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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000324/1985027]]
| number = ML20137X384
| issue date = 09/20/1985
| title = Insp Repts 50-324/85-27 & 50-325/85-27 on 850801-31. Violation Noted:Bolts Replaced on Hydraulic Control Units W/Type Other than Specified on Drawings
| author name = Fredrickson P, Garner L, Hicks T
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000324, 05000325
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-324-85-27, 50-325-85-27, NUDOCS 8510040510
| package number = ML20137X354
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 11
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000324/1985027]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:--    -                        -                          -          _    -    _.
      .
  .
          pn Rico                                        UNITED STATES
      f            'o                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                  / ,^S                                    REGION 11
    Eet'I *$  k  I
                                                  101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.
              -
                      f                            ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
      % .' ,',#,. *                                    SEP 2 31985
      Report Nos. 50-325/85-27 and 50-324/85-27
      Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
                        P. O. Box 1551
                        Raleigh, NC 27602
1
      Docket Nos.:        50-325 and 50-324                          License Nos.          DPR-71 and DPR-62
      Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2
      Inspection Co                  ed:    ugust 1 ; 31,1985
      Inspectors:          -
                                      \                                                                      W [
                h L.                arner                    _                                    Vate figned
                              *
                                                            "
                                                                                                      j M        $4
                h T. E.            'cks                                                            D6te Sfgned
      Approved By:                -    /                                                              7      [fd'
                        P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief                                            Dite Signed
                        Division of Reactor Projects
                                                          SUMMARY
      Scope: This routine safety inspection involved 177 inspector-hours on site in
      the areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational
      safety verification, onsite review committee, ESF System walkdown, Licensee Event
      Reports review, follewup on inspector identified items, refueling activities and
      plant modifications.
      Results:        One violation was identified: Bolts Replaced on Hydraulic Control
      Units with Type Other Than That Specified on Drawings. One unresolved item was
      identified:        Seismic Qualification of Hydraulic Control Unit Frame.
I
      h0040510850923
    G        ADOCK 05000324
                                    PDR
                                __        _    ..  __    _      __      _ _ _ _ - . _ _ ._    _ ,_ _ _              __ _ ._
 
                      ._    ..._ ___. .                  ._.                  - . - - - .      ._ __ _                                  - _. _ __
r-                .
      .
1
i
                                                              REPORT DETAILS
!
                    1.    Licensee Employees
,
                          Persons Contacted
.
                          P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
                          C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project
,                        T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction
                          G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control
!                        J. Holder, Manager - Outages
l                        E. Bishop, Assistant to General Manager                                                                                    I
i                        L. Jones, Director - QA/QC                                                                                                r
                          M. Shealy, Acting Director - Training                                                                                      ,
;                        M. Jones, Acting Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP
'
                          J. Chase, Manager - Operations
                          J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance
,
                          G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
4                        K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance
                          B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support
                          L. Boyer, Director - Administrative Support
;                        V. Wagoner, Director - IPBS/Long Range Planning
L                        C. Blackmon, Superintendent - Operations
j                        J. Wilcox, Principle Engineer - Operations
                          W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor
,
                          W. Tucker, Engineering Supervisor
;                        B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor
                          R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
                          J. Moyer, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
                          R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
                          R. Poulk, Senior.NRC Regulatory Specialist
                          D. Novotny, Senior Regulatory Specialist
4
                          W. Dorman, QA - Supervisor
                          W. Hatcher, Security Supervisor
.                        W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit
                          Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
                          engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force
,
                          members.
!
;                  2.    Exit Interview (30703)                                                                                                    i
                          The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 5, 1985 with
;                        the general manager. The licensee acknowledged the findings without
i                        exception.        The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
j                        materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
                    3.    Followup on' Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
                          Not inspected.
.
    . - _ . . . - ,              - ..    .
                                              - - . - - -        . . _ - . , ,        . . - . -        - _ - , , . - - - - . ,- ,,.-.-,.
 
      _                    ..
        .
    a
                                                                    2
i
        4. Followup on Inspector Followup Items
          a.    (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 325, 324/84-35-02; Post Trip Reviews
                01-22. An open item was generated after a reactor scram in December
                1984 because of a questionable post trip review. The item was to
                follow the licensee's progress toward enhancing the scram review
                process.    Revisions 8-10 to the Post Trip Review Procedure 01-22 were
                the result of this effort.                      These revisions clarify the responsibili-
                ties of the operations engineer and other associated requirements.
                This item is considered closed.
          b.    (Closed)      Inspector  Followup                  Item  324/84-31-03;  Standby Air
                Compressors.      This item was opened because of a concern over the
                inoperability of an automatic start pressure switch for a standby air
                compressor.      The licensee has failed to find a suitable replacement,
I
                but is presently undertaking a plant modification on Unit 1 (and is
                planned on Unit 2) which will alleviate the need for these air
::              compressors during post accident conditions.                        The modification will
                install a nitrogen backup system which will supply the necessary
.
                pneumatic pressure during accident conditions. This item is considered
!              closed.
  I
          c.    (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 325, 324/85-03-01; Radwas*e Shipping.
                This item was generated to track improvements in the radwaste shipping                    ,
                quality control program and the auditing of this program. This item is
                considered closed because a notice of violation 325, 324/85-17-01 was
                written in this area and will track corrective actions.
        5. Maintenance Observation (62703)
          The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to
          verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
:        Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The
          inspectors also verified that:                          redundant components were operable;
j          administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were
,
          qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were
          proper; fire protection was adequate; QC hold points were adequate and
          observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent
          verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently
4
          verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
          Outstanding work requests and authorizations (WR&A) were reviewed to ensure
          that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
          a.    Bolting Replacement and Seismic Qualification of Hydraulic Contr^1
                Units
<
                Inspection Report 325/85-22- issued a notice of violation for loose
                and/or missing rack-support-to-foundation bolting for the control rod
!                hydraulic control units (HCU). During followup of the repair and
                replacement, it was observed by the inspector that all the replaced
i
i
                        _    ,        _      _ _ - , _ _ , _ _ _
 
    .
  .
                                                  3
                                                                                                                  !
                                                                                                                  !
        bolts (five) had been replaced with bolts which were not cadmium plated
        as required by plant design drawing G.E. 919D615. The apparent root
,        cause was that the maintenance planner verified that Q bolting was
        required but failed to check the specifications for any special
        requirements. Discussion with licensee personnel indicates that this
        may have been a common practice when replacing bolting. The licensee
        is currently evaluating the impact of this on plant equipment.
        Failure to install the type of bolting specified on G.E. 9190615
        drawing is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,                            Criterion V
        (324/85-27-01): Bolts Replaced on Hydraulic Control Units with Type
        Other than that Specified on Drawings.
        The licensee has attempted to establish the seismic qualification of
        the as-found conditions documented in inspection report 325/85-22,
        i.e., one HCU had 2 out of the 4 rack-support-to-foundation bolts
        missing. Calculations were performed on the HCU's with missing bolts,
        on HCU's which stand alone and on HCU's installed back-to-back with all
        fasteners properly installed. The calculations show the as found HCU's
        with loose or missing bolts met at least short term criteria (IEB
        79-14),  i.e.,        bolts might deform but would not break.                  The same
        conclusion was deterrrined for the stand alone HCU's. However, in all
        cases including back-to-back installation, stresses were calculated
        which exceeded the allowable stress in the tubular frame. The original
i
        seismic qualification was performed by the vendor (G.E.) based upon
        results of field tests with the units tested back-to-back. This field
        test data is not available to the licensee at this time. Without field
        test data, the complexity of the installed configuration requires
        several conservative assumptions to be made to allow analytic modeling.
        The licensee believes that their calculated results are conservative.
        Therefore, since the frame was qualified by the vendor from experi-
        mental data, the licensee believes the frames to be qualified and the
        HCU's are operable, i.e. seismically qualified. However, the licensee
        expects to resolve this apparent discrepancy between their analytic
        model and the original seismic qualification based on field data.
1
        Resolution of this apparent discrepancy is an unresolved item
        (325/85-27-01 and 324/85-27-02):          Seismic Qualification of HCU Frame,
      b. Post Maintenance Test Requirement Test Sheet Fails to Specify Pressure
        Test /VT-2 Inspection
,
'
        During a routine inspection of post maintenance surveillance testing
        for the Unit I standby liquid control injection check valve C41-F007,
        the inspector noticed that no pressure test /VT-2 inspection was
        specified on the Post Maintenance Test Requirement (PMTR) sheet even
        though the pressure boundary for the valve had been broken during
4
        maintenance. The valve is Class 1. Two similar maiatenance activities
        involving Class 1 valves B21-F028B and B21-F019 were also reviewed and
        found to not contain the pressure test /VT-2 inspection requirement on
i
                              '
4
                      - - - . ,              -. -              -        ,-, - _ - - -        -- -- ,- - - - - -
 
                    _ -      _ _ _                .-      -- . _ = - -                          -              . _ _ - - _ _ .
                                                                                                                                    - - - .  _. .
        *
>
    .
                                                                        4
                        the PMTR sheet. It became clear that the maintenance planners were not
                        using ENP-16, Inservice Inspection Requirements, properly. After
                        scoping the jobs and realizing that the work involved disassembly of
                        the valves, the planners should have realized that the pressure
                        boundaries of each of these valves was to be broken and that entry into
                        Section VI, Visual Inspection, of ENP-16 was necessary to determine
                        additional post maintenance test requirements. This process was not
,
                        done.
i                        The problem was discussed with plant management and the following
!
                        immediate corrective actions were taken:
'
                        (1) Training was conducted for all mechanical maintenance planners in
                                the proper use of ENP-16.
                        (2) A review was conducted of PMTR's for Class 1 valves worked during
                                the Unit 1 outage. For those which required pressure test /VT-2
                                inspections, an additional test / inspection was included on the
                                PMTR sheet. Those activities already closed out, were reopened by
                                an additional PMTR sheet stating the required test.
                              At the completion of the present Unit 1 outage, a vessel
                                hydrostatic test and inspection including all Class 1 piping and
                              components is to be performed (PT-80.1, 10 year Inservice
                                Inspection Reactor Vessel Hydrostatic Test). This test would have
                                satisfied the inservice inspection requirements for the valves
;
-
                                identified. Followup of long term corrective actions will be an
                                inspector followup item (IFI 325/85-27-02): Administrative
!.                            Control Changes to Ensure Pressure Test /VT-2 Inspections are
                                Identified as Post Maintenance Requirements.
f      6.        Surveillance Observation (61726)
l
)                  The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical
:                  Specifications. Through observation and record review, the inspectors
                  verified that:                      tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements;
                  administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified;
                  instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The
4
                  inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to
                  service of equipment.
                A special review was performed of the following Licensee finding:
                  On August 21, 1985, the Maintenance Surveillance Test (MST) rewrite group
                  discovered that Periodic Tests, PT-A22.2-1,                                    PT-22.2-2, PT-A24.2 and
                  PT-45.2.4, covering Secondary Containment Isolation Response Time Testing,
                  did not adequately test all the relays in the associated logic circuit.
,
'
                  Technical Specification Surveillance 4.3.2.3 requires that this be done
                  every 18 months.
:
i
      , -  , , - .        ,_        -, _ _ . _ . _                  _  _ _ _ _
                                                                                  _ ~ - . _ . _ _      ..-..__.                ._,
                                                                                                                                  -
                                                                                                                                            ,      .
 
    _          . - - _                    .                        ,        .      _      _                                _      .    _- -
4
                          .
              i
    - J
          ,
                                                                                  5                                                                            !
                            Specifically, relays K66, K67, 3AA, 3AB, 3BA, 3BB, 3BD, A-CRMX and B-CRMX
  ,/                        were not being included in the response time test. At the time, Unit I was
                            shutdown for a refueling outage (no core alterations were in progress) and
>
                            Unit 2 was at 100% power. The surveillance test problem involved both
                            units.
4
                            Licensee management conducted a Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC)
                            meeting concerning this problem and concluded that there was no technical
                            reason to consider this instrumentation inoperable based on the following:
  ,
                            a.      Relays not presently being timed have been verified operable in logic
4
                                      system functional tests which were performed in October 1984 (Unit 2).
                            b.      The manufacturer's expected response time for these relays is less than
                                      85 milliseconds.
                            c.      The allowed response time for the instrumentation is less than or equal
                                      to 13 seconds. Adding the relay's expected response time to the
                                      existing instrumentation response time still results in a response time
                                      of less than or equal to 1 second.
                            A special test procedure was generated to test the relays (SP-85-086) and
                            'was satisfactorily performed for Units i and 2 on August 25, 1985.
                                                                                                                                                              ,
                            These inadequate procedures constitute a violation of Technical Specifi-
i.                          cation Surveillance 4.3.2.3,.in that they failed to adequately response time
1,                          test all the necessary relays. However,10 CFR i Appendix C, Section V,
4
                            paragraph A, states that a notice of violation will generally not be issued
                            if a violation meets 5 stated criteria. This violation meets these criteria
;                            and no notice of violation will be issued.
,                            A permanent procedure to conduct the testing will also be written and
i
                            implemented by the MST rewrite group prior to the end of the next
                            surveillance interval.
,
                            No violations or deviations were identified.
                        7.  Operational Safety Verification (71707) (71710)
                            The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct
:                            observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,
                            reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
                            The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR
_
                            50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control room, shift
i
                            supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain
                            information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to
                            ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting
j                            Conditions for Operations. Direct observations wera conducted of control
!
!
,
      - - - .                - - . +        - . ~ . , , - - , - - . ..  s-. -.    ,,  ,a,.  . ~ . . , , . - , . , - , . ,.m  ,,-,r-+-. -, - - , , - , , -
 
