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Al)PLICA'fJ.Oj~ DOCKETED LUT CO~STRUCl'I.ON PUJ~TS UNDER CO:~STIWCTlO:~ AND PERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATmr; PLANTS codes and standards developed by such organizations as the American National Standards | Al)PLICA'fJ.Oj~ DOCKETED LUT CO~STRUCl'I.ON PUJ~TS UNDER CO:~STIWCTlO:~ AND PERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATmr; PLANTS codes and standards developed by such organizations as the American National Standards | ||
,Institute (ANSI.) and the'American Water \.Jorks Association (A\.JHA). | ,Institute (ANSI.) and the'American Water \.Jorks Association (A\.JHA). |
Revision as of 04:11, 25 February 2020
ML15322A269 | |
Person / Time | |
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Issue date: | 08/23/1976 |
From: | Office of New Reactors |
To: | |
References | |
Download: ML15322A269 (53) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. ~. ... / ( ( ENCLOSURE 1 ( APPENDIX A TO BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB
. 9.5-1 "GUIDELINES FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR NUCLEJ.\.R PO\'lER PLANTS DOCKETED PRIOR TO "lJT~Y 1, 1976" . ~ I
( AUGUST 23, 1976
I ' .. SCOPE This Appendix A provides guidance on the preferred ~nd, where applicable, acceptable alternatives to fire protection design for those nuclear power plants for which applications for conatruction permits were docketed prior to July I, 1976. The provisions of this appendix will apply to the following categories of nuclear power plants: (1) Plants for which applications for construction permits were docketed prior to July 1, 1976, but have not received a construction permit;
'(2) Plants for \which construction permits were issued prior to July 1, 1976, and operating plants. ) This appendix modifies, as deemed appropriate, the guidelines in Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" ,...hich are intended for plants whose application for con-struction pe~it is docketed after July I, 1976 * . The guidelines of the above cited BTP were adopted for this appendix and are preferred in all instances. Alternative acceptable fire protection guidelin~ are identified in this appendix for areas where, depending on the construction or opera-tional status of a given plant, application of the guidelines per se could have significant impact, e.g., \olhere the building and system designs are alrcady finalized and construction is in progrcss, or where the plant is )
in operation. These alternative guidelines are intended to provide adequate and acceptable fire protection consistent with safe plant shutdm*ffi requirements without a significant impact on plant design, constru~tion, and operation. Particular sections that are intended to apply only to pl.ants under review, under construction or operating are identified under the appropriate column. Although this appendix provides specific guidance, alternatives may be proposed by applicants and licensees. These alternatives will be evaluated by the NRC ~taff on a case-by-case basis where such departures are suitably justified. Among the alternatives that should be considered is the provision of a "dedicated" system for assuring continued safe shutdo~ffi of the plant. This dedicated system should be completely independent of other plant systems, including the power source; however, for fire protection, it is not necessary for the system to be designed to seisnic Category I criteria or meet single failure criteria. Manual
] fire fighting capability to protect the other safety related systems would still be required.
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. . ~ ~ ' --t'~"l'PLICfl.1"iON DOCK.ETED BUT CO:-iST1~VCTION -----1!---P-L-N.-~-T-S-U-Nr.:....)E-~R-C-O-:\-*S-T=-R~U=-C:-T:-I......,O-N.,.....
'-- ' -l-\l~"""l-)- - - - -
. PERllIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PLA:-rrS ") Positions -Positions-. ) ---
A. Overall Requirements of Nucl.ear Plant A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Fire Protection Program Plant Fire Protection Program
- 1. Personnel 1. Personnel Responsiblity for the overall fire SAHE protection program should be assigned to a designated person in the upper level of management. This person should retain ultimate responsibility even though formulation and assurance of program implementation is delegated.
Such delegation of authority should be to staff personnel prepared by training and experience in fire pro-tection and nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in dir-ecting the fire protection programs for nuclear power plants. The quali-fication requirements for the fire protection engineer or consultant who
,,*ill assist in the design and selection of equipment, inspect and test the completed physical aspects of the ~ys tern, develop the fire protection pro-gram~ and assist in the fire-fighting training for the operating plant should be stated. Subsequently, the FSAR should discuss the training and the updating provisions such as fire drills provided for maintaining the competence of the station fire-fighting and operating crew, including personnel responsible for maintaining and inspecting the fire protection equipment.
The fire protection staff should be responsible for: (a) coordination of building layout and systems design with fire area
)
2 APPLICATION DOCIU::TED BUT CO;';STRt.:CTIO~{ rLAl~TS UtmER CO:~STfWCrIO:~ IJm
,~~P~E~ru~~~I~T~N~OT~RE~C~E~'I~V~E~D~A~S~O~F~'~7~/~I~/~7~6__________~~O~P~ERA~T~I~N~'G~P~I~~'~T~S______________________ )
requirements, including con-sideration of potential hazards associated with postulated design basis fires, (b) design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression, .and extinguishing systems, (c) fire prevention activities, (d) training and manual fire-fighting activities of plant personnel and the fire brigade. (NOTE: NFPA 6 - Recommendations for Organization of lndustrial Fire Loss Prevention, contains useful guidance for organ-ization and operation of the entire fire loss prevention program. ) J 2. Design Bases The overall fire protection program
- 2. ~esign SAl-IE Bases shouid be based upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated design basis fires relative to main-taining ability to perform safety shutdown functions and minimize radio-active releases to the environment.
- 3. Backup 3. Backup Total reliance should not be placed SAME on a single automatic fire suppression system. Appropriate backup fire suppression capability should be provided.
- 4. Single Failure Criterion 4. Single Failure Criterion A single failure in the fire suppression . A single failure in the fire system should not impair both the suppression system should not primary and backup fire suppression impair both the primary and capability. For example, redundant backup fire suppr~ssi6n cap-
.J o fire water pumps with independent power supplies and controls should be provided. Postulated fires or ability. For example, redun-dant fire water pumps with in-dependent pow~r supplies and
3 * ~----------~----~--------~~------------------~~------- Al'PLICAl'!.ON DOCKETED JT Cm,STRUCT10N PLANTS , ~JER CONSTRUCTION J'u.,\D PERlH'f NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPE}{}.TING PLANTS ') fire protection system failures need controls should be provided.
) not be considered concurrent with Postulated fires or fire pro-other plant accidents or the most tection system failures need not severe natural phenomena. However, be considered concurrent with in the event of the most severe earth- other plant accidents or the quake, i.e., the Safe Shutdown most severe natural phenomena.
Earthquake (SSE), the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing
. equipment required for safe plant shutdown. The fire protection systems shoula, however, retain their original design capability for (1) nat-ural phenomena of less severity and greuter frequency (approximately once in 10 years) such as tornadoes, hurri-canes, floods, ice storms, or small intensity earthquakes which are characteristic of the site geographic region and (2) for potential man-created site related events such as oil barge collisions, aircraft crashes ",hich have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant J site. The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the ove!~ll ~lant fire protection program.
The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall-- plant fire protection program.
- 5. Fire Suppression Systems 5. Fire Suypression Systems Failure or inadvertent operation of S.hlm the fire suppression system should not incapacitate safety related systems or components. Fire suppression systems that are pressurized during normal plant operation should meet the guidelines specified in APCSB Branch Technical Position 3-1, "Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside ContaiI'lI\ent."
- 6. Fuel Storage Areas 6. Fuel Storage Areas The fire protection pr0gram (plans, Schedule for implementation of personnel and equipment) for btiildings ~odifications, if any, will be storing new reactor fuel and for adja"- establ"ished on a case-by-case cent fire zones which could affect basis.
the fu~l storage zone should be fully operational before fuel is received
'\ at the site.
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APPLICATION DOCKE'" J BUT Cm~STl{uCl'ION . PLAI,'L. U~DER Cm~STIWCTION J~';D PER.'IlT HOT RECEIVr:n AS OF 7/1/7 6 OPERATING PI AL~TS
- 7. Fuel Londing 7. Fuel Loading The fire protection program for an Schedule for implcmentntion of entire reactor unit should be fully modifications, if any, will be oper~tional prior to initial fuel established on a case~by-case loading in that reactor unit. basis.
- 8. Hultiple-Reactor Site~ 8. Multiple-Reactor Sites On multiple-reactor sites where SAHE there are operating reactors and construction of remaining units is being completed, the fire protection program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.
- 9. Simultaneous Fires 9. Simultaneous Fires
.J o Simultaneous fires in more than one
!'e_actor need not be postulated, where SAME separati,on requirements are met. A 8 fire involving more than one re~ctor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units.
B. Administrative Procedures, Controls and B. Administrative Procedures, Fire Brigade Controls, and Fire Brigade Administrative procedures consistent SANE with the need for maintaining the per-formance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants should be provided. Guidance is contained in the following publications: NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services
)
5 I APPLICATlO;~
~------~~~----~~~--
DOCKETED ..-uT CO~~STRUCTION FLANTS
~~----
L .. JER CO:~STj\uCTION lJm PElG1IT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING Pl.ANTS "\ NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire
) Department NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 - ~~nagement of Fire Emergencies NFPA 8 - Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades
- 2. Effective administrative measures 2. SM1E should be implemented to prohibit hulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety related buildings or systems during operation or maintcnance periods. Regulatory Guide 1.39, "Housekeeping Require-ments for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Jl , provides guidance on house-keeping, including the disposal
) of combustible materials.
- 3. Normal and abnormal conditions or other 3. SM1E anticipated operations such as modi-ficatlons (e.g., breaking fire stops, impairment of fire detection and suppression systems) and ref!Jeling activities should be reviewed by appropriate levels of m~agement and appropriate special actionS and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers implemented to assure adequate fire protection and reactor safety. In particular:
(a) Work involving ,ignition sources such as welding and flame cutting should be done under closely controllcd conditions. Procedures governing such work should be re-viewed and approved by persons )
b I '. - - - APPLIC!\TlON DOCKET~~~UT COi;STIU':CTlO:~ l'UHT~ )~DER CO(.i ST IWCT'-=I-=O"7N:--t~.h:--'D---- PER."'llT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PLANTS ") trained and experienced in fire
) protection. Persons performing and directly assisting in such work should be trained and , equipped to prevent and combat fires. If this is not possible, a person qualified in fire pro-tection should directly monitor the work and function as a fire watch.
(b) Leak testing, and similar pro-cedures such as air flow deter-mination, should use one of the co~~ercially available aeresol techniques. Open flames or combustion generated smoke'should not be permitted. (c) Use of combustible material, e.g., HEPA and charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins or other combustible supplies, in safety related areas should be con-trolled. Use of wood inside ) buildings containing safety related systems or equipme~t should be pernlitted only when suitable non-combustible sub-stitutes are not available. If wood must be used, only fire retardant treated wood (scaffolding lay dO\m blocks) should be per-mitted. Such materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be used immediately. Their possible and probable use should be con-sidered in the fire hazard analysis to determine the adequacy of the installed fire protection systems.
- 4. Nuclear power plants are frequently 4. SANE located in remote areas, at some distance fron public fire departments.
Also, first response fire departments are often volunteer. Public fire department response should be con- )
I , , -::~ 7 APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CQi,STRUCTION PLANTS u I~ fJER CO~.j STRUCTlOl' AIiD
}'EIt'fIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PLANTS
'\ sidered in th~ overall fire pro-
.\ tection program. HO\*,ever, the plant should be designed to be self-suffi-cient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely on the public response only for supplemental or backup capability.
- 5. The need for good organization, 5. SAME training and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires effective measures be imple-mented to assure proper discharge of these functions. The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants",
should be followed as applicable. (a) Successful fire fighting requires (a) SANE testing and maintenance of the fire protection equipment, emergency lighting and communi-cation, as well as practice as brigades for the people who must utilize the equipment. A test plan that lists the indi-viduals and their responsibilities in connection wlth routine tests and inspections of the fire detection and protection systems should be developed. The test plan should contain the types, frequency and detailed -~rocedures for testing. Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant mainten-ance, e.g., fire watches or tem-porary hose connections to water systems.
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, - - - - - - - - - - '" "\.. ----~_:=_::_::_:_:_--_r_-- 'APPLICATION DOCKE .. _JBUT CO~STRUCTIOi\ ' ')
PUtiH., ':-:lI:-:-:~:-::D-:-:E7'R-C'::'O:::-~:7~=S'~rR::::-:U~C::::-:T=I=-:O:-:i7""{-:A"'7"l~:-=D~--- PER.'HT t:OT RECEIVED AS OF 7 / l / 7 6 0 P E R A T I N G PI.Ju'ns (b) Basic training is a necessary (b) . SANE element in effective fire fighting operation. In order for a fire brigade to operate effectively, it must operate as a team. All members must know what their individual duties are. They must .be familiar with the layout of the plant and equipment location and operation in order to permit effective fire-fighting operations during times when a particular area is filled with smoke or is insufficiently lighted. Such training can only be accomplished by conducting drills several times a year (at least quarterly) so that all members of the fire brigade have had the opportunity to train as a team, testing itself i~ the major areas of the plant. The drills should include the simulated use of equipment in each area and should be preplanned and post-critiqued to establish the
- training objective of the drills and determine how well these objectives have been met. These drills should periodically (at least annually) include local fire department participation where possible. Such drills also permit supervising personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of communications \-.rithin the fire brigade and \-lith the on scene fire team leader, the reactor operator in the control room, and the off site command post.
- 3. To have proper coverage during all 3. SAME phases of operation, members of each shift crew should be trained in fire protection. Training of the plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the
)
9 .. ) ) APP-L-r-C-A-T-I-O-N-D-O-C-}(E-'-T-E-D II U-T-C-O-~;51' RU eT 1O:~- * --""* ** * -t--l*-L1-\-N-TS-UHD'-E-R-C-O~STr.U;~C;;;T~I;-;O::;-:::-;-~-A:"-:h7:
'l)::------ . PERHIT NOT RECEJ,VED AS OF 7/1/76 OPER./>.Tlj{G PLANTS local fire department so that respon-sibilities and duties are delineated in advance. This coordination should be part of the training course and implemented into th~
training of the local fire department staff. Local fire departments should be educated in the operational pre-cautions when fighting fires on
. nutlear power plant sites. Local fire*
departments should be made aware of the need for radioactive protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant site.
- 4. NFPA 27, "Private Fire Brigade" should 4. SAME be followed in organization, training, and fire drills. This standard also is applicable for the inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equip-ment. Among the standards referenced in this document, the following should be utilized: NFPA 194, "Standard for Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings",
NFPA 196, "Standard for Fire Hose," NFPS'197, "Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks", NFPA 601, "Reconnnended Hanual of Instructions and Duties for the Plant v!atchman on Guard." NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed on page 27-11 of Volume 8, 1971-72 are also applicable for good training references. In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppressio"n which are recognized and/or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized. J
10 _-----=-----:.__---~--::-:- ~I-----------~--- ) ____
. APPLICr.TION DOCKEn... .£jUT co~~sn:.t;CTlO;~ PLAl';TS ... ;;;OER cm~STRucTION Al:D PER!lIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 Ol'ERATl::C PLA,ns C. Qualitv Assurance Program c. Quality Assurance Program Quality assurance (QA) programs of appli- SAME cants and contractors should be developed and implemented to assure that the requirements for design, procurement, in-stallation, and testing and administrative ~ontrols for the fire protection program for safety related areas as defined in this Branch Position are satisfied.
The program should be under the management control of the QA organization. The QA program criteria that apply to the fire protection program should include the follo\,ring:
- 1. Design Control and Procurement Document Control Heasures should be established to assure that all design-related guidelines of the Branch Technical Position are in-cluded in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefrom are controlled.
- 2. Instructions, Procedures and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by doc-umented instructions, procedures or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.
- 3. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services Measures should be established to assre that purchased material, equip-ment and services conform to the procurement documents.
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. :~ ~ ~
APPLICATION DO'C-KE-'-l-'E-D HUT CO!~ST-RU-C-T-I-O-N---**----PLANTS "tJl~nI::R CC)1~STRUCTIOl~ AND PERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 O]'EKATING l']'AI~TS
.~~-----------------
~ 4. Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protec-tion should be est~hlished and executed by, or for,' the organization per-forming the activity to verify con-formance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.
- 5. Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to assure that testing is performed and verified by in-spection and audit to demonstrate con-formance ",ith design and system readi-ness requirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be prop2rly evaluated and acted on.
- 6. Inspec!ion, Test and Operating Status Heasures should be established to pro-vide.for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.
- 7. Non-Confor~ing Items Measures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use of installation.
- 8. Corrective Action Neasures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protec-tion, such as failures, malfunctions, deficienCies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and non-conformances are promptly identified, reported and corrected.
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- APPLICATION DOCKET.t.LJ
-------~~~~~~------~--~
1mT CO:~STRUCTJ.ON PLA:n~ U~DER COl~SIRUCTIOU ANlJ PER?-IlT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPEPu\TH,G PLANTS "\
} 9. Records Records should be prepared and maintuine to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire pro-tection program.
- 10. Audits Audits should be conducted and doc-umented to verify compliance with the fire protection program in-cluding design and procurement documents; instructions; procedures and drawings; and inspection and test activities.
