ENS 49149: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 06/26/2013 10:40 EDT | | event date = 06/26/2013 10:40 EDT | ||
| last update date = 06/26/2013 | | last update date = 06/26/2013 | ||
| title = Inadvertent Closure | | title = Inadvertent Closure of Opposite Train Valve Renders Safety Trains Inoperable | ||
| event text = At 1040 [EDT], on June 26, 2013, with the Unit 1B Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) trains inoperable for planned maintenance, a motor operated isolation valve (1LP-21) was inadvertently closed, rendering the 1A LPI and RBS trains inoperable. The intended action was to close 1LP-22 in the Unit 1B train. 1LP-21 was closed due to a human error. Unit 1 entered Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both trains of LPI and RBS being inoperable. At 1053, on June 26, 2013, the Unit 1A train of LPI and RBS were restored to operable by opening 1LP-21, and Tech Spec 3.0.3 was exited. Units 1, 2 and 3 were stable at 100% power during and after this event. No other safety or non-safety systems were degraded or lost as a result of this event. The event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) A, B, C and D "Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. | | event text = At 1040 [EDT], on June 26, 2013, with the Unit 1B Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) trains inoperable for planned maintenance, a motor operated isolation valve (1LP-21) was inadvertently closed, rendering the 1A LPI and RBS trains inoperable. The intended action was to close 1LP-22 in the Unit 1B train. 1LP-21 was closed due to a human error. Unit 1 entered Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both trains of LPI and RBS being inoperable. At 1053, on June 26, 2013, the Unit 1A train of LPI and RBS were restored to operable by opening 1LP-21, and Tech Spec 3.0.3 was exited. Units 1, 2 and 3 were stable at 100% power during and after this event. No other safety or non-safety systems were degraded or lost as a result of this event. The event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) A, B, C and D "Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. | ||
Initial Safety Significance: None. There was no event on-going at the time of discovery that required the Unit 1 LPI and RBS systems to function, and the safety function was restored when the 1A LPI and RBS trains were restored to operability. Although declared inoperable, the Unit 1B LPI and RBS trains were available during the time 1LP-21 was closed. | Initial Safety Significance: None. There was no event on-going at the time of discovery that required the Unit 1 LPI and RBS systems to function, and the safety function was restored when the 1A LPI and RBS trains were restored to operability. Although declared inoperable, the Unit 1B LPI and RBS trains were available during the time 1LP-21 was closed. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:00, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Oconee  South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| LER: | 05000269/LER-2013-002 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.88 h0.162 days <br />0.0231 weeks <br />0.00531 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Bob Meixell 18:33 Jun 26, 2013 |
| NRC Officer: | Pete Snyder |
| Last Updated: | Jun 26, 2013 |
| 49149 - NRC Website
| |
Oconee with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | |