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| {{#Wiki_filter:Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 WBL-23-052 November 8, 2023 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 50.71(e) | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96 NRC Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391
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| ==Subject:==
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| Watts Bar Nuclear Plants Unit 1 and 2 - Periodic submission for changes made to the Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual
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| ==Reference:==
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| TVA Letter to NRC, WBL-22-026 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Periodic Submission for Changes Made to the Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual dated May 11, 2022 (ML22131A168)
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| The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with copies of changes to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) Bases and Technical Requirement Manual (TRM). These changes have been implemented at WBN since the last periodic submission in the referenced letter.
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| Copies of changes to the TS Bases, revisions 183 through 193 for Unit 1 and revisions 60 through 72 for Unit 2, are provided in accordance with WBN Units 1 and 2 TS section 5.6, Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program.
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| Copies of changes to the TRM, revisions 73 through 77 for Unit 1 and revisions 17 through 22 for Unit 2, are provided in accordance with WBN Units 1 and 2 TRM section 5.1 Technical Requirements (TR) Control Program.
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| The changes meet the criteria described within the above control programs for which prior NRC approval is not required.
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| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission WBL-23-052 Page 2 November 8, 2023 There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Please direct any questions concerning this matter to Jonathan Johnson, WBN Licensing Manager, jtjohnson0@tva.gov.
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| I certify that I am duly authorized by TVA, and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information contained herein accurately presents changes made since the previous submittal, necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission or prepared pursuant to Commission requirements.
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| Anthony L. Williams IV Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Enclosures 1- WBN Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases - Table of Contents 2- WBN Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases - Changed Pages 3- WBN Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual - Table of Contents 4- WBN Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual - Changed Pages 5- WBN Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual Bases - Changed Pages 6- WBN Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases - Table of Contents 7- WBN Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases - Changed Pages 8- WBN Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual - Table of Contents 9- WBN Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual - Changed Pages 10- WBN Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual Bases - Changed Pages cc: (w/o enclosures)
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| NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Project Manager - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
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| ENCLOSURE 1 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................. i LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................. iv LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................. v LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................. vi LIST OF AMENDMENTS ............................................................................................................................... viii B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) ..................................................................................................... B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs .......................................................................................... B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL .............................................. B 2.0-8 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY ............................ B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY............................................ B 3.0-10 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .................................................................... B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Tavg > 200°F ................................................ B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Tavg 200°F ................................................ B 3.1-7 B 3.1.3 Core Reactivity............................................................................................... B 3.1-11 B 3.1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) .................................................. B 3.1-17 B 3.1.5 Rod Group Alignment Limits ......................................................................... B 3.1-23 B 3.1.6 Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits.................................................................... B 3.1-32 B 3.1.7 Control Bank Insertion Limits ........................................................................ B 3.1-37 B 3.1.8 Rod Position Indication .................................................................................. B 3.1-45 B 3.1.9 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 1 ....................................................... B 3.1-52 B 3.1.10 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 2 ....................................................... B 3.1-59 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS .......................................................................... B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)) ......................................................... B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel N
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| Factor (F_H ).......................................................................................... B 3.2-11 B 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) .............................................................. B 3.2-18 B 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) ................................................ B 3.2-23 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION ............................................................................................. B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation ................................................ B 3.3-1 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation .......................................................... B 3.3-53 B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ........................................ B 3.3-101 B 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System ........................................................................... B 3.3-118 B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG)
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| Start Instrumentation .............................................................................. B 3.3-126 B 3.3.6 Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation ................................................ B 3.3-131 B 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation ...................................................... B 3.3-138 B 3.3.8 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)
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| Actuation Instrumentation....................................................................... B 3.3-145 (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 i Revision 162
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ............................................................... B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits ....................................................... B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality .................................................... B 3.4-6 B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits .............................................. B 3.4-9 B 3.4.4 RCS Loops MODES 1 and 2 .................................................................... B 3.4-16 B 3.4.5 RCS Loops MODE 3 ................................................................................. B 3.4-19 B 3.4.6 RCS Loops MODE 4 ................................................................................. B 3.4-24 B 3.4.7 RCS Loops MODE 5, Loops Filled ........................................................... B 3.4-30 B 3.4.8 RCS Loops MODE 5, Loops Not Filled .................................................... B 3.4-35 B 3.4.9 Pressurizer ..................................................................................................... B 3.4-38 B 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves ............................................................................. B 3.4-44 B 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)...................................................................................... B 3.4-46 B 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) ........................................... B 3.4-52 B 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ......................................................................... B 3.4-65 B 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage.............................................. B 3.4-70 B 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ..................................................... B 3.4-75 B 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity ..................................................................................... B 3.4-80 B 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity .......................................................... B 3.4-85 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) ......................................... B 3.5-1 B 3.5.1 Accumulators ................................................................................................. B 3.5-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS Operating ........................................................................................ B 3.5-9 B 3.5.3 ECCS Shutdown ....................................................................................... B 3.5-19 B 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) ....................................................... B 3.5-23 B 3.5.5 Seal Injection Flow......................................................................................... B 3.5-29 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .................................................................................. B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 Containment ................................................................................................... B 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks .................................................................................. B 3.6-5 B 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves ....................................................................... B 3.6-11 B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure ................................................................................... B 3.6-22 B 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature....................................................................... B 3.6-25 B 3.6.6 Containment Spray Systems ........................................................................ B 3.6-28 B 3.6.7 Deleted ........................................................................................................... B 3.6-34 B 3.6.8 Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) ............................................................. B 3.6-35 B 3.6.9 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) ............................................... B 3.6-40 B 3.6.10 Air Return System (ARS) .............................................................................. B 3.6-44 B 3.6.11 Ice Bed ........................................................................................................... B 3.6-48 B 3.6.12 Ice Condenser Doors..................................................................................... B 3.6-56 B 3.6.13 Divider Barrier Integrity .................................................................................. B 3.6-64 B 3.6.14 Containment Recirculation Drains ................................................................ B 3.6-69 B 3.6.15 Shield Building ............................................................................................... B 3.6-73 (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 ii Revision 82, 94, 162
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS .................................................................................................. B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ............................................................ B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) .......................................................... B 3.7-7 B 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs) and Associated Bypass Valves .............................................................. B 3.7-12 B 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)............................................................... B 3.7-17 B 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.............................................................. B 3.7-21 B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ................................................................. B 3.7-29 B 3.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS) .............................................................. B 3.7-33 B 3.7.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System ........................................... B 3.7-38 B 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).............................................................................. B 3.7-42 B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) ............................ B 3.7-44 B 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) .................................................................. B 3.7-51 B 3.7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS).................................... B 3.7-55 B 3.7.13 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ..................................................................... B 3.7-60 B 3.7.14 Secondary Specific Activity ........................................................................... B 3.7-63 B 3.7-15 Spent Fuel Pool Assembly Storage .............................................................. B 3.7-66 B 3.7-16 Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown.......................................... B 3.7-69 B 3.7-17 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System Shutdown ......................... B 3.7-75 B 3.7-18 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration. B 3.7-81 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS........................................................................ B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources Operating .............................................................................. B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources Shutdown .............................................................................. B 3.8-39 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air .................................................... B 3.8-44 B 3.8.4 DC Sources Operating .............................................................................. B 3.8-54 B 3.8.5 DC Sources Shutdown.............................................................................. B 3.8-66 B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters ........................................................................................ B 3.8-71 B 3.8.7 Inverters Operating .................................................................................... B 3.8-80 B 3.8.8 Inverters Shutdown ................................................................................... B 3.8-84 B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating ................................................................ B 3.8-87 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems Shutdown ................................................................ B 3.8-97 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS .................................................................................. B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration...................................................................................... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves ................................................... B 3.9-4 B 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation ................................................................................ B 3.9-7 B 3.9.4 Deleted ........................................................................................................... B 3.9-10 B 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation High Water Level ............................................................. B 3.9-11 B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation Low Water Level .............................................................. B 3.9-15 B 3.9.7 Refueling Cavity Water Level ........................................................................ B 3.9-18 B 3.9.8 Deleted ........................................................................................................... B 3.9-21 B 3.9.9 Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration .......................................................... B 3.9-22 B 3.9.10 Decay Time .................................................................................................... B 3.9-24 Watts Bar-Unit 1 iii Revision 150, 162, 167
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| LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Page Page B 3.3.4-1 Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls.. B 3.3-124 B 3.8.1-2 TS Action or Surveillance Requirement (SR)
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| Contingency Actions ....................................................................... B 3.8-37 B 3.8.9-1 AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems............................................................................................ B 3.8-96 Watts Bar-Unit 1 iv Revision 150, 162
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| LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. Title Page B 2.1.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits vs Boundary of Protection ....................................................................................................... B 2.0-7 B 3.1.7-1 Control Bank Insertion vs Percent RTP ................................................................. B 3.1-44 B 3.2.1-1 K(z) - Normalized FQ(z) as a Function of Core Height ............................................................................................................. B 3.2-10 B 3.2.3-1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Acceptable Operation Limits as a Function of RATED THERMAL POWER ............................................. B 3.2-22 Watts Bar-Unit 1 v Revision 162
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 1 of 2)
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| Acronym Title ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Control Room Panel ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARO All Rods Out ARFS Air Return Fan System ADV Atmospheric Dump Valve BOC Beginning of Cycle CAOC Constant Axial Offset Control CCS Component Cooling System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line Isolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PDMS Power Distribution Monitoring System PIV Pressure Isolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Thermal Power Watts Bar-Unit 1 vi Revision 104
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 2 of 2)
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| Acronym Title RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety Injection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar-Unit 1 vii
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT NPF-20 11-09-95 Low Power Operating License Revision 1 12-08-95 Slave Relay Testing NPF-90 02-07-96 Full Power Operating License Revision 2 (Amendment 1) 12-08-95 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Suction Requirement Revision 3 03-27-96 Remove Cold Leg Accumulator Alarm Setpoints Revision 4 (Amendment 2) 06-13-96 Ice Bed Surveillance Frequency And Weight Revision 5 07-03-96 Containment Airlock Door Indication Revision 6 (Amendment 3) 09-09-96 Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Surveillance Revision 7 09-28-96 Clarification of COT Frequency for COMS Revision 8 11-21-96 Admin Control of Containment Isol. Valves Revision 9 04-29-97 Switch Controls For Manual CI-Phase A Revision 10 (Amendment 5) 05-27-97 Appendix-J, Option B Revision 11 (Amendment 6) 07-28-97 Spent Fuel Pool Rerack Revision 12 09-10-97 Heat Trace for Radiation Monitors Revision 13 (Amendment 7) 09-11-97 Cycle 2 Core Reload Revision 14 10-10-97 Hot Leg Recirculation Timeframe Revision 15 02-12-98 EGTS Logic Testing Revision 16 (Amendment 10) 06-09-98 Hydrogen Mitigation System Temporary Specification Revision 17 07-31-98 SR Detectors (Visual/audible indication)
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| Revision 18 (Amendment 11) 09-09-98 Relocation of F(Q) Penalty to COLR Revision 19 (Amendment 12) 10-19-98 Online Testing of the Diesel Batteries and Performance of the 24 Hour Diesel Endurance Run Watts Bar-Unit 1 viii Revision 19
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 20 (Amendment 13) 10-26-98 Clarification of Surveillance Testing Requirements for TDAFW Pump Revision 21 11-30-98 Clarification to Ice Condenser Door ACTIONS and door lift tests, and Ice Bed sampling and flow blockage SRs Revision 22 (Amendment 14) 11-10-98 COMS - Four Hour Allowance to Make RHR Suction Relief Valve Operable Revision 23 01-05-99 RHR Pump Alignment for Refueling Operations Revision 24 (Amendment 16) 12-17-98 New action for Steam Generator ADVs due to Inoperable ACAS.
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| Revision 25 02-08-99 Delete Reference to PORV Testing Not Performed in Lower Modes Revision 26 (Amendment 17) 12-30-98 Slave Relay Surveillance Frequency Extension to 18 Months Revision 27 (Amendment 18) 01-15-99 Deletion of Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate Reactor Trip Function Revision 28 04-02-99 P2500 replacement with Integrated Computer System (ICS). Delete Reference to ERFDS as a redundant input signal.
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| Revision 29 03-13-00 Added notes to address instrument error in various parameters shown in the Bases.
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| Also corrected the applicable modes for TS 3.6.5 from 3 and 4 to 2, 3 and 4.
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| Revision 30 (Amendment 23) 03-22-00 For SR 3.3.2.10, Table 3.3.2-1, one time relief from turbine trip response time testing. Also added Reference 14 to the Bases for LCO 3.3.2.
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| Revision 31 (Amendment 19) 03-07-00 Reset Power Range High Flux Reactor Trip Setpoints for Multiple Inoperable MSSVs.
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| Revision 32 04-13-00 Clarification to Reflect Core Reactivity and MTC Behavior.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 ix Revision 32
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 33 05-02-00 Clarification identifying four distribution boards primarily used for operational convenience.
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| Revision 34 (Amendment 24) 07-07-00 Elimination of Response Time Testing Revision 35 08-14-00 Clarification of ABGTS Surveillance Testing Revision 36 (Amendments 22 and 25) 08-23-00 Revision of Ice Condenser sampling and flow channel surveillance requirements Revision 37 (Amendment 26) 09-08-00 Administrative Controls for Open Penetrations During Refueling Operations Revision 38 09-17-00 SR 3.2.1.2 was revised to reflect the area of the core that will be flux mapped.
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| Revision 39 (Amendments 21and 28) 09-13-00 Amendment 21 - Implementation of Best Estimate LOCA analysis.
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| Amendment 28 - Revision of LCO 3.1.10, Physics Tests Exceptions - Mode 2.
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| Revision 40 09-28-00 Clarifies WBNs compliance with ANSI/ANS-19.6.1 and deletes the detailed descriptions of Physics Tests.
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| Revision 41 (Amendment 31) 01-22-01 Power Uprate from 3411 MWt to 3459 MWt Using Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM)
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| Revision 42 03-07-01 Clarify Operability Requirements for Pressurizer PORVs Revision 43 05-29-01 Change CVI Response Time from 5 to 6 Seconds Revision 44 (Amendment 33) 01-31-02 Ice weight reduction from 1236 to 1110 lbs per basket and peak containment pressure revision from 11.21 to 10.46 psig.
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| Revision 45 (Amendment 35) 02-12-02 Relaxation of CORE ALTERATIONS Restrictions Revision 46 02-25-02 Clarify Equivalent Isolation Requirements in LCO 3.9.4 Watts Bar-Unit 1 x Revision 46
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 47 (Amendment 38) 03-01-02 RCS operational LEAKAGE and SG Alternate Repair Criteria for Axial Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking (ODSCC)
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| Revision 48 (Amendment 36) 03-06-02 Increase Degraded Voltage Time Delay from 6 to 10 seconds.
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| Revision 49 (Amendment 34) 03-08-02 Deletion of the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) requirements from Section 5.7.2.6 of the Technical Specifications.
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| Revision 50 (Amendment 39) 08-30-02 Extension of the allowed outage time (AOT) for a single diesel generator from 72 hours to 14 days.
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| Revision 51 11-14-02 Clarify that Shutdown Banks C and D have only One Rod Group Revision 52 (Amendment 41) 12-20-02 RCS Specific Activity Level reduction from
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| <1.0 Ci/gm to <0.265 Ci/gm.
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| Revision 53 (Amendment 42) 01-24-03 Revise SR 3.0.3 for Missed Surveillances Revision 54 (Amendment 43) 05-01-03 Exigent TS SR 3.5.2.3 to delete SI Hot Leg Injection lines from SR until U1C5 outage.
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| Revision 55 05-22-03 Editorial corrections (PER 02-015499),
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| correct peak containment pressure, and revise I-131 gap inventory for an FHA.
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| Revision 56 07-10-03 TS Bases for SRs 3.8.4.8 through SR 3.8.4.10 clarification of inter-tier connection resistance test.
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| Revision 57 08-11-03 TS Bases for B 3.5.2 Background information provides clarification when the 9 hrs for hot leg recirculation is initiated.
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| Revision 58 (Amendment 45) 09-26-03 The Bases for LCO 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 were revised to delete the Unit 2 Inverters.
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| Revision 59 (Amendment 46) 09-30-03 Address new DNB Correlation in B2.1.1 and B3.2.12 for Robust Fuel Assembly (RFA)-2.
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| Revision 60 (Amendment 47) 10-06-03 RCS Flow Measurement Using Elbow Tap Flow Meters (Revise Table 3.3.1-1(10) &
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| SR 3.4.1.4).
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xi Revision 60
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 61 (Amendments 40 and 48) 10-14-03 Incorporated changes required to implement the Tritium Program (Amendment 40) and Stepped Boron Concentration increases for RWST and CLAs (Amendment 48) depending on the number of TPBARS installed into the reactor core.
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| Revision 62 10-15-03 Clarified ECCS venting in Bases Section B 3.5.2 (WBN-TS-03-19)
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| Revision 63 12-08-03 The contingency actions listed in Bases Table 3.8.1-2 were reworded to be consistent with the NRC Safety Evaluation that approved Tech Spec Amendment 39.
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| Revision 64 (Amendment 50) 03-23-04 Incorporated Amendment 50 for the seismic qualification of the Main Control Room duct work. Amendment 50 revised the Bases for LCO 3.7.10, CREVS, and LCO 3.7.11, CREATCS. An editorial correction was made on Page B 3.7-61.
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| Revision 65 04-01-04 Revised the Bases for Action B.3.1 of LCO 3.8.1 to clarify that a common cause assessment is not required when a diesel generator is made inoperable due to the performance of a surveillance.
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| Revision 66 05-21-04 Revised Page B 3.8-64 (Bases for LCO 3.8.4) to add a reference to SR 3.8.4.13 that was inadvertently deleted by the changes made for Amendment 12.
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| Revision 67 (Amendment 45) 03-05-05 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate changes to the Vital Inverters (DCN 51370). Refer to the changes made for Bases Revision 58 (Amendment 45)
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| Revision 68 (Amendment 55) 03-22-05 Amendment 55 modified the requirements for mode change limitations in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 by incorporating TSTF-359, Revision 9.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xii Revision 68
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 68 (Amendment 55 and 56) 03-22-05 Change MSLB primary to secondary leakage from 1 gpm to 3 gpm (WBN-TS-03-14).
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| Revision 69 (Amendment 54) 04-04-05 Revised the use of the terms inter-tier and inter-rack in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.10.
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| Revision 70 (Amendment 58) 10-17-05 Alternate monitoring process for a failed Rod Position Indicator (RPI) (TS-03-12).
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| Revision 71 (Amendment 59) 02-01-06 Temporary Use of Penetrations in Shield Building Dome During Modes 1-4 (WBN-TS-04-17)
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| Revision 72 08-31-06 Minor Revision (Corrects Typographical Error) - Changed LCO Bases Section 3.4.6 which incorrectly referred to Surveillance Requirement 3.4.6.2 rather than correctly identifying Surveillance Requirement 3.4.6.3.
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| Revision 73 09-11-06 Updated the Bases for LCO 3.9.4 to clarify that penetration flow paths through containment to the outside atmosphere must be limited to less than the ABSCE breach allowance. Also administratively removed from the Bases for LCO 3.9.4 a statement on core alterations that should have been removed as part of Amendment 35.
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| Revision 74 09-16-06 For the LCO section of the Bases for LCO 3.9.4, administratively removed the change made by Revision 73 to the discussion of an LCO note and placed the change in another area of the LCO section.
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| Revision 75 (Amendment 45) 09-18-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for Channel 1-II of the Vital Inverters (DCN 51370).
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xiii Revision 75
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 76 (Amendment 45) 09-22-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for Channel 1-IV of the Vital Inverters (DCN 51370).
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| Revision 77 (Amendment 45) 10-10-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for Channel 1-I of the Vital Inverters (DCN 51370).
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| Revision 78 (Amendment 45) 10-13-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for each of the Vital Inverters (DCN 51370).
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| Revision 79 (Amendment 60, 61 and 11-03-06 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level
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| : 64) Indication Increased from 6% to 32% (WBN-TS-05-06) Bases Sections 3.4.5, 3.4.6, and 3.4.7.
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| Revision 80 11-08-06 Revised the Bases for SR 3.5.2.8 to clarify that inspection of the containment sump strainer constitutes inspection of the trash rack and the screen functions.
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| Revision 81 (Amendment 62) 11-15-06 Revised the Bases for SR 3.6.11.2, 3.6.11.3, and 3.6.11.4 to address the Increase Ice Weight in Ice Condenser to Support Replacement Steam Generators (WBN-TS-05-09) [SGRP]
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| Revision 82 (Amendment 65) 11-17-06 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity (WBN-TS-05-10) [SGRP]
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| Revision 83 11-20-06 Updated Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.6.5 to clarify that the number of unobstructed spray nozzles is defined in the design bases.
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| Revision 84 11-30-06 Revised Bases 3.6.9 and 3.6.15 to show the operation of the EGTS when annulus pressure is not within limits.
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| Revision 85 03-22-07 Revised Bases 3.6.9 and 3.6.15 in accordance with TACF 1-07-0002-065 to clarify the operation of the EGTS.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xiv Revision 85
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| | |
| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 86 01-31-08 Figure 3.7.15-1 was deleted as part of Amendment 40. A reference to the figure in the Bases for LCO 3.9.9 was not deleted at the time Amendment 40 was incorporated into the Technical Specifications. Bases Revision 86 corrected this error (refer to PER 130944).
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| Revision 87 02-12-08 Implemented Bases change package TS 13 for DCN 52220-A. This DCN ties the ABI and CVI signals together so that either signal initiates the other signal.
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| Revision 88 (Amendment 67) 03-06-08 Technical Specification Amendment 67 increased the number of TPBARs from 240 to 400.
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| Revision 89 (Amendment 66) 05-01-08 Update of Bases to be consistent with the changes made to Section 5.7.2.11 of the Technical Specifications to reference the ASME Operation and Maintenance Code Revision 90 (Amendment 68) 10-02-08 Issuance of amendment regarding Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System completion times, bypass test times, and surveillance test intervals Revision 91 (Amendment 70) 11-25-2008 The Bases for TS 3.7.10, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) were revised to address control room envelope habitability.
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| Revision 92 (Amendment 71) 11-26-2008 The Bases for TS 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation were revised to remove the requirement for the atmospheric gaseous radiation monitor as one of the means for detecting a one gpm leak within one hour.
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| Revision 93 (Amendment 74) 02-09-2009 Updates the discussion of the Allowable Values associated with the Containment Purge Radiation Monitors in the LCO section of the Bases for LCO 3.3.6.
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| Revision 94 (Amendment 72) 02-23-2009 Bases Revision 94 [Technical Specification (TS)] Amendment 72 deleted the Hydrogen Recombiners (LCO 3.6.7) from the TS and moved the requirements to the Technical Requirements Manual.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xv Revision 94
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 95 03-05-2009 Corrected an error in SR 3.3.2.6 which referenced Function 6.g of TS Table 3.3.2-1.
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| This function was deleted from the TS by Amendment 1.
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| Revision 96 (Amendment 75) 06-19-2009 Modified Mode 1 and 2 applicability for Function 6.e of TS Table 3.3.2-1, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation." This is associated with AFW automatic start on trip of all main feedwater pumps. In addition, revised LCO 3.3.2, Condition J, to be consistent with WBN Unit 1 design bases.
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| Revision 97 (Amendment 76) 09-23-2009 Amendment 76 updates LCO 3.8.7, Inverters - Operating to reflect the installation of the Unit 2 inverters.
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| Revision 98 (Amendments 77, 79, & 10-05-2009 Amendment 77 revised the number of
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| : 81) TPBARs that may be loaded in the core from 400 to 704.
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| Amendment 79 revised LCO 3.6.3 to allow verification by administrative means isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured.
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| Amendment 81 revised the allowed outage time of Action B of LCO 3.5.1 from 1 hour to 24 hours.
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| Revision 99 10-09-2009 Bases Revision 99 incorporated Westinghouse Technical Bulletin (TB) 08-04.
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| Revision 100 11-17-2009 Bases Revision 100 revises the LCO description of the Containment Spray System to clarify that transfer to the containment sump is accomplished by manual actions.
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| Revision 101 02-09-2010 Bases Revision 101 implemented DCN 52216-A that will place both trains of the EGTS pressure control valves hand switches in A-AUTO and will result in the valves opening upon initiation of the Containment Isolation phase A (CIA) signal.
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| They will remain open independent of the annulus pressure and reset of the CIA.
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| Revision 102 03-01-2010 Bases Revision 102 implemented EDC 52564-A which addresses a new single failure scenario relative to operation of the EGTS post LOCA.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xvi Revision 102
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 103 04-05-2010 Bases Revision 103 implemented NRC guidance Application of Generic Letter 80-30 which allows a departure from the single failure criterion where a non-TS support system has two 100% capacity subsystems, each capable of supporting the design heat load of the area containing the TS equipment.
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| Revision 104 (Amendment 82) 09-20-2010 Bases Revision 104 implemented License Amendment No. 82, which approved the BEACON-TSM application of the Power Distributing System. The PDMS requirements reside in the TRM.
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| Revision 105 10-28-2010 DCN 53437 added spare chargers 8-S and 9-S which increased the total of 125 VDC Vital Battery Chargers to eight (8).
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| Revision 106 01-20-2011 Revised SR 3.8.3.6 to clarify that identified fuel oil leakage does not constitute failure of the surveillance.
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| Revision 107 (Amendment 85) 02-24-2011 Amendment 85 revises TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS). Specifically, the proposed change will only be applicable during plant modifications to upgrade the CREATCS chillers. This "one-time" TS change will be implemented during Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Cycles 10 and 11 beginning March 1, 2011, and ending April 30, 2012.
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| Revision 108 03-07-2011 Bases Revision 108 deletes reference to NSRB to be notified of violation of a safety limit within 24 hours in TSB 2.2.4. Also, corrected error in SR 3.3.2.4 in the reference to Table 3.3.1-1. It should be Table 3.3.2-1.
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| Revision 109 04-06-2011 Bases Revision 109 clarifies that during plant startup in Mode 2 the AFW anticipatory auto-start signal need not be OPERABLE if the AFW system is in service. PER 287712 was identified by NRC to provide clarification to TS Bases 3.3.2, Function 6.e, Trip of All Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps.
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| Revision 110 04-19-2011 Clarified the text associated with the interconnection of the ABI and CVI functions in the bases for LCO 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 3.7.12 and 3.9.8.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xvii Revision 110
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 111 05-05-2011 Added text to several sections of the Bases for LCO 3.4.16 to clarify that the actual transient limit for I-131 is 14 Ci/gm and refers to the controls being placed in AOI-28.
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| Revision 112 05-24-2011 DCN 55076 replaces the existing four 125-Vdc DG Battery Chargers with four sets of redundant new battery charger assemblies.
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| Revision 113 06-24-2011 Final stage implementation of DCN 55076 which replaced the existing four 125-Vdc DG Battery Chargers with four sets of redundant new battery charger assemblies.
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| Revision 114 12-12-2011 Clarifies the acceptability of periodically using a portion of the 25% grace period in SR 3.0.2 to facilitate 13 week maintenance work schedules.
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| Revision 115 12-21-2011 Revises several surveillance requirements notes in TS 3.8.1 to allow performance of surveillances on WBN Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators while WBN Unit 1 is operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 Revision 116 06-27-2012 Revises TS Bases 3.8.1, AC Sources -
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| Operating, to make the TS Bases consistent with TS 3.8.1, Condition D Revision 117 07-27-2012 Revises TS Bases 3.7.10, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS), to make the TS Bases consistent with TS 3.7.10, Condition E Revision 118 01-30-2013 Revises TS Bases 3.4.16, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to change the dose equivalent I-131 spike limit and the allowable value for control room air intake radiation monitors.
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| Revision 119 08-17-2013 Revises TS Bases 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 3.7.12, 3.7.13, 3.9.4, 3.9.7, 3.9.8, and adds TS Bases 3.9.10 to reflect selective implementation of the Alternate Source Term methodology for the analysis of Fuel Handling Accidents (FHAs) and make TS Bases consistent with the revised FHA dose analysis.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xviii Revision 119
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 120 01-23-2014 Revised the References to TS Bases 3.1.9, PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - Mode1, to document NRC approval of WCAP 12472-P-A. Addendum 1-A and 4-A., Addendum 1-A approved the use of the Advance Nodal Code (ANC-Phoenix_ in the BEACON system as the neutronic code for measuring core power distribution. Is also approved the use of fixed incore self-powered neutron detectors (SPD) to calibrate the BEACON system in lieu of incore and excore neutron detectors and core exit thermocouples (CET). For plants that do not have SPDs Addendum 4-A approved Westinghouse methodology that allow the BEACON system to calculate CET uncertainty as a function of reactor power on a plant cycle basis during power ascension following a refueling outage.
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| Revision 121 08-04-2014 Revises references in TS Bases 3.7.1 for consistency with changes to the TS Bases 3.7.1 references approved in Revision 89.
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| Revision 122 (Amendment 94) 01-14-2014 Revises TS Bases 3.7.10, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) to make the TS Bases consistent with TS 3.7.10, Actions E, F, G, and H.
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| Revision 123 (Amendment 104) 03-16-2016 Amendment 104, TSB Revision 123 adds TS B3.7.16, Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown and adds TS B3.7.17, Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW)
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| System - Shutdown.
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| Revision 124 02-12-2016 Revises TS Bases Table B3.8.9-1, AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems, the second Note.
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| Revision 125 (Amendment 84, 102, 03-16-2016 Revises TS Bases Section B3.8-1, AC 103) Sources-Operating.
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| Revision 126 03-18-2016 Revises TS Bases Section B3.7.7, Component Cooling System the 1B and 2B surge tank sections.
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| Revision 127 04-18-2016 Revises TS Bases Section B 3.6.4, Containment Pressure and B3.6.6, Containment Spray System to change the maximum peak pressure from a LOCA of 9.36 psig.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xix Revision 127
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 128 06-27-16 Revises TS Bases Section B3.6.8, Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS), to delete sentence regarding Hydrogen Recombiners that are abandoned.
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| Revision 129 08-19-16 Revises TS Bases Section 3.6.15, Shield Building, to clarify the use of the Condition B note.
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| Revision 130 12-22-16 Revises TS Bases Sections 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3 to reflect the deletion of TS 3.9.4 in WBN Unit 1 TS Amendment 92.
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| Revision 131 (Amendment 107) 01-13-17 Revises TS Bases Section 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), Applicable Safety Analyses Revision 132 (Amendment 110) 01-17-17 Revises TS Bases Section 3.8.1, AC Sources -Operating Revision 133 (Amendment 111) 03-13-17 Adds TS Bases Section 3.0.8 for Inoperability of Snubbers.
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| Revision 134 (Amendment 112) 04-25-17 Revise TS Bases Section 3.7.11 Action A.1 regarding CREATCS.
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| Revision 135 05-17-17 Revises TS Bases Section B3.3.3, PAM Instrumentation Revision 136 (Amendment 113) 05-17-17 Revises TS Bases Section B3.7.7 CCS Revision 137 (Amendment 114) 07-14-17 Revises TS Bases Section B SR 3.0.2 to add a one-time extension for the surveillance interval.
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| Revision 138 (Amendment 115) 11-2-17 Revises TS Bases to adopt the TSTF-522 to revise ventilation system surveillance requirements to operate for 10 hours per month.
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| Revision 139 (Amendment 116) 11-2-17 Revises TS Bases Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System.
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| Revision 140 12-12-17 Revises TS Bases to include the ABB-NV and WLOP secondary CHF correlations.
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| Revision 141 03-08-18 Revises TS Bases 3.0.6 to remove non-standard guidance added by Bases Rev.103 that applied LCO 3.0.6 to non-TS support equipment when the equipment consisted of two 100% capacity subsystems, each capable of supporting both trains of TS equipment.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xx Revision 141
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 142 04-06-18 Add clarifying information of ECCS gas that some gas is acceptable based on output of DCP 66453.
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| Revision 143, Amendment 120 08-20-18 Revises TS Bases and adopts the TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod position requirements.
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| Revision 144, Amendment 121 08-16-18 Revises TS Bases 3.0 to extend surveillance requirements and specify intervals.
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| Revision 145, Amendment 122 09-21-18 Revises TS Bases 3.2.4 and Bases 3.3.1 related to the reactor trip system instrumentation.
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| Revision 146, Amendment 119 10-11-18 Revises TS Bases 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, to reflect plant modifications to the reactor protection system instrumentation associated with the turbine trip on low fluid oil pressure.
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| Revision 147 11-14-18 Revises TS Bases 3.7.5, AFW System, to increase margin on the AFW MDAFW pumps.
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| Revision 148 11-14-18 Revises TS Bases 3.4.12, References section to update Reference 4 with an updated FSAR Section.
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| Revision 149 2-13-19 Revises TS Bases 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Revision 150, Amendment 124 3-19-19 Revises TS Bases 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System Revision 151, Amendment 123 6-13-19 Revises TS Bases 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.5 for the containment purge valves to revise the frequency from "184 days AND Within 92 days after opening the valve" to "In accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program."
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| Revision 152, Amendment 126 8-1-19 Revises TS Bases 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating, to add a new Condition C.
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| Revision 153 8-1-19 Revises TS Bases 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
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| Revision 154 8-7-19 Revises TS Bases 3.8.6, surveillance requirements.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxi Revision 154
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 155 8-22-19 Revises TS Bases 3.8.4, DC Sources -
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| Operating.
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| Revision 156 (Amendment 128) 12-17-19 Revises TS Bases 3.3.5, LOP DG Start Instrumentation, to implement Class 1E unbalanced voltage relays.
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| Revision 157 9-26-19 Removed Reference 5 from B 3.3-162.
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| CR 1514672 Revision 158 (Amendment 129) 12-17-19 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.8.1, 3.8.7, 3.8.8, and 3.8.9 to support performance of the 6.9kV and 480V shutdown board maintenance.
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| Revision 159 1-13-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to remove the term operational convenience.
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| Revision 160 (Amendment 130) 1-29-20 TSTF-500 - DC Electrical Rewrite -
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| Update to TSTF-360 Revision 161 2-20-20 Revises CSST A and B to qualify to GDC-17 requirements in order to be considered as a TS offsite power source substitute for CSST D or C when out of service.
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| Revision 162 (Amendment 132) 3-25-20 TSTF- 425 - Surveillance Frequency Testing Program Revision 163 3-17-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating, regarding the Diesel Auxiliary Building Boards.
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| Revision 164 (Amendment 133) 4-8-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.3.5, LOP DG Start Instrumentation for Condition C.
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| Revision 165 (Amendment 135) 7-20-20 Revises miscellaneous administrative changes to the Tech Specs Bases.
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| Revision 166 (Amendment 136) 9-15-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.8.1 operability of the automatic transfer from a Unit Service Station Transformer to a Common Station Service Transformer A or B at the associated unit board.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxii Revision 166
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 167 (Amendment 125) 11-4-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Assembly Storage, and adding the Bases 3.7.18 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration.
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| Revision 168 (Amendment 137) 12-8-20 Adopts TSTF-541, Revision 2, Add exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for valves and dampers locked in the actuated position.
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| Revision 169 (Amendment 139) 01-05-21 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.6.15 by deleting existing Condition B and revise the acceptance criteria for annulus pressure.
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| Revision 170 (Amendment 141) 02-02-21 Adopts TSTF-569, Revision 2, Revise Response Time Testing Definition.
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| Revision 171 (Amendment 144) 03-31-21 Revises the Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation to remove plasma from the text.
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| Revision 172 (Amendment 145) 05-19-21 One-Time Change to Tech Spec Bases 3.7.11 to Extend the Completion Time for Main Control Room Chiller Modifications.
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| Revision 173 (Amendment 146) 06-22-21 TSTF-490 Deletion of E Bar and revision of the RCS specific activity.
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| Revision 174 (Amendment 147) 08-11-21 TSTF-510 Steam Generator Tube Inspection frequency.
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| Revision 175 (Amendment 142) 11-04-21 Implement WCAP-17661-P-A, Improved RAOC and CAOC FQ Surveillance Tech Specs.
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| Revision 176 (Amendment 143) 11-10-21 Full SpectrumTM Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis (LOCA) and New LOCA - Specific Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rod Stress Analysis Methodology.
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| Revision 177 (Amendment 148) 11-17-21 Revises Technical Specification Bases B3.3.2 for Function 6.E.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxiii Revision 177
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 178 (Amendment 149) 11-30-21 Revise Technical Specification 5.7.2.19, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to extend containment integrated and local leak rate test intervals.
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| Revision 179 (Amendment 150) 1-12-22 Revise Technical Specification SR 3.6.15.4.
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| Revision 180 1-25-22 Revises Technical Specification Bases 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating to support the upcoming shutdown board cleaning.
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| Revision 181 2-9-22 Revises Technical Specification Bases Table 3.8.9-1 to remove C&A vent Boards 1A2-A and 1B2-B.
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| Revision 182 (Amendment 151) 3-1-22 Revises Technical Specification Bases 3.7.12 to add note for one-time exception.
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| Revision 183 (Amendment 153) 10-5-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.8 to permanently extend the allowed completion time of the ERCW system Train.
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| Revision 184 11-9-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.5 to delete one valve for the MDAFW System flow path to the Steam Generators.
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| Revision 185 (Amendment 156) 12-1-22 TSTF-205-A, Rev 3 Revision of CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL Functional Test, and Related Definitions, and TSTF-563-A, Revise Instrument Testing Definitions to Incorporate the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| Revision 186 (Amendment 158) 2-15-23 TSTF-529, Rev 4 Clarify Use and Application Rules Revises Sections 1.3 and 3.0.
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| Revision 187 (Amendment 159) 2-22-23 TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements.
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| Revision 188 3-2-23 Revises B3.1.4, Moderator Temperature Coefficient which replaces the measurement of the MTC with a conditional verification of the design MTC in Tech Spec.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxiv Revision 188
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 189 4-4-23 Revises B 3.8.7 and B 3.8.8 for Plant Configuration for both Units SDBD cleaning require 120V AC Vital Inverters and 125V DC Vital Chargers to be placed on the cross-train 480V Shutdown Board power sources.
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| Revision 190 4-26-23 Revises B 3.8.3 location of reference regarding Relocation of Stored Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Volume Valves to Licensee Control Revision 191 (Amendment 160) 5-4-23 Revises TSB 3.4.12, Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS), to add a note to the Limiting Condition for Operation.
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| Revision 192 (Amendment 162) 6-15-23 Revises TSB 3.7.11 CREATCS footnotes.
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| Revision 193 9-14-23 Revises TSB 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating, battery has 4 hours of capacity.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxv Revision 193
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| ENCLOSURE 2 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGED PAGES
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY BASES LCOs LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
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| LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e.,
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| when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).
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| LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered, unless otherwise specified. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:
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| : a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and
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| : b. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.
| |
| There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. If this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. In this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-1 Revision 133, 186 Amendment 111, 158
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.2 Completing the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met or is no (continued) longer applicable, unless otherwise stated in the individual Specifications.
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| The nature of some Required Actions of some Conditions necessitates that, once the Condition is entered, the Required Actions must be completed even though the associated Conditions no longer exist. The individual LCO's ACTIONS specify the Required Actions where this is the case. An example of this is in LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."
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| The Completion Times of the Required Actions are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service intentionally. The ACTIONS for not meeting a single LCO adequately manage any increase in plant risk, provided any unusual external conditions (e.g., severe weather, offsite power instability) are considered. In addition, the increased risk associated with simultaneous removal of multiple structures, systems, trains or components from service is assessed and managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
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| Individual Specifications may specify a time limit for performing an SR when equipment is removed from service or bypassed for testing. In this case, the Completion Times of the Required Actions are applicable when this time limit expires, if the equipment remains removed from service or bypassed.
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| When a change in MODE or other specified condition is required to comply with Required Actions, the unit may enter a MODE or other specified condition in which another Specification becomes applicable. In this case, the Completion Times of the associated Required Actions would apply from the point in time that the new Specification becomes applicable, and the ACTIONS Condition(s) are entered.
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| LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 establishes the actions that must be implemented when an LCO is not met and:
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| : a. An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or
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| : b. The condition of the unit is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corresponding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 be entered immediately.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-2 Revision 159
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.3 This Specification delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe (continued) MODE or other specified condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LCO and its ACTIONS. Planned entry into LCO 3.0.3 should be avoided. If it is not practicable to avoid planned entry into LCO 3.0.3, plant risk should be assessed and managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and the planned entry into LCO 3.0.3 should have less effect on plant safety than other practicable alternatives.
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| Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, 1 hour is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before initiating a change in unit operation. This includes time to permit the operator to coordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to enter lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies. The use and interpretation of specified times to complete the actions of LCO 3.0.3 are consistent with the discussion of Section 1.3, Completion Times.
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| A unit shutdown required in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 may be terminated and LCO 3.0.3 exited if any of the following occurs:
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| : a. The LCO is now met.
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| : b. The LCO is no longer applicable,
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| : c. A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have now been performed, or
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| : d. ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Completion Times. These Completion Times are applicable from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LCO 3.0.3 is exited.
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| The time limits of Specification 3.0.3 allow 37 hours for the unit to be in MODE 5 when a shutdown is required during MODE 1 operation. If the unit is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for entering the next lower MODE applies. If a lower MODE is entered in less time than allowed, however, the total allowable time to enter MODE 5, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if MODE 3 is entered in 2 hours, then the time allowed for entering MODE 4 is the next 11 hours, because the total time for entering MODE 4 is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours. Therefore, if remedial measures are completed that would permit a return to MODE 1, a penalty is not incurred by having to enter a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-3 Revision 159, 186 Amendment 158
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.3 In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, LCO 3.0.3 provides actions for Conditions not covered (continued) in other Specifications. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6 because the unit is already in the most restrictive Condition required by LCO 3.0.3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.
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| Exceptions to LCO 3.0.3 are provided in instances where requiring a unit shutdown, in accordance with LCO 3.0.3, would not provide appropriate remedial measures for the associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3.7.13, "Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." LCO 3.7.13 has an Applicability of "During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool."
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| Therefore, this LCO can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.13 are not met while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.13 of "Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool" is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.
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| LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It allows placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., the Applicability desired to be entered) when unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met, in accordance with either LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4.b, or LCO 3.0.4.c.
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| LCO 3.0.4.a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered following entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability will permit continued operation within the MODE or other specified condition for an unlimited period of time. Compliance with ACTIONS that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change.
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| Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made and the Required Actions followed after entry into the Applicability.
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| For example, LCO 3.0.4.a may be used when the Required Action to be entered states that an inoperable instrument channel must be placed in the trip condition within the Completion Time. Transition into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4 and the channel is subsequently placed in the tripped condition within the Completion Time, which begins when the Applicability is entered. If the instrument channel cannot be placed in the tripped condition and the subsequent default ACTION (Required Action and associated Completion Time not met) allows the (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-4 Revision 68, 186 Amendment 55, 158
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.4 OPERABLE train to be placed in operation, use of LCO 3.0.4.a is acceptable (continued) because the subsequent ACTIONS to be entered following entry into the MODE include ACTIONS (place the OEPRABLE train in operation) that permit safe plant operation for an unlimited period of time in the MODE or other specified condition to be entered. LCO 3.0.4.b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.
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| The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities be assessed and managed. The risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4.b, must take into account all inoperable Technical Specification equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope.
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| The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants. Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the LCO would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability.
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| LCO 3.0.4.b may be used with single, or multiple systems and components unavailable. NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance relative to consideration of simultaneous unavailability of multiple systems and components. The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. The LCO 3.0.4.b risk assessments do not have to be documented.
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| The Technical Specifications allow continued operation with equipment unavailable in MODE 1 for the duration of the Completion Time. Since this is allowable, and since in general the risk impact in that particular MODE bounds the risk of transitioning into and through the applicable MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability of the LCO, the use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance should be generally acceptable, as long as the risk is assessed and managed as stated above. However, there is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined to be more important to risk and use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance is prohibited. The LCOs governing these system and components (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-5 Revision 68, 186 Amendment 55, 158
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.4 contain Notes prohibiting the use of LCO 3.0.4.b by stating that LCO 3.0.4.b is (continued) not applicable.
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| LCO 3.0.4.c allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met based on a Note in the Specification which states LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. These specific allowances permit entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time and a risk assessment has not been performed. This allowance may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification.
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| The risk assessments performed to justify the use of LCO 3.0.4.b usually only consider systems and components. For this reason, LCO 3.0.4.c is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., RCS Specific Activity), and may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval.
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| The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.
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| The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.
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| Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the LCO is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification.
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| Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1.
| |
| Therefore, utilizing LCO 3.0.4 is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for any Surveillances that have not been performed on inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-6 Revision 68, 186 Amendment 55, 158
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
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| LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of SRs to demonstrate:
| |
| : a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or
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| : b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.
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| The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the allowed SRs. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance. LCO 3.0.5 should not be used in lieu of other practicable alternatives that comply with Required Actions and that do not require changing the MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in order to demonstrate equipment is OPERABLE. LCO 3.0.5 is not intended to be used repeatedly.
| |
| An example of demonstrating equipment is OPERABLE with the Required Actions not met is opening a manual valve that was closed to comply with Required Actions to isolate a flowpath with excessive Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) leakage in order to perform testing to demonstrate that RCS PIV leakage is now within limit.
| |
| Examples of demonstrating equipment OPERABILITY include instances in which it is necessary to take an inoperable channel or trip system out of a tripped condition that was directed by a Required Action if there is no Required Action Note for this purpose. An example of verifying OPERABILITY of equipment removed from service is taking a tripped channel out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during performance of required testing on the inoperable channel. Examples of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition 1) to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of an SR on another channel in the other trip system, or 2) to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of an SR on another channel in the same trip system.
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| The administrative controls in LCO 3.0.5 apply in all cases to systems or components in Chapter 3 of the Technical Specifications, as long as the testing could not be conducted while complying with the Required Actions. This includes the realignment or repositioning of redundant or alternate equipment or trains previously manipulated to comply with ACTIONS, as well as equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-7 Revision 186 Amendment 158
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.6 LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for support systems that have an LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). This exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCO's Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify other Required Actions.
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| When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.
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| However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system. This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
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| Specification 5.7.2.18, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP),"
| |
| ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken.
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| Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.
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| Cross train checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support multiple and redundant safety systems are required. The cross train check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-8 Revision 141
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the plant. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select plant performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions.
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| Test Exception LCOs 3.1.9 and 3.1.10 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.
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| The Applicability of a Test Exception LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Test Exception LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Test Exception LCO, the requirements of the Test Exception LCO shall be followed.
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| LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered to remain capable of performing their intended safety function when associated snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s). This LCO states that the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s).
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| This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance, testing, or repair of one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures are specified in the snubber requirements, which are located outside of the Technical Specifications (TS) under licensee control. LCO 3.0.8 applies to snubbers that only have seismic function. It does not apply to snubbers that also have design functions to mitigate steam/water hammer or other transient loads. The snubber requirements do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), and, as such, are appropriate for control by the licensee.
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| When applying LCO 3.0.8.a, at least one train of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system must be OPERABLE during MODES when AFW is required to be OPERABLE. When applying LCO 3.0.8.a during MODES when AFW is not required to be OPERABLE, a core cooling method (such as Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system) must be available. When applying LCO 3.0.8.b, a means of core cooling must remain available (AFW, DHR, equipment necessary for feed and bleed operations, etc.). Reliance on availability of a core cooling source during modes where AFW is not required by TSs provides an equivalent safety margin for plant operations were LCO 3.0.8 not applied and meets the intent of Technical Specification Task Force Change Traveler TSTF-372, Revision 4, "Addition of LCO 3.0.8, Inoperability of Snubbers."
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-9 Revision 133 Amendment 111
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.8 When a snubber is to be rendered incapable of performing its related support (continued) function (i.e., nonfunctional) for testing or maintenance or is discovered to not be functional, it must be determined whether any system(s) require the affected snubber(s) for system OPERABLILITY, and whether the plant is in a MODE or specified condition in the Applicability that requires the supported system(s) to be OPERABLE.
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| If an analysis determines that the supported system(s) do not require the snubber(s) to be functional in order to support the OPERABILITY of the system(s), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. If the LCO(S) associated with any supported system(s) are not currently applicable (i.e., the plant is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. If the supported system(s) are inoperable for reasons other than snubbers, LCO 3.0.8 cannot be used. LCO 3.0.8 is an allowance, not a requirement. When a snubber is nonfunctional, any supported system(s) may be declared inoperable instead of using LCO 3.0.8.
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| Every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used, WBN Unit 1 will confirm that at least one train (or subsystem) of systems supported by the inoperable snubbers will remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. A record of the design function CNL-16-061 Page E-23 of 30 of the inoperable snubber (i.e., seismic vs. non-seismic) and the associated plant configuration will be available on a recoverable basis for NRC staff inspection.
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| LCO 3.0.8 does not apply to non-seismic snubbers. The provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are not to be applied to supported TS systems unless the supported systems would remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. The risk impact of dynamic loadings other than seismic loads was not assessed as part of the development of LCO 3.0.8. These shock-type loads include thrust loads, blowdown loads, water-hammer loads, steam-hammer loads, LOCA loads and pipe rupture loads.
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| However, there are some important distinctions between non-seismic (shocktype) loads and seismic loads which indicate that, in general, the risk impact of the out-of-service snubbers is smaller for non-seismic loads than for seismic loads. First, while a seismic load affects the entire plant, the impact of a nonseismic load is localized to a certain system or area of the plant. Second, although non-seismic shock loads may be higher in total force and the impact could be as much or more than seismic loads, generally they are of much shorter duration than seismic loads. Third, the impact of non-seismic loads is more plant specific, and thus harder to analyze generically, than for seismic loads. For these reasons, every time LCO 3.0.8 is applied, at least one train of each system that is supported by the inoperable snubber(s) should remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads.
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| If the allowed time expires and the snubber(s) are unable to perform their associated support function(s), the affected supported system's LCO(s) must be declared not met and the Conditions and Required Actions entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-10 Revision 133 Amendment 111
| |
| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing (continued) their associated support function(s) to a single train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or to a single train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hours to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function and due to the availability of the redundant train of the supported system.
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| LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.b allows 12 hours to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function.
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| LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed. Industry and NRC guidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) (the Maintenance Rule) does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO 3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existing Maintenance Rule process to the extent possible so that maintenance on any unaffected train or subsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues are properly addressed. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated support function.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-11 Revision 133 Amendment 111
| |
| | |
| SR Applicability B 3.0 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY BASES SRs SR 3.0.1 through SR 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
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| SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.1 establishes the requirement that SRs must be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LCO apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual SRs. This Specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, in accordance with SR 3.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO.
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| Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated SRs have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when:
| |
| : a. The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the SRs; or
| |
| : b. The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known not to be met between required Surveillance performances.
| |
| Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LCO are not applicable, unless otherwise specified. The SRs associated with a test exception are only applicable when the test exception is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a Specification.
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| Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by Required Actions, do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTIONS define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.
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| Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-12
| |
| | |
| SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
| |
| SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per . . ." interval.
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| SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency.
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| This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g.,
| |
| transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).
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| The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the surveillance requirement will include a note in the frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 does not apply." An example of an exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations, is the discussion in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program that SR 3.0.2 does not apply. This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.
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| As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per . . ."
| |
| basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%
| |
| extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
| |
| The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified, with the exception of surveillances required to be performed on a 31-day frequency. For surveillances performed on a 31-day frequency, the normal surveillance interval may be extended in accordance with Specification 3.0.2 cyclically as required to remain synchronized to the 13-week maintenance work schedules. This practice is acceptable based on the results of an evaluation of 31-day frequency surveillance test histories that demonstrate that no adverse failure rate changes have occurred nor would be expected to develop as a result of cyclical use of surveillance interval extensions and the fact that the total number of 31-day frequency surveillances performed in any one-year period remains unchanged.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-13 Revision 10, 114, 137, 144, 159, 165 Amendment 5, 114, 121, 135
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| | |
| SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
| |
| SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency. A delay period of up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time that the specified Frequency was not met.
| |
| This delay period provides adequate time to perform Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the performance of a Surveillance before complying with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might preclude performance of the Surveillance.
| |
| The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements.
| |
| When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions, operating situations, or requirements of regulations (e.g., prior to entering MODE 1 after each fuel loading, or in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions, etc.) is discovered to not have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows for the full delay period of up to the specified Frequency to perform the Surveillance. However, since there is not a time interval specified, the missed Surveillance should be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.
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| SR 3.0.3 provides a time limit for, and allowances for the performance of, Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.
| |
| SR 3.0.3 is only applicable if there is a reasonable expectation the associated equipment is OPERABLE or that variables are within limits, and it is expected that the Surveillance will be met when performed. Many factors should be considered, such as the period of time since the Surveillance was last performed, or whether the Surveillance, or a portion thereof, has ever been performed, and any other indications, tests, or activities that might support the expectation that the Surveillance will be met when performed. An example of the use of SR 3.0.3 would be a relay contact that was not tested as required in accordance with a particular SR, but previous successful performances of the SR included the relay contact; the adjacent, physically connected relay contacts were tested during the SR performance; the subject relay contact has been tested by another SR; or historical operation of the subject relay contact has been successful. It is not sufficient to infer the behavior of the associated equipment from the performance of similar equipment. The rigor of determining whether there is a reasonable expectation a Surveillance will be met when performed should increase based on the length of time since the last performance of the Surveillance. If the Surveillance has been performed recently, a review of the Surveillance history and equipment performance may be sufficient to support a reasonable (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-14 Revision 53, 159, 186 Amendment 42, 158
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| | |
| SR Applicability B.3.0 BASES SR 3.0.3 expectation that the Surveillance will be met when performed. For Surveillances (continued) that have not been performed for a long period or that have never been performed, a rigorous evaluation based on objective evidence should provide a high degree of confidence that the equipment is OPERABLE. The evaluation should be documented in sufficient detail to allow a knowledgeable individual to understand the basis for the determination.
| |
| Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used repeatedly to extend Surveillance intervals.
| |
| While up to 24 hours or the limit of the specified Frequency is provided to perform the missed Surveillance, it is expected that the missed Surveillance will be performed at the first reasonable opportunity. The determination of the first reasonable opportunity should include consideration of the impact on plant risk (from delaying the Surveillance as well as any plant configuration changes required or shutting the plant down to perform the Surveillance) and impact on any analysis assumptions, in addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and the time required to perform the Surveillance. This risk impact should be managed through the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65 a(a)(4)nd its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.
| |
| This Regulatory Guide addresses consideration of temporary and aggregate risk impacts, determination of risk management action thresholds, and risk management action up to and including plant shutdown. The missed Surveillance should be treated as an emergent condition as discussed in the Regulatory Guide. The risk evaluation may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended methods. The degree of depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with the importance of the component. Missed Surveillances for important components should be analyzed quantitatively. If the results of the risk evaluation determine the risk increase is significant, this evaluation should be used to determine the safest course of action. All missed Surveillances will be placed in the licensee's Corrective Action Program.
| |
| If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.
| |
| Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.
| |
| SR 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-15 Revision 53, 68, 186 Amendment 42, 55, 158
| |
| | |
| SR Applicability B.3.0 BASES SR 3.0.4 This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY (continued) requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit. The provisions of the Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.
| |
| A provision is included to allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability when an LCO is not met due to Surveillance not being met in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.
| |
| However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change. When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability. However, since the LCO is not met in this instance, LCO 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes. SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the LCO not met has been delayed in accordance with SR 3.0.3.
| |
| The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.
| |
| The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCOs Applicability, would have its Frequency specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met. Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs' annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-16 Revision 68 Amendment 55
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| | |
| MTC B 3.1.4 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)
| |
| BASES BACKGROUND According to GDC 11 (Ref. 1), the reactor core and its interaction with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) must be designed for inherently stable power operation, even in the possible event of an accident. In particular, the net reactivity feedback in the system must compensate for any unintended reactivity increases.
| |
| The MTC relates a change in core reactivity to a change in reactor coolant temperature (a positive MTC means that reactivity increases with increasing moderator temperature; conversely, a negative MTC means that reactivity decreases with increasing moderator temperature). The reactor is designed to operate with a negative MTC over the largest possible range of fuel cycle operation. Therefore, a coolant temperature increase will cause a reactivity decrease, so that the coolant temperature tends to return toward its initial value.
| |
| Reactivity increases that cause a coolant temperature increase will thus be self limiting, and stable power operation will result.
| |
| MTC values are predicted at selected burnups during the safety evaluation analysis and are confirmed to be acceptable by surveillances. Both initial and reload cores are designed so that the beginning of cycle (BOC) MTC is less than zero. The actual value of the MTC is dependent on core characteristics, such as fuel loading and reactor coolant soluble boron concentration. The core design may require additional fixed distributed poisons to yield an MTC at BOC within the range analyzed in the plant accident analysis. For some core designs, the burnable absorbers may burn out faster than the fuel depletes early in the cycle.
| |
| This may cause the boron concentration to increase with burnup early in the cycle and the most positive MTC not to occur at BOC, but somewhat later in the cycle. For these core designs, a BOC criterion is established that is sufficiently less positive than zero to ensure that the MTC remains within the LCO upper limit during the cycle. The end of cycle (EOC) MTC is also limited by the requirements of the accident analysis. Fuel cycles that are designed to achieve high burnups or that have changes to other characteristics are evaluated to ensure that the MTC does not exceed the EOC limit.
| |
| The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting conditions assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-17 Revision 32, 188
| |
| | |
| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES BACKGROUND If the LCO limits are not met, the unit response during transients may not (continued) be as predicted. The core could violate criteria that prohibit a return to criticality during non-MSLB events, or the departure from nucleate boiling ratio criteria of the approved correlation may be violated, which could lead to a loss of the fuel cladding integrity.
| |
| The SRs for verification of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits, since this coefficient changes slowly, due principally to changes in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel and burnable absorber burnup.
| |
| APPLICABLE The acceptance criteria for the specified MTC are:
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES
| |
| : a. The MTC values must remain within the bounds of those used in the accident analysis (Ref. 2); and
| |
| : b. The MTC must be such that inherently stable power operations result during normal operation and accidents, such as overheating and overcooling events.
| |
| The FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), contains analyses of accidents that result in both overheating and overcooling of the reactor core. MTC is one of the controlling parameters for core reactivity in these accidents. Both the most positive value and most negative value of the MTC are important to safety, and both values must be bounded. Values used in the analyses consider worst case conditions to ensure that the accident results are bounding (Ref. 3).
| |
| The consequences of accidents that cause core overheating must be evaluated when the MTC is at the most positive value. Such accidents include the rod withdrawal transient from either zero (Ref. 4) or RTP, loss of main feedwater flow, and loss of forced reactor coolant flow. The consequences of accidents that cause core overcooling must be evaluated when the MTC is at the most negative value. Such accidents include sudden feedwater flow increase and sudden decrease in feedwater temperature.
| |
| In order to ensure a bounding accident analysis, the MTC is assumed to be its most limiting value for the analysis conditions appropriate to each accident. The bounding value is determined by considering rodded and unrodded conditions, whether the reactor is at full or zero power, and whether it is the BOC or EOC life. The most conservative combination appropriate to the accident is then used for the analysis (Ref. 2).
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-18 Revision 32, 188
| |
| | |
| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES APPLICABLE MTC values are bounded in initial and reload safety evaluations by SAFETY ANALYSIS assuming steady state conditions at BOC and EOC. An EOC verification (continued) is conducted for conditions of an RCS boron concentration of approximately 300 ppm. The value determined during the verification may be extrapolated to project the EOC value in order to confirm reload design predictions.
| |
| MTC satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. Even though it is not directly observed and controlled from the control room, MTC is considered an initial condition process variable because of its dependence on boron concentration.
| |
| LCO LCO 3.1.4 requires the MTC to be within specified limits of the COLR to ensure that the core operates within the assumptions of the accident analysis. During the initial and reload core safety evaluation, the MTC is analyzed to determine that its values remain within the bounds of the original accident analysis during operation.
| |
| Assumptions made in safety analyses require that the MTC be less positive than a given upper bound and more positive than a given lower bound. The MTC is most positive at or near BOC; this upper bound must not be exceeded. This maximum upper limit occurs at or near BOC, all rods out (ARO), hot zero power conditions. For some core designs, the burnable absorbers may burn out faster than the fuel depletes early in the cycle. This may cause the boron concentration to increase with burnup early in the cycle and the most positive MTC not to occur at BOC, but somewhat later in the cycle. Therefore, a BOC criterion is established in the COLR that is sufficiently less positive than zero to ensure that the MTC remains within the LCO upper limit during the cycle. This criterion is not an LCO MTC limit; the COLR prescribes appropriate administrative controls for exceeding this value consistent with SR 3.1.4.1. At EOC the MTC takes on its most negative value, when the lower bound becomes important. This LCO exists to ensure that both the upper and lower bounds are not exceeded.
| |
| During operation, the LCO is ensured through surveillances. The Surveillance checks at BOC and EOC on MTC provide confirmation that the MTC is behaving as anticipated so that the acceptance criteria are met.
| |
| The LCO establishes a maximum positive value (upper limit) that cannot be exceeded. The BOC positive limit and the EOC negative limit are established in the COLR to allow specifying limits for each particular cycle. This permits the unit to take advantage of improved fuel management and changes in unit operating schedule.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-19 Revision 32, 188
| |
| | |
| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY Technical Specifications place both LCO and SR values on MTC, based on the safety analysis assumptions described above.
| |
| In MODE 1, the limits on MTC must be maintained to ensure that any accident initiated from THERMAL POWER operation will not violate the design assumptions of the accident analysis. In MODE 2 with the reactor critical, the upper limit must also be maintained to ensure that startup and subcritical accidents (such as the uncontrolled CONTROL ROD assembly or group withdrawal) will not violate the assumptions of the accident analysis. The lower MTC limit must be maintained in MODES 2 and 3, in addition to MODE 1, to ensure that cooldown accidents will not violate the assumptions of the accident analysis. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, this LCO is not applicable, since no Design Basis Accidents using the MTC as an analysis assumption are initiated from these MODES.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 If the BOC MTC upper limit is violated, administrative withdrawal limits for control banks must be established to maintain the MTC within its upper limit. The MTC becomes more negative with control bank insertion and decreased boron concentration. A Completion Time of 24 hours provides enough time for evaluating the MTC surveillance and computing the required bank withdrawal limits.
| |
| Using physics calculations, the time in cycle life at which the calculated MTC will meet the LCO requirement can be determined. At this point in core life Condition A no longer exists. The unit is no longer in the Required Action, so the administrative withdrawal limits are no longer in effect.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-20 Revision 32, 188
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| | |
| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)
| |
| If the required administrative withdrawal limits at BOC are not established within 24 hours, the unit must be brought to MODE 2 with keff < 1.0 to prevent operation with an MTC that is more positive than that assumed in safety analyses.
| |
| The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| C.1 Exceeding the EOC MTC limit means that the safety analysis assumptions for the EOC accidents that use a bounding negative MTC value may be invalid. If the EOC MTC limit is exceeded, the plant must be brought to a MODE or condition in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 4 within 12 hours.