D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection
- 1. Buildi.ng Design 1. Building Design (a) Plant Layouts should be arranged to:
) (1) Isolate safety related (1) SAl*1E systems from unacceptable fire hazards, and (2) Separate redundant safety (2) Alternatives: related systems from each (a) Redundant safety other so that both are not related systems that subject to damage from a are subject to damag single fire hazard. from a single fire hazard should be protected by a com-bination of fire retardant coatings and fire detection and suppression systems, or (b) a separate system to perform the safety function should be provided. J
13 * --=-.- -.- '------- - - - - '-""'\'- - - - - -____- - : - : - - - - _ i - - - - APl'LICAT ION DOCKETED .. JT CO:~STRUCTION l'LAHTS _JER CONSTRUCT 10:. A..\D PER.~lIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PlANTS (b) In order to accomplish l.(a) (b) SANE - Additional above, safety related sysiems and fire haz~rds analysis fire hazards should be identi- should be done after fied throughout the plant. There- any plant modification. fore, a detailed fire hazard analy-sis ohould be made. The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed ruld updated as necessary. ec) For multiple reactor sites, cable (c) Alternative guidance spreading rooms should not be for constructed plants shared between reactors. Each is shown in Section E.3, cable spreading room should be "Cable Spreading Roon~." separated from other areas of the plant by barriers (walls and floors) having a minimum fire resistanee of three hours. Cabling for redundant safety divi-sions should be separated by walls having three hour fire barriers. (d) Interior \vall and structural com- (d) SAHE ponents, thermal insulation mat-erials and radiation shielding materials and sound-proofing should be non-combustible. In-terior finishes should be non-
.- -"combustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory }lutual or Undenlriters' Lab-oratory, Inc. for flame- spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in i .ts use configura~
tion (ASTM E-84 Test), "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Haterials"). (e) Hetal deck roof construction (e) SAME. \~here combustible should be non-combustible material is used in metal (see the building materials deck roofing design directory of the Underwriters
- acceptable alternatives Laboratory, Inc.) or listed as are (i) replace com-Class I by Factor Mutual System bustibles with non-Approval Guide. combustible materials, (ii) provide an auto-matic sprinkler system, or (iii) provide ahility to cover roof exterior and interior with adequate water volume and pressure.
14
'. APPLICATION DOC}~TE . . JUT CO}(STRUCTION PLANTS ADER CONSTRUCTIOt-l AtlD PEnNIT NOT RECEIVED AS Or 7/1/76 OPERATING PLAHTS (f) Suspended ceilings and their (f) SAHE. Adcqua te fire supports should be of non- detection and suppression combustible construction. systems should be pro-Concealed spaces should be devoid vided where full imple-of combustibles. mentation is not practicable.
(g) High voltage - high amperage (g) S~lli. Safety related transformers installed inside systems that are exposed buildings containing safety to flammable oil filled related systems *should be of the transformers should be dry type or insulated and cooled protected from the
'-lith non-combustible liquid ~ . effects of a fire by:
(i) replacing with dry transformers or transformers that are insulated and cooled ,,,ith non-combustible liquid; or (ii) enclosing the transformer with a three-hour fire barrier and in-stalling automatic water spray protection. (h) Buildings containing safety (h) Buildings containing related systems should be pro- safety related systems, tected from exposure or' spill having openings in ex-fires involving oil filled terior walls closer than transformers by: 50 feet to flanwable oil filled transformers
°locating such transformers at leas should be protected from 50 feet distant; or the effects of a fire by: °ensuring that such building walls (i) closing of the within 50 feet of oil filled opening to have transformers are \.lithout openings fire resistance and have a fire resistrulce rating equal to three of at least three hours. hours, (ii) constructing a three-hour fire barrier bet ..... een the transformers and the wall openings; or
)
15 *
~P?LICATION DGCl~TED ,.~"' . * .f CO~STRUCTION l'LA:HS u. ""'-_._- ~R CO~ST!{\JCTION Ao."\D , 1'EK~-1lT NOT r.r:CUVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPF.RATI:';G PLA..'HS --~.
(~ii) closinc the opening and pro-viding the c.,p-ability to main-tain a water cur-tain in case of a fire. (i) Floor drains, sized to remove (i) SAME. In operating expected fire fighting water plants or plants under flow should be provided in those construction, if areas where fixed water fire supp- accumulation of water ression systems are installed. from the operation Drains should also be provided in of new fire suppression other areas where hand hose lines systems docs not create ffiay be used if such fire fighting unacceptable consequences, water could cause unacceptable drains need not be in-damage to equipment in the area. stalled. Equipment should be installed on pedestals, or curbs should be provided as required to contain water and direct it to floor drains. (See NFPA 92M, I~ater proofing and Draining of Floors.") D~ains in areas containing com-bustible liquids should have pro-visions for preventing the spread . of the fire throughout the drain
-system. Water drainage from areas which may contain radioactivity should be sampled and analyzed before discharge to the environ-ment.
(j) Floors, walls and ceilings enclosin (j) SA}ffi. The fire hazard separate fire areas should have in each area should be minimum fire rating of three hours. evaluated to determine Penetrations in these fire barr- barrier requirements. iers, including conduits and If barrier fire resis-piping, should be sealed or closed tance cannot be made to provide a fire resistance adequate, fire detection rating at least equal to that of and suppression should be the fire barrier itself. Door provided, such as: openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames and (i) water curtain hardware that have been tested in case of fire, and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors (ii) flame retardant coatings, ) (iii) additional fire
'barriers. \';
16 I APPLIC/\TIOi.i DOCKETED Ii;;!---------------------+---------- CCi.~STRUCTION PLAHTS Uh __ it CO~~STRUC1'IOi; Al;D PERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 Ol'ERI\TING PUNTS should be normally closed and locke or alarmed ~ith alarm and annun-ciation in the control room. Penetrations for ventilation system should be protected by a standard "fire door damper" where required. (Refer to NFPA 80, "Fire Doors and Windm..,s. ")
- 2. ControJ of Combustibles 2. Coi1trol of Combustible (a) Safety related systems should be (a) SAHE isolated or separated from com-bustible materials. ~~en this is not possible because of the nature of the safety system or the com-bustible material, special pro-tection should be provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety system function.
Such protection may involve a combination of automatic fire suppression, and construction capable of \dthstanding and con-taining a fire that consumes all co~bustibles present. Examples
.pf such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:
(1) Emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tanks ** (2) Turbine-genrator oil and hydraulic control fluid systems (3) Reactor coolant pump lube oil system (b) Bulk gas storage (either compiessed (b) SAl-fE or cryogenic), should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment. Storage of flammable gas such as hydrogen, should be located outdoor or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety J related systems or equipment.
17 *
-------~-~---- " "~----~----t------ . APPLICATION DOCKETED fl .. ~ CO~STRUCTIO~ 'r--:=-:-:=-::-:-:-=::--o.,.---,-------
PLANTS UN~ .l~ CONSTRUCTION AIm PEIUUT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PU~NTS (Refer to NFPA 50A, "Gaseous Hydrogen Systems.") Care should be taken to locate high pressure gas storage con-tainers with the long axis parallel to building walls. This will minimize the possibility of wall penetration in the event of a container failure. Use of compressed gases (es-pecially flammable and fuel gases) inside buildings should be controlled. (Refer to NFPA 6, "Industrial Fire Loss Pre-vention. lI ) (c) The use of plastic materials should be minimized. In parti-cular, haloginated plastics such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute non-combustible materials are not available. All plastic materials, including ) flame and fire retardant materials, will burn ,,,i th an intensity and _B.TU production in a range similar to that of ordinary hydrocarbons. h~en burning, they produce heavy smoke that obscures V1S1-bility and can plug air filters, especially charcoal and HEPA. The haloginated plastics also re-lease free chloriI~ and hydrogen chloride when burning ~'hich are toxic to humans and corrosive to equipment. (d) Storage of flammable liquids should (d) SA.),{E as a minimum, comply with th~ requirements of NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code." J
18 I
~
:-A=-P=-P=-L=-IC=-ll":"":~=ll=-O::-:l-:-~
. -=n::"":o::"":c::":'KE:::':::T:::E:::D--:::B:-:U=T--=C-::-O:-:-~~-::-S,::,:,1'R::":U:'":"c::":r: ":'l:-:O::-:;-:-~---t-::P~r.-:-Ilili-:-:*:-=T~:;~U~NDE RCO:-l STRV cn 0 ~i Aim PERlHT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PLANTS ""') .I 3. Electric Cable Construction, Cable 3. Electric Cable Con"truction, Trays and Cable Penetrations Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (a) ~1ly non-combustible materials (a) SAHE should be used for cable tray .
construction. (b) See Section E.3 for fire pro- (b) SAl-ill tection guidelines for cable
'spreading rooms.
