ML20196E012

Safeguards Requirements for Fuel Facilities Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic SNM, 10CFR2,70 & 73 Final Rules.Regulations Amended to Require Protection Equivalent to That in Place at Comparable DOE Fuel Facilities

ML20196E012
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/14/1988
From:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
To:
References
FRN-53FR45447, RULE-PR-2, RULE-PR-70, RULE-PR-73 NUDOCS 8812090255
Download: ML20196E012 (30)

Text

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RSfl NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PARTS 2, 70, AND 73 Safeguards Requirements for Fuel Facilities Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material AGENCY:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its physical protection and security personnel performance regulations and its design basis threat for fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) to require protection equivalent to that in place at comparable Department of Energy (DOE) fuel facilities.

These changes have been prompted by a recent study that compared NRC's security requirements for SSNM with DOE's recently up-graded security system.

The changes are also supported by findings f

from reviews of safeguards event reports, Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews, and inspection reports.

The amendments provide greater assur-ance that physical protection measures at these fuel facilities can protect against theft.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 12, 1988.

P FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dr. Sandra Frattali, Division of Regulatory Applications, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear.tgelatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone 1

G812090255 GS1114

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(301)492-3773; or Kristina Z. Jamgochian, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301)492-0360.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In 1974, a national goal was established that nuclear weapons-usable material, whether in the licensed or license-exempt sector, should receive fully adequate and essentially comparable levels of protection.

The objective of providing comparable protection for SSNM has been reiterated in a number of subsequent communications by the National Security Council, Energy Research and Development Administration (,iow DOE), Department of Defense, and NRC.

In consonance with this objective, reviews have been conducted periodically by joint NRC/ DOE review teams.

The findings from the most recent review (1986) indicated that DOE has placed increased emphasis on guard weaponry, training, and tactical response exercises and has upgraded some physical security measures.

To maintain comparability with DOE as well as to respond to recent NRC security reviews, the NRC is amending its physical protection regulations for licensed fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNN.

These facilities are:

General Atomics, La Jolla, California; Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, Tennessee; Babcock and Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia; and United Nuclear Corporation, Montville, Connecticut.

Although the Fort St. Vrain reactor (Colorado) uses high enriched uranium fuel, it is notsubjecttotheseupgradesbecauseoftheextensiveprocessingrequired to yield weapons useable material and because of the weight of the fuel 2

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t elements and their low concentration of urraium.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission will initiate an exemption ?om the new requirements for l

Fort St. Vrain.

These amendments will provide greater assurance that security systems and security force capabilities at these facilities are comparable to those used by 00E.

A remaining comparability issue relates 4

to the use of deadly force by licensee guards.

This issue is being 4

addressed separately and is not covered by these amendments.

On December 31, 1987, the NRC published in the Federal Register (52 FR 49418) a proposed rule for upgrading safeguards requirements for j

licensed fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM, The upgr& des called for:

(1) security system performance evaluation through I

tactical response exercises (2) night firing qualification for guards using all assigned weapons, (3) search of 100 percent of entering per-j sonnel and packages (for explosives, firearms, and incendiary devices),

f (4) posting of armed guards at MAA control points, (5) providing two i

j separate physical personnel barriers around the protected area, and i

(6) revision Sf the design basis threat at these fuel facilities to include land vehicle use by adversaries attempting to commit theft and j

require the implementation of countermeasures to prevent forcible vehicle 1

j entry into the protected area.

The comment period ended on March 30,

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1988, i

a Summary of Public Comment S

Latters of comment were received from six respondents:

four from fuel facility licensees, one from DOE, and one from a manufacturer of fences who submitted specifications on a type of security fence but did 1

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not comment on the rule itself.

Copies of comment letters are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC.

A summary of the public comments and their resolution follows.

The comments are organized in the following categories:

1.

Performance Evaluation Through Tactical Response Exercises and Tactical Response Teams (TRT) 2.

Guard Force Weaponry 3.

Personnel, Package, and Material Entrance Search 4,

Protected Area Physical Barri0rs 1.

Performance Evaluation _Through Tactical Response Exercises and Tactical Response Teams Under the proposed rule, affected licensees would conduct tactical i

response exercises for each guard force shift on a quarterly basis.

