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| {{Adams
| | #REDIRECT [[IR 05000454/1999015]] |
| | number = ML20211P200
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| | issue date = 09/08/1999
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| | title = Insp Repts 50-454/99-15 & 50-455/99-15 on 990824-26.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Evaluation of Licensee Performance During Exercise of EP
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| | author name =
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| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
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| | addressee name =
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| | addressee affiliation =
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| | docket = 05000454, 05000455
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| | license number =
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| | contact person =
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| | document report number = 50-454-99-15, 50-455-99-15, NUDOCS 9909130162
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| | package number = ML20211P189
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| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
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| | page count = 12
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| }}
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| See also: [[see also::IR 05000454/1999015]]
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| | |
| =Text=
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| {{#Wiki_filter:,
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| *
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| U.S' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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| REGIONlli
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| Docket Nos. 50 4 54; 50-455
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| License Nos: NPF-37; NPF-66 -
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| 1
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| Report No: 50-454/99015(DRS); 50-456/99015(DRS) j
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| Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
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| Facility: ' Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
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| Location: 4450 N. German Church Road
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| Byron,IL 61010
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| Dates: August 24-26,1999
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| Inspectors: J. Foster, Sr Emergency Preparedness Analyst l
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| R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst !
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| D. Funk, Emergency Preparedness Analyst
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| B. Kemker, Resident inspector
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| Approved by: Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch
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| Division of Reactor Safety
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| 9909130162 990908
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| PDR ADOCK 05000454
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| G PDR ^
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| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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| Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2
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| NRC Inspection Report 50-454/99015(DRS); 50-455/99015(DRS)
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| This inspection consisted of evaluating the licensee performance during an exercise of the
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| Emergency Plan. It was conducted by three regionalinspectors and a Resident inspector. No
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| violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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| Plant Sucoort
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| e' Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was very good
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| and performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was excellent. (Section P4.1.c).
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| * Performance in the Simulator Control Room was effective. (Section P4.1.c)
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| e The Technical Support Center staff's overall performance was excellent. (Section
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| P4.1.c)
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| e Overall performance of Operational Support Center management and staff was good.
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| (Section P4.1.c)
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| e Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough and in close
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| agreement with the majority of the inspectors' observations. Licensee critique findings
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| were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's findings. (Section P4.1.c)
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| Report Details ;
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| IV. Plant Support
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| P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation )
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| P3.1 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario (82302)
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| The inspectors reviewed the1999 exercise's objectives and scenario and determined I
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| that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensee's emergency I
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| plan. The scenario provided a very challenging framework to cupport demonstration of I
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| the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a I
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| radiological release and several equipment failures.
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| P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness
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| P4.1 1999 Evaluated Biennial Emeraency Preparedness Exercise
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| ]
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| a. Insoection Scope (82301)
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| )
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| Appendix E to 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 requires that power
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| reactor licensees conduct biennial exercises that involve participation by offsite
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| authorities. On August 25,1999, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving
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| partial participation by the State of Illinois, and full participation by Ogle County
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| responders. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the licensee's onsite
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| and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response
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| organizations and emergency response facilities were activated.
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| The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:
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| * Simulator Control Room (SCR)
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| e Technical Support Center (TSC) j
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| e Operational Support Center (OSC)
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| * Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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| The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions,
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| classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of
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| protective action recommendations, command-and-control, the transfer of emergency
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| responsibilities between facilities, communications, and the overall implementation of ,
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| the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in l
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| each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of exercise
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| performancs. l
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| b, Emeraency Response Facility Observations and Findinas
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| b.1 Control Room Simulator
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| Exercise performance of shift personnel in the control room simulator was effective.
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| Operators effectively controlled and stabilized plant parameters, utilizing the appropriate
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| alarm and emergency response proceoures. The shift manager and Unit 1 Senior
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| Reactor Operator (SRO) demonstrated strong command and control throughout the
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| exercise event. The Shift Technical Advisor and Unit 2 SRO were effectively utilized to
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| assist the Unit 1 SRO.
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| Communications were generally a strength. Routine briefings provided necessary
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| information to operations personnel and were appropriate in scope and duration. The
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| inspectors noted that on at least two occasions, proper use of three-way " repeat back" '
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| communications prevented operators from potentially acting on incorrect information.
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| The inspectors also noted, however, that three-way communications were not
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| consistently utilized during later portions of the exercise. Radio communications were
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| often difficult to understand because of poor quality transmissions. Cnmmunications
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| between communicators in the control room simulator and the Technical Support Center
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| (TSC) were dependable.
