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| {{Adams
| | #REDIRECT [[IR 05000333/1985098]] |
| | number = ML20207S813
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| | issue date = 03/13/1987
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| | title = SALP Rept 50-333/85-98 for Dec 1985 - Nov 1986
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| | author name =
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| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
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| | addressee name =
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| | addressee affiliation =
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| | docket = 05000333
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| | license number =
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| | contact person =
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| | document report number = 50-333-85-98, NUDOCS 8703200292
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| | package number = ML20207S799
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| | document type = SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
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| | page count = 51
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| }}
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| See also: [[see also::IR 05000333/1985098]]
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| | |
| =Text=
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| {{#Wiki_filter:-
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| . i
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| <
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| ENCLOSURE
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| SALP BOARD REPORT
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| U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
| |
| REGION I
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| SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
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| SALP REPORT 50-333/85-98-
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| NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY
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| JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
| |
| ASSESSMENT PERIOD: DECEMBER 1, 1985 - NOVEMBER 30,~1986
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| BOARD MEETING DATE, FEBRUARY 13, 1987
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| 8703200292 870313
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| gDR ADOCK 05000333
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| PDR
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| | |
| .. ,
| |
| , TABLE OF CONTENTS
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| Page
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| .I. INTRODUCTION ........................ 1
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| A. Purpose and Overview .................. -1
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| B. SALP Board Members .............. .... 1
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| C. Background ....................... 2
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| II. CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 4
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| III . SUMMARY OF RESU LTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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| A. Overall Facility Evaluation . . . . . .......... 6
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| B. Facility Performance .................. 7
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| IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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| A. Plant Operations .................... 8
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| B. Radiological Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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| C. Maintenance . . .................... 15
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| D. Surveillance ...................... 18
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| E. Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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| F. Security and Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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| G. Outage Management and Engineering Support . ....... 25
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| H. Licensing Activities .................. 27
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| I. Training and Qualification Effectiveness ........ 30
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| J. Assurance of Quality .................. 33
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| V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES ................ 36
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| A. Investigation and Allegation Review . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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| B. Escalated Enforcement Action .............. 36
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| C. Management Conferences ................. 36
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| D. Licensee Event Reports ................. 36
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| E. Licensing Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
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| TABLES
| |
| ' Table 1 Inspection Report Activities ............... 39
| |
| Table 2 Inspection Hours Summary ................ 41
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| Table 3 Tabular Listing of LERs by Functional Area ........ 42
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| Table.4 LER Synopsis ....................... 43
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| Table 5 Enforcement Summary . ................... 45
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| Table 6 Reactor Trips and Plar.t Shutdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
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| Figure 1 Number of Days Shutdown . . . . . . . .......... 49
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| a
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| ,
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| ..
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| 1
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| I. INTRODUCTION
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| A. Purpose and Overview
| |
| The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an inte-
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| grated NRC staff effort to collect the available observations and
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| data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based
| |
| upon this information. SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory
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| processes used to ensure compliance to NRC rules and regulations.
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| SALP is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational
| |
| basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance
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| to the licensee's management to promote quality and safety of plant
| |
| operation.
| |
| A NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on
| |
| February 13, 1987 to review the collection of performance observa-
| |
| tions and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance with
| |
| the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of
| |
| Licensee Performance." A summary of the guidance and evaluation cri-
| |
| teria is provided in Section II of this report.
| |
| This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety
| |
| performance at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant for the peri-
| |
| od December 1, 1985 to November 30, 1986.
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| B. SALP Board Members
| |
| Chairman:
| |
| W. F. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
| |
| Members:
| |
| D. R.. Muller, Director, BWR Project Directorate No. 2, NRR
| |
| T. T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
| |
| (DRSS) (part-time)
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| W. V. Johnston, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS),
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| (part-time)
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| R. M. Gallo, Chief, Projects Branch 2, DRP
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| J. C. Linville, Chief, Projects Section 2C, DRP
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| A. J. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick, DRP
| |
| H. Abelson, Licensing Project Manager, BWR Project Directorate No.2,
| |
| NRR
| |
| Other Attendees:
| |
| P. W. Eselgroth, Chief, Test Program Section, DRS (part-time)
| |
| R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS (part-time)
| |
| G. W. Meyer, Project Engineer, RPS 2C, DRP
| |
| N. S. Perry, Reactor Engineer, RPS 2C, DRP
| |
| | |
| , i-
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| 2
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| C. Background
| |
| -1. Licensee Activities
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| The facility operated at or near full power from December 1,
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| 1985 until March 13, 1986 when the plant was shut down for a
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| scheduled maintenance outage which lasted until March 28, 1986.
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| During this outage, the licensee replaced 16 control rod drive
| |
| mechanisms, conducted preventive and corrective maintenance ac-
| |
| tivities, and completed several modifications. The plant re-
| |
| turned to power operation on March 31, 1986.
| |
| From this maintenance outage until the next scheduled mainte-
| |
| nance outage, normal power operatior, was interrupted by three
| |
| unscheduled outages lasting between one and three days. On
| |
| April 4, -1986 the reactor tripped from 88% power during main
| |
| turbine stop valve testing caused by an improper valve position
| |
| indication. On May 15, 1986, the plant was shut down as re-
| |
| quired by Technical Specifications due to an inoperable Recircu-
| |
| lation Loop Discharge Bypass Valve. On July 3,1986, the
| |
| reactor tripped from full power when a failure occurred in the
| |
| protective relaying circuit for the outgoing electrical trans-
| |
| mission lines.
| |
| The facility was shut down from September 27, 1986 until October
| |
| 9,1986 for another scheduled maintenance outage which involved
| |
| the replacement of ten control rod drive mechanisms, turbine
| |
| blade inspection, preventive and corrective maintenance, and
| |
| modification insta11'ation. Following the completion of the
| |
| maintenance outage, the plant again operated at near full power
| |
| until November 1, 1986 when a plant coast down began for the
| |
| refueling outage scheduled for Jr.nuary 1987. The plant was
| |
| continuing to coast down at the end of the assessment period.
| |
| Table 6 provides a description, including our classification of
| |
| the cause of all reactor trips and unscheduled plant shutdowns
| |
| during this assessment period.
| |
| 2. Inspection Activities
| |
| One NRC resident inspector was assigned to the James A.
| |
| FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant for this assessment period. The
| |
| total NRC inspection effort for the period was 1920 hours with a
| |
| distribution in the appraisal functional areas as shown in Table
| |
| 2.
| |
| During the assessment period, an NRC team evaluated the annual
| |
| emergency preparedness exercise conducted on September 26, 1985.
| |
| Tabulations of Inspection and Enforcement Activities are pre-
| |
| sented in Tables 1 and 5, respectively.
| |
| .
| |
| . . - - - ,
| |
| | |
| .. ...
| |
| ' 3
| |
| This report also discusses " Training and Qualification Effec-
| |
| tiveness" and " Assurance of Quality" as separate functional ar-
| |
| eas. Although these topics are used in the.other functional
| |
| areas as evaluation criteria, they are being addressed separate-
| |
| ly to provide'an overall assessment of their effectiveness. For
| |
| example, quality assurance effectiveness is assessed on a day-
| |
| to-day basis by resident inspectors and as an integral aspect'of
| |
| each specialist inspection. Although quality of work is the
| |
| responsibility of every employee, one of the management tools to
| |
| measure this effectiveness is reliance on inspections and au-
| |
| dits. 0ther n.afor factors that influence quality, such as in -
| |
| volvement of first line supervision, safety committees, and
| |
| worker attitudes, are discussed in each area, as appropriate.
| |
| Fire Protection was not evaluated as a separate functional area
| |
| since extensive new information on performance, such as when an
| |
| Appendix R team inspection has occurred, was not generated dur-
| |
| ing this assessment period.
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| i
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| - . , . . - - - - , . - . , . . , . . . , . . , - , . , . . . - - . -
| |
| | |
| . .
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| - 4
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| ~II. CRITERIA.
| |
| Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending
| |
| on whether the facility,is in the construction, preoperational, or operat-
| |
| ing phase. Each. functional area normally represents areas significant to
| |
| nuclear safety and the environment, and are normal programmatic areas.
| |
| Special areas may be added to highlight significant observations.
| |
| The following evaluation criteria were used, where appropriate, to assess
| |
| each functional area.
| |
| 1. Management involvement and control in assuring quality.
| |
| 2. Approach to resolution of_ technical issues from a safety standpoint.
| |
| 3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
| |
| 4. Enforcement history.
| |
| 5. Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
| |
| 6. ' Staffing (including management)
| |
| 7. Training and qualification effectiveness.
| |
| Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional area evaluated is
| |
| classified into one of three performance categories. The definitions of
| |
| these performance categories are:
| |
| Category 1
| |
| Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee management attention
| |
| and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety;
| |
| licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of
| |
| performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.
| |
| Category 2
| |
| NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Licensee management
| |
| attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuclear safe-
| |
| ty; licensee resources are adequate and reasonably effective so that sat-
| |
| isfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being
| |
| achieved.
| |
| Category 3
| |
| Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. Licensee management
| |
| attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but
| |
| weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained or not
| |
| effectively used so that minimally satisfactory performance with respect
| |
| to operational safety is being achieved.
| |
| _.
| |
| - . __ -
| |
| | |
| . >
| |
| 5
| |
| - The SALP Board 'also assesses functional areas to compare the licensee's.
| |
| -
| |
| performance during the last part of the assessment period to that during the
| |
| entire period (normally one year) in order to determine the recent trend for
| |
| functional areas as appropriate. The SALP trend categories are as follows:
| |
| Improving: Licensee performance has generally improved over the last
| |
| part of the SALP assessment period.
| |
| Declining: Licensee performance has generally declined over the last
| |
| part of the SALP assessment period.
| |
| A trend is assigned only when, in the opinion of the SALP board, the trend is
| |
| significant enough to be considered indicative of a likely change in the
| |
| performance category in the near future. For example, a classification of
| |
| " Category 2, Improving" indicates the clear potential for " Category 1"
| |
| performance in the next SALP period.
| |
| .
| |
| 3
| |
| 1
| |
| e
| |
| '
| |
| i
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| 1
| |
| , - - . ._ . , .
| |
| y .- . , , - - - . - - - - - -
| |
| | |
| - .
| |
| , .
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| 6
| |
| III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
| |
| A. Overall Facility Evaluation
| |
| '
| |
| Management attention has resulted in noticeable improvement through-
| |
| out the facility and in particular the areas of plant operations and
| |
| assurance of quality. Although the functional area ratings have
| |
| remained the same, this does not reflect the general, overall improve-
| |
| ment observed in site activities. The number of operational events
| |
| has significantly decreased during this assessment period with two
| |
| reactor trips from power. Neither was caused by operator error.
| |
| Plant management, and in particular the Resident Manager and Quality
| |
| Assurance Superintendent, have demonstrated a philosophy oriented
| |
| toward nuclear safety and have been influential in. improving the
| |
| overall plant performance. The New York Power Authority (NYPA) has
| |
| been effective in fostering an improved attitude towards safety,
| |
| accountability, and pride in workmanship. Plant personnel now dis-
| |
| play a greater degree of attention to detail in day-to-day
| |
| activities. With the exceptions discussed in the licensing area,
| |
| Plant management is cooperative and responsive to NRC concerns and
| |
| initiatives.
| |
| Although an overall improving trend was evident, several areas previ-
| |
| ously noted as deficient warrant additional management attention.
| |
| These include, procedural adherence, follow-up of commitments, and
| |
| instilling a questioning attitude within the organization.
| |
| .
| |
| | |
| -.
| |
| s' o''
| |
| 7
| |
| B. Facility Performance
| |
| CATEGORY CATEGORY
| |
| LAST THIS RECENT
| |
| FUNCTIONAL AREA PERIOD * PERIOD ** TREND
| |
| 1. Plant Operations 2 2 Improving
| |
| 2. Radiological Controls 2 2
| |
| 3. Maintenance 2 2
| |
| 4. Surveillance 2 2
| |
| 5. Fire Protection 1 N/A
| |
| 6. Emergency Preparedness 1 1
| |
| 7. Security & Safeguards 1 1
| |
| 8. Outage Management and 2 2
| |
| Engineering SLpport
| |
| 9. Licensing Activities 2 2 Declining
| |
| 9
| |
| '
| |
| 10. Training and Qualification 2 2
| |
| i
| |
| Effectiveness
| |
| '
| |
| 11. Assurance of Quality 2 2 Improving
| |
| * July 1, 1984 to November 30, 1985 (17 months)
| |
| ** December 1, 1985 to November 30, 1986 (12 months)
| |
| | |
| . .
| |
| . 8
| |
| IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
| |
| A. Plant Operations (775 Hours, 40.3%)
| |
| '
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During the previcus assessment period, this functional area was
| |
| rated as Category 2 with an overall decline in performance. A
| |
| number of personnel errors and inconsistent review of opera-
| |
| tional events and root cause analysis were noted as
| |
| deficiencies.
| |
| During this assessment period, the plant operators were deter-
| |
| mined to be knowledgeable and conducted themselves in a profes-
| |
| sfonal manner. They exhibit a positive attitude toward
| |
| operating the plant in a safe manner. During operational events
| |
| .and routine evolution, the operators demonstrated their ability
| |
| to respond quickly and efficiently. Also, their ability to con-
| |
| duct three normal reactor shutdowns and five reactor startups in
| |
| a controlled manner without causing a reactor trip is commend-
| |
| able. Several isolated cases occurred where operators did not
| |
| fully investigate or were not aware of.off-normal conditions.
| |
| These included annunciators, control room ventilation fan
| |
| operability, tripping of overloads on a motor operated valve,
| |
| and systems affected by a level switch failure. Although these
| |
| conditions were of minor safety significance, continued emphasis
| |
| should be placed on understanding and identifying off-normal
| |
| conditions.
| |
| One noteworthy improvement during this assessment period was the
| |
| absence of a significant number of personnel errors. Two plant
| |
| trips occurred from power and neither was directly attributed to
| |
| personnel error. One of nine trips which took place while the
| |
| plant was shut down was attributed to operator error; however,
| |
| this occurred while the operator was taking necessary actions to
| |
| isolate a leak in the feedwater system while in the process of
| |
| lowering reactor vessel level. In addition, no plant transient
| |
| or equipment inoperability occurred as a result of personnel
| |
| error.
| |
| As a result of the unusually large number of trips which oc-
| |
| curred during the previous assessment period, a Scram Review Team
| |
| conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the trips and the cir-
| |
| cumstances surrounding them. As a result of that review, about
| |
| >
| |
| 66 recommendations were given to improve overall plant
| |
| performance and reduce the number of trips. These recommenda-
| |
| tions, their resolution, and their implementation are tracked by
| |
| the licensee using a formal system. Although no single signifi-
| |
| cant root cause existed for the reactor trips, each recommenda-
| |
| tion improved the way plant management conducts operations. In
| |
| 't
| |
| ,y . , , , , . ..y _ . , . _ _ _
| |
| , y __ _ _ _ . - _ , _ . - , _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ , _ _ _ _ . _
| |
| | |
| .. .-
| |
| 9
| |
| the.short term, the management continues to work to instill a
| |
| positive attitude and pride in workmanship among its employees,
| |
| which has resulted in a reduction of personnel errors and the
| |
| ability to correct deficiencies quickly and correctly. Further
| |
| assessment of the long term recommendations is required.
| |
| Administrative controls, procedures and procedural adherence are
| |
| generally strong, but minor exceptions have been noted that re-
| |
| quire plant management attention. Exceptions include not comply-
| |
| ing with the procedure for securing the high pressure coolant
| |
| injection turbine during surveillance testing, using data sheets
| |
| to perform testing instead of the procedure, and skipping steps
| |
| of a procedure during testing. These examples are not of major
| |
| significance' and are considered isolated events. Plant manage-
| |
| ment is aware of this concern and is stressing improvement in
| |
| this area.
| |
| Plant management continues to stress professionalism and to
| |
| improve the cor. trol room environment, as noted by the removal of
| |
| the Secondary Alarm Station from the control room, installation
| |
| of curtains to limit traffic in the control room, and continued
| |
| improvements in establishing an effective work control center.
| |
| In addition, plant management has placed emphasis on reducing
| |
| the number of continuously lighted annunciators. Although plant
| |
| management has made progress in this area, continued attention
| |
| is warranted. The Operations Superintendent conducts weekly
| |
| meetings with each shift to review events and stress the need
| |
| for improvements. Additional improvements noted were the in-
| |
| creased use of formal critiques to review events and a more com-
| |
| prehensive post-trip review procedure. Senior plant management
| |
| takes an active role in the plant operations area as indicated
| |
| by daily control room reviews, which include log reviews, panel
| |
| walkdowns and discussions with operators. Plant management
| |
| stresses safety and emphasizes a methodical approach to plant
| |
| evolutions. There is consistent evidence of a commitment to
| |
| plant betterment and timely, effective corrective actions.
| |
| Corrective actions for a violation for a failure to comply with
| |
| 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements did not prevent a second
| |
| violation. The second instance occurred nine months after the
| |
| first occurrence. Plant management failed to take adequate
| |
| measures to prevent recurrence. In addition, the licensee had
| |
| not implemented all of the corrective actions committed to fol-
| |
| lowing the first occurrence, even though they had exceeded the
| |
| commitment date by several months. At the time of the second
| |
| instance, a formal tracking program was in the process of being
| |
| implemented. The tracking program follows items on which action
| |
| is scheduled and highlights those which are commitments.
| |
| Although improvements were noted in the review of operational
| |
| I
| |
| -- -
| |
| , -- - - - -
| |
| | |
| I
| |
| .
| |
| ,.
| |
| . 10
| |
| events and root cause analysis, some deficiencies have been not-
| |
| ed as discussed in Section C, Maintenance. A marked improvement
| |
| has been noted in the FitzPatrick Licensee Event Report (LER)
| |
| submittals. ,
| |
| The LERs presented a clear understanding of the event, its
| |
| cause, and corrective action taken or committed to be taken.
| |
| Further improvement can still be made by consistently discussing
| |
| the safety implication of the event and identifying the manufac-
| |
| turer and model of failed components.
| |
| Housekeeping at the facility has improved. Senior plant manage-
| |
| ment makes weekly tours of the facility to review cleanliness
| |
| conditions and continues to emphasize plant cleanliness. Al-
| |
| though cleanliness has generally been good, occasional lapses
| |
| have occurred in material storage, such as ladders left stand-
| |
| ing,' gas bottles improperly stored, and small items adrift.
| |
| In summary, plant operations is a strength as indicated by the
| |
| high unit availability and significant improvements. Plant
| |
| Management attention has resulted in a significant reduction in
| |
| operator related events.
| |
| 2. Conclusion
| |
| Rating: 2
| |
| Trend: Improving
| |
| 3. Board Recommenaations
| |
| None
| |
| l
| |
| !
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| ,
| |
| , ,., - - . ,y v. , .- ,-,e + .. -- --,--~r- - ~ - , - - - *- - - - *
| |
| | |
| -
| |
| . .
| |
| 11
| |
| +
| |
| B. -Radiological Controls (392 Hours, 20.4%)
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During the previous SALP period this area was rated as Category
| |
| 2. Weaknesses included delayed responses?to NRC findings and
| |
| lack of management attention relative to conforming to radiation
| |
| protection procedures. This functional area will be discussed
| |
| in terms of radiological protection,- radioactive waste transpor-
| |
| tation, and effluent monitoring and control. There were six
| |
| inspections conducted by radiation specialistsoin this area, two
| |
| in radiological protection, one in radioactive waste transporta-
| |
| tion, and three in effluent monitoring and control. The resi-
| |
| dent inspector also monitored tne implementation of the
| |
| radiation protection program.
| |
| RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
| |
| The licensee showed consistent performance relative to the pre-
| |
| vious assessment period, with no major weakness identified and
| |
| no major program improvements. Several minor instances of per-
| |
| sonnel-failing to follow procedures occurred during this assess-
| |
| ment period as in the previous assessment period.
| |
| The Radiological Protection Program is staffed with qualified
| |
| personnel. However, it should be noted that the Health Physics
| |
| General Supervisor left FitzPartick in the last month of the
| |
| assessment period and that the station Radiation Protection
| |
| Manager has been temporarily acting in this position. When a
| |
| new General Supervisor is selected, increased management atten-
| |
| tion will be needed to assure a smooth transition.
| |
| The ALARA program is strong and effective with good management
| |
| support and represents a program strength. ALARA reviews for
| |
| planned work, completed work, and continuous evaluation of work
| |
| in progress are good. During the course of several inspections
| |
| in this rating period, the ALARA program was examined and found
| |
| to be of consistently high quality.
| |
| The licensee's ALARA person-rem goal for the site was 600 per-
| |
| son-rem for 1986, a non-refueling year, based on a calculated
| |
| exposure estimate of 575 person-rem. With the accumulated ex- '
| |
| posure at the end of the assessment period,'the exposure for
| |
| 1986 was not expected to exceed 400 person-rem. While this ex-
| |
| posure reflects well on the ALARA program, it shows the goal set
| |
| for the 1986 calendar year was not aggressive.
| |
| The program for external and internal exposure control reflects
| |
| an adequate commitment to safety. In this SALP assessment peri-
| |
| od, as in the previous assessment period, no overexposures oc-
| |
| curred and no individuals received an uptake that required
| |
| . . - .
| |
| | |
| . . . . . - -- -. . - - . .-
| |
| 1 x .: >
| |
| . 12
| |
| r
| |
| '
| |
| -assessment or any further actions. Radiation Work Permits were
| |
| effectively used to control work within the Restricted Area. As
| |
| -in past years, NYPA is implementing an adequate whole body
| |
| .
| |
| counting program.
| |
| ~
| |
| However, there are areas where improvement is necessary in the
| |
| .
| |
| Linternal'and external exposure control program. Minor problems
| |
| *
| |
| 1nclude failure'to follow procedures and insufficient middle
| |
| '
| |
| management attention to detail to provide oversight in the area
| |
| 'of-external exposure control. Instances of failure to follow
| |
| , ' procedures included failure to maintain survey instrument.cali- i
| |
| >
| |
| bration records and failure to perform alpha surveys on arriving
| |
| new fuel shipments. . Additional middle management attention to
| |
| .the-supervision and assessment of day-to-day radiological con-
| |
| trols activities is needed to improve self-identification and
| |
| ,
| |
| correction of. program weaknesses.
| |
| The re'spiratory protection program is of state-of-the-art
| |
| q'uali ty. The licensee has placed a high priority on this pro-
| |
| 1 gram as evidenced by effective respirator selection, issue, use,
| |
| and maintenance practices.
| |
| L Radiological survey instrument controls were weak. Specifical-
| |
| *
| |
| .ly, the storage, maintenance, and calibration facilities for
| |
| portable survey instruments needed improvement. Furthermore,
| |
| survey equipment availability during the October 1986 outage was
| |
| limited, which indicated poor control of equipment inventory.
| |
| Personnel frisking practices were inferior to industry stan-
| |
| ,
| |
| dards, in that high background count rates potentially precluded
| |
| effective detection of personnel contamination. Compounding
| |
| i-- this problem were poor frisking; techniques by station personnel.
| |
| Regarding both the survey instrument control and frisking prob- l
| |
| : 1 ems, middle management within the radiological controls group t
| |
| appeared unaware of these problems until informed by the NRC,
| |
| >
| |
| ~
| |
| despite the seemingly obvious nature of the problems. It was
| |
| ..
| |
| ' unclear whether the lack of awareness was due to the failure to
| |
| personally inspect field activities, poor communications with '
| |
| ,
| |
| personnel in the field, or low standards of work. F
| |
| l Corporate management is frequently involved in the activities
| |
| .
| |
| providing guidance and consultation to FitzPatrick Station man-
| |
| agement. For example, Corporate and Standard Audits were per-
| |
| formed of the Rad ution Protection Program. However, most
| |
| Standard Audits, while timely, were superficial and of limited
| |
| .
| |
| '
| |
| scope due to a lack of audit personnel qualified or trained in ;
| |
| health physics and chemistry. This weakness was identified by
| |
| corporate management late in the SALP assessment period. Corpo-
| |
| >
| |
| *
| |
| ,
| |
| rate management indicated that their audit personnel, qualified
| |
| :
| |
| s
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| .. . ', !
| |
| ,
| |
| '
| |
| 13
| |
| 4* ..,
| |
| in HP and Chemistry, would be made available to augment the
| |
| '
| |
| Standard Audit program.
| |
| RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE TRANSPORTATION
| |
| '
| |
| An inspection of radioactive waste transportation-found this
| |
| area to be generally good. While a concern was identified
| |
| regarding the circumvention of the receipt inspection system for
| |
| transport packages, the corrective actions were timely and
| |
| thorough. In addition, when concerns were identified regarding
| |
| the adequacy and effectiveness of the audit program for trans-
| |
| port packages, QA/QC involvement in this area was promptly in-
| |
| creased.
| |
| EFFLUENT MONITORING AND CONTROL'
| |
| During the previous assessment period the Radiological Effluent
| |
| Technical Specifications (RETS) were implemented. Inspections
| |
| during this period found no significant problems in RETS imple- l
| |
| mentation, and the licensee was effective in correcting the
| |
| minor problems which occurred. An inspection of the environ-
| |
| mental monitoring program found a problem with implementation of
| |
| a calibration procedure. However, this problem appeared to be
| |
| an isolated instance due to a lack of attention to detail rather
| |
| than a programmatic breakdown. With this exception, the envi-
| |
| ronmental monitoring program was effectively implemented with
| |
| respect to Technical Specification requirements for sampling
| |
| frequencies, types of measurements, analytical sensitivity, and
| |
| reporting schedules.
| |
| 'An inspection of the nonradiological chemistry program found it
| |
| to be generally effective. Minor deficiencies were identified
| |
| in several of the chemical analysis procedures, but the licensee
| |
| response was prompt and thorough. With a few exceptions, all of
| |
| the analyses of chemical standards agreed with the analyses of
| |
| the split samples. The reasons for the few disagreements were
| |
| determined and resolved.
| |
| An inspection of effluent and process radiation monitor calibra-
| |
| tion and surveillance testing, and in place filter testing found
| |
| these areas to be acceptable.
| |
| Summary
| |
| The established programs for radiological protection, radioac-
| |
| tive waste transportation, environmental monitoring, and
| |
| nonradiological chemistry are sound and effective. The day-to-
| |
| day implementation of these programs must be managed and super-
| |
| vised to achieve the results of which the programs are capable
| |
| and to prevent the minor problems experienced during this peri-
| |
| od. A more probing and effective quality assurance review of
| |
| these programs would aid in assuring proper implementation.
| |
| ,
| |
| -
| |
| , - - - - - , - , , . - . -n
| |
| | |
| - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| |
| . .
| |
| . 14
| |
| 2. Conclusion
| |
| Rating: Category 2
| |
| ,
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| .
| |
| . .
| |
| .. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| |
| | |
| . .
| |
| 15
| |
| C. Maintenance (159 Hours, 8.3%)
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During the previous assessment period, this functional area was
| |
| rated as Category 2. Although FitzPatrick management continued
| |
| to implement several improvement programs, progress was slow and
| |
| had loosely defined completion schedules. Also, several per-
| |
| sonnel errors resulted in reactor trips or plant shutdowns.
| |
| During this period, this area was frequently reviewed by the
| |
| resident inspector. In addition, specialist inspections re-
| |
| viewed the maintenance of the recirculation pump trip system and
| |
| the equipment qualification of Limitorque valve operators. No
| |
| .sp'rogrammatic inspection of maintenance was conducted during the
| |
| ' current assessment period.
| |
| During this assessment period, plant management became more ac-
| |
| tively involved in implementing the improvement programs, and
| |
| progress was generally good. A program to control vendor tech-
| |
| nical manuals was begun by developing a computerized index and
| |
| reviewing the manuals maintained by each department. However,
| |
| there have been delays in implementing the program in the Main-
| |
| tenance Department. Implementation of the Planned Maintenance
| |
| Program continued with some minor delays. The development of
| |
| the Master Equipment List progressed with component classifica-
| |
| tions. Improvements were made in tool control, and a vibration
| |
| analysis test program began.
| |
| Improvements were noted in the maintenance area during this pe-
| |
| riod. Most noteworthy was the absence of a significant number
| |
| of personnel errors. Maintenance personnel were well qualified
| |
| and conscientious, and exhibited a proper safety perspective
| |
| concerning their potential impact on plant operations. The ad-
| |
| ministrative control of preventive and corrective maintenance
| |
| work was good. Based on this, it appeared that maintenance
| |
| training programs were effective. Also, personnel turnover rate
| |
| was low. Supervisory involvement was evident and effective in
| |
| the timely resolution of equipment problems.
| |
| During this assessment period, nine reactor trips occurred while
| |
| : the plant was shutdown with all rods fully inserted. Six of
| |
| these trips were caused by spiking of the "G" IRM during under
| |
| vessel work. A broken connector was later found on the IRM, and
| |
| it was determined that minimal contact by maintenance personnel
| |
| caused the spike. Based on the nature of under-vessel work and
| |
| an abnormal condition of one channel of RPS deenergized for
| |
| other modifications, these trips are of minimal concern. The
| |
| three remaining trips while shut down were unrelated and are
| |
| discussed in Table 6.
| |
| . - - . _ . - -_ _ _ _ _ - , .
| |
| | |
| _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
| |
| . .
| |
| 16
| |
| Regarding the Recirculation Pump Trip System, preventive mainte-
| |
| nance was properly controlled and documented, and corrective
| |
| maintenance was timely and adequate. In addition, the engineers
| |
| and supervisors were technically competent and knowledgeable of
| |
| past system problems. Management involvement was evident in the
| |
| effort to modify a failed breaker and to pursue modifications
| |
| for the same breakers in other applications.
| |
| A concern was identified regarding examples of personnel not
| |
| following maintenance procedures. These involved not applying
| |
| thread sealant during assembly of a pressure transmitter conduit
| |
| connection as required by the technical manual, missing a step
| |
| during assembly of a control rod drive mechanism, and incorrect
| |
| torque setting for pressure transmitter mounting bolts. The
| |
| last two examples were identified by Quality Control personnel
| |
| observing these activities. These are considered to be individ-
| |
| ual errors and are not indicative of a widespread disregard for ,
| |
| procedures. Although these examples are of minor safety signif-
| |
| icance, plant management attention to prevent more significant
| |
| problems is warranted.
| |
| The licensee has taken a more aggressive approach to correct
| |
| several recurring equipment problems, including the Low Pressure
| |
| Coolant Injection Independent Power Supplies, the Containment
| |
| Atmosphere Analyzer, and the transmitters in the Analog Trans-
| |
| mitter Trip System. However, plant management failed to estab-
| |
| lish the root cause of other problems such as the Main Steam
| |
| Isolation Valve limit switch failures, recirculation loop bypass
| |
| valve packing leakage, and the Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch
| |
| failure.
| |
| Specifically, failure to establish the root cause of a limit
| |
| switch failure on a Turbine Stop Valve subsequently contributed
| |
| to a ceactor trip during surveillance testing. The limit switch
| |
| had ralfunctioned numerous times in the six months prior to the
| |
| trip but was not properly evaluated and repaired. Following the
| |
| determination that the limit switch was involved in the reactor
| |
| trip, plant management conducted extensive testing to determine
| |
| the exact cause of the failure. However, maintenance managers
| |
| neglected to review the past failures of the limit switch, which
| |
| indicated that a change in the valve stroke was occurring. In
| |
| addition, during the reactor startup following the trip, when
| |
| maintenance managers identified that the valve stroke had
| |
| changed, no detailed review of the cause of the stroke change
| |
| was considered until several days after the startup. Subsequent
| |
| inspection found that loose bolts had allowed the valve stroke
| |
| to change. Apparently, the bolts became loose due to a failure
| |
| to apply proper torque.
| |
| The environmental qualification (EQ) program for Limitorque
| |
| valve operators was generally effective. Management involvement
| |
| _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ __
| |
| | |
| . .
| |
| . 17
| |
| 'was evident'by the number of management personnel who actively
| |
| participated in the EQ program, the high degree of organization
| |
| of EQ documents, and the prompt performance of EQ related activ-
| |
| ities. Further evidence of commendable performance included the
| |
| thorough resp'onse to NRC Information Notice 86-03, including a
| |
| 100% inspection of.Limitorque valve operators requiring EQ and.
| |
| the licensee's decision to upgrade the Limitorque valve control
| |
| wiring, even though qualification data was available for the
| |
| existing control wires. However, some implementation problems
| |
| were identified within the general EQ program, which will be
| |
| evaluated during the pending inspection of the plant EQ program.
| |
| Overall, the plant maintenance program has improved from the
| |
| previous assessment period. The absence of significant per-
| |
| sonnel errors and the proficiency in properly completing work is
| |
| noteworthy. Continued emphasis should be placed on. timely com-
| |
| pletion of improvement programs, procedure compliance, and root
| |
| cause analysis to prevent recurring problems.
| |
| 2. Conclusion
| |
| Rating: 2
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| .
| |
| | |
| .
| |
| . ..
| |
| -
| |
| 18
| |
| D. Surveillance (194 Hours, 10.1%)
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During the previous assessment period, this functional area was-
| |
| rated as Category 2, primarily due to repeated problems in es-
| |
| tablishing an effective Inservice Testing (IST) Program.
| |
| During the current assessment period, the surveillance, calibra-
| |
| tion, and IST programs were reviewed. The resident inspector
| |
| also examined surveillance testing during the routine inspection
| |
| program.
| |
| The licensee improved the IST Program by including all required
| |
| valves, rewriting procedures to include acceptable values, and
| |
| assuring that the operators do a thorough review of data follow-
| |
| ing the tests. However, the previous SALP Report noted problems
| |
| regarding the review of test data by operations and plant per-
| |
| formance personnel. During this period, operations department
| |
| reviews of the data were adequate and timely, but-the subsequent
| |
| review of the data by plant performance personnel was, at times,
| |
| excessively slow (up to several weeks). This review is relied
| |
| upon to determine trends and notify Operations to increase test
| |
| frequency when components exhibit undesirable trends.
| |
| Surveillance tests are performed by the responsible department,
| |
| with the majority of testing completed by the following depart-
| |
| ments: Instrument and Control, Operations, Maintenance, and
| |
| Radiological and Environmental Services. Each depar_tment
| |
| maintains its own system for scheduling, tracking and performing
| |
| surveillances. The completed surveillance tests were well docu-
| |
| mented utilizing detailed procedures, data forms, and acceptance
| |
| criteria. Overall, personnel performing the tests were know1-
| |
| edgeable, responsible, and well trained. Procedure use and ad-
| |
| herence was good in general with exceptions noted in Section A,
| |
| Operations. No plant trips or shutdowns were the direct result
| |
| of testing errors.
| |
| However, three surveillance tests were either performed late or
| |
| missed as follows:
| |
| --
| |
| A monthly test of the APRM flow bias network was missed for
| |
| eight months when it was not placed on the schedule follow-
| |
| ing a shutdown period.
| |
| --
| |
| A quarterly test of the diesel fire pump was performed 18
| |
| days beyond the grace period due to a lack of management
| |
| oversight of the maintenance department surveillance
| |
| program.
| |
| --
| |
| A chemistry sample during startup was about one hour late
| |
| due to personnel error.
| |
| . _. - . _ _ _ _ _ _,
| |
| ._ -
| |
| _ . -
| |
| | |
| *-
| |
| ...
| |
| 19
| |
| NYPA took prompt actions to strengthen its administrative re-
| |
| quirements associated with the surveillance test program to pre-
| |
| vent recurrence. No surveillance tests were missed in the last
| |
| six months of,the period.
| |
| Although no surveillance tests were missed during the previous
| |
| assessment period, there had been numerous missed surveillance
| |
| tests in the period preceding it. It appears that the recurring
| |
| problem of missed surveillance tests is symptomatic of the unco-
| |
| ordinated approach that the surveillance program has taken. The
| |
| lack of an overall responsibility for surveillance testing be-
| |
| yond the individual departments and the minimal coordination
| |
| -
| |
| between departments appear to hamper the long term resolution of
| |
| surveillance testing problems.
| |
| "
| |
| The NRC identified that not all safety-related instruments were
| |
| being periodically calibrated, nor was there an adequat_e sur-
| |
| veillance test to verify that they are functioning within the
| |
| required ranges. The licensee immediately calibrated those
| |
| instruments identified and was further evaluating the remaining
| |
| .
| |
| safety related instruments for periodic calibration. Also, the
| |
| delayed implementation of calibration program improvements rec-
| |
| ommended by a 1983 QA audit reflected poorly on management's
| |
| interest in implementation high quality program.
| |
| Improvements were made in the storage and control of measuring
| |
| and test equipment, including a computerized system for tracking
| |
| the location, status, and restrictions regarding all measuring
| |
| and test equipment.
| |
| In summary, the surveillance test program is adequate. One
| |
| strength noted was in the area of conduct of the surveillance
| |
| tests, as aidenced by the lack of personnel errors during test-
| |
| ing. However, increased management attention is warranted in
| |
| the area of program administration and coordination.
| |
| 2. Conclusion
| |
| Rating: 2
| |
| i
| |
| ,
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| ,_. . -- - - - - -
| |
| _ _ _ - - - - . - . . . .
| |
| | |
| . '.
| |
| . 20
| |
| E. Emergency Preparedness (110 Hours, 5.7%)
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During the pr'evious assessment period this functional area was
| |
| rated as Category 1. This assessment was based upon a good dem-
| |
| onstration of emergency response capability during two annual
| |
| exercises, responsiveness to weaknesses identified in these ex-
| |
| ercises and a clear management commitment to the emergency pre-
| |
| paredness program.
| |
| The current assessment period included observation of one
| |
| partial-scale exercise conducted'in June 1986. The exercise
| |
| demonstrated a high degree of proficiency which appears to re-
| |
| sult from a strong training program. Emergency response person-
| |
| nel are quite knowledgeable and dedicated. Only one minor
| |
| deficiency was identified during the exercise. This exercise
| |
| showed improvement from the previous year's exercise, which had
| |
| only minor discrepancies.
| |
| The licensee staff is active in maintaining and improving the
| |
| emergency response program. Program weaknesses are promptly
| |
| identified and corrected. NYPA and others have taken the init-
| |
| iative to jointly study the local effects of Lake Ontario on
| |
| atmospheric dispersion. The information gained will help quan-
| |
| tify the local lake effect and improve capabilities overall in
| |
| protective action decision making for the central New York lake
| |
| region. The licensee recently incorporated the use of a " Lag-
| |
| rangian Puff" model for dose assessment.
| |
| The emergency preparedness training and qualification program
| |
| . continues to make a positive contribution to plant safety, com-
| |
| mensurate with procedures and staffing which have been consis-
| |
| tently good.
| |
| The licensee has developed and maintains a good rapport with the
| |
| local government (Oswego County) and the State (New York) regard-
| |
| ing emergency preparedness. They met on a regular basis (quar-
| |
| terly) to discuss, plan and address issues related to emergency
| |
| ,
| |
| response. Also, in a joint initiative with Niagara Mohawk Power
| |
| Corp., NYPA plans to install a siren verification system.
| |
| In summary, continued commitment to a high quality emergency
| |
| preparedness program was demonstrated by excellent performance
| |
| during the exercise, thorough preparation in procedures and
| |
| training, and improvements in program and facilities.
| |
| 2. Conclusion
| |
| Rating: Category 1
| |
| ... . .. - - . -
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| c. .
| |
| 21
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| | |
| y -.
| |
| 22
| |
| F. Security and Safeguards (140 Hours, 7.3%)
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During this a'ssessment period, only one physical security in-
| |
| spection was conducted because the licensee's performance during
| |
| the two previous assessment periods was rated as Category 1.
| |
| Routine resident inspections of the security program were per-
| |
| formed throughout the assessment period. One material control
| |
| and accounting inspection was conducted.
| |
| The licensee continued to review the effect!veness of the secu-
| |
| rity program and the adequacy of related facilities during the
| |
| period. As a result, the licensee plans to move the security
| |
| administrative offices into new office facilities and has al-
| |
| ready moved the secondary alarm station (SAS) into new facili-
| |
| ties that provide more space and efficiency of operation.
| |
| Additionally, as a result of recommendations resulting from sur-
| |
| veys of the security program performed by outside contractors, a
| |
| new computerized security system and new card readers were in-
| |
| stalled, along with the new search equipment that was installed
| |
| at the end of the last assessment period. The licensee's com-
| |
| mitment to a high quality security program is evident by the
| |
| continued support, in terms of capital resources for program
| |
| upgrades, and the continued excellent interface among security
| |
| and other corporate and site functions.
| |
| The supervisory staff is well experienced and continued to dem-
| |
| onstrate their knowledge of and ability to meet NRC security
| |
| performance objectives.
| |
| The security training program is now managed by one full-time
| |
| training instructor with assistance from several part-time in-
| |
| structors who have expertise in specific areas. While this is a
| |
| reduction of one full-time instructor from the previous assess-
| |
| ment period, the assistance of the part-time instructors has
| |
| compensated for the reduction and no adverse impact on the
| |
| training program has thus far been apparent. The licensee has
| |
| excellent training facilities that, in addition to modern class-
| |
| rooms and physical fitness facilities, include an indoor firing
| |
| range. Contingency plan drills are conducted regularly as a
| |
| . supplement to the training program. Critiques of the drills are
| |
| conducted and documented, with feedback into the training pro-
| |
| gram. This has proven to be a very effective training aid. The
| |
| effectiveness of the training program is apparent by the lack of
| |
| performance related events during the assessment period, and
| |
| this performance, as well as the appearance and morale of the
| |
| security force, reflect favorably on both the training program
| |
| and security management.
| |
| | |
| . . . - . , -. - - - . . ~ - . - . -. ..
| |
| __
| |
| 4
| |
| 1
| |
| ;. .
| |
| ~
| |
| v
| |
| a
| |
| .
| |
| '
| |
| 23.
| |
| .
| |
| , Staffing of the security force appears.to be adequate with occa
| |
| . sional overtime being used to meet unforeseen operational needs.
| |
| This use of overtime has had no adverse effects on:the perfor-
| |
| mance of the force. In preparation for an upcoming outage that
| |
| ,
| |
| has the potential for taxing the existing' force, security man-
| |
| , agement developed and implemented a training program to qualify
| |
| additional watch persons to supplement the force. This advance
| |
| planning.is characteristic of the licensee's security management
| |
| and 'is .further evidence of their desire to implement an effec-
| |
| ; tive and high quality program.-
| |
| I
| |
| "
| |
| Security management.is actively involved in the Region I Nuclear
| |
| . Security Organization and other organizations involved in nucle-
| |
| i ar power plant security. The licensee maintains an. excellent
| |
| relationship with law enforcement agencies and periodically-in -
| |
| vites key members of these agencies to the site for orientation
| |
| in response procedures, plant layout and other matters involved
| |
| with the protection of a nuclear power plant, and to discuss
| |
| ;
| |
| recent developments and innovations, in general. This is1 fur-
| |
| i
| |
| ''
| |
| ther evidence of the licensee's. interest in providing an effec-
| |
| tive security program.