    . - - -                              -    _        _                        ._    .      .      .
              .
  .
                                                        6
                .
                  room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to
                  verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification
                  limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity
                  of system status was maintained.      The inspectors verified the status of
                  selected control room annunciators.
J                Operability of a selected ESF train was verified by insuring that: each
;                accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power
                  supply and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for
,
                  components that must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from
'
                  those ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications,
                  was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper
                  lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which
                  might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional                  requirements.
                  Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified
                  operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve
                  lineup, if accessible.
                  The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / pro-
                  cedures were followed. This included a review of            area surveys, radiation
l
                  work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
                  The inspectors verified that: the security organization was properly manned
                  and that security personnel were cepable of performing their assigned
                  functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the
                  protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and
                  escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification
                  badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; effective compensatory
                  measures were employed when required; and security's response to threats or
                  alarms was adequate.
                  The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position
                  of certain containment isolation valves, checked clearances, and verified
                  the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
                  No violations or deviations were identified.
            8.  Onsite Review Committee (40700)
                  The inspectors attended selected Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meetings                    '
                  conducted during the period. The inspectors verified that the meetings were
                  conducted in accordance with Technical Specification requirements regarding
                  quorum membership, review process, frequency and personnel qualifications.
                  No violations or deviations were identified.
,
                                                                                                                i
!
                                                                    _ _ . _ _        _    _      _
                                                                                                      ..  _.
 
    _.    .-  -.            ..              -                                          . _ - .
        .
  .
                                                7
        9. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
          The listed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) were reviewed to verify that the
          information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The verification
          included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
          planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety
          significance of the event. Onsite inspections were performed and concluded
          that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with
          existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.    The following
          reports are considered closed:
          (Closed) LER 1-80-20; Containment monitoring system isolated due -to
          personnel error.
          (Closed) LER 1-81-34; Four supports were found damaged due to water hammer.
          (Closed) LER 1-83-10; Fire barrier / secondary containment seal degradation
          allows water to leak into reactor building.
,
          (Closed) LER 1-83-23; Fire in 4160/480 volt E-6 transformer.
;          (Closed) LER 1-83-26; Diesel generator trips due to operator failing to
          follow procedure.
          (Closed) LER 1-83-32; Control rods have no position indication.
          (Closed) LER 1-83-36; Control power fuse to motor operator blew due to
          ground in circuit.
          (Closed) LER 1-83-40; Inadequate surveillance procedure and personnel error
,
          cause HPCI to isolate.
          (Closed) LER 1-83-62; Reactor building exhaust ventilation radiation monitor
          actuated outside technical specification limit.
          (Closed) LER 1-84-01; Air entrapped in suction header caused residual heat
          removal service water pumps to trip.
!        (Closed) LER 1-84-29; Spurious actuation of control building emergency air
i          filtration system.
t
          (Closed) LER 1-84-30; Spurious actuation of control building emergency air
          filtration system.
          (Closed) LER 1-84-31; Spurious actuation of control building emergency air              i
          filtration system.
          (Closed) LER 1-85-02; Automatic isolation of the control building heating,              ;
          ventilation and air conditioning system due to spurious chlorine signal.                l
                                                                                                    1
                                                                                                    i
I
                                                  __
                                                                  -
                                                                              . _ _ . . _ ,
 