The exercises would demonstrate the guard force state of readiness and test the effectiveness of delay mechanisms, alarm and communication systems, response times, deployment of response forces, firing skills (simulated),

and tactical maneuvers.

The results would be used to determine whether additional training or security system improvements are needed.

The exercises are not intended to be viewed in terms of "pass" or "fail."

The quarterly exercises could be of short duration, would have at least one exercise per guard shift, and would cumulatively represent the various lighting conditions during a 24-hour day.

Each year, at least two of the quarterly exercises for each shift would include force-on-I force scenarios.

Also proposed was an additional, more extensive annual exercise to be observed by NRC representatives that would include force-on-force scenarios.

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One letter of cow. nt stated that quarterly exercises are more frequent than necessary and requested a reduction in the number of exer-cises to one per shift every four months.

Another respondent requested that the NRC observe one of the quarterly force-on-force exercises rather than have the licensee conduct a special annual exercise.

A third respondent requested clarification of the number of exercises and how much prior notice the NRC needed before the NRC-observed annual exercise.

The NRC staff accepts that a routine of 13 exercises per year, seven l

of which are force-on-force (based on a three-shift operation, one exer-cise per shift per quarter, plus one annual exercise) can, over time, become less effective due to their frequent repetition and reduced i

3 learning curve.

Therefore, this final rule is being modified to require 2

6 a licensee, during the first year of rule implementation, to conduct a total of 12 exercises (one exercise per quarter per shift), half of which r'

are to be force-on-force.

The NRC will observe one of the quarterly j

force-on-force exercises and will not require an additional annual exercise.

This reduces the number of exercises during the first year of I

compliance to 12 for a three-shift operation.

During the second year and l

each year thereafter, licensees will be required to conduct nine exer-1 l

cises per year (one exercise per shift every four months), one-third of

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which will be force-on-force, with the NRC observing one of the force-

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on-force exercises.

The NRC is to be notified 60 days prior to an j

NRC-observed, force-on-force exercise so that possible scheduling con-i flicts can be resolved.

This final rule requires licensees to esiablish a designated TRT l

and replaces the current general requirement for an armed response force.

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Creation of TRTs is expected to provide more highly motivated, profes-sional, and effective organizations to respond to and prevent forceful attempts to remove SSNM from licensee sites.

This rule also requires that TRT members have individually assigned, upgraded weaponry and an item of uniform distinctive and different from that of the guard force (e.g., cap, armband, etc.).

One licensee objected to the NRC replacing the term "armed response personnel" with "Tactical Response Team." This licensee believed that it should not be restricted 'a seiection of a title, since the title /

designation of its respon.e force G 4 9ged periodically for security purposes,.

The NRC does not object to a licensee using different code names or changing code names for its TRT. When amending the security plan, however, a licensee shall use the term "Tactical Response Team."

This licensee also objected to the proposed reoui.ement that TRT members have a distinctive item of uniform.

It was the licensee's experience that fostering a spirit of elitism among a small group of individuals within the security force often only serves to create a schism and affects morale unfavorably.

The NRC accepts that the estab-lishment of the TRT could have unfavorable effects on the morale of some personnel as foreseen by the licensee.

However, these negative factors, if indeed they develop, are far less important than the need for a highly effective response capability.

Moreover, an elite group within the guard force need not to be viewed negatively by the remaining guard force if presented properly.

All members of a security force could be eligible to qualify as TRT members (as opposed to being singled out by the licensee).

Ideally, if all members of the security force qualify as TRT members, they can be rotated through the schedule on an equal basis, thereby 6

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alleviating the concern of creating a separate elitist group and making shift scheduling easier.

The licensee was also concetned that a distinctive item of uniform f

could single out TRT members to an adversary.

The NRC accepts this as a valid concern.

However, the distinctive item could be small, such as a f

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pin or badge, and not noticeable at a distance.

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Under the proposed amendment, TRT members and guards who are eligible

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L to be TRT members would have to successfully complete training in response j

d tactics.

The training would be in addition to the 'adividual training

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l currently required in Appendix B to Part 73.

No specific criteria or l

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standards for the training in response tactics were provided with the proposed rule.