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| The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification of the MTC at BOC prior to entering MODE 1 in order to demonstrate compliance with the most positive MTC LCO. Meeting the upper limit prior to entering MODE 1 ensures that the limit will also be met at higher power levels.
| |
| Compliance with the BOC limit provided in the COLR ensures that the MTC will remain within the LCO upper limit during the cycle. If required, the BOC MTC can be used to establish administrative withdrawal limits for control banks.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-21 Revision 32, 188
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| | |
| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.4.2 and SR 3.1.4.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) In similar fashion, the LCO demands that the MTC be less negative than the specified value for EOC full power conditions. This surveillance may be performed at any THERMAL POWER, but its results must be extrapolated to the conditions of RTP and all banks withdrawn in order to make a proper comparison with the LCO value. Because the RTP MTC value will gradually become more negative with further core depletion and boron concentration reduction, a 300 ppm SR value of MTC should be less negative than the EOC LCO limit. The 300 ppm SR value is sufficiently less negative than the EOC LCO limit value to ensure that the LCO limit will be met when the 300 ppm Surveillance criterion is met.
| |
| SR 3.1.4.3 is modified by a Note that includes the following requirements:
| |
| : a. If the 300 ppm Surveillance limit is exceeded, it is possible that the EOC limit on MTC could be reached before the planned EOC. Because the MTC changes slowly with core depletion, the Frequency of 14 effective full power days is sufficient to avoid exceeding the EOC limit.
| |
| : b. The Surveillance limit for RTP boron concentration of 60 ppm is conservative. If the measured MTC at 60 ppm is more positive than the 60 ppm Surveillance limit, the EOC limit will not be exceeded because of the gradual manner in which MTC changes with core burnup.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 11, "Reactor Inherent Protection."
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| : 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analyses."
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| : 3. WCAP 9272-P-A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology," July 1985.
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| : 4. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.1, "Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal From a Subcritical Condition."
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| : 5. PWROG-19014-P, Verification Versus Measurement of the Beginning of Cycle Life and End of Cycle Life Moderator Temperature Coefficient, June 2020.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-22 Revision 188
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Bases SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.4 is the performance of a TADOT. This test shall verify OPERABILITY by actuation of the end devices. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay.
| |
| This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The RTB test shall include separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms. Independent verification of RTB undervoltage and shunt trip Function is not required for the bypass breakers. No capability is provided for performing such a test at power. The bypass breaker test shall include a local shunt trip. A Note has been added to indicate that this test must be performed on the bypass breaker prior to placing it in service.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.5 SR 3.3.1.5 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The SSPS is tested, using the semiautomatic tester. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection Function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.6 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels. If the measurements do not agree, the excore channels are not declared inoperable but must be calibrated to agree with the incore power distribution measurement(s). If the excore channels cannot be adjusted, the channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(I) input to the Overtemperature T Function. The incore power distribution measurement(s) may be obtained using the Movable Incore Detector System or an OPERABLE PDMS (Ref. 16).
| |
| A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.6. The Note states that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is > 50% RTP and that 6 days is allowed for performing the first surveillance after reaching 50% RTP.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-46 Revision 90, 104, 162, 185 Amendment 68, 82, 132, 156
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Bases SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT.
| |
| A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
| |
| The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of References 6 and 7.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-10 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.8 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for greater than 4 hours, this Surveillance must be performed within 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. Note 2 states that this test shall include verification that the P-6 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-47 Revision 90, 162, 185 Amendment 68, 132, 156
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Bases SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.8 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program prior to reactor startup and 4 hours after reducing power below P-10 and P-6. The Frequency of "prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source and intermediate range instrument channels. The Frequency of "4 hours after reducing power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate channels) and "4 hours after reducing power below P-6" (applicable to source range channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance.
| |
| The Frequency thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10 or P-6. The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-10 for the intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the source range channels. Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to be maintained < P-10 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. This test ensures that the NIS source and intermediate range channels are OPERABLE channels prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P-10 or < P-6) for periods > 4 hours.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a TADOT and the Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. Since this SR applies to RCP undervoltage and underfrequency relays, setpoint verification requires elaborate bench calibration and is accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-48 Revision 90, 162, 185 Amendment 68, 132, 156
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Bases SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.10 REQUIREMENTS (continued) CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the Watts Bar setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable.
| |
| For channels with a trip time delay (TTD), this test shall include verification that the TTD coefficients are adjusted correctly.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric performed above 15% RTP. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data.
| |
| This Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1, and is not required for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry into MODE 2, because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-49 Revision 34, 90, 185 Amendment 24, 68, 156
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Bases SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.12 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.13 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manual Reactor Trip, Reactor Trip from Manual SI, and the Reactor Trip from Automatic SI Input from ESFAS.
| |
| A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The test shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms for these Reactor Trip Functions for the Reactor Trip Breakers. The test shall also verify OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers for these Functions.
| |
| Independent verification of the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms is not required.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. The Functions affected have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.14 SR 3.3.1.14 is the performance of a TADOT of Turbine Trip Functions. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. This TADOT is as described in SR 3.3.1.4, except that this test is performed prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock whenever the unit has been in Mode 3. This Surveillance is not required if it has been performed within the previous 31 days.
| |
| Verification of the Trip Setpoint does not have to be performed for this Surveillance. Performance of this test will ensure that the turbine trip Function is OPERABLE prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-50 Revision 34, 90, 185 Amendment 24, 68, 156
| |
| | |
| EFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a COT.
| |
| A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
| |
| The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of Reference 6.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function, or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| This SR is modified by a Note, which states that performance of this test is not required for those relays tested by SR 3.3.2.7.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the AFW Pumps Train A and B Suction Transfer on Suction PressureLow (Function 6.f),
| |
| and Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation - Main Steam Valve Vault Rooms Water Level - High (Function 5.d and 5.e).
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-95 Revision 1, 162, 185 Amendment 132, 156
| |
| | |
| EFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.6 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by the Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays.
| |
| Relay setpoints require elaborate bench calibration and are verified during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST for slave relays K603A, K603B, K604A, K604B, K607A, K607B, K609A, K609B, K612A, K625A, and K625B. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment which may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment which may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the slave relay test circuit.
| |
| For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pumps. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation functions. The manual initiation functions have no associated setpoints.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-96 Revision 34, 185 Amendment 24, 156
| |
| | |
| EFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests (Reference 16), provides the basis and methodology for using allocated signal processing and actuation logic response times in the overall verification of the protection system channel response time. The allocations for sensor, signal conditioning and actuation logic response times must be verified prior to placing the component in operational service and re-verified following maintenance that may adversely affect response time. In general, electrical repair work does not impact response time provided the parts used for repair are of the same type and value. Specific components identified in the WCAP may be replaced without verification testing. One example where response time could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter.
| |
| The response time may be verified for components that replace the components that were previously evaluated in Ref. 15 and Ref. 16, provided that the components have been evaluated in accordance with the NRC approved methodology as discussed in Attachment 1 to TSTF-569, Methodology to Eliminate Pressure Sensor and Protection Channel (for Westinghouse Plants only) Response Time Testing, (Ref. 21).
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. This deferral is required because there may be insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.
| |
| There is an additional note pertaining to this SR on Page 3 of Table 3.3.2-1 of the Technical Specification, which states the following (Ref. 14):
| |
| Note h: For the time period between February 23, 2000 and prior to turbine restart (following the next time the turbine is removed from service), the response time test requirement of SR 3.3.2.10 is not applicable for 1-FSV-47-027.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.11 SR 3.3.2.11 is the performance of a TADOT as described in SR 3.3.2.8, except that it is performed for the P-4 Reactor Trip Interlock, and the Frequency is once per RTB cycle. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. This Frequency is based on operating experience demonstrating that undetected failure of the P-4 interlock sometimes occurs when the RTB is cycled.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Function tested has no associated setpoint.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-98 Revision 20,30, 162, 177, 185 Amendment 13,23,132, 148, 156
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.4.4 is the performance of a TADOT. This test should verify the OPERABILITY of the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) open and closed indication on the remote shutdown panel, by actuating the RTBs. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria 19, "Control Room."
| |
| : 2. Watts Bar FSAR Section 7.4, "Systems Required for Safe Shutdown."
| |
| : 3. TVA Calculation WBN-OSG4-193, "Auxiliary Control System Required Equipment per GDC 19."
| |
| : 4. Design Criteria WB-DC-40-58, "Auxiliary Control System."
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-123 Revision 162, 185 Amendment 132, 156
| |
| | |
| LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)
| |
| Condition C applies to the LOP Diesel Start function for unbalanced voltage with one or more channels per bus inoperable.
| |
| A Note has been added which states that Condition C is only applicable to Function 5 of Table 3.3.5-1.
| |
| Required Action C.1 requires restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour Completion Time takes into account the low probability of an event requiring a LOP start occurring during this interval.
| |
| D.1 Condition D applies to each of the LOP DG start Functions when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A, B, or C are not met.
| |
| In these circumstances the Conditions specified in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," or LCO 3.8.2, "AC SourcesShutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately. The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to refer to Table 3.3.5-1 to determine which Surveillance REQUIREMENTS Requirements apply for each LOP Function.
| |
| SR 3.3.5.1 SR 3.3.5.1 is the performance of a TADOT. The test checks operation of the undervoltage, degraded voltage, and unbalanced voltage relays that provide actuation signals. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay.
| |
| This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| This SR has been modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays/timers. Relay/timer setpoints require elaborate bench calibration and are verified during a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| SR 3.3.5.2 SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-129 Revision 156, 162, 164, 185 Amendment 128, 132, 133, 156
| |
| | |
| Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2 (continued)
| |
| REQUIRMENTS The SR is modified by a Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation.
| |
| SR 3.3.6.3 SR 3.3.6.3 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation.
| |
| SR 3.3.6.4 A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPRATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment vent system isolation. The setpoint shall be left consistent with the current unit specific calibration procedure tolerance.
| |
| SR 3.3.6.5 SR 3.3.6.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.
| |
| This test is performed every 92 days. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-136 Revision 45, 119, 162, 185 Amendment 35, 92, 132, 156
| |
| | |
| Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.6.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay.
| |
| This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). For these tests, the relay trip setpoints are verified and adjusted as necessary. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| SR 3.3.6.7 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."
| |
| : 2. DELETED
| |
| : 3. DELETED
| |
| : 4. DELETED
| |
| : 5. DELETED Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-137 Revision 26, 90, 157, 162, 185 Amendment 17, 68, 132, 156
| |
| | |
| CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.7.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the CREVS actuation. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The setpoints shall be left consistent with the unit specific calibration procedure tolerance. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.7.3 SR 3.3.7.3 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay.
| |
| This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| SR 3.3.7.4 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES None.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-144 Revision 162, 185 Amendment 132, 156
| |
| | |
| ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.8-1 determines REQUIREMENTS which SRs apply to which ABGTS Actuation Functions.
| |
| SR 3.3.8.1 SR 3.3.8.1 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the manual actuation functions. Each manual actuation function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (e.g., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-148 Revision 119, 162, 185 Amendment 92, 132, 156
| |
| | |
| COMS B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABLE RCS Vent Performance (continued)
| |
| SAFETY ANALYSES The RCS vent size will be re-evaluated for compliance each time the P/T limit curves are revised based on the results of the vessel material surveillance. The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.
| |
| The COMS satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
| |
| LCO This LCO requires that the COMS is OPERABLE. The COMS is OPERABLE when the minimum coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE.
| |
| Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as a result of an operational transient.
| |
| To limit the coolant input capability, the LCO requires no safety injection pumps and a maximum of one charging pump be capable of injecting into the RCS, and all accumulator discharge isolation valves be closed and immobilized when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.
| |
| The LCO is modified by three Notes. Note 1 allows two charging pumps to be made capable of injecting for less than or equal to 1 hour during pump swap operations. One hour provides sufficient time to safely complete the actual transfer and to complete the administrative controls and surveillance requirements associated with the swap. The intent is to minimize the actual time that more than one charging pump is physically capable of injection.
| |
| Note 2 states that accumulator isolation is only required when the accumulator pressure is more than or at the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by the P/T limit curves. This Note permits the accumulator discharge isolation valve Surveillance to be performed only under these pressure and temperature conditions.
| |
| Note 3 allows one safety injection pump and one charging pump to be capable of injecting into the RCS for the purpose of testing in MODE 5 or MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on, provided the pressurizer manway cover is removed to provide a vent path for adequate pressure relief.
| |
| The elements of the LCO that provide low temperature overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:
| |
| : a. Two RCS relief valves, as follows:
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.4-58 Revision 68, 191 Amendment 55, 160
| |
| | |
| COMS B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The required RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying both RHR suction isolation valves are open and by testing it in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This Surveillance is only performed if the RHR suction relief valve is being used to satisfy this LCO.
| |
| Both RHR suction isolation valves are verified locked open, with power to the valve operator removed, to ensure that accidental closure will not occur. The "locked open" valves must be locally verified in the open position with the manual actuator locked. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.4.12.7 The COT is required to be in frequency prior to decreasing RCS temperature to 350°F or be performed within 12 hours after decreasing RCS temperature to 350°F on each required PORV to verify and, as necessary, adjust its lift setpoint.
| |
| A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The COT will verify the setpoint is within the PTLR allowed maximum limits in the PTLR. PORV actuation could depressurize the RCS and is not required. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The 12 hour allowance to meet the requirement considers the unlikelihood of a low temperature overpressure event during this time.
| |
| A Note has been added indicating that this SR is required to be met within 12 hours after decreasing RCS cold leg temperature to 350°F.
| |
| SR 3.4.12.8 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV actuation channel is required to adjust the whole channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the required range and accuracy to known input. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Requirements."
| |
| : 2. Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operation."
| |
| : 3. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.4-63 Revision 89, 185 Amendment 66, 156
| |
| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABLE Except for primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE, the safety analyses do SAFETY ANALYSES not address operational LEAKAGE. However, other operational LEAKAGE is related to the safety analyses for LOCA; the amount of leakage can affect the probability of such an event. The safety analysis for a main steam line break (MSLB) assumes that the pre-accident primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE from three steam generators is 150 gallons per day (gpd) per steam generator and 1 gallon per minute (gpm) from one steam generator. This leakage assumption remains the same after the accident. For a SGTR accident, the accident analysis assumes a primary-to-secondary leakage of 150 gpd per steam generator prior to the accident. Subsequent to the SGTR a leakage of 150 gpd is assumed in each of three intact steam generators and RCS blowdown flow through the ruptured tube in the faulted steam generator. Consequently, the LCO requirement to limit primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator to less than or equal to 150 gpd is acceptable.
| |
| The safety analysis for the SLB accident assumes the entire 1 gpm primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE is through the affected steam generator as an initial condition. The dose consequences resulting from the SLB accident are within the limits defined in 10 CFR 100 or the staff approved licensing basis (i.e., a small fraction of these limits).
| |
| The RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
| |
| LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
| |
| : a. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE Pressure boundary LEAKAGE is prohibited as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
| |
| : b. Unidentified LEAKAGE One gallon per minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment pocket sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Separating the sources of leakage (i.e., leakage from an identified source versus leakage from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.4-66 Revision 47, 68, 82, 187 Amendment 38, 56, 65, 159
| |
| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES (continued)
| |
| LCO c. Identified LEAKAGE (continued)
| |
| Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS Makeup System. Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, but does not include controlled reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE).
| |
| : d. Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE through Any One SG The limit of 150 gpd per SG (600 gpd total for all SGs) is based on the operational LEAKAGE performance criteria in NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines (Ref. 4). The Steam Generator Program operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06 states, The RCS operational primary to secondary leakage through any one SG shall be limited to 150 gallons per day. The limit is based on operating experience with SG tube degradation mechanisms that result in tube leakage. The operational leakage rate criterion in conjunction with the implementation of the Steam Generator Program is an effective measure for minimizing the frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the RCS is pressurized.
| |
| In MODES 5 and 6, LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower, resulting in lower stresses and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours. While in this condition, structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location.
| |
| Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.4-67 Revision 82, 187 Amendment 65, 159
| |
| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS B.1 (continued)
| |
| Unidentified LEAKAGE or identified LEAKAGE, in excess of the LCO limits must be reduced to within limits within 4 hours. This Completion Time allows time to verify leakage rates and either identify unidentified LEAKAGE or reduce LEAKAGE to within limits before the reactor must be shut down. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
| |
| C.1 and C.2 If primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE is not within limits or if any of the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met, the reactor must be brought to lower pressure conditions to reduce the severity of the LEAKAGE and its potential consequences. The reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. This action reduces the LEAKAGE and also reduces the factors that tend to degrade the pressure boundary.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 5, the pressure stresses acting on the RCPB are much lower, and further deterioration is much less likely.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.13.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying RCS LEAKAGE to be within the LCO limits ensures the integrity of the RCPB is maintained. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE would at first appear as unidentified LEAKAGE and can only be positively identified by inspection.
| |
| Unidentified LEAKAGE and identified LEAKAGE are determined by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.
| |
| The RCS water inventory balance must be met with the reactor at steady state operating conditions and near operating pressure. The SR is modified by 2 Notes. Note 1 states that this SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after establishing steady state operation. The 12 hour allowance provides sufficient time to collect and process all necessary data after stable plant conditions are established.
| |
| Steady state operation is required to perform a proper inventory balance; calculations during maneuvering are not useful. For RCS operational LEAKAGE determination by water inventory balance, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
| |
| An early warning of pressure boundary LEAKAGE or unidentified LEAKAGE is provided by the automatic systems that monitor the containment atmosphere radioactivity and the containment pocket sump level. These leakage detection systems are specified in LCO 3.4.15, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation."
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.4-68 Revision 82, 187 Amendment 65, 159
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| | |
| RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.15 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.15.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.15.1 requires the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.4.15.2 SR 3.4.15.2 requires the performance of a COT on the required containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The test ensures that the monitor can perform its function in the desired manner. The test verifies the alarm setpoint and the relative accuracy of the instrument string. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.4.15.3 and SR 3.4.15.4 These SRs require the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 30, "Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary."
| |
| : 2. Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," Revision 0, May 1973.
| |
| : 3. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 5.2.7, "RCPB Leakage Detection Systems."
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.4-79 Revision 12, 92, 162, 185 Amendment 71, 132, 156
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| | |
| AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABLE The AFW System design is such that it can perform its function following an SAFETY ANALYSES FWLB between the MFW check valves and the steam generators, combined (continued) with a loss of offsite power following turbine trip, and a single active failure of the steam turbine driven AFW pump. One motor driven AFW pump would deliver to the faulted steam generator. Sufficient flow would be delivered to the intact steam generators by the redundant AFW pump.
| |
| The ESFAS automatically actuates the AFW turbine driven pump and associated power operated valves and controls when required to ensure an adequate feedwater supply to the steam generators during loss of power.
| |
| Each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (one Train A and one Train B) supplies flow paths to two steam generators. The flow path for each steam generator contains an automatic air operated level control valve (LCV). The LCVs have the same train designation as the associated pump and are provided trained air. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump supplies flow paths to all four steam generators. Each of these flow paths contains an automatic air-operated LCV, two of which are designated as Train A, receive A-train air and provide flow to the same steam generators that are supplied by the B-train motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The remaining two LCVs are designated as Train B, receive B-train air, and provide flow to the same steam generators that are supplied by the A-train motor-driven pump. This design provides the required redundancy to ensure that at least two steam generators receive the necessary flow assuming any single failure. It can be seen from the description provided above that the loss of a single train of air (A or B) will not prevent the auxiliary feedwater system from performing its intended safety function and is no more severe than the loss of a single auxiliary feedwater pump. Therefore, the loss of a single train of auxiliary air only affects the capability of a single motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump because the turbine-driven pump is still capable of providing flow to the two steam generators that are separated from the other motor-driven pump.
| |
| The AFW System satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
| |
| LCO This LCO provides assurance that the AFW System will perform its design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in overpressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Three independent AFW pumps in three diverse trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of RHR capability for all events accompanied by a loss of offsite power and a single failure. This is accomplished by powering two of the pumps from independent emergency buses. The third AFW pump is powered by a different means, a steam driven turbine supplied with steam from a source that is not isolated by closure of the MSIVs.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.7-23 Revision 184
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| | |
| ERCW B 3.7.8 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Condition A is modified by two notes that limit the conditions and parameters that allow entry into Condition A. The first note limits the applicability of Condition A to the time period when Unit 2 is defueled. The second note states that Condition A is only applicable during planned maintenance of a Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown board and associated 480 V boards and motor control centers (MCC).
| |
| In order to credit the temperature limit noted in A.2, the effected ERCW train must be aligned in accordance with UFSAR Section 9.2.1.3. This will allow the plant configuration to be aligned (i.e., cross-ties exist and isolation of loads to facilitate maintenance and modification activities) to minimize the heat load on the ERCW system to ensure ERCW continues to meet its design function.
| |
| During this period, with the planned maintenance of a Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown board and the associated 480V boards and motor control centers, entering Condition A will only require the EDG associated with the shutdown board being removed from service to be inoperable. In this condition, the remaining EDGs will have sufficient ERCW flow with this arrangement.
| |
| The 7 day completion time is acceptable based on the following:
| |
| Low probability of a DBA occurring during that time.
| |
| Heat load on the ERCW System is substantially lower than assumed for the DBA with the opposite unit defueled.
| |
| Redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train.
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| If one ERCW system train is inoperable for planned maintenance, action must be taken to restore the ERCW train to an OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE ERCW system train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ERCW system train could result in loss of ERCW system function.
| |
| If UHS temperature exceeds 78 F sometime after 48 hours of continuous ERCW train inoperability, then action must be taken to restore the ERCW train to an OPERABLE status within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal time zero for beginning the allowed outage time clock.
| |
| The 24 hour Completion Time only begins 48 hours after an ERCW train is made inoperable for planned maintenance on a Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown board (and associated 480 V boards and MCCs) and the UHS temperature is > 78 F.
| |
| Required Action A.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources -
| |
| Operating, should be entered if an inoperable ERCW system train results in an inoperable diesel generator. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, RCS Loops - MODE 4, should be entered if an inoperable ERCW system train results in an inoperable residual (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.7-40 Revision 162, 183 Amendment 132, 153
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| | |
| ERCW B 3.7.8 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) heat removal loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. Required Action A.2 ensures the credited UHS temperature limit is maintained. If the credited UHS temperature is not maintained, the analytical assumptions for relying on the effected ERCW Train, for both units, as a defense-in-depth measure during the extended Completion Time for Required Action A.1 are no longer met.
| |
| B.1 If one ERCW train is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE ERCW train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ERCW train could result in loss of ERCW System function.
| |
| Required Action B.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," should be entered if an inoperable ERCW train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable ERCW train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. The 72 hour Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.
| |
| C.1 and C.2 If the ERCW train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.7-41 Revision 162, 183 Amendment 132, 153
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| | |
| CREATCS B 3.7.11 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
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| The Completion Time is modified by a footnote that states an allowance is permitted for one CREATCS train to be inoperable for 60 days. This TS provision is only authorized for one entry per train during modification activities planned for the upgrade of the main control room chillers beginning no earlier than July 1, 2023, and ending no later than December 31, 2024, provided the following compensatory measures are implemented as described in TVA letter CNL-20-012, dated May 19, 2020.
| |
| * A temporary, non-safety related chiller system with a temporary DG to provide power to the temporary chiller system will be installed and operated as described in the LAR.
| |
| * Instructions for operation of the temporary cooling equipment will be provided.
| |
| * During replacement of the CREATCS chillers, TVA will employ a graded approach to defense-in-depth and protected equipment strategies based on the operating status of the affected unit. The risk of the activity will be assessed and managed, including the use of physical barriers as needed.
| |
| Additionally, TVA procedures preclude work on or near protected equipment and limit access to the area to emergency situations and non-intrusive monitoring of running equipment per operator rounds.
| |
| * During replacement of the CREATCS chillers, no elective maintenance will be performed on TS related support equipment for the Operable CREATCS chiller except for any required TS SRs.
| |
| B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREATCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| C.1 and C.2 In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel, if the inoperable CREATCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREATCS train must be placed in operation immediately. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that active failures will be readily detected.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.7-53 Revision 45, 172, 192 Amendment 35, 145, 162
| |
| | |
| CREATCS B 3.7.11 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
| |
| An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk.
| |
| This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
| |
| D.1 In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, with two CREATCS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
| |
| E.1 If both CREATCS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 the CREATCS may not be capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. The Completion Time is modified by a footnote that states an allowance to monitor the main control room temperature every hour and verify the main control room temperature is less than or equal to 90°F is permitted for up to four days in lieu of the immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. If the main control room temperature exceeds 90°F, or the duration without a train of CREATCS being OPERABLE exceeds four days, immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required. This provision is only applicable during modification activities planned for the upgrade of the main control room chillers beginning no earlier than July 1, 2023, and ending no later than December 31, 2024, provided the following compensatory measures are implemented as described in TVA letter CNL-20-012, dated May 19, 2020.
| |
| * A temporary, non-safety related chiller system with a temporary DG to provide power to the temporary chiller system will be installed and operated as described in the LAR.
| |
| * Instructions for operation of the temporary cooling equipment will be provided.
| |
| * During replacement of the CREATCS chillers, TVA will employ a graded approach to defense-in-depth and protected equipment strategies based on the operating status of the affected unit. The risk of the activity will be assessed and managed, including the use of physical barriers as needed.
| |
| Additionally, TVA procedures preclude work on or near protected equipment and limit access to the area to emergency situations and non-intrusive monitoring of running equipment per operator rounds.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.7-54 Revision 45, 172, 192 Amendment 35, 145, 162
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| | |
| Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air BASES BACKGROUND Each diesel generator (DG) is provided with four interconnected storage tanks embedded in the building foundation having a fuel oil capacity sufficient to operate that diesel for a period of 7 days while the DG is supplying maximum post loss of coolant accident load demand discussed in the FSAR, Section 9.5.4.3 (Ref. 1). The maximum load demand is calculated using the assumption that a minimum of any two DGs is available. This onsite fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the DGs for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources.
| |
| An approximately 550 gal skid-mounted day tank is provided for each diesel engine. Each DG incorporates two diesel engines operating in tandem and directly coupled to the generator. Each skid-mounted day tank has fuel capacity for approximately 2 hours of full-load operations (Ref. 1). Fuel oil is transferred from 7 day storage tanks to the skid mounted day tank by a pump located on each skid mounted day tank. Redundancy of pumps and piping precludes the failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve or tank to result in the loss of more than one diesel engine. In the event that the piping between the last isolation valve and the skid-mounted day tank breaks, the use of one DG can be lost. This occurs only after the two hour supply of fuel in the skid-mounted day tank has been used.
| |
| During operation of the DGs, fuel oil pumps driven by the diesel engines transfer fuel from the skid mounted day tanks to the skid-mounted diesel engine fuel manifolds. Level controls mounted on the skid-mounted day tanks automatically start and stop the 7 day storage tank transfer pumps.
| |
| In addition, alarms both locally and in the control room annunciate low level and high level in any skid-mounted day tank.
| |
| In the unlikely event of a failure in one of the supply trains, the associated skid-mounted day tank low-level alarm annunciates when the fuel oil remaining in the tank provides approximately 1 hour of full-load operation, thus allowing the operator to take corrective action to prevent the loss of the diesel.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-44 Revision 190
| |
| | |
| Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR performs visual inspection, in lieu of the 10 year hydrostatic test indicated in Regulatory Guide 1.137 Position C.1.e(1), of all exposed fuel oil piping while the diesel is running. Identified leakage does not constitute failure of this surveillance. Upon discovery, leakage is entered into the corrective action program and evaluated for impact on diesel generator operability and corrected as appropriate. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.8.3.7 Draining of the fuel oil stored in the supply tanks, removal of accumulated sediment, and tank cleaning are required by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2),
| |
| paragraph 2.f. To preclude the introduction of surfactants in the fuel oil system, the cleaning should be accomplished using sodium hypochlorite solutions, or their equivalent, rather than soap or detergents. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of sediment does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided that accumulated sediment is removed during performance of the Surveillance. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 9.5.4.3, Safety Evaluation.
| |
| : 2. Regulatory Guide 1.137, "Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1, October, 1979.
| |
| : 3. ANSI N195-1976, "Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators,"
| |
| Appendix B.
| |
| : 4. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 9.5.7, "Diesel Engine Lubrication System."