| |
| '
| |
| *
| |
| i
| |
| : There were no security events that required reporting under 10 :
| |
| : CFR 73;71 during the assessment period._ This is attributed to
| |
| : the effective training program that resulted in excellent per-
| |
| formance from the members of the security force and to the pro-
| |
| '
| |
| gram implemented by the licensee to maintain its security
| |
| L systems'and equipment in good working order, which includes mon-
| |
| L itoring of and planning to replace aging' equipment and replace-
| |
| ment of equipment before it became a source of problems. ,
| |
| During the assessment period, the licensee submitted'two changes
| |
| i. to the NRC approved Security Plan in accordance with the provi-
| |
| ! sions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). These plan ~ changes were reviewed and
| |
| i
| |
| '
| |
| considered acceptable. The changes were clearly described and
| |
| the plan pages were marked'to facilitate review. The changes
| |
| :- were made to accommodate modifications to existing site facili-
| |
| , ties and, as with plans for similar modifications since that
| |
| l' time, the licensee discussed its plans beforehand with regional
| |
| personnel to ensure a clear understanding of NRC security pro-
| |
| -
| |
| gram objectives. This demonstrated the licensee's' interest in
| |
| 1. maintaining a high quality program.
| |
| F
| |
| A material control and accounting inspection identified that two
| |
| j neutron fission detectors had not been physically accounted for
| |
| ! during a 1985 inventory of special nuclear material (SNM). The
| |
| : inventory was promptly reconciled. However, the failure to
| |
| t
| |
| physically account for all SNM during an inventory and a misin-
| |
| : terpretation of an NRC requirement regarding the conduct of
| |
| l physical inventories of SNM, also raised during that inspection,
| |
| ;
| |
| i
| |
| 1
| |
| 4
| |
| - , 4, c%., -- y % ,. e,_e._%_.-wm m, .-.o__~,.,
| |
| -
| |
| -_m__m, ,_m,.,.mm_.. ,.,,.,..,___-,_._.m.
| |
| | |
| . o
| |
| 24
| |
| demonstrate the need for increased management attention to the
| |
| accounting of SNM.
| |
| In summary, the continued good performance of the security
| |
| force, coupled with the associated attention to facilities and
| |
| equipment, training, staffing, and involvement with other secu -
| |
| rity organizations, demonstrated the security area to be a
| |
| strength within the FitzPatrick organization.
| |
| 2. Conclusion
| |
| Rating: Category 1
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| 9
| |
| 1
| |
| b
| |
| I
| |
| 1
| |
| .. _ _ _. _ , . ,_--____ _. . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . - -_ - _ . . . _ _ , - _ . . _ _ .
| |
| | |
| . .
| |
| 25
| |
| G. Outage Management and Engineering Support (152 Hours, 7.9%)
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During the previous assessment period, this functional area was
| |
| rated as Category 2. Performance had declined due to inadequate
| |
| planning, poor control of activities, and personnel errors.
| |
| During this period, no refueling outage took place, but two
| |
| short scheduled maintenance outages, totaling 24 days, cccurred.
| |
| During these outages major work included replacement of control
| |
| rod drive mechanisms, installation of several modifications, and
| |
| preventive and corrective maintenance. The resident inspector
| |
| reviewed these activities, and a specialist inspector reviewed
| |
| radiological controls during one of the outages.
| |
| In January, 1986, the licensee established a new Planning and
| |
| Contract Services Department to plan, schedule, and manage out-
| |
| age and contractor activities. In addition to a full time plann-
| |
| ing department, this action provided more direct plant manage-
| |
| ment control of outage activities by replacing the contractor
| |
| supervisors with licensee supervisors and eliminating the con-
| |
| tractors.
| |
| During both maintenance outages the licensee exhibited good con-
| |
| trol of outage activities. Daily meetings brought problems to
| |
| the appropriate level of attention and led to timely resolut-
| |
| ions. The newly organized Work Control Center also contributed
| |
| by better controlling work activities. Detailed critiques of
| |
| both outages examined methods of improving future outage activit-
| |
| ies. Despite an ambitious schedule and unforeseen required main-
| |
| tenance, the licensee was able to complete the outages with only
| |
| a day delay for each outage. Based on the above, both the
| |
| Planning and Contract Services Department and the Work Control
| |
| Center improved the control of the outages that were conducted.
| |
| The plant Technical Services Department supplied engineering
| |
| support for the review and design of modifications, resolved
| |
| plant engineering problems, administered the environmental qual-
| |
| ification program onsite, and reviewed all safety-related pur-
| |
| chase orders. Significant modifications included installation
| |
| of a new plant computer system including SPDS, Appendix R modi-
| |
| fications, installation of a second level of undervoltage pro-
| |
| tection, and installation of new drywell sump level t'rans-
| |
| mitters. The engineers were knowledgeable and competent, and
| |
| were actively involved throughout the installation and testing
| |
| of the modifications. However, due to the significance of their
| |
| functions, the department's potential to impact other plant
| |
| departments and the fluctuating work loads between modifications
| |
| and plant ent'neering problems, the Technical Services Depart-
| |
| ment will require continuing plant management review to assure
| |
| __ . _ _ _ . _ _
| |
| . _ _ _ _ _ ~ . _ _ _ , _ _ _-- _ - - -
| |
| -
| |
| | |
| --
| |
| r
| |
| '
| |
| :
| |
| f
| |
| . 26
| |
| proper oversight'of the department's activities. It appeared
| |
| that this oversight was inadequate.on occasion based on the
| |
| .following examples: '
| |
| --
| |
| ~ The ongo'ing program to inspect all safety-related pipe sup-
| |
| ports was placed on hold in November 1985 following funding
| |
| shortages which prevented the Architect Engineer (AE) from
| |
| '
| |
| performing further evaluations. The licensee believed at
| |
| the time that-the fifty items waiting evaluation by the AE
| |
| did not affect support or system operability. In April
| |
| 1986 after.the funding became available, the AE determined
| |
| a support in the Core Spray system identified on November
| |
| 7, 1985 as having a discrepancy was inoperable. Subsequent
| |
| evaluation concluded the inoperable support did not affect
| |
| the system operability. The delay in recognizing the inop-
| |
| erable support was caused by the Pipe Support Field Engi-
| |
| neer's (PSFE), a contract engineer, failure to make the
| |
| operability determination upon discovering the discrepan-
| |
| cies_as expected. On November 15, 1985, when the PSFE left
| |
| the site permanently, the Pipe Support Program Manager was
| |
| not informed of the problem by the PSFE, and no formal re-
| |
| view of the support packages was conducted when.the PSFE
| |
| departed.
| |
| --
| |
| An installation deficiency caused by inadequate design
| |
| change review on a valve motor operator resulted in a Re-
| |
| circulation Loop Discharge Bypass Valve being inoperable
| |
| due to mechanical interference following piping thermal
| |
| expansion. .During installation of the new operator, the
| |
| orientation of the operator had been changed due o dif-
| |
| ferent clearance requirements. This event resulted in a
| |
| plant shutdown required'by Technical Specifications.
| |
| In summary, outage management was well organized and effective
| |
| in planning and managing the two short outages. The dedicated
| |
| outage planning staff has been instrumental in upgrading the
| |
| planning for the upcoming refueling outage. With the exception
| |
| noted, the engineering support group performed well in assuring
| |
| the technical adequacy of modifications, but upper plant and
| |
| corporate management review of their activities should be in-
| |
| creased.
| |
| 2. Conclusion
| |
| Rating: 2
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| <
| |
| | |
| m
| |
| i
| |
| ~
| |
| , *.
| |
| 27
| |
| H. Licensing Activities
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| During the previous assessment period, this functional area was
| |
| rated as Category 2. Performance had improved as evidenced by
| |
| the reduction in the backlog of licensing actions.
| |
| A reorganization of the headquarters staff took effect at the
| |
| beginning of this rating period. In the new configuration, the
| |
| licensing staffs for both FitzPatrick and Indian Point 3 report
| |
| to the same Vice-President. Notwithstanding the differences in
| |
| the respective reactor designs, this change has resulted in an
| |
| improved exchange of information between the two-licensing
| |
| staffs and should result in more uniform interactions with NRR.
| |
| Interaction between headquarters management and NRR was at a
| |
| comparatively reduced level during this rating period due to
| |
| elimination of a large backlog of licensing actions during the
| |
| previous rating period and the absence of any major outages.
| |
| Nevertheless, management interest and involvement in licensing
| |
| activities was evident. A case in point was the attendance of
| |
| licensee senior level management at a counterparts working meet-
| |
| ing between BWR Project Directorate #2 staff and licensing man-
| |
| ; agers of utilities assigned to that directorate, held in April
| |
| 1986. Increased management attention to the quality of Sholly
| |
| '
| |
| i evaluations and licensing correspondence has also been evident
| |
| during this rating period and is responsive to a recommendation
| |
| made in the previous SALP evaluation.
| |
| ,-
| |
| Licensee management, however, has not directed sufficient atten-
| |
| tion towards correcting and revising the Technical Specifica-
| |
| tions (TS) to ensure that the current, as-built configuration of
| |
| the plant is reflected, that errors are eliminated, and that
| |
| wording clearly reflects the intent of the TS. A case in point
| |
| is Table 3.7-1 regarding containment isolation valves. Inaccu-
| |
| ; racies have existed in this table for years, and the table does
| |
| l not reflect the current configuration of the plant, yet the
| |
| licensee has not, to date, proposed revisions. The TS pertain-
| |
| ing to recirculation bypass valves illustrates a case where
| |
| l wording is not consistent with intent. Although this TS was
| |
| '
| |
| subsequently deleted, no effort was made to revise the wording
| |
| i during a 6-month period from the time this TS led to a plant
| |
| i shutdown to the time the deletion was requested.
| |
| l Licensee efforts towards the resolution of safety issues is evi-
| |
| l dent by its active participation and close contact with various
| |
| ! industry groups involved in the identification and resolution of
| |
| safety issues. These groups include the BWR Owners Group, the
| |
| Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, the Seismic Qualifica-
| |
| tion Utility Group, the Nuclear Utilities Fire Protection Group,
| |
| f
| |
| | |
| s D
| |
| . 28
| |
| the Nuclear Utility Group on Station Blackout, IDCOR, the Nucle-
| |
| ar Utility Management and Resource Committee, the Atomic Indus- .
| |
| trial Forum, and the American Nuclear Society.
| |
| With a few ex'ceptions, safety evaluations submitted by the
| |
| licensee in support of proposed TS changes or to resolve techni-
| |
| cal issues have been clear and substantive. One exception was
| |
| the documentation (a contractor report) submitted to support a
| |
| TS revision to lower the MSIV isolation water level setpoint.
| |
| Better screening of contractor outputs, for clarity as well as
| |
| technical content, will reduce the NRR resources required for
| |
| review, with attendant reduction in cost-'tc the licensee.
| |
| Licensee responsiveness to NRC initiatives was noted in the pre-
| |
| vious two SALP evaluations as an attribute for which improved
| |
| performance was sought. No improvement in the licensee's over-
| |
| all spirit of cooperation, however, was evident during this
| |
| rating period. Encompassed here is the licensee's responsive-
| |
| ness to requests for information, both verbal and written, de-
| |
| lays in submittal or resubmittal of documentation (often of a
| |
| routine or simple nature), and the general reluctance to provide
| |
| definitive schedules. All of these factors represent impedi-
| |
| ments to conducting day-to-day business. Examples include poor
| |
| responsiveness to requests for additional information concerning
| |
| the following reviews: SpDS (isolation devices), Salem ATWS
| |
| Item 1.2, an Appendix R exemption related to safe shutdown, and
| |
| the ISI program review. In addition, delays were experienced in
| |
| the resubmittal of amendment requests concerning NUREG-0737 TS
| |
| (a problem area identified in the previous SALP evaluation) and
| |
| transfer of reserve power (returned to the licensee because of
| |
| an inadequate Sho11y analysis). Delays in the submittal of TS
| |
| needed to support plant modifications, in accordance with 10 CFR
| |
| 50.59, have also been evident. Cases in point are the TS re-
| |
| lated to second level undervoltage protection modifications, the
| |
| analog transmitter trip system installation, and containment
| |
| isolation valve additions.
| |
| In view of i.he previous elimination of a large backlog of li-
| |
| censing actions, and the increase in size of the licensing
| |
| staff, improvement was possible during this rating period but
| |
| was not achieved. In summary, the licensee needs to improve
| |
| communications as well as its spirit of cooperation with the
| |
| HRC in the area of licensing activities.
| |
| 2. Conq1usion
| |
| Rating: 2
| |
| Trend: Declining
| |
| | |
| ,
| |
| ,s o l
| |
| )
| |
| 29
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| l
| |
| !
| |
| !
| |
| .
| |
| I
| |
| !
| |
| l
| |
| t
| |
| | |
| F
| |
| -
| |
| 3
| |
| y :p r
| |
| .e .
| |
| '
| |
| 30
| |
| ,
| |
| '
| |
| I'. ~ Training and Qualification Effectiveness (NA)
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| The.various a'spects of this functional area have been considered
| |
| -
| |
| .
| |
| .and discussed as an integral part of other functional areas and
| |
| the respective inspection hours have'been included in each one.
| |
| - Consequently, this discussion is a synopsis of the assessment's-
| |
| related to training conducted-in other areas. Training effec -
| |
| tiveness has been. measured primarily by the observed performance
| |
| of licensee personnel and,,to a lesser degree, as a review of
| |
| program adequacy. The discussion below addresses three princi-
| |
| ple areas: licensed operator training, nonlicensed staff
| |
| training, and the status of INP0 training accreditation.
| |
| In the previous assessment period, this-functional area was rat-
| |
| ed as Category 2. FitzPatrick management displayed a strong
| |
| commitment to training, shown by several programs for the im-
| |
| provement of the technical knowledge of both licensed and non-
| |
| licensed personnel. A declining trend had been noted in lic-
| |
| ensed operator examination results. This was attributed to in-
| |
| adequate screening of the candidates.
| |
| During this assessment period, one set of replacement operator
| |
| . licensing examinations was administered, and a requalification
| |
| training program inspection was also conducted by NRC. Region I.
| |
| A total of six candidates were given written and oral examina-
| |
| tions for initial licenses in July 1986. The two (2) Senior
| |
| Reactor Operators (SRO) candidates-and the Instructor Certifi-
| |
| cation candidate passed the examination. Of the three (3).Reac-
| |
| tor Operators (RO) candidates, one passed, one failed the oral
| |
| examination,'and one failed both the. oral and written ,
| |
| examinations.
| |
| During this assessment period, several deficiencies were noted
| |
| in the administration of the licensed operator training program. '
| |
| 'As noted above, two of the three Reactor Operator license candi-
| |
| dates failed the examinaticn given this period. Over the past;
| |
| two years, four of six Reactor Operator candidates have failed
| |
| the examination. This poor performance has been attributed to
| |
| inadequate screening of NR'J examination candidates and not poor
| |
| -training practices. This conclusion is based on the performance
| |
| of the-Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operators who have
| |
| passed the examinations and the fact that both the Senior Reac-
| |
| tor Operators and Reactor Operators are trained together in one
| |
| classroom.
| |
| An inspection of the FitzPatrick requalification training pro-
| |
| gram identified significant weaknesses. The utility training
| |
| | |
| ,
| |
| ;; x
| |
| < -
| |
| 6
| |
| e . 31
| |
| ~
| |
| staff ' submitted 20% of.both the _SRO and R0 written requalifi-
| |
| -
| |
| cation ~ examinations given, including the answer keys,.to.the NRC
| |
| for parallel grading. A' comparison of results revealed signifi--
| |
| . cant differences between the licensee and the NRC grading, with
| |
| the NRC grade's being lower in allicases. A review of the grad-
| |
| ing techniques revealed that many questions were not graded
| |
| strictly'to the answer key, and grading between the examinations
| |
| g. wa. ' ansistent.
| |
| Oth weaknesses identified during the requalification training
| |
| program inspection included poor: lectures, poor attendance,
| |
| ~
| |
| missed required reading assignments, missed oral examinations,
| |
| and overall weak program supervision. Some of these problems
| |
| can be attributed to the temporary reassignment of the requaliff-
| |
| cation program administrator,.who attended advanced technical
| |
| training for eight months. In his absence,.the as;igned program
| |
| administrator did not adequately. implement the requalification
| |
| program and the licensee management failed to properly. oversee
| |
| the program. However, many of these weaknesses' existed before
| |
| 4 the reassignment and are attributed'to overall poor management-
| |
| oversight of the program.
| |
| Although weaknesses were noted in the administration of the
| |
| requalification program, these weaknesses did not appear to
| |
| have a' direct-impact.on the day-to-day operations of the plant,
| |
| as evidenced by the 'small number of personnel errors and opera-
| |
| tional events. A positive. initiative,.which was-begun during
| |
| this assessment period by the Operations Department, was an
| |
| on-shift operator training program. This program, implemented
| |
| to improve operator knowledge, includes auxiliary operator
| |
| walkthroughs, scenario walkthroughs with the entire shift,
| |
| written examinations, and incident discussions.
| |
| The training programs for nonlicensed personnel continue'to be
| |
| strong and effective as evidenced by the absence of personnel
| |
| errors and improvement in performance. The stcte' accredited
| |
| training program has been implemented and well received. Con-
| |
| *
| |
| tinued. improvements are being made in the area of nonlicensed
| |
| . operator training program as evidenced by the implementation
| |
| of a formal remediation program. In addition, FitzPatrick main-
| |
| 'tained strong and effective training programs for maintenance,
| |
| radiation protection, and security personnel.
| |
| FitzPatrick received training program accreditation from INP0 in
| |
| the areas of Reactor Operators, Senior Reactor Operators and
| |
| auxiliary operators. The self-evaluation reports for the remain-
| |
| ing seven programs have been submitted and the Accreditation
| |
| Team visit to review these programs is scheduled for February
| |
| 1987. The simulator and new training facility are scheduled for
| |
| completion in mid-1988.
| |
| | |
| . .
| |
| oc ..:
| |
| '
| |
| l
| |
| 32
| |
| In summary, the training programs for nonlicensed operators,
| |
| maintenance workers, radiation protection technicians, and
| |
| security personnel were strong and effective. Problems occurred
| |
| in the screening of initial operator license candidates and the
| |
| - administration of the requalification training of ifcensed oper-
| |
| ators, but FitzPatrick management belatedly found the problems
| |
| (concurrently with NRC inspections)-and corrective action is.
| |
| being taken regarding the requalification program. In spite of
| |
| the problems there is no evidence that they adversely affected
| |
| plant operations.
| |
| 2. Conclusions
| |
| <
| |
| Rating: 2
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| i-
| |
| *
| |
| 4
| |
| 4
| |
| =cv, . - ,.v.-. ,y--, - , , , , e . , . _ .c-- .. . - _ - . -~.m ,-, _ , - , .. . . , , _ - - , - .. . . , , , . . . . - - , , . _ , . . . . . ,,,4.. ~ . . ..-._--.. ,_
| |
| | |
| , s. n
| |
| 33
| |
| J. Assurance of Quality
| |
| 1. Analysis
| |
| Assurance of Quality is a summary assessment of management over-
| |
| sight and effectiveness in implementation of the quality assur-
| |
| ance program and administrative controls affecting quality.
| |
| Activities affecting the assurance of quality as they apply spe-
| |
| cifically to a functional area are addressed under each of the
| |
| separate functional areas. Further, this functional area is not
| |
| merely an assessment of the Quality Assurance Department alone,
| |
| but is an overall evaluation of management's initiatives, pro-
| |
| grams, and policies which affect or assure quality.
| |
| During the previous assessment period, this functional area was
| |
| rated as a Category 2. The Quality Assurance (QA) Department
| |
| was actively involved in startup testing, maintenance and modi-
| |
| fication activities. Weaknesses noted were in the scope of au-
| |
| dits and involvement in surveillance testing.
| |
| During this assessment period, the weaknesses noted above have
| |
| been corrected. With the exception of Radiation Protection Pro-
| |
| grams, audits were found generally to be of sufficient depth.
| |
| The QA departmeat also utilizes surveillances to review activi-
| |
| ties in progress. The QA department expanded their involvement
| |
| in the surveillance test area.
| |
| A review of the quality assurance program found the QA depart-
| |
| ment to be adequately staffed. The QA personnel receive train-
| |
| ing in the department and at the Training Center. The QA depart-
| |
| ment is part of the corporate organization, but frequent meet-
| |
| ings of the QA Superintendent, the Resident Manager and the
| |
| Superintendent of Power are held to discuss QA/QC concerns.
| |
| .
| |
| '
| |
| Thus QA issues are brought to the attention of appropriate. plant
| |
| management in a timely fashion.
| |
| A maintenance program for items in storage was lacking and re-
| |
| sulted in a pump being improperly maintained. The lack of such
| |
| a program was brought to the licensee's attention in 1983, 1984
| |
| and during the course of inspection 86-11. The licensee has
| |
| initiated corrective action in the form of a material equipment
| |
| list which is scheduled for completion in January 1987 and for
| |
| full implementation by late 1988. The list is intended to
| |
| identify all the maintenance requirements for each item. Cor-
| |
| rective actions in this area have been slow.
| |
| The licensee has recognized a need for improvement in the per-
| |
| formance of receipt inspections by QC inspectors and is develop-
| |
| ing an upgraded receipt inspection instruction. The instruction
| |
| will delineate receipt inspection requirements, and provide
| |
| .
