ML18092B519

Responds to NRC 870312 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-272/87-03 & 50-311/87-04.Corrective Actions:Detailed Review of Containment Integrity Surveillances Immediately Performed & Discrepancies Corrected

ML18092B519
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/14/1987
From:	Corbin McNeil Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NLR-N87063, NUDOCS 8704210273
Download: ML18092B519 (4)

See also: IR 05000272/1987003

Text

• Public Service Electric and Gas Company Corbin A. McNeill, Jr. Vice President

-Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 339-4800 Nuclear April 14, 1987 NLR-N87063

United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 50-272/87-03

AND 50-311/87-04

SALEM GENERATING

STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company {PSE&G) is in receipt of your letter dated March 12, 1987, which transmitted

a Notice of Violation

regarding

failure to verify closure of five primary containment-boundary

valves as required by Technical cation Surveillance

Requirement

4.6.1.la.

Pursuant to the provisions

of 10 CFR 2.201, the PSE&G response to the subject Notice of Violation

is provided in Attachment

1. Attachments

C Mr. D. C. Fischer Licensing

Project Manager Mr. T. J. Kenny Senior Resident Inspector

Sincerely, Director, Bureau of Radiation

Protection

Department

of Environmental

Protection

380 Scotch Road Trenton, NJ 08628 8704210273

870414 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G PDR *\'

-[' _____ _ ATTACHMENT

1 10 CFR 2. 201 INFORMATION

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM GENERATING

STATION RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

The NRC letter dated March 12, 1987 identified

a violation

of Salem Generating

Station CSGS> Technical

Specification

Surveillance

Requirement

4. 6. 1. 1a which is required to ensure primary containment

integrity

is maintained.

During NRC Inspection

50-272/87-03

and 50-311/87-04, the NRC Inspector

reviewed SGS Containment

Integrity

Surveillance

Procedures

CSPC0>4.6.1.1A1-I

and -II> against Unit "as-built" drawings for selected systems penetrating

containment

and identified

five CS> valves which should have been included in the surveillance

but were omitted. These five valves are all located in the piping associated

with the discharge

from various relief valves in the Auxiliary

Building which subsequently

form a common header that penetrates

containment

and discharges

to the Pressurizer

Relief Tank C PRT>. The piping associated

with these valves is only required to have a single check valve inside containment

for isolation.

This single check valve is PR-25, which was itself not included in the SGS Inservice

Testing CIST> Program until a recent program review in July of 1986 Cthe revised IST Program was submitted

to Steven A. Varga, NRC from C.A. McNeill, Jr. on September

24, 1986). During the July 1986 review, the personnel

involved failed to recognize

that the relief valve discharge

lines could have vents associated

with them. This oversight

is attributable

to the normal design of relief valve discharge

lines which are usually solid sections of piping directly piped to a common header or tank. Because the group reviewing

the IST Program failed to recognize

the potential

of vents being installed

on the relief valve discharge

piping, only the common 4 inch header was reviewed for containment

integrity

surveillance

requirements.

1. PSE&G DOES NOT DISPUTE THE VIOLATION.

2. THIS VIOLATION

IS ATTRIBUTABLE

TO A FAILURE BY PSE&G TO ADEQUATELY

REVIEW IST PROGRAM CHANGES AGAINST CONTAINMENT

INTEGRITY

SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS.

3. IMMEDIATE

CORRECTIVE

ACTIONS: a> Upon no ti fi ca ti on of possible discrepancies, the Shi rt Supervisor

immediately

performed

a detailed review of both Unit *1 and Unit Containment

Integrity

Surveillances.

Because of the known discrepancy

involving

particular

.. : ... *-.... ' -,-. * attention

was paid to relief valve discharge

lines and the Shift Supervisor

identified

4 other vents off relief lines C 2SJ293, 2SJ299, 2CV309 and 2CV365> not included in the containment

integrity

surveillance.

All five of these *valves are identified

in the Notice of Violation.

Additionally, the Shift Supervisor

reviewed Unit tt1 and Unit tt2 containment

surveillances

against each other and found nine <9> other discrepancies.

Certain valves were contained

on the Unit tt1 surveillance

and not on Unit tt2 surveillance, and vice-versa.

After the review or the Containment

Integrity

Surveillances, the Shift Supervisor

had the surveillances

performed

and also had the discrepancies

corrected.

The tagging request inquiry system <TRIS> was updated and the surveillance

lineups were changed to reflect the corrections.

All valves which were noted as discrepancies

on the integrity

lineups were round in their closed positions, as required by their normal surveillance.

After the performance

or the surveillance, all the above noted valves were locked closed. b> In response to the Shift Supervisor's

and NRC Inspector's

findings, the Technical

Department

Procedure

Group completed

a review or the Containment

Integrity

Surveillances

against the SGS Containment

Isolation

System UFSAR Table 6. 2-10. This review verified the Shift Supervisor's

findings and also discovered

ten C10) more discrepancies.

1) Six C6> vent and drain valves associated

with the excess letdown heat exchanger

component

cooling supply line had not been included in the surveillance.

-Two < 2> or these valves C CC180 and CC278> were already locked closed in accordance

with the normal component

cooling water lineup, therefore

they were just added to the integrity

surveillance

lineup -Four <4> of the valves were normally closed in accordance

with the normal component

cooling water lineup, therefore

the normal position or these valves was changed to locked closed. However, three of these valves CCC205, CC110 and CC275> are located in the excess letdown heat exchanger

room Ca locked, high radiation

area inside the bioshield

and essentially

inaccessible>.

Because or the inaccessibility

or these valves, PSE&G will check these valves only on the initial lineup and rely on the fact that they are located in a locked room. The fourth valve CCC274) was added to the containment

integrity

surveillance . .. ., .. -

• • • -< -... -r-* 2> Four C4> drain valves associated

with the steam generator

blowdown header located inside containment

C11-14GB19)

had not been included in the containment

integrity

surveillance

and therefore

were added to the "inside" containment

surveillance

and their normal position was changed from closed to locked closed. 4. LONG-TERM

CORRECT! VE ACTIONS: PSE&G's long-term

solution for providing

adequate review of design changes and IST Program changes is close coordination

between the System Engineers

and the Technical

Department

Procedures

Group. Due to greater system specific training and design criteria expertise

possessed

by the System Engineers, a better level of review than that which previously

existed is expected.

5. COMPLIANCE

PSE&G is now in full compliance

the Technical

Specification

Surveillance

Requirement

4. 6. 1. 1a . . . ::*