ENS 46434: Difference between revisions
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StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
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| event date = 10/26/2010 23:56 EDT | | event date = 10/26/2010 23:56 EDT | ||
| last update date = 11/23/2010 | | last update date = 11/23/2010 | ||
| title = Invalid Actuation | | title = Invalid Actuation of High Consequence Limiting Safeguards and Safety Injection Systems | ||
| event text = This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). | | event text = This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). | ||
With Unit 1 at cold shutdown (about 105 degrees Fahrenheight and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 'A' train of the High Consequence Limiting Safeguards (HI CLS) system and Unit 1 'A' train of the Safety Injection (SI) system occurred at 23:56 during setup for 'H' Bus Logic Testing. Plant systems and components responding to the HI CLS and SI 'A' train signals started and functioned successfully as designed (with the exception of those systems and components procedurally rendered inoperable due to the RCS being below 350 degrees Fahrenheight and 450 psig). The HI CLS and SI 'A' trains were reset and the affected systems were restored to their pre-event configurations. | With Unit 1 at cold shutdown (about 105 degrees Fahrenheight and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 'A' train of the High Consequence Limiting Safeguards (HI CLS) system and Unit 1 'A' train of the Safety Injection (SI) system occurred at 23:56 during setup for 'H' Bus Logic Testing. Plant systems and components responding to the HI CLS and SI 'A' train signals started and functioned successfully as designed (with the exception of those systems and components procedurally rendered inoperable due to the RCS being below 350 degrees Fahrenheight and 450 psig). The HI CLS and SI 'A' trains were reset and the affected systems were restored to their pre-event configurations. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:08, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Surry  Virginia (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+658.58 h27.441 days <br />3.92 weeks <br />0.902 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Jerry Ashley 15:31 Nov 23, 2010 |
| NRC Officer: | Pete Snyder |
| Last Updated: | Nov 23, 2010 |
| 46434 - NRC Website
| |