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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000302/1988035]]
| number = ML20244D967
| issue date = 05/26/1989
| title = Forwards Summary of 890405 Presentation Meeting Re SALP Rept 50-302/88-35,written Comments,Slides Used at Presentation, Errata Sheet Providing Basis for Changes to Interim SALP & Final SALP for Sept 1987 - Dec 1988
| author name = Ebneter S
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name = Wilgus W
| addressee affiliation = FLORIDA POWER CORP.
| docket = 05000302
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = NUDOCS 8906200085
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 28
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000302/1988035]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:._
      _-                                                                                  ,
                                                                                              ,
.,  -o_,
    V                                                            [,
          '
    .                                    May 26, 1989                  /
        Docket No. 50-302
        License No. DPR-72
        Florida Power Corporation
        Mr. W. S. Wilgus, Vice President,
          Nuclear Operations
        ATTN: Managar, Nuclear Operations Licensing
        P. O. Box 219-NA-21
        Crystal River, FL 32629
        Gentlemen:
        SUBJECT:  SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
                    REPORT N0. 50-302/88-35
        This refers to the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
        for your Crystal River facility which was sent to you on March 27, 1989; our
        meeting of April 5,1989, at which we discussed the report; and your written
        comments dated May 5, 1989.
        We appreciate .your efforts in evaluating the SALP report and providing
        corrections and clarification to the Interim Report.        I have enclosed a
        summary of our presentation meeting, a copy of your written comments, a copy
        of the slides which were used at the presentation, an errata sheet which
        provides the basis for changes to the Interim SALP and the Final SALP report
        for the period September 1, 1987 - December 31, 1988.
        In accordance wits Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
        Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter with the
        referenced enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
        No reply to this letter is required; however, should you have any questions
        concerning these matters, I will be pleased to discuss them with you.
                                                    Sincerely,
                                                    Original Signed by
                                                    Charles W. Hehl /for
                                                    Stewart D. Ebneter
                                                    Regional Administrator
        Enclosures:    (See page 2)
                                                                                ,
                                                                                          '
      89062000ss e90526                                                        d        /
              ADOCK 0300
                                                                            '
                                2
      {DR
                                                                        __        __  __ ??$ L
 
    ,                                                                                                    - _ - - - _ - _ _
  .. ,  . ,_
          %
      ,.
            F16rida Power Corporation            2
                                                                                        May 26,19857
l
l
l            Enclosures:
            1. SALP Presentation Meeting Summary
            2. Written Comments Received from
                    Licensee
            3. Copy of SALP Presentation Slides
,
            4. Final SALP Report Errata Sheet
'
            5. Final SALP Report as Revised
i
                    from Interim Report
            cc w/encls:
            G. L. Boldt, Vice President,
              Nuclear Production
            A. H. Stephens, General Counsel
            R. C. Widell, Director, Nuclear
              Operations Site Support
            P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear
              Plant Operations
            State of Florida
            bcc w/encls:
            NRC Resident Inspector
            Document Control Desk
                                                                                                                              l
            RII              R            RII                  RII                      RII
              d                ,k            #
                                                                  8772 C--                    /7 es[-    //
            KPoertner        Rdr  jak      PF*ed ickson  ibson  DCollins                  L
            05/af/89        0  /89      05/jgs9      05g(,/89 05/Zl/89                  05/>[/89
            RII
            MErnst
            05/ /89
                                                                    . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _        _ - _ - _                    -
 
    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _                _    . _ _ _ _                ._                                          _. _
                                                                                                                                  __,
    ..a,
      -
          t.        ..
                          ,
                              '
L                                                                                                  May'26. 1989
  -
                g
                    .
                                                                  ENCLOSURE'1
                              . A.  A meeting was held on April 5,1989, at the Crystal River site to discuss
                                    the SALP report for the period September 1,.1987 - December 31, 1988.
                                B. Licensee Attendees
                                    FPC'
                                    B. Griffin Executive Vice President
                                    W.'Wilgus Vice President, Nuclear Operations
                                    G. Boldt, Vice President, Nuclear Production.
                                    B. Simpson, Director, Nuclear Engineering
                                    R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
                                    J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
l                                  K.- Baker, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Assurance
;                                  G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services
,
                                    J. Brandely, . Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning
!
                                    B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
                                    K. Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance
l
                                    P. McKee, Director Nuclear Plant Operations
                                    V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance
                                    W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
                                C.  NRC Attendees
                -
                                    S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
                                    A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety. RII
                                    H. N. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate 11-2, NRR
                                    R. V. Crienjak, Chief, Section 2B, Division of Reactor Projects, RII
                                    P. Holmes-Ray; Senior-Resident, Crystal River
                                    J. Tedrow, Resident Inspector, Crystal River
                                    H. Silver, Project Manager, NRR
                                                                                            _-___-______ -__ _ _ _ _ _ __ -
 
                                          )
., .    .,                ENCLOSURE 3
    .
            '
      ~
                      EXITED STATES
                XECLEAR REGELATORY
                                          ;
                    @
                      COMMISSIOX
                SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMEXT
                              OF
                LICEXSEE PERFORMANCE
                                        G
                          'SA _Pj'
              d
 
                              --    - - - - - - ----- --- --- --------- - --                -- -
  ..    ..
            .
    .
              ~
      '
                      FLORIDA POWER                                                                t
                                                                                                    i
                      CORPORATION
i
                SE3TEMBER 1, ' 987 .irougl DECEMBER 31, 1988
                                                                                  .
                                  CRYSTAL RIVER
                                  A3RIL 5, ' 989
                                    .
                          CRYSTAL RIVER, ILOR JA
                                                                              - _  _ - _ _ _
 
                              -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - _ - - - - -                                      - _ -
    '
  '
          .
      -
            -
                                                                                                                          1
        .
                  SALP PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
              1.  JEsTY ~REs)S \ _CENS                                          E 3ER20RVA\C-
                                    .
                                                                                _
              2. 310V JE A 3AS S 20.R A__0CA"0\'
                  Or s RC RESOURCES
c            3.  V3 ROVE N RC REGUXORY. 3ROGRAV
                                                                                    - - - --- - - _ ---- _ --------
 
  ..  ..
          .
            t
      .
l
l'
                          l
                          V
                SA _3 310G RA V
                    R V S CLNS
              4
                              _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - -
 
                                                                ,
...      .
          .
            ,
    a.
              '
      '
                  mas 0R C 'ANGES "0 "4E
                  SALP 'R0 GRAM CONSIS" 0F...
                                                                ;
                  *  Redefinition of functional Areas
                  *  Reduction in Number of Separate
                    Functional Areas
                *  Two--New functional Areas
                      : Engineering / Technical Ssupport
                      : Safety Assessment /Quality Verification
                *  Attributes Addressing Fuman Performance
                    and Self- Assessment
                *  Emphasis on Analysis
                                                    -- _
 
                                                          1
  ..  ..
          '
    .
            '
                  PERFORMANCE AXALYSIS AREAS            !
                                                          L
                      FOR OPERATING REACTORS            i
                                            .
              1. PLANT OPERATIONS
                      .
              2. RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS
              3. MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE
              4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
                                                          :
              5. SECURITY
              6. ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT
              7. SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION
\
                                                      ---
 
+.    ..
          a
  -
            .
    .
                                              .
              3ER  0RVA\CE RA" sG CA"EGOR                      ES
              * Expanded discuss"on nient
              *
                Redefinit"on of the categories to clarify
                the"r meaning
                                                  -  - - - - -
 
                                                                                                            - --- - -
..
-
        ..
            ,
    .
              '
      '
                        AREA        PERFORMANCE
                                      CATEGORY 1
                  LICENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION AND INVOLVEMEN
                  ARE READILY EVIDENT AND PLACE EMPHASIS ON SU
  .
                  PERFORMANCE-0F NUCLEAR-SAFET(-0R-SAFECUARDS                                            r-
                  ACTMTIES WITH THE RESULTING PERFORMANCE SUB -
                  STANTIALLY EXCEEDING REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS.
                  LICENSEE RESOURCES ARE AMPLE AND EFFECTIVELY U
                  S0 THAT A HIGH LEVEL OF PLANT AND PERSONNEL
                  PERFORMANCE IS BEING ACHIEVED. REDUCED NRC ATT
                  MAY BE APPROPRIATE.
                .
                                              _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
 
..    . .
          ,
  e
            ~
    '
                        AREA PERFORMANCE
                                                                                                                          1
                                  CMEGORY2
                  UCENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO AND INVOLVEMENT
                  IN THE PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY OR SAFEGUA
                ACTMTIES. ARE GOOD. JHE .UCENSEE HAS ATTAINED-A-- -                                                    -
                  LEVEL 0F PERFORMANCE AB0VE THAT NEEDED TO MEET
                REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS. UCENSEE RESOURCES ARE
                ADEQUATE AND REASONABLY ALLOCATED S0 THAT GOOD P
                AND PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE IS BEING ACHIEVED. NRC
              ATTENTION MAY BE MAINTAINED AT NORMAL LEVELS.
              .
                                              _ . _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
 
                                                                                                                      --
..    ..
          ,
  -
                        -
            .    .
    '
                        AREA PERFORMANCE
                                    CHEGORY J
                  UCENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO AND INVOLVEMENT
                IN THE PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY OR SAFEGUARD
                ACTMTIES ARE NOT SUFFICIENT. THE UCENSEE'S
                PERFORMANCE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED THAT NEED
                TO MEET MINIMAL REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS. UCENSEE
                RESOURCES APPEAR TO BE STRAINED OR NOT EFFECTIVELY
                USED. NRC ATTENTION SHOULD BE INCREASED AB0VE NORMA
                LEVELS.
              .
                                            . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .
 
,                                                                                                                                                  _
  . .  . .
            e
      '
                                                                                                                                                            i
                                                                                                                                                      -
                  .
                                          V        C E C s ~S.JMMAR.Y
                      ' SEPTEMBER '1,1987 through DECEMBER 31, 1988
                                                        .          l        ll      Ill                                                      IV    V
                                .. .                      - . . .    - - .    _ .  - . . - .
                                                                                                                                                          .
                                                ''
              CRYSTAL RIVER                                        0          0      2                                                        22    4
                                                                                                                                              .
                              .        .            ..        .
                                  . . .
              REGION ll AVE.                                    0          0      1                                                        17    4
                          .
                                      ~
                                          :.
              PER UNIT
                                            -
                    .
                                      =            =
                                    ,.,,s.                                                                                                  -
                                                                                                                                          '
                            -                          *
                            .          .,
                            *
                          ..,,,,            . , , . , ',
                                              '
l
1
                                                                                        _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
                                                                                                  - - - - - -
    . .. .  ..
            .
                          0PERATIONS PHASE VIOLATIONS /0PERATING REA
                                    SEPTEMBER 1,1987 through DECEMBER 31, 1988
                                                                                        LEGEND
                      3..                                                                        R 11 AVE
                                                                                                CRYSTAL RIVER!
                    ""
                                                                                                UTIUTIES
                    2s -
                                      g    ,
                                                        "
                                                                                                                  !
                                                            ;-.
                          .
                              .          _      _    _
                                                                          __          _
                                                                                          . _ ...            ._
                  l
                , , ..
                                                                                    c
                                                                      ;
                                                  '
                j io .
                                    -
                                                                    -
                                                              :
                                                                                  ;
                    5"                                                      -
                    g.-                -a          w    -      -            a
                                                                        -
                                                                                    4
                          GPC      DUKE          FPL        SCE            APC
                              CRYS      Rll AV        CPL        VEP          SERI                            '
                                                  UTILIT(
-__-
 
                                                                                          -- - _ - _
  .. . . .
                                                    2 :0
    -
                              33s :?:33
                  SEPTEMBER 1,1987 through DECEMBER 31,1988
                                                                                LEGEND
              3.  3                                                          b NAT' LAVE.
                                                                                      CRYSTAL RIVER
              30'
                                                                                      PLANT TYPE
          , 2, .
          5
                                        n
          E,,.            _:        __          r _.
                                                                                  - -    - -
                                                                                                      -
                                                        18
          !is-
            10-
              5-
                  GE  CRYS  WE kTL AVCE          BW
                        3 A\~~ ~Y3E
                          _
l
                                        _______    ___-__-__- - ___- _ _ _ _ -
 
          __
..    ..
  '
              CRYSTAL RIVER LERs
            '
    .
                                (?_.AN1
                SEPTEMBER 1,1987 through DECEMBER 31, 1988
.
                .
                                                                                                                                                    '
                                PERSONNEL                                                                                                          *-
                                    54.5%
                                                                                                                                                  .
                                                                                                                                                9
                                                                                                                                          OTHER 6.1%
                                                                                                                                  9.1%
                                30.3%
                                                                                                                                      COMP. FAILURE
                  DESIGN /CONST.
                                                                                                                                                        1
                                      _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
 
                                            ____ ___          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -  _ _ .
    *
...      . .
      b
              ~
        -
                CRYSTAL RIVER LERS
                                                                                                                      '
                              (PERSO 4NEL)
                SEPTEMBER 1,1987 through DECEMBER 31, 1988
                                                                                                                    i
                    TEST /CAUB.
'
                                16.7%
                                                          MAINTENANCE
                                                                22.2%
                  ___._.-_;..--
                                                                                                          OTHER 5.6%
                            OPERATIONS
                              55.6%
                                      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _      ______________ _ - _ _
 
  ..    ..
                                                                                                                                          2
    '.    '
                                      TJNCTONA_ AREA COV?AR SON                                                                        -
                                              70R REG.ON
                                                                                                  '
                                                                                  1
                                                                                    7AC_~ES
                                                                  CYC_E V
                  14 -
                                                    n
                                                                                                      LEGEND
                                                                                                                              CATEGORY 1
                                    ;
                                                                                                      b CATEGOR
                                                        -
                    ,,
                                                                                                      bk CATEGOR
          0                          ,
          89                                          -
                                                                    ,_ -
                                                                                '
                                                                                    -
          gl*-                                                            _
                                                                                        .
                                                                                              --
          LO                              .        \
                                                                      \
                                                                                                    -
                                                                                      ,
                  g. .
              -
                <--
                            *
                                                  \            \                            -
                2"        .
                                  t
                                                            i
                                                                                          )
                                .
                                                \
                                                                              \        \
                        '
                0-            .
                                    '
                                        '
                                                                    *
                                            .
                                                          .      .        .        .
                            OPS                      MAINT            EM PREP
                                        RAD CON                  SUIN            FIRE PROT
                                              FUNCTIONAL AREA
l                                                                                                      - - - - - - - - - - -        -
 
                                                                                  _
                          4 *          . .
                                                                                                                      3
                                  .
                                    .
                                                              .\C:~ 0\ A_ AEA COM?ARSO\
                                                          .
                                  .
                                                                  7
                                                                .
                                                                    01 REG.0 \                  rAC _T~ ES
                                                                                *
                                                                                    CYCLE V
!                                                ""
                                                                                                            LEGEND
l
                                                    '
                                                                              /                            EM CATEGOR
                                                                          -
                                                                              f/      :        :-          I// CATEGOR
                                                ,,
                                                                                                            $N CATEGOR
                                                                      *
                                            0
                                            gg            ,
                                                                        -
                                                                                        .
                                                                                          -      **
                                                  "
                                          25 '          /                  /                        :
                                          !!          'f,                  /        f
                                          .,.                                                ,/
                                          Z
                                                        /f
                                                        /                  /        /                *
                                                                                                        ~
                                                            f              f                //
                                              -        // / / 7                                      f  ,
                                                        /8 /
                                                                    /      /        /                /j/
                                                                            / /                -
                '                            -        % L L lb il 4
                                              ~
                                                      e&e                          e e s.
                                                                                                          .
                                                                                                          -
                                                                    FUNCTIONAL AREA
_ _ - _ - - - _ - - - - - - - - -                              -
                                                                                                                        ,
 
