RBG-47144, Cycle 17 Startup Report: Difference between revisions

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* Ensuring it is latched to its control rod drive Criteria Testing of each control rod is performed in accordance with technical specification to ensure proper operability.
* Ensuring it is latched to its control rod drive Criteria Testing of each control rod is performed in accordance with technical specification to ensure proper operability.
This testing includes coupling verification, and scram time testing.Results All control rods were scram timed tested and coupling verified as discussed below.Fifteen (15) Control Rod Drive Mechanisms and eleven (11) Control Rod Blades were replaced during the outage. Seven (7) hydraulic control units had maintenance completed.
This testing includes coupling verification, and scram time testing.Results All control rods were scram timed tested and coupling verified as discussed below.Fifteen (15) Control Rod Drive Mechanisms and eleven (11) Control Rod Blades were replaced during the outage. Seven (7) hydraulic control units had maintenance completed.
All maintenance related rods with the exception of 20-45 and 16-53 were scram time tested prior to startup during the vessel pressure test in accordance with TechnicalSpecification Surveillance Requirements 3.1.4.3 and 3.1.4.4 with satisfactory results. Control rod 20-45 remained inoperable  
All maintenance related rods with the exception of 20-45 and 16-53 were scram time tested prior to startup during the vessel pressure test in accordance with TechnicalSpecification Surveillance Requirements 3.1.4.3 and 3.1.4.4 with satisfactory results. Control rod 20-45 remained inoperable
(@ position 00) and reactor power below 40% CTP until tested. Control rod 16-53 was tested at zero pressure to restore operability for the approach to critical.The remaining control rods were scram time tested during the vessel pressure test in accordance with RBS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.4.4 (fuel movement) with the exception of 12-45 and 04-37.Control rods 20-45, 16-53, 12-45 and 04-37 were tested and satisfactorily met the acceptance criteria prior to exceeding 40 percent rated core thermal power.
(@ position 00) and reactor power below 40% CTP until tested. Control rod 16-53 was tested at zero pressure to restore operability for the approach to critical.The remaining control rods were scram time tested during the vessel pressure test in accordance with RBS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.4.4 (fuel movement) with the exception of 12-45 and 04-37.Control rods 20-45, 16-53, 12-45 and 04-37 were tested and satisfactorily met the acceptance criteria prior to exceeding 40 percent rated core thermal power.
Attachment to RBG-Page 3 of 4 A control rod coupling check was performed in accordance with RBS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.3.5 each time a control rod was fully withdrawn.
Attachment to RBG-Page 3 of 4 A control rod coupling check was performed in accordance with RBS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.3.5 each time a control rod was fully withdrawn.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERMINATION  
SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERMINATION  
/ REACTIVITY ANOMALY CHECK Purpose To ensure that: The reactor can be made sub-critical from all operating conditions The reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits The reactor will be maintained sufficiently sub-critical to preclude inadvertent critically in the shutdown condition Criteria The in-sequence rod withdrawal shutdown margin calculation begins by withdrawing control rods in their standard sequence until criticality is achieved.
/ REACTIVITY ANOMALY CHECK Purpose To ensure that: The reactor can be made sub-critical from all operating conditions The reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits The reactor will be maintained sufficiently sub-critical to preclude inadvertent critically in the shutdown condition Criteria The in-sequence rod withdrawal shutdown margin calculation begins by withdrawing control rods in their standard sequence until criticality is achieved.
The shutdown margin of the core is determined from calculations based on the critical rod pattern, the reactor period and the moderator temperature to satisfy SR 3.1.1 .1 .a.Reactivity Anomaly verification is performed in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.2.1 after reaching equilibrium xenon concentrations at 100%reactor power.Results The in-sequence critical shutdown margin surveillance procedure was completed on February 11, 2011. The shutdown margin (SDM) at the beginning-of-cycle (BOC) was calculated to be 0.778 % delta k/k which is bounded by RBS Technical Specification  
The shutdown margin of the core is determined from calculations based on the critical rod pattern, the reactor period and the moderator temperature to satisfy SR 3.1.1 .1 .a.Reactivity Anomaly verification is performed in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.2.1 after reaching equilibrium xenon concentrations at 100%reactor power.Results The in-sequence critical shutdown margin surveillance procedure was completed on February 11, 2011. The shutdown margin (SDM) at the beginning-of-cycle (BOC) was calculated to be 0.778 % delta k/k which is bounded by RBS Technical Specification 3.1.1 requirement of 0.38% delta k/k. Final steady state full power operation was achieved on February 23, 2011.It was verified on February 23, 2011, that no reactivity anomaly was present by performance of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.2.1.
 
