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Public Service Electnc and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000 April 2, 1976 Dr. Dona?d F. Knuth, Director                                                                                                         f U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 7920 Norfolk Avenue                                                                                                                   l Bethesda, Maryland 20014                                                                                                               l
Public Service Electnc and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000 April 2, 1976 Dr. Dona?d F.
Knuth, Director f
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20014


==Dear Dr. Knuth:==
==Dear Dr. Knuth:==
 
PRESSURIZER SNUBBER MALFUNCTION PRESSURIZER SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE PIPING NO. 1 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-272 On March 4, 1976 a verbal report was made to Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, advising that. snubbers installed on the Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valve Piping of No. 1 Unit had malfunctioned.
PRESSURIZER SNUBBER MALFUNCTION PRESSURIZER SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE PIPING NO. 1 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-272 On March 4, 1976 a verbal report was made to Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, advising that. snubbers installed on the Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valve Piping of No. 1 Unit had malfunctioned. This report was in accordance with provision of 10CFR50.55(e).
This report was in accordance with provision of 10CFR50.55(e).
The following is a detailed analysis and report on the subject:
The following is a detailed analysis and report on the subject:
During Hot Functional Test SUP 50.0 Hanger Movement Verifica-tion Group reported that snubber units were restricting pipe movement.           Ensuing investigations resulted in the removal of twelve units (approximately 28% of the total installed). These units were manufactured by International NuclearSafeguards Corporation (I.N.C.).
During Hot Functional Test SUP 50.0 Hanger Movement Verifica-tion Group reported that snubber units were restricting pipe movement.
Of the 12 units removed from the piping system, 9 were found to be locked up and inoperable during the hot function test and 1 in a similar condition during cool down.                             The remaining 2 units which were operable during the test were removed for evaluation purposes.           The I.N.C. units removed. consisted of 2 size No. 1, 8 size No. 2 and 2 size No. 3.
Ensuing investigations resulted in the removal of twelve units (approximately 28% of the total installed).
Initial investigation revealed that shipping and installation locking screws, which had not been removed fron 4 units, sheared off during operation. These 4 units are identified as:                                                       Size No._1, S/N 271; Size No. 2, S/N 47 and 118; and Size No. 3, S/N'OO2281.
These units were manufactured by International NuclearSafeguards Corporation (I.N.C.).
The 12 I.N.C. units were returned to the manufacturer for load testing, disassembly and evaluation.                           The factory tests, witnessed by a PSE&G QA Engineer revealed the following: Three Size No. 2 Jnits (S/N 92, llo and 111) were completely jammed and disassembly 8311220567 760409 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S                           PDR The Energy People gd3Y
Of the 12 units removed from the piping system, 9 were found to be locked up and inoperable during the hot function test and 1 in a similar condition during cool down.
                        ,                                                                                                    95-2001 (400M) 5-73
The remaining 2 units which were operable during the test were removed for evaluation purposes.
_ _ _ _ _ , _ .                                . ~.                         .  . - - - . - - ~ . - - - + - -
The I.N.C. units removed. consisted of 2 size No.
1, 8 size No. 2 and 2 size No. 3.
Initial investigation revealed that shipping and installation locking screws, which had not been removed fron 4 units, sheared off during operation.
These 4 units are identified as:
Size No._1, S/N 271; Size No.
2, S/N 47 and 118; and Size No. 3, S/N'OO2281.
The 12 I.N.C. units were returned to the manufacturer for load testing, disassembly and evaluation.
The factory tests, witnessed by a PSE&G QA Engineer revealed the following:
Three Size No. 2 Jnits (S/N 92, llo and 111) were completely jammed and disassembly 8311220567 760409 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S
PDR The Energy People gd3Y 95-2001 (400M) 5-73
. ~.
. - - -. - - ~. - - - + - -
W
W


'  ~                                                               '
~
      .                O                                     O Dr. D. F. Knuth                                                                                           4/2/76 disclosed internal components were heavily corroded. PSE&G Energy Laboratory is now analyzing samples to determine the nature and cause of the corrosion. Five units (Size No. 1, S/N 271 and 273; Size No. 2, S/N 75 and 118; and Size No. 3, S/N 002281) operated within prescribed load limits and were not disassembled. The remaining 4 units (Size No. 2, S/N 73, 74 and 78; and Size No. 3, S/N 002281) were operable, but exceeded specified load limits. Disassembly of these 4 units did not reveal evidence of any corrosion.
O O
Dr.
D. F.
Knuth 4/2/76 disclosed internal components were heavily corroded.
PSE&G Energy Laboratory is now analyzing samples to determine the nature and cause of the corrosion.
Five units (Size No.
1, S/N 271 and 273; Size No.
2, S/N 75 and 118; and Size No. 3, S/N 002281) operated within prescribed load limits and were not disassembled.
The remaining 4 units (Size No.
2, S/N 73, 74 and 78; and Size No. 3, S/N 002281) were operable, but exceeded specified load limits.
Disassembly of these 4 units did not reveal evidence of any corrosion.
Additional system testing of installed units will be conducted at the site under the direction of the manufacturer and will be evaluated by Engineering Department and witnessed by Site Quality Control personnel.
Additional system testing of installed units will be conducted at the site under the direction of the manufacturer and will be evaluated by Engineering Department and witnessed by Site Quality Control personnel.
Preliminary investigation results disclosed that the heavy corrosion of the internal components caused 3 units to jam..
Preliminary investigation results disclosed that the heavy corrosion of the internal components caused 3 units to jam..
Failure to remove the lock and installation screws on 4 units caused misoperation and overloading. Still under investigation is snubber installation alignments which may have affected snubber operability. Inte rnational NuclearSafeguards Corporation has been requested to revise their snubber installation procedure to include more definitive and-precautionary instructions. The vendor has committed to comply by April 15, 1976. Site Quality Control will verify implementation during the reinstallations.
Failure to remove the lock and installation screws on 4 units caused misoperation and overloading.
Still under investigation is snubber installation alignments which may have affected snubber operability.
Inte rnational NuclearSafeguards Corporation has been requested to revise their snubber installation procedure to include more definitive and-precautionary instructions.
The vendor has committed to comply by April 15, 1976.
Site Quality Control will verify implementation during the reinstallations.
PSE&G Engineering Department is currently conducting a study and evaluation on the continued use of these snubbers for the subject application.
PSE&G Engineering Department is currently conducting a study and evaluation on the continued use of these snubbers for the subject application.
Theby will be completed    action April to 23,be1976.
The action to be taken as a result of those studies will be completed by April 23, 1976.
taken as a result of those studies If you desire additional information on this subject, we will be pleased to discuss it with you.
If you desire additional information on this subject, we will be pleased to discuss it with you.
Very truly yours, l         m2 E.   . Schwalde Manager of Quality Assurance Engineering & Construction Department CC   Mr. .J.P. O'Reilly King of Prussia, Pa.
Very truly yours, l
m2 E.
Schwalde Manager of Quality Assurance Engineering & Construction Department CC Mr..J.P.
O'Reilly King of Prussia, Pa.
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Latest revision as of 02:41, 14 December 2024

