|
|
| Line 1: |
Line 1: |
| {{Adams
| | #REDIRECT [[IR 07100202/2030001]] |
| | number = ML24068A087
| |
| | issue date = 03/22/2024
| |
| | title = NRC Routine Inspection Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS) - Prein & Newhof
| |
| | author name = Curtis D
| |
| | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRSS/MIB
| |
| | addressee name = Vandyke J
| |
| | addressee affiliation = Prein & Newhof
| |
| | docket = 03028571
| |
| | license number = 21-18663-02
| |
| | contact person = Craffey R
| |
| | case reference number = EA-23-119, EN 56157
| |
| | document report number = IR 2023001
| |
| | document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| |
| | page count = 12
| |
| }}
| |
| See also: [[see also::IR 07100202/2030001]]
| |
| | |
| =Text=
| |
| {{#Wiki_filter:EA 23-119
| |
| EN 56157
| |
| NMED No. 220442 (closed)
| |
| Brent VanDyke
| |
| Radiation Safety Officer
| |
| Prein & Newhof
| |
| 3355 Evergreen Drive NE
| |
| Grand Rapids, MI 49525
| |
| SUBJECT: NRC ROUTINE INSPECTION REPORT NO. 03028571/2023001(DRSS) - PREIN
| |
| & NEWHOF
| |
| Dear Brent VanDyke:
| |
| On April 13, 2023, and September 18 through 21, 2023, inspectors from the U.S. Nuclear
| |
| Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine inspection at your facilities in Kalamazoo,
| |
| Cadillac, Muskegon and Grand Rapids, Michigan, as well as temporary job sites in Kalamazoo
| |
| and Muskegon with continued in-office review through February 21, 2024. The purpose of the
| |
| inspection was to review activities performed under your NRC license to ensure that they were
| |
| being performed in accordance with NRC requirements, and to review an incident involving
| |
| damage to a device containing licensed material that you reported on October 11, 2022. The
| |
| in-office review included an evaluation of the inspection findings and their significance. The
| |
| enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.
| |
| This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
| |
| compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions in your license.
| |
| Within these areas, the inspection consisted of an examination of selected procedures and
| |
| representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
| |
| Based on the results of this inspection, two apparent violations of NRC requirements were
| |
| identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the
| |
| NRC Enforcement Policy, available on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-
| |
| nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violations concerned (1) four
| |
| examples of failing to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible
| |
| barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, whenever portable gauges are
| |
| not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee, as required by Title 10 of the
| |
| Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 30.34(i); and (2) failing to report a safety equipment
| |
| failure within 24 hours of its discovery, as required by 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). The circumstances
| |
| surrounding the apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and
| |
| effective corrective action - in particular, regarding the repetitive nature of the first apparent
| |
| violation - were discussed with you at the inspection exit meeting conducted by Ryan Craffey of
| |
| my staff on February 21, 2024. March 22, 2024
| |
| B. VanDyke 2
| |
| | |
| | |
| Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to
| |
| (1) respond to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the
| |
| date of this letter, (2) request a Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference (PEC), or (3) request
| |
| Alternative Dispute Resolution. If a PEC is held, it will be open for public observation and the
| |
| NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference. Please
| |
| contact Rhex Edwards at (630) 829-9722 or Rhex.Edwards@nrc.gov within 10 days of the
| |
| date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response or request. A PEC should
| |
| be held within 30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.
| |
| | |
| If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the
| |
| Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS); EA-23-119, and
| |
| should include, for the apparent violations: (1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if
| |
| contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violations; (2) the corrective steps that have
| |
| been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further
| |
| violations; and (4) the date when full compliance was or will be achieved. Your response may
| |
| reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately
| |
| addresses the required response. Your response should be sent to the NRCs Document
| |
| Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy mailed to the NRC Region III Office,
| |
| 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, Illinois 60532, within 30 days of the date of this letter. If
| |
| an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not
| |
| been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a
| |
| PEC.