(c) Automatic water sprinkler systems (c) SAHE. When safety should be provided for cable related cables do _not trays outside the cable spreading satisfy the provisions room. Cables should be designed of Regulatory Guide 1.75, to allow wetting down with all exposed cables should deluge water without electrical be covered with an faulting. Manual hose stations approved fire retardant and portable hand extinguishers coating and a fixed should be provided as backup. automatic water fire Safety related equipment in the suppression system vicinity of such cable trays, should be provided. that does not itself require water
) fire protection, but is subject to unaccepteble damage from
__ sprinkler water discharge, should be protected from sprinkler system operation of malfunction. (d) C*able and cable tray penetration of (d) s~m. Where installed fire barriers (vertical - and hori- penetration seals are zontal) should be sealed to give deficient with respect protection at least equivalent to to fire resistance, these that fire barrier. The design seals may be protected of fire barriers for horizontal by covering both sides and vertical cable trays should, with an approved fire as a minimum, meet the require- retardant material. ments of ASTH E-ll9, "Fire Test The adequacy of using of Building Construction and such material should be Naterials," including the hose demonstrated by suitable stream test. testing. (e) Fire breaks should be provided as (e) SAl-ill deemed necessary by the fire hazards analysis. Flame or flame retardant coatings may be used as a fire break for grouped elec-trical cables to limit spread of fire in cable ventings. (Possible j cable derating o\.ling to use of such
19 Al'PLICATION DOCKETED Bur Cm;STRUCTION 1'I.AI'TS Ui~u...t\. CO ~~S'~RUCTION AND PER}IIT KOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING !"JA.'iTS coating materials must be con-sidered during design.) (f) Electric cable constructions (f) SAME. For cable in-should as a minimum pass the stallation in operating current IEEE No. 383 flame test. plants and plants under (This does not imply that cables construction that do not passing this test will not require meet the IEEE No. 383 additional fire protection.) flame test requirements, all cables must be covered with an approved flame retardant coating and properly de~ated. (g) To the extent practical, eable (g) Applicable to new construction that does not give off cable installations. corrosive gases while burning should be used. (h) Cable trays, raceways, conduit, (h) SA}ffi. Installed equip-trenches, or culverts should be ment :l,.n cable tunnels used only for cables. Mis- or culverts, need not be cellaneous storage should not be removed if they present permitted, nor should piping for no hazard to the cable flammable or combustible liquids runs as determined by or gases be installed in these the fire hazards areas. analysis. (i) The design of cable tunnels, cul- (i) SAME verts and spreading rooms should provide for automatic or manual smoke venting as required _to facilitate manual fire fighting capability. (j) Cables in the control room should (j) SAME. Existing cabling be kept to the minimum necessary installed in concealed for operation of the control toom. floor and ceiling spaces All cables entering the control should be protected ~ith room should terminate there. an automatic total Cables should not be installed in flooding halon system. floor trenches or culverts in the control room.
I 20 APPLICATIO:~ DOCKETED nUT CO:\STI{uCTIO~ PLANTS UN!)j~1{ CONSTRUCTION Al';D PEru-lIT 1,0T RECEIVED f..S OF 7/1/76 OI'ERf..TlNr. rLf..NTS
- 4. Ventilation 4. Ventilation (a) The products of combustion that (a) Sf..!-IE. The products of need to be removed from a specific combustion which need to fire area should be evaluated to be removed from a determine how they will be contro- specific fire area should lled. Smoke and corrosive gases be evaluated to deter-should generally be automatically mine how they will be discharged directly outside to a controlled.
safe location. _ Smoke and gases containing radioactive materials should be monitored in the fire area to determine if release to the environment is within the permissible. limits of the plant Technical Specifications. (b) Any ventilatio"n system designed to - (b) SAHE exhaust smoke or corrosive g~ses should be evaluated to ensure that inadvertent operation or single failures wil<L not violate the con-trolled areas ,of the plant design. This requirement includes con- ) tainment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability for operations
- personnel.
(c) The pm-ler supply and controls (c) SAt-iE for mechanical ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system. SAHE (d) Fire suppression systems should (d) be installed ~o protect charcoal filters in accordance witth Reg-ulatory Guide 1. 52, "l;>esign Testing and Haintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Cleanup Air Filtration." (e) The fresh air supply intakes to (e) SAl-IE areas containing safety related equipment or systems should be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas to minimize the possibility of contalninating the intake air with the products of combustion.
*. ~
21
-.:.\
API'LIC/\l'lON DOCKETED BUT
------.------------.--~.----------
CONSTRUCTIO~~ PI..AHTS tHmL.i~ CO:~STRUCnON A~\ D PERHIT lWT RECEIVED AS OF 7/J./7C1 Ol'ERtiTmC PlANTS (f) Stairwells should be designed to (0 SAltE. Hhere stairwells minimize smoke infiltration or elevators cannot be during a fire. Staircases enclosed in three-hour should serve as escape routes fire rated barrier with and access routes for fire equivalent fire doors, fighting. Fire exit rou~es should escape and access routes be cl~arly marked. Stairwells, should be established elevators and chutes should be by p~e-fire plan and enclosed in masonry towers with practiced in drills by minimum fire rating of three operating and fire hours and automatic fire doors at brigade personnel. least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building Elevators should not be u~ed during fire emergencies. (g) Smoke and heat* vents Dlay be useful (g) SANE in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switch-gear rooms. Hhen natural-convec-tion ventilati.on is used J a minimUlI ratio of I sq. foot of venting area per 200 sq. feet of floor area should be provided. If : forced-convection ventilation is
- -used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 sq. feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke con-trol.
(h) Self-contained breathing appara- (h) SAHE tus: using full *face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupa-
~ional Safety and Health - approva formerly given by the U. S.
nureau of }lines) ~hould be provided
- for fire brigade, damage control and control room personnel. Con-trol room personnel may be fur-nished breathing air by a manifold
)
22
- APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CO:-iSTIWCTlON PL\N1'S UNDL" CO:~STI~UCTION AND PEru-aT NOT RECEIV[D AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATmr. PLANTS system piped from a storage re-servoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one half have for the self-contained units.
At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick Clnd complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If com-pressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contam-inants. (i) '~ere total flooding gas extin- (i) SAHE
) guishing systems are used, area intake and exhaust ventilation dampers should close upon ini-tiation of gas flOty to maintain necessary gas concentration.
(See NFPA 12, "Carbone Dioxide Systems", and 12A, "Halon 1301 Systems.")
- 5. Lighting and Communication 5. Lighting and Communication Lighting and tlVO way voice communi- SAME cation are vital to safe shutdo~~ and emergency response in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency l.it;hting and communication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements:
(a) Fixed emergency lighting should consist of sealed beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery pm..'er supplies. J
23 *
-------- ~~~~~~~~----~~~~~~ *APl'LICATlON DOCKETED B. 'CO~STRUCTlOH '~
PLANTS .UNL ~TI\uCTlm~ A~U PERIHT tWT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 - OPERATING PLANTS "j (b) Suitable sealed beam battery powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use. (c) Fixed emergency communication should use voice powered head sets at pre-selected stations. (d) Fixed repeaters installed to per-mit use of portable radio communi-cation units should be protected from exposure fire damage. C. Fire Detection and Suppression C. Fire Detection and Suppre~sion
- 1. Fire Detection 1. Fire Detection (a) Fire detection systems should as SANE-. Deviations from the a minimum comply with NFPA 72D, requirements of NFPA 72D should "Standard for the Installation, be identified and justified.
Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems." (b) Fire detection system should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room .
.-Local audible alarms should .:;,lso sound at the location of the fire.
(c) Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique. They should not be capable of being confused ,-rith any other plant system alarms. (d) Fire detection and actuation systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply.
- 2. Fire Protection Water Supply Systems 2. Fire Protection Water Supply Systems (a) An underground yard fire main loop . (a) SAJffi. Visible location should be installed to furnish marking signs for under-anticipated fire water require- ground valves is accep-ments. NFPA 24 - Standard for table. Alternative Outside Protection - gives nec- valve position indicators essary guidance for such installa- should also.be provided.
tion. It references other design J
24
~------_r~-------
Al)PLICA'fJ.Oj~ DOCKETED LUT CO~STRUCl'I.ON PUJ~TS UNDER CO:~STIWCTlO:~ AND PERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATmr; PLANTS codes and standards developed by such organizations as the American National Standards
,Institute (ANSI.) and the'American Water \.Jorks Association (A\.JHA).
Lined steel or cast iron pipe should be used to reduce inter-nal tuberculation. Such tuber-culation deposits in an unlined pipe over a period of years can significantly reduce water flow through the combination of increa-sed friction and reduced pipe diameter. Heans for treating and flushing the systems should be provided. Approved visually indicating sectional control valves, such as Post Indicator Valves, should be provided to isolate portions of the main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system. The fire main system piping should For operating plants, be separate from service o~ fire main system piping sanitary water system piping. that can be isolated from service or sanitary water system piping is acceptable. (b) A corranon yard fire main loop may (b) SAl*fE. Sectionalized serve multi-unit nuclear power systems are acceptable. plant sites, if cross-connected between units. Sectional con~ trol valves should permit maintain ing independence of the indivi-dual loop around each unit. For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized. The water supply should be sized for the largest single expected flow. For multiple reactor sites with widely separ-ated plants (approaching 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used. J
;~
25 -~-~------. , APPLICATIO;~ DOCKETED liU1' CQi,STRUCTION l'LAl~TS m\DJ.:.l~ CONSTlmCTlO:~ AND PERt-ll T t~OT RCCEl VED AS OF--.:.7..:../:.::l..:..I...:..7..=.6_ _ _ _ _ _--1r.-::C..:;..1'..:.:E..:.:R::...:A:..:,T..:I..:.:N:.::G--..:..P.::L:.:I\::...:N..:T.::S_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ (c) If pumps are required to meet '(c) SANE system pressure or flow require-ments, a sufficient number of pumps should be provided so that 100% capacity will be available with one pump inactive (~.g., three 50% pumps or two 100% pumps). The connection to the yard fire main loop from each fire pump should be widely separated, preferably located on opposite sides of the plant. Each pump should have its o"~ driver with independent power supplies and control. At least one pump (if not powered frem the emergency diesels) should be driven by non-electri-cal means, preferably diesel engine. Pumps and drivers should be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by a micimum three-hour fire wall. Alarms in-dicating pump runOling, driver availability, or failure to start should be provided in the
,.. control room.
