ML19240A327: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:}} | {{#Wiki_filter:Modernization Plan #1D BTP 7-19 Update Public Meeting NRC Staff Presentation August 29, 2019 | ||
Agenda | |||
* Description of Changes Proposed for BTP 7-19 | |||
* Discussion with and feedback from NEI/Stakeholders | |||
* Next Actions | |||
* Schedule 2 | |||
Major Changes in Proposed BTP | |||
* Reorganization of BTP to align review guidance with acceptance criteria | |||
* Clarification of applicability | |||
* Incorporation of categorization scheme and graded approach for addressing CCF in DI&C systems | |||
- D3 Assessment | |||
- Qualitative assessment | |||
* Clarification of criteria for addressing spurious operation | |||
* Clarification of criteria for manual system level actuation 3 | |||
Process Flow for CCF Assessment | |||
* Determine category of proposed DI&C system (i.e., A1, A2, B1, B2) | |||
* Identify any integration or interconnectivity of the proposed DI&C system with other categories of systems | |||
* If A1 system, perform D3 assessment | |||
- Use of means to eliminate CCF from further consideration | |||
- Use of diverse means | |||
- Use of analysis to demonstrate consequences of CCF is within acceptable limits | |||
* If A2 or B1 system (or integrated B2 system), perform qualitative assessment 4 | |||
Spurious Operation | |||
* Evaluate potential for spurious operation due to CCF in DI&C system | |||
* Evaluation should focus on those spurious operations that may induce initiating events that can challenge plant safety | |||
* Design features or defensive measures can be credited to reduce scope of evaluation 5 | |||
Manual System Level Actuation and Indications SRM-SECY-93-087 Positions 3 and 4 Clarifications | |||
* Refers to the displays and manual controls described in Position 4 of the SRM on SECY-093-87 | |||
* Displays and manual controls necessary to monitor and perform system level actuation of safety critical functions | |||
* Need to be located within the main control room | |||
* Displays and controls provided for Position 4 can be credited as diverse means for addressing Position 3 6 | |||
Still Under Consideration Industry Feedback Requested | |||
* How Leak-Before-Break (LBB) criteria can be credited in excluding large break LOCAs and MSLB events from evaluation | |||
* Need feedback from industry regarding crediting LBB | |||
- Applicability to PWRs and BWRs | |||
- What operator or maintenance actions will be taken if a leak is detected to allow LBB to be credited for exclusion of the two events 7 | |||
Next Steps and Schedule Milestones Activity Completion Date A.1 Begin revision to draft BTP 7-19 In progress A.2 Category 2 public meeting to discuss the direction of draft BTP 7-19 Completed April 4, 2019 A.3 Category 2 public meeting to discuss topic focused areas of BTP 7-19 Completed June 26, 2019 A.4 Finalize draft BTP 7-19 for staff review Completed August 19, 2019 A.5 Final Category 2 public meeting to discuss BTP 7-19 prior to NRC review and concurrence August 29, 2019 A.6 Agency review and concurrence on draft BTP 7-19 in preparation for public comment October 2019 period A.7 ACRS Subcommittee Meeting November 2019 A.8 Issue Draft BTP 7-19 for public comment period (60 day comment period) December 2019 Public meeting, if needed - January 2020 A.9 Public comment period ends February 2020 A.10 Public Comment/ACRS Comment Resolution Complete March 2020 A.11 ACRS Full Committee Meeting April 2020 A.12 Prepare Final BTP 7-19 Concurrence May 2020 Receive OMB Clearance Approval (non-major rule determination) | |||
A.13 Issuance of Final BTP 7-19 June 2020 8 | |||
Questions 9 | |||
Acronyms | |||
* BTP: Branch Technical Position | |||
* BWR: Boiling Water Reactor | |||
* CCF: Common Cause Failure | |||
* D3: Defense-in-Depth and Diversity | |||
* DI&C: Digital Instrumentation and Controls | |||
* LBB: Leak-Before-Break | |||
* LOCA: Loss of Coolant Accident | |||
* MSLB: Main Steamline Break | |||
* NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute | |||
