ML20249B078: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
VisualWikitext
StriderTol Bot insert
 
StriderTol Bot change
 
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:-_ _                 _-_                     -
{{#Wiki_filter:-_ _
                                              June 11,1998
_-_
    EA 98-293
-
    Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services
June 11,1998
    C/O Ms. P. A. Loftus, Director - Regulatory
EA 98-293
      Affairs for Millstone Station
Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services
    Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
C/O Ms. P. A. Loftus, Director - Regulatory
    PO Box 128
Affairs for Millstone Station
    Waterford, CT 06385
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
    Dear Mr. Bowling:
PO Box 128
    SUBJECT:       NRC TEAM INSPECTION 50-423/97-82 and NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Waterford, CT 06385
    On February 26,1998,the NRC completed a team inspection of the Northeast Utilities
Dear Mr. Bowling:
    (NU) controls in identifying, resolving and preventing issues that degrade the quality of
SUBJECT:
    plant operatic 80 or safety at Millstone Unit 3. The enclosed report presents the results of
NRC TEAM INSPECTION 50-423/97-82 and NOTICE OF VIOLATION
    that inspection.
On February 26,1998,the NRC completed a team inspection of the Northeast Utilities
    This team inspection was performed onsite from February 9 through February 20,1998,
(NU) controls in identifying, resolving and preventing issues that degrade the quality of
    using NRC Inspection Procedure 40500, " Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying,
plant operatic 80 or safety at Millstone Unit 3. The enclosed report presents the results of
    Resolving and Preventing Problems." Overall, the team found evidence of improving
that inspection.
    performance. The corrective action program is adequate to suppurt restart, but it is clear
This team inspection was performed onsite from February 9 through February 20,1998,
    that the program will continue to require careful monitoring by NU management to ensure
using NRC Inspection Procedure 40500, " Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying,
    sustained performance. Self-assessments were typically of high quality. The quality                     l
Resolving and Preventing Problems." Overall, the team found evidence of improving
    assurance and quality control functions of the Nuclear Oversight organization have                     ;
performance. The corrective action program is adequate to suppurt restart, but it is clear
    improved as a direct result of improved staffing, qualifications, and knowledge level. Of             )
that the program will continue to require careful monitoring by NU management to ensure
    note is the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Assessment, which the team considered
sustained performance. Self-assessments were typically of high quality. The quality
    to be a strong initiative. All three safety review committees (Nuclear Safety Assessment
l
    Board, Site Operations Review Committee, and Plant Operations Review Committee)
assurance and quality control functions of the Nuclear Oversight organization have
    operated effectively and provided quality input in addressing the issues before them. The               j
;
    team also noted that the Independent Safety Engineering Group has made considerable
improved as a direct result of improved staffing, qualifications, and knowledge level. Of
                                                                                                          {'
)
    progress, albeit at the expense of performing safety reviews, in reducing the backlog of
note is the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Assessment, which the team considered
    operating experience (OE) reviews. The team found that management communications
to be a strong initiative. All three safety review committees (Nuclear Safety Assessment
    methods with the plant staff were a strength. The plant staff feels that management is
Board, Site Operations Review Committee, and Plant Operations Review Committee)
    receptive to problems brought forward and individuals generally characterized the                       ,
operated effectively and provided quality input in addressing the issues before them. The
    environment as improved and currently receptive to problem identification.                             I
j
    Nonetheless, our inspection identified six violations of NRC requirements. The first two
team also noted that the Independent Safety Engineering Group has made considerable
    violations involve examples of inappropriate corrective actions: failure to take corrective             :
{
    actions for recurrent problems with the boric acid transfer pumps and failing to complete all           l
progress, albeit at the expense of performing safety reviews, in reducing the backlog of
    of the work specified in an automated work order for modifications to service water flow
'
    instrurnentation. The third violation concerns failing to review independent Safety                     ,
operating experience (OE) reviews. The team found that management communications
    Engineering Group procedures. The fourth violation involves two examples of failing to                 l
methods with the plant staff were a strength. The plant staff feels that management is
    adhere to written procedures for design basis docurnents. The fifth violation concerns                 I
receptive to problems brought forward and individuals generally characterized the
    assigning inappropriate significance levels to two condition reports. The sixth violation
,
                                                                                                            '
I
                                                                                                      l
environment as improved and currently receptive to problem identification.
                                                                                                    \[
Nonetheless, our inspection identified six violations of NRC requirements. The first two
  eso622oo44 98o611
violations involve examples of inappropriate corrective actions: failure to take corrective
  PDR      ADOCK 05000423                                                            y\hDwsL'; -        .\
:
                                                                                                            .
actions for recurrent problems with the boric acid transfer pumps and failing to complete all
                                                                                                            !
l
  a                       PDR                                                         V               l
of the work specified in an automated work order for modifications to service water flow
                                                                                                            1
instrurnentation. The third violation concerns failing to review independent Safety
                                                                                                  .
,
                                                                                                          j
Engineering Group procedures. The fourth violation involves two examples of failing to
l
adhere to written procedures for design basis docurnents. The fifth violation concerns
I
assigning inappropriate significance levels to two condition reports. The sixth violation
l
'
\\[
eso622oo44 98o611
y\\hDwsL';
.
PDR
ADOCK 05000423
.\\
!
-
a
PDR
V
l
1
.
j


                                              ,.                                                     .
,.
                                    '
.
                                                                                                        4
'
                                                                                                        I
4
                                                                                                        I
I
                                          June 11,1998
I
  EA 98-293                                                                                             !
June 11,1998
                                                                                                        1
EA 98-293
                                                                                                        !
!
  Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services                                             j
1
C/O Ms. P. A. Loftus, Director - Regulatory                                                           i
!
  Affairs for Millstone Station
Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
j
PO Box 128
C/O Ms. P. A. Loftus, Director - Regulatory
Waterford, CT 06385
i
Dear Mr. Bowling:
Affairs for Millstone Station
SUBJECT:       NRC TEAM INSPECTION 50-423/97-82 snd NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
On February 26,1998, the NRC completed a team inspection of the Northeast Utilities
PO Box 128
(NU) controls in identifying, resolving and preventing issues that degrade the quality of
Waterford, CT 06385
plant operations or safety at Millstone Unit 3. The enclosed report presents the results of
Dear Mr. Bowling:
that inspection.
SUBJECT:
This tecm inspection was performed onsite from February 9 through February 20,1998,
NRC TEAM INSPECTION 50-423/97-82 snd NOTICE OF VIOLATION
using NRC Inspection Procedure 40500," Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying,
On February 26,1998, the NRC completed a team inspection of the Northeast Utilities
Resolving and Preventing Problems." Overall, the team found evidence of improving
(NU) controls in identifying, resolving and preventing issues that degrade the quality of
performance. The corrective action program is adequate to support restart, but it is clear
plant operations or safety at Millstone Unit 3. The enclosed report presents the results of
that the program will continue to require careful monitoring by NU management to ensure
that inspection.
sustained performance. Self-assessments were typically of high quality. The quality
This tecm inspection was performed onsite from February 9 through February 20,1998,
assurance and quality control functions of the Nuclear Oversight organization have
using NRC Inspection Procedure 40500," Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying,
improved as a direct result of improved staffing, qualifications, and knowledge level. Of
Resolving and Preventing Problems." Overall, the team found evidence of improving
note is the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Assessment, which the team considered
performance. The corrective action program is adequate to support restart, but it is clear
to be a strong initiative. All three safety review committees (Nuclear Safety Assessment
that the program will continue to require careful monitoring by NU management to ensure
Board, Site Operations Review Committee, and Plant Operations Review Committee)
sustained performance. Self-assessments were typically of high quality. The quality
operated effectively and provided quality input in addressing the issues before them. The
assurance and quality control functions of the Nuclear Oversight organization have
team also noted that the independent Safety Engineering Group has made considerable
improved as a direct result of improved staffing, qualifications, and knowledge level. Of
progress albeit at the expense of performing safety reviews, in reducing the backlog of
note is the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Assessment, which the team considered
operating experience (OE) reviews. The team found that management communications
to be a strong initiative. All three safety review committees (Nuclear Safety Assessment
methods with the plant staff were a strength. The plant staff feels that management is
Board, Site Operations Review Committee, and Plant Operations Review Committee)
receptive to problems brought forward and individuals generally characterized the
operated effectively and provided quality input in addressing the issues before them. The
environment as improved and currently receptive to problem identification.
team also noted that the independent Safety Engineering Group has made considerable
Nonetheless, our inspection identified six violations of NRC requirements. The first two
progress albeit at the expense of performing safety reviews, in reducing the backlog of
violations involve examples of inappropriate corrective actions: failure to take corrective
operating experience (OE) reviews. The team found that management communications
actions for recurrent problems with the boric acid transfer pumps and failing to complete all
methods with the plant staff were a strength. The plant staff feels that management is
of the work specified in an automated work order for modifications to service water flow
receptive to problems brought forward and individuals generally characterized the
instrumentation. The third violation concerns failing to review independent Safety
environment as improved and currently receptive to problem identification.
Engineering Group procedures. The fourth violation involves two examples of failing to
Nonetheless, our inspection identified six violations of NRC requirements. The first two
adhere to written procedures for design basis documents. The fifth violation concerns
violations involve examples of inappropriate corrective actions: failure to take corrective
assigning inappropriate significance levels to two condition reports. The sixth violation       !
actions for recurrent problems with the boric acid transfer pumps and failing to complete all
                                                                                                i
of the work specified in an automated work order for modifications to service water flow
                                                                                          g,
instrumentation. The third violation concerns failing to review independent Safety
Engineering Group procedures. The fourth violation involves two examples of failing to
adhere to written procedures for design basis documents. The fifth violation concerns
assigning inappropriate significance levels to two condition reports. The sixth violation
!
i
/y L' ,,. (y
g,
9006220044 900611
9006220044 900611
gor    aoocxomoga                                                                /y L' ,,. -)(y    \
-)
                                                              __
\\
gor
aoocxomoga
__