      .
  - .
                                                                                      l
                                                                                      l
                                            8
        (Closed) LER 1-85-03; Inadequate logic system functional testing of degraded
        and under-voltage relays of emergency buses.
        (Closed) LER 1-85-05; Inadequate functional testing of rod block monitor.
        (Closed) LER 1-85-07; Spurious actuation of control building emergency air
        filtration system.
        (Closed) LER 1-85-14; Steam leak causes reactor core isolation cooling
        system isolation.
        (Closed) LER 1-85-17; Loss of emergency bus E-1 normal feed.
        (Closed) LER 1-35-19; Control building emergency air filtration system
        actuation due to accidental shorting of detector circuit.
        (Closed) LER 1-85-22; Standby gas treatment train IA relay over heats and
        fails.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-41; A " rod drift" annunciation was received due to the rod
        position indication probe.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-46; Wires to terminals in the terminal box were reversed.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-52; Transmitter shorted to ground when alligator clip test
        leads were accidentally bumped.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-62; Prima ry containment temperature exceeds technical
        specification limit as result of seasonal ambient temperatures.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-65; Condensate storage tank level switches for High
        Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system improperly installed.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-71; Suppression pool temperature exceeds limit as result
        of HPCI run.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-82; Suppression pool level exceeds limit due to personnel
        error.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-84.    This item was voided by the Licensee.
        (Closed) LER 2-83-94; Reed switch problems cause incorrect position
        indication.
        (Closed) LER 2-84-04; Reactor scram initiated by HFA relay replacement and
        surveillance testing.
[
'
        (Closed) LER 2-84-06; Procedure failed to identify the need for jumping the
        low low level signal.
:
 
    .                    __      . - _ _ _ .            .__ _ .                                    .                                - __.                      _._
                      .
  .
      .
4
3
  i
                                                                                          9
:
4
                            (Closed) LER 2-85-01; Surveillance test not performed within allowable time
                            due to inadvertent deletion from scheduling system.
                            (Closed) LER 2-85-03; Inadequate surveillance procedure results in an
                            unexpected group 1 isolation.
;                          No violations or deviations were identified.
                      10.  Refueling Activities (60710)
                            During the licensee's refueling operations, the inspectors verified that
  i
                            selected surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications was
!                          current and that the licensee's fuel- handling procedure was implemented.
'
                            The following additional items were verified:
;
                            a.  Selected fuel bundle movements,
                            b.  Core monitcring during refuel operations was in accordance with
                                Technical Specifications.
                            c.  Vessel water level was maintained in accordance with Technical
1
                                Specification.                                                                                                                          ,
                                                                                                                                                                        '
i
                            d.  Reactor mode switch position was as required by Technical Specifi-
                                cation.
f
                            e.  Continuous communications were maintained between the refueling                                                                        ,
1
                                platform and the control room and that . control room operators were
                                cognizant of the applicable procedure steps.
                            f.  Health-Physics personnel maintained constant coverage of all fuel
j                                moving activities, ensuring area dose rates, contamination levels and
                                airborne samples were within required tolerances.
                            No violations or deviations were identified.
                      11. Modification Process and Masonry Walls (37700)                                                                                                i
)                                                                                                                                                                        i
                            During review of design activities, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
'
-
                            method for ensuring that safety related equipment would not be installed on
j-                          or in close proximity to masonry walls whose failure could affect the
+
                            equipment (Bulletin 80-11 concern).                                    The method currently employed relies
                            upon -notes on the wall drawings to inform the user of the wall status
                            (analyzed or unanalyzed) and their general engineering practice of. not
                            installing new supports onto masonry walls.                                      These appear to adequately
                            address installation onto walls but do not provide a positive means to
j                          ensure that safety related equipment is not placed close to an unanalyzed
!
i
l
I
        ,, + - ~ - - -      .,              , , - - - -        ,w., ,-n-- , , - - - . . -----n,.    ~e--  ,  .,,,,.,..p o-m-,,--m.v w w.  ,. mg-m m.- --.,--,,,. ,,e
 
  .
.
                                        10
    wall (walls which did not have safety related equipment around them were not
    analyzed per Bulletin 80-11).        This is an inspector followup item
    (324/85-27-03 and 325/85-27-03): Enhancements of controls to preclude
    installation of safety related equipment in proximity to unanalyzed masonry
    walls.
    No violations or deviations were identified.
}}

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