative Error Per ADM 01-070

-

85-40 - Timely PSRC Approval Not Obtained For Temporary

-

Procedure Changes

85-41 - Start of STS-901 Without Shift Supervisor Approval

-

85-42 - Excessive Pressurizer Heatup Rate

-

85-44 - Control Room A/C Inlet Damper Blocked Closed

-

85-45 - Rod Speed Indicator Found Inoperative

-

85-48 - Reactor Trip Breaker Failed To Open Due To Switch Not

-

Actuated Hard Enough

85-49 - STS MT-024 and STS MT-025 Used Beyond One Time Issue

--

Date

_.

y

-

.

.

-6-

85-51 - Off Loading Of NA0H

-

85-52 - Loss Of Paperwork (Containment Purge Permit CPP

-

No. 001)

85-53 - Clearance Of Temporary Modification Prior To Issuance

-

Of PMR

85-54 - Two Year Maintenance On Air Operated 3" Globe Valve

-

BMFV054

b.

The following defect / deficiency reports were reviewed:

85-10 - Excessive Vibration On EJ FO-3

-

85-12 - Inadvertent Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal

--

(CRVIS)

85-19 - Containment Sump Screens

-

85-20 - Ruskin Horizontal Dampers-Stitch Welds

-

85-21 - Conduit Fire Barriers / Gas Seals

-

85-22 - Inadvertent Reset Of Steam Line SI-Causing SI Train B

-

85-23 - Failure Of Valve Operator EFHV-60 Caused By Broken Lug

-

85-24 - CRVIS Due To Chlorine Monitor GK AI-2 Running Out

-

Of Paper

c.

The following licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed:

50-482/85-001-00 - Engineered safety feature actuation

-

50-482/85-002-00 - Technical Specifications violation

-

50-482/85-003-00 - Engineered safety feature actuation

-

50-482/85-004-00 - Technical Specifications violation

-

50-482/85-005-00 - Technical Specifications violation

-

Unless otherwise noted below, the NRC inspector had no comments,

d.

During April, the licensee had three safety injections (SI).

All

were inadvertent and due to low steam line pressure signals.

The

following is a list of the dates, times, and modes in which they

occurred:

1.

April 19, 1985

16:19 CST

Mode 4

2.

April 28, 1985

15:50 CDT

Mode 3

3.

April 30, 1985

11:43 CDT

Mode 3

The resident inspector was onsite during the three sis and responded

to the control room as soon as he was notified.

The NRC inspector

verified the licensee had responded in accordance with procedures and

notified the necessary agencies and personnel in a timely fashion.

The plant operators responded to the sis in a calm, deliberate, and

knowledgeable manner.

During tne' April 28, 1985 SI, approximately 2

hours after the event, the NRC inspector was performing a detailed

review of all control room panels when he observed Annunciator F-79,

" Loose Parts Monitor" energized.

Upon questioning the supervising

operator, the NRC inspector learned that the annunciator had been

acknowledged without any control room personnel being aware it had

"come in".

An operator was sent to the loose parts monitor panel and

.

.

m

_.

-___

-

-

..

"

..

.

-

-7-

.

reported a signal on Channel'2. ' Operations requested reactor

engineering personnel to investigate, and.it was verified that the

-noise was being heard on Channels.1, 2, and 4.

At this time, the

noise ~is a high frequency, low amplitude type which is indicative of

an object with a small mass or one which is restrained. The failure

-

to follow Alarm Procedure ALR 00-0079F is a violation.

(50-482/8519-02)

e.

.During this inspection the NRC inspector also followed up on the

following engineered safety features actuation events:

1.

April 7, 1985 10

38 CST Mode 5

Control Room Ventilation

Isolation (CRVIS) and Fuel

Building Isolation (FBIS)

2.

April 8, 1985 08:47 CST Mode 5

CRVIS

3. .

April 9, 1985 14:06 CST Mode 5

Containment Purge Isolation

(CPIS) and CRVIS

4.

April 12, 1985 22:15 CST Mode 5

CRVIS

5.

April 12,~ 1985 11:14 CST Mode 5

FBIS, CPIS, and CRVIS

6.-

April 21, 1985 19:22 CST Mode 4

CRVIS

7.

April 26, 1985 18:54 CST Mode 3

Feedwater Isolation (FWIS)

and Auxiliary Feedwater

Actuation (AFAS)

f.