                                          _ - _ - . __- _ ___ __                      ___  __                                . _ - _ _  __        ._    _ - _ _
              .~                                          . .
                                                                .
                                          -
l                                                                    .
                                                        .
  h
                                                                                                                            PLANT OPERATIONS - CATEGORY 2
                                                                        *
                                                                          PLANT. GENERALLY OPERATED IN A CONSERVATIVE MANNER
                                                                        '
                                                                          SATISFACTORY CONTROL 0F PLANT OPERATIONS
                                                                      *
                                                                          IMPROVED OPERATIONS STAFFING
                                                                  .
                                                                      *
                                                                          ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE
                                                                      '
                                                                          IMPROVED PROFESSIONALISM IN CONTROL ROOM
                                                                      *
                                                                          ADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
          ,
                                                                                                                                                                  1
                                                                                                                                                                  l
    __ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                    _ . . . _    _    _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _
 
                                                          _  __      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
  w. . -  ,, . ,
                .
        '
                  .
            4
                                                        .
                                  RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS - CATEGORY 2
                      *
                          THREE -YEAR- AVERAGE COLLECTIVE DOSE (1986-88) SLIGHTLY
                        -BELOW INDUSTRY AVERAGE
                      *
    ,
                          CONTINUED REDUCTION IN SIZE OF CONTAMINATED AREAS
                                -
                                        -
                    *
                          NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION WAS LOW IN 1987 .AND
                          1988
                    -'
                        RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS WERE WITHIN TECHNICAL
                        SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS
                    *
  '
                        STRONG MANAGEMENT SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT
,
,
                    b
                                                                                              ___________.__m. - - - - - -
 
                                            _ - _ _ _  _
                                                          . _ - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
    ..    -.          .                                                                                                          ;
                          '
        -
                                                                                                                                  l
                            .                                                                                                      i
            .
                                          ' MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE - CATEGORY 2
                                *
    ,
                                    MAINTENANCE CONTINUES TO BE A STRENGTH
                                *
                                    CONTINUING TO ENHANCE TRENDING 0F EQUIPMENT FAILURES
                                '
                                    USE OF M0CKUPS
                                *
                                  ADEQUATE CONTROL OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
                              *
                                  IMPROVED OUTAGE CONTROL AND PLANNING
                              *
                                  IMPROVED CORROSION CONTROL
                              *
                                  MISTAKES DURING MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
l
                                  CAUSED ESF ACTUATION
                              *
                                  WEAKNESSES IN IST FOR CHECK VALVES
                                                      '
                              .
                              *
                                  IMPROVED SURVEILLANCE SCHEDULING
L____.____    - - - - -
 
<.
  .
    !d '  . .
          '
                      .
            .
i
                                    EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - CATEGORY 2
                          *
                            IMPROVED PERFORMANCE DURING 1987 REMEDIAL- DRILL
                          *
                            SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE DURING JUNE 1988 DRILL
                        *
                            SATISFACTORY CAPABILITY CONFIRMED BY JULY 1988 ROUTINE
                            INSPECTION-
                                                                                                              i
                        .
                - - -                                            - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - - _ - _
 
                                                                                ___ ___ -____ - _
[. g.    , ,
            .
      .4
        (
,
                                SECURITY - CATEGORY 1
-
                *
                  EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE DURING CONTINGENCY DRILLS
                                                                                                    .
              *
                  EFFECTIVE TRAINING FROGRAM
                                                                                                  .
              *
                  SECURITY PLAN WELL MAINTAINED
              *
                  SECURITY EFFECTIVE IN IDENTIFYING FIREARM INTRUSIONS
              *
                  CORPORATE AND SITE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT SECURITY
                                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
 
                                ___ _ _ _ _
                  .      ..
                      '
                            .
                        .
                                                  ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT - CATEGORY 3
                                              ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS DID NOT CONSISTENTLY IDENTIFY
                                              ASSUMPTIONS AND DESIGN INPUTS
                                              INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF EQ
                                              PRIORITIZATION OF WORK NEEDED IMPROVEMENT
                                              FAILURE  TO  TRANSLATE DESIGN BASES    INTO TEST AND
                                              OPERATING PROCEDURES
                                              CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM STRENGTHENED TO MORE
                                              EFFECTIVELY CONTROL DESIGN CHANGES
1
                    '        *
                                              SYSTEM ENGINEER PROGRAM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
                              *
                                              SIZE OF THE ENGINEERING STAFF INCREASED
                                            .
                              *
                                              TRAINING 0F ENGINEERS STRENGTHENED
  _ _ - _ - _ _ _
 
                                                                                                                                                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
v.  ..
        .
            .  . .
          '
                    . . .
            .
                                SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION - CATEGORY-2
              .
                              '-
!
                                  QA' AUDITS WERE PERFORMANCE BASED
                                  CORRECTIVE ACTIONS NOT ADEQUATE
                            *
                                  PARTICIPATION IN PRC MEETINGS WEAK
                            *
                                  LACK 0F INTERDEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION
                          .
                            *
                                  SATISFACTORY ROOT CAUSE ANALYSES
                            *
                                  INCONSISTENT PERFORMANCE ON LICENSING ACTIONS
                            *
                                GOOD RESPONSE TO GENERIC ISSUES
  4
                            *
                                SATISFACTORY QUALITY AND TIMELINESS OF LERS
  ,
                            W
                                                                    . - _ _ . - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ . _ - -
 
        __  _ - - - - _
,v    <
    ..a    . .
[ .'                    e
  W                      ~
        .                  .
                                                                                                                                                    May 26, 1989
                                                                      ENCLOSURE 4
'
                                                                    ERRATA SHEET
                              Page  Line            Interim Report Reads                                                                    Final Report Now Reads-
[                              24    29-30            ... unfamiliarity with                                                                  ... unfamiliarity with
                                                      the E0Ps ....                                                                            the Verification
                                                                                                                                              Procedures....
  "
                              Basis: Revised to clarify the procedures that the 50TA's were found to
                                      exhibit unfamiliarity with.
                            -27      22-31          Only after this extended                                                                After reinforcement ....
                                                      period of. disagreement and                                                              the ATWS rule the
                                                      after reinforcement ....                                                                licensee exhibited a
                                                      the ATWS rule did the                                                                    very cooperative
                                                      licensee exhibit a                                                                      attitude. 'The licensee.
                                                      cooperative attitude. .The                                                              .... a design ....
                                                      licensee .... a conceptual                                                              Another example of good
                                                      design .... Another example                                                              responsiveness after.
                                                      of belated good responsive-                                                              extended discussion ....
                                                      ness ....
                              Basis:  Revised to more accurately describe,the licensee's actions with
                                      respect to ATWS and EFW.
                                                            _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -                          -
 
            . , _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._    . _ -
          .          ,                                                                                                                                                      1
  e
      '. /*    *
                                                                          ENCLOSURE 2
                                                                                                                                                                            l
                                                                                                                                                                            j
        ,
                      .
                          ...
                  .
                  i                                                                              ) ,,
                                                                                                  > g . . . o,,
                                                                                                          .
                                                                                                              8
                                                                                                                            PI; q
                  Florida
    -
                  Power
                  COR POR ATION
                              May 05, 1989
                              3F0589-05
                              Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter
                              Regional Administrator, Region II
                              U. S. Nuclear Regulatory rw einnion
                              101 Marietta St. N. W., Suite 3100
                              Atlanta, GA 30323
                              Subject:              Crystal River Unit 3
                                                    Docket No. 50-302
                                                    Operating Licensee No. DPR-72
                                                    Systematic Awcment of Licensee Ibrformance (SAIP)
                                                    Inspection Report 88-35
                                                    .
                                                            . . . . . .
                              Dear Sir:
                              Florida Power Corporation (FEC) is dedicated to the safe operation of Crystal
                              River Unit 3 and to maintaining a strong safety culture throughout our
                              organization.            FPC appreciates the significance of the SALP process and
                              respects the criticism provided.                        We are also pleased that the areas of
                              inproved performance and continued good performance were recognized.                                                                      Our
                              overall performance was rated as satisfactory; however, we are ocenitted to
                            etntinually striving to inprove our performance and to resolving the concerns
                            with tectinical support and supervisory review.
                            FPC has focused considerable attention to the engineerirxy area.                                                                            We
                            recognized problens existed and had wuwt.ive actions un$erway or planned
                            prior to the SAIP report.                        'Ibe ratiry in this area was not unexpected.
                            Internally reca;nized weaknesses, confirmed by the Operational Safety 'Ibam
                            Inspection (OSTI) and other inspections clearly iniicated a need to perform
                            an awc:mant of the tactinical support area. 'Ihis amert has resulted in
                            additional efforts to strengthen specific areas through redirected and
                            achiitional resources. Major areas in the engineering organization have been
                            realigned and inproved definiticn of the roles and responsibilities within
                            those areas are being develcped.                      We are also re-enghasizirg "feam" concepts
I                            throupiout Nuclear Operations.
                        ,
                              t! . ' .1 ") f                        f      I
            [C . ( }e n+3#
  .,
                                            POST OFFICE BOX 219 * CRYSTAL RIVER. FLORIDA 326294219 * (904) 563-2943
                                                                        A Florida Progress Company
                                                                                                                _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - -
 
_ _ _ _      _ _ - _ _      - _ _ - -
          .
              '
        ..  ;.        .
                        .
          '
              -
                          -
                                        Mr. Stewart D. Ibneter
                                        Regional Administrator, Region II
                                        U. S. Nuclear Regulatory hinaian
                                        3FT)589-05 - May 5,1989
                                        Page 2
                                        Mr. B. L. Griffin, Executive Vice President, stated at the SAIP meeting that
                                        FPC is ocanitted to striving for higher ratings. We are actively performing
                                        asseaamants in eads of the SAIP functional areas to identify and correct
                                        weakrwaaan
                                        performance.
                                                        and to identify and pursue wrtunities to further enhance our
                                                        We consider periodic self amaaaamant essential to assurirg the
                                        drive for impIUved performance is not lost and does not stagnate. We are
                                        taking    positive steps in eads area that will help us adlieve performance
                                        improvements.    We recognize open, professional n =mutication with the NRC as
                                        another element in our ongoing efforts to adileve high levels of performance.
                                        We feel cand.Jerable improvement has been made throughout the past SALP
                                        cvaluation period, arxl we look forward to a continuation of this good
                                        ocumInication in the future.
                                        Florida Power Corporation's detailed response to the Category 3 area is
                                      provided in Attadunent A.
                                      provided in Attadiment B.      C=.utus on the reainder of the evaluation are
                                      you in the near future.        We look forward to dianwrcing our progress with
                                      Sincerely,
                                                -
                                                        k rush                  - -
                                      Walter S. 11gus
                                      Vice President
                                      Nuclear Operations
                                      R3W/sdw
                                      Attadunent
                                                                                                          - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _
 
  __-              __          _ _ _ - _ -                                        -_    _ - _ _ _ _ _      _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ - _    _ _ - _ .        - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ -      . . _
        .
  ,,
;,; ; .-                .
            .,
      '-
                        . .
          .
                                                                                                                                              mg
                                                                                                              REERMSE '10 QGEIRY 3 RNFING
                            F.          Drrin==rirmmaremir=1 9====t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ,
                                        FPC management recognizes the engineering organization is not adieving a
                                        hiW1 level of quality performance an a consistent basis. Several programs
                                        and initiatives to improve performance have been under develve-A.. These
                                        include the Configuration Management Pregam, Engineering Assurance, Design
                                        Basis Issue Resolution and System Engineering.'                                                                                  Extensive resource
                                      crnanitments have been made to these programs and they are beginning to'
                                      pro &aos results. , Roosnt faadhar* from the industry and through the.SMP
                                      have demonstrated the need to' go further and to amaa== the role of-
                                      engineering in the support of Crystal River Unit 3.. ' mis assessment has
                                      resulted . in establishing a Design Basis Issue Rasolution Project Team,
                                      initiating.a review of the Envitu miumi Qualification .Prupam,                                                                                                    an1
                                      establishing a program to set the expectations and respcrisibilities for the
                                    Systens Engineers.
                                    'Iha Configuration Man , _ d. Prupam is underway to capture, I=usid.ruct
                                'and document the design basis of the plant. ' mis program is established as
                                .a separate organization with dedicated FPC supervision.. ' mis group is not
                                    effected by the ' design activities or day-to-day sqport of the plant. The
                                    objective of. this rogam                                                                          is to dmanaric the design basis- information
                                  provide the infonnation in a raadily retrievable format to those who.need
                                    it, assure the physical plant conforms to the design basis, and to assure
                                  the plant r - tnas ocnform to the design basis.
                                                                                  ~
                                  Nuclear Operations Engineering (NDE)' has primary responsibility for' the                                                                                                  *
                                  resolution of design related questions and the design of plant
                                modifications.                                                            NOE controls the, design / modification prmaan and is -
                                accountable for design input and assuring the design solution resolves the
                                problem effectively. They are also arvvunitable to assure modifications are
                                  fully? implemented and ~ tested in au dar = with the design including
                                rig-          two &anges, drawing revisions, and transfer of the final quality
                                records to file.
                                Site Nuclear Engineering Services (SNES) provides the day-to-day technical
                                angport to the plant. ' mis function includes the System Engineer Pregam,
                                Procurement . Engineering, and discipline engineering support for
                                modifications, te&nical problems, the Manctional Test Prupam, Post
                                Maintenance Test Prupam, and the ASME Section XI Repair and Replacement
                                Pru am. Site Nuclear Services plays an important role in the operation of -
                                CR-3 and is intimately involved in all critical decisions of a tednical
                                nature.
                                'Ihe Design Basis Issue Resolution Project Team has been recently
                                established. The function of this team is to deal with design basis iamma
                                that ocune tp in any area. The team is W of dedicated, disciplined
                                engineers, a licensing engineer, and a safety analysis engineer. 'Ihe team
                                will reonive potential design basis l a= == and be responsible for the
                                initial assessment of safety significance, the preliminary evaluation for
                                b:en. Lability, reocenending any rmadad changes in operational mode, and
                                sufficientresolution.
                                ultimate                                                tednical review of the i=== to determine alternatives for the
.
              ___m__m____                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . .                        _                  _ _ .
 
