ENS 49674: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 12/23/2013 15:00 EST | | event date = 12/23/2013 15:00 EST | ||
| last update date = 12/23/2013 | | last update date = 12/23/2013 | ||
| title = Historical Gaps | | title = Historical Gaps in High Energy Line Break Barrier | ||
| event text = At 1930 EST on June 7, 2012, it was determined that a series of gaps in a high energy line break (HELB) barrier rendered equipment in the west 480 VAC switchgear room inoperable. There is evidence that this condition had existed since initial construction. The openings were sealed and the equipment restored to operable status at 1605 EST on June 8, 2012. This condition was previously reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) in LER 2012-001-00. Upon further engineering analysis, it was determined that for limited exposure times safety functions could have been prevented for certain postulated high energy line breaks. Therefore, this condition is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A),(D), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | | event text = At 1930 EST on June 7, 2012, it was determined that a series of gaps in a high energy line break (HELB) barrier rendered equipment in the west 480 VAC switchgear room inoperable. There is evidence that this condition had existed since initial construction. The openings were sealed and the equipment restored to operable status at 1605 EST on June 8, 2012. This condition was previously reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) in LER 2012-001-00. Upon further engineering analysis, it was determined that for limited exposure times safety functions could have been prevented for certain postulated high energy line breaks. Therefore, this condition is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A),(D), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| URL = http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2013/20131224en.html#en49674 | | URL = http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2013/20131224en.html#en49674 | ||
Latest revision as of 20:52, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Millstone  Connecticut (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-3.47 h-0.145 days <br />-0.0207 weeks <br />-0.00475 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Walter Orf 16:32 Dec 23, 2013 |
| NRC Officer: | Charles Teal |
| Last Updated: | Dec 23, 2013 |
| 49674 - NRC Website
| |
Millstone with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | ||
[Table view] | ||