ENS 47945: Difference between revisions
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StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
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| event date = 05/22/2012 13:11 EDT | | event date = 05/22/2012 13:11 EDT | ||
| last update date = 05/22/2012 | | last update date = 05/22/2012 | ||
| title = Manual Reactor Scram Due | | title = Manual Reactor Scram Due to Degrading Condenser Vacuum | ||
| event text = On Tuesday, May 22, 2012 at 1311 hours [EDT], with the reactor at approximately 35% core thermal power, during a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. | | event text = On Tuesday, May 22, 2012 at 1311 hours [EDT], with the reactor at approximately 35% core thermal power, during a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. | ||
Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'B,' which is designed to shutdown 65 seconds after the Group II signal is received if the Standby Gas Treatment Train 'A' is in service, continued to operate until manually secured. With this exception, all other plant systems responded as designed. | Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'B,' which is designed to shutdown 65 seconds after the Group II signal is received if the Standby Gas Treatment Train 'A' is in service, continued to operate until manually secured. With this exception, all other plant systems responded as designed. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:04, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Pilgrim Massachusetts (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.63 h-0.0263 days <br />-0.00375 weeks <br />-8.62974e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Joe Bracken 16:33 May 22, 2012 |
| NRC Officer: | Dong Park |
| Last Updated: | May 22, 2012 |
| 47945 - NRC Website
| |