A licensee respondent suggested that the NRC shoulo i

establish minimum standards but that the standards or criteria should be i

adaptable to site-specific situations, i

The NRC agrees with this suggestion.

A Tactical Training Manual has been developed for licensee use.

The material can be adapted and I

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used under a variety of conditions and circumstances.

The manual pro-i j

vides viable approaches for licensees to use in structuring site-specific tactical response trainin0 programs.

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Guard Force Weaponry Under the praposed rule, all TRT members would be armed with 9mm

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semiautomatic pistols.

Many major city law enforcement agencies, SWAT l

teams, and the U.S. military are shifting from revolvers to semiautomatic pistols in order to take advantage of sustained fire capability.

These police upgrades respond to increased encounters with sdversaries using 1

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j more sophisticated weapons.

Af ter conducting a literature review and 7

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I discussing with various agencies their rationale for converting from l

i revolvers to semiautomatic pistols, the NRC included in the proposed l

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amendments a requirement for TRT members only (not other security force l

l personnel) to be armed with 9mm semiautomatic pistols.

j The Commission explicitly solicited public comment on the require-4 ment for equipping TRT members with semiautomatic pistols and on whether l

l the final choice of weapons should be left to the licensee.

Only one response (from a licensee) was received.

It stated that the choice of j

weapon and caliber of weapon should be left to the individual licensee.

l This licensee believes that the NRC is justifying the requirement for a l

9 tem semiautomatic pistol on the faulty conclusions (1) that greater firepower (increased availability of rounds) equates with an enhanced 1

i ability to hit the target, and (2) that the 9mm's larger magazine (up to I

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15 rounds) and more rapid action allows for faster discharge of rounds i

i and increased hit probability.

The licensee also stated that certain t

j types of revolvers could be equally justified and that after an in-depth l

evaluation of weapons and ammunition currently available, each licensee

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j could best determine which meet the requirements of the site.

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The NRC's rationale for the requirement is based on the advantages of the weapon.

The 9mm has less recoil than revolvers currently used, t

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making it easier to control, and thereby allowing increased accuracy.

In light of the growing worldwide trend among the criminal element toward l

j the adoption of sophisticated automatic and semiautomatic weaporry, the l

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j 9mm provides added firepower considered necessary while maintaining the l

necessary high degree of reliability and accuracy.

Additionally, the J

I semiautomatic pistol is easier to load in the dark, in the cold, or when or.e is under stress.

In the event adversaries armed with semiautomatic l

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(7590-01) weapons attack a facility where TRT members are equipped with standard six-round revolvers, the TRT responders would need to reload amunition long before the opponents would.

During reloading, TRT responders could be exposed to deadly fire without defense.

The ability to sustain fire isofmajorimportance.

This final rule requires that all TRT members be equipped with 9mm semiautomatic pistols, with qualification and annual requalificat!ca in both day and night firing courses.

The choice of model and manufacturer is left to the licensee.

The proposed rule required each TRT member be armed with a shoulder fired weapon, and at least one TRT member carry a.30 caliber or 7.62mm rifle.

The requirement for a heavier rifle would provide additional effectiveness against the use of land vehicles, which is now included in the design basis threat.

Letters of comment on this issue were received from two licensees.

One licensee did not agree with the large caliber weapon requirement and recomended that this option be lef t up to the licensee.

The licensee asserted that a rifle of.30 caliber or 7.62mm will not immediately stop a vehicle and if that was NRC's intent, then nothing less than d

.50 caliber heavy machine gen would be needed.

A second licensee requested an exemption from this requirement due to the configuration and limited size of its facility.

This licensee was concerned about various problems due to the proximity of high population areas and public reac-tion and, therefore, believed it unnecessary and dangerous to arm TRT members with large caliber rifles.

The requirement that one TRT member carry a rifle of at least

.30 caliber or 7.62mm is retained in the final rulemaking.

The Commission believes that additional capability should be available to defend against 9

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adversaries in a vehicle attempting to penetrate a protected area boundary.

i The intent of this requirement is not to stop the vehk.le immediately, j

but to disable adversaries inside the vehicle.

Any site-specific consid-erations that licensees may have once this final rulemaking is effective should be dealt with on an Wividual basis through appropriate procedures.