====3.1.1 requirement====
 
of 0.38% delta k/k. Final steady state full power operation was achieved on February 23, 2011.It was verified on February 23, 2011, that no reactivity anomaly was present by performance of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.2.1.
Attachment to RBG-Page 4 of 4 TIP SYMMETRY CHECK Purpose To determine the reproducibility of the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system readings Criteria This procedure applies to BWR plants operating with Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF)reduced uncertainties safety limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) methodology and using 3D MONICORE version 6.58 and higher. This MCPR methodology requires that a TIP symmetry check be conducted each cycle to confirm its assumptions.
Attachment to RBG-Page 4 of 4 TIP SYMMETRY CHECK Purpose To determine the reproducibility of the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system readings Criteria This procedure applies to BWR plants operating with Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF)reduced uncertainties safety limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) methodology and using 3D MONICORE version 6.58 and higher. This MCPR methodology requires that a TIP symmetry check be conducted each cycle to confirm its assumptions.
Results The TIP symmetry calculation was performed on April 4, 2011, using 3D Monicore at 100%core thermal power.The determined TIP uncertainty is 5.59% which is bounded by the acceptance criteria of 6%.}}
Results The TIP symmetry calculation was performed on April 4, 2011, using 3D Monicore at 100%core thermal power.The determined TIP uncertainty is 5.59% which is bounded by the acceptance criteria of 6%.}}

Revision as of 13:57, 30 April 2019

Cycle 17 Startup Report
ML11137A081
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/2011
From: Lorfing D N
Entergy Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RBG-47144
Download: ML11137A081 (8)


Text

En te. rgy River Bend Station 5485 U.S. Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775 Tel 225-381-4157 David N. Lorfing Manager, Licensing RBG-47144 May 11, 2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Cycle 17 Startup Report River Bend Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 License No. NPF-47

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with River Bend Station (RBS) Technical Requirements'Manual TR 5.6.8, enclosed is a Startup Report that provides a summary of the startup physics testing conducted on the Cycle 17 core reload.If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact David Lorfing, Manager, Licensing at (225) 381-4157.Sincerely, DNL/bmb Attachment RBG-47144 Page 2 of 2 cc: Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4125 NRC Senior Resident Inspector P. 0. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Alan B. Wang MS 0-7 D1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mr. Jeffrey P. Meyers Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Office of Environmental Compliance Attn. OEC -ERSD P. O. Box 4312 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312 RBS- 47144 Page 1 of 1 RBG-47144 RBF1-11-0077 File codes; G9.5, G9.25.1.4 ATTACHMENT TO RBG-47144 Cycle 17 Startup Physics Test Summary Attachment to RBG-47144 Page 1 of 4 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.RIVER BEND STATION Cycle 17 Startup Physics Test Summary OVERVIEW River Bend Station (RBS) resumed commercial operation in Cycle 17 on February 12, 2011 following a Refueling/Maintenance Outage. The Cycle 17 reload consisted of replacing 240 Atrium 10 AREVA fuel assemblies with 240 Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) GNF2 fuel assemblies.

No other revision to the design or operation of the station were conducted which would affect the scope of this report.The following startup tests were performed during Refueling Outage RF16 or while' attaining full power after RF16, and are summarized in this report: 1) Core Loading Verification

2) Control Rod Scram Time Testing 3) Shutdown Margin Determination
4) TIP Symmetry In addition to the above startup physics tests, the startup test program included:

Core Monitoring System Verification, and other surveillance testing required by RBS Technical Specifications.