| |
| | |
| If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your
| |
| perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take
| |
| into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a pre-decisional
| |
| enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has
| |
| occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain
| |
| information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during
| |
| the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information
| |
| to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation,
| |
| and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned. In presenting your corrective
| |
| action, you should be aware that the promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be
| |
| considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC
| |
| Information Notice 96-28, "Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation
| |
| of Corrective Action," may be helpful in preparing your response. You can find the information
| |
| notice on the NRC website at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-
| |
| notices/1996/in96028.html.
| |
| | |
| In lieu of a PEC, you may also request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue.
| |
| ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral
| |
| third-party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a
| |
| voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral party (the mediator) works with parties to
| |
| help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually agreeable
| |
| neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions. Mediation
| |
| gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find
| |
| areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues. Additional information concerning
| |
| the NRCs program can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-
| |
| nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell
| |
| University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact
| |
| ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in
| |
| B. VanDyke 3
| |
| pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR. In addition, if you choose ADR, please
| |
| also contact Rhex Edwards at the telephone number or email address listed above.
| |
| In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations
| |
| described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You
| |
| will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
| |
| In accordance with the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure in 10 CFR 2.390, a
| |
| copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made
| |
| available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the
| |
| NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from
| |
| the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any
| |
| response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that
| |
| it can be made publicly available without redaction.
| |
| Please feel free to contact Ryan Craffey of my staff if you have any questions regarding this
| |
| inspection. Ryan can be reached at 630-829-9655 or ryan.craffey@nrc.gov.
| |
| Sincerely,
| |
| David Curtis, Director
| |
| Division of Radiological Safety and Security
| |
| Docket No. 030-28571
| |
| License No. 21-18663-02
| |
| Enclosure:
| |
| Inspection Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS)
| |
| cc w/encl: State of Michigan
| |
| Stoedter, Karla signing on behalf
| |
| of Curtis, David
| |
| on 03/22/24
| |
| | |
| B. VanDyke 4
| |
| | |
| Letter to B. VanDyke from D. Curtis, dated March 22, 2024.
| |
| | |
| SUBJECT: NRC ROUTINE INSPECTION REPORT NO. 03028571/2023001(DRSS) -
| |
| PREIN & NEWHOF
| |
| | |
| | |
| DISTRIBUTION w/encl:
| |
| Jack Giessner
| |
| Mohammed Shuaibi
| |
| David Curtis
| |
| Diana Betancourt-Roldan
| |
| Kenneth Lambert
| |
| Geoffrey Edwards
| |
| MIB Inspectors
| |
| | |
| ADAMS Accession Number: ML24068A087
| |
| OFFICE RIII-DRSS RIII-DRSS OE OGC
| |
| NAME RCraffey:brt REdwards JPeralta AValentine
| |
| (PSnyder alt.)
| |
| DATE 3/8/24 3/14/24 3/21/24 3/21/24
| |
| OFFICE RIII-EICS RIII
| |
| NAME DBetancourt:GEdwards DCurtis:KStoedter
| |
| concurred behalf of signed behalf of
| |
| DATE 3/22/24 3/22/24
| |
| OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
| |
| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
| |
| Region III
| |
| | |
| | |
| Docket No. 030-28571
| |
| | |
| | |
| License No. 21-18663-02
| |
| | |
| | |
| Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS)
| |
| | |
| | |
| EN No./NMED No. 56157 / 220442
| |
| | |
| | |
| EA No. EA-23-119
| |
| | |
| | |
| Licensee: Prein & Newhof
| |
| | |
| | |
| Facilities: 3355 Evergreen Drive NE, Grand Rapids, MI
| |
| 1707 South Part Street, Kalamazoo, MI
| |
| 100 East Chapin Street, Cadillac, MI
| |
| 4910 Stariha Drive, Muskegon, MI
| |
| Job Site on Lake Street in Kalamazoo, MI
| |
| Job Site on Glenside Boulevard in Muskegon, MI
| |
| | |
| | |
| Inspection Dates: April 13, 2023, and September 18-21, 2023
| |
| | |
| | |
| Exit Meeting Date: February 21, 2024
| |
| | |
| | |
| Inspectors: Ryan Craffey, Senior Health Physicist
| |
| Elizabeth Tindle-Englemann, Health Physicist
| |
| | |
| | |
| Approved By: Rhex Edwards, Chief
| |
| Materials Inspection Branch
| |
| Division of Radiological Safety and Security
| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| Enclosure
| |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
| |
| | |
| Prein & Newhof
| |
| NRC Inspection Report 03028571/2023001(DRSS)
| |
| | |
| This was an unannounced routine inspection of licensed activities involving the use of byproduct
| |
| material to measure the physical properties of materials. Prein & Newhof, an engineering
| |
| consulting firm, was authorized by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License
| |
| No. 21-18663-02 to store portable moisture density gauges containing byproduct material at its
| |
| offices in Grand Rapids, Cadillac, Kalamazoo, and Muskegon, Michigan, and to use them at
| |
| temporary job sites in NRC jurisdiction.
| |
| | |
| As a result of this inspection, the NRC identified four examples of an apparent violation of
| |
| regulatory requirements for failing to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that
| |
| form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, whenever portable
| |
| gauges are not under the control and constant surveillance, as required by Title 10 of the Code
| |
| of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 30.34(i).
| |
| | |
| The inspection also included a follow-up review of an incident involving damage to a device
| |
| containing licensed material that Prein & Newhof reported on October 11, 2022. As a result of
| |
| this review, the NRC identified one additional apparent violation of regulatory requirements for
| |
| failing to report a safety equipment failure within 24 hours of its discovery, as required by
| |
| 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 2
| |
| REPORT DETAILS
| |
| | |
| | |
| 1 Program Overview and Inspection History
| |
| | |
| Prein & Newhof (the licensee), an engineering consulting firm, was authorized by U.S.
| |
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License No. 21-18663-02 to store portable
| |
| moisture density gauges containing byproduct material at its offices in Grand Rapids,
| |
| Cadillac, Kalamazoo, and Muskegon, Michigan, and to use them at temporary job sites
| |
| in NRC jurisdiction. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had 25 gauges and around
| |
| 30 individuals authorized to use them.
| |
| | |
| The NRC last performed a routine inspection of the licensee on November 16 and 17,
| |
| 2017, at its facilities in Grand Rapids, Cadillac, and Kalamazoo. One Severity Level III
| |
| violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 30.34(i) was identified
| |
| for two examples of failing to secure a portable gauge in transport with two barriers (only
| |
| one was used). A follow-up inspection was performed on August 20, 2018, to evaluate
| |
| the completion and effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions. Although the 2017
| |
| violation was closed, a Severity Level IV (SLIV) violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c) and
| |
| License Condition 10 was subsequently identified for failing to limit the possession of
| |
| licensed material to the locations listed on the license.
| |
| | |
| The NRC previously performed a routine inspection of the licensee on January 17, 2013,
| |
| at its facilities in Grand Rapids and Kalamazoo. One SLIV violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i)
| |
| was identified for failing to secure potable gauges in storage with two barriers (only one
| |
| was used). This violation was reviewed and closed during the 2017 inspection.
| |
| | |
| 2 Security of Portable Gauges
| |
| | |
| 2.1 Inspection Scope
| |
| | |
| On April 13, 2023, and September 18-21, 2023, the inspectors toured the licensees
| |
| facilities in Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, Cadillac, and Muskegon, and interviewed
| |
| involved staff to evaluate the licensees measures for securing portable gauges in use,
| |
| transit, and storage.
| |
| | |
| 2.2 Observations and Findings
| |
| | |
| On April 13, 2023, an inspector visited the Kalamazoo office, where one gauge was in
| |
| storage and another in the field. The inspector found that the exterior door to the storage
| |
| room was locked. However, the case containing the gauge was not secured to anything
| |
| inside the room. There was an anchored chain that was normally used to secure both
| |
| gauge cases by feeding it through the handle of the cases and locking it. However, the
| |
| lock was not closed.