Under the proposed rule, TRT members on duty would be required to 1

carry their individually assigned shotgun or semiautomatic rifle, with t

one member carrying the.30 caliber or 7.62mm weapon.

Two licensee l

respondents believed that the weapons need not be carried but should be readily available i.e., kept at strategic locations throughout the f

facility.

Both respondents noted that there were times when cerrying f

shoulder fired weapons whs not practical and were concerned about the safety hazard i.1volved should the weapon have to be laid down (i.e.,

lunch,restroomt).

Additional concerns were that the weapons may be functionally abused during the TRT r. embers normal activities of climbing ladders and maneuvering through close areas, or contamine'ed should the weapon have to be laid down while performing searches in material access areas.

The requirem1nt for TRT members to carry their assigned shoulder fired weapons while on duty is included in this final rule.

The require-~

ment "to carry" is not to be interpreted to mean "hand carry" but to be on the person as in a shoulder sling.

The normal duties of a TRT member should permit immediate response and, therefore, should not include routint searches at material access areas.

Likewise, while on lunch break, a TRT member should be relieved by another TRT qualified security officer in order to avoid the need to lay the weapon down.

The main rationale for TRT members to carry their assigned weapons is to permit 10

(7590-01) immediate response.

In the event of an adversary Attack the time delay caused by retrieving weapons from strategically located repositories could have an adverse impact on the successful containment of the adversaries.

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3.

personnel, Package, and Material Entrance Search Under the proposed amendments, search for explosives, firearms, and incendiary devices would be required of 100 percent of entering personnel 9

and packages except for Federal, State, and local law enforceme M. per-sonnel on of/icial duty.

Also, under the proposed amendments, present i

exemptions would continue for those delivery and inspection activities specifically designated by the licensee and approved by the Commission to be carried out within material access, vital, or protected areas for I

reasons of safety, security, or operational necessity.

One licensee respondent recommended that "Q" cleared armed security officers should be included in the exemption based on the fact that it could see no benefit in performing a prohibited article search on a 5

l security officer overtly carrying a weapon.

In response, it is pointed out that of concern to the NRC is the issue of an insider attempting to 1

introduce not only firearms, but also explosives and incendiary devices

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inside a pri.,tected area.

Under this criterion, although a security l

officer dicplays an authorized handgun, searching the officer for explo-sives, incendiary devices, and unauthorized weapons is still necessary before the officer enters a protected area.

Accordingly, the proposed search requirement stained unchanged in the final rule.

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4.

Protected Area Physical Barriers Under the proposed rule, the perimeter of the protected area of a fuel fai:ility possessing formula quantities of SSNM would be required to have a double physical personnel barrier.

The two barriers would be constructed and installed primarily to ensure the ability to assess an attempted penetration of the protected area perimeter at the time of the occurrence and secondarily to delay attempts at unauthorized exit from the protected area.

The present intrusion detection systems required by NRC would be located between these two barriers.

In the sole letter of comment regardi'; the proposed requirement, DOE recommended that the proposed changes be deferred until a performance ant. lysis of the existing security system has been completed and the need for change has been determined.

In its detailed comments, 00E stated that two perimeter fences are not a DOE requirement and that double fences, where they have been installed, are installed on the basis of the overall performance of all security systems at these sites.

00E pointed out that only very limited adversary delay time is provided by a perim-eter fence, and the potential of a second perimeter barrier is realized only if designed to enhance assessment.

Reletive to the intrusion detec-tion system, DOE proposed revising the requirement to call for optimum use of the present systems and leaving the systems in their current loca-tions until an evaluation of the usefulness of these present systems through a performance exercise is made.

Jr,e NRC recognizes that DOE has not established a generic require-ment for two perimeter fences.

However, all DOE facilities reviewed by the NRC/00E Comparability Review Group do have double perimeter barriers.

The NRC believes that the performance standards achieved at these DOE l

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facilities, which are met in part by double fences, should be provided at comparable NRC-licensed facilities.

In guidance to affected licensees NRC makes clear that the intrusion detection system and the inner barrier are to be positioned and con-structed to assure adequate delay after an intruder triggers an alarm.

The delay must be sufficient to permit a defender to determine positively whether the triggering was due to an intruder.

The interrelationship of the perimeter intruslon detection system and the double barriers is so close that it is essential to treat improvements to them simultaneously.

Therefore, it is necessary for the overall performance of the protection system that the double barrier system and intrusion detection system locations (and possible reinstallation) be designed in concert.

For these reasons, the barrier requirement is retained in the final rule, gherChanges:

Weapons Qualification These amendments require night firing qualification and annual requalification by the security force and TRT members with all weapons assigned to them.

This revises the current requirement for night familiarization firing only.

Specified courses (included in Appendix H) for qualification and annual requalification with revolvers, shotguns, and rifles are a<fded as requirements in this final rulemaking.

Licensees may develop and submit for NRC approval a qualification course for day firinn for 9mm semiautomatic pistols which TRT memprs must now carry.

Adfitionally, licensees may also substitute shoulcre firing for hip fir-ing for the day shotgun qualification course cont:!'ej in Appendix B to Part 73 and reflect this change in their amended security plan.

lcen-sees are required to retain the documentation of each qualificction and 13

[7590-01) requalification as a record for three years after each qualification and requalification.

Microfilm documents are acceptable.

Implementation Currently, under conditions of license, licensees carry out certain of the measures called for in the amendments, namely:

(1) search of 100 percent of personnel and packages admitted to the protected area, (2) posting of armed guards at MAA control points, and (3) night firing qualification for guards using all assigned weapons.

Under the new amendments, each licensee will modify its physical security plan to show how all of the new requirements would be carried out and will submit the plan to the NRC for approval within 180 days after the effective date of these amendments.

The license conditions listed earlier will be with-drawn at the time that the cresponding commitments in the approved plan become effective.

The lices.,e will carry out the various additional new commitments not already implemented by license conditions in the approved plan commencing at various dates, ranging from 30 to 365 days after NRC approval of the plan.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Sub-part A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.

These amendments affect neither the safety of operation nor 4

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the routine release of, or exposure to, radioactivity from fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM.

Their only intent is to provide a

greater protection against the rdvised design basis threat and thus reduce the risks of theft of SSNM from these facilities.

Of the six measures proposed, three have no identifiable environmental impact; namely, initiation of security system performance evaluations through tactical team exercises, night firing qualification of guards using all assigned weapons, and posting of armed guards at MAA control points.

The 100 percent search of entering personnel and packages would require installation of edditional walk-through detection equipment which likely would require construction activities to expand or modify the existing building in which this equipm.at is located.

The requirement regarding protected area personnel barriers would necessitate construction, on the licensee's property, of a second barrier.

Finally, the installation of structures to prevent forcible vehicle entry would likely require the deployment of vehicle barriers which would be installed on the licensee's property at or near the protected area boundary at points accessible to vehicles.

These construction activities at four current licensee sites and at any sites of future fuei facility licensees who require possession of formula quantities of SSNM are considered to have a minor impact on the environment and support a finding that the final rule involves no significant environmental impact.

The environmental assessment and find-ing of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555.

Single copies of the environ-mental assessment and finding of nc

~.nificant impact are available from 15 e

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Dr. Sandra D. Frattali, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055$, telephone (301)492-3773.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

These requirements wera approved by the Office of Management and Budget under approval number 3150-0002.

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 2.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per response, including the time for reviewing instruc-tions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.

Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to The Records and Reports Management Branch, Mail Stop P-530, l

Division of Information Support Services, IRM, Office of Administration and Resources Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this rule.

The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission.

The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC l

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Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555.

Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Dr. Sandra D.

Frattali, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301)492-3773.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.

The rule affects four licensees who operate fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM under 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73.

They are GA Technologies Inc., La Jolla, California; Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, Tennessee; Babcock & Wilcox, Lynm.t.urg, Virginia; and United Nuclear Corporation, Uncasville, Connecticut.

The companies that own these plants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the scope of the definition of small entities set forth in 6 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 or within the definition of Small Business size standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.

Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does

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not apply to this final rule and, therefore, a backfit analysis is not required since these amendments do not involve any provisions which would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).

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List of Subjects in 10 CFR Parts 2, 70, and 73 i

Part 2 - Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Byproduct material, Classified information, Environmental. protection, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Sex discrimina-tion, Source material, Special nuclear material, Waste treatment and disposal.