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| The shift manager correctly classified events at the Unusual Event and Alert levels in a
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| timely manner. Event notification message forms and verbal notifications to the State ;
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| and NRC were completed in sufficient detail and well within required time limits. l
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| Transfer of command and control of emergency responsibilities from the control room l
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| simulator to the TSC was completed smoothly.
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| The Unit 2 SRO made a very early assessment of a containment release based upon a ,
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| slight containment building pressure decrease. When the actual release occurred, the 4
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| control room staff readily identified it.
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| Operatcrs diligently monitored the control panels following the loss of annunciators. A 1
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| '
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| ; reactor operator promptly identified that the 1 A centufical charging pump tripped by
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| noting the trip indicating lamp. However, operators could have made better use of the
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| alarm printout to monitor alarm conditions during the time that the annunciators were out ,
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| of service. Operators were slow to recognize that the 1CC0685 valve failed closed
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| isolating component cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchangers. The
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| condition was not recognized until 15 minutes after the valve failed and upon return of
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| the annunciators to service, which prompted operators to walkdown the control panels to
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| evaluate alarming annunciators.
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| b.2 Technical Suocort Center
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| Overall performance in the TSC was excellent. Personnel were focused on their
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| emergency response, and teamwork and communications were very good. The TSC
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| staff promptly staffed and activated in an orderly manner following the Alert declaration.
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| Transfers of command and control of event response to and from the TSC's Station
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| Director (SD) were done in a timely and well coordinated manner and effectively utilized
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| the turnover briefing form. The SD made good use of TSC staff and ensured the staff
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| was informed of the current status of communications and forthcoming notifications. An
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| Assistant SD provided excellent support to the SD.
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| Briefings of the TSC staff were effectively and efficiently performed by utilizing a
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| cordless microphone circulated among the directors. Those periodic briefings kept all
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| TSC personnel wellinformed of changing plant conditions, major decisions and revised -
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| plant priorities. The initial briefing conducted by the SD was especially effective in
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| providing the proper focus for the TSC staff and assigning specific responsibilities to key j
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| individuals. L
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| Status boards were effectively used to accurately display information on major events,
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| key decisions, current priorities and the status of in-plant team activities. Status board i
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| information served as a good backup information source to the verbal briefings. I
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| The Operations and Technical directors were pro-active in tracking plant conditions and
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| comparing emergency action levels for possible event paths leading to potential l
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| emergency classification upgrades. Tasks and priorities were effectively identified for j
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| OSC repair teams by the Maintenance, Operations, Technical, and Radiation Protection j
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| Directors and quickly communicated to the OSC. l
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| Individuals assigned to participate as the " mock NRC" site team could have been better
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| integrated into TSC activities. These individuals arrived and immediately began to
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| interact with TSC personnel before being briefed and introduced. After TSC staff
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| recognized that the mock NRC team was present they were appropriately briefed by the
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| Assistant SD and introduced during the next facility briefing.
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| Simulated dose rates in the TSC were monitored. The SD and Radiation Protection
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| Director kept TSC staff adequately informed of the TSC's simulated radiation levels. A
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| radiation protection technician was observed conducting habitability monitoring every 30
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| minutes after elevated radiation levels were identified.
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| Two offsite radiation survey teams were activated following the Alert declaration. Their
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| initial deployment strategy was reasonable. The TSC kept command and control of
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| these teams until an expanded EOF activation was accomplished at the Site Area
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| Emergency classification. The TSC then appropriately completed transfer of command
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| and control of these radiation survey teams to the EOF, monitored the communications
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| between these teams and the EOF and continued to compare survey data in case a
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| discrepancy in data was observed.
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| b.3 Operational Support Center and Emeraency Response Teams
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| The overall performance by OSC personnel was good. Personnel were professional
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| and focused on their emergency response. The OSC activation was rapid and efficient.
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| The facility was fully staffed and operational within 30 minutes after the Alert declaration.
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| The TSC's staff was promptly notified when OSC personnel were ready to accept
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| assignments. The inspector noted, however, that plant announcements for the
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| emergency and facility activations were not heard in the OSC.
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| The OSC Director provided good command and control of the facility and personnel.
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| Facility briefings were periodic and concise. However, some personnelin the facility
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| were not attentive to the briefings as discussions and phone conversations continued as
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| the OSC Director and OSC Supervisor provided updates to the staff. Also, it was noted
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| that when the OSC Supervisor and RP Director spoke during some of the initial facility
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| briefings, some information could not be heard in all locations of the OSC.
