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{{#Wiki_filter:B/B-FSARAMENDMENT18JANUARY1979QUESTION010.4"Werequirethatthecompartmentbetweenthecontainmentandthesafetyvalvehousewhichhousesthemainsteamlinesandfeedwaterlinesandtheisolationvalvesforthoselines,bedesignedtoconsidertheenviron-mentaleffects(pressure,temperature,humidity)and potentialfloodingconsequencesfromanassumedcrack, equivalenttotheflowareaofasingleendedpiperuptureintheselines.Werequirethatessentialequipmentlocatedwithinthecompartment,including themainsteamisolationandfeedwatervalvesandtheir operatorsbecapableofoperatingintheenvironment resultingfromtheabovecrack.Wealsowillrequirethatifthisassumedcrackcouldcausethestructuralfailureofthiscompartment,thenthefailureshould notjeopardizethesafeshutdownoftheplant.In addition,werequirethattheremainingportionof thepipeinthetunnelbetweenthesafetyvalvehouseandtheturbinebuildingmeettheguidelinesofBranchTechnicalPositionAPCSB3-1."Werequirethatyousubmitasubcompartmentpressureanalysistoconfirmthatthedesignofthepipetunnelconformstoourpositionasoutlinedabove."Werequestthatyouevaluatethedesignagainstthisstaffposition,andadviseusastotheoutcomeof yourreview,includinganydesignchangeswhichmayberequired.Theevaluationshouldincludeaverifica-tionthatthemethodsusedtocalculatethepressure buildupinthesubcompartmentsoutsideofthecon-tainmentforpostulatedbreaksarethesameasthose usedforsubcompartmentsinsidethecontainment.Also,theallowanceforstructuraldesignmargins(pressure)shouldbethesame.Ifdifferentmethodsareused, justifythatyourmethodprovidesadequatedesignmargins andidentifythemarginsthatareavailable.Whenyou submittheresultsofyourevaluation,identifythecomputercodesused,theassumptionsusedformassandenergyreleaserates,andsufficientdesigndata sothatwemayperformindependentcalculations.Thepeakpressureandtemperaturesresultingfromthepostulatedbreakofahighenergypipelocatedincompart-mentsorbuildingsisdependentonthemassandenergy flowsduringthetimeofthebreak.Youhavenotpro-videdtheinformationnecessarytodeterminewhattermi-natestheblowdownortodeterminethelengthoftimeblowdownexists.Foreachpipebreakorleakagecrackanalyzed,providethetotalblowdowntimeandthemech-anismusedtoterminateorlimittheblowdowntimeof B/B-FSARAMENDMENT18JANUARY2979flowsothattheenvironmentaleffectswillnotaffectsafeshutdownofthefacility." | {{#Wiki_filter:B/B-FSARAMENDMENT18JANUARY1979QUESTION010.4"Werequirethatthecompartmentbetweenthecontainmentandthesafetyvalvehousewhichhousesthemainsteamlinesandfeedwaterlinesandtheisolationvalvesforthoselines,bedesignedtoconsidertheenviron-mentaleffects(pressure,temperature,humidity)and potentialfloodingconsequencesfromanassumedcrack, equivalenttotheflowareaofasingleendedpiperuptureintheselines.Werequirethatessentialequipmentlocatedwithinthecompartment,including themainsteamisolationandfeedwatervalvesandtheir operatorsbecapableofoperatingintheenvironment resultingfromtheabovecrack.Wealsowillrequirethatifthisassumedcrackcouldcausethestructuralfailureofthiscompartment,thenthefailureshould notjeopardizethesafeshutdownoftheplant.In addition,werequirethattheremainingportionof thepipeinthetunnelbetweenthesafetyvalvehouseandtheturbinebuildingmeettheguidelinesofBranchTechnicalPositionAPCSB3-1."Werequirethatyousubmitasubcompartmentpressureanalysistoconfirmthatthedesignofthepipetunnelconformstoourpositionasoutlinedabove."Werequestthatyouevaluatethedesignagainstthisstaffposition,andadviseusastotheoutcomeof yourreview,includinganydesignchangeswhichmayberequired.Theevaluationshouldincludeaverifica-tionthatthemethodsusedtocalculatethepressure buildupinthesubcompartmentsoutsideofthecon-tainmentforpostulatedbreaksarethesameasthose usedforsubcompartmentsinsidethecontainment.Also,theallowanceforstructuraldesignmargins(pressure)shouldbethesame.Ifdifferentmethodsareused, justifythatyourmethodprovidesadequatedesignmargins andidentifythemarginsthatareavailable.Whenyou submittheresultsofyourevaluation,identifythecomputercodesused,theassumptionsusedformassandenergyreleaserates,andsufficientdesigndata sothatwemayperformindependentcalculations.Thepeakpressureandtemperaturesresultingfromthepostulatedbreakofahighenergypipelocatedincompart-mentsorbuildingsisdependentonthemassandenergy flowsduringthetimeofthebreak.Youhavenotpro-videdtheinformationnecessarytodeterminewhattermi-natestheblowdownortodeterminethelengthoftimeblowdownexists.Foreachpipebreakorleakagecrackanalyzed,providethetotalblowdowntimeandthemech-anismusedtoterminateorlimittheblowdowntimeof B/B-FSARAMENDMENT18JANUARY2979flowsothattheenvironmentaleffectswillnotaffectsafeshutdownofthefacility." RESPONSEQualificationtestshavebeenconductedforthecomponentsinthesafetyvalvehouse.Thecomponentsincludethemain steamandmainfeedwaterisolationvalves,themainsteam power-operatedreliefvalve,andthemainsteamsafetyvalves. | ||
RESPONSEQualificationtestshavebeenconductedforthecomponentsinthesafetyvalvehouse.Thecomponentsincludethemain steamandmainfeedwaterisolationvalves,themainsteam power-operatedreliefvalve,andthemainsteamsafetyvalves. | |||
Thesetestsconservativelyappliedaging,radiation,seismic,andworstcaseenvironmental(temperature,pressure,andhumidity)loadingtothecomponents,andshowedthatloss offunctiondidnotoccur.TheportionofthemainsteamandmainfeedwaterpipeinthetunnelbetweentheSafetyValveHouseandtheTurbineBuildingmeetstheguidelinesofBranchTechnicalPosition APCSB3-1.Aspecialpipewhiprestraintislocatedaround eachpipeasitpassesthroughthewallseparatingtheisola-tionvalveroomfromthemainsteamtunnel.Thisrestraintlimitstheamountofstrainthatcanbetransmittedtotheisolationvalvesfromanypipebreakinthetunneltoa levelwhichwillnotinterferewiththeproperfunctioning oftheisolationvalves.Thesafetyvalveroom,thesteamtunnel,andthecompartmentbetweenthecontainmentandthesafetyvalveroomallhave thesamebasisfordesign.Thesecompartmentshavebeen designedforpressurization,impingementandtemperature asspecifiedinTable3.8-10,loadcombinations8,13,and 14.Anassumedpipecrackorbreakinthetunnel,isolationvalveroom,orsafetyvalvehousecannotcausestructural failure.ThesubcompartmentpressurizationanalysisisincludedasAttachmentC3.6totheFSAR.Themethodsusedtocalculatethepressurebuildupandallowanceforstructural designmarginsinsubcompartmentsoutsidethecontainment (AttachmentsA3.6andC3.6)arethesameasthoseusedfor subcompartmentsinsidethecontainment. | Thesetestsconservativelyappliedaging,radiation,seismic,andworstcaseenvironmental(temperature,pressure,andhumidity)loadingtothecomponents,andshowedthatloss offunctiondidnotoccur.TheportionofthemainsteamandmainfeedwaterpipeinthetunnelbetweentheSafetyValveHouseandtheTurbineBuildingmeetstheguidelinesofBranchTechnicalPosition APCSB3-1.Aspecialpipewhiprestraintislocatedaround eachpipeasitpassesthroughthewallseparatingtheisola-tionvalveroomfromthemainsteamtunnel.Thisrestraintlimitstheamountofstrainthatcanbetransmittedtotheisolationvalvesfromanypipebreakinthetunneltoa levelwhichwillnotinterferewiththeproperfunctioning oftheisolationvalves.Thesafetyvalveroom,thesteamtunnel,andthecompartmentbetweenthecontainmentandthesafetyvalveroomallhave thesamebasisfordesign.Thesecompartmentshavebeen designedforpressurization,impingementandtemperature asspecifiedinTable3.8-10,loadcombinations8,13,and 14.Anassumedpipecrackorbreakinthetunnel,isolationvalveroom,orsafetyvalvehousecannotcausestructural failure.ThesubcompartmentpressurizationanalysisisincludedasAttachmentC3.6totheFSAR.Themethodsusedtocalculatethepressurebuildupandallowanceforstructural designmarginsinsubcompartmentsoutsidethecontainment (AttachmentsA3.6andC3.6)arethesameasthoseusedfor subcompartmentsinsidethecontainment. | ||
Q10.4-2}} | Q10.4-2}} | ||
Revision as of 01:25, 8 July 2018
| ML17040A303 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/2017 |
| From: | Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | NRC/EDO |
| References | |
| OEDO-17-00104 | |
| Download: ML17040A303 (2) | |
Text
B/B-FSARAMENDMENT18JANUARY1979QUESTION010.4"Werequirethatthecompartmentbetweenthecontainmentandthesafetyvalvehousewhichhousesthemainsteamlinesandfeedwaterlinesandtheisolationvalvesforthoselines,bedesignedtoconsidertheenviron-mentaleffects(pressure,temperature,humidity)and potentialfloodingconsequencesfromanassumedcrack, equivalenttotheflowareaofasingleendedpiperuptureintheselines.Werequirethatessentialequipmentlocatedwithinthecompartment,including themainsteamisolationandfeedwatervalvesandtheir operatorsbecapableofoperatingintheenvironment resultingfromtheabovecrack.Wealsowillrequirethatifthisassumedcrackcouldcausethestructuralfailureofthiscompartment,thenthefailureshould notjeopardizethesafeshutdownoftheplant.In addition,werequirethattheremainingportionof thepipeinthetunnelbetweenthesafetyvalvehouseandtheturbinebuildingmeettheguidelinesofBranchTechnicalPositionAPCSB3-1."Werequirethatyousubmitasubcompartmentpressureanalysistoconfirmthatthedesignofthepipetunnelconformstoourpositionasoutlinedabove."Werequestthatyouevaluatethedesignagainstthisstaffposition,andadviseusastotheoutcomeof yourreview,includinganydesignchangeswhichmayberequired.Theevaluationshouldincludeaverifica-tionthatthemethodsusedtocalculatethepressure buildupinthesubcompartmentsoutsideofthecon-tainmentforpostulatedbreaksarethesameasthose usedforsubcompartmentsinsidethecontainment.Also,theallowanceforstructuraldesignmargins(pressure)shouldbethesame.Ifdifferentmethodsareused, justifythatyourmethodprovidesadequatedesignmargins andidentifythemarginsthatareavailable.Whenyou submittheresultsofyourevaluation,identifythecomputercodesused,theassumptionsusedformassandenergyreleaserates,andsufficientdesigndata sothatwemayperformindependentcalculations.Thepeakpressureandtemperaturesresultingfromthepostulatedbreakofahighenergypipelocatedincompart-mentsorbuildingsisdependentonthemassandenergy flowsduringthetimeofthebreak.Youhavenotpro-videdtheinformationnecessarytodeterminewhattermi-natestheblowdownortodeterminethelengthoftimeblowdownexists.Foreachpipebreakorleakagecrackanalyzed,providethetotalblowdowntimeandthemech-anismusedtoterminateorlimittheblowdowntimeof B/B-FSARAMENDMENT18JANUARY2979flowsothattheenvironmentaleffectswillnotaffectsafeshutdownofthefacility." RESPONSEQualificationtestshavebeenconductedforthecomponentsinthesafetyvalvehouse.Thecomponentsincludethemain steamandmainfeedwaterisolationvalves,themainsteam power-operatedreliefvalve,andthemainsteamsafetyvalves.
Thesetestsconservativelyappliedaging,radiation,seismic,andworstcaseenvironmental(temperature,pressure,andhumidity)loadingtothecomponents,andshowedthatloss offunctiondidnotoccur.TheportionofthemainsteamandmainfeedwaterpipeinthetunnelbetweentheSafetyValveHouseandtheTurbineBuildingmeetstheguidelinesofBranchTechnicalPosition APCSB3-1.Aspecialpipewhiprestraintislocatedaround eachpipeasitpassesthroughthewallseparatingtheisola-tionvalveroomfromthemainsteamtunnel.Thisrestraintlimitstheamountofstrainthatcanbetransmittedtotheisolationvalvesfromanypipebreakinthetunneltoa levelwhichwillnotinterferewiththeproperfunctioning oftheisolationvalves.Thesafetyvalveroom,thesteamtunnel,andthecompartmentbetweenthecontainmentandthesafetyvalveroomallhave thesamebasisfordesign.Thesecompartmentshavebeen designedforpressurization,impingementandtemperature asspecifiedinTable3.8-10,loadcombinations8,13,and 14.Anassumedpipecrackorbreakinthetunnel,isolationvalveroom,orsafetyvalvehousecannotcausestructural failure.ThesubcompartmentpressurizationanalysisisincludedasAttachmentC3.6totheFSAR.Themethodsusedtocalculatethepressurebuildupandallowanceforstructural designmarginsinsubcompartmentsoutsidethecontainment (AttachmentsA3.6andC3.6)arethesameasthoseusedfor subcompartmentsinsidethecontainment.
Q10.4-2