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-52 Revision 106, 162, 190 Amendment 132
| |
| | |
| DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES BACKGROUND 125 V Vital DC Electrical Power Subsystem (continued)
| |
| Each Vital DC electrical power subsystem battery charger has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient excess capacity to restore the battery bank from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 12 hours (with accident loads being supplied) following a 30 minute AC power outage and in approximately 36 hours (while supplying normal steady state loads following a 2 hour AC power outage), (Ref. 5).
| |
| The battery charger is normally in the float-charge mode. Float-charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the connected loads and the battery cells are receiving adequate current to optimally charge the battery. This assures the internal losses of a battery are overcome and the battery is maintained in a fully charged state.
| |
| When desired, the charger can be placed in the equalize mode. The equalize mode is at a higher voltage than the float mode and charging current is correspondingly higher. The battery charger is operated in the equalize mode after a battery discharge or for routine maintenance. Following a battery discharge, the battery recharge characteristic accepts current at the current limit of the battery charger (if the discharge was significant, e.g., following a battery service test) until the battery terminal voltage approaches the charger voltage setpoint. Charging current then reduces exponentially during the remainder of the recharge cycle. Lead-calcium batteries have recharge efficiencies of greater than 95%, so once at least 105% of the ampere-hours discharged have been returned, the battery capacity would be restored to the same condition as it was prior to the discharge. This can be monitored by direct observation of the exponentially decaying charging current or by evaluating the amp-hours discharged from the battery and amp-hours returned to the battery.
| |
| 125 V Diesel Generator (DG) DC Electrical Power Subsystem Control power for the DGs is provided by four DG battery subsystems, one per DG. Each subsystem is comprised of a battery, a dual battery charger assembly, distribution center, cabling, and cable ways. One of the two battery chargers in each dual battery charger assembly is required to support the associated DG.
| |
| The DG 125V DC control power and field-flash circuits have power supplied from their respective 125V distribution panel. The normal supply of DC current is from the associated charger. The battery provides control and field-flash power when the charger is unavailable. The charger supplies the normal DC loads, maintains the battery in a fully charged condition, and recharges (480V AC available) the battery while supplying the required loads regardless of the status of the unit.
| |
| The batteries are physically and electrically independent. The battery has sufficient capacity when fully charged to supply required loads for a minimum of four hours following a loss of normal power. Each battery is normally required to supply loads during the time interval between loss of normal feed to its charger and the receipt of emergency power to the charger from its respective DG.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-56 Revision 113, 160, 193 Amendment 130
| |
| | |
| Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES LCO The inverters ensure the availability of AC electrical power for the systems instrumentation required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA.
| |
| Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls is maintained. The twelve inverters (one Unit 1, one Unit 2 and one spare per channel) ensure an uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are de-energized.
| |
| OPERABLE inverters require the associated AC vital bus to be powered by an inverter with output voltage and frequency within tolerances and power input to the inverter from a 125 VDC vital battery. Alternatively, power supply may be from an internal AC source via rectifier as long as the vital battery is available as the uninterruptible power supply. The unit inverters have an associated bypass supply provided by a regulated transformer that is automatically connected to the associated AC vital bus in the event of inverter failure or overload. The bypass supply is not battery-backed and thus does not meet requirements for inverter operability. The spare inverters do not have an associated bypass supply.
| |
| Additionally, the 480V Vital Transfer Switch, while connected to the alternate power supply, can only be declared operable for technical specifications under the limitations of applicable LCOs and provided the associated unit is defueled (Unit 1 for Channels I or II, and Unit 2 for Channels III or IV).
| |
| APPLICABILITY The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:
| |
| : a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
| |
| : b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
| |
| Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters - Shutdown."
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-81 Revision 58, 67, 75, 76, 77, 78, 97, 189 Amendment 45, 76
| |
| | |
| Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)
| |
| LCO The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are de-energized. OPERABILITY of the inverters requires that the AC vital buses required by LCO 3.8.10, Distribution Systems - Shutdown be powered by the inverter. As a minimum, either the channel I and III or II and IV inverters for each unit (or spare inverters) shall be OPERABLE to support the distribution systems required by LCO 3.8.10.
| |
| The unit inverters have an associated bypass supply provided by a regulated transformer that is automatically connected to the associated AC vital bus in the event of inverter failure or overload. The bypass supply is not battery-backed and thus does not meet requirements for inverter operability. The spare inverters do not have an associated bypass supply. Additionally, the 480V Vital Transfer Switch, while connected to the alternate power supply, can only be declared operable for technical specifications under the limitations of applicable LCOs and provided the associated unit is defueled (Unit 1 for Channels I or II, and Unit 2 for Channels III or IV). This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).
| |
| APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:
| |
| : a. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
| |
| : b. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
| |
| : c. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the plant in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.
| |
| Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the remaining OPERABLE Inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-85 Revision 58, 67, 75, 76, 77, 78, 97, 189 Amendment 45, 76
| |
| | |
| ENCLOSURE 3 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................................... v LIST OF FIGURES....................................................................................................................................... vi LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................. vii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES .................................................................................................................... viii 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION ................................................................................................ 1.1-1 1.1 Definitions ........................................................................................................... 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors .................................................................................................. 1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times .................................................................................................... 1.3-1 1.4 Frequency................................................................................................................. 1.4-1 TR 3.0 APPLICABILITY ............................................................................................................... 3.0-1 TR 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .............................................................................. 3.1-1 TR 3.1.1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown ......................................................... 3.1-1 TR 3.1.2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating ......................................................... 3.1-3 TR 3.1.3 Charging Pump, Shutdown ................................................................................ 3.1-5 TR 3.1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating .............................................................................. 3.1-6 TR 3.1.5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown ................................................................... 3.1-8 TR 3.1.6 Borated Water Sources, Operating ................................................................... 3.1-10 TR 3.1.7 Position Indication System, Shutdown .............................................................. 3.1-13 TR 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION ...................................................................................................... 3.3-1 TR 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation..................................................... 3.3-1 TR 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation ..................................................... 3.3-5 TR 3.3.3 Movable Incore Detectors .................................................................................. 3.3-12 TR 3.3.4 Seismic Instrumentation ..................................................................................... 3.3-14 TR 3.3.5 Turbine Overspeed Protection........................................................................... 3.3-18 TR 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System ............................................................................ 3.3-20 TR 3.3.7 Plant Calorimetric Measurement ....................................................................... 3.3-22 TR 3.3.8 Hydrogen Monitors ............................................................................................. 3.3-24 TR 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) ................................................ 3.3-26 TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ......................................................................... 3.4-1 TR 3.4.1 Safety Valves, Shutdown ................................................................................... 3.4-1 TR 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits ........................................................................ 3.4-3 TR 3.4.3 RCS Vents .......................................................................................................... 3.4-5 TR 3.4.4 Chemistry ............................................................................................................ 3.4-7 TR 3.4.5 Piping System Structural Integrity ..................................................................... 3.4-10 TR 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ............................................................................................ 3.6-1 TR 3.6.1 Ice Bed Temperature Monitoring System ......................................................... 3.6-1 TR 3.6.2 Inlet Door Position Monitoring System .............................................................. 3.6-4 TR 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System .................................................... 3.6-6 (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 i Technical Requirements Revision 56
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| TR 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ........................................................................................................... 3.7-1 TR 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure/
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| Temperature Limitations ...................................................................... 3.7-1 TR 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan ......................................................................................... 3.7-3 TR 3.7.3 DELETED. .......................................................................................................... 3.7-10 TR 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination ........................................................................... 3.7-22 TR 3.7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring............................................................................ 3.7-26 TR 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ................................................................................. 3.8-1 TR 3.8.1 Isolation Devices ................................................................................................ 3.8-1 TR 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices................................................................................ 3.8-5 TR 3.8.3 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices .................................................................................... 3.8-10 TR 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection ....................................................... 3.8-17 TR 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ........................................................................................... 3.9-1 TR 3.9.1 Deleted ................................................................................................................ 3.9-1 TR 3.9.2 Communications ................................................................................................. 3.9-2 TR 3.9.3 Refueling Machine.............................................................................................. 3.9-3 TR 3.9.4 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building............................................. 3.9-5 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ..................................................................................... 5.0-1 5.1 Technical Requirements (TR) Control Program ............................................... 5.0-1 (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 ii Technical Requirements Revision 62
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| BASES B 3.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS (TR) AND TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (TSR)
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| APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................. B 3.0-1 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .............................................................................. B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown ....................................................................... B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating ....................................................................... B 3.1-5 B 3.1.3 Charging Pump, Shutdown. ............................................................................................. B 3.1-9 B 3.1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating ............................................................................................ B 3.1-11 B 3.1.5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown ................................................................................. B 3.1-14 B 3.1.6 Borated Water Sources, Operating ................................................................................. B 3.1-18 B 3.1.7 Position Indication System, Shutdown ............................................................................ B 3.1-23 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION ...................................................................................................... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation................................................................... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation ..................................................... B 3.3-4 B 3.3.3 Movable Incore Detectors. ............................................................................................... B 3.3-7 B 3.3.4 Seismic Instrumentation ................................................................................................... B 3.3-10 B 3.3.5 Turbine Overspeed Protection......................................................................................... B 3.3-14 B 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System .......................................................................................... B 3.3-18 B.3.3.7 Plant Calorimetric Measurement ..................................................................................... B 3.3-21 B 3.3.8 Hydrogen Monitors ........................................................................................................... B3.3-25 B 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) .............................................................. B3.3-30 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)......................... ............................................... B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 Safety Valves, Shutdown ................................................................................................. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits ...................................................................................... B 3.4-4 B 3.4.3 RCS Vents ........................................................................................................................ B 3.4-7 B 3.4.4 Chemistry .......................................................................................................................... B 3.4-10 B 3.4.5 Piping System Structural Integrity ................................................................................... B 3.4-14 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ............................................................................................ B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 Ice Bed Temperature Monitoring System............. .......................................................... B 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 Inlet Door Position Monitoring System ............................................................................ B 3.6-6 B 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System .................................................................. B 3.6-10 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ........................................................................................................... B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure/Temperature Limitations .................................................... B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan ....................................................................................................... B 3.7-4 B 3.7.3 DELETED ......................................................................................................................... B 3.7-12 B 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination ......................................................................................... B 3.7-18 B 3.7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring.......................................................................................... B 3.7-22 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ................................................................................. B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 Isolation Devices .............................................................................................................. B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices......................................................................... B 3.8-7 B 3.8.3 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices .................................................................................. B 3.8-15 B 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection ..................................................................... B 3.8-19 (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 iii Technical Requirements Revision 62
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ........................................................................................... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Deleted .............................................................................................................................. B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Communications............................................................................................................... B 3.9-3 B 3.9.3 Refueling Machine............................................................................................................ B 3.9-5 B 3.9.4 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building ....................................................................................................... B 3.9-8 (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 iv Technical Requirements Revision 53
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| LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Page 1.1-1 MODES ............................................................................................................... 1.1-6 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Times.... .............................. 3.3-3 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Response Times .................................................... 3.3-7 3.3.4-1 Seismic Monitoring Information ......................................................................... 3.3-17 3.7.3 3.7.3-5 ............. ............. ................................................................................................. DELETED 3.7.5-1 Area Temperature Monitoring...... ..................................................................... 3.7-29 3.8.3-1 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices Which Are Bypassed Under Accident Conditions .......................................... 3.8-12 3.8.4-1 Submerged Components With Automatic De-energization Under Accident Conditions .................................................................. 3.8-19 Watts Bar-Unit 1 v Technical Requirements Revision 62
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| LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. Title Page 3.1.6 Boric Acid Tank Limits Based on RWST Boron Concentration ....................... 3.1-12a 3.7.3-1 DELETED LIST OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND PROGRAMS Core Operating Limits Report Watts Bar-Unit 1 vi Technical Requirements Revision 62
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS Acronym Title ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Control Room Panel ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARO All Rods Out ARFS Air Return Fan System ARV Atmospheric Relief Valve BOC Beginning of Cycle CCS Component Cooling Water System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCC Lower Compartment Cooler LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line Isolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PDMS Power Distribution Monitoring System PIV Pressure Isolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Thermal Power RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety Injection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar-Unit 1 vii Technical Requirements Revision 46
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 0 09-30-95 Initial Issue Revision 1 12-06-95 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 2 01-04-96 Area Temperature Monitoring - Change in MSSV Limit Revision 3 02-28-96 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Suction Requirement Revision 4 08-18-97 Time-frame for Snubber Visual Exams Revision 5 08-29-97 Performance of Snubber Functional Tests at Power Revision 6 09-08-97 Revised Actions for Turbine Overspeed Protection Revision 7 09-12-97 Change OPT/OTT Response Time Revision 8 09-22-97 Clarification of Surveillance Frequency for Position Indication System Revision 9 10-10-97 Revised Boron Concentration for Borated Water Sources Revision 10 12-17-98 ICS Inlet Door Position Monitoring - Channel Check Revision 11 01-08-99 Computer-Based Analysis for Loose Parts Monitoring Revision 12 01-15-99 Removal of Process Control Program from TRM Revision 13 03-30-99 Deletion of Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate Reactor Trip Function Revision 14 04-07-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 15 04-07-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 16 04-13-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 17 05-25-99 Flood Protection Plan Revision 18 08-03-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 19 10-12-99 Upgrade Seismic Monitoring Instruments Revision 20 03/13/00 Added Notes to Address Instrument Error for Various Parameters Revision 21 04/13/00 COLR, Cycle 3, Rev 2 Revision 22 07/07/00 Elimination of Response Time Testing (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 viii Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 23 01/22/01 Plant Calorimetric (LEFM)
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| Revision 24 03/19/01 TRM Change Control Program per 50.59 Rule Revision 25 05/15/01 Change in Preventive Maintenance Frequency for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Revision 26 05/29/01 Change CVI Response Time from 5 to 6 Seconds Revision 27 01/31/02 Change pH value in the borated water sources due to TS change for ice weight reduction Revision 28 02/05/02 Refueling machine upgrade under DCN D-50991-A Revision 29 02/26/02 Added an additional action to TR 3.7.3 to perform an engineering evaluation of inoperable snubbers impact on the operability of a supported system.
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| Revision 30 06/05/02 Updated TR 3.3.5.1 to reflect implementation of the TIPTOP program in a Technical Instruction (TI).
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| Revision 31 10/31/02 Correct RTP to 3459 MWt (PER 02-9519-000)
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| Revision 32 09/17/03 Editorial correction to Bases for TSR 3.1.5.3.
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| Revision 33 10/14/03 Updated TRs 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 and their respective bases to incorporate boron concentration changes in accordance with change packages WBN-TS-02-14 and WBN-TS-03-017.
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| Revision 34 05/14/04 Revised Item 5, Source Range, Neutron Flux function of Table 3.3.1-1 to provide an acceptable response time of less than or equal 0.5 seconds. (Reference TS Amendment 52.)
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| Revision 35 04/06/05 Revised Table 3.3.2-1, Engineered Safety Features Actuation systems Response Times, to revise containment spray response time and to add an asterisk note to notation 13 of the table via Change Package WBN-TS-04-16.
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| Revision 36 09/25/06 Revised the response time for Containment Spray in Table 3.3.2-1 and the RTNDT values in the Bases for TR 3.7.1. Both changes result from the replacement of the steam generators.
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| Revision 37 11/08/06 Revised TR 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 and the Bases for these TRs to update the boron concentration limits of the RWST and the BAT.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 ix Technical Requirements Revision 37
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 38 11/29/06 Updated the TRM to be consistent with Tech Spec Amendment 55. TRM Revision 38 modified the requirements for mode change limitations in TR 3.0.4 and TSR 3.0.4 by incorporating changes similar to those outlined in TSTF-359, Revision 9. (TS-06-24)
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| Revision 39 04/16/07 Updated the TRM to be consistent with Tech Spec Amendment 42.
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| TRM Revision 39 modified the requirements of TSR 3.0.3 by incorporating changes similar to those outlined in TSTF-358.
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| (TS-07-03)
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| Revision 40 05/24/07 Updated the TRM and Bases to remove the various requirements for the submittal of reports to the NRC. (TS-07-06)
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| Revision 41 05/25/07 Revision 41 updates the Bases of TR 3.1.3, 3.1.4 and 3.4.5 to be consistent with Technical Specification Amendment 66. This amendment replaces the references to Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code with the ASME Operation and Maintenance Code for Inservice Testing (IST) activities and removes reference to applicable supports from the IST program.
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| Revision 42 03/20/2008 Revision 42 updates Figure 3.1.6 to remove the 240 TPBAR Limit.
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| Revision 43 07/17/2008 Revision 43 removes a reporting requirement from TR 3.7.4, Sealed Source Contamination. The revision also updates the Bases for TR 3.7.4.
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| Revision 44 10/10/2008 Revision 44 updates Table 3.3.1-1 to be consistent with the changes approved by NRC as Tech Spec Amendment 68.
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| Revision 45 02/23/2009 Added TR 3.3.8, Hydrogen Monitors, and the Bases for TR 3.3.8.
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| This change is based on Technical Specification (TS) Amendment 72 which removed the Hydrogen Monitors (Function 13 of LCO 3.3.3) from the TS.
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| Revision 46 09/20/2010 Revision 46 implements changes from License Amendment 82 (Technical Specification (TS) Bases Revsion 104) for the approved BEACON-TSM application of the Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS).
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| Revision 47 10/08/2010 Revision 47 changes are in response to PER 215552 which requested clarification be added to the TRM regarding supported system operability when a snubber is declared inoperable or removed from service.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 x Technical Requirements Revision 47
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 48 04/12/2011 CANCELLED Revision 49 05/24/2011 Revision 49 updated Note 14 of Table 3.3.2-1 to clarify that the referenced time is only for partial transfer of the ECCS pumps from the VCT to the RWST.
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| Revision 50 12/12/2011 Clarifies the acceptability of periodically using a portion of the 25%
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| grace period in TSR 3.0.2 to facilitate 13 week maintenance work schedules.
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| Revision 51 08/09/2013 Adds a note to TR 3.1.2 and TR 3.1.4 to permit securing one charging pump in order to supporting transition into or from the Applicability of Technical Specification 3.4.12 (PER 593365).
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| Revision 52 08/30/2013 Clarifies that TR 3.4.5, Piping System Structural Integrity, applies to all ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping systems, and is not limited to reactor coolant system piping.
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| Revision 53 12/12/2013 Technical Specification Amendment 92 added Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.10, Decay Time, which was redundant to Technical Requirement (TR) 3.9.1, Decay Time. Revision 53 removes TR 3.9.1 from the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) and the TRM Bases.
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| Revision 54 01/23/2014 TRM which updates Technical Requirement (TR) 3.3.9, Power Distribution Monitoring System, to reflect the Addendum to WCAP 12472-P-A.
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| Revision 55 01/14/2015 Provided in the attachment is TRM Revision 55 which revises TRM Table 3.8.3-1 pages 3 and 5, Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices which are bypassed under accident conditions.
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| This revision results in the valves requiring their Thermal Overload Bypasses to be operable.
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| Revision 56 04/30/2015 This revision restructures TR 3.6.2 CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIME(s) to address two distinct cases of system inoperability. TRM BASES B 3.6.2 was also revised to coincide with the changes described above and to include additional detail regarding use of indirect means for performing channel checks Revision 57 05/07/2015 This revision changes the elevation of the Mean Sea Level by submergence during floods vary from 714.5 ft to 739.2 ft in TRM Bases B 3.7.2, Flood Protection Plan.
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| Revision 58 05/19/2015 This revision is an administrative change in TRM Bases 3.4.5 background information.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xi Technical Requirements Revision 58
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 59 10/13/2015 This revision adds the Unit 1 and Unit 2 FCV-67-0066 and FCV-67-0067 valves to TRM Table 3.8.3-1.
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| Revision 60 06/01/2016 This revision is to add 2-FCV-70-153 valve to TRM Table 3.8.3-1 Sheet 4 of 5.
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| Revision 61 02/21/2017 Revises TRM Bases 3.6.2 Inlet Door Position Monitoring System actions.
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| Revision 62 03/31/2017 This revision deletes TRM and TRM Bases section 3.7.3, Snubbers via the License Amendment 111.
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| Revision 63 5/17/2017 Revises the obsolete analog system that was limited to monitoring 1 sensor for each RCS collection point.
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| Revision 64 8/22/17 Clarified ASME Code Class in the section description in Section 3.4.5, Piping System Structural Integrity.
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| Revision 65 4/6/18 Revised TRM Bases Section 3.6.2, to more closely match information provided in the UFSAR. The Bases as written limits credit for the lower inlet door main panel annunciator as part of the Inlet Door Position Monitoring System.
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| Revision 66 (Amendment 10/11/18 Revises TRM Bases Section 3.3.5, Turbine Overspeed 119) Protection, to change the background information.
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| Revision 67 8/14/19 Revises TRM Section 3.3.9, PDMS and TRM Bases Section B3.3.9, PDMS to align the EFPD with the NRC SER.
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| Revision 68 (Amendment 12/17/19 Revises TRM Table 3.3.2-1 Page 3, to add Unbalanced voltage to 131) item 14.
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| Revision 69 4/21/20 Revises TRM to change TSRs 3.1.2.3, 3.8.3.1, and 3.8.4.2 due to the frequency of SR 3.6.3.6 being changed to 36 months.
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| Revision 70 9/24/20 Revises TRM and Bases to change the frequency of the PDMS calibration with the CET chess knight move pattern not satisfied from 30 to 31 EPFD.
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| Revision 71 11/4/20 Revises TRM and Bases TR 3.1.7 involving the requirements for the Position Indication System during Shutdown conditions.
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| Revision 72 1/11/22 Revises TRM and Bases to correct TRM 3.3.9 PDMS regarding the great than or equal too and greater than because a process parameter is never exactly equal to a value.
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| Revision 73 11/17/22 Revises TRM and Bases 3.8.1.3 and 3.8.1.4 to extend the SR test interval from 18 months to 36 months through the SFCP processes.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xii Technical Requirements Revision 73
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 74 2/28/23 TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements Revision 75 3/13/23 Revises TRM and TRM Bases requirements for isolation devices to be removed and replaced with an action to document in the Corrective Action program.
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| Revision 76 8/23/23 Revises TRM and TRM Bases 3.3.4.2, Table 3.3.4-1, Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, and 2.a, test frequency being extended.
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| Revision 77 8/24/23 Revises TRM and TRM Bases 3.1.5.2, 3.1.5.5 and 3.1.6.2 and 3.1.6.5 Frequency due to TS SR intervals extended by STRIDE.
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 xiii Technical Requirements Revision 77
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| ENCLOSURE 4 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL CHANGED PAGES
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| Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE 2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere (continued) from sources that are both specifically located and known to not interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems; or
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| : 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) tube to the Secondary System;
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| : b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE;
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| : c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except SG tube LEAKAGE) through a fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
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| LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
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| MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.
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| OPERABLE - OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 1.1-3 Revision 74 Technical Requirements
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| Borated Water Sources, Shutdown TR 3.1.5 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
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| -------------------------------------------------------------NOTES---------------------------------------------------------
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| : 1. TSR 3.1.5.1, TSR 3.1.5.2 and TSR 3.1.5.3 are only required to be performed if the RWST is the required borated water source.
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| : 2. TSR 3.1.5.4, TSR 3.1.5.5 and TSR 3.1.5.6 are only required to be performed if the Boric Acid Storage System is the required borated water source.
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.5.1 -------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------
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| Only required when ambient air temperature is < 60°F.
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| Verify RWST solution temperature is 60F. 24 hours TSR 3.1.5.2 Verify RWST boron concentration is 3,100 ppm. 31 days TSR 3.1.5.3 Verify RWST borated water volume is 7 days 62,900 gallons.
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| TSR 3.1.5.4 Verify Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 24 hours 63°F.
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| TSR 3.1.5.5 Verify BAT boron concentration is 6,120 31 days and 6,990 ppm.
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| TSR 3.1.5.6 Verify BAT borated water volume is 5,300 gallons. 7 days Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.1-9 Technical Requirements Revision 9, 33, 37, 77
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| Borated Water Sources, Operating TR 3.1.6 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. RWST boron concentration C.1 Restore RWST to 8 hours not within limits. OPERABLE status.
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| OR RWST borated water temperature not within limits.
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| D. RWST inoperable for D.1 Restore RWST to 1 hour reasons other than OPERABLE status.
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| Condition C.
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| E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition C AND or D not met.
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| E.2 Be in MODE 4 with one or 12 hours more RCS cold leg temperatures < 310 °F.
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| TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.6.1 ------------------------NOTE----------------------
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| Only required when outside air temperature is < 60 °F or >105 °F.
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| Verify RWST solution temperature is 60 F 24 hours and 105 °F.
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| TSR 3.1.6.2 Verify RWST boron concentration is 31 days 3,100 ppm and 3,300 ppm.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.1-11 Technical Requirements Revision 9, 33, 77
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| Borated Water Sources, Operating TR 3.1.6 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.6.3 Verify RWST borated water volume is 7 days 370,000 gallons.
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| TSR 3.1.6.4 ---------------------------NOTE-----------------------------
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| Only required if the BAT is required OPERABLE.
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| Verify Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 24 hours 63°F.
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| TSR 3.1.6.5 --------------------------NOTE-------------------------------
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| Only required if the BAT is required OPERABLE.
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| Verify BAT boron concentration is in accordance with 31 days Figure 3.1.6.
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| TSR 3.1.6.6 -------------------------NOTE--------------------------------
| |
| Only required if the BAT is required OPERABLE.
| |
| Verify BAT borated water volume is in accordance 7 days with Figure 3.1.6.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.1-12 Technical Requirements Revision 77
| |
| | |
| Seismic Instrumentation TR 3.3.4 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Refer to Table 3.3.4-1 to determine which Technical Surveillance Requirements apply for each seismic monitoring instrument.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 31 days TSR 3.3.4.2 Perform CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST. 18 months TSR 3.3.4.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.3-16 Revision 76 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Isolation Devices TR 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and Initiate a Corrective Action Program 24 hours associated Completion (CAP) document to develop plans and Time of Condition A not schedule for restoring the breaker to met. OPERABLE status.
| |
| TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.1.1 -----------------------------NOTE--------------------------
| |
| The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that the molded case circuit breaker functions as designed.
| |
| Perform a functional test of each molded-case In Accordance with circuit breaker. 0-TI-109 (continued)
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| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-2 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Isolation Devices TR 3.8.1 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.1.2 -----------------------------NOTE-------------------------
| |
| The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that each electrically-operated circuit breaker functions as designed.
| |
| Perform a functional test of each electrically In accordance with operated circuit breaker. 0-TI-109 TSR 3.8.1.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of associated 36 months protective relays for medium voltage circuits (6.9 kV).
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-3 Revision 73, 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Isolation Devices TR 3.8.1 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.1.4 --------------------------------NOTE---------------------------
| |
| For each circuit breaker found inoperable during functional tests, an additional representative sample of 10% of the defective type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all of that type have been functionally tested.
| |
| Perform an integrated system functional test on 36 months each medium voltage (6.9 kV) breaker which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed.
| |
| TSR 3.8.1.5 Inspect each circuit breaker and perform In accordance with preventive maintenance in accordance with 0-TI-109 procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's and EPRI recommendations for electrically operated breakers and Class 1E MCCB.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-4 Revision 25, 73, 75 Technical Requirements
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| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 TR 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TR 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more containment A.1 Restore the protective 72 hours penetration conductor device(s) to OPERABLE overcurrent protection status.
| |
| devices inoperable.
| |
| OR A.2.1 Deenergize the circuit(s) by 72 hours tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or removing the inoperable circuit breaker.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-5 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) AND A.2.3 Verify the backup circuit Once per 7 days breaker to be tripped or the thereafter.
| |
| inoperable circuit breaker removed.
| |
| B. Required Action and Initiate a Corrective Action Program 24 hours associated Completion (CAP) document to develop plans and Time not met. schedule for restoring the breaker to OEPRABLE status.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-6 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.2.3 --------------------------NOTE------------------------
| |
| The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed.
| |
| Perform a functional test of each molded-case circuit breaker. In accordance with 0-TI-109 (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-8 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.2.4 -------------------------NOTE---------------------------
| |
| The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that each electrically-operated circuit breaker functions as designed.
| |
| Perform a functional test of each electrically In accordance with operated circuit breaker. 0-TI-109 TSR 3.8.2.5 Inspect each circuit breaker and perform In accordance with preventive maintenance in accordance with 0-TI-109 procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's and EPRI recommendations:
| |
| : 1. For electrically operated breakers and Class 1E MCCB.
| |
| : 2. For non-Class 1E MCCB.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-9 Technical Requirements Revision 25, 75
| |
| | |
| ENCLOSURE 5 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL BASES CHANGED PAGES
| |
| | |
| Borated Water Sources, Shutdown B 3.1.5 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.5.1 (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS is greater than or equal to 60°F. With ambient air temperature greater than 60°F, the RWST solution temperature should not decrease below this limit, therefore, monitoring is not required.
| |
| TSR 3.1.5.2 This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration of the RWST is 3,100 ppm. This boron concentration is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and also ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 31-day Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| TSR 3.1.5.3 This surveillance requires verification every 7 days that the RWST borated water volume is 62,900 gallons (value does not account for instrument error). This borated water volume is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and also ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7-day Frequency to verify borated water volume is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. The 62,900 gallon volume requirement includes 11,400 gallons for shutdown margin and adjustments for minimum safety limit level in the RWST.
| |
| TSR 3.1.5.4 This surveillance requires verification every 24 hours that the Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 63°F (value does not account for instrument error). This ensures that the concentration of boric acid in the BAT is not allowed to precipitate due to cooling. The Frequency of 24 hours for performance of the surveillance is frequent enough to identify a temperature change that would approach the 63°F temperature limit.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-16 Technical Requirements Revision 20, 27, 32, 33, 37, 77
| |
| | |
| Borated Water Sources, Shutdown B 3.1.5 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.5.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration (continued) of the BAT is between 6,120 ppm and 6,990 ppm. This boron concentration is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
| |
| Since the BAT volume is normally stable, a 31-day Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| TSR 3.1.5.6 This surveillance requires verification every 7 days that the BAT borated water volume is 5,300 gallons (value does account for instrument error). This borated water volume is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the BAT volume is normally stable, a 7-day Frequency to verify borated water volume is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. WCAP-11618, "MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application,"
| |
| including Addendum 1 dated April 1989.
| |
| : 2. CEN-603, "Boric Acid Concentration Reduction Effort, Technical Bases and Operational Analysis for Watts Bar, Unit 1," Revision 00, April 1993.
| |
| : 3. TVA Calculation, EPM-PDM-071197, Revision 5, Boric Acid Concentration Analysis for BAT and RWST.
| |
| : 4. Westinghouse Letter, WAT-D-10940, Revision 1, Watts Bar Unit One TRM & FSAR Markups - Post LOCA Sump pH.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-17 Technical Requirements Revision 20, 27, 33, 37, 77
| |
| | |
| Borated Water Sources, Operating B 3.1.6 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)
| |
| With the RWST inoperable for reasons other than Condition C (e.g. water volume), it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The short time limit of 1 hour to restore the RWST to OPERABLE status is based on this condition simultaneously affecting two of the boration system flow paths. The Completion Time is consistent with Technical Specification 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank.
| |
| E.1 and E.2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C or D are not met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the TR does not apply.
| |
| This is done by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable and based on operating experience to reach required plant conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The limits assumed in the accident analysis band for the RWST borated water temperature are 60F and 105°F (values do not account for instrument error).
| |
| This surveillance requires verification of the water temperature limits every 24 hours. This is frequent enough to identify a temperature change that would approach either temperature limit and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| The TSR is modified by a Note which eliminates the requirement to perform this surveillance when ambient air temperatures are within the operating limits of the RWST. With ambient air temperatures within the band, the RWST solution temperature should not exceed the limits.
| |
| TSR 3.1.6.2 This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration of the RWST is within the required band. This ensures the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Further, it assures that the resulting sump pH will be maintained in an acceptable range so that (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-20 Revision 20, 77 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Borated Water Sources, Operating B 3.1.6 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.6.2 (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS boron precipitation in the core will not occur and the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized.
| |
| Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 31-day Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| TSR 3.1.6.3 This surveillance requires verification every 7 days that the RWST borated water volume is within the required limit of 370,000 gallons (value does not account for instrument error). This will ensure that a sufficient initial supply is available for injection and to support continued ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation on recirculation. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7-day Frequency to verify borated water volume is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| TSR 3.1.6.4 This surveillance requires verification every 24 hours that the Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 63°F (value does not account for instrument error). This ensures that the concentration of boric acid in the BAT is not allowed to precipitate due to cooling. The Frequency of 24 hours for performance of the surveillance is frequent enough to identify a temperature change that would approach the 63°F temperature limit and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| This surveillance has been modified by a NOTE stating that the surveillance is only required if the BAT is used as one of the required borated water sources for TR 3.1.2.
| |
| TSR 3.1.6.5 This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration of the BAT is in accordance with Figure 3.1.6 of TR 3.1.6. This boron concentration is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the BAT volume is normally stable, a (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-21 Technical Requirements Revision 20, 27, 77
| |
| | |
| Borated Water Sources, Operating B 3.1.6 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.6.5 (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 31-day sampling Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| This surveillance has been modified by a NOTE stating that the surveillance is only required if the BAT is used as one of the required borated water sources for TR 3.1.2.
| |
| TSR 3.1.6.6 This surveillance requires verification every 7 days that the BAT borated water volume is in accordance with Figure 3.1.6 (the values listed on the figure do account for instrument error). This borated water volume at the boron concentration specified in TSR 3.1.6.5 is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM. Since the BAT volume is normally stable, a 7-day Frequency to verify borated water volume is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| This surveillance has been modified by a NOTE stating that the surveillance is only required if the BAT is used as one of the required borated water sources for TR 3.1.2.
| |
| The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs near EOL from full power peak xenon conditions and requires borated water from a boric acid tank in accordance with Figure 3.1.6, and additional makeup from either (1) the common boric acid tank and/or batching tank, or (2) a maximum of 23,000 gallons of 3,100 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank. With the refueling water storage tank as the only borated water source, a maximum of 62,000 gallons of 3,100 ppm borated water is required.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. WCAP-11618, MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application, including Addendum 1 dated April 1989.
| |
| : 2. CEN-603, Boric Acid Concentration Reduction Effort, Technical Bases and Operational Analysis for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Revision 00, April 1993.
| |
| : 3. TVA Calculation, EPM-PDM-071197, Revision 5, Boric Acid Concentration Analysis For BAT and RWST.
| |
| : 4. Westinghouse Letter, WAT-D-10940, Revision 1, Watts Bar Unit One TRM and FSAR Markups - Post LOCA Sump pH.