| |
| | |
| On September 18, 2023, another inspector returned to the Kalamazoo office, where two
| |
| gauges were in storage. The inspector found that the exterior door to the storage room
| |
| was locked. The inspector observed that the two cases containing the gauges were
| |
| secured to an anchor using a single chain that had been fed through the handle of the
| |
| cases. The chain was in a closed loop using a padlock. During the inspection, the
| |
| inspector observed that a ceiling tile was missing from the storage room. The licensee
| |
| stated that the building landlord was tracing plumbing in the building and the ceiling tile
| |
| had been removed to aid that process. The inspector was made aware that the landlord
| |
| | |
| | |
| 3
| |
| maintained a key and access to the storage closet, and on at least one occasion,
| |
| accessed the storage closet independently. Thus, the lock on the storage room
| |
| door was not considered a tangible barrier.
| |
| | |
| On September 20, 2023, the same inspector visited the Cadillac office, where multiple
| |
| gauges were in storage, multiple others in the field at the time, and one gauge onboard a
| |
| truck in the parking lot. Upon arriving at the facility, the inspector performed surveys of
| |
| the licensees vehicles that were in the parking lot. The inspector identified that one truck
| |
| contained a portable gauge. The inspector observed that the gauge was in the truck bed
| |
| and the truck bed had a cover. The inspector challenged the lock of the cover and found
| |
| that it was unlocked. Within the truck bed, the gauge was secured to one anchor using
| |
| only one chain and one lock.
| |
| | |
| On September 21, 2023, the same inspector visited the main office in Grand Rapids,
| |
| where multiple gauges were in storage and multiple others in the field at the time. The
| |
| storage location was a storage closet within the biology laboratory. No gauge users or
| |
| individuals involved with licensed activities worked at this location full time, though the
| |
| company did maintain full time staff at the facility. At the time of the inspection, two
| |
| gauges were in a storage closet behind a door with a locking handle. The key to the
| |
| closet was kept in a drawer exterior to the closet, and the gauges were placed on the
| |
| floor within the closet. There were no chains, anchors, or locks used to secure the
| |
| gauges within the closet. The licensee stated that front desk staff were responsible for
| |
| maintaining gauge security and controlling access during business hours. However,
| |
| based on discussions with the front desk staff, they were unaware that gauges were
| |
| onsite or that they were responsible for providing for their security. Additionally, the
| |
| facility had multiple entry points that were unlocked during business hours and not all
| |
| entry points were continuously monitored.
| |
| | |
| Title 10 CFR 30.34(i) requires that each portable gauge licensee shall use a minimum of
| |
| two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges
| |
| from unauthorized removal, whenever portable gauges are not under the control and
| |
| constant surveillance of the licensee.
| |
| | |
| Contrary to the above:
| |
| | |
| * On April 13, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control - an
| |
| exterior door - that formed a tangible barrier to secure one portable gauge in storage
| |
| at its facility in Kalamazoo.
| |
| | |
| * On September 18, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control -
| |
| a locked chain - that formed a tangible barrier to secure two portable gauges in
| |
| storage at its facility in Kalamazoo.
| |
| | |
| * On September 20, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control -
| |
| a locked chain - that formed a tangible barrier to secure one portable gauge being
| |
| prepared for transport at its facility in Cadillac.
| |
| | |
| * On September 21, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control -
| |
| a locked closet - that formed a tangible barrier to secure two portable gauges in
| |
| storage at its facility in Grand Rapids.
| |
| | |
| These examples represent an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) and are being
| |
| considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with section 2.3.4 and
| |
| 6.3.c.3 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
| |
| 4
| |
| As immediate corrective action to restore compliance, the licensee (1) installed an
| |
| additional locking anchored chain to secure gauge cases in Kalamazoo; (2) regained
| |
| control of the gauge being prepared for transit in Cadillac; (3) installed a key code lock
| |
| box for the key to the storage room door in Grand Rapids; and (4) installed additional
| |
| locking anchored chains to secure gauge cases in Grand Rapids.
| |
| | |
| The licensee also committed to develop and implement lasting and effective corrective
| |
| actions to address the potential for recurrence of a similar violation.
| |
| | |
| 2.3 Conclusions
| |
| | |
| The inspectors identified four examples of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i).