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| Status boards were continuously maintained and included indication of the TSC's priority
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| assigned to the plant response teams. Team personnel's information was effectively _
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| transferred from the OSC Staffing board to the Team Tracking Status Board which
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| provided a good means of tracking personnel availability. The teams' deployment times
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| and results were promptly communicated to TSC staff. One ad hoc flip chart was used
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| to track emergency events. The Station Priority Log was available and used in the
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| OSC. The Station Priority Log's wall projected information was not focused tightly and
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| . was difficult to read from certain locations in the facility; the screen saver activated
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| periodically, resulting in a black screen.
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| Personnel selected for response teams were adequately briefed prior to dispatch.
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| During the emergency hatch repair team briefing, team members were checked to verify
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| whether they were qualified to use respirators. The Security Guard appropriately
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| identified that he was not qualified to wear a respirator. Respiratory protection
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| equipment requirements were later removed for the emergency hatch leak repair team
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| when dose estimates were performed. The requirement for full protective clothing was
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| retained.
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| OSC habitability monitoring, which included dose rates, contamination, and airborne
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| surveys, was periodically performed. A step off pad was conservatively set up at the
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| OSC entrance in the event of an unmonitored radiological release. Later in the
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| - exercise, participants appropriately determined whether issuance of potassium lodide to
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| environmental teams and an OSC response team was warranted.
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| - The inspector accompanied two OSC response teams. A plant survey team was
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| requested to survey the Turbine Building after the General Emergency was declared.
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| The radiation protection technician (RPT) accompanying the team was professional,
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| demonstrated effective radiation practices, and demonstrated appropriate exercise
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| drilismanship.
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| The unit one emergency hatch inspection / repair teams requested dispatch from the
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| OSC was delayed more than one hour and 27 minutes while the licensee evaluated the
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| emergency conditions and the team prepared to respond. A radiological release to the
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| environment was thought to be from a leaking emergency hatch on unit one
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| containment. An " urgent" priority team was requested at approximately 11:37 a.m. to
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| inspect and later, at 12:30 p.m., to repair the suspected leaking emergency hatch. At
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| 1:04 p.m., the exercise objectives had been met, the exercise was terminated, and the
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| emergency hatch repair team was not yet fully prepared for dispatch. The licensee's
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| evaluation of the process to request, prepare, brief, and dispatch " urgent" OSC
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| response teams will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (IFl 50-454/99015-01;
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| 455/99015-01).
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| ~ b.4 E Emeroency Ooerations Facility
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| Overall performance of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff was excellent.-
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| The facility was efficiently activated and assigned personnel performed their duties
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| . effectively throughout the exercise?
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| Procedures and associated checklists were observed to be extensively used.- Status
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| ~ boards were generally well maintained, with few exceptions. Periodic and as-needed
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| - briefings kept the EOF staff aware of current status and concems. Tumover of
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| command and control from the TSC was smoothly accomplished.' Availability of a -
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| - former Byron SRO appeared to significantly enhance familiarity with sation equipment.
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| Event classifications were accurate and timely. A list of events or parameter changes
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| . which would lead to a higher level classification were posted on a status board.
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| Parameters which would lead to classification changes were trended. Notification forms
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| were quickly generated when classifications changed, and communicated to offsite
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| authorities within required timeframes.
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| Protective action recommendations were developed per the applicable procedure and
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| promptly communicated to state of Illinois authorities. Periodic communication between
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| the Manager of Emergency Operations and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
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| officials effectively kept offsite authorities aware of plant status and event mitigation
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| activities. The EOF staff was aware of protective actions implemented by the State of
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| lilinois. Minor errors made in several Illinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS)
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| forms were quickly detected and corrected by verbal communication or re-issuance of
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| the NARS form.
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| The Protective Measures staff performed well, utilizing available information to make
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| decisions on dose extensions and issuance of potassium iodide. Communication
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| problems with one environs team developed immediately after the decision to issue
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| potassium iodide. Environs team communicators coped well with this problem,
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| requesting the other environs team to communicate with the team which was out of )
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| communication, or search for and directly communicate with the other team.
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| Priorities for response activities were well tracked by the " Station Priorities Log", and
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| events were tracked by the "Significant Events" electronic system.
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| !
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| b.5 Scenario and Exercise Control i
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| The exercise scenario was very challenging and exercised the majority of the licensee's
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| emergency response capabilities. ;
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| The inspectors identified no significant controller performance concems related to the
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| plant response teams that were evaluated. Controllers ensured that team members
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| asked appropriate questions before providing them with information sought, such as ,
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| current radiological conditions. Simulation for obtaining parts from stores was noted by j
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| the inspectors.
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| 7
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| The control room ventilation system was not initially aligned for operation in the make-up
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| mode (which would have been normal with the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump in
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| operation) by the drill controllers prior to starting the exercise. Operators promptly
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| recognized this in the simulator, and properly aligned the control room ventilation
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| system.