              - - _
- - _
l
Mr. M. L. Bowling
2
l
concerns the lack of organizationalindependence of the Radiation Protection Manager.
This is a concern because other similar examples of noncompliance with Section 6.0 of the
plant's Technical Specifications were found during the inspection.
These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and the circumstances
surrounding them are described in detailin the enclosed report. Please note that you are
required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
enclosed notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part,
to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with
regulatory requirements.
NRC review of SIL closure packages has closed SIL ltems No. 41 and 73.
This report captures the staff's observations of the program as it was implemented up to
the beginning of 1998. Your staff's implementation and refinement of the corrective
action program was still maturing at the time of the inspection, and the results of this
inspection indicate areas where continued improvements were needed. Our observations
since the time of the inspection are that the program has continued to progress, and the
team's conclusions that the program is adequate to support restart is even more valid at
this date. However, it is clear that continued management attention to sustain the
improvements made can be more completely assessed by evaluating long-term
performance, including the degree to which recurring problems manifest themselves over
time. In view of this consideration and the historical problems NNECO has had in
maintaining an effective corrective action program, we intend to conduct another IP 40500
l
inspection within about one year.
l
l
  Mr. M. L. Bowling                                2
I
'
in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this
letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
I
Wayne D. Lanning
Deputy Director of Inspections
Special Projects Office
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Docket No. 50-423
l
l
  concerns the lack of organizationalindependence of the Radiation Protection Manager.
Enclosures:
  This is a concern because other similar examples of noncompliance with Section 6.0 of the
l
  plant's Technical Specifications were found during the inspection.
1.
  These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and the circumstances
Notice of Violation
  surrounding them are described in detailin the enclosed report. Please note that you are
i
  required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
2.
  enclosed notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part,
NRC Inspection Report 50-423/97-82
  to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with
1
  regulatory requirements.
l
  NRC review of SIL closure packages has closed SIL ltems No. 41 and 73.
l
  This report captures the staff's observations of the program as it was implemented up to
l
  the beginning of 1998. Your staff's implementation and refinement of the corrective
l
  action program was still maturing at the time of the inspection, and the results of this
)
  inspection indicate areas where continued improvements were needed. Our observations
!
  since the time of the inspection are that the program has continued to progress, and the
:
  team's conclusions that the program is adequate to support restart is even more valid at
l
  this date. However, it is clear that continued management attention to sustain the
l
  improvements made can be more completely assessed by evaluating long-term
i
  performance, including the degree to which recurring problems manifest themselves over
j
  time. In view of this consideration and the historical problems NNECO has had in
  maintaining an effective corrective action program, we intend to conduct another IP 40500  l
  inspection within about one year.                                                          l
                                                                                            I
                                                                                            '
  in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this
  letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
                                                      Sincerely,
                                                      ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
                                                                                            I
                                                      Wayne D. Lanning
                                                      Deputy Director of Inspections
                                                      Special Projects Office
                                                      Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
  Docket No. 50-423
                                                                                            l
  Enclosures:                                                                                l
  1.     Notice of Violation                                                               i
  2.     NRC Inspection Report 50-423/97-82                                                 1
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            )
                                                                                            !
                                                                                            :
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            i
                                                                                            j


