05000387/FIN-2010003-01: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = A self-revealing, Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," occurred when PPL failed to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the 1 D intermediate range monitor (IRM) prior to a second reactor startup resulting in its failure and the aggregate of two IRMs inoperable in the same trip system. PPL inserted all control rods, placed the unit in Mode 3 to conduct IRM repairs, and entered the issue in PPL's corrective action program (CAP). The finding was more than minor since it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected its objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the reliability and capability of the IRM system was impacted by the 1 D failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of a system/train safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external events. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, in that PPL did not use conservative assumptions in decision making [H.1(b)]. Specifically, PPL did not consider other failure mechanisms as possible causes for the 1 D IRM's degraded condition and adopted a troubleshooting approach of proving an expectation vice disproving all other possible causes. | | description = A self-revealing, Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, \"Corrective Action,\" occurred when PPL failed to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the 1 D intermediate range monitor (IRM) prior to a second reactor startup resulting in its failure and the aggregate of two IRMs inoperable in the same trip system. PPL inserted all control rods, placed the unit in Mode 3 to conduct IRM repairs, and entered the issue in PPL\'s corrective action program (CAP). The finding was more than minor since it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected its objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the reliability and capability of the IRM system was impacted by the 1 D failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, \"Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,\" the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of a system/train safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external events. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, in that PPL did not use conservative assumptions in decision making [H.1(b)]. Specifically, PPL did not consider other failure mechanisms as possible causes for the 1 D IRM\'s degraded condition and adopted a troubleshooting approach of proving an expectation vice disproving all other possible causes. | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2010003 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook E Huang E Torres J Bream J Furia J Greives P Finney P Krohn |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |