ML24068A087

NRC Routine Inspection Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS) - Prein & Newhof

ML24068A087
Person / Time
Site:	03028571
Issue date:	03/22/2024
From:	David Curtis NRC/RGN-III/DRSS/MIB
To:	Vandyke J Prein & Newhof
Craffey R
References
EA-23-119, EN 56157 IR 2023001
Download: ML24068A087 (12)

See also: IR 07100202/2030001

Text

EA 23-119

EN 56157

NMED No. 220442 (closed)

Brent VanDyke

Radiation Safety Officer

Prein & Newhof

3355 Evergreen Drive NE

Grand Rapids, MI 49525

SUBJECT: NRC ROUTINE INSPECTION REPORT NO. 03028571/2023001(DRSS) - PREIN

& NEWHOF

Dear Brent VanDyke:

On April 13, 2023, and September 18 through 21, 2023, inspectors from the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine inspection at your facilities in Kalamazoo,

Cadillac, Muskegon and Grand Rapids, Michigan, as well as temporary job sites in Kalamazoo

and Muskegon with continued in-office review through February 21, 2024. The purpose of the

inspection was to review activities performed under your NRC license to ensure that they were

being performed in accordance with NRC requirements, and to review an incident involving

damage to a device containing licensed material that you reported on October 11, 2022. The

in-office review included an evaluation of the inspection findings and their significance. The

enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions in your license.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of an examination of selected procedures and

representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, two apparent violations of NRC requirements were

identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the

NRC Enforcement Policy, available on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-

nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violations concerned (1) four

examples of failing to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible

barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, whenever portable gauges are

not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee, as required by Title 10 of the

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 30.34(i); and (2) failing to report a safety equipment

failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of its discovery, as required by 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). The circumstances

surrounding the apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and

effective corrective action - in particular, regarding the repetitive nature of the first apparent

violation - were discussed with you at the inspection exit meeting conducted by Ryan Craffey of

my staff on February 21, 2024. March 22, 2024

B. VanDyke 2

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to

(1) respond to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the

date of this letter, (2) request a Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference (PEC), or (3) request

Alternative Dispute Resolution. If a PEC is held, it will be open for public observation and the

NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference. Please

contact Rhex Edwards at (630) 829-9722 or Rhex.Edwards@nrc.gov within 10 days of the

date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response or request. A PEC should

be held within 30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the

Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS); EA-23-119, and

should include, for the apparent violations: (1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if

contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violations; (2) the corrective steps that have

been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further

violations; and (4) the date when full compliance was or will be achieved. Your response may

reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately

addresses the required response. Your response should be sent to the NRCs Document

Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy mailed to the NRC Region III Office,

2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, Illinois 60532, within 30 days of the date of this letter. If

an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not

been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a

PEC.

If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your

perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take

into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a pre-decisional

enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has

occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain

information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during

the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information

to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation,

and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned. In presenting your corrective

action, you should be aware that the promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be

considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC

Information Notice 96-28, "Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation

of Corrective Action," may be helpful in preparing your response. You can find the information

notice on the NRC website at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-

notices/1996/in96028.html.

In lieu of a PEC, you may also request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue.

ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral

third-party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a

voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral party (the mediator) works with parties to

help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually agreeable

neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions. Mediation

gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find

areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues. Additional information concerning

the NRCs program can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-

nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell

University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact

ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in

B. VanDyke 3

pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR. In addition, if you choose ADR, please

also contact Rhex Edwards at the telephone number or email address listed above.

In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations

described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You

will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In accordance with the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure in 10 CFR 2.390, a

copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made

available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the

NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from

the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any

response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that

it can be made publicly available without redaction.

Please feel free to contact Ryan Craffey of my staff if you have any questions regarding this

inspection. Ryan can be reached at 630-829-9655 or ryan.craffey@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

David Curtis, Director

Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Docket No. 030-28571

License No. 21-18663-02

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS)

cc w/encl: State of Michigan

Stoedter, Karla signing on behalf

of Curtis, David

on 03/22/24

B. VanDyke 4

Letter to B. VanDyke from D. Curtis, dated March 22, 2024.

SUBJECT: NRC ROUTINE INSPECTION REPORT NO. 03028571/2023001(DRSS) -

PREIN & NEWHOF

DISTRIBUTION w/encl:

Jack Giessner

Mohammed Shuaibi

David Curtis

Diana Betancourt-Roldan

Kenneth Lambert

Geoffrey Edwards

MIB Inspectors

ADAMS Accession Number: ML24068A087

OFFICE RIII-DRSS RIII-DRSS OE OGC

NAME RCraffey:brt REdwards JPeralta AValentine

(PSnyder alt.)

DATE 3/8/24 3/14/24 3/21/24 3/21/24

OFFICE RIII-EICS RIII

NAME DBetancourt:GEdwards DCurtis:KStoedter

concurred behalf of signed behalf of

DATE 3/22/24 3/22/24

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region III

Docket No. 030-28571

License No. 21-18663-02

Report No. 03028571/2023001(DRSS)

EN No./NMED No. 56157 / 220442

EA No. EA-23-119

Licensee: Prein & Newhof

Facilities: 3355 Evergreen Drive NE, Grand Rapids, MI

1707 South Part Street, Kalamazoo, MI

100 East Chapin Street, Cadillac, MI

4910 Stariha Drive, Muskegon, MI

Job Site on Lake Street in Kalamazoo, MI

Job Site on Glenside Boulevard in Muskegon, MI

Inspection Dates: April 13, 2023, and September 18-21, 2023

Exit Meeting Date: February 21, 2024

Inspectors: Ryan Craffey, Senior Health Physicist

Elizabeth Tindle-Englemann, Health Physicist

Approved By: Rhex Edwards, Chief

Materials Inspection Branch

Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Prein & Newhof

NRC Inspection Report 03028571/2023001(DRSS)

This was an unannounced routine inspection of licensed activities involving the use of byproduct

material to measure the physical properties of materials. Prein & Newhof, an engineering

consulting firm, was authorized by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License

No. 21-18663-02 to store portable moisture density gauges containing byproduct material at its

offices in Grand Rapids, Cadillac, Kalamazoo, and Muskegon, Michigan, and to use them at

temporary job sites in NRC jurisdiction.

As a result of this inspection, the NRC identified four examples of an apparent violation of

regulatory requirements for failing to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that

form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, whenever portable

gauges are not under the control and constant surveillance, as required by Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 30.34(i).

The inspection also included a follow-up review of an incident involving damage to a device

containing licensed material that Prein & Newhof reported on October 11, 2022. As a result of

this review, the NRC identified one additional apparent violation of regulatory requirements for

failing to report a safety equipment failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of its discovery, as required by

10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).

2

REPORT DETAILS

1 Program Overview and Inspection History

Prein & Newhof (the licensee), an engineering consulting firm, was authorized by U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License No. 21-18663-02 to store portable

moisture density gauges containing byproduct material at its offices in Grand Rapids,

Cadillac, Kalamazoo, and Muskegon, Michigan, and to use them at temporary job sites

in NRC jurisdiction. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had 25 gauges and around

30 individuals authorized to use them.

The NRC last performed a routine inspection of the licensee on November 16 and 17,

2017, at its facilities in Grand Rapids, Cadillac, and Kalamazoo. One Severity Level III

violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 30.34(i) was identified

for two examples of failing to secure a portable gauge in transport with two barriers (only

one was used). A follow-up inspection was performed on August 20, 2018, to evaluate

the completion and effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions. Although the 2017

violation was closed, a Severity Level IV (SLIV) violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c) and

License Condition 10 was subsequently identified for failing to limit the possession of

licensed material to the locations listed on the license.

The NRC previously performed a routine inspection of the licensee on January 17, 2013,

at its facilities in Grand Rapids and Kalamazoo. One SLIV violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i)

was identified for failing to secure potable gauges in storage with two barriers (only one

was used). This violation was reviewed and closed during the 2017 inspection.

2 Security of Portable Gauges

2.1 Inspection Scope

On April 13, 2023, and September 18-21, 2023, the inspectors toured the licensees

facilities in Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, Cadillac, and Muskegon, and interviewed

involved staff to evaluate the licensees measures for securing portable gauges in use,

transit, and storage.

2.2 Observations and Findings

On April 13, 2023, an inspector visited the Kalamazoo office, where one gauge was in

storage and another in the field. The inspector found that the exterior door to the storage

room was locked. However, the case containing the gauge was not secured to anything

inside the room. There was an anchored chain that was normally used to secure both

gauge cases by feeding it through the handle of the cases and locking it. However, the

lock was not closed.

On September 18, 2023, another inspector returned to the Kalamazoo office, where two

gauges were in storage. The inspector found that the exterior door to the storage room

was locked. The inspector observed that the two cases containing the gauges were

secured to an anchor using a single chain that had been fed through the handle of the

cases. The chain was in a closed loop using a padlock. During the inspection, the

inspector observed that a ceiling tile was missing from the storage room. The licensee

stated that the building landlord was tracing plumbing in the building and the ceiling tile

had been removed to aid that process. The inspector was made aware that the landlord

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maintained a key and access to the storage closet, and on at least one occasion,

accessed the storage closet independently. Thus, the lock on the storage room

door was not considered a tangible barrier.