  ._
._
          - - - .       .
- - - .
                                  _ - - _ - _ _ -   _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ - _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _       -_ _ _ _ _
.
      -*
_ - - _ - _ _ -
  4 ,.             .
_ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ - _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _
                                                                                                                  .
-_ _ _ _ _
  *
-*
                    . Mr. M. L'. Bowling -                                                                   3
4 ,.
                        cc w/encls:
.
                        B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer - Nucleer Group
.
                        M. H. Brothers, Vice President - Operations
*
                        J. McElwain; Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit 2
. Mr. M. L'. Bowling -
                        J. Streeter, Recovery Officer - Nuclear Oversight
3
                      '
cc w/encls:
                        G. D. Hicks, Director - Unit 3
B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer - Nucleer Group
                    - J. A. Price, Director - Unit 2
M. H. Brothers, Vice President - Operations
                        D. Amerine, Vice President - Human Services
J. McElwain; Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit 2
                        E. Harkness, Director, Unit 1 Operations
J. Streeter, Recovery Officer - Nuclear Oversight
                        JJ Althouse, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group
G. D. Hicks, Director - Unit 3
                        F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services
'- J. A. Price, Director - Unit 2
                        J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training (CT)
D. Amerine, Vice President - Human Services
                        S. J.' Sherman, Audits and Evaluation
E. Harkness, Director, Unit 1 Operations
                        L. M. Cuoco, Esquire
JJ Althouse, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group
                        J. R. Egan, Esquire
F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services
                        V. Juliano, Waterford Library
J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training (CT)
                        J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control
S. J.' Sherman, Audits and Evaluation
                        S. B. Comley, We The People
L. M. Cuoco, Esquire
                        State of Connecticut SLO Designee
J. R. Egan, Esquire
                        D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
V. Juliano, Waterford Library
                        R. Bassilakis, CAN                                                                                     i
J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control
                                                                                                                              '
S. B. Comley, We The People
                        J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN
State of Connecticut SLO Designee
                        S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)
D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
                        Representative T. Concannon
R. Bassilakis, CAN
                        E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC
i
J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN
'
S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)
Representative T. Concannon
E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC
l
l
!
!
!                                                 ,.
!
L.1_     _ _ _ _ _
,.
                                                                                                                -
L.1_
_ _ _ _ _
-


