ML19347A827: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:..                                                                                    1 ATH E NS, AL A. 3 5611
{{#Wiki_filter:..                                                                                    1 ATH E NS, AL A. 3 5611
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* Of        ;$h Chatrsan, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H St. NW Washington, D.C. 20055
Of        ;$h Chatrsan, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H St. NW Washington, D.C. 20055 Dear Sir; I question the safety design o f the Brown's Ferry Nuclear P1, ant in the following arecs. Although I think some calculations about the drop-ping of a spent fuel bundle and breaka'ge of came were made, I an concerned about the possibility of a plane crashing accidently or by terrorists, into the secondary containment with spent fuel outside the reactor. I think the dropped fuel accident assumes that the secondary contain=ent remains intact. What if the plane      ca=c through the roof into the reactor core or into the spent fuel pool?      I don't think the FSAR included this possibility or the possibility of a plane crash at the intake structure.
                                                                                                  .
g                                Such a crash could possibly cut off all sources of cooling water with the exception of the condensate storage tanks. Of course a fire in the intake tunnel or building ci;;ht possibly result in the dame cutoff. With all the redundancy and seperatione of systems, I still don't understand why all the intake water pu=p wiring for all 3 units was routed through the same cotson tunnel. I know that temporary wiring and pumps could i:e installed on such e an occasion. Nihat I do not know is whether the design pressure of the pri=ary containment is high enough to contain the pressure until such temporary =easures were effected. Do you.know?
Dear Sir; I question the safety design o f the Brown's Ferry Nuclear P1, ant in the following arecs. Although I think some calculations about the drop-ping of a spent fuel bundle and breaka'ge of came were made, I an concerned
Thank You, Y
                                            ,
George Smith 3
about the possibility of a plane crashing accidently or by terrorists, into the secondary containment with spent fuel outside the reactor. I think the dropped fuel accident assumes that the secondary contain=ent remains intact. What if the plane      ca=c through the roof into the reactor core or into the spent fuel pool?      I don't think the FSAR included this possibility or the possibility of a plane crash at the intake structure.
g                                Such a crash could possibly cut off all sources of cooling water with the
  '
exception of the condensate storage tanks. Of course a fire in the intake tunnel or building ci;;ht possibly result in the dame cutoff. With all the redundancy and seperatione of systems, I still don't understand why all the intake water pu=p wiring for all 3 units was routed through the same cotson tunnel. I know that temporary wiring and pumps could i:e installed on such e an occasion. Nihat I do not know is whether the design pressure of the pri=ary containment is high enough to contain the pressure until such temporary =easures were effected. Do you.know?
                                .
Thank You,
                                      .
Y George Smith 3
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8009800325
8009800325
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Revision as of 02:16, 31 January 2020

Questions Safety Design of Facilities
ML19347A827
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/24/1980
From: Galen Smith
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML19347A822 List:
References
NUDOCS 8009300325
Download: ML19347A827 (1)


Text

.. 1 ATH E NS, AL A. 3 5611

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Of  ;$h Chatrsan, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H St. NW Washington, D.C. 20055 Dear Sir; I question the safety design o f the Brown's Ferry Nuclear P1, ant in the following arecs. Although I think some calculations about the drop-ping of a spent fuel bundle and breaka'ge of came were made, I an concerned about the possibility of a plane crashing accidently or by terrorists, into the secondary containment with spent fuel outside the reactor. I think the dropped fuel accident assumes that the secondary contain=ent remains intact. What if the plane ca=c through the roof into the reactor core or into the spent fuel pool? I don't think the FSAR included this possibility or the possibility of a plane crash at the intake structure.

g Such a crash could possibly cut off all sources of cooling water with the exception of the condensate storage tanks. Of course a fire in the intake tunnel or building ci;;ht possibly result in the dame cutoff. With all the redundancy and seperatione of systems, I still don't understand why all the intake water pu=p wiring for all 3 units was routed through the same cotson tunnel. I know that temporary wiring and pumps could i:e installed on such e an occasion. Nihat I do not know is whether the design pressure of the pri=ary containment is high enough to contain the pressure until such temporary =easures were effected. Do you.know?

Thank You, Y

George Smith 3

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8009800325

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