| |
| | |
| 3 Review of Event Number 56157
| |
| | |
| 3.1 Inspection Scope
| |
| | |
| On September 20, 2023, the inspector interviewed involved staff and reviewed
| |
| procedures, records and equipment related to an incident involving damage to a device
| |
| containing licensed material which the licensee reported on October 11, 2022.
| |
| | |
| 3.2 Observations and Findings
| |
| | |
| A. Sequence of Events and Licensee Response
| |
| | |
| On October 5, 2022, one of the licensees technicians, an authorized gauge user,
| |
| took a Troxler 3430 gauge (serial no. 32676 containing 40 millicuries of americium-
| |
| 241 and 8 millicuries of cesium-137 at time of manufacture in 1999 and 2001,
| |
| respectively) from storage in the Grand Rapids office and transported it to a
| |
| construction site on Buth Drive NE, west of West River Drive in Comstock Park,
| |
| Michigan. At approximately 3:30 pm ET, the technician was actively performing a
| |
| density test (i.e., the source rod was extended into the compacted soil) when a
| |
| skid-steer operated by a contractor backed towards him. The technician attempted to
| |
| alert the equipments operator but was unsuccessful. The technician moved out of
| |
| the way to avoid being hit by the skid-steer but did not have time to secure the
| |
| source rod or remove the gauge from the measurement location. The skid-steer
| |
| struck the gauge, cracking its plastic top cover and bending the source rod such that
| |
| it could not be retracted into a shielded position.
| |
| | |
| Upon examining the damage to the gauge, the technician placed the gauge back into
| |
| the ground and cordoned off the area. The technician immediately notified the RSO,
| |
| who notified personnel at a gauge manufacturer service center in Grand Rapids, who
| |
| provided the licensee with a lead-lined barrel to safely transport the damaged gauge
| |
| to the service center. A leak test was then performed on the gauge, the results of
| |
| which confirmed visual indications that neither source sustained any damage nor
| |
| was leaking. The licensee formally transferred the damaged gauge to the
| |
| manufacturer for disposal on October 10, 2022.
| |
| | |
| B. Notifications and Reporting
| |
| | |
| The gauge was damaged on October 5, 2022, at approximately 3:30 pm ET. The
| |
| licensees RSO was immediately informed of the incident but did not notify the NRCs
| |
| Headquarters Operations Center by telephone until October 11, 2022, at 9:50 am ET
| |
| | |
| 5
| |
| to report the damage to the device as a safety equipment failure per 10 CFR
| |
| 30.50(b)(2). This notification resulted in Event Number 56157 and was recorded in
| |
| the Nuclear Materials Events Database under item number 220442.
| |
| | |
| Title 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) requires that each licensee notify the NRC within 24 hours
| |
| after the discovery of an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as
| |
| designed when: (i) the equipment is required by regulation or license condition to
| |
| prevent releases exceeding regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation and
| |
| radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of
| |
| an accident; (ii) the equipment is required to be available and operable when it is
| |
| disabled or fails to function; and (iii) no redundant equipment is available and
| |
| operable to perform the required safety function.
| |
| | |
| Contrary to the above, on October 6, 2022, the licensee failed to notify the NRC
| |
| within 24 hours after the discovery of an event in which equipment was disabled or
| |
| failed to function as designed. Specifically, the source rod on one of the licensees
| |
| portable gauges was damaged at a temporary job site on October 5, 2022, and failed
| |
| to function as designed to retract the Cs-137 source into a shielded position and the
| |
| criteria in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)(i) through (iii) were met1. However, the licensee did not
| |
| notify the NRC until October 11, 2022, six days after the discovery of this failure.
| |
| | |
| This is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) (NRC Enforcement Policy
| |
| Section 6.9).
| |
| | |
| The licensee submitted its 30-day written report to the NRC in a letter dated
| |
| October 27, 2022, which was received on November 1, 2022. The report included all
| |
| information required by 10 CFR 30.50(c)(2).
| |
| | |
| C. NRC Assessment
| |
| | |
| The inspectors agreed with the licensees determination that the damaged gauge
| |
| met the criteria in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) to be considered a reportable safety
| |
| equipment failure. The inspectors found that the licensee promptly and effectively
| |
| implemented their emergency procedures and adequately resolved the situation with
| |
| no additional measurable radiation exposure to staff involved in the recovery.
| |
| | |
| The inspectors further determined that no violations of security and control
| |
| requirements occurred because the gauge user maintained adequate control and
| |
| surveillance of the gauge while using it, made a reasonable effort to maintain control
| |
| in the face of oncoming construction equipment, and was only forced to move away
| |
| from the gauge to protect their personal safety.
| |
| | |
| 3.3 Conclusions
| |
| | |
| The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 1 The source rods functionality was required for compliance with public dose limits in 10 CFR 20.1301 and with
| |
| Conditions 17 and 19.A (the latter as it related to the licensees commitment to implement gauge operating
| |
| procedures); the equipment was required to be operable when it was damaged (i.e., when it was in use), and no
| |
| redundant equipment was available to retract the source into its shielded position.
| |
| 6
| |
| 4 Other Areas Inspected
| |
| | |
| 4.1 Inspection Scope
| |
| | |
| On April 13, 2023, and September 18-21, 2023, the inspectors toured the licensees
| |
| facilities in Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, Cadillac, and Muskegon, visited temporary job
| |
| sites in Kalamazoo and Muskegon, interviewed staff and reviewed records to evaluate
| |
| the licensees implementation of its radiation protection program, and to review the
| |
| effectiveness of corrective actions taken in response to a previous violation.
| |
| | |
| 4.2 Observations and Findings
| |
| | |
| The Kalamazoo field office was properly posted, and independent radiation surveys in
| |
| unrestricted areas were indistinguishable from background. Utilization logs for the
| |
| gauges stationed there were completed as required. Both gauges were operable and in
| |
| good condition, and their transport cases in good condition and adequately labeled.
| |
| | |
| The authorized user at the job site in Kalamazoo maintained adequate control of and
| |
| security for their gauge while in the field, and was knowledgeable of gauge operation,
| |
| radiation protection principles, and the licensees gauge operating and emergency
| |
| procedures.
| |
| | |
| The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness licensees corrective actions for the SLIV
| |
| violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c) cited in 2018. The inspectors confirmed that the possession
| |
| of licensed material remained confined to the locations currently listed on the license.
| |
| The inspectors also found that the licensee remained knowledgeable of the requirement
| |
| to seek NRC approval for new locations of use before storing licensed material there.
| |
| The inspectors noted that the licensee requested approval in April 2021 for a new
| |
| location of use in Kalamazoo; that request was approved in June 2021.
| |
| | |
| The inspectors determined that the licensees corrective actions had been effective, and
| |
| that the violation had not occurred again since. The violation is therefore closed.
| |
| | |
| No other findings were identified during visits to the field offices in Grand Rapids,
| |
| Cadillac, and Muskegon, nor during the visit to the job site in Muskegon.
| |
| | |
| 4.3 Conclusions
| |
| | |
| The inspectors had no other findings and closed the previous violation from 2018.
| |
| | |
| 5 Exit Meeting Summary
| |
| | |
| On February 21, 2024, an inspector held an inspection exit meeting with the licensees
| |
| RSO by telephone to discuss the inspection findings. The RSO acknowledged the
| |
| findings presented and committed to develop and implement lasting and effective
| |
| corrective actions to address the potential for recurrence of both apparent violations.
| |
| | |
| | |
| LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED
| |
| | |
| Michael Anderson - Authorized Gauge User
| |
| Ethan Bancroft - Construction Service Manager, Cadillac
| |
| Chris Cruickshank, PE - Corporate Secretary
| |
| Dennis Todd - Authorized Gauge User
| |
| | |
| 7
| |
| # Brent Van Dyke - Construction Service Manager, Grand Rapids (RSO)
| |
| | |
| # Attended exit meeting on February 21, 2024
| |
| | |
| | |
| INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
| |
| | |
| 87103:Inspection of Nuclear Material Licensees Involved in an Incident or Bankruptcy Filing
| |
| 87139: Portable Nuclear Gauge Programs
| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 8
| |
| }}
| |