On April 10, 1985, at approximately 1555 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.916775e-4 months <br /> CST the central alarm

station (CAS) operator identified a problem with Door 31042-(access

from health physics area to auxiliary building) and dispatched an

officer to.that location. Upon arrival, the officer found 10 to 15

,

individuals waiting for. access through the door. Apparently, no one

had identified an access problem to security.

A number of

individuals had apparently entered the auxiliary building when other

individuals exited as the card reader had not been operating

-properly.

The_CAS operator dispatched an officer to the scene after

several individuals had requested computer overrides to allow then to

exit the auxiliary building.

The CAS operator incorrectly assumed the locking mechanism was not

operating properly, when the dispatched officer could not' gain access

through the door, and placed it in access.. He directed the officer

to ensure everyone was'using the card reader.

Approximately 20

minutes later, a second CAS operator decided the card reader was

inoperable and directed the officer at the scene to initiate a manual

~

access log.

All personnel who had entered the auxiliary building

i

during this incident were identified and found to have access

authorization.

The NRC inspector discussed with the plant superintendent the

apparent slow response in discovering the problem and lack of

,

training and/or concern for security.

The plant superintendent

I

{

stated that he would have al1~ individuals involved in the incident

[.

interviewed to determine why they had not contacted security when

l

they were having access problems.

l

\\

E

._

.c_

_

.

b

-8-

5.

Startup Test Witnessing and Observation

The NRC inspectors observed portions of the following startup tests:

SU7-SF03.1 - Cold No Flow Control Rod System Testing

-

SU7-SF03.2 - Cold Full Flow Control Rod System Testing

-

SU7-SR03 - Incore Movable Detector Test

-

SU7-0015 - Power Ascension Thermal and Dynamic Test

-

SU8-BB13 - Pressurizer Relief Valve Test

-

STS-PE19 - Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valve Leakage

-

The NRC inspectors verified conformance by the licensee to procedural and

license requirements, observed the performance of the plant operating

staff and verified the adequacy of test program records, including

preliminary evaluation of the test results.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Precritical Testing Data Review

The NRC inspectors reviewed the following completed test procedures to

ascertain compliance with administrative and test procedures and

conformance to Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical

Specifications requirements:

SU7-0001 - Initial Core Loading

-

SU7-0002 - Inverse Count Rate Ratio Monitoring For Core Loading

-

5U7-5009 - Initial Core Loading

-

SU7-SE02.1 - Operational Alignment Of Nuclear Instrumentation

-

SU7-SC01 - Core Loading Instrumentation and Neutron Source

-

Requirements

SU7-SR03 - Incore Movable Detector Test

-

Selected NRC inspector comments are noted below:

During the review of SU7-5009, the inspector noted that steps 4.1, " Core

loading operations shall be suspended, pending evaluation by the senior

reactor operator (SRO) in charge of refueling, who has no concurrent

responsibilities, and reactor engineering personnel, if any of the

following conditions occur during core loading" and 4.1.8 "Less than two

of the nuclear channels being used for inverse count rate ratio ICRR

,'

monitoring have counting rates greater than or equal to 2 counts per

second (af ter both primary source-bearing assemblies are loaded in the

vessel and completion of core loading step 10)" were written so as to be

vague enough to allow test and operations personnel to exceed the

i

limitations desired by the plant safety review committee (PSRC) and the

Plant Manager.

Although this did not occur during the performance of this

test, the inspectors concern was that it could happen during a future

refueling operation.

The licensee stated that this statement was not in

lL

r

_-

.

>

-9-

the procedure to be used for the refueling operation and they committed

that if they wanted to place it in that procedure, appropriate limitations

and precautions would be taken.

All NRC inspector concerns with this

procedure have been resolved.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Plant Tours

Control room activities were observed on a regular basis including several

shift turnovers.

Special emphasis was placed on verifying implementation

of administrative controls for fire protection, temporary modifications,

and out of-service equipment.

Compliance with TS and limiting conditions

for operations were verified as appropriate.

The NRC inspector observed that although WCGS Administrative Procedure ADM

13-102, Rev. 4, requires an expiration date for combustible materials

permits in step 5.2.1, the form in use does not have a block for this

i

date.

The Superintendent of Plant Support committed to making the

'

procedure and form compatible.

This will be tracked as an open item.