Details of the fire pump in-stallation should as a minimum conform to NFPA 20, "Standard for the Installation of Centri-fugal Fire Pumps.1I (d) Two separate, reliable water (d) SAHE supplies should be provided. If tanks are used, two 100% (min-imum of 300,000 gallons each) system capa~ity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both. However, a leak in one tank or its piping should not cause both
)
26
'"'\ ' "
APPLICATION DOCKETED hUT CONSTHUCTION PLANTS Ui,J)ER Cm;STRUCTlOi, A:m
. PERlnT ImT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPEiu\TJNC PLAIns tanks to drain. The main plant fire water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in a minimum of eight hours.
Common tanks are permitted for fire ond sanitary or service water storage. vlhen this is done, hOvl-ever, minimum fire 'l-later storage
~equireIDents should be dedi-cated by means of a vertical-standpipe for other water services.
(e) The fire t.later supply (total (e) SAME capacity and flow rate) should be calculated on the basis of the largest exp~cted flow rate for a period of two hours, but not les!:: than 300,000 gallons. This flow rate should be based (con-servatively) on 1,000 gpm for manual hose streams plus the greater of: (1) all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) the largest open head deluge system(s) operating. (f) Lakes or fresh water ponds of (f) SAHE sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least tt.70 intakes to the pump supply. lfuen a common wa ter supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied:
)
.-----:...-----..---- .~
27
-----------t-....,--___-___
APl'LICATlON DOCKETED liUl CONSTlWCTlON l'U~NTS UNDL1{
--;:;-;-::-;-;;-;;:::~~_:::7~"7:"::-------
C():\STIW(;Tlm~ ,\lID PERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERAtING Pl.ANTS ') (1) TIle additional fire pro-
)
tection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity; and (2) Failure of the fire pro-tection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink. (g) Outside manual hose installation (g) SANE should be sufficient to reach any location with an effective hose stream. To accomplish this hydrants should be in-stalled approximately every 250 feet on the yard main system. The lateral to each hydrant from the yard main should be controlled by a visually indicating or key operated (curb) valve. A hose house, equipped with hose and combination nozzle, alld other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection", should be provided as needed but _ at least every 1,000 feet. Threads compatible \.,.i th those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants. hose couplings and standpipe risers.
- 3. I~ater Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe 3. Water Sprinklers and Hose Systems Standpipe Systems (a) Each automatic sprinkler system (a) SANE and manUal hose station standpipe sho~ld have an independent con-nection to the plant wlder-ground wate~ main. Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply .
multiple sprinkler and stand-pipe systems. When provided, such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system. TIle header arrungement ) should be such that no sinelc failure can impair both the
28
.: '-\
~--,--------------------- ~~~~~~~~----~~~.---- .,~~~~~~~~~~----------
APPLICATlON DOCKETED BUT CONST!{UCTlON PUJH'S UNJ}EK CONSTRUCTlON AND PEP-HIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/16 OPERATING PUNTS primary and backup fire protection systems. -~ Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve, or other approved shut off valve, and water flow alarm. Safety related equip-ment that does not itself re-quire sprinkler water fire pro-tection, but is subject to un-acceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles. (b) All valves in the fire water .(b) SN-1E. When electrical systems should be electrically supervision of fire supervised. The electrical protection valves is supervision signal should in- not practicable, an dicate in the control room and adequate management super-other appropriate command location vision program should be in the plant (See NFPA 26, provided. Such a program "Supervision of Valves. t1 ) should include locking valves open with strict .' key control; tamper proof seals; and periodic, visual check of all valves. (c) Automatic sprinkler sy~tems (c) SAHE should as a minimum conform to requirements of appropriate standards such' as NFPA 13, "Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems", and NFPA IS, "Standard for Water Spray Fixed Syst.ems." (d) Interior ffianual hose installation (d) Interior manual hose should be able to reach any lo- installation should be cation with at least one effec- able to reach any lo-tive hose stream. To accomplish cation with at least one this, standpipes with hose effective hose steam. To connections, equipped with a accomplish this, stand-maximunl of 75 feet of l-!i-inch pipes with hose connection!
)
29 *
--------- .'~-----.-----;--::-:PI.AI'IS J\Fl'LICAT10;, DOCKETED llL.. Cm:STRUCTlON UNI*..* COi~STlWCTlON AND PElUHT t~OT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/7 ("'- _ _ _ _ _4_0..:....P_I_':l_V_IT_I_N_'G_'_P_L_A_~_~T_S_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
woven jacket-lin~d fire hose ~nd equipped with a maximum suitable nozzles should be of 7S feet of l-~ inch provided in all buildings, , woven jacket lined fire including containment, on all hose and suitable nozzles floors and shoUld be spaced should be provided in at not more than lOO-foot all buildings, including intervals. Individual stand- containment, on all pipes should be of at least floors and should be 4-inch diametcr for multiple spaced at not mOre than hose connections and 2-~-inch IOO-foot intervals. diameter for single hose con- Individual standpipes nections. These systems should should be of at least follow the requirements of NFPA 4-inch diameter for 14, "Standpipe and Hose Systems" multiple hose connections for sizing, spacing and pipe and 2-~-inch diameter for support requirements. single hose connections. These systems should
£0110\-1 the requirements ,of NFPA No. 14 for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements (NELPIA).
Hose stations should be located Hose stations should be outside entrances to normally located outside entrances tL"1occupied areas and inside to normally unoccupied normally occupied areas. Stand- areas and inside norm~lly pipes serving hose stations in occupied areas. Stand-areas housing safety related equip- pipes serving hose
- ment should have shut off valves stations in areas housing and pressure reducing devices safety related equipment (if applicable) outside the area. should have shut off valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area.
Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual fire fighting in areas wi thin hose reach 6f equipment required for safe plant shutdO\offi in the event of ~'Safe ShutdO\m Earthquake (SSE). The standpipe system scrving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports to assure system pressure in-tegrity. The piping and valves J
.,"""'"\
30
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~---------------------
Al'l'LICATIOl~ DOCKETED uUT CONSTIWCTlON l' LA l'\ T S U1Hi' ';:E:-;-;~:-;:C~O::-i\~S::;1~
' R:-:-U~C~ ' "l~'l:-:O::-;L-;-~-/:~-:::-:~0;:----------- . l'ERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/]/76 OPERI\TlHG PLI\~TS for the port~on of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirement should at least sat-isfy ANSI Standard B3l.l, "Power *Piping." The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valve(s) in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a norma Seismic Category I water system such as Essential Service Water System. The cross connection should be (a) capable of provj,ding flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 7S gpm/
hose station), and (b) designed to the s~~e standards as the seis-mic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the Seismic Category I water system. (e) The proper type of hose nozzles to (e) SM*IE be suppEed to each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The usual ' combin-ation spray/straight-stream nozzle may cause wlacceptable mechanical damage (for example, the delicate electronic equip-ment in the control room) and be unsuitable. Electrically safe nozzles should be provided at locations where electrical equip-ment or cabling is located. (f) Certain fires such as those (f) SN-IE invol ving flammable liquids respond well to foam suppression. Consideration should be given to _ use of any of the available foams for'such specialized pro-tection application. These include the 1110re common chemical and mechanical 101-' expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AfH). J
31
'~ ~~\
o1-0-r-l-ri'O-C-K-E-T-E-D-b u1":"CO-:-~S-*1-*J-~U-L--l-*-lO-N----1---,PLArn-oS-U~'u.t:l'-:-t~C;::O;::t:-:i.::-S*:::-r'::'J~:-:-U-;-:C':::T71-=07":N~A=I';D~----- ---A'-}-)I-'j'-.l-C-'-\1-
'PERMIT NOT RECEIVE" AS OF 7/1/7~ OPERATING rU~,NTS
- 4. Halon Suppression Systems 4. Halon Suppression.Systems The use of lIalon fire extinguishing SAl-IE agents should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12A and 12B, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishin Agent Systems - ilalon 1301 alld Halon 1211." Only UL or HI approved agents should be used.