On September 20, 2023, the same inspector visited the Cadillac office, where multiple

gauges were in storage, multiple others in the field at the time, and one gauge onboard a

truck in the parking lot. Upon arriving at the facility, the inspector performed surveys of

the licensees vehicles that were in the parking lot. The inspector identified that one truck

contained a portable gauge. The inspector observed that the gauge was in the truck bed

and the truck bed had a cover. The inspector challenged the lock of the cover and found

that it was unlocked. Within the truck bed, the gauge was secured to one anchor using

only one chain and one lock.

On September 21, 2023, the same inspector visited the main office in Grand Rapids,

where multiple gauges were in storage and multiple others in the field at the time. The

storage location was a storage closet within the biology laboratory. No gauge users or

individuals involved with licensed activities worked at this location full time, though the

company did maintain full time staff at the facility. At the time of the inspection, two

gauges were in a storage closet behind a door with a locking handle. The key to the

closet was kept in a drawer exterior to the closet, and the gauges were placed on the

floor within the closet. There were no chains, anchors, or locks used to secure the

gauges within the closet. The licensee stated that front desk staff were responsible for

maintaining gauge security and controlling access during business hours. However,

based on discussions with the front desk staff, they were unaware that gauges were

onsite or that they were responsible for providing for their security. Additionally, the

facility had multiple entry points that were unlocked during business hours and not all

entry points were continuously monitored.

Title 10 CFR 30.34(i) requires that each portable gauge licensee shall use a minimum of

two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges

from unauthorized removal, whenever portable gauges are not under the control and

constant surveillance of the licensee.

Contrary to the above:

• On April 13, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control - an

exterior door - that formed a tangible barrier to secure one portable gauge in storage

at its facility in Kalamazoo.

• On September 18, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control -

a locked chain - that formed a tangible barrier to secure two portable gauges in

storage at its facility in Kalamazoo.

• On September 20, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control -

a locked chain - that formed a tangible barrier to secure one portable gauge being

prepared for transport at its facility in Cadillac.

• On September 21, 2023, the licensee used only one independent physical control -

a locked closet - that formed a tangible barrier to secure two portable gauges in

storage at its facility in Grand Rapids.

These examples represent an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) and are being

considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with section 2.3.4 and

6.3.c.3 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

4

As immediate corrective action to restore compliance, the licensee (1) installed an

additional locking anchored chain to secure gauge cases in Kalamazoo; (2) regained

control of the gauge being prepared for transit in Cadillac; (3) installed a key code lock

box for the key to the storage room door in Grand Rapids; and (4) installed additional

locking anchored chains to secure gauge cases in Grand Rapids.

The licensee also committed to develop and implement lasting and effective corrective

actions to address the potential for recurrence of a similar violation.

2.3 Conclusions

The inspectors identified four examples of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i).

3 Review of Event Number 56157

3.1 Inspection Scope

On September 20, 2023, the inspector interviewed involved staff and reviewed

procedures, records and equipment related to an incident involving damage to a device

containing licensed material which the licensee reported on October 11, 2022.

3.2 Observations and Findings

A. Sequence of Events and Licensee Response

On October 5, 2022, one of the licensees technicians, an authorized gauge user,

took a Troxler 3430 gauge (serial no. 32676 containing 40 millicuries of americium-

241 and 8 millicuries of cesium-137 at time of manufacture in 1999 and 2001,

respectively) from storage in the Grand Rapids office and transported it to a

construction site on Buth Drive NE, west of West River Drive in Comstock Park,

Michigan. At approximately 3:30 pm ET, the technician was actively performing a

density test (i.e., the source rod was extended into the compacted soil) when a

skid-steer operated by a contractor backed towards him. The technician attempted to

alert the equipments operator but was unsuccessful. The technician moved out of

the way to avoid being hit by the skid-steer but did not have time to secure the

source rod or remove the gauge from the measurement location. The skid-steer

struck the gauge, cracking its plastic top cover and bending the source rod such that

it could not be retracted into a shielded position.

Upon examining the damage to the gauge, the technician placed the gauge back into

the ground and cordoned off the area. The technician immediately notified the RSO,

who notified personnel at a gauge manufacturer service center in Grand Rapids, who

provided the licensee with a lead-lined barrel to safely transport the damaged gauge

to the service center. A leak test was then performed on the gauge, the results of

which confirmed visual indications that neither source sustained any damage nor

was leaking. The licensee formally transferred the damaged gauge to the

manufacturer for disposal on October 10, 2022.

B. Notifications and Reporting

The gauge was damaged on October 5, 2022, at approximately 3:30 pm ET. The

licensees RSO was immediately informed of the incident but did not notify the NRCs

Headquarters Operations Center by telephone until October 11, 2022, at 9:50 am ET

5

to report the damage to the device as a safety equipment failure per 10 CFR

30.50(b)(2). This notification resulted in Event Number 56157 and was recorded in

the Nuclear Materials Events Database under item number 220442.

Title 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) requires that each licensee notify the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

after the discovery of an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as

designed when: (i) the equipment is required by regulation or license condition to

prevent releases exceeding regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation and

radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of

an accident; (ii) the equipment is required to be available and operable when it is

disabled or fails to function; and (iii) no redundant equipment is available and

operable to perform the required safety function.

Contrary to the above, on October 6, 2022, the licensee failed to notify the NRC

within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the discovery of an event in which equipment was disabled or

failed to function as designed. Specifically, the source rod on one of the licensees

portable gauges was damaged at a temporary job site on October 5, 2022, and failed

to function as designed to retract the Cs-137 source into a shielded position and the

criteria in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)(i) through (iii) were met1. However, the licensee did not

notify the NRC until October 11, 2022, six days after the discovery of this failure.

This is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) (NRC Enforcement Policy

Section 6.9).

The licensee submitted its 30-day written report to the NRC in a letter dated

October 27, 2022, which was received on November 1, 2022. The report included all

information required by 10 CFR 30.50(c)(2).

C. NRC Assessment

The inspectors agreed with the licensees determination that the damaged gauge

met the criteria in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) to be considered a reportable safety

equipment failure. The inspectors found that the licensee promptly and effectively

implemented their emergency procedures and adequately resolved the situation with

no additional measurable radiation exposure to staff involved in the recovery.

The inspectors further determined that no violations of security and control

requirements occurred because the gauge user maintained adequate control and

surveillance of the gauge while using it, made a reasonable effort to maintain control

in the face of oncoming construction equipment, and was only forced to move away

from the gauge to protect their personal safety.

3.3 Conclusions

The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).

1 The source rods functionality was required for compliance with public dose limits in 10 CFR 20.1301 and with

Conditions 17 and 19.A (the latter as it related to the licensees commitment to implement gauge operating

procedures); the equipment was required to be operable when it was damaged (i.e., when it was in use), and no

redundant equipment was available to retract the source into its shielded position.

6

4 Other Areas Inspected

4.1 Inspection Scope

On April 13, 2023, and September 18-21, 2023, the inspectors toured the licensees

facilities in Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, Cadillac, and Muskegon, visited temporary job

sites in Kalamazoo and Muskegon, interviewed staff and reviewed records to evaluate

the licensees implementation of its radiation protection program, and to review the

effectiveness of corrective actions taken in response to a previous violation.

4.2 Observations and Findings

The Kalamazoo field office was properly posted, and independent radiation surveys in

unrestricted areas were indistinguishable from background. Utilization logs for the

gauges stationed there were completed as required. Both gauges were operable and in

good condition, and their transport cases in good condition and adequately labeled.

The authorized user at the job site in Kalamazoo maintained adequate control of and

security for their gauge while in the field, and was knowledgeable of gauge operation,

radiation protection principles, and the licensees gauge operating and emergency

procedures.

The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness licensees corrective actions for the SLIV

violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c) cited in 2018. The inspectors confirmed that the possession

of licensed material remained confined to the locations currently listed on the license.

The inspectors also found that the licensee remained knowledgeable of the requirement

to seek NRC approval for new locations of use before storing licensed material there.

The inspectors noted that the licensee requested approval in April 2021 for a new

location of use in Kalamazoo; that request was approved in June 2021.

The inspectors determined that the licensees corrective actions had been effective, and

that the violation had not occurred again since. The violation is therefore closed.

No other findings were identified during visits to the field offices in Grand Rapids,

Cadillac, and Muskegon, nor during the visit to the job site in Muskegon.

4.3 Conclusions

The inspectors had no other findings and closed the previous violation from 2018.

5 Exit Meeting Summary

On February 21, 2024, an inspector held an inspection exit meeting with the licensees

RSO by telephone to discuss the inspection findings. The RSO acknowledged the

findings presented and committed to develop and implement lasting and effective

corrective actions to address the potential for recurrence of both apparent violations.

LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED

Michael Anderson - Authorized Gauge User

Ethan Bancroft - Construction Service Manager, Cadillac

Chris Cruickshank, PE - Corporate Secretary

Dennis Todd - Authorized Gauge User

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1. Brent Van Dyke - Construction Service Manager, Grand Rapids (RSO)

1. Attended exit meeting on February 21, 2024

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

87103:Inspection of Nuclear Material Licensees Involved in an Incident or Bankruptcy Filing

87139: Portable Nuclear Gauge Programs

8