05000266/FIN-2007008-06: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing | | title = Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing of the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Following Major Maintenance | ||
| docket = 05000266, 05000301 | | docket = 05000266, 05000301 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000266/2007008 | | inspection report = IR 05000266/2007008 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = K Walton, M Jones, C Zoia, R Ruiz, R Winter, N Valos, W Slawinski, M Kunowski, P Higgins, S Burton, R Krsekg, | | Inspector = K Walton, M Jones, C Zoia, R Ruiz, R Winter, N Valos, W Slawinski, M Kunowski, P Higgins, S Burton, R Krsekg, Gibbsr Krsek, J Giessner | ||
| CCA = P.1 | | CCA = P.1 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.1 | | INPO aspect = PI.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct the cause of outboard bearing alarm conditions, a condition adverse to quality, and the subsequent failure to implement prompt corrective actions was a performance deficiency that warranted a significance evaluation in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening. The finding was more than minor because it could reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Specifically, the failure to identify and investigate the cause of the high bearing temperature alarms could potentially result in failure of the TDAFW pump turbines. Additionally, the finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, Attachment 1, SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the inspectors determined this programmatic finding was not a design qualification deficiency resulting in a loss of function per Generic Letter 91-18, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system or train of equipment, and was not potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. Therefore, the finding was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green). The risk assessment for the potential loss of safety function is attributed to the performance deficiencies associated with inadequate 10 Enclosure post-maintenance testing discussed in Section 4OA3.6.b.1 as Unresolved Item (URI) 5000266/2007008-06. The primary cause of this finding was related to a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution for the failure to implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues completely, accurately and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance (P.1(a)). | | description = The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct the cause of outboard bearing alarm conditions, a condition adverse to quality, and the subsequent failure to implement prompt corrective actions was a performance deficiency that warranted a significance evaluation in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening. The finding was more than minor because it could reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Specifically, the failure to identify and investigate the cause of the high bearing temperature alarms could potentially result in failure of the TDAFW pump turbines. Additionally, the finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, Attachment 1, SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the inspectors determined this programmatic finding was not a design qualification deficiency resulting in a loss of function per Generic Letter 91-18, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system or train of equipment, and was not potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. Therefore, the finding was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green). The risk assessment for the potential loss of safety function is attributed to the performance deficiencies associated with inadequate 10 Enclosure post-maintenance testing discussed in Section 4OA3.6.b.1 as Unresolved Item (URI) 5000266/2007008-06. The primary cause of this finding was related to a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution for the failure to implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues completely, accurately and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance (P.1(a)). | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2007008 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2007 (2007Q2) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Walton M Jones C Zoia R Ruiz R Winter N Valos W Slawinski M Kunowski P Higgins S Burton R Krsekg Gibbsr Krsek J Giessner |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
| ' | |