In addition to the guidelines of NFPA 12A and 12B, preventative maintenance and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be done at least quarterly. Particular consideration should also be given to: (a) ln1nlmUm required Halon con-centration and soak tine (b) toxicity of Halon (c) toxicity and corrosive. characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon. S. Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems S. Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems The use of carbon dioxide extin- SAr*1E guishing systems should as a ' minimum comply \lith the requirements of NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Extin-guishing Systems." Particular consideration should also be biven to: (a) mln,JmUm required CO concentration and soak time; 2 (b) toxicity of CO ; 2 (c) possibility of secondary therwzl shock (cooling) damage; (d) offsetting requirements for venting during CO injection to 2 J prevent overprcssurization versus scalj.ng to prevent loss of agent;
32
- IJlPLICATION DOCKETED nUT CO;,STRUCT iON l'LA};'fS UNDER CONSTlWCTIOlJ Al,l)
PERHJI NOT RECEI\'ED AS OF 7/1/76 OPEMTING PLANT~
) (e) design requirements from over-pressurization; and (f) possibility and probability of CO systems being out-of-2 service.because of personnel safety consideration. CO sys-2 tems are disarmed whcnevet pe6ple are present in an area so pro-tected. Areas entered frequently (e~en though duration time for any visit is short) have often been fOlmd with CO systems shut 2
off.
- 6. Portable Extinguishers 6. Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers should be pro- SN-lE vided in accordance ~vith guide-lines of NFPA 10 and IDA, "Portable Fire Exting~ishers, Maintenance and Use. II Dry chemical extinguishers should be installed with due con-sideration given to cleanup problems
) after use and possible adverse effects on equipment installed in the area. D. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas D. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas
- 1. Primary and Secondary Containment 1. Primary and Secondary Containment (a) Normal Operation Ca) SAJ\!E except as noted.
Fire protection requirements for the primary and secondary con-tainment areas should be pro~ vided on the basis of specific identified hazards. For example:
°Lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid system for the primary coolant pumps °Cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations °Charcoal filters
)
III 33 - - - - - - - -. - - - ~I--_ _-___:_~*-:---t~~~ ,":7::-~_:_;_;:_:=~~__:_7;-:-:-----_ APl'LlCATIO~ DOCKETEl> ,~UT cOt\Sna;CTlON l'U.tHS L .. uER CO:{STRUCTION AND PERlHT t;OT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OL1f.RATmG PLANTS Because of the general in- Fire suppression ~ystcms accessability of these areas should be provided based on during normal plant operations, the fire hazards analysis. protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. Fixed fire suppression cap-Automatic sprinklers should be ability should be provided installed for those hazards for hazards that could identified as requiring fixed jeopardize safe plant shut-suppression. down. Automatic sprinklers are preferred. An acceptable alternate is automatic gas (Halon or CO ) for hazards 2 identified as ' requiring fixed suppression pro-tection. Operation of the fire protection An enclosure may be required systems should not compromise to confine the agent if a integrity of the containment gas system is used. Such or the other safety related enciosures should not adversely systems. Fire protection affect safe shutdown, or other activities in the containment operating equipment in con-areas should function in con- tainment. junction ,"ith total containment requirements such as control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release and ventilation. Fire detection systems should Automatic fire suppression alarm and annunciate in the con- capability need not be trol room. The type of detection provided in the primary con-used and the location of the tainment atmospheres that detectors should be mos't suitable are inerted during normal to the particular type of fire operation. However, ,special that could be expected from fire protection requirements the identified hazard. A primary during refueling and main-containment general area fire tenance operations should be detection capability should satisfied as provided below be provided as backup for the above described hazard detection. To acco~plish this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters. )
APPLICATION DOC!~TED BUT CONSTRUCTION PI.Al:TS UNDER CQitSrIWCTION Al';O PERIUT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPEP-ATING PLANTS Automatic fire suppression cap-ability need not be provided in the primary containment atmos-pheres that arc inerted during normal operation. However, special fire protection require-ments. during refueling and main-tenance operations should be satisifed as provided below. (b) Refueling and Haintenance (b) Refueling and Maintenance Refueling and maintenance opera- SAl*IE tions in containment may intro-duce additional hazards such as contamination cont-c ol materials, decontamination supplies, \wod planking, tempqrary wiring, weldin~ and flame cutting (with portable compressed fuel gas supply). Pos~ible fires lo1OUld not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and scppressi,on systems. ) Management procedures and controls _. necessary to assure adequate fire protection are discussed in Section 3a. In addition, manual fire fighting Equivalent protection capability should be permanently from portable systems installed in containment. Stand- should be provided if it pipes with hose stations, and is impractical to in-portable fire extinguishers, stall standpipes with should be installed at strategic hose stations. locations throughout containment for any required manual fire - fighting operations. Adeqcate self-contained breathing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances for fire fighting and damage control personnel. These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities. )
"1-'}-m-
---II-.-l'-P-t-I-C-i-\'l-*1-.0-;-~-D-O-C-I~-i:.- *..;,-r-(-;(-);\-.S-'j-'h-'l-;(-:l-'l-O-N-'- - - PERiH'!' lmT RECETVED AS OF 7/ .1 /l(1 OI'E1U,'j' I ~(: PLANTS
- 2. Control Room ? Control Room The control room is essential to safe SAHE reactor operation. It must be pro-tected against disabling fire damage and slwuld be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls and roofs having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours.
Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to damage from t\1IO distinct fire hazards: (a) Fire originating within a cabinet or console; and (b) Exposure fire involving com-bustibles in the general room area. Manual fire fighting capability Hose stations adjacent to should be provided for both hazards. the control room with portable Hose stations and portable water and extinguishers in the control Halon extinguishers should be located room are acceptable. in the control room to eliminate the need for operators to leave the con~r91 room. An additional hose piping shut off valve and pressure reducing device should be installed outside the control room. Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable. Nozzles that are compatible \oTith the hazards and equipment in the control room should be provided for the Iflanual hose station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fichting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement. )
JU
- Al)l'I.ICA'j'W;~ DOCI~ETED ml"!:
(;C,**~:.;~*iUJCECN PLAIns U;'W£R CONSTRUCTlOi, A':~D PERr-lIT NOT RECEIVED 1\5 01,' .71.V ;6___ . OPEn.ATJI ~ G Pl..I\_N_T_S_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Fire detection in the control room cabinets, and consoles should be provided by smoke and heat detectors in each fire area. Alarm and annun-ciation ' should be provided in the con-trol room. Fire alarms in other parts of the plan t should also l?e alarnled ' and annunciated in the control room. Breathing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available. Control room floors, ceiling, supporting structures, and \... alls. including penetrations and doors, should be designed to a minimum fire rating of three hours. All penetration seals should be air ~ight. The control room ventilation intake Manually operated ventilation should be provided with smoke detec- systems are acceptaLle. tion capability to automatically alarm locally and isolate the control room ventilation system to protect operator~ by preventing smoke from entering the control room. Maaually operated venting of the control room should be available so that operators have the option of venting for visibility. Cables should not be located in con- If such concealed spaces are cealed floor and ceiling spaces. All used, however, they should cables that enter the control room have fixed automatic total should terminate in the control flooding halon protection. room. That is, no cabling should be simply routed through the control room from one area to another. Safety related equipment should be Not applicable. mounted on pedestals or the control room should have curbs and drains to direct water away from such equip-ment. Such drains should be pro-vided with means for closing to maintain integrity of the control room in the event of other accidents requiring control room isolation.
37 *
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- 3. Cable Spreading Room ~. Cahle Spreadinn Room The primary fire suppression in the (a) The preferred acceptable cable spreading room should be an auto- methods are:
matic water system such as closed head sprinklers, open head deluge, or 1. Automatic v.'ater open directional spray nozzles. system such as closed Deluge and open spray systems should head sprinklers. have provisions for manual operation open head deluge, or at a remote station; however, there open directional should be provisions to preclude spray nozzles. Deluge inadvertent operation. Location and open spray systems of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should have pro~ should consider cable tray sizing and visions for manual arrangements to assure adequate water operation at a remote coverage. Cables should be designed station; however; there to allow wetting down with deluge water should also be pro-without electrical faulting. visions to preclude inadvertent operation. Open head deluge and open directional Location of sprinkler spray systems should be zoned to that heads or spray nozzles a single failure will not deprive should consider cable the entire area of automatic fire tray sizing and suppression capability. arrangements to assure adequate The use of foam is acceptable. water coverage. Cables provided it is of a type capable of should be designed to being oeliv~red by a sprinkler or deluge allow wetting down system. such as an Aqueous Film Forming with deluge water Foam (AFFF). without electrical faulting. Open head An automatic Hater suppression'* deluge and open sys tern ,,,ith manual hoses and portable directional spray extinguisher backup is acceptable, systems should be provided: zoned so that a single failure ,,,ill (a) At l~ast two remote and separate not deprive the entrances are provided to the entire area of auto-room for access by fire brigade matic fire scpprcssion personnel; and capability. The use of foam is accept~ble, (b) Aisle separation provided provided it is of a between tray stacks should type capable of being be at least three feet wide and delivered by a sprink-eight fl!et high. ler or deluge system, such as an Aque0us Film Forming foam (AFFF)
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38 I
.'""'1 APl'LlCATlON lJOr.I\.ETEO li.llT CONSTi\uCTlON ~ERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATlNr. PL\NTS -f'Li~N'l'S-U-,,'J)I;'I~' ell:': S '1"1: Ill;:l"llIN' ,\~, \)
Alternatcly, gas systcrr.s (Balon or CO ) (2) Manual hoses nnd portable 2 may bc uscd for primary firc Buppression extinguishers should be if they are backed up by an installed provided as backup. water spray Ryste~ and hose stations and portable extinguishers ilUllled- (3) Each cable spreading room iately outside th~ room and if the of each unit should have acccss rcquirements stated above divisional cable sepnra-are met. tion, and be separated from the other and the Electric cable construction should, rest of the plant by a as a minimum, pass the flame test in minimum three-hour rated IEEE Std 383, "IEEE Standard for fire wall (Refer to NFPA Type Tes t of Class IE Electric Cables, 251 or ASTH E-119 [or Field Splices and Connections for fire tcst resistance Nuclear Power Generating Stations. 1I rating). Drains to remove fire' fighting water (4) At least two remote .and should be provided with adequate seals separate entrances are when gas extinguishing systems provided to the room for are also installed. access by fire brigade personnel; and Redundant safety related cable division should be sepcrated by walls with a (5) Aisle separation pro-three-hour fire rating. vided between tray ) stacks should be at least three feet wide and eight feet high.
