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#REDIRECT [[IR 05000354/1997007]]
{{Adams
| number = ML20199L423
| issue date = 02/03/1998
| title = Ack Receipt of 971212 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-354/97-07 on 971113.C/As Will Be Examined During Future Insp at Hope Creek
| author name = Linville J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| addressee name = Keiser H
| addressee affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY
| docket = 05000354
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-354-97-07, 50-354-97-7, NUDOCS 9802090197
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 3
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000354/1997007]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:. _                          _  .--___ _
  .
  1                                                                                                                          4
  4
                                                                      February 3,1998
                    Mr. Harold W. Keiser
                    Executive Vice President
                                    _
                    Nuclear Business Unit
                    Public Service Electric & Gas Company
                    PO Box 236
                    Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038
                    SUBJECT:                    Inspection Report 50-354/97-07
                    Dear Mr.- Keiser:
i
                    This letter refers to your December 12,1997 correspondence (LR N97767),in response to
                    our November 13,1997 letter regarding the Hope Creek facility.
                    Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions for the Notice of
                    Violation, as documented in your letter. The first violation involved two examples of Hope
                    Creek maintenance technicians failirT tr. !nplement procedural adherence requirements
                    during maintenance ectivities. The s90ed violation involves a failure to promptly identify
                    an inoperable electric motor-driven fire pump supply breaker. Your actions will be
                  - examined during future inspections at Hope Creek.
                  . Your cooperation with us is appreciated.
                                                                              Sincerely,
                                                                              ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
                                                                              -James C. Linville, Chief
                                                                              Projects Branch 3
                                                                              Division of Reactor Projects            ,.
                    Docket No. 50-354                                                                              I
                                                                                                                          ,
                                                                                                                          i  ,
                    in" EE Ugg3,                                -
                                                      PDR
                                                                                                                  fl
                                                                      ll l.I'l.ll.l I.lil.l 1.1 ll
                                                                      .                      .                1
                                                                                                                0
                                                                                                                                ,
        . . . . .        . . . .
                                                  .  .
                                                                        , ..
                                                                                                                              . .l
                                                                                          ._
                                                                                                        .
                                                                                                            . .
                                                                                                                  .
                                                                                                                            .
 
      _
                . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - -
                                                                                                                      - - -
  .
  .
    Mr. Harold W. Keiser                                                                                    2
    cc:
    L. Stor:, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations
    E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering
    E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support
    M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations
    J. McMahon, Director - Quality / Nuclear Training / Emergency Preparedness
    D. Powell,- Manager - Licensing / Regulation and Fuels
    A. O. Tapert, Program Administrator
    cc w/cy of Licensee's Letter:
I    A. F. Kirby, Ill, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.
'
    J. A. Isabella, Manager, Joint Generation
      Atlantic Electric
    R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs.
    Jeffrey J. Keenan, Esquire
    M. J. Wetterhahn, Esquire
    Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate
    William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township                                                  .
    State of New Jersey
    State of Delaware
I
                                                                                                              _ _ _ _      ..  i
 
_ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .                      _ _ _ _ - _
                  .
                .
                                              ' Mr. Harold W. Keiser                                        -3
                                                Distribution w/ copy of Licensee's Response Letter:
                                                Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
                                                Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
                                                NRC Resident inspector
                                                PUBLIC
                                                D. Screnci, PAO
                                                J. Linville, DRP
                                                S. Barber, DRP
                                                C. O'Daniell, DRP -
                                                . B. McCabe, OEDO
                                                J. Stolz, PD1-2, NRR
                                                B. Mozafari, Project Manager, NRR
                                                inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
                                                R. Correia, NRR
                                                F. Talbot, NRR '
                                                DOCDESK
                                                                                                                                                                                          i
l
l
t
l
  t
                                    DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ BRANCH 3\REPLYLTR\9707RSP.LTR
                                  Ta receive a copy of this document, Indipate ,n the box: "C" = Cooy without attachment / enclosure "E* = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy
                                        OFFICE'      Rl/DRP              ///]        /                          /                l                                                    l
                                        NAME      JLinville W/
                                        DATE      OM/98// '                      01/ /98                  01/ /98                    01/ /98                    01/ /98
                                                    M'                                          OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
                                                                                                                                                            _                          _
 
                                  ._-. _-.-__---------- - -- - -
  .?    .
    . .        .
    e
  .
                                                                Pubhc Service
                                                                Electnc and Gas
                                                                Company
      Louis F. Stort                      Pubhc Sennee Electne and Gas Company        P O. Box 236. Hancocks Bndge, NJ 08038 609-3394 700
      % ue e,.w.n . w.., o .-
                                                                              DEC 121997
                                                                                LR-N97767                                                            ,
                United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                Document Contro) Desk
                Washington, DC          20555
                REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION
                INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-354/97-07
                HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
                FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57
                DOCKET NO. 50-354
                Gentlemen:
                Pursuant to the provisions of 10CFR2.201, Public Service Electric
                and Gas Company (PSE&G) hereby submits a reply to the Notice of
'              Violation (NOV) . issued to the Hope Creek Generating Station in a
                letter dated November 13, 1997. The violations contained in
                Appendix A of the November 13th letter concerned: 1) a failure to
,
                promptly identify an inoperable electric motor-driven fire pump,
l                as required by 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI; 2) two
j
'
                examples of a failure to follow procedures, as required by
                Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, during maintenance activities;
                3) a failure to appropriately perform a 10CFR50.59 safety
                evaluation for a design modification; 4) a failure to follow the
                requirements of 10CFR50.49 applicable to the environmental
                qualification of Struthers-Dunn relays; and 5) a failure to
                follow the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B,                                      Criterion III,
                Design Control, when extending the service life of the safety-
                related Agastat and Telemechanique relays.
                As discussed with NRC management on November 18, 1997, the
                details of this reply address the first two violutions contained
                in the inspection report. The reply to the last three violations
                contained  in Appendix A of the inspection report will be provided
                by January 12, 1998.
                Should you have any questions or comments on this transmittal, i-
                not hesitate to contact us.
                                                                                Sincerely,
                                                                                                                                                    ,,
                                                                                              '
                Attachment (1)
      @ Pnotedon
            necyew Pap.,
          8 % % 20 Off                                                                .-                                .                . _ _ _ .
 
i.:            .
  .    -1 . '      .-
  ,.
                    ; Document Control Desk              -2-
                    LR-N97767
                                                                              ..
                    C    Mr. :- T. Martin, Administrator - Region I
                          U. S.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                          475'Allendale Road-
                          King of. Prussia,:PA '19406
                          Ms. B. Mozafari, Licensing Project Manager - HC
                                            _
                        .U.;S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission
                          One White Flint North
                        111555 Rockville Pike
                          Mail Stop 14E21
                          Rockville, MD 20852
                        -Mr. S.-Morris (X24)-
                          USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - HC
                          Mr. K.:Tosch, Manager IV
                          Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
                          -P.10. Boa 415
                          . Trenton,-NJ
                                    -
                                          08625
            ..
                  -
  ..
                                                                          @
                                                                          .,
      e
 
      e-
  .        .
    <    ,
            ..
      .
    .
            Attachment 1                                              LR-N97767
            RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION
              INSPECTION REPORT No. 50-354/97-07
            HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
            DOCKET NO. 50-354
            -I.  REPLY TO THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION
              A.  10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI Violation
                  1.  Description of the Notice of Violation
                        "10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires in part
                        that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures,
                        malfunctions and deficiencies, be promptly identified
                        and corrected.
                        Contrary to the above, on September 14, 1997, the
                        electric motor-driven fire pump supply breaker opened
                        during an electrical bus swap which rendered the pump
                        inoperable, a condition adverse to quality. Despite
                        several opportunities to detect this condition earlier,
l                      the inoperable fire pump was not identified and
                        corrected until September 15, 1997, approximately 34
                        hours after electrical supply breaker opened."
                        This is a Severity Level IV violation-(Supplement I) .
                  2.  Recly to Notice of Violation
I
                        .PSE&G_ agrees with the violation.
                  3.    Reason for the Violation
                        PSE&G has attributed the cause of the 10 CFR S0,
                        Appendix B, Criterion XVI, violation to personnel error.
                        During the electrical bus swap,-operators failed to
                        follow a procedure precaution, which required unloading
                        of equipment from the bus prior to transferring infeed
                        pswer.  During=the bis transfer,-the fire pump breaker
                                              -
                        was racked in (which energized a downstream control
                        panel) ; however, the pump itself was de-energized.  When
                        the electrical bus was de-energized, the undervoltage
                        condition caused the fire pump breaker to trip,
                        rendering the fire pump inoperable. The operators had
                        incorrectly concluded that the fire pump breaker would
                        not trip with the pump in the de-energized condition.
                        Prior to the bus transfer, fire protection personnel
                        were notified by the operators of a temporary
                                          Page 1 of 5
                                                                                    _ - _ _
 
- _ - _-___ - -                - -
    'c        ..
                  '
                    . Attachment'1
                                                                                      LR-N97767
            s
        .
                                      interruption of power to the motor driven fire pump.
                                    When the bus-was de-energized, several alarms
                                    annunciated. The alarm for the inoperable fire pump was
                                    received and acknowledged, but the operators failed to
                                    recognize  that the fire pump breaker had tripped during
                                    the bus de-energization.    Because of the assumption that
                                    thesfire pump breaker would not trip during the bus de-
                                    energization, no follow-up was performed by either
                                    operations or fire _ protection personnel upcn power
                                    restoration toenergized.
                                    appropriately  the bus to ensure that the fire pump was
                                  :
                                    Subsequently, one operations'round and two fire
                                    protection rounds were conducted through the fire pump
                                    house while the fire pump was. inoperable. During these
                                    rounds, the operations and fire protection personnel
                                    failed to notice that an indication light was
                                    extinguished on the fire pump panel, which would have.
                                    alerted them that the fire pump was inoperable.
                                    Inattention to detail.on the-part of these individuals
                                  perpetuated the knoperable condition of the fire pump
                                    for the approxit ately 34 hcur period.
                            4.
                                  Corrective
                                  Achieved      Steos That Have Been Taken and Results
                            a.
                                  Breaker 52-590-43 was reset.and the electric motor-drive
                                  fire pump was retested satisfactorily on September 15,
                                  1997.
                            b.  Fire protection and operations personnel involved with              '
                                -the failure _to recognize the inoperability of the fire
                                  pump have been held accountable for their actions in
                                  accordance with PSE&G's disciplinary policy.
                            c.
                                The_ lessons learned _from this event have been discussed
                                with Operations and Fire Protection Department
                                personnel.
!
!
                            5.
                                Corrective
                                Violations      Steos That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further
                            a.  The-Training Department will evaluate this event to
                                determine if additional training is required on breaker
                                design and performance. The evalurtion on the need for
                                training
                                1998,        modifications will be completed by January 15,
                            b.  Procedure revisions will be made to provide additional
                                guidance      on breaker operation and bus power supply
                                transfers. These revisions will be completed by
                                February 18, 1998.
                                                      Page 2 of 5
                                                                                                ___ d
 
      __ _ _ _ _
                  _ - _ _ - .                  . _ _ - - . _ _                .
                                                                                      .
                                                                                . .                  .
                                                                                                          .      .
                                                                                                                            . .
  ,              .
    ,
                              Attachment ' l -                                                                    LR-N97767
  a
  .v
                                  26.                          Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved
                                  -Full' compliance was achieved on September 15, 1997, when the
                                      fire pump breaker was closed and the fire pump was declared
                                      operable.
                              B.- ! Technical Specification 6.8.1.a Violation
                                        1.-                    Descriotion of the Notice of Violation
                                                                " Hope Creek technical specification 6.8.1.a requires in
                                                                part that written procedures'shall be established and
                                                                implemented for the applicable activities specified in            .
                                                                Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33 Revision 2. RG            ?
                                                                1.33 requires administrative procedures be implemented'
                                                                which prescribe procedure adherence practices. PSE&G
                                                                Nuclear Administrative Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0001 (NAP-
                                                                1) ,- specifies procedure usage requiren ents, including
                                                                Category I (in-hand with verbatim step-by-step
                                                                compliance) and Category II (available at work site and              ,
                                                                completed as applicable)..
                                                                Contrary to the above, two examples of failures by
                                                                maintenance technicians to implement the procedure
                                                                adherence requirements of NAP-1 were identified as
                                                                follows:
                                                                (1)- On September 18,-1997,. technicians deviated from.
                                                                the sequence of steps specified in a Category.I
  ~
                                                                maintenance procedure, HC.MD-ST-PB-0010 (Q) , in order to
                                                                complete a 4160 VAC vital bus relay test.
                                                                ~(2)  On October 4, 1997, technicians completed feed
j                                                                water system flow transmitter calibration checks and
                                                                adjustments without-completing-the applicable sections
                                                                of the governing CategoryfII maintenance procedure,
                                                                HC.IC-DC.ZZ-0030(Q)."
                                                                This is a Severity Level-IV violation (Supplement I).
                                            2.                  Recly to Notice of Violation
                                                                  PSE&G agrees with the violation.
                                            3.                  Reason for the Violation
                                                                  PSE&G has attributed the cause of both of the examples
                                                                  cited in the Technical Specification 6.8.1.a violation
                                                                  to personnel error. During the 4160 VAC vital bus relay
                                                                  test, the relay technicians inappropriately implemented
                                                                  " skill of the craft" to compensate for unexpected
                                                                  conditions encountered during the teeting. This failure
                                                                  to adhere to the Category I procedure requirements,
                                                                                    Page 3 of 5
                                                                                                                                        l
                                                                                                                                        1
                                    . . . . .                          . . . .
                                                                                        .
                                                                                                  . .  .
                                                                                                                      .
                                                                                                                                .    J
 
            .
                ____________ - _ _ - -
  a    .
    ~ *  '
            Attachment 1                                                                LR-N97767
    i
<
                                        which does not permit " skill of the craft" to perform
                                        steps out of sequencu, was the result of a lack of
                                        understanding concerning this aspect of-compliance with
                                        category I p.oceduros.
                                      _During the feed water system flow transmitter
                                        calibration checks and adjustments, the contractor
                                      : technicians did not appropriately sign-off steps-in
                                        applicable sections of the procedure.    The calibration
                                        procedure for the feed water flow transmitter was_used
                                        by the technicians as a guide and not followed step-by-
                                        step as is required.    In this particular case, the
                                        calibration was performed and the procedure initials
                                        completed later. . There were three other transmitter
                                                                        -
                                        calibrations completed at the same time by the same
                                        technicians. When the procedures were filled out, all
                                        four were done the same way; however, one of the
                                        transmitters did require adjustments, which was not
                                        documented properly by the technicians when the
                                      -procedure was completed. The technician's inattention
                                        to detail was the cause of the procedure non-compliance.
                      4.              Corrective Steos That Have Been Taken and Results
                                        Achieved
                          a .- The relay technicians f avolved in the 4160 VAC vital 'aus
                                        relay tests were hald accountable for their actions in      {
                                        acccrdance with PSE&G's disciplinary policy.
                        .b.            The contractor technicians involved in the feed water
                                        system flow transmitter calibration checks and
                                        adjustments were terminated. The contract supervisor of
                                        those technicians was also removed from his. position,
                            c._          Following the 4160 VAC vital bus relay test procedure
                                        non-compliance, a work stand <down was conducted for
                                        Relay Department personnel to review this event and
                                        reinforce procedure compliance requirements.    Following
                                        this stand down, Relay Department personnel have been
                                        identifying cases where " skill,of the craft" use needs
                                        to be incorporated in procedure revisions,
                            d.          The procedure for-the 4160 /AC vital bus relay tests wa.,
                                        enhanced to address the c+ .ition where " skill of the
                                        craft was implemented. Additional procedural guidance
                                        has also been established to address " skill of the
                                        craft" and compliance with written procedures.
                            3.          Following the feed water system flow transmitter
                                          calibration checks and adjustments procedure non-
                                          compliance, a work stand-down was conducted with the
                                          contract group involved with the event to review this
                                          event and reinforce procedure compliance requirements.
                                                            Page 4 of_5
 
    6
  *
    *'
        *
          * Attachment 1
                                                                        LR-N97767
      ,
    ,
                        In addition, a field verification was performed to
                        ensure that the appropriate procedure steps had been
                        actually completed during the ficw transmitter
                        calibration checks and adjustments.
                    f.
                      A review of selected work packages completed by the
                      contract grouo performing the feed water system flow
                      transmitter calibrations was conducted and only one
                      other similar case of an inadequately filled out
                      procedure was identified. However, the cause of this
                        issue was attributed to an ambiguously worded procedure
                      step  andexample.
                      violation  not technician inattention to detail as in the
                                              A field verification was also
                      performed to ensure that the appropriate procedure steps
                      had been actually completed in thic case as well.
                  5.
                      Corrective
                      Violations  Steos That Will Be Taken to Avoid Fu*thgg
                No additional corrective actions are planned.
                6.
                      Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved
                Hope Creek is in full compliance. The two examples of
                procedure non-compliance were determined to ha.ve no adverse
                impact on equipment operability. Corrects"e actions have
                been  implemented to adfress the cause of the procedure non-
                compliance.
!
                                    _          _
                                                                                  1
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  l
                                        Page 5 of S
}}

Revision as of 05:24, 15 December 2020

Ack Receipt of 971212 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-354/97-07 on 971113.C/As Will Be Examined During Future Insp at Hope Creek
ML20199L423
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek 
Issue date: 02/03/1998
From: Linville J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Keiser H
Public Service Enterprise Group
References
50-354-97-07, 50-354-97-7, NUDOCS 9802090197
Download: ML20199L423 (3)


See also: IR 05000354/1997007

Text

. _ _ .--___ _

.

1 4

4

February 3,1998

Mr. Harold W. Keiser

Executive Vice President

_

Nuclear Business Unit

Public Service Electric & Gas Company

PO Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: Inspection Report 50-354/97-07

Dear Mr.- Keiser:

i

This letter refers to your December 12,1997 correspondence (LR N97767),in response to

our November 13,1997 letter regarding the Hope Creek facility.

Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions for the Notice of

Violation, as documented in your letter. The first violation involved two examples of Hope

Creek maintenance technicians failirT tr. !nplement procedural adherence requirements

during maintenance ectivities. The s90ed violation involves a failure to promptly identify

an inoperable electric motor-driven fire pump supply breaker. Your actions will be

- examined during future inspections at Hope Creek.

. Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

-James C. Linville, Chief

Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects ,.

Docket No. 50-354 I

,

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.

.

_

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - -

- - -

.

.

Mr. Harold W. Keiser 2

cc:

L. Stor:, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations

E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering

E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support

M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations

J. McMahon, Director - Quality / Nuclear Training / Emergency Preparedness

D. Powell,- Manager - Licensing / Regulation and Fuels

A. O. Tapert, Program Administrator

cc w/cy of Licensee's Letter:

I A. F. Kirby, Ill, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.

'

J. A. Isabella, Manager, Joint Generation

Atlantic Electric

R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs.

Jeffrey J. Keenan, Esquire

M. J. Wetterhahn, Esquire

Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate

William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township .

State of New Jersey

State of Delaware

I

_ _ _ _ .. i

_ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _

.

.

' Mr. Harold W. Keiser -3

Distribution w/ copy of Licensee's Response Letter:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident inspector

PUBLIC

D. Screnci, PAO

J. Linville, DRP

S. Barber, DRP

C. O'Daniell, DRP -

. B. McCabe, OEDO

J. Stolz, PD1-2, NRR

B. Mozafari, Project Manager, NRR

inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)

R. Correia, NRR

F. Talbot, NRR '

DOCDESK

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ BRANCH 3\REPLYLTR\9707RSP.LTR

Ta receive a copy of this document, Indipate ,n the box: "C" = Cooy without attachment / enclosure "E* = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE' Rl/DRP ///] / / l l

NAME JLinville W/

DATE OM/98// ' 01/ /98 01/ /98 01/ /98 01/ /98

M' OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

_ _

._-. _-.-__---------- - -- - -

.? .

. . .

e

.

Pubhc Service

Electnc and Gas

Company

Louis F. Stort Pubhc Sennee Electne and Gas Company P O. Box 236. Hancocks Bndge, NJ 08038 609-3394 700

% ue e,.w.n . w.., o .-

DEC 121997

LR-N97767 ,

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Contro) Desk

Washington, DC 20555

REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-354/97-07

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57

DOCKET NO. 50-354

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to the provisions of 10CFR2.201, Public Service Electric

and Gas Company (PSE&G) hereby submits a reply to the Notice of

' Violation (NOV) . issued to the Hope Creek Generating Station in a

letter dated November 13, 1997. The violations contained in

Appendix A of the November 13th letter concerned: 1) a failure to

,

promptly identify an inoperable electric motor-driven fire pump,

l as required by 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI; 2) two

j

'

examples of a failure to follow procedures, as required by

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, during maintenance activities;

3) a failure to appropriately perform a 10CFR50.59 safety

evaluation for a design modification; 4) a failure to follow the

requirements of 10CFR50.49 applicable to the environmental

qualification of Struthers-Dunn relays; and 5) a failure to

follow the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III,

Design Control, when extending the service life of the safety-

related Agastat and Telemechanique relays.

As discussed with NRC management on November 18, 1997, the

details of this reply address the first two violutions contained

in the inspection report. The reply to the last three violations

contained in Appendix A of the inspection report will be provided

by January 12, 1998.

