ENS 47709: Difference between revisions

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| event date = 02/29/2012 12:22 CST
| event date = 02/29/2012 12:22 CST
| last update date = 02/29/2012
| last update date = 02/29/2012
| title = Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers Fail To Close During Quarterly Surveillance
| title = Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers Fail to Close During Quarterly Surveillance
| event text = On 2/29/2012 at 0905 [CST] during scheduled surveillance testing it was discovered that Secondary Containment isolation damper 1VAD017B3 would not fully isolate.  1VAD017B3 was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition A and an 8 hour action statement to isolate the affected flowpath via a closed and deactivated damper was entered.  While performing subsequent actions to isolate the companion isolation damper, 1VAD017A3, it was found on 2/29/2012 at 1222 [CST] that this damper also failed to fully isolate.  This left both Secondary Containment isolation dampers in the same flowpath unable to isolate, and Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition B was entered with a 4 hours action statement to isolate the affected flowpath.  This condition is reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
| event text = On 2/29/2012 at 0905 [CST] during scheduled surveillance testing it was discovered that Secondary Containment isolation damper 1VAD017B3 would not fully isolate.  1VAD017B3 was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition A and an 8 hour action statement to isolate the affected flowpath via a closed and deactivated damper was entered.  While performing subsequent actions to isolate the companion isolation damper, 1VAD017A3, it was found on 2/29/2012 at 1222 [CST] that this damper also failed to fully isolate.  This left both Secondary Containment isolation dampers in the same flowpath unable to isolate, and Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition B was entered with a 4 hours action statement to isolate the affected flowpath.  This condition is reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
Further actions to isolate the flowpath were successful and both 4 hour and 8 hour Technical Specification action statements were completed within the required time.
Further actions to isolate the flowpath were successful and both 4 hour and 8 hour Technical Specification action statements were completed within the required time.

Latest revision as of 21:04, 1 March 2018

ENS 47709 +/-
Where
Duane Arnold NextEra Energy icon.png
Iowa (NRC Region 3)
Reporting
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.25 h-0.0104 days <br />-0.00149 weeks <br />-3.4245e-4 months <br />)
Opened: Doug Peterson
18:07 Feb 29, 2012
NRC Officer: Steve Sandin
Last Updated: Feb 29, 2012
47709 - NRC Website
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