ML19318A850

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-259/80-13,50-260/80-11 & 50-296/80-12.Corrective Actions:Personnel Instructed to Keep Shift Engineer Informed of Work Status & Sys Status Procedure Revised

ML19318A850
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/20/1980
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19318A846	List: IR 05000259/1980013 ML19318A845 ML19318A850 ML19318A852 ML19318A853
References
NUDOCS 8006240258
Download: ML19318A850 (3)

Text

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TENNECSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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t CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE 374o1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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May 20, 1980 t

Mr. James P. 'O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement A"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street f

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Enclosed is our response to R. C. Lewis' April 23, 1980, letter, RII:RFS 50-259/80-13, 50-260/80-11, and 50-296/80-12, concerning activities at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant which appeared to be in noncomplidnce with NRC requirements.

We have reviewed the above inspection report and find no proprietary information in it.

If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 854-2014.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure i

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ENCLOSURE g

RESPONSE TO R. C. LEWIS' LETTER DATED APRIL-23, 1980,

REFERENCE:

RII:1)FS 50-259/80-13, 50-260/80-11, 50-296/80-12

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INFRACTION As required by Technical Specification 3.5.F.2, the Reactor Core

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Isolation Coolant System (RCICS) may be inoperable for a period

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. not to exceed 7 days if 'the High Pressure Coo.' ant Injection System I,3 (HPCIS) is operable during such time period. In addition, Browns Ferry Standard Practice 12.2 requires the shif t engineer, assistant

.shif t engineer, and unit operator to keep journais and these journais shall contain significant equipment malfunctions.

Contrary to the above, on December 8,1979, RCICS was inoperable for approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for replacement and calibration 'of the Electro Governor-Mechanical (EGM) box and HPCIS was not determined to be operable.

In addition, neither the unit operator, assistant shif t cu;;ineer, nor the shif t engineer documented in their journals that RCICS was inoperable for replacement and calibr,ation of the ECM box.

RESPONSE

' Corrective Steos Taken and Results Achieved At the time of the occurrence, unit 3 was in the initial startup testing phase of operation following refueling outage.

.Before startup, the RCICS and HPCIS were proven operable on auxiliary boiler steam by-appropriate MOV and flow test surveillance instructions. The refueling test instructions' require MOV and flow test on HPCIS and RCICS with rated reactor conditions. The RCICS MOV and flow test data was acceptable for the test condition, however, the flow controller was erratic which resulted in oscil-

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lation of discharge flow. The shift engineer, assistant shift engineer and 4

unit operator were aware of the flow controller problem, but did not consider the RCICS inoperable. Plant engineering and maintenance personnel were summoned to correct the probleu. However, poor communications between operations and. maintenance personnel resulted in an understanding by the shift engineer, 4;-

assistant shif t engineer, and unit operator that only minor adjustments were

-required and, therefore, they did not declare the RCICS to be inoperable. The-HPCIS operability surveillance instruction was not performed and the event was

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not logged in' journals because.of the communication error and misunderstanding.

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.l2 Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved (Continued) e Personnel involved in the error have been reminded of the consequences of poor communications and instructed to keep the shift engineer informed of status as work progresses. ~ Planti procedures have been revised to require more detailed

. documentation and monitoring of systes s tatus.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Noncomo11ance Operations personnel will review this incident in supplemental training.

?!aintenance and engineering personnel have discussed the incident and were made aware of related problems.

Date Full Comoliance Achieved Supplemental training sessions will be completed by June 17, 1980.

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