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.1-22 Technical Requirements Revision 20, 27, 33, 37, 77
| |
| | |
| Seismic Instrumentation B 3.3.4 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is to be performed on each required channel (continued) to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is the comparison of the response of the instrumentation, including all components of the instrument, to a known signal. Although the seismic trigger is functionally checked, its setpoint is not verified. The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is based upon the known reliability of the monitoring instrumentation and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
| |
| TSR 3.3.4.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor by comparing the response of the instrument to a known input on the sensor. This test verifies the capability of the seismic instrumentation to correctly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is based upon operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.12, Instrumentation for Earthquakes, Revision 1, April 1974.
| |
| : 2. WCAP-11618, "MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application,"
| |
| including Addendum 1 dated April 1989.
| |
| : 3. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 3.7.4, "Seismic Instrumentation Program."
| |
| : 4. EPRI NO-5930, July 1988, A Criterion for Determining Exceedance of the Operating Basis Earthquake
| |
| : 5. EPRI TR-104239, June 1994, Seismic Instrumentation in Nuclear Power Plants for Response to OBE Exceedance: Guideline for Implementation
| |
| : 6. Regulatory Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Post-Earthquake Actions, Revision 0, March 1997.
| |
| : 7. EPRI NP-6695, December 1989, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-13 Revision 19, 76 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Isolation Devices B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B (continued)
| |
| If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A cannot be met, the Class 1E system remains unprotected from faults on non-Class 1E portions of the distribution system, on non-Class 1E associated cables routed in Class 1E cable trays or on non-Class 1E cables insufficiently separated from Class 1E cables.
| |
| A Corrective Actions Program (CAP) document to develop plans and schedule for restoring the breaker to OPERABLE status will be initiated.
| |
| TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires a functional test of molded case circuit breakers used as insolation devices per guidance maintained by the Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
| |
| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-4 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Isolation Devices B 3.8.1 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires a functional test of electrically operated breakers used (continued) as isolation devised per guidance maintained by the Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
| |
| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-5 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Isolation Devices B 3.8.1 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires that the performance of a CHANNEL (continued) CALIBRATION of all protective relays associated with medium voltage (6.9 kV) isolation overcurrent devices. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION assures that the relays will be able to detect overcurrent conditions on the non-Class 1E loads.
| |
| The Frequency of 36 months is consistent with other similar equipment and plant historical data.
| |
| TSR 3.8.1.4 This surveillance requires the performance of an integrated system functional test which verifies that the relays and associated medium voltage (6.9 kV) circuit breakers function as designed to isolate fault currents. An integrated test assures that the individual elements of the protection scheme, the relays, breakers and other control circuits, interact as designed.
| |
| The surveillance has been modified by a Note stating that if a failure is discovered in the integrated functional test, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be tested to assure that there is no common cause failure mechanism that could systematically affect all breakers of a given type.
| |
| The Frequency of 36 months is consistent with other similar equipment and plant historical data.
| |
| TSR 3.8.1.5 This surveillance requires the inspection of each circuit breaker and the performance of procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's recommendations. By performance of recommended maintenance, the likelihood for the circuit breakers to become inoperable can be minimized. The Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109 will maintain guidance to ensure recommended maintenance is performed per vendor, industry, or EPRI recommendations for breaker reliability.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-6 Technical Requirements Revision 25, 73, 75
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES APPLICABLE electrical penetrations must therefore provide that they SAFETY ANALYSES remain intact in the event of faults on components inside (continued) containment or penetration conductors that supply these components. The containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices provide additional fault protection of the penetrations and help ensure that the design limits of the penetrations are not challenged. However, these overcurrent protective devices are not a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes a failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier (Ref. 2).
| |
| TR TR 3.8.2 requires that all containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices be OPERABLE. These protection devices are identified on Drawing Series 45A710 (Ref. 3). This assures that the design limits of the containment electrical penetrations will not be challenged as a result of electrical faults on the penetration conductors or the equipment that they supply in containment.
| |
| APPLICABILITY The OPERABILITY of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices is required when the containment is required to be OPERABLE. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5, and 6 the probability and consequences of these events are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. The containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices are, therefore, required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.3 With one or more containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices inoperable, the circuit(s) associated with the inoperable protection device(s) must (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-9 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.3 (continued) be placed in a condition that would preclude the possibility of a fault that could overload the circuit(s). To accomplish this the circuit is deenergized by either tripping the circuit's backup circuit breaker or by removing the inoperable circuit breaker.
| |
| The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the design of the electrical penetration for maximum fault current, the availability of backup circuit protection on the distribution system and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. This Completion Time is also considered reasonable to perform the necessary repairs or circuit alterations to restore or otherwise deenergize the affected circuit.
| |
| In order to assure that any electrical penetration which is not protected by an overcurrent device remains deenergized, it is necessary to periodically verify that its backup circuit breaker is tripped or that the inoperable circuit breaker is removed. A Completion Time of once per 7 days is considered sufficient due to the infrequency of plant operations that could result in reenergizing a circuit that has been deenergized in this manner.
| |
| B If the inoperable containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices are not able to be restored to OPERABLE status and the associated circuit cannot be deenergized within 72 hours, the containment penetration is vulnerable to the mechanical effects of a short circuit, should one occur. These effects can challenge (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-10 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS B (continued) the design capability of the penetration and therefore pose a threat to containment integrity.
| |
| A Corrective Actions Program (CAP) document to develop plans and schedule for restoring the breaker to OPERABLE status will be initiated.
| |
| TECHNICAL As described by Technical Surveillance Requirements SURVEILLANCE general surveillance Note 1, the surveillances for this TR REQUIREMENTS are necessary to assure that the overcurrent protection devices given in Drawing Series 45A710 (excluding fuses) are demonstrated OPERABLE. Note 2 explains that the surveillance requirements apply to at least one Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) such that all RCP circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 month period. This recognizes the importance of the RCP circuits to the safe operation of the plant as well as the potentially large amount of short circuit current associated with a fault on these circuits.
| |
| TSR 3.8.2.1 This surveillance requires the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all protective relays associated with medium voltage (6.9 kV) containment penetration overcurrent devices. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION assures that the relays will be able to detect overcurrent conditions on the penetration conductors.
| |
| The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.
| |
| TSR 3.8.2.2 This surveillance requires the performance of an integrated system functional test which verifies that the relays and associated medium voltage (6.9 kV) circuit breakers function as designed to isolate fault currents. An integrated test assures that the individual elements of the protection scheme, the relays, breakers and other control circuits, interact as designed.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-11 Revision 75 Technical Requirements
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.2.2 (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The surveillance has been modified by a Note stating that if a failure is discovered in the integrated functional test, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be tested to assure that there is no common cause failure mechanism that could systematically affect all breakers of a given type.
| |
| The Frequency of 18 months coincides with the typical industry refueling cycle.
| |
| TSR 3.8.2.3 This surveillance requires a functional test of molded case circuit breakers used as isolation devices per guidance maintained by the Site breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
| |
| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-12 Technical Requirements Revision 75
| |
| | |
| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.2.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires a functional test of electrically operated breakers used (continued) as isolation devices per guidance maintained by the Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
| |
| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
| |
| TSR 3.8.2.5 This surveillance requires the inspection of each circuit breaker and the performance of preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturers recommendation. Performance of recommended preventive maintenance helps ensure the operability of the circuit breakers. The Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109 will maintain guidance to ensure recommended maintenance is performed per vendor, industry, or EPRI recommendations for breaker reliability.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-13 Technical Requirements Revision 25, 75
| |
| | |
| ENCLOSURE 6 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS
| |
| | |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS .... i LIST OF TABLES vi LIST OF FIGURES . vi LIST OF ACRONYMS vii LIST OF AMENDMENTS.............. x B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) ...... B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs .. B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL B 2.0-7 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO)
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| APPLICABILITY ........ B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ... B 3.0-11 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ...... B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) - Tavg > 200°F .......... B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) - Tavg 200°F B 3.1-8 B 3.1.3 Core Reactivity ... B 3.1-12 B 3.1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) B 3.1-18 B 3.1.5 Rod Group Alignment Limits B 3.1-25 B 3.1.6 Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits .. B 3.1-35 B 3.1.7 Control Bank Insertion Limits ...... B 3.1-40 B 3.1.8 Rod Position Indication . B 3.1-48 B 3.1.9 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 1 . B 3.1-57 B 3.1.10 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 2 . B 3.1-64 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS . B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)) .... B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (F ) ..... B 3.2-14 B 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) ............ B 3.2-21 B 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) .. B 3.2-26 Watts Bar - Unit 2 i (continued)
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION . B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation . B 3.3-1 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
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| Instrumentation .... B 3.3-64 B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation. B 3.3-122 B 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System ... B 3.3-138 B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation .... B 3.3-144 B 3.3.6 Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation ................ B 3.3-151 B 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
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| Actuation Instrumentation ................ B 3.3-159 B 3.3.8 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) Actuation Instrumentation .... B 3.3-165 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) .. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits ... B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality . B 3.4-6 B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits B 3.4-9 B 3.4.4 RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2 . B 3.4-16 B 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3 ... B 3.4-20 B 3.4.6 RCS Loops - MODE 4 ... B 3.4-25 B 3.4.7 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled .. B 3.4-31 B 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4-35 B 3.4.9 Pressurizer .. B 3.4-38 B 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves .... B 3.4-42 B 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) .. B 3.4-46 B 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) .... B 3.4-52 B 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE .... B 3.4-65 B 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ... B 3.4-71 B 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation .. B 3.4-76 B 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity ............... B 3.4-82 B 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity B 3.4-88 Watts Bar - Unit 2 ii (continued)
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) ................ B 3.5-1 B 3.5.1 Accumulators .. B 3.5-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating .. B 3.5-9 B 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown .. B 3.5-20 B 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) .... B 3.5-24 B 3.5.5 Seal Injection Flow .... B 3.5-30 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .. B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 Containment ... B 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks .. B 3.6-6 B 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves .. B 3.6-13 B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure .. B 3.6-27 B 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature . B 3.6-30 B 3.6.6 Containment Spray System . B 3.6-34 B 3.6.7 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION .......... B 3.6-41 B 3.6.8 Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) B 3.6-42 B 3.6.9 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) . B 3.6-48 B 3.6.10 Air Return System (ARS) .. B 3.6-54 B 3.6.11 Ice Bed . B 3.6-59 B 3.6.12 Ice Condenser Doors .... B 3.6-69 B 3.6.13 Divider Barrier Integrity . B 3.6-78 B 3.6.14 Containment Recirculation Drains .. B 3.6-83 B 3.6.15 Shield Building B 3.6-87 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ................ B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ............. B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) .... B 3.7-8 B 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs) and Associated Bypass Valves .......................................................... B 3.7-13 B 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) . B 3.7-19 B 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System B 3.7-23 B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) B 3.7-32 (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 iii
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)
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| B 3.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS) .... B 3.7-36 B 3.7.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System B 3.7-42 B 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) . B 3.7-47 B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) .... B 3.7-50 B 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) .. B 3.7-59 B 3.7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) .... B 3.7-63 B 3.7.13 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7-68 B 3.7.14 Secondary Specific Activity ............. B 3.7-71 B 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Pool Assembly Storage. B 3.7-74 B 3.7.16 Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown............. B 3.7-77 B 3.7.17 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) - Shutdown. B 3.7-84 B 3.7.18 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration B 3.7-89 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ................ B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating ......................... B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ......................... B 3.8-38 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air ................ B 3.8-43 B 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating .................. B 3.8-53 B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown .................. B 3.8-68 B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters ...................... B 3.8-72 B 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating .............................. B 3.8-78 B 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown .............................. B 3.8-82 B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating ............... B 3.8-86 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown .... B 3.8-95 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS . B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration .. B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves . B 3.9-5 B 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation .... B 3.9-8 B 3.9.4 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION B 3.9-11 B 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level ... B 3.9-12 (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 iv Revision 41
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS (continued)
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| B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level .... B 3.9-16 B 3.9.7 Refueling Cavity Water Level ... B 3.9-20 B 3.9.8 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION B 3.9-23 B 3.9.9 Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration .... B 3.9-24 B 9.10 Decay Time ....................................................................................... B 3.9-26 Watts Bar - Unit 2 v
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO TITLE PAGE B 3.3.4-1 Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls B 3.3-143a B 3.8.1-2 TS Action or Surveillance Requirements Contingency B3.8-37a Actions.
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| B 3.8.9-1 AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems B 3.8-94 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE NO. TITLE PAGE B 2.1.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits vs. Boundary of Protection ..................... B 2.0-6 B 3.1.7-1 Control Bank Insertion vs. Percent RTP ................... B 3.1-47 B 3.2.1-1 K(Z) - Normalized FQ(Z) as a Function of Core Height . B 3.2-13 B 3.2.3-1 TYPICAL AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Acceptable Operation Limits as a Function of RATED THERMAL POWER ................................................. B 3.2-25 Watts Bar - Unit 2 vi Revision 19
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 1 of 3)
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| ACRONYM TITLE ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Control Room Panel AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARFS Air Return Fan System ARO All Rods Out ARV Atmospheric Relief Valve ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BOC Beginning of Cycle CAOC Constant Axial Offset Control CCS Component Cooling Water System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 vii
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 2 of 3)
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| ACRONYM TITLE ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line Isolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PIV Pressure Isolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 viii
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 3 of 3)
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| ACRONYM TITLE RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Thermal Power RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety Injection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar - Unit 2 ix
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT NPF-20 10-22-15 Low Power Operating License Revision 1 2-12-16 TS Bases Table B 3.8.9-1, AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems Revision 2 3-18-16 Revise TS Bases B3.3.7, Component Cooling System (CCS), regarding the 1B and 2B surge tank sections.
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| Revision 3 7-11-16 Revise TS Bases B3.6.4, Containment Pressure, and B3.6.6, Containment Spray System regarding the maximum peak containment pressure from a LOCA of 11.73 psig.
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| Revision 4 8-19-16 Revise TS Bases B3.6.15, Shield Building, to clarify the use of the Condition B note.
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| Revision 5 1-17-17 Revises TS Bases B 3.8.1 AC-Sources Revision 6 2-24-17 Revises TS Bases B 3.7.7, Component Cooling System (CCS), and B 3.7.16, Component Cooling System (CCS) -
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| Shutdown.
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| Revision 7 3-13-17 Adds TS Bases B 3.0.8 for Inoperability of Snubbers.
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| Revision 8 4-7-17 Revises TS Bases B 3.4.6.3 to correct the steam generator minimum narrow range level.
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| Revision 9 4-25-17 Revises TS Bases B3.7-10 CREVS.
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| Revision 10 7-14-17 Revises TS Bases SR B3.0.2 for a one-time extension of the Alternating Current Sources.
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| Revision 11, Amendment 14 9-29-17 Revises TS Bases B3.6.11 to change the ice mass weight.
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| Revision 12, Amendment 15 11-2-17 Revises TS Bases to adopt the TSTF-522 to revise ventilation system surveillance requirements to operate for 10 hours per month.
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| Revision 13, Amendment 16 11-2-17 Revises TS Bases B3.7-12 to provide action when both trains of ABGTS are inoperable. Also, B3.8-37a correction of unit error.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 x Revision 13
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 14 11-9-17 Revises TS Bases B 3.8.1 AC Sources -
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| Operating LCO to correct a typo 1.a.
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| Revision 15 12-13-17 Revises TS Bases B3.6.4 and B 3.6.6 to change the calculated peak pressure.
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| Revision 16, Amendment 20 08-20-18 Revises TS Bases B3.1.5, B3.1.6, B3.1.7, and B3.1.8 which adopts the TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod position requirements.
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| Revision 17, Amendment 21 09-21-18 Revises TS Bases 3.2.4 and Bases 3.3.1 related to the reactor trip system instrumentation.
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| Revision 18 02-13-19 Revises TS Bases 3.3.1 related to the reactor trip system instrumentation.
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| Revision 19, Amendment 25 03-19-19 Revises TS Bases 3.3.4 which adds Table 3.3.4-1, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls Revision 20 03-21-19 Revises TS Bases Table 3.3.4-1, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls Revision 21 05-16-19 Revises TS Bases 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation, to relocation of the Turbine Trip - Low Fluid Oil Pressure trip function from pressure switches in the low pressure fluid oil header to a new location In the high pressure EHC System trip header.
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| Revision 22, Amendment 24 06-13-19 Revises TS Bases 3.6.3,Containment Isolation Valves, to change the frequency to in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
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| Revision 23, Amendment 29 08-1-19 Revises TS Bases 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating, to add a new Condition C.
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| Revision 24 08-1-19 Revises TS Bases 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
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| Revision 25 08-7-19 Revises TS Bases 3.8.6, surveillance requirements.
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| Revision 26 08-19-19 Revises TS Bases 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating Watts Bar - Unit 2 xi Revision 26
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 27, Amendment 31 12-17-19 Revises TS Bases 3.3.5, LOP DG Start Instrumentation, to implement Class 1E unbalanced voltage relays.
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| Revision 28, Amendment 32 12-17-19 Revises Tech Specs 3.8.1, 3.8.7, 3.8.8, and 3.8.9 to support performance of the 6.9kV and 480V shutdown board maintenance.
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| Revision 29 1-09-20 Revises TS Bases Table B 3.3.4-1, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls Revision 30 1-13-20 Revises TS Bases 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to remove the Term operatioal convenience.
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| Revision 31, Amendment 33 1-29-20 TSTF - 500 - DC Electrical Rewrite -
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| Update to TSTF-360 Revision 32 2-20-20 Revises CSST A and B to qualify to GDC-17 requirements in order to be considered as a TS offsite power source substitute for CSST D or C when out of service.
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| Revision 33, Amendment 35 3-03-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.8 for a one-time extension of completion time for inoperable ERCW train.
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| Revision 34, Amendment 36 3-25-20 TSTF-425 - Surveillance Frequency Testing Program.
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| Revision 35 3-19-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating, regarding the Diesel Auxiliary Building Boards.
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| Revision 36, Amendment 37 4-8-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.3.5, LOP DG Start Instrumentation for Condition C.
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| Revision 37 6-1-20 Corrected reference in Tech Spec Bases 3.8.9 Condition E, Action E.1, for the repairs to U1 Shutdown boards.
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| Revision 38, Amendment 39 7-20-20 Revises miscellaneous administrative changes.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 xii Revision 38
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 39, Amendment 40 8-26-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases to allow the use of Westinghouse leak-limiting non-nickel banded Alloy 800 sleeves to repair degraded steam generator tubes.
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| Revision 40, Amendment 41 9-15-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases to delete Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.22 requirement to verify the operability of the automatic transfer from a Unit 2 Service Station Transformer to a Common Station Service Transformer A or B at the associated unit board.
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| Revision 41, Amendment 27 11-4-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Assembly Storage, and adding the Bases 3.7.18 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration.
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| Revision 42, Amendment 42 11-10-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.1, MSSVs, for measurement uncertainty recapture power uprate.
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| Revision 43, Amendment 43 12-8-20 Adopts TSTF-541, Revision 2, Add exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for valves and dampers locked in the actuated position.
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| Revision 44 12-14-20 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.5, AFW System, reducing assumed accumulation for the lowest MSSV setpoint.
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| Revision 45, Amendment 45 01-05-21 Revise Tech Spec 3.6.15 by deleting existing Condition B and revise the acceptance criteria for annulus pressure.
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| Revision 46, Amendment 47 02-02-21 Adopts TSTF-569, Revision 2, Revise Response Time Testing Definition.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 xiii Revision 46
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 47, Amendment 51 05-19-21 One-Time Change to Tech Spec Bases 3.7.11 to Extend the Completion Time for Main Control Room Chiller Modifications.
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| Revision 48, Amendment 52 06-22-21 TSTF-490 - DELETION OF E BAR DEFINITION AND REVISION TO RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TECH SPEC Revision 49, Amendment 53 06-30-21 Implement WCAP-18124-NP-A to Tech Spec Bases 3.4.3, RCS P/T Limits Revision 50 08-26-21 Revises Tech Spec Bases LCO 3.6.12, Ice Condenser Doors, notes issue.
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| Revision 51 09-2-21 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.4.12, Reference 8.
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| Revision 52, Amendment 56 11-30-21 Revises Tech Spec 5.7.2.19, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to extend containment integrated and local leak rate test intervals.
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| Revision 53, Amendment 58 1-12-22 Revises Tech Spec SR 3.6.15.4.
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| Revision 54 1-25-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating to support the future shutdown board cleaning activities.
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| Revision 55 2-9-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases Table 3.8.9-1 to remove C&A 1A2-A, 2A2-A, 1B2-B and 2B2-B.
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| Revision 56, Amendment 49 3-9-22 Implement WCAP-17661-P-A, Improved RAOC and CAOC FQ Surveillance Tech Specs.
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| Revision 57, Amendment 50 3-16-22 Revises Tech Spec 5.9.5 implementation of Full Spectrum LOCA and New LOCA Specific Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber rod stress analysis methodology Watts Bar - Unit 2 xiv Revision 57
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 58, Amendment 55 03-30-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.3.2 Function 6.E.
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| Revision 59, Amendment 57 04-06-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases RCS Loops -
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| Steam Generator Secondary Side Water Level.
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| Revision 60, Amendment 60 05-11-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.4.17, to delete requirements for steam generator (SG) tube inspection and repair methodologies that no longer apply following installation of the replacement SGs.
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| Revision 61 06-23-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.3 regarding the Feedwater impacts on the replacement of the Steam Generators.
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| Revision 62, Amendment 62 10-5-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.8 to permanently extend the allowed completion time of the ERCW system Train.
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| Revision 63 11-9-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.5 to delete one valve for the MDAFW System flow path to the Steam Generators.
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| Revision 64, Amendment 64 12-1-22 TSTF-205-A, Rev 3 Revision of CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL Functional Test, and Related Definitions, and TSTF-563-A, Revise Instrument Testing Definitions to Incorporate the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| Revision 65, Amendment 66 2-15-23 TSTF-529, Rev 4 Clarify Use and Application Rules.
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| Revision 66, Amendment 67 2-22-23 TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements.
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| Revision 67 3-2-23 Revises B3.1.4, Moderator Temperature Coefficient which replaces the measurement of the MTC with a conditional verification of the design MTC in Tech Spec.
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| Revision 68 4-4-23 Revises B 3.8.7 and B 3.8.8 for Plant Configuration for both Units SDBD cleaning require 120V AC Vital Inverters and 125V DC Vital Chargers to be placed on the cross-train 480V Shutdown Board power sources.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 xv Revision 68
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 58, Amendment 55 03-30-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.3.2 Function 6.E.
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| Revision 59, Amendment 57 04-06-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases RCS Loops -
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| Steam Generator Secondary Side Water Level.
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| Revision 60, Amendment 60 05-11-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.4.17, to delete requirements for steam generator (SG) tube inspection and repair methodologies that no longer apply following installation of the replacement SGs.
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| Revision 61 06-23-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.3 regarding the Feedwater impacts on the replacement of the Steam Generators.
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| Revision 62, Amendment 62 10-5-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.8 to permanently extend the allowed completion time of the ERCW system Train.
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| Revision 63 11-9-22 Revises Tech Spec Bases 3.7.5 to delete one valve for the MDAFW System flow path to the Steam Generators.
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| Revision 64, Amendment 64 12-1-22 TSTF-205-A, Rev 3 Revision of CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL Functional Test, and Related Definitions, and TSTF-563-A, Revise Instrument Testing Definitions to Incorporate the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| Revision 65, Amendment 66 2-15-23 TSTF-529, Rev 4 Clarify Use and Application Rules.
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| Revision 66, Amendment 67 2-22-23 TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements.
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| Revision 67 3-2-23 Revises B3.1.4, Moderator Temperature Coefficient which replaces the measurement of the MTC with a conditional verification of the design MTC in Tech Spec.
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| Revision 68 4-4-23 Revises B 3.8.7 and B 3.8.8 for Plant Configuration for both Units SDBD cleaning require 120V AC Vital Inverters and 125V DC Vital Chargers to be placed on the cross-train 480V Shutdown Board power sources.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 xv Revision 68
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
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| REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 69 4-26-23 Revises B 3.8.3 location of reference regarding Relocation of Stored Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Volume Valves to Licensee Control Revision 70, Amendment 68 5-4-23 Revises B3.4.12, Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) to add a note to the Limiting Condition for Operation.
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| Revision 71, Amendment 69 6-15-23 Revises B3.7.11 CREATCS footnotes.
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| Revision 72 7-10-23 Revises B3.6.5 to correct a missed impact from the Westinghouse COBRA/TRAC implementation.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 xvi Revision 72
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| ENCLOSURE 7 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGED PAGES
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY BASES LCOs LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
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| LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e., when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).
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| LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered, unless otherwise specified.
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| The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:
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| : a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and
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| : b. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.
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| There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. If this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. In this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-1 Revision 7, 65 Amendment 6, 66
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.2 Completing the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met or (continued) is no longer applicable, unless otherwise stated in the individual Specifications.
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| The nature of some Required Actions of some Conditions necessitates that, once the Condition is entered, the Required Actions must be completed even though the associated Conditions no longer exist. The individual LCO's ACTIONS specify the Required Actions where this is the case. An example of this is in LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."
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| The Completion Times of the Required Actions are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service intentionally. The ACTIONS for not meeting a single LCO adequately manage any increase in plant risk, provided any unusual external conditions (e.g., severe weather, offsite power instability) are considered. In addition, the increased risk associated with simultaneous removal of multiple structures, systems, trains or components from service is assessed and managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Individual Specifications may specify a time limit for performing an SR when equipment is removed from service or bypassed for testing. In this case, the Completion Times of the Required Actions are applicable when this time limit expires, if the equipment remains removed from service or bypassed.
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| When a change in MODE or other specified condition is required to comply with Required Actions, the unit may enter a MODE or other specified condition in which another Specification becomes applicable. In this case, the Completion Times of the associated Required Actions would apply from the point in time that the new Specification becomes applicable, and the ACTIONS Condition(s) are entered.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 (continued)
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| B 3.0-2 Revision 30
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
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| LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 establishes the actions that must be implemented when an LCO is not met and:
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| : a. An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or
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| : b. The condition of the unit is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corresponding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 be entered immediately.
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| This Specification delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other specified condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LCO and its ACTIONS. Planned entry into LCO 3.0.3 should be avoided. If it is not practicable to avoid planned entry into LCO 3.0.3, plant risk should be assessed and managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and the planned entry into LCO 3.0.3 should have less effect on plant safety than other practicable alternatives.
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| Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, 1 hour is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before initiating a change in unit operation. This includes time to permit the operator to coordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to enter lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies. The use and interpretation of specified times to complete the actions of LCO 3.0.3 are consistent with the discussion of Section 1.3, Completion Times.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-3 Revision 30, 65 Amendment 66
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.3 A unit shutdown required in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 may be (continued) terminated and LCO 3.0.3 exited if any of the following occurs:
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| : a. The LCO is now met,
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| : b. The LCO is no longer applicable,
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| : c. A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have now been performed, or
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| : d. ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Completion Times. These Completion Times are applicable from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LCO 3.0.3 is exited.
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| The time limits of Specification 3.0.3 allow 37 hours for the unit to be in MODE 5 when a shutdown is required during MODE 1 operation. If the unit is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for entering the next lower MODE applies. If a lower MODE is entered in less time than allowed, however, the total allowable time to enter MODE 5, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if MODE 3 is entered in 2 hours, then the time allowed for entering MODE 4 is the next 11 hours, because the total time for entering MODE 4 is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours. Therefore, if remedial measures are completed that would permit a return to MODE 1, a penalty is not incurred by having to enter a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.
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| In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, LCO 3.0.3 provides actions for Conditions not covered in other Specifications. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6 because the unit is already in the most restrictive Condition required by LCO 3.0.3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-4 Revision 65 Amendment 66
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.3 Exceptions to LCO 3.0.3 are provided in instances where requiring a unit (continued) shutdown, in accordance with LCO 3.0.3, would not provide appropriate remedial measures for the associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3.7.13, "Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." LCO 3.7.13 has an Applicability of "During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool." Therefore, this LCO can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.13 are not met while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.13 of "Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool." is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.