Part 70 - Hazardous materials-transportation, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Secur~,ty measures, Special nuclear material.

Part 73 - Hazardous materials-transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 2, 70, and 73.

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PART 2--RULES OF PRACTICE FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS 1.

The authority citation for Part 2 continues to read as

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follows:

[

AUTHORITY:

Sec. 161, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

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2.

In Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 4 to Table 1A is amended by revising "(as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(bb))" to read "(as defined in 10 CFR 73.2)."

3.

In Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 10 to Supplement III is revised to read "10See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of ' formula quantity.'"

4.

In Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 11 to Supplement III is revised to read "11See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of 'special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance.'"

5.

In Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 12 to Supplement III is revised to read "See 10 CFR Part 73.2 for the definition of 'special nuclear material of low strategic significance.'"

PART 70--00MESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 6.

The authority citation for Part 70 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Sec. 161, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201);

sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

7.

In S 70.22, paragraph (k) is amended by revising "as defined under S 73.2(x) and (y) of this chapter" to read "as defined under S 73.2 of this chapter."

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTEC' ION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 8.

The authority citation for CFR Part 73 is reviaed to read as follows:

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AUTHORITY:

Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2M7, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161).

Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273); SS 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat.

948, as amended (42 U.S.C.2201(b)); SS 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and SS 73.20(c)(1), 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f), 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6), and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2),

(3)(iii)(B), and (h), 73.55(h)(2) and (4)(iii)(B), 73.57, 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2201(o)).

9.

In Section 73.1, paragraph (a)(2)(i) is revised to read as follows:

S 73.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) ***

(2) Theft or diversion of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material.

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(1) A determined, violent, external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions by a small group with the following attributes, assistance, and equipment:

(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals; (B)

Inside assistance that may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information),

an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or both; (C) Suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long-range accuracy; (0) Hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safe-guards system; (E) Land vehicles used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment; and (F) The ability to operate as two or more teams.

A A

A A

A 10.

In S 73.2, remove all alphabetical designators and place all definitions in alphabetical sequence; paragraph (1) of the definition of "Special nuclear material of low strategic significance" is amended by removing "S 73.2(x)(1)" and inserting "paragraph (1) of the definition of strategic nuclear material of moderate strategic significance set out in this section;" insert new definition, "Tactical Response Taam," in 21

[7590-01]

e proper alphabetical sequence; and revise paragraphs (1) and (2) of the definition for "Physical Barrier" to read as follows:

$ 73.2 Definitions.

A A

A A

A "Physical Barrier" means:

(1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30* and 45* from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed topping; (2) Building walls, y

ceilings and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinder block, concrete steel or comparable materials (openings in which are secured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of sufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any openi g), or walls of similar construction, not part of a building, provided with a barbed topping described in paragraph (1) of this definition of a height of not less than 8 feet; or i

A A

"Tactical Response Team" means the primary response force for each shift which can be identified by a distinctive item of uniform, armed with specified weapons, and whose other duties permit immediate response.

A A

A A

A 11.

In S 73.46, paragraphs (b)(3)(1), (b)(4), (b)(6), (c)(1),

(d)(4)-(6), (d)(9), and (h)(3) are revised and paragraphs (b)(7)-(9) and (i) are added to read as follows:

i l

22

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5 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.

A A

A A

A (b) Security organization.

(3) ***

(i) Written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of the Tactical Response Team, guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for sca.urity.

The licensee shall retain a copy of the current procedures as a record until the Commission terminates the license for which these procedures were developed and, if any portion of these procedures is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change; and A

A A

A A

(4) The licensee may not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman, Tactical Response Team member, or other member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and quali-I j

fled to perform each assigned security duty in accordance with Appendix B of this part, "General Criteria for Security Personnel."

In addition, guards and Tactical Response Team members shall be trained, equipped, and qualified in accordance with paragraphs (b)(6) and (b)(7) of this section.

Upon the request of an authorized representative of the l

Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel, whether licensee or contractor employees, to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities.

Each guard, watchman, Tactical Response Team member, or other member of the security organiza-tion, whether a licensee or contractor employee, shall requalify in 23

~*

[7590-01]

accordance with Appendix B of this part, and, for guards and Tactical Response Team members, in accordance with paragraph (b)(7) of this sec-tion, at least every 12 months.