                          ..          _ _.  -          -          -      . - .                                        _- -
          .
  .,[*;, ' .'
;    ,      -,
        '
                .
            ,      -- F.  ;  'r    irwun- - ir=1 a---- U (C a.'d)
                          Structuring the engineering support in'this manner will ptwide effective                            3
                          tactinical s@ port and contribute to enhanced interaction with the ' plant
e                        organizations.- The acticos taken demcmstrate rwp--it's intention to
                          resolve the problems in this area.                                  '
                          FPC intends to arrange a meeting with the NRC in June 1989 to diacu== the'
                        details .of our programs and the role of Engineering at CR-3.
                        The Training area continues to asunr=1 strate a ' hiWi level of performance
                        whicts will be' further enhanced by the simlator whicts will be operational
                        in 1990.
<
                        2he SALP Report irwuactly references. Som problems with E0P's.                              The
                        identified problem was with VP's (VP-540 and BP-580).
                        Nuclear Operations Training was not required to ruegini to a concern in NRC-
,
                        Report 50-302/88-09 where a reference was nede to indication .of
                        insufficient training for SOIA's regarding VP-540 -and VP-580. However,
!
                        Nuclear Operations Training evaluates all training deficiencies and, in
                        this case, the following actions were taken:
                        1.    All Som's were evaluated on shift by a qualified'NSS or ANSS.
                        2.    Training walk-throughs ~ an VP-540 and VP-580 were given to all
                                SOM's.
                        3.    Tasuenri. Plans. covering _these VP!s were added-to-the-initial ,90m--
                                cxtrricultan.- ---    -
                                                              - - ~
                        4.    An actual walk-through was addad to the som Job 1%rformance Manual.
                        These actions were ocmpleted in ot+rhr of 1988.
  4
                                                                                - - - . _ _ _ . . _ _---.-.n__ .---
 
                                                                                                          _ - .                                  _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  .
      .. . .  . .
            ,
                  ,
    '
          ,-
                    ,
                                                                                                                                                                                                        ,
                                                              FPC CDGENIS CN 1988 SAIP
                                                                                                                                                                                                        i
L.
l'                      Overall Evaluatim
                        Florida Power Cuiputatica (FPC) is in general agreement with the overall SAIP
                      ' ratings.      FPC also~ appreciates the recognition by the NRC that. many
                        initiatives are underway to improve overall perfomance and to correct the
                      weaknesses identified.              FPC .is firmly ev=nitted to developing cxxisistently
                      high quality performance in all areas . and with identifying and resolving
                      prtblems.in an expeditious manner.                                                                                                                                        '
                      FPC is. plaaaad that the NRC has noted the impwz .L in n MW adherence
                      and g Mwal Magwy. - _ FPC has dedicated considerable resources to the
                      issue and it continues to be an area of sharp man:,                                                                                _.t focus.
                      Supervisory responsibility and involvement is an area that FPC also believes
                      is critical to safe, efficient operations. Tunadiate steps are being taken in
                      several areas and management evaluation for . langer term improvements is
                      underway.
                      A.      Plant Operaties
                              '!he six-shift rotation has' made it possible to rdww overtime and allow an
                              extra shift on duty during normal working hours.                                                                                                      'this additional
                              availability of licensed operators has improved work flow throujhaut
                            Nuclear _ Operations.          'Iha shift team umuayL for operations was also
                              implemented during~thiis SAIP~isidEiBd.~~Cbntinues iwtw _ .L in operations .
                              is expected frtan these changes and as the newer operators beame 'more
                            experienced.
                            'Ihe operations staff has shown initiative in the development.of operator
                            professionalism.      'Ibese efforts will continue to be encouraged by
                            marwynant.      _ Efforts are underway to extend these initiatives - and to
                            enhance the professional envitw===st in which our training is done.
                            ITC took innadiate steps to resolve the ocncerns with the BDP's identified                                                                                                .
                            by the BOP innpection. We are also participating with the BfM Owners Group
                            to address dwgies with tedinical cantant.                                                                                                            'the plant specific
                          .sindator, W11ch will be operational next year, will contribute
                            significantly to the verification and validation that can be accomplished
                            on E0P's.
      *
                      B.    Endiological controls
                            FPC is plamaad with continuing improvements in this area. As noted,
                            considerable marwpunant support and involvement has been present.
                            Improvements in tg ability to safely process personnel in and out of the
                          Rch have been made. FPC is continuing to identify uw0itanities to inprove
                          the Radiological Protection Fxvg am and has several actions underway
                          through the cambined efforts of the Health Physics and Radiological Support
                          Services departmpets.                'Ihese include coupleticm of the Radiological
                            Protection Plan, issuing a periodic newsletter an radiaticm protection, and
                          closer coordination between these depad-da.
      .
                                                      _ . -              __  . _ _ _ . _ _ . . - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - - - . - - - - _ _ _ . _ _ -
 
            _ _ - _                              . -      ..    - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .              ______ __-__ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _                                - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _
                                          .
t                                                    ,
'
        c :< ' a,      .
              .,
                          ,1
  s
                    '
    ..
                      '
                            -
                                      B.      n.Mn1,we=1 Qxitzn1= La.'d)
                                                A self assessment of the overall . AIARA program is underway.                                                                                          '1his
                                                amaa==arit has been undertaken since wa now have several years expecience
                                                with    the program and new guidance has been developed sinos our sur- = was
                                                implemented. '1his is an area where additional grovenant .is actuevable
                                                and ==='M.
                                                A .; ,        d. attention continues                                                    to      sephasize            plant                decontamination.
                                              Unernnemrod amaan                            to the plant is recognized as a contributor to safe
                                              operation, as well as a means to r*= overall cost.
                                    C.        Maintenance / Surveillance
                                              Maintenance
                                              Crystal River Unit. 3.
                                                                                      is critically Important to the safe, reliable operation of
                                                                                                FPC places a . Lug esphasis in this area and is
                                              very pleased with your assessment of our perfonannae. We are continuirq to.
                                              pursue improvements and are currently in the prmaan of a major assessment
                                              of maintenanos. We are considering the maltitude of_ activities, including
                                              engineering, materials,                            contracts, . quality programs, etc., thati form a
                                              ocuplete,. , overall maintenance program.                                                              '!his aammam ant is' hamad on
                                              information frun industry, both <hantic and international, INPO, the NRC,
                                              a:L our internally. developed experience. FPC considers this effort a key
                                            -factor      in the future performance of CR-3 and the continued high level!of
                                              performance in maintenance.
                                            - A significant <v=nitment to improving the Surveillance testing performance
                                            was made following the previous SAIP period.: . A large p.=;w ,Unge of the
                                            p -- bnm were rewritten to the approved writers guide format; technical
                                              W=y has been yrgaGed; and the g<-- bres were validated by both the
                                              reepansible engineers and the users. 'Ihe results of these efforts are now
                                            being evaluated to assure the objectives of our. effort have been met.
                                            Additional improvements will be implananted as they are riaaded.
                                            'Ihe implementation of the new 10 year in-service inspection and testing
                                            programs, along with the administrative changes arti staff increases,'will
                                            provide a . Lug foundation for continuing performance inprovenant in this
        .                                  area.
          .
                              D.            Baettamcy Preparedness
                                            Emergency Preparedness is an area that has shown continued                                                                                        L=.#1.    '1he
        '                                  deficiencies noted with the last emergency exercise have been corrected.
                                            'Ihe does assessment capability has been improved through incranaad team
                                            sizes, enhanced training, and improved rvemmication.
        -
                              E.          Security
        .
                                            'Ihe achievement of Category 1 in Security is particularly satisfying
                                            oansidering past performance.                                                      'Ihe efforts to improve the management of
                                            this area have been avv=aaful and improved the recurity effectiveness.
        ,
                                            Hi@t performance levels will be maintained in this area.                                                                                                Current
                                          managmaant
                                            systems and facilities.
                                                                    attention is beiny directed to the mananamarit of the security
                                          being developed.
                                                                                                  A pupam to tpp.3E systems and ecpiprrent is
                                                                                        It is anticipated this will be a phased gwpam over the
                                            next several years.
      '.
                          .
                                                                          .                                          -
                              _ _ _ _                                                                                              . - - - - - -          --                            -
 
    .__- _ - _ _
l'
                >
  :.                .. .
                          '
l
                  '
                            *
                      ,
                                F.      Dnineerim/Tednical 9-ww=t
                                          See At' xhment A.
                                G.      Safety Aaaaanmant/G =1ity Verificaticm
                                        Resources
                                        correctivehave  beenga=.
                                                    acticri    directed toward the nanocnformance identification and
                                                                        A medensive review has been performed and
                                        a major rework of the pr%imu is urder development. 'Ihis effort will
                                        resolve the acroerns identified and will be inpleented later in this SAIP
                                        period.
                                        Manacfasit emphasis is contiming on procedural adherence. 'Ihe Human
                                        Performance Evaluation Frwimu is expanding and the Safety Training
                                        Observation Pr w sma (SIOP) has been implemented.      'Ihis ptwtan ack!r m e= =
                                        nct only safety issues, but all facets of task performance includirq
                                        w w dares, radiation protection, workmanship, etc.
                                        Extensive Vendor 'Ibchnical Information program enhumsis were completed
                                        at the end of the SAIP period.        Efforts are continuing in this area to
                                        further mi.uuidien this program.
                                      A  significant ===anent of overall licensirg activity has been taking
                                      place.    Efforts to provide more distinct definition of the roles and
                                      responsibilities, as well as the expectations, of the licensing staff will
                                      achieve inproved and more consistent performance.        Improved ocannunication
                                      with the NRC at technical and management levels also contributes to
                                      improved performance in this area.
                                      FB::
                                      to  beconsiders the m.=rds on' A'IWS and the achiitional source of feedwater
                                              misl=11ng.      Although the resolution of these i=== was mutually
                                      agreeable, FPC does not consider the NRC Staff's actions on these issues to
                                      have been timely or responsive. 'Ibere was cruisiderable delay in FPC
                                      receiving an NRC position that clearly identified the specific problems. In
                                    both < a==a, the issues came down to regulatory riiar= fort and not technical
                                      issues. When this was ocamunicated FPC could, and did, aggressively pursue
                                    appropriate resolution.
                                    'Ibe Configuration Manacfasit gwima is currently a mial for the industry.
                                    FPC's approach is to do it right through a med,Eussive, well-planned-out
                                    program. 'Ihe depth and quality of the effort does make the schadule larger
                                    than would be desired. However, nuch of the information and benefit will
                                    be available to the users as the program pr%s                  .                    FPC developed this
                                    piwimu internally and is managing the s wima thtu gh dedicated resources.
                                    'Ihis will aaatte mavi== benefit is obtained by the in-house staff.
                                    FPC has made changes in the operation and guirlance for the Plant Review
                                    Omnittee (PRC) .      It is noted, however, that the PRC operates under an NRC
                                    approved alternate approach.            'Ihis may ocritribute to the perceived                          '
                                    weakrmaaa. FPC will review the PRC operation and evaluate uwerwnities
                                    for improvement.
                              H.    Idosisiin Activities
                                    No Ctznent
                                                                                              _____-____-_-__ ___ - - -      _
 
          _ - _ -          - _ _ - _ _    - - -        - - - - - -
                  -
                  1, ;
    ..,;...-...
Fi    ,.              .
'
            '' ,        '-
                                        I.  Ehfaroummt Activity
                                          No &=nant
                                        J. Reactor Trisas
                                          No ownant
                                        K. Crystal River Iktit 3 Efflust: Dal---- A
                                                                              -
                                                                                    w
                                          No Ocaments
  ,
                                                                                      _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
  __ _ _ _ - _ _ .                .__                                                                                      .
                                                                                                                              '
            .,    -
                        ,.
!
t
                          -
                    *
                            .                                                                          May 26, 1989
!
:
l
I
l
                                                                  ENCLOSURE 5
                                                              FINAL SALP REPORT
                                                    U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                                    REGION II
                                              SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
                                                          INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER
                                                                !iO-302/88-35
                                                          FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
                                                            CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3
                                                  September 1, 1987 - December 31, 1988
                                                                                                                              l
                      5+ n, vn, ;- i n i,'7n /,n 7 Ts u,      ,lLl) -
                                                                                        -. - - - - _ -              - --__
 
                                                                                                                                                                '
1
    -
  ,    .,- .
1
      .
              .
        5
                                                  TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                                                                                                          Page
                  I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................                                                                            1
                    A.  Licensee Activities ................................... 2
                    B.  Direct Inspection and Review Activities ............... 2
                II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ......................................... 3
                III. CRITERIA ................................................... 4
                IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ....................................... 6
                    A.  Plant Operations ...................................... 6
                    8.  Radiological Controls ................................ 10
                    C.  Maintenance / Surveillance .............................                                                                          13
                                                                                                                                                                  1
                    D.  Emergency Preparedness ...............................                                                                            17    i
                    E.  Securi,ty    .......r....................-.. ......r..........                                                                    19
                    F.  Engineering / Technical Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
                    G.  Safety Assessment / Quality Verification ............... 25
                  V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES ............................. 29
                    A.  Investigation Review ................................. 29
                    B.  Escalated Enforcement Action ......................... 30
                    C.  Management Conferences ............................... 30
                    D.  Confirmation of Action Letters ....................... 31
                    E.  Review of Licensee Event Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
                    F.  Licensing Activities ................................. 31
                    G.  E n fo rc eme n t Ac t i v i ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2
                    H.  R e a c to r T r i p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2
                    1.  Ef fl uent Rel ea se Summa ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
                                                                                                                                                                  I
                                                                                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _
 
                                                                                                                                                          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
    *
          -
  .      .
            .
      *
              .
        .
                I.  INTRODUCTION
                    The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is an
                    integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and data on
                    a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance on the basis of this
                    information. The program is supplemental to normal regulatory processes
                    used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations. It is intended
                    to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocation
                    of NRC resources and to provide meaningful feedback to the licensee's
                    management regarding the NRC's assessment of their facility's performance
                    in each functional area.
                    An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on
                    February 23, 1989, to review the observations and data on performance, and
                    to assess licensee performance in accordance with Chapter NRC-0516,
                    " Systematic A3sessment of Licensee Performance." The guidance and
                    evaluation criteria are summarized in Section III of this report.                                                                The
                    Board's findings and recommendations were forwarded to the NRC Regional                                                                                    .
                    Administrator for approval and issuance.                                                                                                                  I
                    This report is the NRC's assessment of the licensee's safety performance
                    at Crystal River Unit 3 for the period September 1, 1987 through
                    December 31, 1988.
                    The SALP Board for Crystal River Unit 3 was composed of:
                    L. A. Reyes, Director, Reactor Projects Division (DRP), Region II (RII)
                      (Chairman)
                    A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Recctor Safety (DPS), RII
                    D. M. Collins, Acting Director, Division of Radiation Safety and
                      Safeguards (DRSS),RII
                    B. A. Wilson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, DRP, RII
                    H. N. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate 11-2, Office of Nuclear
                      Reactor Regulation (NRR)
                    P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector, Crystal River, DRP, RII
                    H. Silver, Project Manager, Project Directorate 11-2, NRR
                    Attendees at SALP Board Meeting:
                    R. V. Crienjak, Chief, Project Section 28, DRP, RII
                    M. S. Lewis, Project Engineer, Project Section 2B, DRP, RII                                                                                                ,
                    J. E. Tedrow, Resident Inspector, Crystal River, DRP, RII                                                                                                  '
                    P. A. Balmain, Reactor Engineer, Technical Support Staff (TSS),                                                                                          !
                      DRP, RII                                                                                                                                                '
I
I                                                                                                                                                                            1
                                                                                                                                                                              '
I
                                                                                                                                                                              I
i
                                                                        _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
  .    -    . -  -.    -    -  -    -.                                              - - - - -          - - - - - -
L
p.,,..
L          -
1.  a            ,
      -
                                                              2
                    .A.      Licensee Activities
                              This assessment period included a continuous operating record of 216
E                            days, 'as well as a refueling outage and three short maintenance
                              outages. The unit sustained two reactor trips, and had an average
                              capacity factor for 1988 of 80%.        This capacity factor compared
                              favorably to the average B&W capacity factor of 62.5%.
'
                              Crystal River began this assessment period by achieving criticality
                              on September 1,1987, following a maintenance outage to repair a.
                              mechanical seal on a reactor coolant pump. On September 19, 1987, a
                              plant shutdown was commenced for a scheduled refueling outage.. Major
                              work included: inspection and maintenance on the emergency diesel
                              generator (EDG), removal of a pressurizer safety.- valve for
                              maintenance, replacement of main steam code safety valves, and
                              replacement of a Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System pump
                              discharge valve. On January 8, 1988, followfng the refueling outage.
                              a reactor startup was commenced and criticality achieved. The
                              reactor tripped from approximately 55% power on February 28, 1988,
                              due to high reactor coolant system pressure. A broken stem nut
                              caused the failure of a main feedwater block valve to close which
                              caused a feedwater transient and a Reactor Coolant Pressure
                              transient. The reactor was critical and resumed power operations on
                          ~ March 2, 1988. On March 7,1988, the plant was shut down for a
                            maintenance outage to perform maintenance on the. main feedwater
                              system. Power operations resumed on March 8,1988. The plant was
            ,              shut down on October 9, -1988, to replace leaking emergency feedwater
                            check valves. Criticality was achieved on October 27, 1988; however,
                            the reactor tripped on October 28, 1988, from 20% power due to
                            problems with the turbine header pressure controls. Criticality was
                            achieved on the same day, and power operations resumed.                  The plant
                            was shut down for a maintenance outage to investigate and repair
                            vibration problems with a reactor coolant pomp on December 7,1988.
                          The plant continued in cold shutdown conditions for the remainder of
                            this period.
                          During the assessment period, ten technical specification amendments
                          were issued, as well as five reliefs and one exemption.
                        B. Direct Inspection and Review Activities
                          During the assessment period, routine inspections were performed at
                          Crystal River Unit 3 by the NRC staff.          Special inspections were
                          conducted as follows:
                          -
                                  August 24-September 4, 1987; This special Operational Safety
                                      Team Inspection was to monitor operational activities and
                                      operations support interfaces.
                          -
                                  October 5-9, 1987; This inspection was conducted to review the
                                      licensee's check valve testing program.
                          -
                                  October 14-16, 1987; This special inspection was conducted to
                                      review the circumstances surrounding the removal of Icad
                                      bricks serving as the access barrier to the reactor cavity
                                      area.
                                                                                            - - _ - - - _ _ -
 