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| LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It allows placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., the Applicability desired to be entered) when unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met, in accordance with either LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4.b, or LCO 3.0.4.c.
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| LCO 3.0.4.a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered following entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability will permit continued operation within the MODE or other specified condition for an unlimited period of time. Compliance with ACTIONS that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made and the Required Actions followed after entry into the Applicability.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-5 Revision 65 Amendment 66
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.4 For example, LCO 3.0.4.a may be used when the Required Action to be (continued) entered states that an inoperable instrument channel must be placed in the trip condition within the Completion Time. Transition into a MODE or other specified in condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4 and the channel is subsequently placed in the tripped condition within the Completion Time, which begins when the Applicability is entered. If the instrument channel cannot be placed in the tripped condition and the subsequent default ACTION ("Required Action and associated Completion Time not met") allows the OPERABLE train to be placed in operation, use of LCO 3.0.4.a is acceptable because the subsequent ACTIONS to be entered following entry into the MODE include ACTIONS (place the OPERABLE train in operation) that permit safe plant operation for an unlimited period of time in the MODE or other specified condition to be entered.
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| LCO 3.0.4.b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.
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| The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities be assessed and managed. The risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4.b, must take into account all inoperable Technical Specifications equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3. Regulatory Guide 1.160 Revision 3 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 4A. These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the LCO would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-6 Revision 65 Amendment 66
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.0.4.b may be used with single, or multiple systems and (continued) components unavailable. NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance relative to consideration of simultaneous unavailability of multiple systems and components.
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| The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. The LCO 3.0.4.b risk assessments do not have to be documented.
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| The Technical Specifications allow continued operation with equipment unavailable in MODE 1 for the duration of the Completion Time. Since this is allowable, and since in general the risk impact in that particular MODE bounds the risk of transitioning into and through the applicable MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability of the LCO, the use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance should be generally acceptable, as long as the risk is assessed and managed as stated above. However, there is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined to be more important to risk and use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance is prohibited. The LCOs governing these system and components contain Notes prohibiting the use of LCO 3.0.4.b by stating that LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable.
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| LCO 3.0.4.c allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met based on a Note in the Specification which states LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. These specific allowances permit entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time and a risk assessment has not been performed. This allowance may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. The risk assessments performed to justify the use of LCO 3.0.4.b usually only consider systems and components. For this reason, LCO 3.0.4.c is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., RCS Specific Activity), and may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval.
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| The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.
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| The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-7 (continued)
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| Revision 65 Amendment 66
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
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| LCO 3.0.4 associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to (continued) MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.
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| Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the LCO is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification.
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| Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, utilizing LCO 3.0.4 is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for any Surveillances that have not been performed on inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.
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| LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of SRs to demonstrate:
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| : a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or
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| : b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.
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| The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the allowed SRs. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance. LCO 3.0.5 should not be used in lieu of other practicable alternatives that comply with Required Actions and that do not require changing the MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in order to demonstrate equipment is OPERABLE. LCO 3.0.5 is not intended to be used repeatedly.
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| An example of demonstrating equipment is OPERABLE with the Required Actions not met is opening a manual valve that was closed to comply with Required Actions to isolate a flowpath with excessive Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) leakage in order to perform testing to demonstrate that RCS PIV leakage is now within limit.
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| Examples of demonstrating equipment OPERABILITY include instances in which it is necessary to take an inoperable channel or trip system out of a tripped condition that was directed by a Required Action, if there is no Required Action Note for this purpose. An example of verifying (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-8 Revision 65 Amendment 66
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
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| LCO 3.0.5 OPERABILITY of equipment removed from service is taking a tripped (continued) channel out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during performance of required testing on the inoperable channel. Examples of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment are taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition 1) to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of an SR on another channel in the other trip system, or 2) to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of an SR on another channel in the same trip system.
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| The administrative controls in LCO 3.0.5 apply in all cases to systems or components in Chapter 3 of the Technical Specifications, as long as the testing could not be conducted while complying with the Required Actions. This includes the realignment or repositioning of redundant or alternate equipment or trains previously manipulated to comply with ACTIONS, as well as equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS.
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| LCO 3.0.6 LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for support systems that have an LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). This exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCO's Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify other Required Actions.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-9 Revision 65 Amendment 66
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.6 When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it (continued) in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.
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| However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system.
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| This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
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| Specification 5.7.2.18, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP),"
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| ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.
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| Cross train checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support multiple and redundant safety systems are required.
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| The cross train check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-10
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.6 This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional (continued) single failure or loss of offsite power. Since operation is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account. Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circuit(s) and inoperable diesel generator(s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities. This explicit cross train verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges that supported system(s) are not declared inoperable solely as a result of inoperability of a normal or emergency electrical power source (refer to the definition of OPERABILITY).
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| When a loss of safety function is determined to exist, and the SFDP requires entry into the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists, consideration must be given to the specific type of function affected. Where a loss of function is solely due to a single Technical Specification support system (e.g., loss of automatic start due to inoperable instrumentation, or loss of pump suction source due to low tank level) the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system. The ACTIONS for a support system LCO adequately addresses the inoperabilities of that system without reliance on entering its supported system LCO. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the supported system.
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| LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the plant. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select plant performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions.
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| Test Exception LCOs 3.1.9 and 3.1.10 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS.
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| Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test will remain in effect.
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| The Applicability of a Test Exception LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS.
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| Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. A special test or operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Test Exception LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special test or operation under the provisions of the Test Exception LCO, the requirements of the Test Exception LCO shall be followed.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-10a
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
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| LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered to remain capable of performing their intended safety function when associated snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s). This LCO states that the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s). This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance, testing, or repair of one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures are specified in the snubber requirements, which are located outside of the Technical Specifications (TS) under licensee control. LCO 3.0.8 applies to snubbers that only have seismic function. It does not apply to snubbers that also have design functions to mitigate steam/water hammer or other transient loads. The snubber requirements do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), and, as such, are appropriate for control by the licensee.
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| When applying LCO 3.0.8.a, at least one train of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system must be OPERABLE during MODES when AFW is required to be OPERABLE. When applying LCO 3.0.8.a during MODES when AFW is not required to be OPERABLE, a core cooling method (such as Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system) must be available. When applying LCO 3.0.8.b, a means of core cooling must remain available (AFW, DHR, equipment necessary for feed and bleed operations, etc.).
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| Reliance on availability of a core cooling source during modes where AFW is not required by TSs provides an equivalent safety margin for plant operations were LCO 3.0.8 not applied and meets the intent of Technical Specification Task Force Change Traveler TSTF-372, Revision 4, "Addition of LCO 3.0.8, Inoperability of Snubbers."
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| When a snubber is to be rendered incapable of performing its related support function (i.e., nonfunctional) for testing or maintenance or is discovered to not be functional, it must be determined whether any system(s) require the affected snubber(s) for system OPERABLILITY, and whether the plant is in a MODE or specified condition in the Applicability that requires the supported system(s) to be OPERABLE.
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| If an analysis determines that the supported system(s) do not require the snubber(s) to be functional in order to support the OPERABILITY of the system(s), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. If the LCO(S) associated with any supported system(s) are not currently applicable (i.e., the plant is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. If the supported system(s) are inoperable for reasons other than snubbers, LCO 3.0.8 cannot be used. LCO 3.0.8 is an allowance, not a requirement. When a snubber is nonfunctional, any supported system(s) may be declared inoperable instead of using LCO 3.0.8.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-10b Revision 7 Amendment 6
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| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.8 Every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used, WBN Unit 2 will confirm (continued) that at least one train (or subsystem) of systems supported by the inoperable snubbers will remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. A record of the design function of the inoperable snubber (i.e.,
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| seismic vs. non-seismic) and the associated plant configuration will be available on a recoverable basis for NRC staff inspection.
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| LCO 3.0.8 does not apply to non-seismic snubbers. The provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are not to be applied to supported TS systems unless the supported systems would remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. The risk impact of dynamic loadings other than seismic loads was not assessed as part of the development of LCO 3.0.8. These shock-type loads include thrust loads, blowdown loads, water-hammer loads, steam-hammer loads, LOCA loads and pipe rupture loads. However, there are some important distinctions between non-seismic (shocktype) loads and seismic loads which indicate that, in general, the risk impact of the out-of-service snubbers is smaller for non-seismic loads than for seismic loads.
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| First, while a seismic load affects the entire plant, the impact of a nonseismic load is localized to a certain system or area of the plant.
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| Second, although non-seismic shock loads may be higher in total force and the impact could be as much or more than seismic loads, generally they are of much shorter duration than seismic loads. Third, the impact of non-seismic loads is more plant specific, and thus harder to analyze generically, than for seismic loads. For these reasons, every time LCO 3.0.8 is applied, at least one train of each system that is supported by the inoperable snubber(s) should remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads.
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| If the allowed time expires and the snubber(s) are unable to perform their associated support function(s), the affected supported system's LCO(s) must be declared not met and the Conditions and Required Actions entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
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| LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to a single train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or to a single train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hours to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function and due to the availability of the redundant train of the supported system.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-10c Revision 7 Amendment 6
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| | |
| LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of (continued) providing their associated support function(s) to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.b allows 12 hours to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function.
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| LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed. Industry and NRC guidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) (the Maintenance Rule) does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO 3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existing Maintenance Rule process to the extent possible so that maintenance on any unaffected train or subsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues are properly addressed. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated support function.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-10d Revision 7 Amendment 6
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| | |
| SR Applicability B 3.0 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY BASES SRs SR 3.0.1 through SR 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
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| SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.1 establishes the requirement that SRs must be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LCO apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual SRs. This Specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, in accordance with SR 3.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO.
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| Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated SRs have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when:
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| : a. The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the SRs; or
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| : b. The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known not to be met between required Surveillance performances.
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| Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LCO are not applicable, unless otherwise specified. The SRs associated with a test exception are only applicable when the test exception is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a Specification.
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| Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by Required Actions, do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTIONS define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-11
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| SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.1 Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is (continued) required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.
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| SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per . . ." interval.
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| SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).
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| The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply.
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| These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the surveillance requirement will include a note in the frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 does not apply." An example of an exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations, is the discussion in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, that SR 3.0.2 does not apply. This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.
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| As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per . . ." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-12 Revision 10, 38 Amendment 12, 39
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| SR Applicability B.3.0 BASES SR 3.0.2 Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial (continued) action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
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| The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified, with the exception of surveillances required to be performed on a 31-day frequency. For surveillances performed on a 31-day frequency, the normal surveillance interval may be extended in accordance with Specification 3.0.2 cyclically as required to remain synchronized to the maintenance work schedules. This practice is acceptable based on the results of an evaluation of 31-day frequency surveillance test histories that demonstrate that no adverse failure rate changes have occurred nor would be expected to develop as a result of cyclical use of surveillance interval extensions and the fact that the total number of 31-day frequency surveillances performed in any one-year period remains unchanged.
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| SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency.
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| A delay period of up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time that the specified Frequency was not met.
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| This delay period provides adequate time to perform Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the performance of a Surveillance before complying with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might preclude performance of the Surveillance.
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| The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-13 Revision 30, 65 Amendment 66
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| SR Applicability B.3.0 BASES SR 3.0.3 When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on time intervals, but (continued) upon specified unit conditions, operating situations, or requirements of regulations (e.g., prior to entering MODE 1 after each fuel loading, or in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions, etc.) is discovered to not have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows for the full delay period of up to the specified Frequency to perform the Surveillance. However, since there is not a time interval specified, the missed Surveillance should be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.
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| SR 3.0.3 provides a time limit for, and allowances for the performance of, Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.
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| SR 3.0.3 is only applicable if there is a reasonable expectation the associated equipment is OPERABLE or that variables are within limits, and it is expected that the Surveillance will be met when performed.
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| Many factors should be considered, such as the period of time since the Surveillance was last performed, or whether the Surveillance, or a portion thereof, has ever been performed, and any other indications, tests, or activities that might support the expectation that the Surveillance will be met when performed. An example of the use of SR 3.0.3 would be a relay contact that was not tested as required in accordance with a particular SR, but previous successful performances of the SR included the relay contact; the adjacent, physically connected relay contacts were tested during the SR performance; the subject relay contact has been tested by another SR; or historical operation of the subject relay contact has been successful. It is not sufficient to infer the behavior of the associated equipment from the performance of similar equipment. The rigor of determining whether there is a reasonable expectation a Surveillance will be met when performed should increase based on the length of time since the last performance of the Surveillance. If the Surveillance has been performed recently, a review of the Surveillance history and equipment performance may be sufficient to support a reasonable expectation that the Surveillance will be met when performed.
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| For Surveillances that have not been performed for a long period or that have never been performed, a rigorous evaluation based on objective evidence should provide a high degree of confidence that the equipment is OPERABLE. The evaluation should be documented in sufficient detail to allow a knowledgeable individual to understand the basis for the determination.
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| Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used repeatedly to extend Surveillance intervals.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-14 Revision 30, 65 Amendment 66
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| MTC B 3.1.4 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)
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| BASES BACKGROUND According to GDC 11 (Ref. 1), the reactor core and its interaction with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) must be designed for inherently stable power operation, even in the possible event of an accident. In particular, the net reactivity feedback in the system must compensate for any unintended reactivity increases.
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| The MTC relates a change in core reactivity to a change in reactor coolant temperature (a positive MTC means that reactivity increases with increasing moderator temperature; conversely, a negative MTC means that reactivity decreases with increasing moderator temperature). The reactor is designed to operate with a negative MTC over the largest possible range of fuel cycle operation. Therefore, a coolant temperature increase will cause a reactivity decrease, so that the coolant temperature tends to return toward its initial value. Reactivity increases that cause a coolant temperature increase will thus be self limiting, and stable power operation will result.
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| MTC values are predicted at selected burnups during the safety evaluation analysis and are confirmed to be acceptable by surveillances.
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| Both initial and reload cores are designed so that the beginning of cycle (BOC) MTC is less than zero. The actual value of the MTC is dependent on core characteristics, such as fuel loading and reactor coolant soluble boron concentration. The core design may require additional fixed distributed poisons to yield an MTC at BOC within the range analyzed in the plant accident analysis. For some core designs, the burnable absorbers may burn out faster than the fuel depletes early in the cycle.
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| This may cause the boron concentration to increase with burnup early in the cycle and the most positive MTC not to occur at BOC, but somewhat later in the cycle. For these core designs, a BOC criterion is established that is sufficiently less positive than zero to ensure that the MTC remains within the LCO upper limit during the cycle. The end of cycle (EOC) MTC is also limited by the requirements of the accident analysis. Fuel cycles that are designed to achieve high burnups or that have changes to other characteristics are evaluated to ensure that the MTC does not exceed the EOC limit.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-18 Revision 67
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| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES BACKGROUND The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the value of this (continued) coefficient remains within the limiting conditions assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.
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| If the LCO limits are not met, the unit response during transients may not be as predicted. The core could violate criteria that prohibit a return to criticality during non-MSLB events, or the departure from nucleate boiling ratio criteria of the approved correlation may be violated, which could lead to a loss of the fuel cladding integrity.
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| The SRs for verification of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits, since this coefficient changes slowly, due principally to changes in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel and burnable absorber burnup.
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| APPLICABLE The acceptance criteria for the specified MTC are:
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| SAFETY ANALYSES a. The MTC values must remain within the bounds of those used in the accident analysis (Ref. 2); and
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| : b. The MTC must be such that inherently stable power operations result during normal operation and accidents, such as overheating and overcooling events.
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| The FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), contains analyses of accidents that result in both overheating and overcooling of the reactor core. MTC is one of the controlling parameters for core reactivity in these accidents. Both the most positive value and most negative value of the MTC are important to safety, and both values must be bounded. Values used in the analyses consider worst case conditions to ensure that the accident results are bounding (Ref. 3).
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| The consequences of accidents that cause core overheating must be evaluated when the MTC is at the most positive value. Such accidents include the rod withdrawal transient from either zero (Ref. 4) or RTP, loss of main feedwater flow, and loss of forced reactor coolant flow. The consequences of accidents that cause core overcooling must be evaluated when the MTC is at the most negative value. Such accidents include sudden feedwater flow increase and sudden decrease in feedwater temperature.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-19 Revision 67
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| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES APPLICABLE In order to ensure a bounding accident analysis, the MTC is assumed to SAFETY be its most limiting value for the analysis conditions appropriate to each ANALYSES accident. The bounding value is determined by considering rodded and (continued) unrodded conditions, whether the reactor is at full or zero power, and whether it is the BOC or EOC life. The most conservative combination appropriate to the accident is then used for the analysis (Ref. 2).
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| MTC values are bounded in initial and reload safety evaluations by assuming steady state conditions at BOC and EOC. An EOC verification is conducted for conditions of an RCS boron concentration of approximately 300 ppm. The value determined during the verification may be extrapolated to project the EOC value in order to confirm reload design predictions.
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| MTC satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Even though it is not directly observed and controlled from the control room, MTC is considered an initial condition process variable because of its dependence on boron concentration.
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| LCO LCO 3.1.4 requires the MTC to be within specified limits of the COLR to ensure that the core operates within the assumptions of the accident analysis. During the initial and reload core safety evaluation, the MTC is analyzed to determine that its values remain within the bounds of the original accident analysis during operation.
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| Assumptions made in safety analyses require that the MTC be less positive than a given upper bound and more positive than a given lower bound. The MTC is most positive at or near BOC; this upper bound must not be exceeded. This maximum upper limit occurs at or near BOC, all rods out (ARO), hot zero power conditions. For some core designs, the burnable absorbers may burn out faster than the fuel depletes early in the cycle. This may cause the boron concentration to increase with burnup early in the cycle and the most positive MTC not to occur at BOC, but somewhat later in the cycle. Therefore, a BOC criterion is established in the COLR that is sufficiently less positive than zero to ensure that the MTC remains within the LCO upper limit during the cycle. This criterion is not an LCO MTC limit; the COLR prescribes appropriate administrative controls for exceeding this value consistent with SR 3.1.4.1. At EOC, the MTC takes on its most negative value, when the lower bound becomes important. This LCO exists to ensure that both the upper and lower bounds are not exceeded.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-20 Revision 67
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| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES LCO During operation, the LCO is ensured through surveillances. The (continued) Surveillance checks at BOC and EOC on MTC provide confirmation that the MTC is behaving as anticipated so that the acceptance criteria are met.
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| The LCO establishes a maximum positive value (upper limit) that cannot be exceeded. The BOC positive limit and the EOC negative limit are established in the COLR to allow specifying limits for each particular cycle. This permits the unit to take advantage of improved fuel management and changes in unit operating schedule.
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| APPLICABILITY Technical Specifications place both LCO and SR values on MTC, based on the safety analysis assumptions described above.
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| In MODE 1, the limits on MTC must be maintained to ensure that any accident initiated from THERMAL POWER operation will not violate the design assumptions of the accident analysis. In MODE 2 with the reactor critical, the upper limit must also be maintained to ensure that startup and subcritical accidents (such as the uncontrolled CONTROL ROD assembly or group withdrawal) will not violate the assumptions of the accident analysis. The lower MTC limit must be maintained in MODES 2 and 3, in addition to MODE 1, to ensure that cooldown accidents will not violate the assumptions of the accident analysis. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, this LCO is not applicable, since no Design Basis Accidents using the MTC as an analysis assumption are initiated from these MODES.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-21 (continued)
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| Revision 67
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| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES (continued)
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| ACTIONS A.1 If the BOC MTC upper limit is violated, administrative withdrawal limits for control banks must be established to maintain the MTC within its upper limit. The MTC becomes more negative with control bank insertion and decreased boron concentration. A Completion Time of 24 hours provides enough time for evaluating the MTC surveillance and computing the required bank withdrawal limits.
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| Using physics calculations, the time in cycle life at which the calculated MTC will meet the LCO requirement can be determined. At this point in core life Condition A no longer exists. The unit is no longer in the Required Action, so the administrative withdrawal limits are no longer in effect.
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| B.1 If the required administrative withdrawal limits at BOC are not established within 24 hours, the unit must be brought to MODE 2 with keff < 1.0 to prevent operation with an MTC that is more positive than that assumed in safety analyses.
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| The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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| C.1 Exceeding the EOC MTC limit means that the safety analysis assumptions for the EOC accidents that use a bounding negative MTC value may be invalid. If the EOC MTC limit is exceeded, the plant must be brought to a MODE or condition in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 4 within 12 hours.
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| The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-22 (continued)
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| Revision 67
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| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES (continued)
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| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification of the MTC at BOC prior to entering MODE 1 in order to demonstrate compliance with the most positive MTC LCO.
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| Meeting the upper limit prior to entering MODE 1 ensures that the limit will also be met at higher power levels.
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| Compliance with the BOC limit provided by the COLR ensures that the MTC will remain within the LCO upper limit during the cycle. If required, the BOC MTC can be used to establish administrative withdrawal limits for control banks.
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| SR 3.1.4.2 and SR 3.1.4.3 In similar fashion, the LCO demands that the MTC be less negative than the specified value for EOC full power conditions. This surveillance may be performed at any THERMAL POWER, but its results must be extrapolated to the conditions of RTP and all banks withdrawn in order to make a proper comparison with the LCO value. Because the RTP MTC value will gradually become more negative with further core depletion and boron concentration reduction, a 300 ppm SR value of MTC should be less negative than the EOC LCO limit. The 300 ppm SR value is sufficiently less negative than the EOC LCO limit value to ensure that the LCO limit will be met when the 300 ppm Surveillance criterion is met.
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| SR 3.1.4.3 is modified by a Note that includes the following requirements:
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| : a. If the 300 ppm Surveillance limit is exceeded, it is possible that the EOC limit on MTC could be reached before the planned EOC.
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| Because the MTC changes slowly with core depletion, the Frequency of 14 effective full power days is sufficient to avoid exceeding the EOC limit.
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| : b. The Surveillance limit for RTP boron concentration of 60 ppm is conservative. If the measured MTC at 60 ppm is more positive than the 60 ppm Surveillance limit, the EOC limit will not be exceeded because of the gradual manner in which MTC changes with core burnup.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-23 (continued)
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| Revision 67
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| MTC B 3.1.4 BASES (continued)
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| REFERENCES 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 11, "Reactor Inherent Protection."
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| : 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analyses."
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| : 3. WCAP 9272-P-A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology," July 1985.
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| : 4. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.1, "Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal From a Subcritical Condition."
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| : 5. PWROG-19014-P, Verification Versus Measurement of the Beginning of Cycle Life and End of Cycle Life Moderator Temperature Coefficient, June 2020.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-24 Revision 67
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| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.3 (continued)
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| REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.4 is the performance of a TADOT. This test shall verify OPERABILITY by actuation of the end devices. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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| The RTB test shall include separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms. Independent verification of RTB undervoltage and shunt trip Function is not required for the bypass breakers. No capability is provided for performing such a test at power. The bypass breaker test shall include a local shunt trip. A Note has been added to indicate that this test must be performed on the bypass breaker prior to placing it in service.
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| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| SR 3.3.1.5 SR 3.3.1.5 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The SSPS is tested using the semiautomatic tester. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation.
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| Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection Function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-53 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
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| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.6 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels.
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| If the measurements do not agree, the excore channels are not declared inoperable but must be calibrated to agree with the incore power distribution measurement(s). If the excore channels cannot be adjusted, the channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(I) input to the Overtemperature T Function. The incore power distribution measurement(s) are obtained using the OPERABLE Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) (Ref. 16).
| |
| A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.6. The Note states that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is > 50% RTP, and that 6 days is allowed for performing the first surveillance after reaching 50% RTP.
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| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT.
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| A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
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| Setpoints must be conservative with respect to the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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| The difference between the current "as found" values and the NTSP or previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
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| The as found and as left values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology.
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| SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-10 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition.
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| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-54 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
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| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.7 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
| |
| Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service.
| |
| For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition. The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting),
| |
| the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.8 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for greater than 4 hours, this Surveillance must be performed within 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. Note 2 states that this test shall include verification that the P-6 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program prior to reactor startup and 4 hours after reducing power below P-10 and P-6.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-55 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
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| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.9 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a TADOT and the Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay is verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. Since this SR applies to RCP undervoltage and underfrequency relays, setpoint verification requires elaborate bench calibration and is accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the Watts Bar setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as found" values and the NTSP or previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable. For channels with a trip time delay (TTD), this test shall include verification that the TTD coefficients are adjusted correctly.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-57 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
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| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.11 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
| |
| Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
| |
| The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-59 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.13 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.13 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manual Reactor Trip, Reactor Trip from Manual SI, and the Reactor Trip from Automatic SI Input from ESFAS. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The test shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms for these Reactor Trip Functions for the Reactor Trip Breakers. The test shall also verify OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers for these Functions. Independent verification of the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms is not required.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. The Functions affected have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.14 SR 3.3.1.14 is the performance of a TADOT of Turbine Trip Functions. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. This TADOT is as described in SR 3.3.1.4, except that this test is performed prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock whenever the unit has been in Mode 3. This Surveillance is not required if it has been performed within the previous 31 days. Verification of the Trip Setpoint does not have to be performed for this Surveillance. Performance of this test will ensure that the turbine trip Function is OPERABLE prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock.
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.15 verifies that the individual channel/train actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.1 (Ref. 8).
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-60 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS (continued) Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and reliability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and that there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a COT.
| |
| A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found conservative with respect to the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-113 Revision 36, 64 Amendment 34, 64
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| This SR is modified by a Note, which states that performance of this test is not required for those relays tested by SR 3.3.2.7.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation - Main Steam Valve Vault Rooms Water Level - High (Functions 5.d and 5.e), and AFW Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low (Function 6.f). A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays. Relay setpoints require elaborate bench calibration and are verified during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST for slave relays K603A, K603B, K604A, K604B, K607A, K607B, K609A, K609B, K612A, K625A, and K625B. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment which may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment.
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| Actuation equipment which may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the slave relay test circuit.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-115 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.7 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS (continued) For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pumps. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation functions. The manual initiation functions have no associated setpoints.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
| |
| Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
| |
| The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-116 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
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| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.9 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the Watts Bar setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| This SR is modified by a Note stating that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable. For channels with a trip time delay (TTD), this test shall include verification that the TTD coefficients are adjusted correctly.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.9 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
| |
| Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
| |
| The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-117 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
| |
| REQUIREMENTS WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests (Ref. 16), provides the basis and methodology for using allocated signal processing and actuation logic response times in the overall verification of the protection system channel response time. The allocations for sensor, signal conditioning and actuation logic response times must be verified prior to placing the component in operational service and re-verified following maintenance that may adversely affect response time. In general, electrical repair work does not impact response time provided the parts used for repair are of the same type and value. Specific components identified in the WCAP may be replaced without verification testing. One example where response time could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter.
| |
| The response time may be verified for components that replace the components that were previously evaluated in Ref. 15 and Ref. 16, provided that the components have been evaluated in accordance with the NRC approved methodology as discussed in Attachment 1 to TSTF-569, Methodology to Eliminate Pressure Sensor and Protection Channel (for Westinghouse Plants only) Response Time Testing, (Ref. 23).
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. This deferral is required because there may be insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.11 SR 3.3.2.11 is the performance of a TADOT as described in SR 3.3.2.8, except that it is performed for the P-4 Reactor Trip Interlock, and the Frequency is once per RTB cycle. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. This Frequency is based on operating experience demonstrating that undetected failure of the P-4 interlock sometimes occurs when the RTB is cycled.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Function tested has no associated setpoint.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-119 Revision 64 Amendment 64
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.4.2 verifies each required Remote Shutdown System control circuit and transfer switch performs the intended function. This verification is performed from the auxiliary control room and locally, as appropriate. Operation of the equipment from the remote shutdown panel is not necessary. The Surveillance can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check. This will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from the auxiliary control room and the local control stations. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| SR 3.3.4.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.4.4 SR 3.3.4.4 is the performance of a TADOT. This test should verify the OPERABILITY of the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) open and closed indication on the remote shutdown panel, by actuating the RTBs. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-142 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)
| |
| Condition C applies to the LOP Diesel Start function for unbalanced voltage with one or more channels per bus inoperable.
| |
| A Note has been added which states that Condition C is only applicable to Function 5 of Table 3.3.5-1.
| |
| Required Action C.1 requires restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour Completion Time takes into account the low probability of an event requiring a LOP start occurring during this interval.
| |
| D.1 Condition D applies to each of the LOP DG start Functions when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A, B, or C are not met.
| |
| In these circumstances the Conditions specified in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources
| |
| - Operating," or LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately. The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to refer to Table 3.3.5-1 to determine which REQUIREMENTS Surveillance Requirements apply for each LOP Function.
| |
| SR 3.3.5.1 SR 3.3.5.1 is the performance of a TADOT. The test checks operation of the undervoltage, degraded voltage, and unbalanced voltage relays that provide actuation signals. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| This SR has been modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays/timers. Relay/timer setpoints require elaborate bench calibration and are verified during a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-148 Revision 27, 36, 64 Amendment 31, 34, 37, 64
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| | |
| Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.6.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.6.3 SR 3.3.6.3 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the master relays of the ESFAS instrumentation.
| |
| SR 3.3.6.4 A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment vent system isolation.
| |
| There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-156 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.6.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.6.6 SR 3.3.6.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).
| |
| For these tests, the relay trip setpoints are verified and adjusted as necessary. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-157 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.7-1 REQUIREMENTS determines which SRs apply to which CREVS Actuation Functions.
| |
| SR 3.3.7.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
| |
| Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.3.7.2 A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the CREVS actuation. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-163 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.7.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.7. 3 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| SR 3.3.7.4 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES None Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-164 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition C applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A or B have not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.8.1 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the manual actuation functions. Each manual actuation function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (e.g., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-168 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| COMS B 3.4.12 BASES (continued)
| |
| LCO This LCO requires that the COMS is OPERABLE. The COMS is OPERABLE when the minimum coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as a result of an operational transient.
| |
| To limit the coolant input capability, the LCO requires no safety injection pumps and a maximum of one charging pump be capable of injecting into the RCS, and all accumulator discharge isolation valves be closed and immobilized when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.
| |
| The LCO is modified by three Notes. Note 1 allows two charging pumps to be made capable of injecting for less than or equal to 1 hour during pump swap operations. One hour provides sufficient time to safely complete the actual transfer and to complete the administrative controls and surveillance requirements associated with the swap. The intent is to minimize the actual time that more than one charging pump is physically capable of injection.
| |
| Note 2 states that accumulator isolation is only required when the accumulator pressure is more than or at the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by the P/T limit curves. This Note permits the accumulator discharge isolation valve Surveillance to be performed only under these pressure and temperature conditions.
| |
| Note 3 allows one safety injection pump and one charging pump to be capable of injecting into the RCS for the purpose of testing in MODE 5 or MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on, provided the pressurizer manway cover is removed to provide a vent path for adequate pressure relief.
| |
| The elements of the LCO that provide low temperature overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:
| |
| : a. Two RCS relief valves, as follows:
| |
| : 1. Two OPERABLE PORVs; or A PORV is OPERABLE for COMS when its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set to the limit required by the PTLR and testing proves its ability to open at this setpoint, and motive power is available to the valve and its control circuit.
| |
| : 2. One OPERABLE PORV and the OPERABLE RHR suction relief valve; or (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-58 Revision 70 Amendment 68
| |
| | |
| COMS B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The COT is required to be in frequency prior to decreasing RCS temperature to the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR or be performed within 12 hours after decreasing RCS temperature to less than or equal to the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR on each required PORV to verify and, as necessary, adjust its lift setpoint. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The COT will verify the setpoint is within the PTLR allowed maximum limits in the PTLR. PORV actuation could depressurize the RCS and is not required.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The 12-hour allowance to meet the requirement considers the unlikelihood of a low temperature overpressure event during this time.
| |
| A Note has been added indicating that this SR is required to be met within 12 hours after decreasing RCS cold leg temperature to less than or equal to the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR.
| |
| SR 3.4.12.8 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV actuation channel is required to adjust the whole channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the required range and accuracy to known input. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-63 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
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| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABLE Except for primary to secondary LEAKAGE, the safety analyses do not SAFETY address operational LEAKAGE. However, other operational LEAKAGE is ANALYSES related to the safety analyses for LOCA; the amount of leakage can affect the probability of such an event. The safety analysis for a main steam line break (MSLB) assumes that the accident primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE from three steam generators is 150 gallons per day (gpd) per steam generator and 1 gallon per minute (gpm) from one steam generator. For an SGTR accident, the accident analysis assumes a primary-to-secondary leakage of 150 gpd per steam generator prior to the accident. Subsequent to the SGTR a leakage of 150 gpd is assumed in each of three intact steam generators and RCS blowdown flow through the ruptured tube in the faulted steam generator. Consequently, the LCO requirement to limit primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator to less than or equal to 150 gpd is acceptable.
| |
| The safety analysis for the SLB accident assumes the entire 1 gpm primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE is through the affected steam generator as an initial condition. The dose consequences resulting from the SLB accident are within the limits defined in 10 CFR 100 or the staff approved licensing basis (i.e., a small fraction of these limits).
| |
| The RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
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| LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
| |
| : a. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE Pressure boundary LEAKAGE is prohibited as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
| |
| : b. Unidentified LEAKAGE One gallon per minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment pocket sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Separating the sources of leakage (i.e., leakage from an identified source versus leakage from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-66 Revision 66 Amendment 67
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| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES LCO c. Identified LEAKAGE (continued)
| |
| Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS Makeup System. Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources but does not include controlled reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leak off (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE).
| |
| : d. Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE through ANY One SG The limit of 150 gallons per day (gpd) per SG (600 gpd total for all SGs) is based on the operational LEAKAGE performance criteria in NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines (Reference 4).
| |
| The Steam Generator Program operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06 states, The RCS operational primary to secondary leakage through any one SG shall be limited to 150 gallons per day. The limit is based on operating experience with SG tube degradation mechanisms that result in tube leakage. The operational leakage rate criterion in conjunction with the implementation of the Steam Generator Program is an effective measure for minimizing the frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the RCS is pressurized.