                                                        _
_
                                                              . _ _ _       - _ _ _ _ - . ___ __
. _ _ _
          .
- _ _ _ _ -
  .e.
.
                .
___
                  .
__
        ,
.
  .
.e.
                    Mr. M. L. Bowling                                 4
.
                    Distribution w/encis:
.
                    Region 1 Docket Room (with gap.y of concurrences)
,
                    Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
.
                    PUBLIC
Mr. M. L. Bowling
                    FILE CENTEP., NRR (with Oriainal concurrences)
4
                    SPO Secretarial File, Region i
Distribution w/encis:
                    NRC Resident inspector
Region 1 Docket Room (with gap.y of concurrences)
                    W. Axelson, ORA
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
                    B. Jones, PIMB/ DISP
PUBLIC
                    W. Lanning, Deputy Director of Inspections, SPO, RI
FILE CENTEP., NRR (with Oriainal concurrences)
                    D. Screnci, PAO
SPO Secretarial File, Region i
                    W. Travers, Director, SPO, NRR
NRC Resident inspector
                    -J. Lieberman, OE
W. Axelson, ORA
                    Distribution w/encls (VIA E-MAIL):
B. Jones, PIMB/ DISP
                    J. Andersen, PM, SPO, NRR
W. Lanning, Deputy Director of Inspections, SPO, RI
                    M. Callahan, OCA
D. Screnci, PAO
                    R. Correia, NRR
W. Travers, Director, SPO, NRR
                    B. McCabe, OEDO
-J. Lieberman, OE
                    S. Dembek, PM, SPO, NRR
Distribution w/encls (VIA E-MAIL):
                    E. Imbro, Deputy Director of ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR
J. Andersen, PM, SPO, NRR
                    D. Mcdonald, PM, SPO, NRR
M. Callahan, OCA
                    P. McKee, Deputy Director of Licensing, SPO, NRR
R. Correia, NRR
                    S. Reynolds, Chief, ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR
B. McCabe, OEDO
                    D. Screnci, PAO
S. Dembek, PM, SPO, NRR
                    Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)
E. Imbro, Deputy Director of ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR
                    DOCDESK
D. Mcdonald, PM, SPO, NRR
                    T. Walker, SES
P. McKee, Deputy Director of Licensing, SPO, NRR
                                      .
S. Reynolds, Chief, ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR
                                  t/
D. Screnci, PAO
        DOCUMENT NAME: ':\ BRANCH 6\lR9882.64
Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)
      To r=elve a copy o this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" =
DOCDESK
T. Walker, SES
.
t/
DOCUMENT NAME: ':\\ BRANCH 6\\lR9882.64
To r=elve a copy o this document, indicate in the box:
"C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure
"E" =
Copy with attachm nt/ enclosure
"N" =,, No copy
'
l OFFICE
Rgf)S[
l
Rl/pg
lE Rlfph
l
l
lNAME
St(6dfody7
Dtirr ;" ,
L#hifthf,
;
lDATE
f l[I nY
(>llll1?
6/IIIS/
[
/ OFFICIAL RECOl4D COPY
'
'
        Copy with attachm nt/ enclosure "N" =,, No copy
      l OFFICE        Rgf)S[          l  Rl/pg          lE        Rlfph                      l          l
      lNAME          St(6dfody7            Dtirr ;" ,              L#hifthf,
;      lDATE            f l[I nY
                                '
                                                (>llll1?              6/IIIS/
                          [                          / OFFICIAL RECOl4D COPY
>
>
l   . -
l
            ____
. -
____
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 14:09, 30 November 2024

Forwards Insp Rept 50-423/97-82 on 980209-20 & Notice of Violation.Six Violations Identified.First Two Violations Involved Examples of Inappropriate C/A & Failure to Take C/A for Recurrent Problems W/Boric Acid Transfer Pumps
ML20249B078
Person / Time
Site: Millstone 
Issue date: 06/11/1998
From: Lanning W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Bowling M
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
Shared Package
ML20249B079 List:
References
50-423-97-82, EA-98-293, NUDOCS 9806220044
Download: ML20249B078 (4)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000423/1997082

Text

-_ _

_-_

-

June 11,1998

EA 98-293

Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services

C/O Ms. P. A. Loftus, Director - Regulatory

Affairs for Millstone Station

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

PO Box 128

Waterford, CT 06385

Dear Mr. Bowling:

SUBJECT:

NRC TEAM INSPECTION 50-423/97-82 and NOTICE OF VIOLATION

On February 26,1998,the NRC completed a team inspection of the Northeast Utilities

(NU) controls in identifying, resolving and preventing issues that degrade the quality of

plant operatic 80 or safety at Millstone Unit 3. The enclosed report presents the results of

that inspection.

This team inspection was performed onsite from February 9 through February 20,1998,

using NRC Inspection Procedure 40500, " Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying,

Resolving and Preventing Problems." Overall, the team found evidence of improving

performance. The corrective action program is adequate to suppurt restart, but it is clear

that the program will continue to require careful monitoring by NU management to ensure

sustained performance. Self-assessments were typically of high quality. The quality

l

assurance and quality control functions of the Nuclear Oversight organization have

improved as a direct result of improved staffing, qualifications, and knowledge level. Of

)

note is the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Assessment, which the team considered

to be a strong initiative. All three safety review committees (Nuclear Safety Assessment

Board, Site Operations Review Committee, and Plant Operations Review Committee)

operated effectively and provided quality input in addressing the issues before them. The

j

team also noted that the Independent Safety Engineering Group has made considerable

{

progress, albeit at the expense of performing safety reviews, in reducing the backlog of

'

operating experience (OE) reviews. The team found that management communications

methods with the plant staff were a strength. The plant staff feels that management is

receptive to problems brought forward and individuals generally characterized the

,

I

environment as improved and currently receptive to problem identification.

Nonetheless, our inspection identified six violations of NRC requirements. The first two

violations involve examples of inappropriate corrective actions: failure to take corrective

actions for recurrent problems with the boric acid transfer pumps and failing to complete all

l

of the work specified in an automated work order for modifications to service water flow

instrurnentation. The third violation concerns failing to review independent Safety

,

Engineering Group procedures. The fourth violation involves two examples of failing to

l

adhere to written procedures for design basis docurnents. The fifth violation concerns

I

assigning inappropriate significance levels to two condition reports. The sixth violation

l

'

\\[

eso622oo44 98o611

y\\hDwsL';

.

PDR

ADOCK 05000423

.\\

!

-

a

PDR

V

l

1

.

j

,.

.

'

4

I

I

June 11,1998

EA 98-293

!

1

!

Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services

j

C/O Ms. P. A. Loftus, Director - Regulatory

i

Affairs for Millstone Station

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

PO Box 128

Waterford, CT 06385

Dear Mr. Bowling:

SUBJECT:

NRC TEAM INSPECTION 50-423/97-82 snd NOTICE OF VIOLATION

On February 26,1998, the NRC completed a team inspection of the Northeast Utilities

(NU) controls in identifying, resolving and preventing issues that degrade the quality of

plant operations or safety at Millstone Unit 3. The enclosed report presents the results of

that inspection.

This tecm inspection was performed onsite from February 9 through February 20,1998,

using NRC Inspection Procedure 40500," Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying,

Resolving and Preventing Problems." Overall, the team found evidence of improving

performance. The corrective action program is adequate to support restart, but it is clear

that the program will continue to require careful monitoring by NU management to ensure

sustained performance. Self-assessments were typically of high quality. The quality

assurance and quality control functions of the Nuclear Oversight organization have

improved as a direct result of improved staffing, qualifications, and knowledge level. Of

note is the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Assessment, which the team considered

to be a strong initiative. All three safety review committees (Nuclear Safety Assessment

Board, Site Operations Review Committee, and Plant Operations Review Committee)

operated effectively and provided quality input in addressing the issues before them. The

team also noted that the independent Safety Engineering Group has made considerable

progress albeit at the expense of performing safety reviews, in reducing the backlog of

operating experience (OE) reviews. The team found that management communications

methods with the plant staff were a strength. The plant staff feels that management is

receptive to problems brought forward and individuals generally characterized the

environment as improved and currently receptive to problem identification.

Nonetheless, our inspection identified six violations of NRC requirements. The first two

violations involve examples of inappropriate corrective actions: failure to take corrective

actions for recurrent problems with the boric acid transfer pumps and failing to complete all

of the work specified in an automated work order for modifications to service water flow

instrumentation. The third violation concerns failing to review independent Safety

Engineering Group procedures. The fourth violation involves two examples of failing to

adhere to written procedures for design basis documents. The fifth violation concerns

assigning inappropriate significance levels to two condition reports. The sixth violation

!

i

/y L' ,,. (y

g,

9006220044 900611

-)

\\

gor

aoocxomoga

__

- - _

l

Mr. M. L. Bowling

2

l

concerns the lack of organizationalindependence of the Radiation Protection Manager.