            __-          _ _ _ _ _ _        --- - _- _--                    ___- __        -        _ _ - -    -.          _- - _-
u-    .,
            ,
    W '' .:    *
                  ,
                    a
l:        ..                                                                3
                                          -
                                            October 20-21,.1987;- This reactive inspection was performed to
                                                      evaluate the licensee's imple:nentation of its Emergency
                                                      Plan when an alert was declared.
                                        -    November 30-December 4,.1987; This inspection was-in the_ area of
                                                : emergency ' diesel generator (EDG) loading.
                                        -    December _7-17, 1987; This inspection was in the areas ofs
                                                      engineering safeguards test witnessing, review of: EDG-load
                                                  . testing procedures, and review of. procedures for, flow
                                                      balance testing of selected. safety-related components.
                                        -    January 5-7, 1988; Tnis 'special inspection was: performed to
                                                      review the circumstances surrounding a. radiation worker's
                                                  -entry-into a high radiation area.-
                                        -    March 28-April 8,1988; This inspection was to review the
                                                      adequacy of the. emergency operating procedures.
                                        -    November 14-18, 1988; This inspection was conducted to determine
                                                  -the cause for higher than industry average collective exposure
                                                      in 1983 through 1987.
'
                      II.        SUMMARY OF RESULTS
                                The Crystal River facility was effectively managed and has achieved a
                                  satisfactory level of operational safety.                    The licensee continuei to
                                exhibit a strong maintenance program and has made significant improvement
                                .in the areas of security and to a lesser degree, radiological controls.
                                  However, weaknes.ses have been identified covering inadequate supervisory
                                  review. in the areas of operations and surveillance.                            Significant-
                                weaknesses (inadequate staff / staff training) were noted .in the area of
                                  engineering / technical support.
                                The weaknesses associated with supervisory review resulted in a lower
                                  overall rating in both the operations and surveillance areas. In.the
                                  operations area, the severity of several events was compounded because of
  '
                                  the lack of appropriate safety assessment by responsible supervisors. In
                                  the surveillance area, several failed surveillance                            were passed as
                                  satisfactory because of inadequate supervisory reviews.
                            .The licensee's resources in the engineering and technical support staffs
                                  are at minimal levels. This has resulted in several . examples where
                                  requested / required engineering analysis was not timely or not provided at
                                  all. There were examples where engineering lacked insight in prioritizing
                                work in regards to plant safety.                    Additionally, engineering does not
                                  appear to be a part of the plant " team", thereby having a negative effect
                                  on inter-departmental cooperation.
                                As described in the two previous paragraphs, the performance attributes of
                                  both supervisory reviews and engineering sensitivity (i.e., establishing
                                  priorities based on plap safety) have been marginal. These weaknesses
                                were also noted in most SALP categories. However, because of the
                                  importance of these attributes on overall quality, a significant negative
                                  impact was noted on the area of safety assessment / quality verification.
                                                                                                  ___-____--________-_-_a
 
    -        ..
  .        .
                .
      ..
                  ,
        .
                                                                  4
                          A noteworthy improvement has been observed in the security area. As noted
                          in the previous SALP, there has been a significant effort by the licensee
                          to improve this area. This effort resulted in increased awareness by all
                          site personnel and considerable expenditure of money and resources to
                          improve security. The appointment of a new security supervisor at the end
                          of the previous SALP period has resulted in providing this area with the
                          necessary leadership to reach and continue to perform at a high level.
                          The maintenance area has continued to be a strong performer within the
                          plant organization. However, surveillance has been added to this area
                          and, although somewhat improved, it has not progressed to the level of the
                          maintenance area.      Emphasis by the licensee is still required in the
                          surveillance area to bring it on par with maintenance.
                                            [ April 1, 1986 Through August 31,1987]
                                                                      Rating Last            Trend Last
                          Functional Area                              Period                Period
                                Plant Operation                          2
                                Radiological Controls                    2
                                Maintenance                                1
                                Surveillance                              3
                                Fire Protection                          1
                                Emergency Preparedness                    2                Improving
                                Security                                  2
                                Outages    --
                                                      -- . . _ __        2
                                Quality Programs and                                                    . ..
                                  Administrative Controls
                                  Affecting Quality                      2
                                Licensing Activities                      2
                                Training                                  2                Improving
                                        [ September 1,1987ThroughDecember 31,1988]
                                                                      Rating This            Trend This
                          Functional Area                              Period                Period
                          Plant Operations                                2
                            (operations & fire protection)
                          Radiological Controls                            2
                          Maintenance / Surveillance                      2
                          Emergency Preparedness                          2
l                        Security                                        1
l                        Engineering / Technical Support                  3
                            (engineering, training & outages)
'
                          Safety Assessment /                              2
                            Quality Verification
                            (quality programs & licensing)
                    III. CRITERIA
                          Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending
                          on whether the facility is in a construction or operational phase.
!
l
l                                                                                        _ -    ------___-----__--o
 
  ,___ _            _-_    . _ _ _    _-_ __          . _ _ - . -  __
                                                                                          _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _    _ - _            _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
      .: .
          .. .
                .
                  .                                                                                                                                    j
            :.                                                      5
                      Functional areas normally represent areas significant to nuclear safety
                    and the environment. Some functional areas may not be assessed because of
                      little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful observations.
                    Special areas may be added to highlight significant observations.
                    The' following evaluation criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each
                      functional area:
                      1.      Assurance of quality, including management involvement and control;
                    2.      Approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety
                                    standpoint;
                    3.      Responsiveness to NRC initiatives;
                    4.      Enforcement history;
                    5.
.
                            Operational
                                    of, reportingand
                                                  of, construction
                                                      and corrective    events  (including)
                                                                          actions  for ;                  response to, analyses
!                    6.      Staffing (including. management); and
                    7.      Effectiveness of training and qualification program
                    However, the NRC is not limited to these criteria and others may have been
                    used where appropriate.
                    On the basis of the NRC ' assessment, each functional area evaluated is
                    rated according to three performance categories. The definitions of these
                    performance categories are as follows:
                    1.    Category 1. . Licensee management attention and involvement are
                            readily evident and place emphasis on superior performance-of nuclear                                                      ;
                            safety or safeguards activities, with-the resulting ~ performance
                            substantially exceeding regulatory requirements. Licensee resources
                            are ample and effectively used so that a high level of plant and
                            personnel performance is being achieved.              Reduced NRC attention may
                            be appropriate.
                    2.      Category 2.        Licensee management attention to and involvement in the
                            performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are good. The
                            licensee has attained a level of performance above that needed to
                            meet regulatory requirements. Licensee resources are adequate and
                            reasonably allocated so that good plant and personnel performance is
                            being achieved.        NRC attention may be maintained at normal levels.
                    3.      Category 3.        Licensee management attention to and involvement in the
                            performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are not
                            sufficient. The licensee's performance does not significantly exceed
F
                            that needed to meet minimal regulatory requirements. Licensee
                            resources appear to be strained or not effectively used. NRC
                            attention should be increased above normal levels.
                    The' SALP Board may also include an appraisal of the performance trend of a
                    functional area. This performance trend will only be used when both a
                    definite trend of performance within the evaluation period is discernable
                    and the Board believes that continuation of the trend may result in a
                    change of performance level. The trend',-if used,'is defined as:
                                                                                                                      _ _-_-__ -
 
,        -_ _ _ _ _                        ._                --                                                    _
                                                                                                                        _-  ._          _
  -, c .            , ,.-
L                      .
              '
                          .
                    -
                                                                          6
                                Improving: Licensee performance was determined to be improving near the-
                                -close of the assessment period.
                                                                                                                                          1
                                Declining:      Licensee performance was determined to be declining near the
                                close of the assessment period and the licensee had not taken meaningful
                                steps to address this pattern.                                                                            l
                            IV.  PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
                                                                                                                                          l
                                A.  Plant Operations
                                      1.      Analysis
                                                In addition to routine inspections, an Operational Safety Team
                                                Inspection (OSTI) was completed during this assessment period.
                                              The principle objectives of the OSTI were operational safety
                                              performance, operations support, design, corrective actions,
                                              safety committee function,      and ' management oversight.
                                                Inspections of the licensee's Emergency Operating Procedures
                                                (E0P) and fire protection program were also performed.
                                              Plant operations were generally conducted in a conservative
                                              manner to ensure plant safety.        An indication of this
                                              conservative approach to operation was the decision to stop a
                                              reactor coolant pump in November 1988, when an increase in pump
                                              vibration was indicated. One instance of a non-conservative
                                              operational decision was the continued operation of the plant
                                              with a bonnet leak from an emergency feedwa_ter check valve even
                                              though a plant shutdown provided an opportunity to repair this
                                              leak.    The leak resulted in emergency feedwater piping
                                              temperatures exceeding the piping design temperature.                          The plant
                                              staff was observant of Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs)
                                              and generally conservative in its application of action
                                              statement requirements.
                                              Overall control of plant operations was satisfactory.                                A
                                              continuous on-line Crystal River operating record of 216 days
                                              was achieved during this assessment period.                            In addition,
                                              Crystal River's average capacity factor of 80% for 1988 compared
                                              favorably to the Babcock and Wilcox plant average of 62.5%. Two
                                              reactor trips occurred; the same number of trips that occurred
                                              in the preceding evaluation period. During one of these reactor
                                              trips, plant operators responded expeditiously and prevented
                                              excessive cooldown of the primary system when the main turbine
                                              failed to automatically trip.    Effective operator action was
                                              also evident in April 1988, when a main steam isolation valve
                                              inadvertently closed and a high pressure reactor trip was
                                              averted. In January 1988, another high pressure reactor trip
                                              was avoided when a feedwater valve failed closed and caused a
                                              feedwater transient. These actions are noteworthy considering
                                              the rapid response required to mitigate primary system
                                              transients induced by secondary transients in babcock and Wilcox
                                              plants.
                                                                                        . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _            . .  -_
 
_ -_            _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
    }.    ,
              c
                4
        '-
        .4
            .                                                              7
                                                  Two instances of deficient operator' performance were also noted.
                                                  During the process of placing the main. turbine generator on line                                                '
                                                  for a plant startup'in October 1988, an excessive-steam flow
                                                  transient occurred that resulted in one of the two reactor-
                                                  trips.- During this event, an operator increased steam flow in
                                                  response to annunciated alarms instead of-decreasing steam flow,
                                                  which would have helped to reduce the pressure transient.
                                                  During a _ plant ,heatup in October 1988, an inadvertent loss of
                                                  decay heat removal cooling occurred because operators were
                                                  unaware of a: change to the isolation pressure setpoint for this
                                                  system.
                                                  Operations staffing has improved.      A six shift rotation. for
                                                  operators has been implemented.    This rotation allows' for three
                                                  operating. crews, an off crew, daily work group / relief crew, and '
                                                  a crew in training. Based on feedback from numerous operators,_
i-                                                this rotation was favorably received and has raised the morale
                                                  of the operations staff.    Coincident with this effort, the use
                                                  of operator overtime has been significantly reduced. As'a
                                                  drawback however, the use of less experienced operators
                                                  contributed to the problem the licensee has had with adherence
                                                  to plant procedures.
                                                  The use of less experienced operators to perform plant
                                                  operations heightened the need for increased - supervisory
                                                  attention.    Several of the violations listed below, and
                                                  nonconformances identified by the licensee, could have been -                                              - - -
                                                  avoided had ' increased supervisory rev'few of the' inexperienced
                                                  operator activities been performed. NRC management met with the
                                                  licensee's management on November 9,1988, to discuss concerns
i                                                of plant personnel performance and corrective actions for
                                                  improvement.
l                                                Several strengths in the operations area were noted by the OSTI,
                                                  including the general sensitivity of operators to strict adher-
                                                  ence to procedures, and timely and thorough shift turnovers.
                                                  Although the sensitivity of operators to adherence to procedures
                                                  has been heightened, problems in this area still exist. Failure
,                                                of operators to properly implement procedures account for most
l                                                of the violations listed below (violations b, c, d, e, f and g).
'
                                                  The licensee has been responsive to this problem and is continu-
                                                  ing to implement corrective actions to identify and correct the
                                                  root causes for these events. These corrective actions are
                                                  discussed in more detail in the Safety Assessment / Quality
                                                  Verification section of this report.    The operations staff has
                                                  instituted a working group which reviews all completed surveil-
                                                  lance and operating procedures performed by operations, to
                                                  detect procedure noncompliance.
                                                  An inspection of the licensee's E0Ps identified numerous minor
                                                  procedure deficiencies. However, overall the E0Ps were found to
                                                  be adequate for continued operation of the facility. While none
                                                  of the individual deficiencies noted were significant enough to
                                                                                              - - - - _ - _ . - - _ _ - . - - _ - , - _ _ . _ - _ _ - - _ --
 
    - _ _ - - -
V.*;            .
                  ..
r                    s
    :<                ,
                -
                                                    8
                          be issued as violations, the larg number found reduces the
                          margin _ of safety of plant operation by placing unnecessary
                          demands on the operators required to take prompt corrective
                          measures during events. Many discrepancies in the areas of
                          procedure technical content, writer . guide adherence, and human
                          factors were identified, including procedure nomenclature and
                          control board labeling inconsistencies. The number of these
                          inadequacies indicate that the E0P verification and validation
                          program had not been adequately performed. To alleviate
                          concerns, the licensee committed to rewrite and revalidate all
                          the E0Ps.
                          The ~ licensee has undertaken several efforts to improve
                          professionalism in the control room including the development of
                          an Operator Code of Ethics.      This document was developed by the
                          plant operations staff to establish high standards of
                          performance. To focus attention of the operators to the control
                          board, the licensee has modified the control room furniture
                          arrangement such that the desks now directly face the consoles
,
                          instead of away from.
                          The installation of an " Operations Lunchroom" has removed much
                          of the traffic in the control room at lunch time. The licensee
                          has also moved the operations turnover meeting to a location
                          ot.tside of the control room, reducing the. traffic and noise
                          level in the control room. On two occasions, non-work related
                          material was noted in the control room. Although this material
                          did not appear to hinder the control board operator performance,
                          it was' considered to be inappropriate for maintaining the
                          professional environment and attitude necessary in the control
                          room.
                          The conduct of shift turnover meetings continues to be a strong
                          point in plant operations.      A _ representative from the site
                          engineering staff has augmented the representatives from the
                          other organizations at these meetings. This addition improves
                          the overall plant control, coordination and support needed by
                          the operations department.
                          Plant operators are encouraged to identify equipment
                          deficiencies and initiate work requests for repair. This action
                          is readily apparent in the number of deficiency tags initiated
                          from the operations department and is reflected by the generally
                          good material condition of plant equipment. The licensee'is
                          striving to operate with a " black board" in the control room.
                          Approximately six annunciators are presently alarmed when the
                          unit is operating at 100 percent power.
                          The licensee's administrative control procedures, which
                          implement the fire protection program, control fire hazards
                          within the plant, and training requirements for the plant fire
                          brigade, were found to meet NRC requirements and guidelines, and
                          were adequate to meet the licensee's fire protection program,
i                                                                ------____ ______ _ _
 
                                                                                              _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
  .. +    .. .
it              *
  , .
      .,.
            -
                                              9                                                                                        1
                      Implementation of the fire prevention administrative controls,
                      and the control of combustible and. flammable ~ materials 'in
                      safety-related areas of the plant were satisfactory.
                    The. fire protection extinguishing systems, fire protection
                      system, and. fire barrier assemblies required for protection of
                      safe shutdown of systems were functional. The licensee's' fire
                      brigade organization -staffing. 'and training met NRC
                      requirements. The training and drills for the fire brigade
                    members met the frequency specified by plant procedures. The
                    effectiveness of the fire brigade emergency response was also
                    evaluated during an unannounced drill observed by.the NRC staff.
                    The overall brigade and brigade leader performances in the drill--
                    were very good and demonstrated .the capability to effectively
                    respond to emergency fire events. The observed drill was
                    considered realistic.
                    Although housekeeping in most of the plant was considered
                    adequate,- housekeeping in several' plant areas was noted to be
                    poor. Areas such as the diesel fuel oil. transfer pits, sodium
                    hydroxide storage- tank room, low level waste compacting room,
                    decay .. heat pits, and seawater room declined in general
                    cleanliness. When the NRC brought these conditions to_ the
                    licensee's attention, appropriate actions were taken to remedy
                    the situations.
                    Seven violations were-identified: -        -      -                                -                      _. _
                    a.    Severity Level V violation for. failure to determine the
                            reactor coolant system cooldown rate at least every 30
                            minutes as required by technical specifications.
                            (302/87-28-02)
                    b.    Severity. Level IV violation for failure to adhere to
                            operating procedures during radioactive liquid release.
                            (302/87-30-02)
                    c.    Severity Level IV violation for failure adhere to
                            procedures requiring an adequate fire watch during
                            welding activities. (302/87-34-02)
                    d.    Severity Level IV violation for failure to adhere to plant
                            procedures related to clearances.      (302/87-40-01)
                    e.    Severity Level IV violation with three examples of failure
                            to implement plant procedures.      (302/88-01-01)
                    f.    Severity Level IV violation for failure to implement the
                            requirements of plant procedures.      (302/88-14-02)
                    9    Severity Level IV violation for failure to have two.
                            operable battery chargers to supply the 'B' station
                            battery. (302/88-29-02)
                  2. performance Rating
                    Category: 2
                                                                        _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -                                -
 
y
  4-  .c.
          .
    ..
            ,
        .
                                                10
                  3.    Recommendations
,
                        None
              B. Radiological Controls
                  1.  Analysis
'
'
                        Inspections were conducted in the areas of radiation protection,
                        radiological effluent and confirmatory measurements during this
                      assessment period. A special team inspection was also conducted
                      to assess the licensee's program for maintaining radiation
                      exposures as low'as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
                      The Acting Superintendent of Chemistry / Radiation was confirmed
                      in the position, the former Chemistry Manager was promoted to
                      Assistant Superintendent of Chem / Rad with new responsibilities
                      in health physics, and the former Staff Chemist became the new
                      Nuclear Chemistry Manager.
                      The licensee's health physics, radwaste, and chemistry staffing
                      levels were ' adequate and compared well with other utilities
                      having facilities of similar size.        An adequate number of
                      American National Standards Institute (ANSI) qualified licensee
                      health physics _(HP) technicians were available to support
                      routine operations.      During outage . operations, additional
                      contract HP technicians were used to supplement the permanent HP
                      staff. ' The ovdrall. ~qua~lityland:experiencelevel of the HP . staff
                      are viewed as a program strength. Radiation protection training
                      was considered good.. The licensee's general employee training
                      (GET) in radiation protection was well defined. The GET program
                      not only included standard topics as outlined in 10 CFR 19, but
                      also findings of licensee audits and NRC inspections. The HP
                                              was accredited by the Institute of Nuclear
                      technician
                      Power        training (INP0) during this assessment period.
                                Operations
                      Management support of and commitment to training were evident in
                      that sufficient time was allowed for training and employees were
                      encouraged to attend.
                      Management support and involvement in matters related to
                      radiation protection were demonstrated by improvements in the
                      instrument calibration facility, relocation of the contaminated
                      clothing laundry, and the development of a new radiation
                      controlled area (RCA) exit which resulted in lower radiation
                      levels in the personnel contamination monitoring area. The
                      licensee has also purchased new monitoring instruments, which
                      have improved the monitoring of tools and equipment leaving the
                      RCA.
                      Resolution of technical issues was adequate, as evidenced by the
                      licensee's development of a comprehensive program for the
                      containment and monitoring of .small highly radioactive
                      particles. Response to NRC initiatives was conducted in an
                      effective and acceptable manner. Specifically, in response to
                      NRC inquiries, the licensee verified the vendor software for the
                                                                            - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ -
 
        - _ - _ _ .
  . .'      ..      .
                      .
      *
                        .
                -
                                                    11
                          new whole body counter and formalized the methods us2d by the HP
                          staff in upgrading protective clothing requirements specified in
                          radiation work permits.
                          The licensee's respiratory protection program was adequate,
                          although a violation (violation b) was identified relating to an
                          individual who was issued and wore a respirator when hic medical
                          qualification had been withdrawn. The licensee aggressively
                          evaluated this finding and took prompt and effective corrective
                          actions.
                          Near the beginning of the assessment period, there was an event
                          involving the removal of several lead bricks from a permanent
                          shielding barrier blocking the reactor cavity access by an
                          unauthorized auxiliary nuclear operator. Mhen the lead bricks
                          were removed from the reactor cavity access, a high radiation
                          area of 50 R/hr, which was uncontrolled with respect to
                          barricading, posting, and access, was created. This radiation
                          field existed for a period of approximately 30-45 minutes until
                          it was discovered and controlled by a HP technician. Although
                          the radiation dose to the worker was less than NRC limits, there
                          was a significant potential for the worker to receive exposure
                          in excess of NRC limits. During an NRC inspection, additional
                          violations were identified, which involved a plant worker
                          entering a posted high radiation area without the required
                          radiation monitoring device and failure to follow plant proce-
                          dures. The violations from these two events (violation a) were
                          collectively categorized as a Severity Level III problem.
                          After the events, the licensee promptly notified the NRC and
                          took extensive corrective actions. The quality of the radiation
                          protection program improved during the assessment period.
                          The 1987 collective radiation dose was 487 person-rem,
                          approximately 32% above the national average of 368 person-rem
                          per pressurized water reactor (PWR). For the years 1986 through
                          1988, the three year average was 335 person-rem as opposed to a
                          national three year average of 345 person-rem for PWRs. In
                          1988, the station's collective radiation dose was 71 person-rem,
                          which was significantly below the national average.                However,
                          there was no refueling or major maintenance outages in 1988.
,                          The NRC performed a special assessment of the licensee's program
                          for maintaining occupational radiation doses ALARA. A high
                          level of plant and corporate management awareness of and support
                          for the dose reduction program was noted. The licensee has
                          taken a number of initiatives, including reorganization of the
                          Nuclear Integrated Planning Scheduling Group, to effectively
                          manage outage related tasks and reduce collective radiation
                          dose. The effectiveness of these initiatives in reducing the
                          collective radiation dose for a major maintenance or refueling
                          outage is yet to be demonstrated.
I
                                                                                _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - _
 
    *
          *
  .    e
            .
l
      '
              .
        -
                                            12
l
l                  At the end of 1987, the area of the plant controlled as
                    radioactively contaminated was approximately fourteen percent of
                  the total area that potentially could become contaminated. At
                  the end of 1988, the area contaminated was approximately seven
                  percent. The total area contaminated was in the median for
                  Region II plants. The licensee's decontamination efforts during
                  the assessment period have significantly improved personnel
                  eccess to the spent fuel pool floor and the miscellaneous waste
                  evaporator room.      The continued reduction in the size of
                  contaminated areas throughout the plant has had a positive
                  effect on plant operations by reducing the use of protective
                  clothing and respirators as well as radiation exposures and
                  personnel contaminations.
                  The licensee experienced 131 personnel contaminations in 1987,
                  56 of these were skin contaminations. The number of personnel
                  contaminations in 1987 was among the lowest in Region II. The
                  number of personnel contaminations in 1988 declined to 56; 43 of
                  these were skin contaminations.
                  The licensee's program for packaging and shipping radioactive
                  material was generally adequate.          However, a violation
                  (violation c) was issued for exceeding the NRC limit for free
                  standing liquid in a waste container transported to a low level
                  waste burial facility.
                '
                  Liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents were within the
                  technical specification (TS) limits and in compliance with
                  40 CFR 190 limits on radiation dose and radioactivity
                  concentration in effluents. Fission and activation products in
                  gaseous effluent were slightly lower in 1987 than in 1985 and
                  1986.    Radioactivity in liquid effluent was approximately the
                  same in 1987 as compared to 1986. There was no significant
                  trend in the quantity of radioactivity in gaseous and liquid
                  effluents discharged from the plant.      Effluent summary data for
                  1985, 1986, and 1987 are contained in Section V.I of this
                  report.
                  Three violations were identified:
                  a.    Severity Level III violation for failure to adequately
                          control access to high radiation areas, failure ta
                          provide adequate radiation instruction to an Auxiliary
                          Nuclear Operator in a restricted area, failure to
                          establish adequate radiation protection and refueling
                          operations procedures, failure to have a radiation dose
                          instrument upon entry into a high radiation area,
                          failure to provide and implement adequate procedures for
                          prompt corrective action for radiation safety violations,
                          and failure to follow radiological control procedures
                          (302/87-35,88-03).
                  b.    Severity Level IV violation - for failure to maintain
                                                                      . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
    . _ - - _ .
  ,-            ,.
          *
                    .
                -
                                                          13
                                        adequate records to implement the approved respiratory
                                        protection program (302/87-29-01).
                                c.    Severity Level IV violation for failure properly solidify
                                        liquid waste transported for burial (302/87-39-01).
                          2.  Performance Rating
                                Category:    2
                          3.  Recommendations
                                None
                        C. Maintenance / Surveillance
                          1.  Analysis
                                In addition to routine inspections, a special check valve test
                                program inspection was conducted during this assessment period.
                                Significant surveillance activities included an integrated
                                containment leak rate test and snubber surveillance. A
                                refueling outage occurred during this assessment period, along
                                with three relatively short maintenance outages to repair main
                                feedwater control valves, emergency feedwater check valves and a
                                reactor coolant pump.
                  ,            The check valve. inspection focused mainly on the ability of the
                                licensee's testing program to establish check- valve disk and
                                seat integrity, location of check valves with respect to sources
                                of turbulence, review of the maintenance and failure history of
                                check valves, and the licensee's response to industry recommen-
                                dations for improving check valve testing programs. Weaknesses
                                were noted in the licensee's inservice testing program for check
                                valves; for example, the program only satisfied the minimum
                                requirements of the code, most of the check valves were not
                                being tested to demonstrate that the valve could perform all of
                                its safety functions in the open and closed positions, and most
                                of the valves were located closer to sources of turbulence thL.
                                recommended by the manufacturer for optimal performance. An
                                emergency feedwater system overtemperature event, which occurred
                                in June 1988, could have been averted had the safety function of
                                this system's check valve, in the closed position, been tested
                                and deficiencies corrected.
l                              Weaknesses in scheduling surveillance and in the overall
I
                                management of the inservice inspection and testing programs were
                                discussed in the previous SALP. To correct the scheduling
                                problems, the licensee revised the scheduling procedure, and is
                                also implementing a computerized system to eventually replace
                                this procedure. The computer system will schedule and track
                                accomplishment of all surveillance, with the exception of
                                special condition surveillance, which will continue to be
                                tracked with procedures.
I
L____________._--__.  _        _
 
!
  ..
        ,,s
          .
l'  ;'
            ~
        .
                                        14
l              The licensee's surveillance testing program was satisfactorily-
l:              established and implemented.      The licensee implemented a new 10
                year inservice inspection and testing program in.1988 and
                committed to a more recent edition of the inservice inspection
                and testing code.  This program was developed and controlled by
                the licensee in contrast to the previous program which was-
                developed by a contractor. All inservice inspection testing
                procedures were rewritten,- verified and validated to the new
                code.
                Past problems with the overall management of the ISI/IST
                programs were in the areas of. procedural adherence, program
                implementation and documentation, and program change review and
                approval. These areas were reviewed on three inspections during
                the current assessment period. To improve' performance, the .
                licensee has reorganized its staff so that the Nuclear Technical
                Support Superintendent can be dedicated to inservice inspection
                and testing issues.    Staffing has been expanded to five
                permanent employees by adding two senior results engineers,
                thereby reducing the dependence on contractors. This expansion
                is expected to enhance the trending of data being placed into a
                computerized data base. For further improvement, the adminis-
                trative controls in this area have been rewritten and
                strengthened.  Additionally, three program documents have been
                created, Non Destructive Examination, Repair and Replacement,
                and Hydrostatic Testing, to better define program activities ano
                responsibilities.  Through interviews and review of programs,
              procedures and records, the NRC staff has ascertained that
              management's actions have effectively addressed the past
                problems and enhanced the ISI/IST programs over the SALP period.
              Surve111ances in the areas of snubbers and containment leakrate
              were conducted with well written procedures, knowledgeable staff
              and adequate preplanning.
              Maintenance continues to be a strength of the licensee's
              performance.    An example is the use of predictive maintenance
              analysis.  Oil and vibration analysis on mechanical equipment,
              as well as infrared analysis on electrical equipment, predict
              degrading trends in equipment pe dormance, allowing equipment to
              be repaired before failure occurs. This program has predicted
              the impending failure of a reactor coc'! ant pump and a gear box
              for a closed cycle cooling water pump.
              The adequacy of preventive maintenance procedures was identified
              as a weakness in the previous SALP. To correct this deficiency,
              the licensee has reviewed and revised .93 preventive maintenance
              procedures to verify technical accuracy and inclusion of human
              factor principles.    The development of preventive maintenance
              procedures for the Integrated Control System (ICS) should
              strengthen the maintenance program. These procedures include
              pre-operational and periodic checks of ICS components, response
              testing of ICS instrumentation, and calibration of ICS control
                                                                    . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - -
 
  L>>.
  s 3, p  ,; .            , ,
                                                                                                            :)
  ,            ,
    ,
        ..y        . , .'                                                                                      i
                '
            ,
                                                          15
n
                                circuitry. . Although the-procedures have been written, they have
L                              not been. fully implemented.
"
                              .The. licensee has implemented a non-safety related equipment
                                reliability improvement policy. This policy ' directs that
                                improvements be madecin operation, maintenance, and failure
4
                                analysis measures for equipment that is critical to plant
                                operation. These measures have historically been used only on
                              . safety related equipment. Some of the; non-safety related
                                equipment selected for the improved treatment include main
1    '
                                feedwater control valves, ICS, critical . electrical power
                                supplies, normal reactor heat removal systems,. turbine generator
                                protection. systems, fire systems, security systems and critical
                                heating and ventilation equipment.
                              A Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Testing System (MOVATS) has
                                been implemented. This system' tests the operability and proper
                              switch settings for motor- operated valves. Training on this
                                system is conducted using a-training valve and generating faults.
                                to enhance the' diagnostic skills of the workers. Although the
                                licensee developed maintenance procedures for the use of M0 VATS,
                              deficiencies were noted, including the . omission of,. problems
                              . identified. in two NRC information notices, and the method for
                              performing the. stroke timing.of valves. The licensee plans to
..                            perform diagnostic testing of all motor operated valves regard-
L                              less of use. This action exceeds the recommended regulatory
                              action required.
                              The reliability centered maintenance program.is still evolving.
                              The program uses machinery history data and the frequency at
                              which components fail to predict future failures. The licensee
                              is continuing to improve the equipment data base to enhance
                              computer trending of_ equipment failures.
                              Another strength of the maintenance program is the use of mockup
                              facilities for. workers to develop and practice good trouble-
                              shooting techniques.        This practice was evident during
                              inspections of reactor vessel core nozzles and skirt welds, and
                              the equipment qualification modification to terminal blocks
                              located inside the reactor buildi g. The use of mockups in the
                              pre-job training for this work reduced equipment downtime and
                              substantially reduced the worker's stay time in high radiation
                              areas.
                              Overall control of maintenance activities was adequate. However,
                              mistakes made by maintenance technicians while performing
                              maintenance or surveillance testing resulted in four actuations
                              of-Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems. This number of ESF
                              actuations accounts for approximately half of the actuations
                              that occurred during this assessment period. In another case,
                              the lack of extensive maintenance troubleshooting techniques
                              employed to determine and correct main feedwater valve control.
                              problems that caused an Emergency Feedwater system actuation in
                                                                                      . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ -
 
      .. -  .
      .    ,
              .
                                                                                                                                            l
                -
                                                                                                                                            i
          .
                                                                                                  16
                  January 1988, resulted in a second actuation of the system a few
                  days later. The maintenance department backlog of work requests                                                          i
                  remained fairly consistent in 1988, at an average of 290 work                                                            i
                  requests.                                                                                                                l
                  All the violations listed below pertain to procedure adherence                                                            ,
                  and procedure adequacy. The failure of supervisory personnel to
                  conduct adequate reviews is a weakness that has been repeatedly                                                          ,
                                                                                                                                            '
                  identified to facility management and was noted to be a weakness
                  in the previous SALP assessment. To correct this deficiency,
1                  the licensee is training the first line supervisors in root
                  cause analysis and human performance evaluations.                                                          To improve
                  the adequacy of surveillance procedures, the engineering staff
                  has devoted considerable time and effort to rewrite and validate
                  all the procedures.
                  The licensee improved the overall control and planning for
                  outages. A strength in this area is the continued use of outage
                  planning meetings, which are held twice daily to schedule
                  activities and resolve conflicts. A new group called Integrated
                  Planning was formed after the 1987 refueling outage. This group
                  serves the function of outage planning and scheduling as well as
                  day-to-day maintenance planning, and has performed well in the
                  two outages following formation of this group. The planning
                  group has made a positive impact on maintenance activities by
                  causing less scheduling changes and more efficient use of
                  available manpower.                                                            Another strength for controlling- work-
                  during outages is the establishment of job sponsors. They
                                                                                                                                          '
                  perform the project manager functions for maintenance activities
                  that have a potential need for coordinated efforts.                                                              Job
                  sponsors plan and schedule all aspects of the activity including
                  resolving the problems that could delay work.
                  Major improvements were noted in corrosion control and plant
                  operations to limit corrosion.                                                            These improvements were the
                  results of several licensee activities including the successful
                  removal of corrosion products from the steam generators,
                  increased surveillance and maintenance related to the main
                  condenser, replacement of copper-nickle alloy tubes in the
                  moisture separator reheaters, and improved training and quality
                  control within the Chemistry Department. The chemistry program
                  has been strengthened through the promulgation of a corporate
                  policy statement that endorsed the water chemistry guidelines
                  recommended by the Steam Generator Owners Group (SG0G) and the
                  Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
    -              Five violations were identified;
                  a.    Severity level IV violation for failure to test the emer-
                            gency power supply to the 'A' pressurizer heaters as
                            required by technical specifications.                                                        (302/88-11-01)
                  b.    Severity level V violation for failure to adhere to
  9
                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _--
 
    _
        _ _ _ - .      _ . _ - _ _ _          _  _ ___      _ _ -      . _ _    - ._.      __                          _ ___-
            ,;.
                  c
      *
                    .
i          *
                                                                              17
                                                        procedures regarding boron concentration analysis for the
  '
                                                        core flood tanks. (302/88-16-02)-
                                            c.        Severity level IV-violation for failure to have an adequate
                                                        maintenance procedure for'the replacement of a hotleg
                                                        RTD.      (302/88-29-01)
                                          d.          Severity level IV violation for failure to properly
                                                        implement a surveillance procedure during engineered
                                                        safeguards channel calibrations. (302/88-29-05)
                                            e.        Severity t.evel IV violation for_ failure to. set RPS trip set-
                                                        point conservatively, resulting in only two RPS chan-
                                                        nels operable for a three hour period. (302/88-34-01)
                                      2.  Performance Rating
                                          Category:        2
                                      3.  Recommendations
                                          The licensee is encouraged to complete implementation of.-its
                                          computerized tracking system and preventive maintenance on the
                                            integrated control system.
                                    D. Emergency preparedness
                                      1.  Analysis-
                                          The inspections conducted during this assessment period by both
                                            resident and regional staffs included a remedial radiological.
                                          medical emergency drill, a reactive emergency preparedness
                                            inspection, an exercise with full participation by the risk
                                          counties, and a supplemental dose assessment drill to
                                          demonstrate corrective actions taken in response to an exercise
                                          weakness.
                                          The remedial radiological medical emergency drill was conducted
                                          on September 3, 1987, to demonstrate corrective action to
                                          deficiencies observed during the 1987 emergency exercise. The
                                          1987 emergency exercise was not part of this SALP period. The
                                          remedial drill disclosed that effective management and control
                                          of the drill were implemented, and that health physics practices
                                          and contamination control were significantly improved and
                                          considered adequate.
                                          The reactive emergency preparedness inspection evaluated the
                                          licensee's implementation of its Emergency Plan on October 16,
                                          1987, when an Alert emergency condition was declared as a result
                                          of events accompanying the loss of offsite power. The scope of
                  ,                      the reactive inspection was expanded to include a similar event
                                          that occurred on October 14, 1987.            The inspection identified
                                          one violation that addressed a procedural noncompliance problem.
                                          A subsequent inspection found the licensee's corrective action
                                          to be adequate.                                                                        '
                                                                                          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _        -
 
                                _
                                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _
'f',;
        . *.
  ..        .
      4
                                              18
                    The routine emergency preparedness inspection performed in July
                    1988 disclosed that the licensee maintained a capability for
                        3
                    prompt notification of the affected counties in the event of an
                    emergency.    Organization and management of the Emergency
                    Preparedness program were reviewed and determined to be-
                    adequate.    Review of an independent audit of the program,
                    conducted by the licensee's Quality- Programs Department,
i.                  disclosed that all findings identified were tracked for adequate
                    response and required closeout action.
                    Additionally,~the routine inspection reviewed the status of the
                    training program, including the review of selected lesson plans,
                    examinations and test results for Emergency Coordinator Training
                    and Emergency Sample Team Training.      The inspection also
                    included an interview in the Control Room with the Shift
                    Supervisor on duty. The individual exhibited a broad knowledge
                    of the Emergency Plan and its . implementing procedures.
                    The emergency exercise, with full participation by the risk
                    counties, was conducted in June 1988, and demonstrated that the
                    licensee could satisfactorily respond _ to an emergency at the
                  -facility.    However, two exercise weaknesses were identified.
                    One of the weaknesses addressed the failure'to fu'lly meet the
                    exercise objective of demonstrating an understanding of
                    Emergency Action Limits (EALs) and proficiency .in recognizing
                    and classifying emergency conditions 'in the Technical Support
                  Center (TSC). Specifically,-the exercise controllers prompted.                  -
                    the Site Area Emergency (SAE) declaration whe'n exercise partici-
                  pants failed to promptly declare a-SAE based on greater than 50
                  mR/hr at the site boundary for greater than 30 minutes. The
                  other exercise weakness addressed the need for timely and
                  correct'offsite dose projection data in the Emergency Operations
                                                                                                    .
                                                                                                    '
                  . Facility (E0F). This occurred because of the time-consuming
                  practice of obtaining radiological and meteorological data from
                  the Control Room and then providing the information to the dose
                  assessment teams in the TSC and the E0F via telephonic communi-
                  cations. The licensee identified the source of their problem
                  and took aggressive corrective action. Corrective actions
                  included additional instruction on the new dose assessment
                  computer model along with a computerized display of radiological
                  and meteorological data in the TSC and E0F. The licensee fully
                  demonstrated this capability to the NRC on November 10, 1988,
                  with a supplemental dose assessment drill.
                  One violation was identified:
                  Severity Level IV violation for failure to maintain and
                  implement the Emergency Plan        Implementing          Procedures
                  (302/87-36-01).
              2.  Performance Rating
                  Category: 2
 
                                                                                                                  _ _ _____-__
[,. ...
        .
          4
    -
                                              19
l
                3.  Recommendations
                      None
              E. Security
                1.  Analysis
                    During this assessment period, five security inspections were
                      performed by the regional staff. In addition, the resident
                      inspectors devoted numerous hours to the review of daily on-duty
                    security force performance.
                    The licensee has submitted changes to the Physical Security Plan
                    through change No. 4-22 and 4-24, dated July 18, 1988. These
                    plan changes were submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p)
                    and did not decrease the effectiveness of the security program.
                    The licensee also submitted revisions to the Physical Security
                    Plan to address the Miscellaneous Amendment and Search Require-
                    ments regulation.      The licensee's submittals were sound and
                    consistent, demonstrating the existence of well developed
                    policies and procedures for the control of security related
                    activities.
                    In an effort to improve the effectivenesses of the Physical
                    Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Training and
                    Qualification Plan, the licensee,is in the process of rewriting
                    these plans.    The plans were recently submitted for NRC review
                    and comment.    To expedite the review process, the licensee has
                    met with the NRC to discuss concerns and make the necessary
                    adjustments. These meetings, along with the early submittal of
                    the plan change proposals, have aided both the licensee and the
                    NRC in ensuring tinely and effective implementation of the new
                    plans.    It was further noted that the licensee has revised
                    security procedures, and has augmented the security procedures
                    with individual security post orders.
                    Although there are no established requirements for security
            '
                    lighting to be equipped with a back-up power source, the
                    licensee, in response to a previous Regulatory Effectiveness
                    Review finding, completed actions to include a portion of the
                    protected area lighting on the Technical Support Center
                    emergency diesel generator.
                    The security staff, with positions and responsibilities well
                    defined, is adequate to implement the physical protection
                    program.    In addition, the security training program is well
                    established and is oriented towards both formal classroom
                    instructions and hands-on proficiency evaluations.                                    Recent
                    inspections have verified that the training programs are
                    providing effective training to responders as evidenced during
                    contingency response drills. The responders were able to
                    effectively neutralize the threat by applying sound tactical
                                                                            _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ -              -
 
                                                                                                _ _ _ _ - -
t ,3    3
        ^
l          .
!
    -
            .
1:
      '
                                                  20
'
                        deployment. maintaining control of the situation, and using good                      i
                        radio discipline.    It was further noted that the alarm station
                        operators, were capable of communicating and maintaining direct
                        command. and control of security . activities during the contin-
                        gency response drills.
                      Another example of the licensee's on duty security force
                        alertness has been their ability to detect, on numerous
                        occasions, th: attempted introduction of firearms :into the
                        facility through' both the personnel and vehicle access portals.
                      Corporate and Site management exhibited a knowledge and
                      understanding. of security requirements, as well as ' a demon-
                        strated supportive attitude towards enhancing the physical
                      security features. This has been evidenced by the willingness
                        to upgrade the perimeter. intrusion system 'and through the
                      procurement of a state-of-the-art computer system. However,
                      during testing, the new computer system was found unreliable and
                      failed to achieve the NRC's security requirements. Therefore,
                      the licenta will continue to utilize the old security computer
                      system pending an in-depth review to determine what type system
                      -will best be adaptable to their needs.
                      No violations were identified during this rating period.
                  2.  Performance Ratig
                                          -                                      . _ . . .
                                                ,
                  3.  Recommendation
                      None
              F. Engineering / Technical Support
                  1.  Analysis
                      The Engineering / Technical Support functional area addresses the
                      adequacy of technical and engineering support for all' plant
                      activities. To determine the adequacy of the support provided,
                      specific attention was given to the identification and resolu-
                      tion. of technical issues, responsiveness to NRC initiatives,
                      enforcement history, staffing, effectiveness of training, and
                      qualification.    Activities evaluated include those associated
                      with the design cf plant modifications; technical support
                      provided for operations, maintenance, testing and surveillance;
                      training; and configuration management. This evaluation is
                      based on routine and special inspections conducted by the NRC in
                      this area and related functional areas and on the licensee's
                      day-to-day performance.      The results of the Operational Safety
                      Team Inspection (OSTI), which was started at the end of the
                      previous assessment period, will be addressed in this report
                                                                                                            ..
                                                      _______ _______ ________ _          ._ _
 
                                                _                            _ __      ..
                                                                                                    .
If,_c
  .
    .
          +
      '
            .
;
l      *:
                                        21
                because the results were issued and responded to in this
                assessment period.
                Engineering weaknesses' were identified in -this assessment
                period. The weaknesses were programmatic inadequacies related
                to control of engineering calculations, quality of design base
                information, prioritization of- plant requests for engineering
                assistance, awareness of environmental qualification (EQ)
                requirements, translation of design basis information into plant
                precedures, soundness and completeness of licensee-analyses, and
                control of vendor technical information.
                Engineering calculations did not consistently identify
;              assumptions and design inputs.        Examples of the use of
              unverified calculations .in the development of design parameters -
              were identified. Additionally, engineering calculations were
              not consistently filed and readily retrievable.                            These
              calculation deficiencies indicate that the design bases are not
              well documented.
              The continuing and expanding Configuration Management Program
              (CMP) is a' major effort to improve engineering performance.
              This program will provide field validation of accident analysis
              base documents, improvement and validation of design basis
              documents, development of a computerized safety list system and
              a configuration management information system. This long term
              program is: intended to substantially improveithe. quality and                      .
              timeliness of engineering reviews and design activity. The
              projected CMP completion period of five years, due to resource
              constraints, impacts the timeliness of resolution.
              A lack of prioritization for engineering assistance requests
              from the plant was a contributing factor to violations (e) and
              (f) discussed in the Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
              section related to overtemperature of energency feedwater
              piping. An engineering evaluation requested for a potential
              overtemperature condition was not performed, therefore a poten-
              tial safety significant condition was not identified.
              Design engineering's inadequate familiarity with EQ requirements
              and issues was a major contributing factor to violations (b) and
              (c). This poor EQ familiarity resulted in inadequate EQ
              consideration in modifications, incorrect removal of components
              from the EQ list, and inadequate EQ master list control.
              Previously existing deficiencies which were identified this
              assessment period included the translation of design bases into
              equipment design, operating, or test procedures. Specific
              examples of these deficiencies included the design loading of
              emergency diesel generators, ultimate heat sink temperatures,
              and minimum design cooling flows to safety related components.
              An additional example identified that the surveillance test for
                                                                                                ..
                                                      ________________-______ - - - -
 
                                                                          _ _ _      ._ _ ____-_ - _
  c' .' -
          4
    -
            .
                                        22
                the Reactor Building Spray Pumps was based on ASME section XI
                requirements, which did not fulfill system design requirements.
              Other programmatic problems identified included failure to
                include High Energy Line Break (HELB) analysis in modification
              package development and inadequate evaluation of incoming vendor
              technical information. The design basis requires HELB analysis
              for safety related modifications as an on-going design criterion
              and this analysis has never been performed. With respect to
              vendor technical information, the incoming information had not
              been adequately evaluated to determine the impact on the design
              function of the associated component or system.
              Inattention to detail resulted in an additional violation and
              deviation.    The technical support staff welding engineers failed
              welders, resulting in violation (d).to assure    that (fproduction
                                                        Deviation      resulted welds we
              from inadequate implementation of a design requirement into a
              modification. This modication, which implemented a Regulatory
              Guide 1.97 requirement for a containment high range radiation
              monitor control room recording and indicating display, failed to
              assure the required recording display was installed.
              The licensee's resolution of the previously discussed weaknesses
              and resulting deficiencies demonstrated broad-based problems in
              Crystal River's responsiveness to NRC initiatives, resolution of
              technical issues,. and the identificati.on and correction of
              problems.    The licensee took an uncertain, non-comprehensive,
              approach to defining the actual EDG load to assure adequacy in
              the short term. The licensee did not respond initially to NRC
              suggestions to perform actual load testing, and response to both
              the long and short term solutions to the loading problem was not
              timely.    Regarding the ultimate heat sink temperature
              discrepancy, the immediate corrective action was adequate;
              however, the final proposed limiting temperature and TS
              submittal were delayed nearly one year. The licensee's
              resolution of the HELB analysis deficiency is a comprehensive
              program but with an extended proposed completion date due to
              resource constraints and other commitments. These examples of
              extended resolutions and limited response activity indicate a
              poor responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
              The resolution of issues from a safety standpoint has also been
              demonstrated to be 6 weakness.        For example, the original
              submittal to resolve the HELB analysis problem was not adequate
              and required amplification and clarification before the NRC
              staff agreed to permit continued operation. As another example,
              the licensee requested discretionary enforcement in September
              1988, to permit containment purging for nine days prior to
              shutdown to reduce containment radiation levels caused by an
l            unidentified 0.6 GPM primary system leak. This request was not
f            granted because radiation levels did not justify compromising
              containment integrity.                                                                    ,
l
t
                                                                                _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ -
 
  , ~ ., :.
            -
1.
l
      .
              ,
        -
                                          '23
                  Crystal River was deficient in problem correction in the design
                  area as demonstrated by the resolution of the EDG overload and
                  combustion air inlet temperature issues. The failure to correct
                    identified problems in a timely manner resulted in violation (a)                                  '
                  and a civil penalty. Although the licensee identified the load
                  calculation error, the event chronology of discovery, reporting
                  and resolution indicated a non-aggressive corrective action
                  strategy for resolving a potentially serious problem.                      The
                  evaluation and short term resolution of the combustion inlet
                  temperature problem was inadequate.
                  Management and staff responded positively to NRC requests for
                  engineering evaluations to determine the root cause of letdown
                  cooler failures and suitability of replacement. A third cooler
                  was added to enhance plant safety.      In the evaluation of a
                  feedwater block valve failure, the engineering staff was
                  knowledgeable, responsive to NRC questions, and provided
                  considerable detail of the event. Management involvement in the
                  evaluation was evident. Good response to NRC initiatives was
                  demonstrated by engineering staff support and response to the
                  NRC inspection teams for Emergency Operating Procedures and
                  Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
                  The licensee has continuing and recently initiated activities to
                  address engineering staff weaknesses. A major contributor to
                  improved engineering support is the implementation of a system
                ,
                  engineering program. The system engineer concept provides the                                    1
                  advantages of improved trending of system performance and a
                  designated responsible individual for interface contact and
                  system information consolidation.
                  The large amount of engineering effort required by present
                  commitments (ATWS, CMP, HELB, response to bulletins and generic
                  letters, etc.) has placed a heavy burden on available resources.
                  Recognizing that staff shortages or strained resources impact
                  all areas of engineering performance, the licensee has increased                                  ,
                  its staff approximately 30 per cent and plans to continue this
                  growth in an effort to reduce reliance on contract employees.
                  This reduction in contract employees is, in part, a response to
                  a weakness recognized during the previous assessment period.                                  In
                  conjunction with staff increases are efforts at staff improve-
                  ment, which include engineering training classes. These classes
                  are designed to increase overall plant system knowledge by
                  providing instruction in systems, plant operations and system
                  interactions. Training in EQ requirements is not included in
                  the system engineering training but is to be included in a
                  training plan for design engineers.
                  During this assessment period the licensee has initiated and
                  continued significant efforts to improve engineering perform-
                  ance. Much of this effort has directly resulted from weaknesses
                  identified in the previous SALP period and ind' cates                                            1
                  management's intention to dedicate resources for resolving                                        i
                  problems in this functional area.    The staff has demonstrated
                                                                                                                      1
                                                                                                                    i
                                                                              . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
                                                                                                                                  . _ _ .                                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
      .,,.'.
  ,
        *        *
                    #e,
              , , -
                      e
      ..
                  .
                                                              24
          *
>
                        #
                        4ej      the capability of responding competently and effectively to
                                  plant conditions and specific technical or regulatory issues.
                                  However
                                  technical licensee response to NRC initiatives, resolution of
                                                issues and correct.on of problems has been
                                  inconsistent. -The examples of poor performance previously
                                a iscussed in these. areas indicate a need for increased emphasi
                                pe    resources to provide consistent high quality engineering
                                      ormance.
                                Opera r      licensing examinations
                                                                            administered during the
                                assess
                                reactor nt period achieved _ a 100 per cent pass rate. Six-
                                were admiperator
                                              istered.and four senior reactor operator examinations
                                operator t ining program.This success rate indicates a high quality
                                examinations                        One detriment to the training and                                                                                            !
                                simulator is      as the  absence    of a plant specific simulator. The
                                in 1990.            esently scheduled to be delivered and operational
    '
                              Information provi
                                                        d to examiners for examination development
                              was
                              the Joblegible,    curren , and effective in relating lesson plans to
                                          Task Analyst
                                                            for operators. Lesson plans- for licensed
                              the learning objectivesand non-licensed oper tor training wer
                              of the plans good.              ere clear and concis'e, and the content
                              During the evaluation of E0Ps, the performance of Shift
                              Operations Technical Advisor (SOTAs) was found to be weak and
                              the quality of SOTA training
                              selection of SOTAs exhibited dentified as ' the root cause. A
                              which govern their actions duri unfamiliarity with the EDPs
                                                                          post trip recovery. These
                              individuals made incorrect assess
                            were unaware of various plant instrnts of proposed symptoms and
                                                                            ent indications.
                            Four violations and two deviations we
            .
                                                                              identified.
                            a.      Severity Level III violation for fa
                                        priate corrective actions to resol urea to  deficiency          take appro-
                                        regarding diesel generator electrica        loads.
                                      (302/87-41-01)
                            b.      Severity Level IV violatica for failure                            identify
                                      components on the EQ list, and failure t have test
                            c.        data in an auditable form.        (302/88-27-01
                                    Severity Level IV violation for failure to a                                                ress
                                      instrument accuracy in EQ files.
                            d.                                                (302/88-2
                                    Severity level IV violation for failure      to meet02)SME Code
                                      Section IX welder performance qualification re ire-
                                      ments.    (302/87-32-01)
                            e.
                                    Deviation involving FSAR requirements for maximum u                                                                                  imate
                                      heat sink temperature.
                            f.                                      (302/88-14-01)
                                    Deviation involving failure to implement a R.G.1.97
                                      commitment (302/87-40-03)                                                                                                                                  '
                                                          .
                                                                                    _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - ' ^ ' ' ' ^ ' ^ ~ ^ ^ ' ~ ~ ~
 
    -_-                -
  3* . p.
            ..
        .
                      .
'          -
                                                    24
                            the capability of responding competently and effectively to
                            plant conditions and specific technical or regulatory ' issues.  1
!
                            However licensee response to NRC initiatives, resolution of      I
                            technical issues and correction of problems has been
                            inconsistent. . The examples of poor performance previously
                            discussed in these areas indicate a need for increased emphasis
                            and resources to provide consistent high quality engineering
                            performance.
                            Operator licensing examinations administered during -the
                            assessment period achieved a 100 per cent pass rate. Six
                            reactor operator and four senior reactor operator examinations
                          were administered. This success rate indicates a high quality
                          operator training program. One detriment to the training and
                          examinations was the absence of a plant specific simulator. The
                            simulator is presently scheduled to be delivered and operational
                            in 1990.
                            Information provided to examiners for examination development
                          was legible, current, and effective in relating lesson plans- to
                          the Job Task Analysis for operators. Lesson plans for' licensed
                          and non-licensed operator training wert technically adcquate,
                          the learning objectives were clear. and concise, and the content
                          of the plans good.
                          During the evaluation of E0Ps, the performance of Shift
                          Operations Technical Advisors (50TAs) was found to be weak and-
                          the quality of S0TA training identified as the root cause. A
                          selection of S0TAs exhibited an unfamiliarity with the
                          Verification Procedures which govern their actions during post
                          trip recovery. These individuals made incorrect assessments of
                          proposed symptoms and were unaware of various plant instrument
                          indications.
                          Four violations and two deviations were identified.
                          a.    Severity Level III violation for failure to take appro-
                                  priate corrective ' actions to resolve a deficiency
                                  regarding diesel generator electrical loads.
                                  (302/87-41-01)
                          b.    Severity Level IV violation for failure to identify
                                  components on the EQ list, and failure to have test
                                  data in an auditable form. (302/88-27-01)
                          c.    Severity Level IV violation for failure to address
                                  instrument accuracy in EQ files. (302/88-27-02)
                          d.    Severity Level IV violation for failure to meet ASME Code
                                  Section IX welder performance qualification require-
                                  ments. (302/87-32-01)
                          e.    Deviation involving FSAR requirements for maximum ultimate
                                  heat sink temperature. (302/88-14-01)
                          f.    Deviation involving failure to implement a R.G.1.97
                                  commitment (302/87-40-03)
-              _ _ _ _
                                                                                            l
 
                            -__ __ _
    :,~*        ,..
                        4 .
        ...                          ,
                *
L                                                                                                                  25
                                              2.                  Performance Rating
                                                                Category:                                3
                                              3.                Recommendations
                                                                The licensee is encouraged to increase inter-departmental
                                                                cooperation and to place priority on developing the system
                                                                engineer program and guiding the current resources to benefit
                                                                the plant organization.
                                          G. Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
                                              1. Analysis
                                                                The licensee's quality program organization is continuing to
    ,
                                                                conduct audits based on organizational performance. .They
                                                                  inspect a specific organization in all functional areas for
                                                              which that organization is involved. The intent of this audit
    '
                                                                process is to identify any programmatic or significant findings
                                                                that remained undetected in the past. Quality assurance
                                                                inspections are also being performed on selected plant systems
                                                                using a similar technique to the NRC's Safety System Functional
                                                                Inspechons (SSFI). The licensee has examined the emergency
                                                                feedwater, decay heat removal, and high pressure injection
                                                                systems using this technique.
                                                              The licensee's Quality Assdrance' (QA) staff is adequate.
                                                              Permanent employees have been hired and contractors eliminated
                                                              to help stabilize this staff. Contractors are still utilized to
                                                              provide technical advisors for the various audit teams.                                    The
                                                              quality program organization has improved the methods of
                                                              reporting nonconformances in its own organization. However,
                                                              other site organizations have retained their own various
                                                                reporting systems.                              The many different systems create potential
                                                              confusion and have resulted in one case (violation e) where a
                                                              nonconformance was not reported to the NRC in a timely manner as
                                                              required. This nonconformance was identified by the engineering
                                                              organization, but no trigger was established by this
                                                              organization's reporting system to involve the operation's
                                                              nonconformance system. This lack of interaction between the
                                                              systems was identified by the licensee and corrective action is
                                                              being taken to remedy the situation. Lack of interdepartmental
                                                              cooperation contributed to this problem.
                                                            Weaknesses were noted in the management controls affecting
                                                              quality.                                    Management involvement was lacking in resolving an
                                                              identified deficiency that existed since 1980 involving a
                                                              slamming check valve, and a 1982 deficiency involving the
                                                            correct pitch setting for a diesel generator radiator fan.                                    The
                                                            existence of these problems for such a long period of time is
                                                              indicative of management's failure to demand appropriate correc-
                                                              tive action to correct the deficiencies. The OSTI found addi-
                                                              tional examples of inadequate or untimely corrective action, and
  i
  ,
          m______.____.____.__________.___        _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _
 
        __
  _f ,3
            7
      ,-
      .
        *
                                        26
                two examples -listed below (violations d and f) involve a
                failure to provide adequate corrective action. Also the lack of
              management involvement to remedy inadequate post supervisory
                reviews of activities discussed in the Operations and
              Maintenance / Surveillance areas of_this report is considered to
                be a weakness.
              The licensee's analyses of root causes of plant problems 'has in
                general, been satisfactory. However, there are- two examples
              where plant problems were not adequately analyzed. In the case
              of overheating of the emergency feedwater lines, inadequate root
              cause evaluations were made to identify.and correct the problems
              .both in the early stages of the event and in several previous
              similar events. Had the leaking emergency feedwater valve been
                repaired earlier, overheating of the line would have been
              avoided. In another example, faulty operation of main feedwater
                low-load valves has contributed to several low-power plant trips
                in the past.    Incomplete root cause analyses and failure to
              correct all problems with these valves resulted in subsequent'
              plant transients.
              Management involvement is evident in the attempt to solve
              procedure adherence problems.      Procedure adherence was
                identified as a general weakness, encompassing all areas in the
              preceding SALP assessment. Plant management is continuing to.
              stress the importance of procedure compliance and the policy of
              high level management-review-of-recurrent-instances of procedure
              noncompliance. The addition of a Human Performance Evaluation?
              System to assist in investigating and reporting human
              performance problems has strengthened the effort to solve this
              problem. This system is used with the Root Cause Evaluation
              Program to focus . on contributing causes related to human
              performance, and has been effective in identifying human factor-
              considerations.
              A review of licensee evaluation packages of incoming vendor
              technical issues .found weaknesses. Four out of nine packages
              reviewed were incomplete or inadequate to properly determine the
              impact of the identified issue on the design function of the
              component or system.    Furthermore, a review of the procedures
              that control incoming vendor information indicated that the
              licensee had failed to establish appropriate procedures to
              evaluate this information (violation g).      Each department
              established its own instructions, without verification of the
              impact on other departments' controls. A licensee quality
              programs surveillance agreed that this program was weak. The
              licensee is revising its administrative controls in this area.
              The licensee's performance in handling licensing actions was
              inconsistent. While many submittals were of acceptable quality,
              some respons.es .were not always complete and comprehensive,
,.            requiring repeated modification. For example, in the review of
              fire protection exemptions, there was evidence of prior planning
              and management awareness of the importance of the issues
              involved, and of a clear understanding and conservative approach
l
 
                                                                                                    _ . _ _ _
  .,
    *
            ,A
          ....'-
                    h
        ,
            -
                  ,  Q,g                                  27
                      h6        to resolution of the technical issues. But the licensee's
                                responses did not always satisfactorily address the riRC's
                                concerns with the first submittal, and final resolution of NRC
                                concerns took about one year. Resolution of the complex EDG
                                capacity problem required multiple submittals involving
                                  cmtinuously changing figures.to define worst case EDG loads,
                                th three related Inservice Inspection relief requests, although
                                tim technical approach was sound and the licensee's responses
                                by th y,4eckWanagement involvement and planning was evident
                                staff urgent. nature of the requests, which required accelerated
                              the tec eview to preclude delays in planned plant restart. In
                              actions ical specification change _ request to provide specific
                              (DC) cont be taken when one battery supplying direct current
                              is inoperab 1 power to the 230 kilovolt (Ky) switchyard breakers
                              evidence of , the submittal was of high quality with clear
                              issues involve .od understanding and effective resolution of the
                              Interpretation o
                                                  and conformance with the Anticipated Transient
                            Without Scram (
                                                    S) rule (10 CFR 50.62) has been under
                            discussion
                              including FPC,withfor
                                                ows rs
                                                      meoftime.
                                                          Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) reactors,
                            of disagreement and                    Only af ter this extended period
                            schedular requirements ter reinforcement by NRC staff of the
                                                        f the ATWS rule did the licensee exhibit
                            a    cooperative attitude.
                            conceptual design which    The    licensee defined and documented a
                            interpretation of the requ      onformed    closely with the staff's
                            implementation on an acceptements of the rule and committed to
                            belated good responsiveness i le schedule. Another example of
,
                                                                  the agreement by FPC to provide
i
                            an additional source of emer ncy feedwater to the steam
                            generators to improve the system s reifability.
'
                            During this evaluation period the icensee voluntarily prepared
                            and submitted a full level-1 Prob bilistic Risk Assessment
                                    .
                            (PRA)* During NRC review, and especia ly during a meeting at the
                            site to discuss the PRA, the licensee          5 extremely cooperative.
                            The PRA was initially prepared by a co tractor, but FPC has
                            developed in-house capability to facilit te the use of the PRA
                            in making design decisions and to maintain nd update the PRA to
                            reflect  plant modifications.
                          Another effort initiated earlier, and continu            actively durin
                          this period is an extensive configuration mana ement program.g
                          Part of this program will be definition and vert cation of the
                          plant's    design basis and review of plant conforman e with these
                          design bases.      Some of the pre-existing problems          scussed in
                          the Engineering / Technical Support area were identi ied as a
                          result of this program.          Licensee management has
      -
                          significant commitment to this effort.                            ade a
l
                          Along with other B&W owners, the Itcensee has activ ly
,                        participated in the B&W Owners Group (BWOG) Safety a
                          Performance Improvement Program (SPIP), which has identifie              a
                          large number of modifications which will enhance plant safet .
                                                            a
 
          __                                                        _
                                                                                              . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
    '        *
  ,    ,
              .
        '
      *          .
                                                                                                                              ,
        '
                                            27
                                                                                                                              l
                    to resolution of the technical issues.      But the licensee's                                          q
                    responses did not always satisfactorily address the NRC's                                                ,
                    concerns with the first submittal, and final resolution of NRC
                    concerns took. about one year.    Resolution of the complex EDG
                    capacity problem required multiple submittals involving
                  continuously changing figures to define worst-case EDG loads.
                  On three related Inservice Inspection relief requests, although
                    the technical approach was sound and the licensee's responses
                    timely, lack of management involvement and planning was evident
                  by the urgent nature of the requests, which required accelerated
                    staff review to preclude delays in planned plant restart. In
                    the technical specification change request to provide specific
                  actions to be taken when one battery supplying direct current
                    (DC) control power to the 230 kilovolt (KV) switchyard breakers
                    is inoperable, the submittal was of high quality with clear
                  evidence of good understanding and effective resolution of the
                    issues involved.
                    Interpretation of and conformance with the Anticipated Transient
                  Without Scram (ATWS) rule (10 CFR 50.62) has been under
                  discussion with owners of Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) reactors,
                    including FPC, for some time. After reinforcement by NRC staff
                  of the schedular requirements of the ATWS rule the licensee
                  exhibited a very cooperative attitude. The licensee defined and
                  documented a design which conformed closely with the staff's
                  interpretation of the requirements of the rule and committed to
                  implementation on an acceptable schedule. . Another. example of
                  good responsiveness after extended discu'ssion is the agreement
                  by FPC to provide an additional source of emergency feedwater to
                  the steam generators to improve the system's reliability.
                  During this evaluation period the licensee voluntarily prepared
                  and submitted a full level-1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
                  (PRA). During NRC review, and especially during a meeting at the
                  site to discuss the PRA, the licensee was extremely cooperative.
                  The PRA was initially prepared by a contractor, but FPC has
                  developed in-house capability to facilitate the use of the PRA
                  in making design decisions and to maintain and update the PRA to
                  reflect plant modifications.
l                  Another effort initiated earlier, and continued actively during
                  this period is an extensive configuration management program.
                  Part of this program will be definition and verification of the
                  plant's design basis and review of plant conformance with these
                  design bases.    Some of the pre-existing problems discussed in
l                  the Engineering / Technical Support area were identified as a
l                  result of this program.      Licensee management has made a
f                  significant commitment to this effort.
l
j                  Along with other B&W owners, the licensee has actively
'
                  participated in the B&W Owners Group (BWOG) Safety and
                  Performance Improvement Program (SPIP), which has identified a
                  large number of modifications whi::h will enhance plant safety.                                        i
l                                                                        -_-___-______________ -
 
            _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _              _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _      . __ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _            . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ -
" . -  ."
          ,                                                                                                                                                            j
      .;    .                                                                                                                                                            l
        '
                                                                    28                                                                                                  I
                                                                                                                                                                        i
                                  FPC management is well represented in. BWOG ~ direction a'nd has
                                  made major. contributions to the success of the SPIP program thus                                                                    ,
                                  far. In addition to SPIP, the licensee continues as an active'                                                                        '
                                  participant in other BWOG activities, such as the Technical                                                                          ,
                                  Specification Improvement Program.
                                  The licensee responses to Bulletins and Generic Letters 'were
                                  timely and acceptable.              FPC is among the relatively few.
i                                  utilities to respond positively to Generic Letter 88-02 by
                                  indicating a willingness to consider pursuit of i.he Integrated
                                  Safety Assessment Program.              Response to Bulletin 88-01 was-
                                  acceptable and the Bulletin closed out. The licensee's response
                                  to Generic Letter 88-05 provided assurance that the plant has a
                                  program in place to deal with boric acid leakage. In evaluation
                                  of a 10 CFR Part 21 report regarding cable qualification, the
                                  licensee incorrectly stated that the cables in question ~were not
                                  insSlled at the plant.                A second evaluation was handled
                                  properly and the cable was found to be acceptabh for
                                  application.
                                  An inspection was held of the licensee's reviews performed in
                                  accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.                                    The NRC concluded that the
                                  licensee's evaluations ranged from adequate to thorough. The
                                  design change process, of which the 50.59 reviews are a part, is
                                  adequately planned, executed, and documented. The quality of
                                  the reviews represents a meaningful-improvement over past 10 CFR
                                  50.59 reviews performed by_the_ licensee.
                                  NRC inspectors attended several Plant Review Committee (PRC)
                                  meetings and noticed that participation in PRC meetings was
                                  weak.    A contributing factor for this observation was the
                                  licensee's utilization of a qLalified reviewer process to
                                  prepare meeting material, with little pre-meeting study of the
                                  material by committee members.                                  Committee members seldom saw
                                  material to be discussed before the meeting unless they were                                                                        y
                                  involved with the qualified reviewer process and the material to
                                  be reviewed was not readily available for cembers. The guidance
                                  procedures that direct PRC activities were noted to be weak,
                                  resulting in poor control and distribution of responsibilities.
                                  No noticable improvements have been noted in this area.
                                  Licensee Event Report (LERs) analyzed during the assessment
                                  period generally described the major aspects of the events,
                                  including component or system failures that contributed to the                                                                        !
                                  events and the corrective action taken or planned to prevent                                                                          I
                                  recurrence. Root causes were identified in most of the LERs.
                                  Of the LERs submitted during the assessment period, two were
                                  categorized as significant. These events involved the discovery
                                  of a potential for overloading the emergency diesel generators
                                  and check valve leaks that led to elevated emergency feedwater
                                  temperatures.
                                                                                                                                  ____ _-              _ - - _ _ _ -
 
                                                                                                                              ._
                                                                                                                                  _ _ - _ _
    .'    ,, "
            ',
        ,,
      .:      ,
          *
                                                        29
                              In the ' area of licensee conformance to Regulatory Guide (RG)
n                              1.97, the licensee installed and modified the instrumentation
                              needed to comply with the RG with the exception of Deviation (f)
l-                            noted in the' previous section. The licensee recognized the need
                              for updating drawings after completion of modifications and
                              developing -instrument loop drawings, but had placed no priority
                              on the effort. The licensee was responsive to NRC's concerns
                              regarding the need to commit more engineering effort to this
                              task and committed to expand this effort.
                              Eight violations'were identified:-
  '
                              a.    Severity level IV violation for failure to meet Nuclear
                                      General Review Committee membership qualifications in
                                      accordance with technical specification requirements.
                                        (302/87-28-01)
                              b.    Severity level V violation for failure to recertify the
                                      qualified reviewers on a periodic basis as required by
                                      technical' specifications. (302/87-28-05)
                              c.    Severity level IV violation for failure to have seismic
;
                                      monitoring instrumentation in the required measurement
                                      range. (302/88 01-03)
                              d.    Severity level IV violation for failure to provide adequate
                                      corrective action to prevent exceeding liquid waste
                                      releare rates. (302/88-16-05)
                              e.    Severity level IV violation for failure to properly
                                      evaluate a,nd report excessive temperatures in the
                                      emergency feedwater piping. (302/88-18-01)
                              f.    Severity level IV violation for failure to provide adequate
                                      corrective actions to prevent exceeding the design
                                      temperatures in the emergency feedwater system.
                                      (302/88-18-02)
                              9    Severity IV violation for inadequate evaluation and
                                      procedures to control incoming vendor technical issues.
                                      (302/88-24-02)
                              h.    Severity level V violation for failure to report a condi-
                                      tion in which containment airlock seal leakage tests
                                      were inadequate.    (302/88-26-01)
                          2.  Performance Rating
                              Category:    2
                          3.  Recommendations
                              None
                                                                                                                            *
                  V. SUPPORTING DATA
                    A.  Investigation Review
                          None
                                                                  _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
 
      ,-___.
!-
p    ,,7    .s+
                4
i. ,    . ;.-
        . , -    -_,
              -
                                                        30
                      B.- . Escalated Enforcement Action
                          1.  Civil Penalties
                              -. Severity Level III violation -issued on March 17, 1988, for
                                failure to control access to a high radiation area, provide
                                adequate training, establish adequate procedures, . provide a-
                              . radiation monitoring device, and follow procedures.                          The
                                propt, sed civil penalty of $100,000 was mitigated to $50,000- by
                                order dated November. 17, 1988.
                                Severity Level III violation issued on May 4, 1988, for failure
                                to take appropriate corrective actions to resolve emergency
                                diesel generator loading deficiencies. The proposed civil-
                                penalty of $50,000 was mitigated to $25,000 by order dated
                                October 31, 1988.
                          2.  Orders
                                None.  (except as noted in paragraph V.B.1 above)
                      C.  Management Conferences
                          September 14, 1987              Quarterly SALP management meeting at
                                                              Region II.
                          December 11, 1987                Enforcement Conference at Region 11 to
                                      ,
                                                              discuss health' physics event.,
                          December 18, 1987                Management. meeting at Crystal River
                                                              Nuclear Plant to discuss the previous
                                                              SALP Board assessment.
                          February 22, 1988                Enforcement Conference at Region 11 to
                                                              discuss the emergency diesel
                                                              generator loading issues.                          ,
                          March 9, 1988                    Enforcement Conference held by tele-
                                                              phone concerning issues related to
                                                            unauthorized entry into a_high
                                                              radiation area.                                    !
                          March 30, 1988                  Management meeting at NRC Headquarters
                                                              to discuss emergency feedwater
                                                            reliability, OSTI issues, and station
                                                            blackout.
                          July 8, 1988                    Management meeting at NRC Headquarters
                                                            to discuss check valve leaks in the
                                                            emergency feedwater system.
                          August 16, 1988                  Management meeting at NRC Headquarters
                                                            to discuss emergency diesel generator
                                                            modifications, ultimate heat sink
                                                            temperature, ATWS, and OSTI response.
                          November 9, 1988                Management meeting at Crystal River
                                                            Nuclear Plant concerning plant person-
                                                            nel performance and the status of
                                                            equipment qualification program.
                                                                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
 
  _ _ - - -        -_                      _                                                            _
    .o-
              ,                                                                                                              !
        >?    .' ,
L        . .
                                                              31
                            November 29,.1988                  Management meeting at NRC Headquarters
                                                                  to discuss ATWS concerns.
                            December.21, 1988                  Management meeting at NRC Headquarters
                                                                  to discuss HELB submittal and final
                                                                  resolution of EDG pressure.
                      D.- . Confirmation of Action Letters
                              1.    On November 17, 1987, the NRC issued a Confirmation of Action
                                    Letter (CAL) confirming that the licensee would satisfactorily
                                    complete specified actions with regtrd to OSTI findings on the
                                    diesel generator loading, ultimate heat sink temperature, and
                                    service water flow balancing issues.
                            2.    On July 6,1988, the NRC issued. a CAL confirming licensee's
                                    actions with regard to the emergency feedwater system
                                    overtemperature caused by check valve leaks.
                      E.    Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
,
                            During the assessment period, 33 LERs were analyzed. .The
!                            distribution of these events by cause, as determined by the NRC
                            staff, are as follows:
                            Cause                                  Number
                            Component Failure                        3
                            Design                                    8
                            Construction, Fabrication,                2
                                or Installation
                            Personnel
                            -    Operating Activity                10
                            -    Maintenance Activity                4
                          --    Test / Calibration Activity          3
                            -
                                  Other-                              1
                            Other' Activity                          2
                                                  '
                            Total                                  33
                      F.    Licensing Activities
                            During the evaluation period, the staff completed review of 37
                              licensing actions which resulted in issuance of 10 amendments, five
                            reliefs, and one exemption.        In addition, significant effort was
                            expended on 11 other issues which were not completed. Some of the
                            more significant matters include the EDG and HELB problems and the
                            request for containment purging.
                                                                                                                            1
                                                                                              _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                            1
 
  ,--    -_
      ;9','                                                                                                          '
                  ,
                *
              .
            -
                  ,.
              '
                                                          32
                      G.    Enforconent Activity
  ,                                                        NO. OF DEVIATIONS AND VIOLATIONS IN EACH
                            FUNCTIONAL                                      SEVERlTY LEVEL
                            AREA                              Dev.    V      IV      III    II                    I
                      Plant Operations                          0      1    6        0      0                      0
                      Radiological Controls                      0      0-  2        1      0                      0
      '
                      Maintenance / Surveillance                0      1    4        0      0                      0
                      Emergency Preparedness                    0      0    1        0      0                      0
                      Security                                  0      0    0        0      1                      0
                      Engineering / Technical
                        Support                                2      0    3        1      0                      0
                      Safety Assessment / Quality
                        Verification                            0      2    6        0      0                      0
                      TOTAL                                      2    4    22        2      0                      0
                                                                                                                      !
                      H.    Reactor Trips
                            Two automatic reactor trips occurred during this assessment period.
                                  On February 28, 1988, the unit sustained an 6utomatic reactor
                                  trip from 55 percent power on high RCS pressure due to a failure
                                  of the main feedwater block valve to fully close.
                                  On October 28, 1988, the unit sustained an automatic reactor
                                  trip from 20 percent power due to problems with the turbine
                                  header pressure controls.
                      I.    Crystal River Unit 3 Effluent Release Summary
                                                                      1985      1986      1987
                          Activity Released (Curies)
                                                                                                                      !
                          Gaseous Effluents
                            Fission and Activation                  1.96 E+3    2.76 E+3  1.10 E+3
                              Gases
                            Iodine and Particulate                  8.46 E-4    1.01 E-3  3.49 E-3
                          Liquid Effluents
t
                                                                                                                      ,
                          Fission and Activation                  1.51 E+0    8.20 E-1  9.55 E-1
                              Products
                          Tritium                                  1.75 E+2    1.73 E+2  3.56 E+2
                                                                                                - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
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