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| In MODES 5 and 6, LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower, resulting in lower stresses and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-67 (continued)
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| Revision 66 Amendment 67
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| RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours. While in this condition, structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
| |
| B.1 Unidentified LEAKAGE or identified LEAKAGE in excess of the LCO limits must be reduced to within limits within 4 hours. This Completion Time allows time to verify leakage rates and either identify unidentified LEAKAGE or reduce LEAKAGE to within limits before the reactor must be shut down. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
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| C.1 and C.2 If primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE is not within limits, or if any of the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met, the reactor must be brought to lower pressure conditions to reduce the severity of the LEAKAGE and its potential consequences. The reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours.
| |
| This action reduces the LEAKAGE and also reduces the factors that tend to degrade the pressure boundary.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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| In MODE 5, the pressure stresses acting on the RCPB are much lower, and further deterioration is much less likely.
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-68 (continued)
| |
| Revision 66 Amendment 67
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| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.13.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying RCS LEAKAGE to be within the LCO limits ensures the integrity of the RCPB is maintained. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE would at first appear as unidentified LEAKAGE and can only be positively identified by inspection. Unidentified LEAKAGE and identified LEAKAGE are determined by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.
| |
| The RCS water inventory balance must be met with the reactor at steady state operating conditions and near operating pressure. The SR is modified by 2 Notes. Note 1 states that this SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after establishing steady state operation. The 12 hour allowance provides sufficient time to collect and process all necessary data after stable plant conditions are established.
| |
| Steady state operation is required to perform a proper inventory balance; calculations during maneuvering are not useful. For RCS operational LEAKAGE determination by water inventory balance, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
| |
| An early warning of pressure boundary LEAKAGE or unidentified LEAKAGE is provided by the automatic systems that monitor the containment atmosphere radioactivity and the containment pocket sump level. These leakage detection systems are specified in LCO 3.4.15, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation."
| |
| Note 2 states that this SR is not applicable to primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE because LEAKAGE of 150 gallons per day cannot be measured accurately by an RCS water inventory balance.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-69 Revision 34, 66 Amendment 36, 67
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| | |
| RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.15 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
| |
| If a Required Action of Condition A or B cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| D.1 With all required monitors inoperable, no automatic means of monitoring leakage are available, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.15.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.15.1 requires the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.4.15.2 SR 3.4.15.2 requires the performance of a COT on the required containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The test ensures that the monitor can perform its function in the desired manner. The test verifies the alarm setpoint and the relative accuracy of the instrument string. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.4.15.3 and SR 3.4.15.4 These SRs require the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-80 Revision 34, 64 Amendment 36, 64
| |
| | |
| SG TUBE INTEGRITY B 3.4.17 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABLE The steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident is the limiting design SAFETY basis event for SG tubes and avoiding an SGTR is the basis for this ANALYSES Specification. The analysis of an SGTR event assumes a bounding primary to secondary LEAKAGE rate equal to the operational LEAKAGE rate limits in LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational LEAKAGE, plus the leakage rate associated with a double-ended rupture of a single tube. The accident analysis for a SGTR assumes the contaminated secondary fluid is only briefly released to the atmosphere via safety valves and the majority is discharged to the main condenser.
| |
| The analysis for design basis accidents and transients other than an SGTR assume the SG tubes retain their structural integrity (i.e., they are assumed not to rupture). In these analyses, the steam discharge to the atmosphere is based on the total primary to secondary LEAKAGE of 150 gallons per day (gpd) per unfaulted steam generator and 1 gallon per minute (gpm) in the faulted steam generator. For accidents that do not involve fuel damage, the primary coolant activity level of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is assumed to be equal to the LCO 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity, limits. For accidents that assume fuel damage, the primary coolant activity is a function of the amount of activity released from the damaged fuel. The dose consequences of these events are within the limits of GDC 19 (Ref. 2), and 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 3) or the NRC approved licensing basis.
| |
| Steam generator tube integrity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
| |
| LCO The LCO requires that SG tube integrity be maintained. The LCO also requires that all SG tubes that satisfy the plugging criteria be plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program.
| |
| During an SG inspection, any inspected tube that satisfies the Steam Generator Program plugging criteria is removed from service by plugging.
| |
| If a tube was determined to satisfy the plugging criteria but was not plugged, the tube may still have tube integrity.
| |
| In the context of this Specification, an SG tube is defined as the entire length of the tube, including the tube wall, between the tube-to-tubesheet weld at the tube inlet and the tube-to-tubesheet weld at the tube outlet.
| |
| The tube-to-tubesheet weld is not considered part of the tube.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-89 Revision 39, 60 Amendment 40, 60
| |
| | |
| SG TUBE INTEGRITY B 3.4.17 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition A applies if it is discovered that one or more SG tubes examined in an inservice inspection satisfy the tube plugging criteria but were not plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program as required by SR 3.4.17.2. An evaluation of SG tube integrity of the affected tube(s) must be made. Steam generator tube integrity is based on meeting the SG performance criteria described in the Steam Generator Program. The SG plugging criteria define limits on SG tube degradation that allow for flaw growth between inspections while still providing assurance that the SG performance criteria will continue to be met. In order to determine if an SG tube that should have been plugged, has tube integrity, an evaluation must be completed that demonstrates that the SG performance criteria will continue to be met until the next refueling outage or SG tube inspection. The tube integrity determination is based on the estimated condition of the tube at the time the situation is discovered and the estimated growth of the degradation prior to the next SG tube inspection. If it is determined that tube integrity is not being maintained, Condition B applies.
| |
| A Completion Time of 7 days is sufficient to complete the evaluation while minimizing the risk of plant operation with a SG tube that may not have tube integrity.
| |
| If the evaluation determines that the affected tube(s) have tube integrity, Required Action A.2 allows plant operation to continue until the next refueling outage or SG inspection provided the inspection interval continues to be supported by an operational assessment that reflects the affected tubes. However, the affected tube(s) must be plugged prior to entering MODE 4 following the next refueling outage or SG inspection.
| |
| This Completion Time is acceptable since operation until the next inspection is supported by the operational assessment.
| |
| B.1 and B.2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A are not met or if SG tube integrity is not being maintained, the reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the desired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-92 (continued)
| |
| Revision 39, 60 Amendment 40, 60
| |
| | |
| SG TUBE INTEGRITY B 3.4.17 BASES (continued)
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.17.1 REQUIREMENTS During shutdown periods the SGs are inspected as required by this SR and the Steam Generator Program. NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines (Ref. 1), and its referenced EPRI Guidelines, establish the content of the Steam Generator Program. Use of the Steam Generator Program ensures that the inspection is appropriate and consistent with accepted industry practices.
| |
| During SG inspections a condition monitoring assessment of the SG tubes is performed. The condition monitoring assessment determines the as found condition of the SG tubes. The purpose of the condition monitoring assessment is to ensure that the SG performance criteria have been met for the previous operating period.
| |
| The Steam Generator Program determines the scope of the inspection and the methods used to determine whether the tubes contain flaws satisfying the tube plugging criteria. Inspection scope (i.e., which tubes or areas of tubing within the SG are to be inspected) is a function of existing and potential degradation locations. The Steam Generator Program also specifies the inspection methods to be used to find potential degradation.
| |
| Inspection methods are a function of degradation morphology, nondestructive examination (NDE) technique capabilities, and inspection locations.
| |
| The Steam Generator Program defines the Frequency of SR 3.4.17.1.
| |
| The Frequency is determined by the operational assessment and other limits in the SG examination guidelines (Ref. 6). The Steam Generator Program uses information on existing degradations and growth rates to determine an inspection Frequency that provides reasonable assurance that the tubing will meet the SG performance criteria at the next scheduled inspection. In addition, Specification 5.7.2.12 contains prescriptive requirements concerning inspection intervals to provide added assurance that the SG performance criteria will be met between scheduled inspections. If crack indications are found in any SG tube, the maximum inspection interval for all affected and potentially affected SGs is restricted by Specification 5.7.2.12 until subsequent inspections support extending the inspection interval.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-93 Revision 39, 60 Amendment 40, 60
| |
| | |
| SG TUBE INTEGRITY B 3.4.17 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.17.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) During an SG inspection, any inspected tube that satisfies the Steam Generator Program plugging criteria is removed from service by plugging.
| |
| The tube plugging criteria delineated in Specification 5.7.2.12 are intended to ensure that tubes accepted for continued service satisfy the SG performance criteria with allowance for error in the flaw size measurement and for future flaw growth. In addition, the tube plugging criteria, in conjunction with other elements of the Steam Generator Program, ensure that the SG performance criteria will continue to be met until the next inspection of the subject tube(s). Reference 1 provides guidance for performing operational assessments to verify that the tubes remaining in service will continue to meet the SG performance criteria.
| |
| The Frequency of prior to entering MODE 4 following an SG inspection ensures that the Surveillance has been completed and all tubes meeting the plugging criteria are plugged prior to subjecting the SG tubes to significant primary-to-secondary pressure differential.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines.
| |
| : 2. 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, GDC 19, Control Room.
| |
| : 3. 10 CFR 100, Reactor Site Criteria.
| |
| : 4. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NB.
| |
| : 5. Regulatory Guide 1.121, Basis for Plugging Degraded Steam Generator Tubes, August 1976.
| |
| : 6. EPRI, Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines.
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-94 Revision 39, 60 Amendment 40, 60
| |
| | |
| Containment Air Temperature B 3.6.5 BASES APPLICABLE The limiting DBA for the maximum peak containment air temperature is SAFETY an SLB. For the upper compartment, the initial containment average air ANALYSES temperature assumed in this design basis analyses (Ref. 2) is 85°F. For (continued) the lower compartment, the initial average containment air temperature assumed in this design basis analyses is 120°F. These temperatures result in a maximum containment air temperature.
| |
| The higher temperature limits are also considered in the depressurization analyses to ensure that the minimum pressure limit is maintained following an inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System for both containment compartments.
| |
| The limiting DBA for establishing the maximum peak containment internal pressure is a LOCA. The lower temperature limits, 85°F for the upper compartment and 100°F for the lower compartment, are used in this analysis to ensure that, in the event of an accident, the maximum containment internal pressure will not be exceeded in either containment compartment.
| |
| Containment average air temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
| |
| LCO During a DBA, with an initial containment average air temperature within the LCO temperature limits, the resultant peak accident temperature is maintained below the containment design temperature. As a result, the ability of containment to perform its design function is ensured. In MODES 2, 3 and 4, containment air temperature may be as low as 60°F (value does not account for instrument error) because the resultant calculated peak containment accident pressure would not exceed the design pressure due to a lesser amount of energy released from the pipe break in these MODES (Ref. 3).
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining containment average air temperature within the limit is not required in MODE 5 or 6.
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-31 (continued)
| |
| Revision 72
| |
| | |
| MFIVs and MFRVs and Associated Bypass Valves B 3.7.3 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs) and Associated Bypass Valves BASES BACKGROUND The MFRVs isolate main feedwater (MFW) flow to the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). The safety related function of the MFIVs is to provide the second isolation of MFW flow to the secondary side of the steam generators following an HELB. Closure of the MFIVs and associated bypass valves or MFRVs and associated bypass valves terminates flow to the steam generators.
| |
| The consequences of events occurring in the main steam lines or in the MFW lines downstream from the MFIVs will be mitigated by their closure.
| |
| Closure of the MFIVs and associated bypass valves, or MFRVs and associated bypass valves, effectively terminates the addition of normal feedwater to an affected steam generator, limiting the mass and energy release for steam line breaks (SLBs) or feedwater line breaks (FWLBs) inside containment, and reducing the cooldown effects for SLBs.
| |
| The MFIVs and associated bypass valves, isolate the non-safety related portions from the safety related portions of the system. In the event of a secondary side pipe rupture inside containment, the valves limit the quantity of high energy fluid that enters containment through the break.
| |
| One MFIV and one MFRV are located on each 16-inch MFW line. One bypass MFRV and one bypass MFIV are located on a smaller 6-inch startup flow feedwater line. Both the MFIV and bypass MFIV are located in the main steam valve vault close to containment.
| |
| The MFIVs and associated bypass valves, and MFRVs and associated bypass valves, close on receipt of a Tavg Low coincident with reactor trip (P-4), safety injection signal, or steam generator water level - high high signal. They may also be closed manually except for the bypass MFIV which has no hand switch. In addition to the MFIVs and associated bypass valves, and the MFRVs and associated bypass valves, a check valve on the 16-inch MFW line is located just outside containment in the main steam valve vault. The check valve terminates flow from the steam generator for breaks upstream of the check valve.
| |
| A description of the MFIVs and MFRVs is found in the FSAR, Section 10.4.7 (Ref. 1).
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-13 (continued)
| |
| Revision 61
| |
| | |
| MFIVs and MFRVs and Associated Bypass Valves B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)
| |
| With one MFRV in one or more flow paths inoperable, action must be taken to restore the affected valves to OPERABLE status, or to close or isolate inoperable affected valves within 72 hours. When these valves are closed or isolated, they are performing their required safety function.
| |
| The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience.
| |
| Inoperable MFRVs that are closed or isolated must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or isolated. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid.
| |
| The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure that the valves are closed or isolated.
| |
| C.1 With one MFIV or MFRV bypass valve in one or more flow paths inoperable, action must be taken to restore the affected valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.
| |
| The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-16 Revision 61
| |
| | |
| AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES APPLICABLE The AFW System design is such that it can perform its function following SAFETY an FWLB between the MFW check valves and the steam generators, ANALYSES combined with a loss of offsite power following turbine trip, and a single (continued) active failure of the steam turbine driven AFW pump. One motor driven AFW pump would deliver to the faulted steam generator. Sufficient flow would be delivered to the intact steam generators by the redundant AFW pump.
| |
| The ESFAS automatically actuates the AFW turbine driven pump and associated power operated valves and controls when required to ensure an adequate feedwater supply to the steam generators during loss of power.
| |
| Each motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (one Train A and one Train B) supplies flow paths to two steam generators. The flow path for each steam generator contains an automatic air operated level control valve (LCV). The LCVs have the same train designation as the associated pump and are provided trained air. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump supplies flow paths to all four steam generators.
| |
| Each of these flow paths contains an automatic air-operated LCV, two of which are designated as Train A, receive A-train air and provide flow to the same steam generators that are supplied by the B-train motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The remaining two LCVs are designated as Train B, receive B-train air, and provide flow to the same steam generators that are supplied by the A-train motor driven pump. This design provides the required redundancy to ensure that at least two steam generators receive the necessary flow assuming any single failure.
| |
| It can be seen from the description provided above that the loss of a single train of air (A or B) will not prevent the auxiliary feedwater system from performing its intended safety function and is no more severe than the loss of a single auxiliary feedwater pump. Therefore, the loss of a single train of auxiliary air only affects the capability of a single motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump because the turbine-driven pump is still capable of providing flow to the two steam generators that are separated from the other motor driven pump.
| |
| The AFW System satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-25 (continued)
| |
| Revision 63
| |
| | |
| ERCW B 3.7.8 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the ERCW System is a normally operating system that is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the ERCW System and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
| |
| In MODES 5 and 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the ERCW System are determined by the systems it supports.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Condition A is modified by two notes that limit the conditions and parameters that allow entry into Condition A. The first note limits the applicability of Condition A to the time period when Unit 1 is defueled.
| |
| The second note states that Condition A is only applicable during planned maintenance of a Unit 1 6.9 kV shutdown board and associated 480 V boards and motor control centers. In order to credit the temperature limit noted in A.2, the effected ERCW train must be aligned in accordance with UFSAR Section 9.2.1.3. This will allow the plant configuration to be aligned (i.e., cross-ties exist and isolation of loads to facilitate maintenance and modification activities) to minimize the heat load on the ERCW system to ensure ERCW continues to meet its design function.
| |
| During this period, with the planned maintenance of a Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown board and the associated 480V boards and motor control centers, entering Condition A will only require the EDG associated with the shutdown board being removed from services to be inoperable. In this condition, the remaining EDGs will have sufficient ERCW flow with this arrangement.
| |
| The 7 day completion time is acceptable based on the following:
| |
| Low probability of a DBA occurring during that time.
| |
| Heat load on the ERCW System is substantially lower than assumed for the DBA with the opposite unit defueled.
| |
| Redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train.
| |
| If one ERCW system train is inoperable for planned maintenance, action must be taken to restore the ERCW train to an OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE ERCW system train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ERCW system train could result in loss of ERCW system function.
| |
| If UHS temperature exceeds 78 F sometime after 48 hours of continuous ERCW train inoperability, then action must be taken to restore the ERCW train to an OPERABLE status within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal time zero for beginning the (continued)
| |
| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-44 Revision 34, 62 Amendment 36, 62
| |
| | |
| ERCW B 3.7.8 BASES (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) allowed outage time clock. The 24 hour Completion Time only begins 48 hours after an ERCW train is made inoperable for planned maintenance on a Unit 1 6.9 kV shutdown board (and associated 480 V boards and MCCs) and the UHS temperature is > 78 F.
| |
| Required Action A.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," should be entered if an inoperable ERCW system train results in an inoperable diesel generator. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable ERCW system train results in an inoperable residual heat removal loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.
| |
| Required Action A.2 ensures the credited UHS temperature limit is maintained. If the credited UHS temperature is not maintained, the analytical assumptions for relying on ERCW Train A as a defense-in-depth measure during the extended Completion Time for Required Action A.1 are no longer met.
| |
| B.1 If one ERCW train is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE ERCW train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ERCW train could result in loss of ERCW System function. Required Action B.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," should be entered if an inoperable ERCW train results in an inoperable diesel generator. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable ERCW train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. The 72 hour Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-44a Revision 34, 62 Amendment 36, 62
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| ERCW B 3.7.8 BASES (continued)
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| ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
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| If the ERCW train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours.
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| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the ERCW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the ERCW System.
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| Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ERCW System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for ERCW System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed, or secured. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.
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| The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| SR 3.7.8.2 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the ERCW System valves on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ERCW System is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal testing. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative control. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-45 Revision 34, 62 Amendment 36, 62
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| CREATCS B 3.7.11 ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
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| The Completion Time is modified by a footnote that states an allowance is permitted for one CREATCS train to be inoperable for 60 days. This TS provision is only authorized for one entry per train during modification activities planned for the upgrade of the main control room chillers beginning no earlier than July 1, 2023, and ending no later than December 31, 2024, provided the following compensatory measures are implemented as described in TVA letter CNL-20-012, dated May 19, 2020.
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| A temporary, non-safety related chiller system with a temporary DG to provide power to the temporary chiller system will be installed and operated as described in the LAR.
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| Instructions for operation of the temporary cooling equipment will be provided.
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| During replacement of the CREATCS chillers, TVA will employ a graded approach to defense-in-depth and protected equipment strategies based on the operating status of the affected unit. The risk of the activity will be assessed and managed, including the use of physical barriers as needed. Additionally, TVA procedures preclude work on or near protected equipment and limit access to the area to emergency situations and non-intrusive monitoring of running equipment per operator rounds.
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| During replacement of the CREATCS chillers, no elective maintenance will be performed on TS related support equipment for the Operable CREATCS chiller except for any required TS SRs.
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| B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREATCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-61 Revision 47, 71 Amendment 51, 69
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| CREATCS B 3.7.11 ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
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| In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel, if the inoperable CREATCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREATCS train must be placed in operation immediately. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that active failures will be readily detected.
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| An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
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| D.1 In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, with two CREATCS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
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| E.1 If both CREATCS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREATCS may not be capable of performing its intended function.
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| Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. The Completion Time is modified by a footnote that states an allowance to monitor the main control room temperature every hour and verify the main control room temperature is less than or equal to 90°F is permitted for up to four days in lieu of the immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. If the main control room temperature exceeds 90°F, or the duration without a train of CREATCS being OPERABLE exceeds four days, immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required. This provision is only applicable during modification activities planned for the upgrade of the main control room chillers beginning no earlier than July 1, 2023, and ending no later than December 31, 2024, provided the following compensatory measures are implemented as described in TVA letter CNL-20-012, dated May 19, 2020.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-62 Revision 47, 71 Amendment 51, 69
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| | |
| Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air BASES BACKGROUND Each diesel generator (DG) is provided with four interconnected storage tanks embedded in the building foundation having a fuel oil capacity sufficient to operate that diesel for a period of 7 days while the DG is supplying maximum post loss of coolant accident load demand discussed in the FSAR, Section 9.5.4.3 (Ref. 1). The maximum load demand is calculated using the assumption that a minimum of any two DGs is available. This onsite fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the DGs for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources.
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| An approximately 550-gal skid-mounted day tank is provided for each diesel engine. Each DG incorporates two diesel engines operating in tandem and directly coupled to the generator. Each skid-mounted day tank has fuel capacity for approximately 2 hours of full-load operations (Ref. 1). Fuel oil is transferred from 7 day storage tanks to the skid-mounted day tank by a pump located on each skid-mounted day tank. Redundancy of pumps and piping precludes the failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve or tank to result in the loss of more than one diesel engine. In the event that the piping between the last isolation valve and the skid-mounted day tank breaks, the use of one DG can be lost. This occurs only after the two hour supply of fuel in the skid-mounted day tank has been used.
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| During operation of the DGs, fuel oil pumps driven by the diesel engines transfer fuel from the skid-mounted day tanks to the skid-mounted diesel engine fuel manifolds. Level controls mounted on the skid-mounted day tanks automatically start and stop the 7 day storage tank transfer pumps.
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| In addition, alarms both locally and in the control room annunciate low level and high level in any skid-mounted day tank.
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| In the unlikely event of a failure in one of the supply trains, the associated skid-mounted day tank low-level alarm annunciates when the fuel oil remaining in the tank provides approximately 1 hour of full-load operation, thus allowing the operator to take corrective action to prevent the loss of the diesel.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-43 Revision 69
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| Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES REFERENCES 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 9.5.4.3, Safety Evaluation.
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| : 2. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators, Revision 1, October, 1979.
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| : 3. ANSI N195-1976, Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators, Appendix B.
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| : 4. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 9.5.7, Diesel Engine Lubrication System.
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| : 5. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15, Accident Analysis and Section 6 Engineered Safety Features.
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| : 6. ASTM Standards:
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| D4057-1988, Practice for Manual Sampling of Petroleum and Petroleum Products.
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| D975-1990, Standard Specification for Diesel Fuel Oils.
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| D4176-1986, Free Water and Particulate Contamination in Distillate Fuels.
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| D1552-1990, Standard Test Method for Sulfur in Petroleum Products (High Temperature Method).
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| D2622-1987, Standard Test Method for Sulfur in Petroleum Products (X-Ray Spectrographic Method).
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| D2276-1989, Standard Test Method for Particulate Contamination in Aviation Fuel.
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| D1298-1985, Standard Test Method for Density, Specific Gravity, or API Gravity of Crude Petroleum and Liquid Petroleum Products by Hydrometer Method.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-52 Revision 69
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| Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES (continued)
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| LCO The inverters ensure the availability of AC electrical power for the systems instrumentation required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA.
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| Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls is maintained. The twelve inverters (one Unit 1, one Unit 2 and one spare per channel) ensure an uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are de-energized.
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| OPERABLE inverters require the associated AC vital bus to be powered by the inverter with output voltage and frequency within tolerances and power input to the inverter from a 125 VDC vital battery. Alternatively, power supply may be from an internal AC source via rectifier as long as the vital battery is available as the uninterruptible power supply. The inverters have an associated bypass supply provided by a regulated transformer that is automatically connected to the associated AC vital bus in the event of inverter failure or overload. The bypass supply is not battery-backed and thus does not meet requirements for inverter operability. The spare inverters do not have an associated bypass supply. Additionally, the 480V Vital Transfer Switch, while connected to the alternate power supply, can only be declared operable for technical specifications under the limitations of applicable LCOs and provided the associated unit is defueled (Unit 1 for Channels I or II, and Unit 2 for Channels III or IV).
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| APPLICABILITY The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:
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| : a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
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| : b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
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| Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, Inverters - Shutdown.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-79 (continued)
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| Revision 68
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| Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)
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| LCO The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are de-energized. OPERABILITY of the inverters requires that the AC vital buses required by LCO 3.8.10, Distribution Systems - Shutdown be powered by the inverter. As a minimum, either the Channel I and III or II and IV inverters for each unit (or spare inverters) shall be OPERABLE to support the distribution systems required by LCO 3.8.10. The unit inverters have an associated bypass supply provided by a regulated transformer that is automatically connected to the associated AC vital bus in the event of inverter failure or overload. The bypass supply is not battery-backed and thus does not meet requirements for inverter operability. The spare inverters do not have an associated bypass supply. Additionally, the 480V Vital Transfer Switch, while connected to the alternate power supply, can only be declared operable for technical specifications under the limitations of applicable LCOs and provided the associated unit is defueled (Unit 1 for Channels I or II, and Unit 2 for Channels III or IV). This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).
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| APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:
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| : a. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
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| : b. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
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| : c. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the plant in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.
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| Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-83 (continued)
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| Revision 68
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| | |
| ENCLOSURE 8 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS . i LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES . vi LIST OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND PROGRAMS .. vi LIST OF ACRONYMS vii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES .. ix TR 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION .. 1.1-1 TR 1.1 Definitions 1.1-1 TR 1.2 Logical Connectors .............. 1.2-1 TR 1.3 Completion Times .. 1.3-1 TR 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 TR 3.0 APPLICABILITY ......... 3.0-1 TR 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ... 3.1-1 TR 3.1.1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown ................ 3.1-1 TR 3.1.2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating .................... 3.1-3 TR 3.1.3 Charging Pump, Shutdown .. 3.1-5 TR 3.1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating . 3.1-6 TR 3.1.5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown . 3.1-8 TR 3.1.6 Borated Water Sources, Operating . 3.1-10 TR 3.1.7 Position Indication System, Shutdown 3.1-14 TR 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION . 3.3-1 TR 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation . 3.3-1 TR 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System . 3.3-4 TR 3.3.3 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION . 3.3-11 TR 3.3.4 Seismic Instrumentation 3.3-12 TR 3.3.5 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION . 3.3-16 TR 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System .. 3.3-17 TR 3.3.7 Plant Calorimetric Measurement . 3.3-18 TR 3.3.8 Hydrogen Monitor .. 3.3-19 TR 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) . 3.3-21 Watts Bar - Unit 2 i (continued)
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| Technical Requirements Revision 14
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) .. 3.4-1 TR 3.4.1 Safety Valves, Shutdown .. 3.4-1 TR 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits .. 3.4-3 TR 3.4.3 Reactor Vessel Head Vent System .... 3.4-5 TR 3.4.4 Chemistry . 3.4-7 TR 3.4.5 Piping System Structural Integrity .... 3.4-10 TR 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .. 3.6-1 TR 3.6.1 Ice Bed Temperature Monitoring System ...... 3.6-1 TR 3.6.2 Inlet Door Position Monitoring System 3.6-4 TR 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System . 3.6-6 TR 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ......... 3.7-1 TR 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitations. 3.7-1 TR 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan 3.7-3 TR 3.7.3 Deleted . 3.7-5 TR 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination . 3.7-16 TR 3.7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring ..... 3.7-19 TR 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ......... 3.8-1 TR 3.8.1 Isolation Devices 3.8-1 TR 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices ........................... 3.8-4 TR 3.8.3 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices ...... 3.8-8 TR 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection .............. 3.8-15 TR 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS . 3.9-1 TR 3.9.1 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION . 3.9-1 TR 3.9.2 Communications . 3.9-2 TR 3.9.3 Refueling Machine ..... 3.9-3 TR 3.9.4 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building 3.9-5 TR 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS .......... 5.0-1 TR 5.1 Technical Requirements Control Program . 5.0-1 Watts Bar - Unit 2 ii Technical Requirements Revision 5
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASES B 3.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT (TR) AND TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY .............. B 3.0-1 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .. B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown ................... B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating ................... B 3.1-5 B 3.1.3 Charging Pump, Shutdown ...... B 3.1-9 B 3.1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating .... B 3.1-12 B 3.1.5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown .... B 3.1-15 B 3.1.6 Borated Water Sources, Operating .... B 3.1-19 B 3.1.7 Position Indication System, Shutdown .......... B 3.1-24 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION . B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation . B 3.3-1 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation B 3.3-4 B 3.3.3 RESERVED FOR FUTRE ADDITION . B 3.3-7 B 3.3.4 Seismic Instrumentation B 3.3-8 B 3.3.5 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION . B 3.3-13 B 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System .. B 3.3-14 B 3.3.7 Plant Calorimetric Measurement . B 3.3-17 B 3.3.8 Hydrogen Monitor .. B 3.3-18 B 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) B 3.3-22 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) .. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 Safety Valves, Shutdown .. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits .. B 3.4-4 B 3.4.3 Reactor Vessel Head Vent System.. B 3.4-7 B 3.4.4 Chemistry B 3.4-10 B 3.4.5 Piping System Structural Integrity ... B 3.4-13 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .. B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 Ice Bed Temperature Monitoring System ......... B 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 Inlet Door Position Monitoring System B 3.6-6 B 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System . B 3.6-10 Watts Bar - Unit 2 iii Technical Requirements Revision 14
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| | |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASES B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ............. B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitations. B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan B 3.7-4 B 3.7.3 Deleted . B 3.7-8 B 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination . B 3.7-15 B 3.7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring .. B 3.7-19 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .. B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 Isolation Devices B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices ........................... B 3.8-7 B 3.8.3 Motor Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices .. B 3.8-13 B 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection .............. B 3.8-16 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS . B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Communications ........ B 3.9-2 B 3.9.3 Refueling Machine ..... B 3.9-4 B 3.9.4 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building B 3.9-7 Watts Bar - Unit 2 iv Technical Requirements Revision 5
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| LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO. TITLE PAGE 1.1-1 MODES . 1.1-6 3.0.2-1 Technical Surveillance Requirement.. 3.0-5 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Times ....... 3.3-2 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Response Times .. 3.3-5 3.3.4-1 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3-15 3.3.9-1 Power Distribution Monitoring (PDMS) Instrumentation 3.3-23 3.7.3-1 Deleted . 3.7-8 3.7.3-2 Deleted ... 3.7-9 3.7.2-3 Deleted 3.7-11 3.7.3-4 Deleted . 3.7-12 3.7.3-5 Deleted .. 3.7-14 3.7.5-1 Area Temperature Monitoring ....... 3.7-22 3.8.3-1 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices Which Are Bypassed Under Accident Conditions 3.8-9 3.8.4-1 Submerged Components With Automatic De-energization Under Accident Conditions ....... 3.8-17 Watts Bar - Unit 2 v Technical Requirements
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| | |
| LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE NO. TITLE PAGE 3.1.6 Boric Acid Tank Limits Based on RWST Boron Concentration Level 1 RWST Concentration .................................................. 3.1-13 DELETED 3.7-15 3.7.3-1 LIST OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND PROGRAMS Core Operating Limits Report Watts Bar - Unit 2 vi Technical Requirements
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 1 of 2)
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| ACRONYM TITLE ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Control Room Panel AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARFS Air Return Fan System ARO All Rods Out ARV Atmospheric Relief Valve ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BOC Beginning of Cycle CCS Component Cooling Water System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCC Lower Compartment Cooler LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line Isolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 vii Technical Requirements
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| | |
| LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 2 of 2)
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| ACRONYM TITLE MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient N/A Not Applicable NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PDMS Power Distribution Monitoring System PIV Pressure Isolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Thermal Power RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety Injection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requirement TSR Technical Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar - Unit 2 viii Technical Requirements
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 01 11/25/15 Revises TRM and TRM Bases section 3.7.3, Snubbers.
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| Revision 02 05/22/16 TR Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Times , to change the overtemperature and over power times.
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| Revision 03 06/27/16 TR Table 3.8.3-1, Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices which are Bypassed under Accident Conditions, add valve 2-FCV-70-133 and delete 4 obsolete valves.
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| Revision 04 02/21/17 Revises TRM Bases 3.6.2, Inlet Door Position Monitoring System, Actions.
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| Revision 05 03/31/17 Revises TRM and TRM Bases to delete section 3.7.3 Snubbers.
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| Revision 06 07/08/17 Revises TRM section 3.0, Technical Surveillance Requirements (TSR) Applicability and adds Table 3.0.2-1.
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| Revision 07 08/22/17 Revises the TR 3.4.5 Title to add ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 in the TRM and Bases. Also revised TSR Table 3.0.2-1 to add two addition TSRs.
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| Revision 08 03/08/18 Revises TR Table 3.8.4-1 to revise the dual fan motors which were replaced with single fan motors.
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| Revision 09 04/06/18 Revises TRM Bases B3.6.2 to more closely match information provided in the UFSAR. The Bases as written limits credit for the lower inlet door main panel annunciator as part of the Inlet Door Position Monitoring system.
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| Revision 10 04/27/18 Revises TRM Table 3.7.5-1, Item 9 to correct the unit identifier on the Mechanical Equipment Room.
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| Revision 11 12/17/19 Revises TRM Table 3.3.2-1 Item 14 to add unbalanced voltage relay Revision 12 04/21/20 Revises TRM to change TSRs 3.1.2.3, 3.8.3.1, and 3.8.4.2 due to the frequency of SR 3.6.3.6 being changed to 36 months.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 ix Technical Requirements Revision 12
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| TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 13 11/4/20 Revises TRM and Bases TR 3.1.7 involving the requirements for the Position Indication System during Shutdown conditions.
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| Revision 14 11/10/20 Revises TRM and Bases to allow execution of the measurement uncertainty recovery (MUR) uprate.
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| Revision 15 06/14/21 Revises TRM and Bases to revise TR 3.3.6 to include both channels of the collection regions of Loose-Part Detection System.
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| Revision 16 01/11/22 Revises TRM and Bases to correct TRM 3.3.9 PDMS regarding the great than or equal too and greater than because a process parameter is never exactly equal to a value.
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| Revision 17 06/23/22 Revises TRM Bases 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure/Temperature Limitations references.
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| Revision 18 11/17/22 Revises TRM 3.8.1.3 and 3.8.1.4 to extend the SR test interval from 18 months to 36 months through the SFCP processes.
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| Revision 19 2/28/23 TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements.
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| Revision 20 3/13/23 Revises TRM and TRM Bases requirements for isolation devices to be removed and replaced with an action to document in the Corrective Action program.
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| Revision 21 8/23/23 Revises TRM and TRM Bases 3.3.4.2, Table 3.3.4-1, Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c and 2.a test frequency being extended.
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| Revision 22 8/24/23 Revises TRM and TRM Bases 3.1.5.2, 3.1.5.5 and 3.1.6.2 and 3.1.6.5 Frequency due to TS SR intervals extended by STRIDE.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 x Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| ENCLOSURE 9 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL CHANGED PAGES
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| Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions Term Definition LEAKAGE 2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from (continued) sources that are both specifically located and known to not interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems; or
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| : 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) tube to the Secondary System;
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| : b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE;
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| : c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except SG tube LEAKAGE) through a fault in as RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
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| LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
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| MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.
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| OPERABLE - OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).
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| QUADRANT POWER TILT QPTR shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore RATIO (QPTR) detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 1.1-3 (continued)
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| Technical Requirements Revision 19
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| Borated Water Sources, Shutdown TR 3.1.5 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
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| --------------------------------------------------------NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------
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| : 1. TSR 3.1.5.1, TSR 3.1.5.2 and TSR 3.1.5.3 are only required to be met if the RWST is the required borated water source.
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| : 2. TSR 3.1.5.4, TSR 3.1.5.5 and TSR 3.1.5.6 are only required to be met if the Boric Acid Storage System is the required borated water source.
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.5.1 -------------------------------NOTE------------------------------
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| Only required when ambient air temperature is
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| < 60°F.
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| Verify RWST solution temperature is 60F. 24 hours TSR 3.1.5.2 Verify RWST boron concentration is 3,100 ppm. 31 days TSR 3.1.5.3 Verify RWST borated water volume is 7 days 62,900 gallons.
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| TSR 3.1.5.4 Verify Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 24 hours 63°F.
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| TSR 3.1.5.5 Verify BAT boron concentration is 6,120 ppm and 31 days 6,990 ppm.
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| TSR 3.1.5.6 Verify BAT borated water volume is 5,300 gallons. 7 days Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.1-9 Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| Borated Water Sources, Operating TR 3.1.6 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. RWST boron concentration C.1 Restore RWST to 8 hours not within limits. OPERABLE status.
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| OR RWST borated water temperature not within limits.
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| D. RWST inoperable for D.1 Restore RWST to 1 hour reasons other than OPERABLE status.
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| Condition C.
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| E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition C or D AND not met.
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| E.2 Be in MODE 4 with one 12 hours or more RCS cold leg temperatures 310°F.
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| TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.6.1 -------------------------------NOTE------------------------------
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| Only required to be performed when outside air temperature is < 60°F or >105°F.
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| Verify RWST solution temperature is 60F and 24 hours 105°F.
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| TSR 3.1.6.2 Verify RWST boron concentration is 3,100 ppm 31 days and 3,300 ppm.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.1-11 Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| Borated Water Sources, Operating TR 3.1.6 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.6.3 Verify RWST borated water volume is 7 days 370,000 gallons.
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| TSR 3.1.6.4 -------------------------------NOTE------------------------------
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| Only required if the BAT is required OPERABLE.
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| Verify Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 24 hours 63°F.
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| TSR 3.1.6.5 -------------------------------NOTE------------------------------
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| Only required if the BAT is required OPERABLE.
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| Verify BAT boron concentration is in accordance with 31 days Figure 3.1.6.
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| TSR 3.1.6.6 -------------------------------NOTE------------------------------
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| Only required if the BAT is required OPERABLE.
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| Verify BAT borated water volume is in accordance 7 days with Figure 3.1.6.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.1-12 Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| Seismic Instrumentation TR 3.3.4 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
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| --------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------
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| Refer to Table 3.3.4-1 to determine which Technical Surveillance Requirements apply for each seismic monitoring instrument.
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 31 days TSR 3.3.4.2 Perform CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST. 18 months TSR 3.3.4.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.3-14 Revision 21 Technical Requirements
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| Isolation Devices TR 3.8.1 TR 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TR 3.8.1 Isolation Devices TR 3.8.1 All circuit breakers actuated by fault currents that are used as isolation devices protecting 1E busses from non-qualified loads shall be OPERABLE.
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| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore the inoperable 8 hours circuit breakers inoperable. circuit breaker(s) to OPERABLE status.
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| OR A.2.1 Trip or remove the 8 hours inoperable circuit breaker(s).
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| AND A.2.2 Verify that inoperable Once per 7 days circuit breaker(s) are thereafter tripped or removed.
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| B. Required Action and Initiate a Corrective Actions 24 hours associated Completion Program (CAP) document to Time of Condition A develop plans and schedule for not met. restoring the breaker to OPERABLE status.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-1 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Isolation Devices TR 3.8.1 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.1.1 -------------------------------NOTE---------------------------
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| The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that the molded case circuit breaker functions as designed.
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| Perform a functional test of each molded-case circuit In Accordance with breaker. 0-TI-109 TSR 3.8.1.2 -------------------------------NOTE---------------------------
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| The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that each electrically operated circuit breaker functions as designed.
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| Perform a functional test of each electrically operated In Accordance with circuit breaker. 0-TI-109 (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-2 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Isolation Devices TR 3.8.1 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.1.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of associated 36 months protective relays for medium voltage circuits (6.9 kV).
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| TSR 3.8.1.4 Perform an integrated system functional test on each 36 months medium voltage (6.9 kV) breaker which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed.
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| TSR 3.8.1.5 Inspect each circuit breaker and perform preventive In Accordance with maintenance in accordance with procedures 0-TI-109 prepared in conjunction with the manufacturers and EPRI recommendations for electrically operated breakers and Class 1E MCCB.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-3 Revision 18, 20 Technical Requirements
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 TR 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TR 3.8.2. Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2. All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices shall be OPERABLE.
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| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more containment A.1 Restore the protective 72 hours penetration conductor device(s) to OPERABLE overcurrent protection status.
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| devices inoperable.
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| OR A.2.1 De-energize the circuit(s) 72 hours by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or removing the inoperable circuit breaker.
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| AND A.2.3 Verify the backup circuit Once per 7 days breaker to be tripped or thereafter the inoperable circuit breaker removed.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-4 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and Initiate a Corrective Actions 24 hours associated Completion Program (CAP) document to Time not met. develop plans and schedule for restoring the breaker to OPERABLE status.
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| TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
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| --------------------------------------------------------NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------
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| : 1. All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices listed in Drawing Series 45A710 (excluding fuses) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following Technical Surveillance Requirements.
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| : 2. Technical Surveillance Requirements 3.8.2.1 and 3.8.2.2 apply to at least one 6900-volt reactor coolant pump circuit such that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 months.
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.2.1 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of associated 18 months protective relays for medium voltage circuits (6.9 kV).
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-5 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.2.2 Perform an integrated system functional test on each 18 months medium voltage (6.9 kV) breaker which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed.
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| TSR 3.8.2.3 -------------------------------NOTE----------------------------
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| : 1. The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed.
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| Perform a functional test of each molded-case circuit In Accordance with breaker. 0-TI-109 (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-6 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TR 3.8.2 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
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| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.2.4 -------------------------------NOTE----------------------------
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| The functional test shall be conducted by simulating a fault current with an approved test set and verifying that each electrically operated circuit breaker functions as designed.
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| Perform a functional test of each electrically operated In Accordance with circuit breaker. 0-TI-109 TSR 3.8.2.5 Inspect each circuit breaker and perform preventive In Accordance with maintenance in accordance with procedures 0-TI-109 prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's and EPRI recommendations:
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| : 1. For electrically operated breakers and Class 1E MCCB
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| : 2. For non-Class 1E MCCB.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-7 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| ENCLOSURE 10 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL BASES CHANGED PAGES
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| Borated Water Sources, Shutdown B 3.1.5 BASES (continued)
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| ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the required borated water source is inoperable, the plant must be placed in a condition where negative reactivity addition is not required.
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| This is accomplished by suspending all CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions immediately. One borated water source is required to meet the TR and to ensure that negative reactivity control is available during MODES 4, 5, and 6. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.
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| The immediate Completion Time is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.
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| TECHNICAL The Notes in the Technical Surveillance Requirements state that SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.1.5.1, TSR 3.1.5.2, and TSR 3.1.5.3 are only required to be REQUIREMENTS performed if the RWST is the required borated water source, and TSR 3.1.5.4, TSR 3.1.5.5, and TSR 3.1.5.6 are only required to be performed if the BASS is the required borated water source.
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| TSR 3.1.5.1 This surveillance requires verification every 24 hours that the RWST temperature is greater than or equal to 60°F (value does not account for instrument error). The Frequency of 24 hours for performance of the surveillance is frequent enough to identify a temperature change that would approach the 60°F temperature limit and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. The TSR is modified by a Note which eliminates the requirement to perform this surveillance when ambient air temperature is greater than or equal to 60°F. With ambient air temperature greater than 60°F, the RWST solution temperature should not decrease below this limit, therefore, monitoring is not required.
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| TSR 3.1.5.2 This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration of the RWST is 3,100 ppm. This boron concentration is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and also ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 31-day Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-16 (continued)
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| Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| Borated Water Sources, Shutdown B 3.1.5 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires verification every 7 days that the RWST (continued) borated water volume is 62,900 gallons (value does not account for instrument error). This borated water volume is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and also ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7-day Frequency to verify borated water volume is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. The 62,900 gallon volume requirement includes 11,400 gallons for shutdown margin and adjustments for minimum safety limit level in the RWST.
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| TSR 3.1.5.4 This surveillance requires verification every 24 hours that the Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 63°F (value does not account for instrument error). This ensures that the concentration of boric acid in the BAT is not allowed to precipitate due to cooling. The frequency of 24 hours for performance of the surveillance is frequent enough to identify a temperature change that would approach the 63°F temperature limit.
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| TSR 3.1.5.5 This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration of the BAT is between 6,120 ppm and 6,990 ppm. This boron concentration is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and also ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the BAT volume is normally stable, a 31-day Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| TSR 3.1.5.6 This surveillance requires verification every 7 days that the BAT borated water volume is 5,300 gallons (value does account for instrument error).
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| This borated water volume is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and also ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the BAT volume is normally stable, a 7-day Frequency to verify borated water volume is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-17 (continued)
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| Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| Borated Water Sources, Operating B 3.1.6 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)
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| With the RWST inoperable for reasons other than Condition C (e.g., water volume), it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The short time limit of 1 hour to restore the RWST to OPERABLE status is based on this condition simultaneously affecting two of the boration system flow paths. The Completion Time is consistent with Technical Specification 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank.
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| E.1 and E.2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C or D are not met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the TR does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable and based on operating experience to reach required plant conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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| TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The limits assumed in the accident analysis band for the RWST borated water temperature are 60F and 105°F (values do not account for instrument error). This surveillance requires verification of the water temperature limits every 24 hours. This is frequent enough to identify a temperature change that would approach either temperature limit and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| The TSR is modified by a Note which eliminates the requirement to perform this surveillance when ambient air temperatures are within the operating limits of the RWST. With ambient air temperatures within the band, the RWST solution temperature should not exceed the limits.
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| TSR 3.1.6.2 This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration of the RWST is within the required band. This ensures the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Further, it assures that the resulting sump pH will be maintained in an acceptable range so that boron precipitation in the core will not occur and the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 31-day Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-21 Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| Borated Water Sources, Operating B 3.1.6 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.1.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires verification every 7 days that the RWST (continued) borated water volume is within the required limit of 370,000 gallons (value does not account for instrument error). This will ensure that a sufficient initial supply is available for injection and to support continued ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation on recirculation.
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| Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7 day Frequency to verify borated water volume is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| TSR 3.1.6.4 This surveillance requires verification every 24 hours that the Boric Acid Tank (BAT) solution temperature is 63°F (value does not account for instrument error). This ensures that the concentration of boric acid in the BAT is not allowed to precipitate due to cooling. The Frequency of 24 hours for performance of the surveillance is frequent enough to identify a temperature change that would approach the 63°F temperature limit and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| This surveillance has been modified by a NOTE stating that the surveillance is only required if the BAT is used as one of the required borated water sources for TR 3.1.2.
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| TSR 3.1.6.5 This surveillance requires verification every 31 days that the boron concentration of the BAT is in accordance with Figure 3.1.6 of TR 3.1.6.
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| This boron concentration is sufficient to provide an adequate SDM and also ensure a pH value between 7.5 and 10.0. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. Since the BAT volume is normally stable, a 31-day sampling Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| This surveillance has been modified by a NOTE stating that the surveillance is only required if the BAT is used as one of the required borated water sources for TR 3.1.2.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.1-22 Technical Requirements Revision 22
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| Seismic Instrumentation B 3.3.4 BASES ACTIONS B.6 (continued)
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| Subsequent analysis must then be performed using data from the remaining seismic monitoring instruments to evaluate the plant response in comparison with previously generated design basis spectra at the locations of those instruments. The Completion Time of 14 days to perform Required Action B.6 is reasonable and based upon the typical time necessary to analyze data.
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| TECHNICAL The TSRs for each seismic monitoring Function are identified by the SURVEILLANCE SRs column of Table 3.3.4-1.
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| REQUIREMENTS A Note has been added to the TSRs to clarify that Table 3.3.4-1 determines which SRs apply to which seismic monitoring instruments.
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| TSR 3.3.4.1 Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK on the seismic instrumentation once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a check of external system status indications that the seismic monitoring equipment is in a state of readiness to properly function should an earthquake occur. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross system failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST.
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| The Surveillance Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience related to instrumentation systems, which demonstrates that gross instrumentation system failure in any 31 day interval is a rare event. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements the loss of power annunciation for the equipment in the auxiliary instrument room. The equipment in the auxiliary control room does not have a loss of power alarm but only provides supplemental data.
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| TSR 3.3.4.2 A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is to be performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is the comparison of the response of the instrumentation, including all components of the instrument, to a known signal. Although the seismic trigger is functionally checked, its setpoint is not verified. The 18 months Surveillance Frequency is based upon the known reliability of the monitoring instrumentation and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.3-11 Revision 21 Technical Requirements
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| | |
| Steam Generator Pressure/Temperature Limitations B 3.7.1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitations BASES BACKGROUND In order to meet regulatory and code requirements with respect to material toughness, certain limits on steam generator pressure and temperature are established. Material toughness varies with temperature and is lower at room temperature than at operating temperature. One indicator of the temperature effect on ductility is the nil-ductility temperature (NDT). Therefore, a nil-ductility reference temperature (RTNDT) has been determined by experimental means. The RTNDT is that temperature below which brittle (non-ductile) fracture may occur. By Reference 3, all steam generator pressure boundary materials are required to have RTNDT no higher than + 10°F. The RTNDT has been determined to be no higher than -10°F for all pressure boundary materials in all steam generators (Ref. 1). Considering uncertainties and proper margins, the minimum operating temperature has been determined to be 70F. The 70F temperature must be established before the pressure is increased to 200 psig. This limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.
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| The fracture mechanic methodology, which is used to determine the stresses and material toughness, follows the guidance given by 10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 2). Reference 3 mandates the use of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G (Ref. 4).
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| APPLICABLE The RTNDT limit is not derived from the Design Basis Accident analyses.
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| SAFETY The RTNDT limit is imposed during normal operation to avert encountering ANALYSES pressure/temperature combinations which are not analyzed as part of the steam generator design. Unanalyzed pressure/temperature combinations could cause propagation of minor, undetected flaws, which could cause brittle failure of the pressure boundary. Because the RTNDT limit is related to normal operation, the RTNDT limit is not a consideration in designing the accident sequences for theoretical hazard evaluations (Ref. 5 & 6).
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-1 (continued)
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| Technical Requirements Revision 17
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| Steam Generator Pressure/Temperature Limitations B 3.7.1 BASES (continued)
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| TECHNICAL TSR 3.7.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.7.1.1 verifies that the pressures on the primary and the secondary sides in the steam generators are less than 200 psig (value does not account for instrument error). At temperatures below 70F (value does not account for instrument error), the temperature margin to RTNDT is diminished. Hence, the pressure must be checked every hour to ensure that the material toughness criteria are not violated. The 1 hour Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with industry practice.
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| Note: Instrument uncertainty has been considered in establishing these values and is discussed in this Bases section under Background.
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| REFERENCES 1. CN-WB2RSG-S120, Rev. 0, Fracture Toughness Evaluation of Watts Bar Unit 2 Replacement Steam Generator, February 21, 2018 (Transmitted to TVA via Letter WB2TV-18-034).
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| : 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Requirements.
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| : 3. WB2RSG-DS-01, Rev. 3, Design Specification for Replacement Steam Generators for TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2, August 22, 2017 (Transmitted to TVA via Letter WB2TV-17-150).
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| : 4. ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, Section III.
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| : 5. WCAP-11618, MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application, including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989, as modified by Reference 6.
| |
| : 6. TVA letter, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), dated August 27, 1992 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073230174) including Enclosure 1, Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, (ADAMS Accession No. ML073620391).
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-3 Revision 17 Technical Requirements
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| | |
| Isolation Devices B 3.8.1 BASES (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2 With one or more of the required circuit breakers inoperable, the Class 1E distribution system is not isolated from faults on non-Class 1E portions of the distribution system, on non-Class 1E associated cables routed in Class 1E cable trays, or on Non-Class 1E cables insufficiently separated from Class 1E cables.
| |
| Action must be taken to restore this isolation. One possible solution is to restore the circuit breaker(s) to OPERABLE status. If this cannot be done, the isolation can be achieved manually by tripping or removing the inoperable circuit breaker(s). Removing the inoperable breaker(s) ensures that they will not be inadvertently closed before they can be restored to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time of 8 hours takes into consideration the low probability of a fault occurring on the distribution system, on an associated non-Class 1E circuit or on an insufficiently separated non-Class 1E cable, concurrent with an event requiring the safety systems supplied by the Class 1E system. It also represents a reasonable time to repair or trip (or remove) the inoperable circuit breaker(s).
| |
| To ensure that the inoperable circuit breaker(s) are not inadvertently re-energized before they are returned to OPERABLE status, it is necessary to periodically verify that they remain tripped or removed. The period of 7 days takes into consideration the unlikelihood that a plant operation or maintenance activity would result in the re-energization of these breaker(s) from the de-energized condition.
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| B If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A cannot be met, the Class 1E system remains unprotected from faults on non-Class 1E portions of the distribution system, on non-Class 1E associated cables routed in Class 1E cable trays or on non-Class 1E cables insufficiently separated from Class 1E cables. A Corrective Actions Program (CAP) document to develop plans and schedule for restoring the breaker to OPERABLE status will be initiated.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-3 (continued)
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| Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| | |
| Isolation Devices B 3.8.1 BASES (continued)
| |
| TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires a functional test of molded case circuit breakers used as isolation devices per guidance maintained by the Stie Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
| |
| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
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| TSR 3.8.1.2 This surveillance requires a functional test of electrically operated circuit breaker used as isolation devices per guidance maintained by the Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
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| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-4 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Isolation Devices B 3.8.1 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires that the performance of a CHANNEL (continued) CALIBRATION of all protective relays associated with medium voltage (6.9 kV) isolation overcurrent devices. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION assures that the relays will be able to detect overcurrent conditions on the non-Class 1E loads. The Frequency of 36 months is consistent with other similar equipment and plant historical data.
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| TSR 3.8.1.4 This surveillance requires the performance of an integrated system functional test which verifies that the relays and associated medium voltage (6.9 kV) circuit breakers function as designed to isolate fault currents. An integrated test assures that the individual elements of the protection scheme, the relays, breakers and other control circuits, interact as designed.
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| The Frequency of 36 months is consistent with other similar equipment and plant historical data.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-5 Technical Requirements Revision 18, 20
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| Isolation Devices B 3.8.1 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.1.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires the inspection of each circuit breaker and the (continued) performance of procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's recommendations. By performance of recommended maintenance, the likelihood for the circuit breakers to become inoperable can be minimized. The Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109 will maintain guidance to ensure recommended maintenance is performed per vendor, industry, or EPRI recommendations for breaker reliability.
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| REFERENCES 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 6.0, Engineered Safety Feature, and Section 15.0, Accident Analyses.
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| : 2. TVA letter, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), dated August 27, 1992 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073230174) including Enclosure 1, Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, (ADAMS Accession No. ML073620391).
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| : 3. Watts Bar Wiring Diagram Series 45A710, Periodic Breaker Test.
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| : 4. NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 including Supplements thereto.
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| : 5. EPRI NP-7410-V3, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Application and Maintenance Guide, Revision 1.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-6 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES (continued)
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| TR TR 3.8.2 requires that all containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices be OPERABLE. These protection devices are identified on Drawing Series 45A710 (Ref. 3). This assures that the design limits of the containment electrical penetrations will not be challenged as a result of electrical faults on the penetration conductors or the equipment that they supply in containment.
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| APPLICABILITY The OPERABILITY of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices is required when the containment is required to be OPERABLE. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. The containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices are, therefore, required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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| ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.3 With one or more containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices inoperable, the circuit(s) associated with the inoperable protection device(s) must be placed in a condition that would preclude the possibility of a fault that could overload the circuit(s). To accomplish this, the circuit is de-energized by either tripping the circuit's backup circuit breaker or by removing the inoperable circuit breaker.
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| The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the design of the electrical penetration for maximum fault current, the availability of backup circuit protection on the distribution system and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. This Completion Time is also considered reasonable to perform the necessary repairs or circuit alterations to restore or otherwise de-energize the affected circuit.
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| In order to assure that any electrical penetration which is not protected by an overcurrent device remains de-energized, it is necessary to periodically verify that its backup circuit breaker is tripped or that the inoperable circuit breaker is removed. A Completion Time of 7 days is considered sufficient due to the infrequency of plant operations that could result in reenergizing a circuit that has been de-energized in this manner.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-8 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS B (continued)
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| If the inoperable containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices are not able to be restored to OPERABLE status and the associated circuit cannot be de-energized within 72 hours, the containment penetration is vulnerable to the mechanical effects of a short circuit, should one occur. These effects can challenge the design capability of the penetration and therefore pose a threat to containment integrity. A Corrective Actions Program (CAP) document to develop plans and schedule for restoring the breaker to OPERABLE status will be initiated.
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| TECHNICAL As described by Technical Surveillance Requirements general SURVEILLANCE surveillance Note 1, the surveillances for this TR are necessary to assure REQUIREMENTS that the overcurrent protection devices given in Drawing Series 45A710 (excluding fuses) are demonstrated OPERABLE. Note 2 explains that the surveillance requirements apply to at least one Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) such that all RCP circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 month period. This recognizes the importance of the RCP circuits to the safe operation of the plant as well as the potentially large amount of short circuit current associated with a fault on these circuits.
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| TSR 3.8.2.1 This surveillance requires the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all protective relays associated with medium voltage (6.9 kV) containment penetration overcurrent devices. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION assures that the relays will be able to detect overcurrent conditions on the penetration conductors. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-9 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires the performance of an integrated system (continued) functional test which verifies that the relays and associated medium voltage (6.9 kV) circuit breakers function as designed to isolate fault currents. An integrated test assures that the individual elements of the protection scheme, the relays, breakers and other control circuits, interact as designed.
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| The Frequency of 18 months coincides with the typical industry refueling cycle.
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| TSR 3.8.2.3 This surveillance requires a functional test of molded case circuit breakers used as isolation devices per guidance maintained by the Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
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| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
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| (continued)
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-10 Technical Requirements Revision 20
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| Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8.2 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.8.2.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires a functional test of electrically operated (continued) breakers used as isolation devices per guidance maintained by the Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109.
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| The Note describes the functional test procedure and the response to be verified to ensure OPERABILITY.
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| TSR 3.8.2.5 This surveillance requires the inspection of each circuit breaker and the performance of preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturers recommendation.
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| Performance of recommended preventive maintenance helps ensure the operability of the circuit breakers. The Site Breaker Program procedure 0-TI-109 will maintain guidance to ensure recommended maintenance is performed per vendor, industry, or EPRI recommendations for breaker reliability.
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| Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-11 (continued)
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| Technical Requirements Revision 20}}
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