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| b.6 Licensee Critiaues
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| The inspectors attended the licensee's self-critiques in the SCR, TSC, OSC, and EOF
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| which occurred immediately after the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited verbal and
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| written inputs from the participants in addition to providing the participants with the
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| controllers' initial assessments of personnel performance. The inspectors concluded
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| that these initial self-critiques were thorough and in close agreement with the majority of
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| the inspectors' observations.
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| c. Summary of Conclusions
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| Evaluation of the license's exercise performance was as follows:
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| * Overall licensee performance during the 1999 exercise was very good.
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| e Performance of shift personnel in the Simulator Control Room was effective.
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| * The Technical Support Center staff's performance was excellent.
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| * Overall performance of OSC management and staff was good.
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| e Performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was excellent.
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| e The participants and controllers initial critique following termination of the
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| exercise was self critical and detailed. The critiques included inputs from
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| controllers and exercise participants. Licensee critique findings were consistent
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| with the NRC evaluation team's findings.
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| P8 Miscellaneous EP lasues
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| P8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-263/97016-01: Exercise Weakness: During
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| the 1997 exercise, personnel in the simulator control room did not classify the initial
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| events properly (an Alert was classified as an Unusual Event). During the current
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| exercise, the shift manager correctly classified events at the Unusual Event and Alert
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| levels in a timely manner. Event notification message forms and verbal notifications to
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| the State and the NRC were completed properly. This itern is closed.
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| P8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-263/97016-02: Exercise Weakness: During
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| the 1997 exercise, the Acting Station Director failed to utilize the Acting Station Director
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| procedure and checklist. During the current exercise, the procedure and checklist were
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| appropriately utilized. This item is closed.
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| 8
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| 8
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| V. Manaaement Meetinas
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| X.1 Exit Meetina Summary
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| The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
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| conclusion of the inspection on August 26,1999. The inspection team leader stated that overall
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| exercise performance was very good, a single Inspection Followup Item had been identified,
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| and the licensee critiques were effective. The licensee acknowledged the preliminary findings
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| presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
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| inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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| PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l
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| Licensee
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| - B. Adams, Regulatory Assurance Manager
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| T. Burns, Emergency Planner ,
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| R. Colglazier, NRC Coordinator
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| D, Drawbaugh, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
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| M. Jurmain, Maintenance Manager
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| B. Kouba, Engineering Manager -
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| 'J. Kramer, Work Control Manager
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| R. Karthelser, Communicatoins
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| S. Kuczynski, Nuclear Oversight Manager - I
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| W. Levis, Site Vice President
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| R. Lopriore, Station Manager
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| W. McNeill, Radiation Protection Manager
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| S. Merrell, Assistant Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
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| M. Snow, Operations Manager l
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| D. Stobaugh, Coordinator l
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| P. Sunderland, Lead Scenario Developer
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| M. Vonk, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager
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| MBE i
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| E. Cobey, Senior Resident inspector
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| B. Kemker, Resident inspector
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| Illinois Deos,b.e ,t of Nuclear Safety
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| C. Thompson, Resident Engineer
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| INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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| IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
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| IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors
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| ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED i
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| Opened
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| 50-454/455/99015-01 IFl Difficulty in dispatching " urgent" inplant team.
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| ClQfed
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| 4
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| .50-454/455/97016-02 IFl Exercise Weakness: Failure to classify properly during the
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| 1997 evaluated exercise.
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| I d
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| ' 50-454/455/97016-01 llFI Exercise Weakness: Failure to utilize the Acting Station
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| Director procedure and checklist.
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| Discussed
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| None.
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| 1.
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| *
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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| CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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| DRP Division of Reactor Projects
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| - DRS Division of Reactor Safety
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| EAL. Emergency Action Level
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| ED Emergency Director.
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| EM Emergency Manager
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| EOF Emergency Operations Facility
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| EOP Emergency Operating Procedure -
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| EP Emergency Preparedness
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| FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
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| IFl inspection Follow up Item
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| Kl Potassium lodide
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| NARS lilinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System
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| NPF ' Nuclear Power Facility
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| NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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| NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor. Regulation
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| NUE. Notification of Unusual Event
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| OSC- Operational Support Center -
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| PA Public Address
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| - PAR Protective Action Recommendation
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| PDR NRC Public Document Room
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| PRR Public Reading Room
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| RPT Radiation Protection Technician
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| SCR Simulator Control Room
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| SD Station Director
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| SRI ' Senior Resident inspector
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| TSC . Technical Support Center
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| 12
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| }}
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