This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation in accordance with
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of
10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report.
With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown (about 105?F and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Main Feedwater (FW) isolation occurred at 2200 [EST] during removal of the 'A' Train Hi Consequence Limiting Safeguards (CLS) fuses. This action caused the 'A' train FW isolation relay to actuate and, as designed, tripped the operating 'B' Main Feed Pump (MFP) and the Main Turbine, which was latched for testing. The 'A' MFP was not in operation at the time of the event.
This was a partial actuation of the SI system. SI signals were inhibited prior to removal of the Hi CLS fuses by the tagging of the lead connecting the Hi CLS relay to the SI master relay. Although FW isolation occurs with SI actuation, the relay associated with the FW isolation circuitry is separately actuated and had not been tagged out. When the Hi CLS fuses were removed, the FW isolation relay was energized.
Plant systems and components responding to the signal started and functioned as designed with the exception of those inhibited by tag out. The affected components were restored to their pre-event configuration, The action to determine and initiate corrective actions is complete, and the necessary procedures are under revision.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.