The licensee shall document the results of the qualification and requalificat'on.

The licensee shall retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for three years after each qualification and requalification.

A A

A A

A (6)

Each guard shall Lee armed with a handgun, as described in Appendix B of this part.

Each Tactical Response Team member shall be armed with a 9mm semiautomatic pistol.

All but one member of the Tactical Response Team shall be armed additionally with either a shotgun or semiautomatic rifle, as described in Appendix B to this part.

The remaining member of the Tactical Response Team shall carry, as an indi-vidua11y assigned weapon, a rifle of no less caliber than.30 inches or 7.62mm.

(7)

In addition to the qualification criteria of Appendix B of this part, guards and Tactical Response Team members shall qualify and requalify

)

annually for night firing with assigned weapons in accordance with Appen-dix H of this part.

The licensee or the licensee's agent shall document the results of weapons qualification and requalification for night firing.

The licensee shall retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for three years after each qualification and requalification.

(8)

In addition to the training requirements contained in Appen-dix B of this part, Tactical Response Team members shall successfuliy complete training in response tactics.

The licensee shall document the i

24

[7590-01]

l completion of training.

The licensee shall retain the documentation of training as a record for three years after training is completed.

(9) The licensee shall conduct Tactical Response Team and guard exercises to demonstrate the overall security system effectiveness and the ability of the security force to perform response and contingency plan responsibilities and to demonstrate individual skills in assigned team duties.

During the first 12-month period following the date specified in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every three months for each shift, half of which are to be force-on-force.

Subsequently, during each 12-month period commencing on the anniversary of the date specified in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every four months for each shift, one third of which are to be force-on-force.

The licensee shall use these exercises to demonstrate its capability to respond to attempts to steal strategic special nuclear material.

During each of the 12-month periods, the NRC shall observe one of the force-on-force exer-cises which demonstrates overall security system performance. The licen-see shall notify the NRC of the scheduled exercise 60 days prior to that exercise.

The licensee shall document the results of all exercises.

The licensee shall retain the documentation of each exercise as a record for i

three years after each exercise is completed.

(c) Physical barrier subsystems.

(1) Vital equipment must be located only within a vital area, and strategic special nuclear material must be stored or processed only in a material access area.

Both vital i

areas and material access areas must be located within a protected area so that access to vital equipment and to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through at least three physical barriers.

The 25 4

[7590-01]

perimeter of the protected area must be provided with two separated physical barriers with an intrusion detection system placed between the two.

The inner barrier must be positioned and constructed to enhance assessment of penetration attempts and to delay attempts at unauthorized exit from the protected area.

The perimeter of the protected area most also incorporate features and structures that prevent forcible vehicle entry.

More than one vital area or material access area may be located within a single protected area.

A A

A A

A (d) Access control subsystems and procedures.

A A

A A

A (4)(i) The licensee chall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.

Identification and search of all individuals for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be made and authorization must be checked at these points except for Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty and United States Department of Energy couriers engaged in the transport of special nuclear material.

The search function for detection of firearms, explo-sives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of detection equipment capable of detecting both firearms and explosives.

The individual responsible for the last access control function (control-ling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a struc-ture with bullet resisting walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows.

(ii) When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into a protected area, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of that individual.

Whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment 26

[7590-01) c.

at a portal is out of service or not cperating satisfactorily, the licen-see shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all psrsons who would otherwise have been subject to search using the equipment.

(5) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all hand-carried packages except those carried by individuals exempted from personal search under the provisions of paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this part must be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.

(6) All packages and material for delivery into a protected area must be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to admittance into the protected area, except those Commission-approved delivery and inspec-tion activities specifically designated by the licensee to be carried out within material access, vital, or protected areas for reasons of safety, security, or operational necessity.

m (9) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access to material access areas, vital areas, and controlled access areas.

At least two armed guards trained ir, accordance with the provi-sions contained in paragraph (b)(7) of this section and Appendix B of this part shall be posted at each material access area control point whenever in use.

Identification and authorization of personnel and vehicles must be verified at the material access area control point.

Prior to entry into a material access area, packages must be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.