| |
| , ._
| |
| .,,--r----=
| |
| -
| |
| = - ~
| |
| v- -
| |
| v e - e-- -w -
| |
| --es- - -+ - - . -- - - -
| |
| | |
| y 4
| |
| . 34
| |
| -
| |
| .
| |
| guidance to inspectors. Without the instruction, inspectors
| |
| must rely on their experience, which can result in inconsistent
| |
| inspection results.
| |
| The Quality A'ssurance Department plays an active role in assur-
| |
| ing quality at the plant. There are excellent lines of communi-
| |
| catior, between the QA department, plant management and each
| |
| department. The QA department has also contributed significantly
| |
| by their involvement in the Scram Reduction Program, Technical
| |
| Specification Matrix, Master Equipment List, procedural reviews,
| |
| and surveillance of plant activities. The QA Superintendent
| |
| emphasizes _ quality on the front-end and not after-the-fact. He
| |
| accomplishes this by making sure that in process inspections
| |
| and evaluations receive high priority and paperwork audits are
| |
| placed in proper perspective. In addition, the QA department
| |
| conducted a review of vendor QA programs and facilities when
| |
| problems arose with Containment Atmosphere Analyzes and
| |
| Rosemount transmitters.
| |
| Corporate and station management are actively involved in plant
| |
| activities. Senior plant management exhibits an excellent
| |
| attitude toward plant safety and have focused their efforts on
| |
| reducing personnel errors and instilling a pride of workmanship.
| |
| These efforts appeared to be effective, based upon the small
| |
| number of personnel errors and high plant availability. First
| |
| line supervision is actively involved in monitoring work activ-
| |
| ities to assure a quality product. NYPA's work force is stable,
| |
| experienced, knowledgeable, and dedicated, and represents a
| |
| strength. NYPA has demonstrated a quality attitude by imple-
| |
| menting the Scram Reduction Program, newly organized work con-
| |
| trol center, and revised work activity control procedures. They
| |
| also maintain an effective program of establishing and tracking
| |
| _. management goals and objectives. The goals provide an extensive
| |
| data base of information for monitoring NYPA's performance and,
| |
| in many cases, are compared to a management goal.
| |
| Improvements have been noted in the Plant Operations Review Com-
| |
| mittee (PORC). The PORC has generally displayed a more inquisi-
| |
| tive nature in reviewing events. One exception was the review
| |
| following a reactor trip discussed in Section C, Maintenance.
| |
| The PORC utilizes a formal system to track resolution of issues
| |
| or questions and corrective actions.
| |
| One overall weakness noted was the sinw or ineffective resolu-
| |
| tion to previously_ identified problems which included: mainten-
| |
| ance of stored items, calibration program weaknesses identified
| |
| in a 1983 audit, and failures to make required Emergency Notifi-
| |
| cation System reports discussed in Section A, Operations.
| |
| In summary, the Quality Assurance Department plays an active
| |
| role in assuring quality at FitzPatrick. The plant management
| |
| | |
| .. -.
| |
| 35
| |
| generally displays an aggressive attitude for improvement of
| |
| quality at the facility, as evidenced by establishing and imple-
| |
| menting improvement programs noted above. However, some pro-
| |
| grams are still slow in developing and lapses have occurred in
| |
| implementing some corrective actions, performing root cause
| |
| analysis, implementation of the requalification training pro-
| |
| gram, and procedural adherepce. These issues require continued-
| |
| management attention.
| |
| 2. Conclusions
| |
| Rating: 2
| |
| Trend: Improving
| |
| 3. Board Recommendations
| |
| None
| |
| | |
| . _ _- ____-_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
| |
| . .
| |
| 36.
| |
| V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES
| |
| A. Investigation and Allegation
| |
| '
| |
| None
| |
| B. Escalated Enforcement Actions
| |
| None
| |
| C. Management Conferences
| |
| Two management meetings were held during the assessment period. One
| |
| was held April 25, 1986, to discuss the last SALP report. The second
| |
| was held August 5, 1986, this was to discuss NYPA's progress on the
| |
| Scram Reduction. Program as recommended in the last SALP.
| |
| D. Licensee Event Reports
| |
| Twenty LERs were submitted during this assessment period. The LERs
| |
| are listed in Table 3. The following is a tabular listing of the
| |
| results of the causal analysis of the LERs.
| |
| A. Personnel Error.................. 5
| |
| B. Design / Man./Construc./ Install.... 6
| |
| C. External Cause.................... O
| |
| D. Defective Procedures............. 3
| |
| E. Component Failure................ 3
| |
| X. 0ther............................ 3
| |
| Total 20
| |
| Causal Analysis
| |
| The following sets of common mode events were identified:
| |
| Inadvertent RPS Actuations
| |
| Five LERs (86-04, 86-06, 86-10, 86-13, and 86-17) reported reactor
| |
| trips. The analysis of these events is delineated in Table 6.
| |
| Inadvertent ESF Actuations
| |
| l Three LERs (85-28, 86-05, and 86-15) reported isolations of either
| |
| the High Pressure Coolant Injection System or Reactor Core Isolation
| |
| Cooling Injection System. These were due to different causes includ-
| |
| ing component failure, design deficiencies and inadequate procedures.
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| !
| |
| l
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| . 4.
| |
| 37
| |
| Inoperable ESF Systems
| |
| Three LERs (86-03, 86-12, and 86-14) report the High Pressure Coolant
| |
| Injection System inoperable. The causes varied but all were due to
| |
| inoperable motor o'perated valves. In one case, the failure was due
| |
| to corrosion. caused by a steam leak, another due to procedural inade-
| |
| quacies, and the third, design deficiencies.
| |
| Surveillance Testing
| |
| Three LERs (86-01, 86-02, and 86-09) reported missed or late surveil-
| |
| lance tests. Two were caused by inadequate program administration
| |
| and the third due to personnel error.
| |
| E. Licensing Activities
| |
| 1. NRC/ Licensee Meetings / Site Visits
| |
| Site Visits: March 18, May 16, June 26-27, October 22, 1986
| |
| Meetings: February 10, 1986: Discussed licensing action status
| |
| March 18, 1986: Discussed Sholly preparation
| |
| April 10, 1986: Licensing counterparts meeting
| |
| (BWD#2)
| |
| April 25, 1986: SALP management meeting
| |
| May 16, 1986: Discussed licensing action status
| |
| July 31, 1986: Discussed Technical Specifications
| |
| related to control room habitability
| |
| September 11, 1986: Discussed licensing action status
| |
| 2. Commission Briefings
| |
| None
| |
| 3. Schedular Extensions Granted
| |
| None
| |
| 4. Relief Granted
| |
| April 18, 1986; Certain inservice inspection requirements
| |
| 5. Exemptions Granted
| |
| April 30, 1986; certain requirements of Appendix R
| |
| September 15, 1986; certain requirements of Appendix R
| |
| 6. License Amendments Issued
| |
| Amendment No. 98, issued May 6, 1986; revises TS regarding sin-
| |
| gle loop operation
| |
| | |
| _ - -
| |
| , -..
| |
| 38
| |
| Amendment No. 99, issued June 20, 1986; revises TS to clarify
| |
| responsibility of Plant Operating Review Committee
| |
| Amendment No. 100, issued June 20, 1986; revises TS regarding
| |
| composition of Safety Review Committee
| |
| Amendment No. 101, issued October 24, 1986; revises TS regarding
| |
| enriched bundles stored in spent fuel pool.
| |
| Amendment No. 102, issued October 31, 1986; revises TS to impose
| |
| more restrictive leakage limit and increased surveillance re-
| |
| quirements (NUREG-0313)
| |
| 7. Emergency / Exigent Technical Specifications
| |
| None
| |
| 8. Orders Isse'ed
| |
| None
| |
| 9. NRR/ Licensee Management Conferences
| |
| None
| |
| s
| |
| | |
| - -
| |
| . 4-
| |
| , 39
| |
| TABLE 1
| |
| INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES
| |
| Report / Dates Inspec' tor Hours Area Inspected
| |
| 85-31 Resident 76 Routine Resident
| |
| 12/1/85 - 1/17/86 Inspection
| |
| 86-01 Resident 109 Routine Resident
| |
| 1/18/86 - 3/10/86 Inspection
| |
| 86-02 Specialist 26 Routine Security
| |
| 1/13/86 - 1/16/86
| |
| '
| |
| 86-03 Specialist 47 Routine Transportation
| |
| 1/28/86 - 1/31/86
| |
| 86-04 Resident 227 Routine Resident
| |
| 3/11/86 - 5/9/86 Inspection
| |
| 86-05 Resident 128 Routine Resident
| |
| 5/10/86 - 6/20/86 Inspection
| |
| 86-06 Specialist 74 Routine Dosimetry
| |
| 5/19/86 - 5/23/86 Program
| |
| 86-07 Specialist 110 Emergency Preparedness
| |
| 6/17/86 - 6/19/86 and Observation of
| |
| Emergency Exercise
| |
| 86-08 Specialist 72 Surveillance Program
| |
| 6/2/86 - 6/6/86
| |
| 86-09 Specialist N/A Operator Examination
| |
| 7/28/86 - 7/31/86 Report
| |
| 86-10 Resident 153 Routine Resident
| |
| 6/21/86 - 8/8/86 Inspection
| |
| ,
| |
| 86-11 Specialist 46 Routine Quality
| |
| 7/14/86 - 7/18/86 Assurance Program
| |
| 86-12 Specialist 36 Radiological
| |
| 7/21/86 - 7/25/86 Environmental
| |
| Monitoring Program
| |
| ,
| |
| '
| |
| 86-13 Resident 123 Routine Resident
| |
| 8/9/86 - 9/29/86 Inspection
| |
| | |
| E-
| |
| . . , - e
| |
| [ 40
| |
| 86-14- Specialist 57 Environmental
| |
| 8/25/86 - 8/28/86 Qualification of
| |
| Limitorque Valve
| |
| ,
| |
| Wiring
| |
| 86-15- Specialist 130 Requalification
| |
| 9/16/86 - 9/18/86 Training Program
| |
| 86-16 Specialist 38 Maintenance
| |
| !
| |
| 9/22/86 - 9/26/86 Surveillance Testing.
| |
| & ISI Programs
| |
| 86-17 Specialist 126 Routine Radiation
| |
| 9/29/86 - 10/3/86 Protection' Program
| |
| 86-18 Resident 171 Routine Resident
| |
| 9/30/86 - 11/24/86 Inspection
| |
| !
| |
| 86-19 Specialist 56 Special Nuclear
| |
| 10/21/86 - 10/23/86 Material Control Program
| |
| l
| |
| 86-20 Specialist 27 Routine
| |
| l 10/21/86 - 10/23/86 Norradiological
| |
| i Chemistry Program
| |
| 86-21 Specialist 56 Routine Effluent
| |
| i 11/17/86 - 11/21/86 Monitoring Program
| |
| 86-22 Specialisc 32 Routine Security
| |
| l
| |
| 11/24/86 - 11/26/86
| |
| i
| |
| l
| |
| !