This is a concern because other similar examples of noncompliance with Section 6.0 of the

plant's Technical Specifications were found during the inspection.

These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and the circumstances

surrounding them are described in detailin the enclosed report. Please note that you are

required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the

enclosed notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part,

to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with

regulatory requirements.

NRC review of SIL closure packages has closed SIL ltems No. 41 and 73.

This report captures the staff's observations of the program as it was implemented up to

the beginning of 1998. Your staff's implementation and refinement of the corrective

action program was still maturing at the time of the inspection, and the results of this

inspection indicate areas where continued improvements were needed. Our observations

since the time of the inspection are that the program has continued to progress, and the

team's conclusions that the program is adequate to support restart is even more valid at

this date. However, it is clear that continued management attention to sustain the

improvements made can be more completely assessed by evaluating long-term

performance, including the degree to which recurring problems manifest themselves over

time. In view of this consideration and the historical problems NNECO has had in

maintaining an effective corrective action program, we intend to conduct another IP 40500

l

inspection within about one year.

l

I

'

in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this

letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

I

Wayne D. Lanning

Deputy Director of Inspections

Special Projects Office

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

l

Enclosures:

l

1.

Notice of Violation

i

2.

NRC Inspection Report 50-423/97-82

1

l

l

l

l

)

!

l

l

i

j

._

- - - .

.

_ - - _ - _ _ -

_ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ - _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _

-_ _ _ _ _

-*

4 ,.

.

.

. Mr. M. L'. Bowling -

3

cc w/encls:

B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer - Nucleer Group

M. H. Brothers, Vice President - Operations

J. McElwain; Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit 2

J. Streeter, Recovery Officer - Nuclear Oversight

G. D. Hicks, Director - Unit 3

'- J. A. Price, Director - Unit 2

D. Amerine, Vice President - Human Services

E. Harkness, Director, Unit 1 Operations

JJ Althouse, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group

F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services

J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training (CT)

S. J.' Sherman, Audits and Evaluation

L. M. Cuoco, Esquire

J. R. Egan, Esquire

V. Juliano, Waterford Library

J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control

S. B. Comley, We The People

State of Connecticut SLO Designee

D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)

R. Bassilakis, CAN

i

J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN

'

S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)

Representative T. Concannon

E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC

l

!

!

,.

L.1_

_ _ _ _ _

-

_

. _ _ _

- _ _ _ _ -

.

___

__

.

.e.

.

.

,

.

Mr. M. L. Bowling

4

Distribution w/encis:

Region 1 Docket Room (with gap.y of concurrences)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC

FILE CENTEP., NRR (with Oriainal concurrences)

SPO Secretarial File, Region i

NRC Resident inspector

W. Axelson, ORA

B. Jones, PIMB/ DISP

W. Lanning, Deputy Director of Inspections, SPO, RI

D. Screnci, PAO

W. Travers, Director, SPO, NRR

-J. Lieberman, OE

Distribution w/encls (VIA E-MAIL):

J. Andersen, PM, SPO, NRR

M. Callahan, OCA

R. Correia, NRR

B. McCabe, OEDO

S. Dembek, PM, SPO, NRR

E. Imbro, Deputy Director of ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR

D. Mcdonald, PM, SPO, NRR

P. McKee, Deputy Director of Licensing, SPO, NRR

S. Reynolds, Chief, ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR

D. Screnci, PAO

Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)

DOCDESK

T. Walker, SES

.

t/

DOCUMENT NAME: ':\\ BRANCH 6\\lR9882.64

To r=elve a copy o this document, indicate in the box:

"C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure

"E" =

Copy with attachm nt/ enclosure

"N" =,, No copy

'

l OFFICE

Rgf)S[

l

Rl/pg

lE Rlfph

l

l

lNAME

St(6dfody7

Dtirr ;" ,

L#hifthf,

lDATE

f l[I nY

(>llll1?

6/IIIS/

[

/ OFFICIAL RECOl4D COPY

'

>

l

. -

____

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20249B078&oldid=3884483"