All vehicles, materials and packages, including trash, wastes, tools, and equipment exiting from a material access area must be searched for concealed strategic special 27

Io

[7590-01]

nuclear material by a team of :t least two individuals who are not authorized access to that material access area.

Each i..dividual exiting a material access area shall undergo at least two separate searches for concealed strategic special nuclear material.

For individuals exiting an area that contains only alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear material, the second search may be conducted in a random manner.

n n

n (h) Contingency and response plans and procedures.

n n

n n

n

}

(3) A Tactical Response Team consisting of a minimum of five (5) members must be available at the facility to fulfill assessment and response requirements.

In addition, a force of guards or armed response personnel also must be available to provide assistance as necessary.

The size and availability of the additional force must be determined on the basis of site-specific considerations that could affect the ability i

of the total onsite response force to engage and impede the adversary force until offsite assistance arrives.

The rationale fte the total number and availability of onsite armed response personnel must be included in the physical protection plans submitted to the Commission for approval.

a n

n n

(i)

Implementation schedele far revisions to physical protection plans.

(1) By (180 days after t.. efnetive date of these amendments) each licensee shall submit a revis,d fixed site physical protection plan to the Commission for approval.

The revised plan must describe hnw the licensee will comply with the requirerants of paragraphs (b)(3)(i),

(b)(4),(b)(6),(b)(7),(b)(8),(b)(9).(c)(1),(d)(4),(d)(5),(d)(6),

28

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[7590-01)

(d)(9), and (h)(3) of this section.

Revised plans must be mailed to the Director, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

(2) Each licensea shall carry out the new commitments in the

[

revised plan in accordance with the following schedule:

{

(i) Commencing 30 days after Commission approval of the revised i

plan for commitments related to paragraphs (b)(3)(i), (d)(4), (d)(5),

(d)(6) and (d)(9) of this section.

f (ii) Commencing 60 days after Commission approval of the revised plan for commitments related to paragraphs (b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7),

(b)(8), (b)(9) and (h)(3) of this section.

(iii) Commencing 365 days after Commission approval of the revised plan 1

for commitments related to paragraph (c)(1) of this section.

I

?

12.

A new Appendix H is added to read as follows:

[See attached appendix.]

Dated at Rockville, MD, this day of Fu v 1988.

[

Fo the Nuclear Re ulatory Commission.

.bl.

Wk

(,

781fiuel J. Chilk, (

j Secretary of the Conmission.

e i

i 29 i

i

s 6

y ul 1

1 APP [NDIE H MINIMUM quALIFICA110N CRITERIA FOR NIGHT IIRIE WEAf0N SIEE DISTANCE No. mmmm5 IIMIE PostTION TARGET SCORIE llGillE for all courses:

Revolver 1

7 yds 12 35 sec standing - no artificial B-27 Minimum qualifying = 701 2 footcandles support.

at center mass l

of target area.

2 15 yds 12 45 sec standing - no artificial support.

Seel-1 7 yds 2 + clip 30 sec standing - no artificial Minleus qualifying = 70E j

automatic support.

I 2

15 yds 2 + clip 40 sec standing - no artificial j

support.

SNOTCuu 1

25 yds 2 alfled 30 sec Standing strong shoulder B-27 Rifled.5 lug:

Slugs (Load 2 slugs Hits = strike area on target

- chamber empty-(10, 9. 7)

Time starts -

Commence firing.)

1 15 yes 5 Double 00 10 sec Standing strong shoulder B-27 Do e le 00 Suckshot:

Suchshot (Load $rds Buckshot Hits in black = 2 pts i

chamber empty-(5rds x 9 pellets /rd a 2 pts = 9C Ilse starts -

Commence firing.)

Minimum qualifying = 70E RIFtE 1

25 yes 1 - Srd seg 45 sec Standing - Barricade 3-27 2

25 yes 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Staeuting 3

25 yes 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Kneeling Minimum qualifying = 70E 4

25 yds 1 - 5sd mag 45 sec Prone te0TE: All firing is to be done only at night. Use of night simulation equipment during daylight is not allouable.

Use of site specific sighting devices (i.e., laser, etc.) should be included in the licensee amended security plan for NRC approval.

O o