* PWR: Pressurized Water Reactor | |||
* SRM: Staff Requirements Memorandum 10}} | |||
Revision as of 22:56, 7 October 2019
| ML19240A327 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/28/2019 |
| From: | Tekia Govan NRC/NRR/DIRS/IRGB |
| To: | |
| Govan T, 415-6197, NRR/DIRS | |
| References | |
| Download: ML19240A327 (10) | |
Text
Modernization Plan #1D BTP 7-19 Update Public Meeting NRC Staff Presentation August 29, 2019
Agenda
- Description of Changes Proposed for BTP 7-19
- Discussion with and feedback from NEI/Stakeholders
- Next Actions
- Schedule 2
Major Changes in Proposed BTP
- Reorganization of BTP to align review guidance with acceptance criteria
- Clarification of applicability
- Incorporation of categorization scheme and graded approach for addressing CCF in DI&C systems
- D3 Assessment
- Qualitative assessment
- Clarification of criteria for addressing spurious operation
- Clarification of criteria for manual system level actuation 3
Process Flow for CCF Assessment
- Determine category of proposed DI&C system (i.e., A1, A2, B1, B2)
- Identify any integration or interconnectivity of the proposed DI&C system with other categories of systems
- If A1 system, perform D3 assessment
- Use of means to eliminate CCF from further consideration
- Use of diverse means
- Use of analysis to demonstrate consequences of CCF is within acceptable limits
- If A2 or B1 system (or integrated B2 system), perform qualitative assessment 4
Spurious Operation
- Evaluate potential for spurious operation due to CCF in DI&C system
- Evaluation should focus on those spurious operations that may induce initiating events that can challenge plant safety
- Design features or defensive measures can be credited to reduce scope of evaluation 5
Manual System Level Actuation and Indications SRM-SECY-93-087 Positions 3 and 4 Clarifications
- Refers to the displays and manual controls described in Position 4 of the SRM on SECY-093-87
- Displays and manual controls necessary to monitor and perform system level actuation of safety critical functions
- Need to be located within the main control room
- Displays and controls provided for Position 4 can be credited as diverse means for addressing Position 3 6
Still Under Consideration Industry Feedback Requested
- How Leak-Before-Break (LBB) criteria can be credited in excluding large break LOCAs and MSLB events from evaluation
- Need feedback from industry regarding crediting LBB
- Applicability to PWRs and BWRs
- What operator or maintenance actions will be taken if a leak is detected to allow LBB to be credited for exclusion of the two events 7
Next Steps and Schedule Milestones Activity Completion Date A.1 Begin revision to draft BTP 7-19 In progress A.2 Category 2 public meeting to discuss the direction of draft BTP 7-19 Completed April 4, 2019 A.3 Category 2 public meeting to discuss topic focused areas of BTP 7-19 Completed June 26, 2019 A.4 Finalize draft BTP 7-19 for staff review Completed August 19, 2019 A.5 Final Category 2 public meeting to discuss BTP 7-19 prior to NRC review and concurrence August 29, 2019 A.6 Agency review and concurrence on draft BTP 7-19 in preparation for public comment October 2019 period A.7 ACRS Subcommittee Meeting November 2019 A.8 Issue Draft BTP 7-19 for public comment period (60 day comment period) December 2019 Public meeting, if needed - January 2020 A.9 Public comment period ends February 2020 A.10 Public Comment/ACRS Comment Resolution Complete March 2020 A.11 ACRS Full Committee Meeting April 2020 A.12 Prepare Final BTP 7-19 Concurrence May 2020 Receive OMB Clearance Approval (non-major rule determination)
A.13 Issuance of Final BTP 7-19 June 2020 8
Questions 9
- BTP: Branch Technical Position
- BWR: Boiling Water Reactor
- CCF: Common Cause Failure
- D3: Defense-in-Depth and Diversity
- DI&C: Digital Instrumentation and Controls
- LBB: Leak-Before-Break
- LOCA: Loss of Coolant Accident
- MSLB: Main Steamline Break
- NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute
- PWR: Pressurized Water Reactor
- SRM: Staff Requirements Memorandum 10