- b. For cable spreading rooms that do not provide divisional cable separation of a (3), in addition to meeting a(l), (2),
(4), and (5) above, the follow-ing should also be provided: (1) Divisional cable separation should meet the guide-lines of Regulatory Guide
- 1. 75, "Physical Indepen-dence of Eiectric Systems."
(2) All cabling should be covered with a suitable fire retardant coating. (3) As an alternate to a(l) above, automatically initiated gas systems (Halon or CO ) may be 2 J
_ _ _l_'I_o:I_,iHT l:!-)'f l~ECEIVED AS Pl-' _7l.VJ3__ o_ _ _ _ _-t Ol'EI~\T1I ~ r; J'I A:ns
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used for primary fire suppression, provided a fixed water system is used as a backup. (4) Plants that cannot meet the guidelines of Reg-ulatory Guid~ 1.75, in addition to meeting a(l), (2), (4), and (5) above, an auxiliary shutdo"m system with all cabling independent of the cable spreading room should be provided. For multiple-reactor unit sites, cable spreading rooms should not be shared bet,oleen reactors. Each cable spreading room of each unit should have divisional c~ble sepration as stated above and be separated from the other and the rest of the plant by a \,all with a minimum fire rating of three hours. (See NFPA 251, "Fire Tests, Building Construction and Haterials", or ASTIr E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and l1aterials", for fire test resistance rating.) The ver.tilaticn system to the cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon acutation of any gas exti.nguishing system in the area. In addition, smoke vznting of the cable spreading room may be desirable. S~ch smoke venting systems should be controlled auto-matic.::ll)' by the fire detection or suppression system as appropriate. Capability for remote manwll control should also be provided.
- 4. Plant Computer Room 4. ' Plant Computer Room S~fety related computers should SAME be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum three-hour fire resistant rating. Automatic fire detection
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4() I APPLICATJON DOCKETED HUT CO:'~STRUCTlON PI..Al'TS lb.JER
----------.~------
CO::ST1~UCnO:~ Ai.;}) OJ'Erv'.Tl ).;(: l'J.:\~T~ l'ERHIT NOT RECEiVED ,\S OF 7/1/76 should be provided to nlarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Manual hose stations and portable water and halon fire extinguishers should be pr:ovided.
- 5. Switchgear Rooms 5. Switchgear Rooms Switchgear rooms should be S\oo'i tchgea r rooms should be separated from the re~~inder of separated from the remai.nder the plant by minimum three-hour of the plant by minim~m three-rated fire barriers, if practicable. hour rated fire barriers to the Automatic fire detection should extent practicable. Automatic alarm and annunciate in the fire detection should alarm and control room and alarm locally. annunciate in the control room Fire hose stations and portable* and alarm locally. Fire hose extinguishers should be readily stations and portable ex-available. tinguishers should be r.eadily available.
Acceptable protection for cables Acceptable protection for that pass through the switchgear cables that pass through the room is automatic water or gas switchgear room is automatic agent suppression. Such auto- water or gas agent suppression .
.. matic suppression must consider Such automatic suppression preventing unacceptable damage must consider preventing un-to electrical equipment and acceptable d~mage to elec-possible necessary containment trical equipment 'and possible '
of agent following discharge. necessary containment of agent following discharge.
- 6. Remote Safety Related Panels 6. Remote Safety Related Panels The general area housing remote SAl-IE safety related panels should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room. Combustible materials should be controlled and. limited to those required for operation.
Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be provided.
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CO:\STI~UCT J o;~ 1\:,1.1 PERl-lIi HOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/)/76
- 7. Station Battery Rooms 1* Station Hattery nooms Battery rooms should be protected SANE against fire explosions. Battery rooms should be separated [rom each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three-hours inclusive of all penetrations and openings. (See NFPA 69, "Standard on E,.:plosion Prevention Systems.") Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol. % hydrogen concentration.
Standpipe and hos~ and portable extinguishers should be provided. Alternatives: (a) Provide a total fire rated barrier enclosure of the battery room complex that exceeds the fire load con-teined in the room. (b) Reduce the fire load to be within the fire barrier cap-ability of 1-1/2 hours. OR. (c) Provide a remote manual act-uated sprinkler system in each room and provide the 1-1/2 hour fire barrier separation.
- 8. Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil 8. Turbine Lubrication and Control Storage and Use Areas Oil Storage and Use Areas A blank fire \"all having a minimum SA1ffi. h~en a blank wall is resistance rating of three hours not present, open head deluge should separate all areas coa- protection should be provided taining safety related systems for the turbine oil hazards and equipment [rom the turbine and automatic open head water oil system curtain protection should be provided for wall openings.
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- 1 __________________
J\l'PLICATION DOCKl:TED LU'!' ,~a":l'!'i*' iJCfjCtf l'L,\IHS u,"Jj~!; C():~S'1'1~UCT 111:~ AIm
. PEIUHT l~CT Rl':CEIVED AS l':,' "Jf.J.ji6 ___ .____ OPElU.l'mC Pl.At:T:;.S___________
- 9. Diesel Generator Areas ~. Diesel Generator Ar~ns Diesel generators should be SANE separated from each other and other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a m1n1mum fire resistance rating of thre~
hours. Automatic fire suppression such ~qlen day tanks cannot be as AFFF foam, or sprinklers should separated from the diescl-be installed to combat any diesel generator one of the generator or lubricating oil following should be provided fires. Automatic fire detection for the diesel generator should be provided to alarm and area: annunciate in the control room and alarm locally~ Drainage for (a) Automatic open head fire fighting water and means for deluge or open head spray local manual venting of smoke nozzle system(s) should be provided. (b) Autom~tic closed head Day tanks with total capacity up sprinklers to 1100 gallons are permitted in the diesel generator area under (c) Automatic AFFF that is the following conditions: delivered by a sprinkler deluge or spray system (a) The day tank is located in a separate enclosure, (d) Automatic gas system with a minimum fire resiscance (Ha~Dn or CO ) may be rating of three hours, 2 used in lieu of foam including doors or penetrations. or sprinklers to combat TIlese enclosures should be diesel generator and/or capable of containing the lubricating oil fires. entire contents of the day tanks. The enclosure should be ventilated to avoid accum-ulation of oil fumes. (b) The enclosure should be protected by automatic fire suppression systems such as AFFF or sprinklers.
- 10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas 10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Arens Diesel fuel oil tanks with a cap- SAME acity greater than 1100 gallons should not be located inside the
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': -:\___ __.________---- "1_____._
Al'PLJ.CATJO~ DOCKETED BUT CO:iSTl~UCTJO:~ PLAinS U~lJ)Li: CmlSl1 : 11CTlOI~ AJ';U PEmUT J:()1' r-r:CE1VEJ) AS OF 7/1 /7(J OI'ERA'!'] NC l'I..\_t_f_I'S_'______________ __ _ buildings containing safety re-lated equipment. They should be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety related equipment, or if located wi thin 50 fee t, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. Buried tanks are considered as meeting the three hour fire resistance require-ments. See NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code", for additional guidance. When located in a s~parate building, the tank should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system such as AFFF or sprinklers. Tanl~s, unless buried, should not In operating plants where tanks be located directly above or below are located directly above or safety related sy~tems or equip- below the diesel generators ment regardless of the fire rating and cannot reasonably be of separating floors or ceilings. moved, separating floors and main structural members should, as a minimum, have fire resistance rating of three hours. Floors should be liquid tight to prevent leaking of possible oil spills from one level to another. Drains should be provided to remove possible oil spills and fire fighting water to a safe location. One of the following accep-table methods of fire pro-tection should also be provided: (a) Automatic open head deluge or open he a d spray nozzle systcrn(s) )
44
- _---'-.-APPL1CATlO;~
----- ----------"1------.-. ))OC1~ETED ~UT CO~';ST)~IJCTIO:-l l'LArtrs umn:n CO;~ST)\llCT J 0:; A;';O . PERm."! NOT r-r,CEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 01'EIU>.TI1;r, l'LMn'S ----~--------------
(b) Automatic closed head sprinklers; or (c) Automatic AFFF that is delivered by a sprinkler system or spray system
- 11. S~fety Related Pumps 11. Safety Related p~
Pump houses and rooms housing Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps or other safety safety related pumps should be related equipment should be sep- protected by automatic sprinkler arat0d from other areas of the protection unless a fire plant by fire b~rriers having at hazards analysis can demon-least three-hour ratings. These strate that a fire will not rooms should be protected by endanger other safety related automatic sprinkler protection equipment required for safe unless a fire hazards analysis plant shutdown. Early can demonstrate that a fire will warning fire detection should not endanger other safety related be installed with alarm and equipment required for safe plant annunciation locally and in the shutdown. Early warning fire control room. Local hose detection should be installed with stations and portable ex-al~rm and ~,nunciatiQn locally tinguishers should also be
) and in the control room. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers provided. . s.hould also be provided.
Equipment pedestals or curbs and drains should be provided to re-move and dir£~C: t wa ter aHay from safety related equipment. " Provisions should be made for manual control of the ventilation system to facilitate smoke removal if required for manual fire fighting operation.
- 12. Ne\ol Fuel Area 12. New Fuel Area Hand portable extinguishers SANE should be located within this area. Also, local hose stations should be located outside but within hose reach of this area.
Automatic fire detection should
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OI'EI*:/l.Tlr~r. l'J .!\~;TS alarm and annunciate in the con-trol room and alarm locally. Combustibles should be limited to a minimum in the ne\.,. fuel area. The storage area should be 'pro-vided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water. The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained' as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application.
- 13. Spent Fuel Pool Area 13. Spent Fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel SAME pool area should be provided by local hose stations and portable extinguishers. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally.
- 14. Radwaste Building
) 14. Radwaste Building The radwaste building should be SAl-IE separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three-hour ratings. Auto-matic sprinklers should be used in all areas \-1here combustible materials are located. Automatic fire detection should be pro-
. vided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. During a fire, the ventilation systems in these areas should be capable of being isolated. Water should drain to liquid radwaste building s~~ps.
Acceptable alternative fire pro-tection is automatic fire detection to alarm and annunciate in the control room, in addition to manual hose stations and portable ex-tinguishers conSisting of hand held and large wheeled units. J
46 Al1PLICA'flON j)OCKJ~'JEJ) lilTT Cl1NSTI\llCTlOI~ PER~IT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76
- 15. Decontamination Areas 15. Decontaminntion Areas The decontamination areas should SMfE be protected by automatic sprinklers if fla~~ble liquids are stored. Automatic fire de tec-
. tion should be provided to annun-ciate and alarm in the control room and alarm 10cally. The ventilation system should be capable of being isolated. Local hose stations and hand portable extinguishers should be provided as backup to the sprinkler system.
- 16. _Safety Related '-later Tanks 16. Safety Related '.Jater Tanks Storage tanks that supply SAt-IE
\o:ater fot' safe shutdov,'U should be protected from the effects of fire. Local hose stations and portable extin~uishers should be provided. Portable extinguishers should be located in nearby hose houses. Combustible materials should not be stored next to out-door tanks. A minimum of 50 fcet of separatjon should be provided bet\oleen outdoor tanks and com-bustible ~2teria1s where feasible.
- 17. Cooling Tovers 17. Cooling TOl.[CI.S..
Cooling towers should be of non- SAME. Cooling towers of com-combustible construction or so bustible construction, so located that a fire will not located that a fire jn them adversely affect any safety re- could adversely affect safety lated systems or equipment. Cooling related systems or equipment towers should be of non-combustible should be protected with an construction when the basins are open head deluge system in-used for the ultimate heat sink or stallation with hydr3nts and for the fire protection water supply. hose houses strategically located.
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' PEl~:'ILT IWT RECEIVED .\S OF 7/1/76 01~~':.IU\TJ::~_,\_~;_T_S_ _,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
- 18. Miscellaneous Areas 18. Hisccllancolls Areas Miscellaneous areas such as SAHE records storage areas, shops, warehouses, and auxiliary boiler rooms shnuld be so located that a fire or effects of a fire, in-cluding smoke, will not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment. Fuel oil tanks for auxiliary boilers should be buried or provid~d with dikes to contain the entire tank contents.
E. Special Protection Guidelines E. Special Protection Guidelines
- 1. Welding and Cutting, Acetylene - 1. Welding and Cutting~ Acetylene -
pxygen Fuel Gas Systems Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems This equipment is used in various SAME areas throughout the plant. Stor-age locations should be chosen to permit fire prote~tion by auto-
.matic sprinkler systems. Local hose stations and portable equip-cent should be provided as back-up. The requirements of NFPA 51 and SIB are ~pplicable to these hazards. A permit system should be required to utilize this equip-ment . (Also refer to 2f herein,)
- 2. Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchan~ 2. Storage Areas for Dry Ion Resins Exchange Resins Dry ion exchange resins should SANE not be stored near essential safety related systems. Dry unused resins should be protected by automatic \o,'et pipe sprinkler installations. Detection by smoke and heat detectors should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Local hose sta-tions and portable extinguishers should provide backup for these areas. Storage areas of dry resin should have curbs .:md drains.
(Refer Lo r~FPA 91H, "\~aterproofing ) and Qraiuing of Floors.")
--_ ......,.... . .__ ..__ .........- .- ----- 1'1.ANTS ----_. .'\.---_._---------- ' ,Il:!: n/:~sTRUCllO:~ Mm -
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._ . 7 iI/iS OJ'LI:AT1 Nl; l'L\r\TS
- 3. Hazardous Chemicals 3. Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicnls should be stored and protected in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 49; "Hazardous Chemicals Data."
Chemicals storage areas should be well ventilated and protected against flooding conditions since some chemicals may react with \-later to produce ignition.
- 4. Haterials Containi.ng Radioactivity 4. Materials Conted.ning Radio-Activity Materials that collect and contain SAME radioactivity such as spent ion ex-change resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or con-tainers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles. These materials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well.
Consideration should be given to requirements for removal ' of iso-topic decay heat from entrained rudioactive materials.
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E~CI.OSURE 2 SUPPLHIC\TARY GUT Di\.'\CE 0:--: INFOR!,L\TIO:, NEED!.:!) FOR FIRE rr{OTECTIO;-': PROGRAM EVALUATJO~
] n order to perform 3 proper firc h3~ards ~nal)'sis, the scrvi ces .of a qua] i fj ed fi re protection engineer should be util ized. To demollstrate the results of the fire hazards analysis the following information must be provided:
- l. Provide plan and elevation vicws of the plant that shol.,. the plant as divided into distinct fire areas. Provide a description of the v:lrious systems, both safety-related and non-safety-related, ,,'hich occupy the fire area and could provide cooling to the core to safely shutdown the rec1ctor, includi ng decay heat removal. Provide a description of :1 reas
('If the F Lant that contain radioactive material th:lt mel)' be rd eas J to the excl :lsion area or beyond should a fire occur in those areas. For each fire area, provide the following: a) Describe the fire barrier that defines the fire area; the consequences of the design basis fire for that area; the con-sequences of the fire if the fire protection system func~ions as designed. b) Identify the safety related equipment and associated cabling. Pl'ovide the design criteria for the fi re protl!ct~ . on re lated to such equipllient. Provide the design criteria for protection of such equipment against inadvertent operat; on, careless operation or rupture of extinguishing systems. c) Provide a list of the type, quantity, and other pertinent characteristics of combustible . materials associated wi th each fire area. d) Provide a list of the fire loadings which represent the combustibles identified in (c) above for each fire area. e) Describe all the extinguishing and detection capJbi Ii ties wi thin each fire area. Discuss all m~ans for cont :lining and inhibiting the progress of a fire, e.g., the \~e of fire stops, coatings, curbs, walls, etc. Describe the extinguishing equipment outside an area h'hich has access to the ~lTea. J NOTE: If large fire areas D.re divided into fire ZOlles for the rlll'pO~l' of fire protect) on, the above information shoul d be prc'\' i ded fOT each zone. ~
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- 2. I\There redlmdant safety re lated equipment or cab] ing is located in a given fire area, describe the design features \\'hich prevent the loss of both redundant trains in a common fire, c. g., the separation provided hy distance, physical barriers, ande lect ri cal isolation. \\11erC control, power, or instrument cables of rcuLL'1clall':
systems used for bringing the reactor to safe, cold shutdown are located in the same cable trays, either provide a bOlmding a~alysis demonstrating that the worst consequences as a result of a fire in the cable trays are acceptable or show that redundant systems required to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown are adequately protected against damage by the fire. ) J}}