The additional test results are available at the site on request.CORE LOADING VERIFICATION Purpose Ensure each reactor fuel assembly is:* In its correct core location* Oriented properly* Seated properly in its support piece Attachment to RBG-Page 2 of 4 Criteria The reactor core is visually checked to verify conformance to the vendor supplied core loading pattern. Fuel assembly serial numbers, orientations, and core locations are-recorded.

A height check is performed to verify all assemblies are properly seated.Results The as-loaded core was verified for proper fuel assembly serial numbers, locations, orientation and seating in accordance with the RBS Cycle 17 core loading pattern. There were no location or orientation deviations from the Cycle 17 core loading pattern.The core verification procedure was successfully completed on February 5, 2011.CONTROL ROD FUNCTIONAL TESTING Purpose Verify functionality of each control rod by:* Performing normal withdrawals and insertions

  • Ensuring it is latched to its control rod drive Criteria Testing of each control rod is performed in accordance with technical specification to ensure proper operability.

This testing includes coupling verification, and scram time testing.Results All control rods were scram timed tested and coupling verified as discussed below.Fifteen (15) Control Rod Drive Mechanisms and eleven (11) Control Rod Blades were replaced during the outage. Seven (7) hydraulic control units had maintenance completed.

All maintenance related rods with the exception of 20-45 and 16-53 were scram time tested prior to startup during the vessel pressure test in accordance with TechnicalSpecification Surveillance Requirements 3.1.4.3 and 3.1.4.4 with satisfactory results. Control rod 20-45 remained inoperable

(@ position 00) and reactor power below 40% CTP until tested. Control rod 16-53 was tested at zero pressure to restore operability for the approach to critical.The remaining control rods were scram time tested during the vessel pressure test in accordance with RBS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.4.4 (fuel movement) with the exception of 12-45 and 04-37.Control rods 20-45, 16-53, 12-45 and 04-37 were tested and satisfactorily met the acceptance criteria prior to exceeding 40 percent rated core thermal power.

Attachment to RBG-Page 3 of 4 A control rod coupling check was performed in accordance with RBS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.3.5 each time a control rod was fully withdrawn.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERMINATION

/ REACTIVITY ANOMALY CHECK Purpose To ensure that: The reactor can be made sub-critical from all operating conditions The reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits The reactor will be maintained sufficiently sub-critical to preclude inadvertent critically in the shutdown condition Criteria The in-sequence rod withdrawal shutdown margin calculation begins by withdrawing control rods in their standard sequence until criticality is achieved.

The shutdown margin of the core is determined from calculations based on the critical rod pattern, the reactor period and the moderator temperature to satisfy SR 3.1.1 .1 .a.Reactivity Anomaly verification is performed in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.2.1 after reaching equilibrium xenon concentrations at 100%reactor power.Results The in-sequence critical shutdown margin surveillance procedure was completed on February 11, 2011. The shutdown margin (SDM) at the beginning-of-cycle (BOC) was calculated to be 0.778 % delta k/k which is bounded by RBS Technical Specification 3.1.1 requirement of 0.38% delta k/k. Final steady state full power operation was achieved on February 23, 2011.It was verified on February 23, 2011, that no reactivity anomaly was present by performance of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.2.1.

Attachment to RBG-Page 4 of 4 TIP SYMMETRY CHECK Purpose To determine the reproducibility of the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system readings Criteria This procedure applies to BWR plants operating with Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF)reduced uncertainties safety limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) methodology and using 3D MONICORE version 6.58 and higher. This MCPR methodology requires that a TIP symmetry check be conducted each cycle to confirm its assumptions.

Results The TIP symmetry calculation was performed on April 4, 2011, using 3D Monicore at 100%core thermal power.The determined TIP uncertainty is 5.59% which is bounded by the acceptance criteria of 6%.