05000390/FIN-2011004-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | ||
| Inspector = R Monk, S Shaeffer, K Millers, | | Inspector = R Monk, S Shaeffer, K Millers, Shaefferp Higgins, R Baldwin, K Miller, W Deschaine, N Childs, R Monk | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = During review of corrective actions associated with PER 206105, the unauthorized placement of temporary structures supporting Unit 2 construction in the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) drainage path, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI). Drainage related to the PMP was impeded by temporary structures and additional items that had been erected in the drainage areas. It is unclear whether these items would increase the probability of water draining into the safetyrelated structures and damaging safety-related equipment. The inspectors noted that PER 206105 initiated on October 28, 2009, identified that Unit 2 temporary facilities had been placed inside the plant protected area surrounding Unit 1 and 2 without verifying impacts to the critical flood elevation. Some of the temporary structures supporting Unit 2 construction had been located in the PMP drainage path. The PMP event is an operating basis event wherein drainage is required to be directed away from plant safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment necessary for continued operation of the plant. Exceeding this elevation would impact the operability of safety-related equipment required for Unit 1 safe operation. In conjunction with this PER, a functional evaluation (FE) was prepared and approved on December 4, 2009, that identified several structures that would need to be moved or modified prior to March 1, 2010. The PER required a corrective action plan due date of February 14, 2010, but a corrective action plan was never developed and there was no FE to address the adverse condition impact on Unit 1 beyond February 28, 2010. In accordance with licensee procedure NPG-SPP-03.1.4, Corrective Action Program Screening and Oversight, the PER screening committee assigns the responsible organization for the PER. In this case the PER was assigned to an organization outside of the nuclear power group that did not have the ability to develop a corrective action plan. This assignment was outside the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B approved corrective action program process and there was no follow-up by the PER screening committee to ensure the corrective action plan development assignment was completed. No further action was taken until the inspectors identified the lack of corrective action to the PER screening committee on August 4, 2011. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 413818 and also initiated PER 417148 to address the continuing potential plant impact from the addition of more temporary structures since the initial problem was identified in 2009. A new drainage model subsequently determined that some of the current temporary structures could cause the PMP drainage to exceed the critical plant elevation impacting plant safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment necessary for continued operation. Pending additional information from the licensee involving potential for drainage to affect safety-related structures, systems, and components, this item is identified as URI 050000390/2011004-01, Failure to Develop and Implement Corrective Actions for PMP Drainage Path Impact on Unit 1. | | description = During review of corrective actions associated with PER 206105, the unauthorized placement of temporary structures supporting Unit 2 construction in the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) drainage path, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI). Drainage related to the PMP was impeded by temporary structures and additional items that had been erected in the drainage areas. It is unclear whether these items would increase the probability of water draining into the safetyrelated structures and damaging safety-related equipment. The inspectors noted that PER 206105 initiated on October 28, 2009, identified that Unit 2 temporary facilities had been placed inside the plant protected area surrounding Unit 1 and 2 without verifying impacts to the critical flood elevation. Some of the temporary structures supporting Unit 2 construction had been located in the PMP drainage path. The PMP event is an operating basis event wherein drainage is required to be directed away from plant safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment necessary for continued operation of the plant. Exceeding this elevation would impact the operability of safety-related equipment required for Unit 1 safe operation. In conjunction with this PER, a functional evaluation (FE) was prepared and approved on December 4, 2009, that identified several structures that would need to be moved or modified prior to March 1, 2010. The PER required a corrective action plan due date of February 14, 2010, but a corrective action plan was never developed and there was no FE to address the adverse condition impact on Unit 1 beyond February 28, 2010. In accordance with licensee procedure NPG-SPP-03.1.4, Corrective Action Program Screening and Oversight, the PER screening committee assigns the responsible organization for the PER. In this case the PER was assigned to an organization outside of the nuclear power group that did not have the ability to develop a corrective action plan. This assignment was outside the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B approved corrective action program process and there was no follow-up by the PER screening committee to ensure the corrective action plan development assignment was completed. No further action was taken until the inspectors identified the lack of corrective action to the PER screening committee on August 4, 2011. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 413818 and also initiated PER 417148 to address the continuing potential plant impact from the addition of more temporary structures since the initial problem was identified in 2009. A new drainage model subsequently determined that some of the current temporary structures could cause the PMP drainage to exceed the critical plant elevation impacting plant safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment necessary for continued operation. Pending additional information from the licensee involving potential for drainage to affect safety-related structures, systems, and components, this item is identified as URI 050000390/2011004-01, Failure to Develop and Implement Corrective Actions for PMP Drainage Path Impact on Unit 1. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000390/2011004 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Monk S Shaeffer K Millers Shaefferp Higgins R Baldwin K Miller W Deschaine N Childs R Monk |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |