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{{#Wiki_filter:11/2/70 (Reprinted 12/1/70)SAFETY GUIDE 2 THERMAL SHOCK TO REACTOR PRESSURE VESSELS A. Introduction Proposed General Design Criterion 35 speci-fies design and operating conditions necessary to assure that the reactor coolant pressure boundary will behave in a nonbrittle manner.To provide protection against loss of coolant accidents, present designs provide for the in-jection of large quantities of cold emergency coolant into the reactor coolant system. The effect on the reactor pressure vessel of this cold water injection is of concern because the reac-tor vessel is subjected to greater irradiation than other components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and, thus, has a greater po-tential for becoming brittle. A suitable program which may be used to implement General Design Criterion 35 to assure that the reactor pressure vessel will behave in a nonbrittle manner under loss of coolant accident conditions is described in this guide.B. Discussion The injection of cold water by the emergency core cooling system into a hot reactor pressure vessel after a loss of coolant accident raises the possibility that a vessel embrittled by irradia-tion and having a small internal defect could fail suddenly as a result of the large thermal gradient imposed and the resulting high stresses.
{{#Wiki_filter:11/2/70 (Reprinted 12/1/70)
Analyses by the reactor vendors indi-cate that cold water injected into a hot reactor pressure vessel toward the end of the vessel's service life could cause incipient defects of the maximum size expected to grow; however, the maximum crack depth is predicted to be no more than 30 to 60 percent of vessel wall thick-ness. The vessel is not expected to fail under these conditions.
SAFETY GUIDE 2 THERMAL SHOCK TO REACTOR PRESSURE VESSELS A. Introduction                                         gram. Since reactor vessel materials are ini-Proposed General Design Criterion 35 speci-         tially ductile and their fracture toughness prop-fies design and operating conditions necessary          erties are not significantly changed upon irra-to assure that the reactor coolant pressure            diation during the initial 5 years of operation, boundary will behave in a nonbrittle manner.            the potential for reactor pressure vessel fail-To provide protection against loss of coolant          ure as a result of cold water injection is con-accidents, present designs provide for the in-        sidered to be acceptably small during this jection of large quantities of cold emergency          period. Sufficient data should be available from coolant into the reactor coolant system. The            the HSST Program to permit a final judgment effect on the reactor pressure vessel of this cold      within this 5-year period on the acceptability water injection is of concern because the reac-        of the projected behavior of vessel material tor vessel is subjected to greater irradiation          throughout its service lifetime.
The maximum crack depth expected cannot be firmly established since the vessel material fracture toughness properties assumed in the analyses have not yet been com-pletely confirmed.
than other components of the reactor coolant              In the event that the results of the HSST pressure boundary and, thus, has a greater po-          Program or other research indicate that the tential for becoming brittle. A suitable program        potential for growth of defects in radiation em-which may be used to implement General Design          brittled reactor pressure vessel n~aterial re-Criterion 35 to assure that the reactor pressure      duces the available margin of safety against vessel will behave in a nonbrittle manner under        brittle fracture to an unacceptable level, an loss of coolant accident conditions is described        acceptable engineering solution to the problem in this guide.                                          could be applied-for example, thermal anneal-ing of the reactor vessel material. Naval Re-B. Discussion                                          search Laboratory data indicate that annealing of a PWR vessel at its design temperature The injection of cold water by the emergency (650'F) for a period of 168 hours should pro-core cooling system into a hot reactor pressure duce a recovery in fracture toughness proper-vessel after a loss of coolant accident raises the ties and reduce the transition temperature shift possibility that a vessel embrittled by irradia-due to irradiation by 30 to 50 percent (i.e., a tion and having a small internal defect could          100'F shift in transition temperature would be fail suddenly as a result of the large thermal reduced to 70-50' after annealing). Annealing gradient imposed and the resulting high BWR vessels at design temperatures and for stresses. Analyses by the reactor vendors indi-        equivalent time periods would, if needed, pro-cate that cold water injected into a hot reactor      vide an equivalent degree of recovery. Based on pressure vessel toward the end of the vessel's the calculation of potential irradiation effects in service life could cause incipient defects of the      presently designed PWRs and BWRs, this de-maximum size expected to grow; however, the gree of recovery of material toughness proper-maximum crack depth is predicted to be no ties combined with the potential for repeating more than 30 to 60 percent of vessel wall thick-the annealing process, if required, appears to ness. The vessel is not expected to fail under be adequate to permit continued plant operation these conditions. The maximum crack depth with the same reactor pressure vessel through-expected cannot be firmly established since the out plant lifetime.
The additional data needed to resolve the uncertainties in the. fracture toughness prop-erties of reactor vessel material are expected to be provided by the Heavy Section Steel Tech-nology (HSST) research and development pro-gram. Since reactor vessel materials are ini-tially ductile and their fracture toughness prop-erties are not significantly changed upon irra-diation during the initial 5 years of operation, the potential for reactor pressure vessel fail-ure as a result of cold water injection is con-sidered to be acceptably small during this period. Sufficient data should be available from the HSST Program to permit a final judgment within this 5-year period on the acceptability of the projected behavior of vessel material throughout its service lifetime.In the event that the results of the HSST Program or other research indicate that the potential for growth of defects in radiation em-brittled reactor pressure vessel n~aterial re-duces the available margin of safety against brittle fracture to an unacceptable level, an acceptable engineering solution to the problem could be applied-for example, thermal anneal-ing of the reactor vessel material.
vessel material fracture toughness properties assumed in the analyses have not yet been com-        C. Regulatory Position pletely confirmed.                                        To assure that the reactor pressure vessel The additional data needed to resolve the            will behave in a nonbrittle manner under loss uncertainties in the. fracture toughness prop-          of coolant conditions, the following program erties of reactor vessel material are expected          should be followed:
Naval Re-search Laboratory data indicate that annealing of a PWR vessel at its design temperature (650'F) for a period of 168 hours should pro-duce a recovery in fracture toughness proper-ties and reduce the transition temperature shift due to irradiation by 30 to 50 percent (i.e., a 100'F shift in transition temperature would be reduced to 70-50' after annealing).
to be provided by the Heavy Section Steel Tech-              1. Data collection and research work on nology (HSST) research and development pro-                    the properties of reactor pressure yes-2.1
Annealing BWR vessels at design temperatures and for equivalent time periods would, if needed, pro-vide an equivalent degree of recovery.
 
Based on the calculation of potential irradiation effects in presently designed PWRs and BWRs, this de-gree of recovery of material toughness proper-ties combined with the potential for repeating the annealing process, if required, appears to be adequate to permit continued plant operation with the same reactor pressure vessel through-out plant lifetime.C. Regulatory Position To assure that the reactor pressure vessel will behave in a nonbrittle manner under loss of coolant conditions, the following program should be followed: 1. Data collection and research work on the properties of reactor pressure yes-2.1 sel material should be continued in or-der to permit verification that expected material properties assure nonbrittle behavior of the reactor vessel through-out its lifetime under postulated acci-dent conditions.
sel material should be continued in or-         ently approved core or reactor pres-der to permit verification that expected        sure vessel designs are proposed.
It is expected that this determination can be made within 5 years.2. During the 5-year period necessary to develop the needed data, the potential reactor pressure vessel thermal shock problem which may result from emer-gency core cooling system operation need not be reviewed in individual cases unless significant changes in pres-ently approved core or reactor pres-sure vessel designs are proposed.3. Should it be concluded that the margin of safety against reactor pressure ves-sel brittle failure due to emergency core cooling system operation at any time during vessel life is unacceptable, an engineering solution, such as an-nealing, could be applied to assure ade-quate recovery of the fracture tough-ness properties of the vessel material.In the meantime, applicants should out-line available engineering solutions and show that their designs do not preclude the use of such solutions.
material properties assure nonbrittle        3. Should it be concluded that the margin behavior of the reactor vessel through-        of safety against reactor pressure ves-out its lifetime under postulated acci-        sel brittle failure due to emergency dent conditions. It is expected that this      core cooling system operation at any determination can be made within 5              time during vessel life is unacceptable, years.                                          an engineering solution, such as an-
: 2. During the 5-year period necessary to          nealing, could be applied to assure ade-develop the needed data, the potential          quate recovery of the fracture tough-reactor pressure vessel thermal shock          ness properties of the vessel material.
problem which may result from emer-            In the meantime, applicants should out-gency core cooling system operation            line available engineering solutions and need not be reviewed in individual              show that their designs do not preclude cases unless significant changes in pres-      the use of such solutions.
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Latest revision as of 00:13, 12 November 2019

Safety Guide 2, Thermal Shock to Reactor Pressure Vessels
ML12216A018
Person / Time
Issue date: 12/01/1970
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
To:
References
RG-1.002
Download: ML12216A018 (2)


Text

11/2/70 (Reprinted 12/1/70)

SAFETY GUIDE 2 THERMAL SHOCK TO REACTOR PRESSURE VESSELS A. Introduction gram. Since reactor vessel materials are ini-Proposed General Design Criterion 35 speci- tially ductile and their fracture toughness prop-fies design and operating conditions necessary erties are not significantly changed upon irra-to assure that the reactor coolant pressure diation during the initial 5 years of operation, boundary will behave in a nonbrittle manner. the potential for reactor pressure vessel fail-To provide protection against loss of coolant ure as a result of cold water injection is con-accidents, present designs provide for the in- sidered to be acceptably small during this jection of large quantities of cold emergency period. Sufficient data should be available from coolant into the reactor coolant system. The the HSST Program to permit a final judgment effect on the reactor pressure vessel of this cold within this 5-year period on the acceptability water injection is of concern because the reac- of the projected behavior of vessel material tor vessel is subjected to greater irradiation throughout its service lifetime.

than other components of the reactor coolant In the event that the results of the HSST pressure boundary and, thus, has a greater po- Program or other research indicate that the tential for becoming brittle. A suitable program potential for growth of defects in radiation em-which may be used to implement General Design brittled reactor pressure vessel n~aterial re-Criterion 35 to assure that the reactor pressure duces the available margin of safety against vessel will behave in a nonbrittle manner under brittle fracture to an unacceptable level, an loss of coolant accident conditions is described acceptable engineering solution to the problem in this guide. could be applied-for example, thermal anneal-ing of the reactor vessel material. Naval Re-B. Discussion search Laboratory data indicate that annealing of a PWR vessel at its design temperature The injection of cold water by the emergency (650'F) for a period of 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> should pro-core cooling system into a hot reactor pressure duce a recovery in fracture toughness proper-vessel after a loss of coolant accident raises the ties and reduce the transition temperature shift possibility that a vessel embrittled by irradia-due to irradiation by 30 to 50 percent (i.e., a tion and having a small internal defect could 100'F shift in transition temperature would be fail suddenly as a result of the large thermal reduced to 70-50' after annealing). Annealing gradient imposed and the resulting high BWR vessels at design temperatures and for stresses. Analyses by the reactor vendors indi- equivalent time periods would, if needed, pro-cate that cold water injected into a hot reactor vide an equivalent degree of recovery. Based on pressure vessel toward the end of the vessel's the calculation of potential irradiation effects in service life could cause incipient defects of the presently designed PWRs and BWRs, this de-maximum size expected to grow; however, the gree of recovery of material toughness proper-maximum crack depth is predicted to be no ties combined with the potential for repeating more than 30 to 60 percent of vessel wall thick-the annealing process, if required, appears to ness. The vessel is not expected to fail under be adequate to permit continued plant operation these conditions. The maximum crack depth with the same reactor pressure vessel through-expected cannot be firmly established since the out plant lifetime.

vessel material fracture toughness properties assumed in the analyses have not yet been com- C. Regulatory Position pletely confirmed. To assure that the reactor pressure vessel The additional data needed to resolve the will behave in a nonbrittle manner under loss uncertainties in the. fracture toughness prop- of coolant conditions, the following program erties of reactor vessel material are expected should be followed:

to be provided by the Heavy Section Steel Tech- 1. Data collection and research work on nology (HSST) research and development pro- the properties of reactor pressure yes-2.1

sel material should be continued in or- ently approved core or reactor pres-der to permit verification that expected sure vessel designs are proposed.

material properties assure nonbrittle 3. Should it be concluded that the margin behavior of the reactor vessel through- of safety against reactor pressure ves-out its lifetime under postulated acci- sel brittle failure due to emergency dent conditions. It is expected that this core cooling system operation at any determination can be made within 5 time during vessel life is unacceptable, years. an engineering solution, such as an-

2. During the 5-year period necessary to nealing, could be applied to assure ade-develop the needed data, the potential quate recovery of the fracture tough-reactor pressure vessel thermal shock ness properties of the vessel material.

problem which may result from emer- In the meantime, applicants should out-gency core cooling system operation line available engineering solutions and need not be reviewed in individual show that their designs do not preclude cases unless significant changes in pres- the use of such solutions.

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