ENS 54675: Difference between revisions

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| utype = GE-4, GE-4
| utype = GE-4, GE-4
| cfr = 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)
| cfr = 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)
| emergency class = Non Emergency  
| emergency class = Non Emergency
| notification date = 04/22/2020 10:43
| notification date = 04/22/2020 10:43
| notification by = Joel Gordon
| notification by = Joel Gordon
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| event text = This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER [licensee event report] submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
| event text = This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER [licensee event report] submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
At approximately 1025 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 5, 2020, with Unit 1 shutdown in Mode 5 for refueling, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring and Post Accident Sampling isolation valves) occurred. The invalid actuation occurred when power was lost as a result of the Inboard Isolation Logic Fuse being removed per a planned clearance hang to support maintenance.
At approximately 1025 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 5, 2020, with Unit 1 shutdown in Mode 5 for refueling, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring and Post Accident Sampling isolation valves) occurred. The invalid actuation occurred when power was lost as a result of the Inboard Isolation Logic Fuse being removed per a planned clearance hang to support maintenance.
The PCIVs functioned successfully and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
The PCIVs functioned successfully and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200423en.html#en54675
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200423en.html#en54675
}}{{unit info
| Unit =  1
| type =
| Scram code =  N
| Reactor critical =  N
| Initial power =  0
| Initial reactor mode =  Refueling
| Current power =  100
| Current reactor mode =  Power Operation
}}
}}


{{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]]
{{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]]

Latest revision as of 12:41, 15 January 2021

ENS 54675 +/-
Where
Brunswick Duke Energy icon.png
North Carolina (NRC Region 2)
Reporting
10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1149.3 h47.888 days <br />6.841 weeks <br />1.574 months <br />)
Opened: Joel Gordon
10:43 Apr 22, 2020
NRC Officer: Howie Crouch
Last Updated: Apr 22, 2020
54675 - NRC Website
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