Should you have any questions or comments on this transmittal, i-

not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

,,

'

Attachment (1)

@ Pnotedon

necyew Pap.,

8 % % 20 Off .- . . _ _ _ .

i.: .

. -1 . ' .-

,.

Document Control Desk -2-

LR-N97767

..

C Mr. :- T. Martin, Administrator - Region I

U. S.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission

475'Allendale Road-

King of. Prussia,:PA '19406

Ms. B. Mozafari, Licensing Project Manager - HC

_

.U.;S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission

One White Flint North

111555 Rockville Pike

Mail Stop 14E21

Rockville, MD 20852

-Mr. S.-Morris (X24)-

USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - HC

Mr. K.:Tosch, Manager IV

Bureau of Nuclear Engineering

-P.10. Boa 415

. Trenton,-NJ

-

08625

..

-

..

@

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. .

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..

.

.

Attachment 1 LR-N97767

RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

INSPECTION REPORT No. 50-354/97-07

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-354

-I. REPLY TO THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION

A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI Violation

1. Description of the Notice of Violation

"10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires in part

that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures,

malfunctions and deficiencies, be promptly identified

and corrected.

Contrary to the above, on September 14, 1997, the

electric motor-driven fire pump supply breaker opened

during an electrical bus swap which rendered the pump

inoperable, a condition adverse to quality. Despite

several opportunities to detect this condition earlier,

l the inoperable fire pump was not identified and

corrected until September 15, 1997, approximately 34

hours after electrical supply breaker opened."

This is a Severity Level IV violation-(Supplement I) .

2. Recly to Notice of Violation

I

.PSE&G_ agrees with the violation.

3. Reason for the Violation

PSE&G has attributed the cause of the 10 CFR S0,

Appendix B, Criterion XVI, violation to personnel error.

During the electrical bus swap,-operators failed to

follow a procedure precaution, which required unloading

of equipment from the bus prior to transferring infeed

pswer. During=the bis transfer,-the fire pump breaker

-

was racked in (which energized a downstream control

panel) ; however, the pump itself was de-energized. When

the electrical bus was de-energized, the undervoltage

condition caused the fire pump breaker to trip,

rendering the fire pump inoperable. The operators had

incorrectly concluded that the fire pump breaker would

not trip with the pump in the de-energized condition.

Prior to the bus transfer, fire protection personnel

were notified by the operators of a temporary

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interruption of power to the motor driven fire pump.

When the bus-was de-energized, several alarms

annunciated. The alarm for the inoperable fire pump was

received and acknowledged, but the operators failed to

recognize that the fire pump breaker had tripped during

the bus de-energization. Because of the assumption that

thesfire pump breaker would not trip during the bus de-

energization, no follow-up was performed by either

operations or fire _ protection personnel upcn power

restoration toenergized.

appropriately the bus to ensure that the fire pump was

Subsequently, one operations'round and two fire

protection rounds were conducted through the fire pump

house while the fire pump was. inoperable. During these

rounds, the operations and fire protection personnel

failed to notice that an indication light was

extinguished on the fire pump panel, which would have.

alerted them that the fire pump was inoperable.

Inattention to detail.on the-part of these individuals

perpetuated the knoperable condition of the fire pump

for the approxit ately 34 hcur period.

4.

Corrective

Achieved Steos That Have Been Taken and Results

a.

Breaker 52-590-43 was reset.and the electric motor-drive

fire pump was retested satisfactorily on September 15,

1997.

b. Fire protection and operations personnel involved with '

-the failure _to recognize the inoperability of the fire

pump have been held accountable for their actions in

accordance with PSE&G's disciplinary policy.

c.

The_ lessons learned _from this event have been discussed

with Operations and Fire Protection Department

personnel.

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5.

Corrective

Violations Steos That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further

a. The-Training Department will evaluate this event to

determine if additional training is required on breaker

design and performance. The evalurtion on the need for

training

1998, modifications will be completed by January 15,

b. Procedure revisions will be made to provide additional

guidance on breaker operation and bus power supply

transfers. These revisions will be completed by

February 18, 1998.

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Attachment ' l - LR-N97767

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26. Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved

-Full' compliance was achieved on September 15, 1997, when the

fire pump breaker was closed and the fire pump was declared

operable.