Interim Deficiency Rept Re Pressurizer Snubber Malfunction of Pressurizer Safety & Relief Valve Piping.Initially Reported on 760304.Caused by Failure to Remove Installation Screws & Heavy Corrosion
ML20086C105
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 04/02/1976
From: Schwalje E
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Knuth D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20086C104 List:
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8311220567
Download: ML20086C105 (2)
v • d • e


Text

-

gFILE COPY m

3 :

G o

Public Service Electnc and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000 April 2, 1976 Dr. Dona?d F.

Knuth, Director f

U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Dear Dr. Knuth:

PRESSURIZER SNUBBER MALFUNCTION PRESSURIZER SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE PIPING NO. 1 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-272 On March 4, 1976 a verbal report was made to Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, advising that. snubbers installed on the Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valve Piping of No. 1 Unit had malfunctioned.

This report was in accordance with provision of 10CFR50.55(e).

The following is a detailed analysis and report on the subject:

During Hot Functional Test SUP 50.0 Hanger Movement Verifica-tion Group reported that snubber units were restricting pipe movement.

Ensuing investigations resulted in the removal of twelve units (approximately 28% of the total installed).

These units were manufactured by International NuclearSafeguards Corporation (I.N.C.).

Of the 12 units removed from the piping system, 9 were found to be locked up and inoperable during the hot function test and 1 in a similar condition during cool down.

The remaining 2 units which were operable during the test were removed for evaluation purposes.

The I.N.C. units removed. consisted of 2 size No.

1, 8 size No. 2 and 2 size No. 3.

Initial investigation revealed that shipping and installation locking screws, which had not been removed fron 4 units, sheared off during operation.

These 4 units are identified as:

Size No._1, S/N 271; Size No.

2, S/N 47 and 118; and Size No. 3, S/N'OO2281.

The 12 I.N.C. units were returned to the manufacturer for load testing, disassembly and evaluation.

The factory tests, witnessed by a PSE&G QA Engineer revealed the following:

Three Size No. 2 Jnits (S/N 92, llo and 111) were completely jammed and disassembly 8311220567 760409 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR The Energy People gd3Y 95-2001 (400M) 5-73

. ~.

. - - -. - - ~. - - - + - -

W

~

O O

Dr.

D. F.

Knuth 4/2/76 disclosed internal components were heavily corroded.

PSE&G Energy Laboratory is now analyzing samples to determine the nature and cause of the corrosion.

Five units (Size No.

1, S/N 271 and 273; Size No.

2, S/N 75 and 118; and Size No. 3, S/N 002281) operated within prescribed load limits and were not disassembled.

The remaining 4 units (Size No.

2, S/N 73, 74 and 78; and Size No. 3, S/N 002281) were operable, but exceeded specified load limits.

Disassembly of these 4 units did not reveal evidence of any corrosion.

Additional system testing of installed units will be conducted at the site under the direction of the manufacturer and will be evaluated by Engineering Department and witnessed by Site Quality Control personnel.

Preliminary investigation results disclosed that the heavy corrosion of the internal components caused 3 units to jam..

Failure to remove the lock and installation screws on 4 units caused misoperation and overloading.

Still under investigation is snubber installation alignments which may have affected snubber operability.

Inte rnational NuclearSafeguards Corporation has been requested to revise their snubber installation procedure to include more definitive and-precautionary instructions.

The vendor has committed to comply by April 15, 1976.

Site Quality Control will verify implementation during the reinstallations.

PSE&G Engineering Department is currently conducting a study and evaluation on the continued use of these snubbers for the subject application.

The action to be taken as a result of those studies will be completed by April 23, 1976.

If you desire additional information on this subject, we will be pleased to discuss it with you.

Very truly yours, l

m2 E.

Schwalde Manager of Quality Assurance Engineering & Construction Department CC Mr..J.P.

O'Reilly King of Prussia, Pa.

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