| |
| !
| |
| .
| |
| | |
| _
| |
| o < .
| |
| -
| |
| f:, n, , . 41
| |
| '
| |
| 3,
| |
| ? ,
| |
| l
| |
| [ '
| |
| ,
| |
| TABLE 2
| |
| INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY
| |
| - JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
| |
| TIME HOURS % OF TIME
| |
| A. Plant Operations........................... 773 40.3 i
| |
| > ,
| |
| _
| |
| '. B. Radiological Controls...................... 392 20.4
| |
| C. Maintenance................................ 159 8.2
| |
| ,
| |
| D. Surveillance............................... 194 10.1
| |
| l
| |
| E. Emergency Preparedne s s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 5.7
| |
| +
| |
| i
| |
| F. Sec,uri ty and Safegua rds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 7.3
| |
| G. Outage Managemert and Engineering Support.. 152 7.9
| |
| H. Licen sing Activi ti es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * *
| |
| I. Training and Qualification.................. ** **
| |
| Effectiveness
| |
| /
| |
| J. , A s s u ra n c e . o f Q ua l i tyl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ** **
| |
| , t,
| |
| ,y0 '. ( 9 )
| |
| Total 1920 100%
| |
| I f.,, d
| |
| 'liours expended in facility license activities and operator license
| |
| activities not included with direct inspection effort statistics.
| |
| ** Hours expended in the areas of training and quality assurance are included in
| |
| other functional areas, therefore, no direct inspection hours are given for
| |
| p ,these areas.
| |
| ! 1
| |
| ,
| |
| .l.-
| |
| .5 i
| |
| >
| |
| t
| |
| a
| |
| t n
| |
| }
| |
| ' .
| |
| e
| |
| f h
| |
| t' !
| |
| ... .-
| |
| | |
| , e
| |
| '
| |
| . 42
| |
| TABLE 3
| |
| LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
| |
| '
| |
| CAUSE CODES
| |
| AREA A ! C D { X TOTAL
| |
| Operations 1 3 0 0 1 1 6
| |
| Radiological / Controls 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
| |
| Maintenance 0 2 0 2 1 0 5
| |
| Surveillance 3 0 0 1 0 1 5
| |
| Emergency Prep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
| |
| Sec/ Safeguards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
| |
| Outage Management 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
| |
| Training 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
| |
| Licensing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
| |
| Assurance of Quality 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
| |
| TOTALS 5 6 0 3 3 3 20
| |
| Cause Codes: A - Personnel Error
| |
| B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction or
| |
| Installation Error -
| |
| C - External Cause
| |
| D - Defective Procedures
| |
| E - Component Failure
| |
| X - Other
| |
| | |
| . ~
| |
| 43
| |
| TABLE 4
| |
| LER SYN 0PSIS
| |
| LER Number Event Date Cause Code Description
| |
| 85-27* 11/22/85 E Inoperable Main Steam
| |
| Isolation Valves found
| |
| during testing.
| |
| 85-28 12/13/85 E High Pressure Coolant
| |
| Injection System Isolation
| |
| due to faulty trip unit.
| |
| 86-01 3/3/86 A Failure to perform APR.:
| |
| surveillance at required
| |
| frequency.
| |
| 86-02 3/3/86 A Failure to perform
| |
| Diesel Fire Pump
| |
| Surveillance at required
| |
| frequency.
| |
| 86-03 3/12/86 X Inoperable containment
| |
| isolation valve on High
| |
| Pressure Coolant Injection
| |
| system.
| |
| 86-04 3/15/86 D Reactor Trip while
| |
| shutdown performing post
| |
| work testing.
| |
| 86-05 4/4/86 B Reactor Core Isolation
| |
| Cooling isolation due to
| |
| loose lead.
| |
| 86-06 3/25/86. A Reactor Trip while
| |
| shutdown due to low vessel
| |
| level.
| |
| 86-07 3/23/86 A Failure to meet
| |
| Environmental
| |
| Qualification requirements
| |
| for 4 valve operators
| |
| inside containment.
| |
| 86-08 3/27/86 X Setpoint drift of ASCO
| |
| pressure switches.
| |
| . _ _ .
| |
| | |
| a. .
| |
| 44
| |
| 86-09 3/28/86 A Late chemistry
| |
| surveillance during
| |
| startup.
| |
| 86-10 4/4/86 B Reactor trip while
| |
| conducting turbine stop
| |
| valve testing.
| |
| 86-11 5/15/86 B Failure of
| |
| recirculation 'oop
| |
| discharge byp.tzs valve to
| |
| operate.
| |
| 86-12 5/25/86 B High Pressure Coolant
| |
| Injunction inoperable due
| |
| to breaker tripping when
| |
| wetted.
| |
| 86-13 7/3/86 B Reactor trip due to
| |
| protective relay test
| |
| block failure.
| |
| 86-14 9/3/86 D High Pressure Coolant
| |
| Injection valve failure
| |
| , due to procedural
| |
| inadequacies.
| |
| 86-15 9/4/86 D Reactor Core Isolation
| |
| Cooling isolation due to
| |
| inadequate venting of
| |
| transmitter.
| |
| 86-16 9/9/86 X Use of incorrect
| |
| .
| |
| Minimum Critical Power
| |
| Ratio calculation.
| |
| 86-17 9/30/86 E 7 Reactor Trips while
| |
| shutdown due to neutron
| |
| instrument spikes.
| |
| 86-18 10/15/86 B Potential common mode
| |
| failure of circuit
| |
| *
| |
| breakers.
| |
| ,
| |
| Event occurred during previous assessment period
| |
| ,
| |
| I
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| a -
| |
| 45
| |
| TABLE 5
| |
| ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY 12/1/85 - 11/30/86
| |
| JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
| |
| A. Number and Severity Level Level of Violations
| |
| Severity Level I 0
| |
| Severity Level II 0
| |
| Severity Level III 0
| |
| Severity Level IV 4
| |
| Severity Level V - 2
| |
| Deviation 0
| |
| TOTAL ~6
| |
| B. Violation vs. Functional Area
| |
| SEVERITY LEVEL
| |
| FUNCTIONAL AREA 1 2 3 4 5 DEV. TOTAL
| |
| Operations 2 2
| |
| Radiological Controls 1 1
| |
| Maintenance 1 1
| |
| Surveillance 1 1
| |
| Emergency Prep. O
| |
| Sec/ Safeguards 0
| |
| Refueling and Outage
| |
| Management 0
| |
| Training 0
| |
| Licensing 0
| |
| Assurance of Quality 1 1
| |
| _ _ _ _ _ _
| |
| TOTALS 2 4 6
| |
| | |
| , ,, .
| |
| . 46
| |
| TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
| |
| ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY
| |
| .
| |
| Inspection Violation Functional-
| |
| Report Requirement Level Area Violation
| |
| 85-31 10CFR50.72 5 Operations Failure to report
| |
| 12/1/85-1/17/86 High Pressure
| |
| Conlant Injection
| |
| System Isolations
| |
| and Inoperability.
| |
| 86-01 Tech Spec 4 Surveillance Failure to perform
| |
| '1/18/86-3/10/86 4.0.8. surveillances
| |
| within required
| |
| frequency.
| |
| 86-11 10CFR50 4 Assurance of Failure to properly
| |
| 7/14/86-7/18/86 APP. B(XIII) Quality care for items in
| |
| storage.
| |
| 86-12 Tech Spec 5 Rad Control -Failure to
| |
| 7/21/86-7/25/86 7.2 properly implement
| |
| procedure for
| |
| calibration of Alpha
| |
| Beta counter.
| |
| 86-13 Tech Spec 5 Maintenance / Failure to
| |
| 8/9/86-9/29/86 6.8(A) Rad. Control properly implement
| |
| procedures for
| |
| installing a pressure
| |
| transmitter and survey
| |
| new fuel shipments.
| |
| 86-13 10CFR50.72 5 Operations Failure to make
| |
| 8/9/86-9/29/86 ENS report for reactor
| |
| core isolation cooling
| |
| system isolation.
| |
| | |
| .,.a.
| |
| 47
| |
| TABLE 6
| |
| REACTOR TRIPS AND UNPLANNED PLANT SHUTDOWNS
| |
| The reactor trips occurring 'during this assessment period fall into three cate-
| |
| gories. These categories included personnel error, procedural deficiency, and
| |
| equipment malfunction. This section assesses the root cause of each trip with-
| |
| in each category from the NRC's perspective.
| |
| Power Functional
| |
| Date Level Description Cause Area
| |
| 1. 3/15/86 SD Reactor trip due to Personnel Error: Assurance
| |
| post-work testing An inadequate review of a of
| |
| on RPS. (LER 86-04) procedure change resulted Quality
| |
| in energizing one
| |
| of the backup scram
| |
| solenoids causing the scram.
| |
| 2. 3/25/86 SD Reactor trip due to Personnel Error: Operations
| |
| reactor vessel low Inadequate control of
| |
| level . (LER-86-06) activities in the control
| |
| room caused the trip when
| |
| the operator's attention was
| |
| diverted to stop a feedwater
| |
| leak while purposely lowering
| |
| vessel level.
| |
| 3/28/86 Start-up
| |
| 3. 4/4/86 88% Reactor trip during Procedural Deficiencies: Maintenance
| |
| turbine stop valve Loose bolts on turbine stop
| |
| testing due to valve, which were apparently
| |
| faulty valve not torqued, allowed a stroke
| |
| position indication change causing faulty position
| |
| (LER 86-10) indication.
| |
| 4/6/86 Start-up
| |
| !
| |
| l 4. 5/15/86 Shutdown required Equipment Failure: Engineering
| |
| by Technical Spect- Inadequate design change Support
| |
| fications due to review resulted in valve
| |
| inoperable inoperability due to thermal
| |
| Recirculation loop growth.
| |
| discharge bypass
| |
| valve (LER 86-11)
| |
| 5/18/86 Start-up
| |
| l
| |
| I
| |
| | |
| . - . . .
| |
| .
| |
| '48
| |
| 5. 7/3/86 100% Reactor Trip.due to Equipment Failure - Maintenance
| |
| Turbine trip Random: A failure in
| |
| (LER 86-13) protective relay test
| |
| circuit caused a turbine trip.
| |
| 7/4/86 Start-up
| |
| 6. 9/30/86 ~ SD Reactor Trip due to Equipment Failure - Maintenance
| |
| neutron monitoring Random: A wet connector
| |
| instrument failure caused the LPRM to fail
| |
| (LER 86-17) upscale.
| |
| 7-12. 10/1/86 SD- Seven reactor trips Equipment Failure: Maintenance
| |
| 10/3/86 due to neutron During under-vessel work,
| |
| 10/4/86 monitoring maintenance personnel
| |
| instrument spiking bumped "G" IRM connector
| |
| (LER 86-17) which was later found to' l
| |
| have a broken connector.
| |
| 10/9/86 Start-up
| |
| | |
| L E '
| |
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| |
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