(482/8519-03)

On April 2, 1985, the NRC inspector noted the following unusual

indications which he discussed with the supervising operator:

345 Kv west bus indicating light was blinking

-

No status lights were illuminated for Breaker 69-16

-

The supervising operator stated that these conditions would be promptly

corrected or work requests would be issued and the indicating lights

status tagged.

The NRC inspector verified that this had been

accomplished.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Document Control

The NRC inspector conducted an audit of WCGS Procedure Manuals and

Drawings located in the TSC and EOF on April 10 and 11, 1985, in response

to expressed concerns.

Documents surveyed were randomly selected from the

KG&E master drawing file index and the computer based master procedure

index.

Sixteen drawings were selected and the correct revision levels

were found at either location.

Of 46 procedures selected, the NRC

inspector identified problems with nine at the TSC and fifteen at the EOF

as follows:

a.

TSC

1.

Temporary Change Notice (TCN) MI 85-162 was not filed with

Procedure CHM 01-004, Rev. 1.

!

>

L

y

i

T

.-

.{

L;-

-

.

,

-10-

>

2.

Rev. O with a'TCN was also filed with Rev. 1 of Procedure

<

l

. CHM 01-007, Rev. 1.

3.

TCN MI.85-224 was not~ filed with Procedure CHM 02-480, Rev. 4.

.4.

TCN MI 85-115 was not filed with Procedure SYS A8-120, Rev. 4.

5.

TCNs MA 85-594 and MA 85-611 were not filed with Procedure SYS88-201, Rev. 4.

6.

TCNs MA 85-486 and MA 85-669 were not filed with Procedure SYS

EF-200, Rev. 5,

-

7.

Expired TCN 84-277 was filed with Procedure SYS GT-121, Rev. 3.

8.

.TCN MA 85-422 was not filed with and expired TCN 84-307 was

filed with Procedure SYS NB-201, Rev. 3.

9.

Expired TCN 84-361 was filed with Procedure SYS NG-131, Rev.-3.

b.

EOF

1.

Two expired TCNs were filed with Procedure GEN 00-005, Rev. 2.

,

2.

Two expired TCNs were filed with Procedure GEN 00-006, Rev. 4.

'

3.

TCN MA 85-220 was not filed with, Procedure EMG FR-C1, Rev. O.

l

4.

TCN MA 85-084 was not filed with Procedure EMG C-31, Rev. O.

i

5.

TCNs MA 85-087, 217, and 439 were not filed with Procedure

EMG E-0, Rev. O.

6.

TCNs MA 85-088 and 218 were not filed with Procedure EMG E-1,

.

Rev. O.

.

I

7.

TCNs MA 85-089 and 219 were not filed with Procedure'EMG E-3,

l

Rev. O.

8.

TCN MI 85-162 was not filed with Procedure CHM 01-004, Rev. 1.

9.

An expired TCN was filed with Procedure CHM 01-007, Rev. 1.

!

10.

TCN MI 85-224 was not filed with Procedure CHM 02-480,.Rev. 4.

!

11.

Procedure SYS AB-120 should have been Rev. 4 with TCN MI

p

l0

85-115.

<

l

12.

TCNs MA 85-486 and 669 were not filed with Procedure SYS EF-200,

!

Rev. 5.

13.

Procedure SYS EP-200 should have been Rev. I with TCN MA 85-539.

,

'

Only Rev. O was found.

14.

An expired TCN was found with SYS NG-131. Rev. 3.

15. - Procedure HPH 01-017 should have been Rev. 1.

Only Rev. O was

l

found.

,

l

The above findings were discussed with the licensee site emergency

l

planning coordinator, who accompanied the NRC inspector during the

audit, and the Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and

l

-Administrative Services committed to the following corrective

!

actions:

The licensee will perform a 100 percent review of WCGS

-

procedures located at the EOF and TSC and correct any

. discrepancies found prior to April 30, 1985.

le

l

l

l

I.L

~

l

.

.

-11-

KG&E Document Control will assign an individual to be

-

responsible for drawings and procedures in the EOF and TSC.

Periodic surveillances will be performed in accordance with WCGS

-

Administrative Procedure ADM 07-100 for WCGS procedures located

at the E0F and TSC and any deficiencies found will be corrected.

The above findings constitute a violation of NRC regulations.

(482/8519-01)

9.

Open Items _

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspector. and which involve some action

on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot..

An open item disclosed during

the inspections is discussed in paragraph i.

10.

Exit Meeting

s

The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and

findings of this inspection on April 30, 1985.