NRC Generic Letter 1988-03: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:I ..4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
{{#Wiki_filter:I .
COMMISSION
    .4                                     UNITED STATES
e WASHINGTON, D. C. 2055 TO ALL LICENSEES, APPLICANTS  
                                NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
FOR OPERATING  
              e                         WASHINGTON, D. C. 2055 TO ALL LICENSEES, APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSES, AND HOLDERS OF
LICENSES, AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION  
          CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS
PERMITS FOR PRESSURIZED  
          Gentlemen:
WATER REACTORS Gentlemen:
          SUBJECT:   RESOLUTION OF GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 93, "STEAM BINDING OF
SUBJECT: RESOLUTION  
                      AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS" (GENERIC LETTER 88-03)
OF GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 93, "STEAM BINDING OF AUXILIARY  
          This generic letter is being issued:
FEEDWATER  
                (1) to inform you of the staff's resolution of the subject generic safety issue, and
PUMPS" (GENERIC LETTER 88-03)This generic letter is being issued: (1) to inform you of the staff's resolution of the subject generic safety issue, and (2) to request that you continue to implement, as a minimum, the monitoring and corrective procedures previously identified for interim resolution of this issue in IE Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,' dated October 29, 1985.(A copy of this bulletin is attached.)
                (2) to request that you continue to implement, as a minimum, the monitoring and corrective procedures previously identified for interim resolution of this issue in IE Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,' dated October 29, 1985.
The issue concerns the potential disabling of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps by steam binding that is caused by backleakage of main feedwater (MFW) past the isolation check valves between the AFW and MFW systems. The issue is significant because most AFW systems are potentially vulnerable to common mode failure of the redundant AFW pumps as a result of steam binding. This vulnerability is inherent to the piping configurations used, which allow redundant trains of AFW to be cross-connected via common headers on the suction and discharge sides of the pumps.To reduce the probability of AFW pump failure as a consequence of steam binding if backleakage does occur, IE Bulletin 85-01 requested that certain licensees and construction permit holders implement procedures both for monitoring the AFW piping temperatures for indication of possible backleakage and for restoring the pumps to operable status if steam binding were to occur. The bulletin was not issued to all holders of operating licenses and construction permits for pressurized water reactors because the staff had determined that a number of them had already taken actions that would minimize the occurrence of the AFW pump steam binding problem at their plants. The bulletin recommended a monitoring frequency of once a shift, compared with the previously recommended frequency of once a month. This increased frequency reduced the likelihood of pump unavailability because of steam binding by a factor of 90 (3 shifts/day x 30 days/month).
 
Cla FEB 1 7 8 Multiple  
(A copy of this bulletin is attached.)
                                                                                            pumps The issue concerns the potential disabling of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) past by steam binding that is caused by backleakage of main feedwater (MFW) is the isolation check valves between the AFW and MFW systems. The issue significant because most AFW systems are potentially vulnerable to common mode failure of the redundant AFW pumps as a result of steam binding. This vulnerability is inherent to the piping configurations used, which allow redundant trains of AFW to be cross-connected via common headers on the suction and discharge sides of the pumps.
 
binding To reduce the probability of AFW pump failure as a consequence of steam if backleakage does occur, IE Bulletin 85-01 requested that         certain licensees the and construction permit holders implement procedures both for monitoring AFW piping temperatures for indication of possible backleakage         and for restoring the pumps to operable status if steam binding were to occur. The bulletin was not issued to all holders of operating licenses and construction     that permits for pressurized water reactors because the staff had determined a number of them had already taken actions that         would minimize the occurrence recommended of the AFW pump steam binding problem at their plants. The bulletin recommended a monitoring frequency of once a shift, compared       with the previously of frequency of once a month. This increased frequency reduced the likelihood x pump unavailability because of steam binding       by a factor of 90 (3 shifts/day
            30 days/month).
Cla
 
FEB 1 7   8 Multiple  


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
-2-As part of its efforts toward a final generic resolution of this issue, the staff surveyed the backleakage experience in operating plants following the implementation of monitoring procedures.
-2- As part of its efforts toward a final generic resolution of this issue, the staff surveyed the backleakage experience in operating plants following the implementation of monitoring procedures. Although the number of backleakage events varied from an average of less than one per reactor year at i large majority of plants to more than 100 per reactor year at others, none of the backleakage events that occurred during the review period appeared to have resulted in the steam binding of an AFW pump. This indicates that the various monitorina methods employed can be highly effective in preventing steam binding if backleakage occurs. For the plants with a high backleakage event rate, the installation of continuous monitoring systems with control room alarms was instrumental in providing for early warning to the operator and timely corrective action.
 
The results of the staff's regulatory analysis indicated that following the recommendations in Bulletin 85-01 would ensure that the contribution of AFN
pump steam binding to core melt frequency and public risk was sufficiently low and that there is no need for new recommendations beyond those in XE
Bulletin 85-01.
 
The staff has concluded that the recommended monitoring actions of IE Bulletin
85-01 should be continued. However, although the staff has concluded that the currently assessed risk associated with this issue is reasonably low, it is still concerned about the generally unsatisfactory reliability of checik valves in operating plants. Plant operators should continue to be alert to the possible development of malfunctioning check valves, especially as the plant ages. They should be prepared to increase the monitoring frequency as needed and to implement appropriate recovery procedures to ensure that steam binding failure of the AFN
pumps does not occur.
 
IE Bulletin 85-01 recommended that procedural controls remain in effect (1)
until the completion of hardware modifications to substantially reduce the likelihood of steam binding, or (2) until it was superseded by action Implemented as a result of resolution of Generic Issue 93. This generic letter resolves Generic Issue 93 by perpetuating the recommendations of IE
Bulletin 85-01. In particular, all addressees should:
      1.  Maintain procedures to monitor fluid conditions within the AFW system each shift during times when the system is required to be operable.


Although the number of backleakage events varied from an average of less than one per reactor year at i large majority of plants to more than 100 per reactor year at others, none of the backleakage events that occurred during the review period appeared to have resulted in the steam binding of an AFW pump. This indicates that the various monitorina methods employed can be highly effective in preventing steam binding if backleakage occurs. For the plants with a high backleakage event rate, the installation of continuous monitoring systems with control room alarms was instrumental in providing for early warning to the operator and timely corrective action.The results of the staff's regulatory analysis indicated that following the recommendations in Bulletin 85-01 would ensure that the contribution of AFN pump steam binding to core melt frequency and public risk was sufficiently low and that there is no need for new recommendations beyond those in XE Bulletin 85-01.The staff has concluded that the recommended monitoring actions of IE Bulletin 85-01 should be continued.
This monitoring should ensure that fluid temperature at the AFN pump discharge is maintained at about ambient levels.


However, although the staff has concluded that the currently assessed risk associated with this issue is reasonably low, it is still concerned about the generally unsatisfactory reliability of checik valves in operating plants. Plant operators should continue to be alert to the possible development of malfunctioning check valves, especially as the plant ages. They should be prepared to increase the monitoring frequency as needed and to implement appropriate recovery procedures to ensure that steam binding failure of the AFN pumps does not occur.IE Bulletin 85-01 recommended that procedural controls remain in effect (1)until the completion of hardware modifications to substantially reduce the likelihood of steam binding, or (2) until it was superseded by action Implemented as a result of resolution of Generic Issue 93. This generic letter resolves Generic Issue 93 by perpetuating the recommendations of IE Bulletin 85-01. In particular, all addressees should: 1. Maintain procedures to monitor fluid conditions within the AFW system each shift during times when the system is required to be operable.This monitoring should ensure that fluid temperature at the AFN pump discharge is maintained at about ambient levels.2. Maintain procedures for recognizing steam binding and for restoring the AFW system to operable status, should steam binding occur.All addressees are requested to provide a letter of confirmation to the NRC within 90 days of receipt of this generic letter indicating that the procedures discussed in this generic letter are in place and will be maintained.
2.   Maintain procedures for recognizing steam binding and for restoring the AFW system to operable status, should steam binding occur.


Confir-mation by addressees who did not previously receive IE Bulletin 85-01 is being requested because the staff believes that they would rely on these procedures as part of the actions to minimize the occurrence of the AFW pump steam binding problem.
All addressees are requested to provide a letter of confirmation to the NRC
  within 90 days of receipt of this generic letter indicating that the procedures discussed in this generic letter are in place and will be maintained. Confir- mation by addressees who did not previously receive IE Bulletin 85-01 is being requested because the staff believes that they would rely on these procedures as part of the actions to minimize the occurrence of the AFW pump steam binding problem.


Multiple  
Multiple  


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
-3- FEB 17 WC3 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), you are requested to submit under oath or affirma-tion the letter of confirmation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, for reproduction and distribution.
-3-                         FEB 17 WC3 or affirma- Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), you are requested to submit under oath Commission,  Document tion the letter of confirmation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory and  distribution.    This Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, for reproduction Management and Budget under request for information is covered by the Office ofDecember blanket clearance number 3150-0011, which expires              31, 1989. Comment on burden and duplication should be directed to the    Office  of Management and Budget, Reports Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office    Building,  Washington, D.C. 20503.
 
following informa- Although no specific request or requirement is intended, ofthethis the cost            generic letter:
tion would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating
      1. Staff time to perform the requested confirmation and any needed followup actions.


This request for information is covered by the Office of Management and Budget under blanket clearance number 3150-0011, which expires December 31, 1989. Comment on burden and duplication should be directed to the Office of Management and Budget, Reports Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20503.Although no specific request or requirement is intended, the following informa-tion would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating the cost of this generic letter: 1. Staff time to perform the requested confirmation and any needed followup actions.2. Staff time to prepare requested documentation.
2.   Staff time to prepare requested documentation.


If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or your project manager in this office.Sincerely, Frank J. ra Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
If there are any questions regarding this matter, please   contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional   office or your project manager in this office.
IEB 85-01 a- Attachment.


OMB No.: 3150-0011 Expiration Date: 9/30/86 1EB 85-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
Sincerely, Frank J. ra          Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:   IEB 85-01 a-
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 29, 1985 IE BULLETIN 85-01: STEAM BINDING OF AUXILIARY
FEEDWATER.


PUMPS  
Attachment.
 
OMB No.: 3150-0011 Expiration Date: 9/30/86
                                                                  1EB 85-01 UNITED STATES
                                NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                          OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
                                    WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 29, 1985 FEEDWATER. PUMPS
IE BULLETIN 85-01:        STEAM BINDING OF AUXILIARY


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
For Action -Those nuclear power reactor facility licensees and construction permit MCP) holders listed in Attachment
                                                                                  construction reactor facility licensees and For Action - Those nuclear power     in Attachment 1.
1.For Information  
 
-All other nuclear power reactor facilities.
permit MCP) holders listed nuclear power reactor facilities.
 
For Information - All other  


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: The purpose of this bulletin is to inform licensees and CP holders of a poten-tially serious safety problem that has occurred at certain operating facilities involving the inoperability of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps as a result of steam binding. Certain PWR licensees and all PWR CP holders are requested to take further action to prevent similar events from occurring at their facili-ties and to document those actions taken or planned.
:
                                                                              holders of a poten- of this bulletin     is   to inform licensees and CP operating facilities The purpose                              that has occurred at certain tially serious safety problemof auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps as a result of involving the inoperability licensees and all PWR CP holders are requested to steam binding. Certain PWR                similar events from occurring at their facili- take further    action    to   prevent actions taken or planned.
 
ties and to document those


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:
:
Numerous events have been reported where hot water has leaked into AFW systems and flashed to steam, disabling the AFW pumps. Events at Robinson 2 in 1981 through 1983, Crystal River 3 in 1982 and 1983, and D. C. Cook 2 in 1981 were summarized in IE Information Notice (IN) 84-06, issued in January 1984. Also in January 1984, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) issued Significant Event Report (SER) 5-84 detailing'events at Robinson 2 and Farley.In April 1984, INPO issued Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 84-3 that discussed another event at Surry 2 In 1983.The NRC's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) issued a case study report entitled "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps" in July 1984. This study identified  
                                                                          leaked into AFW systems events   have   been   reported where hot water has at Robinson 2 in 1981 Numerous                                  the AFW pumps. Events and flashed to steam, disabling     3 in   1982 in 1981 were and 1983, and D. C. Cook 2 1984. Also through 1983,    Crystal    River                                    in January Notice (IN)84-06, issued             (INPO) issued summarized in IE Information              of Nuclear    Power  Operations in January   1984, the   Institute                                   Robinson  2 and Farley.
22 events since 1981; 13 of these occurring in 1983. Based on operating experience, it appears that backleakage into AFW could occur in any PWR. In a number of plants, the two motor-driven pumps feed into a single pipe which feeds into the steam generator;  
 
therefore, a leaking valve in that pipe increases the probability of steam binding in both trains of AFW. Also, multiple AFW pumps often take suction from a common manifold;therefore, if one pump becomes steam bound because of leaking check valves, the steam can heat the common suction and cause other pumps to become steam bound.~~ l g .
Event   Report   (SER)   5-84 detailing'events at           Report (SOER) 84-3 Significant                        Significant      Operating  Experience In April 1984, INPO issued            at Surry 2 In 1983.
I..tachmerot IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 AFW capability is needed for normal shutdown and transient conditions as well as for accident mitigation.
 
that discussed another event issued Analysis     and   Evaluation   of Operational Data (AEOD)         in The NRC's Office for                  "Steam     Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps"
    a case study report      entitled                                            these occurring This study   identified     22 events since 1981; 13 of               into AFW
    July  1984.                                           it appears that   backleakage operating      experience,                                            feed in 1983. Based on In a   number   of plants,   the two motor-driven pumps could occur in any      PWR.                                                        a leaking into the steam generator; therefore, into a single pipe which feedsthe probability of steam binding in both trains of valve in that pipe increases              often take suction from a common manifold;
      AFW. Also, multiple AFW pumps steam bound because of leaking check valves, the therefore, if one pump becomes              and cause other pumps to become steam bound.
 
common    suction steam can heat the
        ~~             l g.


The AEOD case study examined the effects.of steam binding on a sequence in which there was a loss of the power conversion (steam generation)
I                                                    .. tachmerot IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 and transient conditions as well AFW capability is needed for normal shutdown case study examined the effects.of (steam steam as for accident mitigation. The AEODwas    a loss of the      power  conversion binding on a sequence in which there other than loss-of-offsite power. A
system after a transient other than loss-of-offsite power. A probabilistic risk analysis had previously shown this sequence to be a dominant contributor to the core-melt risk for a sample plant (Sequoyah).  
generation) system after a transient          shown this sequence to be a dominant probabilistic risk analysis had previously sample plant (Sequoyah). The case contributor to the core-melt risk forofa the   AFW system as a result of steam study indicated that unavailabilityto the risk of core melt in PWRs. Monitoring binding contributes significantlypromptly correct the situation if backleakage AFW to detect backlealkage and to                 binding.
The case study indicated that unavailability of the AFW system as a result of steam binding contributes significantly to the risk of core melt in PWRs. Monitoring AFW to detect backlealkage and to promptly correct the situation if backleakage occurs would reduce the probability of steam binding.Since the AEOD study was issued, a series of events involving backflow of hot water into the AFW system occurred at McGuire 2 over a period of 7 days in August 1984, before effective corrective action was taken. One of these events involved overpressurization of the suction line and damage to instruments.


In November 1984, Catawba 1 experienced backflow of hot water into AFW resulting in fumes from Insulation and blistering of paint. In December 1984, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) determined that steam binding of AFW was a generic issue and assigned it a high priority (Generic Issue 93, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps").To determine the extent of the safety issue and the need for short-term correc-tive actions, the NRC's regional offices conducted a survey in April and May of 1985. Of the 58 operating reactors surveyed, 39 had temperature monitoring of AFW piping at least once per shift. Of the remaining
occurs would reduce the probability of steam of events involving backflow of hot Since the AEOD study was issued, a series          2 over a period of 7 days in water into the AFW system occurred at McGuire          was taken. One of these events August 1984, before effective corrective actionline and damage to instruments. In involved overpressurization of the suction        of hot water into AFW resulting November 1984, Catawba 1 experienced backflow of paint. In December 1984, the NRC's in fumes from Insulation and blistering        determined that steam binding of AFW
19, 17 had normally closed gate or globe valves in the pump discharge path in addition to check valves, or some unique feature such as complete separation of trains that made serious safety problems unlikely.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation a (NRR)
                                    it high priority (Generic Issue 93, Steam was a generic issue and assignedPumps").
  Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater and the need for short-term correc- To determine the extent of the safety issueconducted a survey in April and May of      of tive actions, the NRC's regional offices           39 had temperature monitoring
  1985. Of the 58 operating reactors surveyed, Of the  remaining    19, 17 had normally AFW piping at least once per shift. pump discharge     path in addition to check closed gate or globe valves in the as complete         separation of trains that made valves, or some unique feature suchThe remaining 2 licensees have subsequently serious safety problems unlikely.


The remaining
decided to monitor AFW piping temperature.
2 licensees have subsequently decided to monitor AFW piping temperature.


Although some degree of action has been taken at all units, many have not incorporated these actions into procedures to detect or correct steam binding.Without these provisions, there is little assurance that effective actions will continue.
at all units, many have not Although some degree of action has been taken to detect or correct steam binding.


For this reason, the addressees are requested to take the following actions: Action for  
incorporated these actions into procedures  assurance that effective actions will Without these provisions, there is little are requested to take the following continue. For this reason, the addressees actions:
                                                    1 Action for  


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
Listed in Attachment  
Listed in Attachment
1 1. Develop procedures for monitoring fluid conditions within the AFW system on a regular basis during times when the system is required to be operable.
    1. Develop procedures for monitoringwhenfluid conditions within the AFW system on a regular basis during times       the system is required to be that fluid temperature at the AFR
        operable. This monitoring should ensure  ambient temperature. Monitoring of pump discharge is maintained at about                for precluding steam fluid conditions, if used as the primary basis binding, is recommended each shift.
 
This item is not intended to require    elaborate instrumentation. A simple touching the pipe, is a satisfac- means of monitoring temperature, such as                                a tory approach.


This monitoring should ensure that fluid temperature at the AFR pump discharge is maintained at about ambient temperature.
binding and for restoring the AFW
    2.  Develop procedures for recognizing steam binding occur.


Monitoring of fluid conditions, if used as the primary basis for precluding steam binding, is recommended each shift.This item is not intended to require elaborate instrumentation.
system to operable status, should steam


A simple means of monitoring temperature, such as touching the pipe, is a satisfac-tory approach.
.ttachment IEB 85-01 October 29. 1985 until completion of hardware
3.    Procedural controls should remain in effect likelihood of steam binding or modification to substantially reduce theas a result of resolution of until superseded by action implemented Generic Issue 93.


a 2. Develop procedures for recognizing steam binding and for restoring the AFW system to operable status, should steam binding occur.
and implement procedures within 90
Schedule: For operating plants, developplants under construction, develop and For
-days of the date of this bulletin. after receiving an operating license or implement procedures within  90 days within 1 year of the date of provide an appropriate response and commitment this bulletin, whichever comes first.


.ttachment IEB 85-01 October 29. 1985 3. Procedural controls should remain in effect until completion of hardware modification to substantially reduce the likelihood of steam binding or until superseded by action implemented as a result of resolution of Generic Issue 93.Schedule:
a report describing the methods Re orting Requirements: Prepare and submit the date(s) that procedures and used to accomplish these actions. Include to be implemented. State the frequency training were implemented or scheduled operating plants, submit this report of monitoring of the temperature. For             For plants under construction, within 120 days of the date of this bulletin.
For operating plants, develop and implement procedures within 90-days of the date of this bulletin.


For plants under construction, develop and implement procedures within 90 days after receiving an operating license or provide an appropriate response and commitment within 1 year of the date of this bulletin, whichever comes first.Re orting Requirements:
receiving an operating license or submit the report within 120 days after        whichever comes first. It is not within 1 year of the date of this bulletin, review.
Prepare and submit a report describing the methods used to accomplish these actions. Include the date(s) that procedures and training were implemented or scheduled to be implemented.


State the frequency of monitoring of the temperature.
netessary to submit the procedures for be submitted to the appropriate The written report, requested above, shall          under provisions of Section Regional Administrator under oath or affirmation In addition, the original copy of
  182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. report should be transmitted to the the cover letter and a copy of the attached      Control Desk, Washington, DC
  U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss0on, Document
  20555 for reproduction and distribution.


For operating plants, submit this report within 120 days of the date of this bulletin.
by the Office of Management and This request for information was approved            Comment on burden and dupli- Budget under blanket clearance number 3150-0011.


For plants under construction, submit the report within 120 days after receiving an operating license or within 1 year of the date of this bulletin, whichever comes first. It is not netessary to submit the procedures for review.The written report, requested above, shall be submitted to the appropriate Regional Administrator under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In addition, the original copy of the cover letter and a copy of the attached report should be transmitted to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss0on, Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 for reproduction and distribution.
of Management and Budget, Reports cation should be directed to the Office        Bullding, Washington, DC 20503.


This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and Budget under blanket clearance number 3150-0011.
Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office is intended, the following informa- Although no specific request or requirement      the cost of this bulletin:
  tion would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating review and testing
        1. staff time to perform requested
        2. staff time to prepare requested documentation


Comment on burden and dupli-cation should be directed to the Office of Management and Budget, Reports Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office Bullding, Washington, DC 20503.Although no specific request or requirement is intended, the following informa-tion would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating the cost of this bulletin: 1. staff time to perform requested review and testing 2. staff time to prepare requested documentation I Attachment IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.es 14. Taylor, S'rector ice of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: Mary S. Wegner% IE (301) 492-4511 C. Vernon Hodge, IE (301) 492-7275 Attachments:
I
                                                              Attachment IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 this matter, please contact the Regional If there are any questions regarding NRC regional office or this office.
 
Administrator of the appropriate es 14. Taylor, S'rector ice of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: Mary S. Wegner% IE
                      (301) 492-4511 C. Vernon Hodge, IE
                      (301) 492-7275 Attachments:
*1.
*1.


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
for Action'2. List of Recently Issued 1E Bulletins I a- Attachment  
for Action   1E Bulletins
1 IEB 85-01 October 29. 1985  
'2. List of Recently Issued I
                                                                        a-
 
Attachment 1 IEB 85-01 October 29. 1985  


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
FOR ACTION: The following PWRs having an OL: BYRON 1 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 DAVIS-BESSE
FOR ACTION:
DIABLO CANYON 1 GINNA INDIAN POINT 3 KEWAUNEE MAINE YANKEE MILLSTONE  
The following PWRs having an OL:
2 NORTH ANNA 1 NORTH ANNA 2 PALISADES POINT BEACH 1 POINT BEACH 2 PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 RANCHO SECO SAN ONOFRE 1 ST. LUCIE 1 ST. LUCIE 2 SUMMER TMI I TROJAN TURKEY POINT 3 TURKEY POINT 4 WATERFORD  
      BYRON 1 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 DAVIS-BESSE
3 WOLF CREEK 1 YANKEE-ROWE
      DIABLO CANYON 1 GINNA
All PWRs holding a CP t a Attachment  
      INDIAN POINT 3 KEWAUNEE
2 IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS hued to*Bulletin Date of No. Subject Issue Isl 84-03 Refueling Cavity Water Seal 8/24/84 All 0 fan an Cov sued to,_ oe eco 84-02 84-01 Failures Of General Electric Type HFA Relays In Use In Class 1E Safety System Cracks In Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Vent Headers 3/12/84 2/3/84 vl Al fa an Al Wi am if a'V.ii 1 power
      MAINE YANKEE
* eactor:1ilities holding OL or CP except rt St. Vrain 1 power reactor cilities holding OL or CP 1 BWR facilities ith Mark I contain-ent and currently i cold shutdown ith an OL for Action ad All other BWRs Ith an OL or CP for nformation
      MILLSTONE 2 NORTH ANNA 1 NORTH ANNA 2 PALISADES
83-08 83-07 Sup. 2 83-07 Sup. 1 83-07 Electrical Circuit Breakers With An Undervoltage Trip Feature In Use In Safety-Related Applications Other Than The Reactor Trip System Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold By Ray Miller, Inc.Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold By Ray Miller, Inc.Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold by Ray Miller, Inc.12/28/83 12/09/83 10/26/83 7/22/83 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP Same as IEB 83-07 Same as IEB 83-07 All power reactor facilities holding an 0L or CP; Other fuel cycle facilities and Category B, Priority I (processors and distributors)
      POINT BEACH 1 POINT BEACH 2 PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 RANCHO SECO
material licensees A*DL = Operating License CP
        SAN ONOFRE 1 ST. LUCIE 1 ST. LUCIE 2 SUMMER
* Construction Permit  
        TMI I
1 5ST OF , ENTLY ISSUED ENEFIC LETT Date of Sub ect. I sSuance S b em 1r i c'Letter No.I ssuIE~d To GL 8R-02 GL 69-01 GL 87-1 6"INTEGRATED  
        TROJAN
SEFETY ASSESSMENT
        TURKEY POINT 3 TURKEY POINT 4 WATERFORD 31 WOLF CREEK
PROGRiAM II (ISAP-8F II)""NRC POSITION1l O;J IGSCC IN BWlR (-t Ic~i.r II( STAINLESS  
          YANKEE-ROWE
STEEL.P P1NbF," NlJREG--1262. "ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS  
                                    t All PWRs holding a CP
AT PUBLIC MEETINGS RE IMPLEMENTATION  
 
OF 1o CFR55 ON OFERAT ORS LICENSES t- 1. /20tO/a9 A1 /25/88 11 / 12/87 ALL POWER REACTOR LICENSEES ALL LICENSEES OF OPERATING BOILING WATER REACl ORS ANI, HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCT
Attachment 2 IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS
I ON PERMITS FOR 14FRS ALL. POWER AND NONP OWER REACTOR LICENSEES
                                                                    hued to*
AND APPLICANTS  
                                                Date of Bulletin                                        Issue        Isl    _ oeto, eco sued No.             Subject
FOR LICENSES GL 87-15 POLICY STATEMENT
                                                8/24/84      All1 power *eactor
ON DEFERRED PLANTS 11/04/87 ALL HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCT  
84-030          Refueling Cavity Water Seal                   fan :1ilities holding anOL or CP except Cov vlrt St.
I ON PERMITS FOR A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT GL 87-14 UL 87-13 REQUEST FOR OPERATOR LICENSE SCHEDUiJLES
 
INTEGRITY  
Vrain
OF REQUALIFICATION
                                                  3/12/84     Al1 power reactor
EXAMINATIONS  
84-02           Failures Of General Electric                   facilities holding Type HFA Relays In Use In                     an OL or CP
AT NON-POWER REACTORS 08 / 04 / 87 07/ 10/87 ALL. POWER REACTOR LICENSEES ALL NON-POWER REACTOR LICENSEES GL 87-12 50.54(f) LETTER RE. LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)DUFING MID-LOOP OPERATION 07 / 09/87 ALL LICENSEES OF OPERATING PWRS AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCT  
                Class 1E Safety System facilities Cracks In Boiling Water         2/3/84       Wi1 BWR
I ON PERM ITS FOR FPWR' S GL 87-11 GL 87-10 RELAXATION  
                                                                Al
IN ARBITRARY INTERMEDI
84-01                                                              ith Mark I contain- Reactor Mark I Containment                    am  ent and currently Vent Headers                                  if i cold shutdown a' ith an OL for Action V. All ad     other BWRs Ith an OL or CP for ii nformation
ATE PIPE RUFTURE REQU I REMENTS IMPLEMENTATION
                                                  12/28/83      All power reactor
OF 10 CFR 73.57, REQUIREMENTS
  83-08           Electrical Circuit Breakers                   facilities holding With An Undervoltage Trip                     an OL or CP
FOR FBI CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECk:S 06/23/87 06/12/87* ALL OFPERATING
                  Feature In Use In Safety- Related Applications Other Than The Reactor Trip System
LICENSEES, CONSTRUCTION
                                                    12/09/83      Same as IEB 83-07
PERMIT HOLDERS, AND APPLI CANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION
  83-07            Apparently Fraudulent Sup. 2            Products Sold By Ray Miller, Inc.
PERMITS AL.L POWER REACT OR LI CENSEES}}
 
10/26/83      Same as IEB 83-07
  83-07            Apparently Fraudulent Sup. 1          Products Sold By Ray Miller, Inc.
 
7/22/83       All power reactor
  83-07             Apparently Fraudulent                          facilities holding Products Sold by Ray Miller,                  an 0L or CP; Other Inc.                                          fuel cycle facilities and Category B,
                                                                    Priority I (processors and distributors)
                                                                    material licensees A*
    DL = Operating License CP
* Construction Permit
 
1 5ST OF ,     ENTLY ISSUED ENEFIC LETT       S
                                                      Date of b em  ic
      1r                                                              I ssuIE~d To Sub ect.                                 I sSuance
'Letter No.
 
t- 1. /20tO/a9  ALL POWER
GL   8R-02   "INTEGRATED SEFETY ASSESSMENT
                                (ISAP-8F II)"                           REACTOR
              PROGRiAM II
                                                                        LICENSEES
                                                        A1 /25/88      ALL LICENSEES
GL  69-01  "NRC POSITION1l O;J IGSCC IN BWlR
              (-t Ic~i.r II( STAINLESS STEEL.                           OF OPERATING
                                                                        BOILING WATER
              P P1NbF,"                                                 REACl ORS ANI,
                                                                        HOLDERS OF
                                                                        CONSTRUCT I ON
                                                                        PERMITS FOR
                                                                          14FRS
                                                        11    / 12/87    ALL. POWER AND
GL  87-1 6  NlJREG--1262. "ANSWERS TO
              QUESTIONS AT PUBLIC MEETINGS                               NONP OWER
              RE IMPLEMENTATION OF 1o CFR55                             REACTOR
              ON OFERAT ORS                                             LICENSEES AND
                  LICENSES                                              APPLICANTS FOR
                                                                        LICENSES
                                        ON DEFERRED     11/04/87         ALL HOLDERS OF
GL  87-15    POLICY STATEMENT
                                                                          CONSTRUCT I ON
              PLANTS
                                                                          PERMITS FOR A
                                                                          NUCLEAR POWER
                                                                          PLANT
              REQUEST FOR OPERATOR LICENSE            08 / 04 / 87      ALL. POWER
  GL 87-14 REACTOR
              SCHEDUiJLES
                                                                          LICENSEES
                INTEGRITY OF REQUALIFICATION             07/ 10/87        ALL NON-POWER
  UL  87-13 REACTOR
              EXAMINATIONS AT NON-POWER
                                                                          LICENSEES
              REACTORS
                                                        07 / 09/87       ALL LICENSEES
  GL   87-12   50.54(f) LETTER RE. LOSS OF
                                                                          OF OPERATING
              RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)
                                                                          PWRS AND
                DUFING MID-LOOP OPERATION
                                                                          HOLDERS OF
                                                                          CONSTRUCT I ON
                                                                          PERM ITS FOR
                                                                          FPWR'S
                RELAXATION IN ARBITRARY                 06/23/87     *   ALL OFPERATING
  GL  87-11 LICENSEES,
                INTERMEDI ATE PIPE RUFTURE
                                                                          CONSTRUCTION
                REQU I REMENTS
                                                                          PERMIT
                                                                          HOLDERS, AND
                                                                          APPLI CANTS FOR
                                                                          CONSTRUCTION
                                                                          PERMITS
                                                          06/12/87        AL.L POWER
  GL  87-10    IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR
                73.57, REQUIREMENTS FOR FBI                              REACT OR
                                                                          LI CENSEES
                CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECk:S}}


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Latest revision as of 02:21, 24 November 2019

NRC Generic Letter 1988-003: Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 93, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
ML031200470
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Calvert Cliffs, Davis Besse, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Palisades, Palo Verde, Indian Point, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Watts Bar, Sequoyah, Byron, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Summer, Prairie Island, Seabrook, Surry, North Anna, Turkey Point, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Farley, Robinson, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, McGuire, 05000000, Washington Public Power Supply System, Trojan, Marble Hill
Issue date: 02/17/1988
From: Miraglia F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
GSI-093 GL-88-003, NUDOCS 8802180267
Download: ML031200470 (10)
v • d • e


I .

.4 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

e WASHINGTON, D. C. 2055 TO ALL LICENSEES, APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSES, AND HOLDERS OF

CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 93, "STEAM BINDING OF

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS" (GENERIC LETTER 88-03)

This generic letter is being issued:

(1) to inform you of the staff's resolution of the subject generic safety issue, and

(2) to request that you continue to implement, as a minimum, the monitoring and corrective procedures previously identified for interim resolution of this issue in IE Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,' dated October 29, 1985.

(A copy of this bulletin is attached.)

pumps The issue concerns the potential disabling of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) past by steam binding that is caused by backleakage of main feedwater (MFW) is the isolation check valves between the AFW and MFW systems. The issue significant because most AFW systems are potentially vulnerable to common mode failure of the redundant AFW pumps as a result of steam binding. This vulnerability is inherent to the piping configurations used, which allow redundant trains of AFW to be cross-connected via common headers on the suction and discharge sides of the pumps.

binding To reduce the probability of AFW pump failure as a consequence of steam if backleakage does occur, IE Bulletin 85-01 requested that certain licensees the and construction permit holders implement procedures both for monitoring AFW piping temperatures for indication of possible backleakage and for restoring the pumps to operable status if steam binding were to occur. The bulletin was not issued to all holders of operating licenses and construction that permits for pressurized water reactors because the staff had determined a number of them had already taken actions that would minimize the occurrence recommended of the AFW pump steam binding problem at their plants. The bulletin recommended a monitoring frequency of once a shift, compared with the previously of frequency of once a month. This increased frequency reduced the likelihood x pump unavailability because of steam binding by a factor of 90 (3 shifts/day

30 days/month).

Cla

FEB 1 7 8 Multiple

Addressees

-2- As part of its efforts toward a final generic resolution of this issue, the staff surveyed the backleakage experience in operating plants following the implementation of monitoring procedures. Although the number of backleakage events varied from an average of less than one per reactor year at i large majority of plants to more than 100 per reactor year at others, none of the backleakage events that occurred during the review period appeared to have resulted in the steam binding of an AFW pump. This indicates that the various monitorina methods employed can be highly effective in preventing steam binding if backleakage occurs. For the plants with a high backleakage event rate, the installation of continuous monitoring systems with control room alarms was instrumental in providing for early warning to the operator and timely corrective action.

The results of the staff's regulatory analysis indicated that following the recommendations in Bulletin 85-01 would ensure that the contribution of AFN

pump steam binding to core melt frequency and public risk was sufficiently low and that there is no need for new recommendations beyond those in XE

Bulletin 85-01.

The staff has concluded that the recommended monitoring actions of IE Bulletin 85-01 should be continued. However, although the staff has concluded that the currently assessed risk associated with this issue is reasonably low, it is still concerned about the generally unsatisfactory reliability of checik valves in operating plants. Plant operators should continue to be alert to the possible development of malfunctioning check valves, especially as the plant ages. They should be prepared to increase the monitoring frequency as needed and to implement appropriate recovery procedures to ensure that steam binding failure of the AFN

pumps does not occur.

IE Bulletin 85-01 recommended that procedural controls remain in effect (1)

until the completion of hardware modifications to substantially reduce the likelihood of steam binding, or (2) until it was superseded by action Implemented as a result of resolution of Generic Issue 93. This generic letter resolves Generic Issue 93 by perpetuating the recommendations of IE

Bulletin 85-01. In particular, all addressees should:

1. Maintain procedures to monitor fluid conditions within the AFW system each shift during times when the system is required to be operable.

This monitoring should ensure that fluid temperature at the AFN pump discharge is maintained at about ambient levels.

2. Maintain procedures for recognizing steam binding and for restoring the AFW system to operable status, should steam binding occur.

All addressees are requested to provide a letter of confirmation to the NRC

within 90 days of receipt of this generic letter indicating that the procedures discussed in this generic letter are in place and will be maintained. Confir- mation by addressees who did not previously receive IE Bulletin 85-01 is being requested because the staff believes that they would rely on these procedures as part of the actions to minimize the occurrence of the AFW pump steam binding problem.

Multiple

Addressees

-3- FEB 17 WC3 or affirma- Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), you are requested to submit under oath Commission, Document tion the letter of confirmation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory and distribution. This Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, for reproduction Management and Budget under request for information is covered by the Office ofDecember blanket clearance number 3150-0011, which expires 31, 1989. Comment on burden and duplication should be directed to the Office of Management and Budget, Reports Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20503.

following informa- Although no specific request or requirement is intended, ofthethis the cost generic letter:

tion would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating

1. Staff time to perform the requested confirmation and any needed followup actions.

2. Staff time to prepare requested documentation.

If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or your project manager in this office.

Sincerely, Frank J. ra Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure: IEB 85-01 a-

Attachment.

OMB No.: 3150-0011 Expiration Date: 9/30/86

1EB 85-01 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 29, 1985 FEEDWATER. PUMPS

IE BULLETIN 85-01: STEAM BINDING OF AUXILIARY

Addressees

construction reactor facility licensees and For Action - Those nuclear power in Attachment 1.

permit MCP) holders listed nuclear power reactor facilities.

For Information - All other

Purpose

holders of a poten- of this bulletin is to inform licensees and CP operating facilities The purpose that has occurred at certain tially serious safety problemof auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps as a result of involving the inoperability licensees and all PWR CP holders are requested to steam binding. Certain PWR similar events from occurring at their facili- take further action to prevent actions taken or planned.

ties and to document those

Description of Circumstances

leaked into AFW systems events have been reported where hot water has at Robinson 2 in 1981 Numerous the AFW pumps. Events and flashed to steam, disabling 3 in 1982 in 1981 were and 1983, and D. C. Cook 2 1984. Also through 1983, Crystal River in January Notice (IN)84-06, issued (INPO) issued summarized in IE Information of Nuclear Power Operations in January 1984, the Institute Robinson 2 and Farley.

Event Report (SER) 5-84 detailing'events at Report (SOER) 84-3 Significant Significant Operating Experience In April 1984, INPO issued at Surry 2 In 1983.

that discussed another event issued Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) in The NRC's Office for "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps"

a case study report entitled these occurring This study identified 22 events since 1981; 13 of into AFW

July 1984. it appears that backleakage operating experience, feed in 1983. Based on In a number of plants, the two motor-driven pumps could occur in any PWR. a leaking into the steam generator; therefore, into a single pipe which feedsthe probability of steam binding in both trains of valve in that pipe increases often take suction from a common manifold;

AFW. Also, multiple AFW pumps steam bound because of leaking check valves, the therefore, if one pump becomes and cause other pumps to become steam bound.

common suction steam can heat the

~~ l g.

I .. tachmerot IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 and transient conditions as well AFW capability is needed for normal shutdown case study examined the effects.of (steam steam as for accident mitigation. The AEODwas a loss of the power conversion binding on a sequence in which there other than loss-of-offsite power. A

generation) system after a transient shown this sequence to be a dominant probabilistic risk analysis had previously sample plant (Sequoyah). The case contributor to the core-melt risk forofa the AFW system as a result of steam study indicated that unavailabilityto the risk of core melt in PWRs. Monitoring binding contributes significantlypromptly correct the situation if backleakage AFW to detect backlealkage and to binding.

occurs would reduce the probability of steam of events involving backflow of hot Since the AEOD study was issued, a series 2 over a period of 7 days in water into the AFW system occurred at McGuire was taken. One of these events August 1984, before effective corrective actionline and damage to instruments. In involved overpressurization of the suction of hot water into AFW resulting November 1984, Catawba 1 experienced backflow of paint. In December 1984, the NRC's in fumes from Insulation and blistering determined that steam binding of AFW

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation a (NRR)

it high priority (Generic Issue 93, Steam was a generic issue and assignedPumps").

Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater and the need for short-term correc- To determine the extent of the safety issueconducted a survey in April and May of of tive actions, the NRC's regional offices 39 had temperature monitoring

1985. Of the 58 operating reactors surveyed, Of the remaining 19, 17 had normally AFW piping at least once per shift. pump discharge path in addition to check closed gate or globe valves in the as complete separation of trains that made valves, or some unique feature suchThe remaining 2 licensees have subsequently serious safety problems unlikely.

decided to monitor AFW piping temperature.

at all units, many have not Although some degree of action has been taken to detect or correct steam binding.

incorporated these actions into procedures assurance that effective actions will Without these provisions, there is little are requested to take the following continue. For this reason, the addressees actions:

1 Action for

Addressees

Listed in Attachment

1. Develop procedures for monitoringwhenfluid conditions within the AFW system on a regular basis during times the system is required to be that fluid temperature at the AFR

operable. This monitoring should ensure ambient temperature. Monitoring of pump discharge is maintained at about for precluding steam fluid conditions, if used as the primary basis binding, is recommended each shift.

This item is not intended to require elaborate instrumentation. A simple touching the pipe, is a satisfac- means of monitoring temperature, such as a tory approach.

binding and for restoring the AFW

2. Develop procedures for recognizing steam binding occur.

system to operable status, should steam

.ttachment IEB 85-01 October 29. 1985 until completion of hardware

3. Procedural controls should remain in effect likelihood of steam binding or modification to substantially reduce theas a result of resolution of until superseded by action implemented Generic Issue 93.

and implement procedures within 90

Schedule: For operating plants, developplants under construction, develop and For

-days of the date of this bulletin. after receiving an operating license or implement procedures within 90 days within 1 year of the date of provide an appropriate response and commitment this bulletin, whichever comes first.

a report describing the methods Re orting Requirements: Prepare and submit the date(s) that procedures and used to accomplish these actions. Include to be implemented. State the frequency training were implemented or scheduled operating plants, submit this report of monitoring of the temperature. For For plants under construction, within 120 days of the date of this bulletin.

receiving an operating license or submit the report within 120 days after whichever comes first. It is not within 1 year of the date of this bulletin, review.

netessary to submit the procedures for be submitted to the appropriate The written report, requested above, shall under provisions of Section Regional Administrator under oath or affirmation In addition, the original copy of

182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. report should be transmitted to the the cover letter and a copy of the attached Control Desk, Washington, DC

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss0on, Document

20555 for reproduction and distribution.

by the Office of Management and This request for information was approved Comment on burden and dupli- Budget under blanket clearance number 3150-0011.

of Management and Budget, Reports cation should be directed to the Office Bullding, Washington, DC 20503.

Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office is intended, the following informa- Although no specific request or requirement the cost of this bulletin:

tion would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating review and testing

1. staff time to perform requested

2. staff time to prepare requested documentation

I

Attachment IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 this matter, please contact the Regional If there are any questions regarding NRC regional office or this office.

Administrator of the appropriate es 14. Taylor, S'rector ice of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: Mary S. Wegner% IE

(301) 492-4511 C. Vernon Hodge, IE

(301) 492-7275 Attachments:

  • 1.

Addressees

for Action 1E Bulletins

'2. List of Recently Issued I

a-

Attachment 1 IEB 85-01 October 29. 1985

ADDRESSEES

FOR ACTION:

The following PWRs having an OL:

BYRON 1 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 DAVIS-BESSE

DIABLO CANYON 1 GINNA

INDIAN POINT 3 KEWAUNEE

MAINE YANKEE

MILLSTONE 2 NORTH ANNA 1 NORTH ANNA 2 PALISADES

POINT BEACH 1 POINT BEACH 2 PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 RANCHO SECO

SAN ONOFRE 1 ST. LUCIE 1 ST. LUCIE 2 SUMMER

TMI I

TROJAN

TURKEY POINT 3 TURKEY POINT 4 WATERFORD 31 WOLF CREEK

YANKEE-ROWE

t All PWRs holding a CP

Attachment 2 IEB 85-01 October 29, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS

hued to*

Date of Bulletin Issue Isl _ oeto, eco sued No. Subject

8/24/84 All1 power *eactor

84-030 Refueling Cavity Water Seal fan :1ilities holding anOL or CP except Cov vlrt St.

Vrain

3/12/84 Al1 power reactor

84-02 Failures Of General Electric facilities holding Type HFA Relays In Use In an OL or CP

Class 1E Safety System facilities Cracks In Boiling Water 2/3/84 Wi1 BWR

Al

84-01 ith Mark I contain- Reactor Mark I Containment am ent and currently Vent Headers if i cold shutdown a' ith an OL for Action V. All ad other BWRs Ith an OL or CP for ii nformation

12/28/83 All power reactor

83-08 Electrical Circuit Breakers facilities holding With An Undervoltage Trip an OL or CP

Feature In Use In Safety- Related Applications Other Than The Reactor Trip System

12/09/83 Same as IEB 83-07

83-07 Apparently Fraudulent Sup. 2 Products Sold By Ray Miller, Inc.

10/26/83 Same as IEB 83-07

83-07 Apparently Fraudulent Sup. 1 Products Sold By Ray Miller, Inc.

7/22/83 All power reactor

83-07 Apparently Fraudulent facilities holding Products Sold by Ray Miller, an 0L or CP; Other Inc. fuel cycle facilities and Category B,

Priority I (processors and distributors)

material licensees A*

DL = Operating License CP

  • Construction Permit

1 5ST OF , ENTLY ISSUED ENEFIC LETT S

Date of b em ic

1r I ssuIE~d To Sub ect. I sSuance

'Letter No.

t- 1. /20tO/a9 ALL POWER

GL 8R-02 "INTEGRATED SEFETY ASSESSMENT

(ISAP-8F II)" REACTOR

PROGRiAM II

LICENSEES

A1 /25/88 ALL LICENSEES

GL 69-01 "NRC POSITION1l O;J IGSCC IN BWlR

(-t Ic~i.r II( STAINLESS STEEL. OF OPERATING

BOILING WATER

P P1NbF," REACl ORS ANI,

HOLDERS OF

CONSTRUCT I ON

PERMITS FOR

14FRS

11 / 12/87 ALL. POWER AND

GL 87-1 6 NlJREG--1262. "ANSWERS TO

QUESTIONS AT PUBLIC MEETINGS NONP OWER

RE IMPLEMENTATION OF 1o CFR55 REACTOR

ON OFERAT ORS LICENSEES AND

LICENSES APPLICANTS FOR

LICENSES

ON DEFERRED 11/04/87 ALL HOLDERS OF

GL 87-15 POLICY STATEMENT

CONSTRUCT I ON

PLANTS

PERMITS FOR A

NUCLEAR POWER

PLANT

REQUEST FOR OPERATOR LICENSE 08 / 04 / 87 ALL. POWER

GL 87-14 REACTOR

SCHEDUiJLES

LICENSEES

INTEGRITY OF REQUALIFICATION 07/ 10/87 ALL NON-POWER

UL 87-13 REACTOR

EXAMINATIONS AT NON-POWER

LICENSEES

REACTORS

07 / 09/87 ALL LICENSEES

GL 87-12 50.54(f) LETTER RE. LOSS OF

OF OPERATING

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)

PWRS AND

DUFING MID-LOOP OPERATION

HOLDERS OF

CONSTRUCT I ON

PERM ITS FOR

FPWR'S

RELAXATION IN ARBITRARY 06/23/87 * ALL OFPERATING

GL 87-11 LICENSEES,

INTERMEDI ATE PIPE RUFTURE

CONSTRUCTION

REQU I REMENTS

PERMIT

HOLDERS, AND

APPLI CANTS FOR

CONSTRUCTION

PERMITS

06/12/87 AL.L POWER

GL 87-10 IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR

73.57, REQUIREMENTS FOR FBI REACT OR

LI CENSEES

CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECk:S

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