B.- ! Technical Specification 6.8.1.a Violation

1.- Descriotion of the Notice of Violation

" Hope Creek technical specification 6.8.1.a requires in

part that written procedures'shall be established and

implemented for the applicable activities specified in .

Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33 Revision 2. RG  ?

1.33 requires administrative procedures be implemented'

which prescribe procedure adherence practices. PSE&G

Nuclear Administrative Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0001 (NAP-

1) ,- specifies procedure usage requiren ents, including

Category I (in-hand with verbatim step-by-step

compliance) and Category II (available at work site and ,

completed as applicable)..

Contrary to the above, two examples of failures by

maintenance technicians to implement the procedure

adherence requirements of NAP-1 were identified as

follows:

(1)- On September 18,-1997,. technicians deviated from.

the sequence of steps specified in a Category.I

~

maintenance procedure, HC.MD-ST-PB-0010 (Q) , in order to

complete a 4160 VAC vital bus relay test.

~(2) On October 4, 1997, technicians completed feed

j water system flow transmitter calibration checks and

adjustments without-completing-the applicable sections

of the governing CategoryfII maintenance procedure,

HC.IC-DC.ZZ-0030(Q)."

This is a Severity Level-IV violation (Supplement I).

2. Recly to Notice of Violation

PSE&G agrees with the violation.

3. Reason for the Violation

PSE&G has attributed the cause of both of the examples

cited in the Technical Specification 6.8.1.a violation

to personnel error. During the 4160 VAC vital bus relay

test, the relay technicians inappropriately implemented

" skill of the craft" to compensate for unexpected

conditions encountered during the teeting. This failure

to adhere to the Category I procedure requirements,

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Attachment 1 LR-N97767

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which does not permit " skill of the craft" to perform

steps out of sequencu, was the result of a lack of

understanding concerning this aspect of-compliance with

category I p.oceduros.

_During the feed water system flow transmitter

calibration checks and adjustments, the contractor

technicians did not appropriately sign-off steps-in

applicable sections of the procedure. The calibration

procedure for the feed water flow transmitter was_used

by the technicians as a guide and not followed step-by-

step as is required. In this particular case, the

calibration was performed and the procedure initials

completed later. . There were three other transmitter

-

calibrations completed at the same time by the same

technicians. When the procedures were filled out, all

four were done the same way; however, one of the

transmitters did require adjustments, which was not

documented properly by the technicians when the

-procedure was completed. The technician's inattention

to detail was the cause of the procedure non-compliance.

4. Corrective Steos That Have Been Taken and Results

Achieved

a .- The relay technicians f avolved in the 4160 VAC vital 'aus

relay tests were hald accountable for their actions in {

acccrdance with PSE&G's disciplinary policy.

.b. The contractor technicians involved in the feed water

system flow transmitter calibration checks and

adjustments were terminated. The contract supervisor of

those technicians was also removed from his. position,

c._ Following the 4160 VAC vital bus relay test procedure

non-compliance, a work stand <down was conducted for

Relay Department personnel to review this event and

reinforce procedure compliance requirements. Following

this stand down, Relay Department personnel have been

identifying cases where " skill,of the craft" use needs

to be incorporated in procedure revisions,

d. The procedure for-the 4160 /AC vital bus relay tests wa.,

enhanced to address the c+ .ition where " skill of the

craft was implemented. Additional procedural guidance

has also been established to address " skill of the

craft" and compliance with written procedures.

3. Following the feed water system flow transmitter

calibration checks and adjustments procedure non-

compliance, a work stand-down was conducted with the

contract group involved with the event to review this

event and reinforce procedure compliance requirements.

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In addition, a field verification was performed to

ensure that the appropriate procedure steps had been

actually completed during the ficw transmitter

calibration checks and adjustments.

f.

A review of selected work packages completed by the

contract grouo performing the feed water system flow

transmitter calibrations was conducted and only one

other similar case of an inadequately filled out

procedure was identified. However, the cause of this

issue was attributed to an ambiguously worded procedure

step andexample.

violation not technician inattention to detail as in the

A field verification was also

performed to ensure that the appropriate procedure steps

had been actually completed in thic case as well.

5.

Corrective

Violations Steos That Will Be Taken to Avoid Fu*thgg

No additional corrective actions are planned.

6.

Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved

Hope Creek is in full compliance. The two examples of

procedure non-compliance were determined to ha.ve no adverse

impact on equipment operability. Corrects"e actions have

been implemented to adfress the cause of the procedure non-

compliance.

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