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{{#Wiki_filter:Attachment II Marked Up Copy of R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications Included Pages: 3.3-26 B 3.3-82*, B 3.3-84" These bases pages are being provided for information only to show the changes RG8cE intends to make following NRC approval of the I.AR.The bases are under RGB control for all changes in accordance with Specification 5.5.13.9710020027 970929 PDR ADQCK 05000244 P PDR ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3'-1 (page 2 of 3)Engineered safety Feature Actuation system Instrwlentation | {{#Wiki_filter:Attachment II Marked Up Copy of R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications Included Pages: | ||
Coincident with | 3.3-26 B 3.3-82* | ||
R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3-26 Amendment No.61 It ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE | , B 3.3-84" These bases pages are being provided for information only to show the changes RG8cE intends to make following NRC approval of the I.AR. The bases are under RGB control for all changes in accordance with Specification 5.5.13. | ||
Containment Pressure-High High must be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3, because there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe break.This would cause a significant increase in the containment pressure, thus allowing detection and closure of the MSIVs.The steam line isolation Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless both MSIVs are closed and de-activated. | 9710020027 970929 PDR ADQCK 05000244 P PDR | ||
In MODES 4, 5, and 6 the steam line isolation Function is not required to be OPERABLE because there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment Pressure | |||
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3 '-1 (page 2 of 3) | |||
R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-82 Revision 6 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE | Engineered safety Feature Actuation system Instrwlentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOMABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT | ||
This Function must be OPERABLE in HODES I, 2, and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines.The Steam Line Isolation Function is required to be OPERABLE in HODES 2 and 3 unless both HSIVs are closed and de-activated. | : 4. Steam Line Isolation | ||
This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in HODES 4, 5, and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the plant to have an accident.e.Steam Line Isolation | : a. Manual Initiation (b) 3(b) 1 per D,G SR 3.3.2.4 NA loop | ||
: b. Automatic Actuation 1 2(b) 3(b) 2 trains E,G SR 3.3.2 ' NA Logic and Actuation Relays | |||
R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-84 Revision 6 Attachment III Proposed Technical Specifications Included Pages: 3.3-26 e ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 3)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrwentation | : c. Contaiment Pressure -High High 2(b) 3(b) -F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 20 psig 1 | ||
Coincident with | RR 3.3.2.2 (C.RR-I 3.3.2.5 s~ | ||
SR 0.( I (=.( | |||
: d. High Steam Flow 1 2(b) 3(b) 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 0.4E6 | |||
~ ~ | |||
steam SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr 9 ibm/hr oI line SR 3.3.2.5 i%i-ps+ ~vpsl g IOUS Pr I OOS Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements. | |||
Coincident with 122 3 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 a 543 F a 545 F T,~ -Low loop SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5 | |||
: e. High -High Steam Flow 1,2,3 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 < 3.7E6 s 3.6E6 steam SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr 9 ibm/hr a line SR 3.3.2.5 755 pslg 755 pslg Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements. | |||
(continued) | |||
(b) Except when both MSIVs are closed and de-activated. | |||
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3-26 Amendment No. 61 | |||
It ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE c. Steam Line Isolation Containment SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure Hi h Hi h (continued) | |||
LCO, and APPLICABILITY Containment Pressure -High High must be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3, because there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. This would cause a significant increase in the containment pressure, thus allowing detection and closure of the MSIVs. The steam line isolation Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless both MSIVs are closed and de-activated. In MODES 4, 5, and 6 the steam line isolation Function is not required to be OPERABLE because there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment Pressure High High setpoint. | |||
: d. Steam Line Isolation Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In 'ection and Coincident With T Low This Function provides closure of the MSIVs~w<'+'P an SLB or inadvertent openjyg of@g4G 'uring atmospheric relief or safety valv8to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. | |||
(continued) | |||
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-82 Revision 6 | |||
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE d. Steam Line Isolation Hi h Steam Flow Coincident SAFETY ANALYSES, With Safet In 'ection and Coincident With LCO, and T Low (continued) | |||
APPLICABILITY This Function must be OPERABLE in HODES I, 2, and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines. The Steam Line Isolation Function is required to be OPERABLE in HODES 2 and 3 unless both HSIVs are closed and de-activated. | |||
This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in HODES 4, 5, and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the plant to have an accident. | |||
: e. Steam Line Isolation Hi h Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In 'ection tion provides closure of the HSI dur~in a team line brea (or dna ent openin | |||
+of an SG~aeÃp er>c re i s valve to ann a east one unfaulted SG as a eat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy Value- release to containment. | |||
~~ " c+po~ tin~~ | |||
FlOOWnlaid te <-' | |||
ba+5 po~ i tnv44 Two steam required to line flow channels per steam be OPERABLE line for this Function. | |||
are These (oQQ c are combined in a one-out-of-two logic t,o qp ~or indicate high high steam flow in one steam line. | |||
FT-464 and FT-465 are the two channels required for steam line A. FT-474 and FT-475 are the two channels required for steam line B. Each steam line is considered a separate function for the purpose of this LCO. The steam flow transmitters provide control inputs, but the control function cannot initiate events that the Function acts to mitigate. Therefore, additional channels are not required to address control protection interaction issues. | |||
S+ta~ | |||
o~ ~o Alai +lAL a ~~ | |||
o ~OdlJ) A co~i iooapQ, ~~4~w, ~g c, HAII Q'ieo~ ~'ELJ clod~og | |||
'L gi a ~+ io~eo ~ cw~~~h wi (continued) | |||
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-84 Revision 6 | |||
Attachment III Proposed Technical Specifications Included Pages: | |||
3.3-26 | |||
e ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 3) | |||
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrwentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED 'URVEILLANCE ALLOHABLE TRIP FUNCTION COHDIT IOHS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT | |||
: 4. Steam Line Isolation | |||
: a. Manual Initiation 1 2(b) 3(b) 1 per D,G SR 3.3.2.4 HA HA loop | |||
: b. Automatic Actuation 1,2( ) 3( ) 2 trains E,G SR 3.3.2.7 HA HA Logic and Actuation Relays | |||
: c. Containment Pressure -High High 2(b) 3(b) F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 20 psig s 18 psig 1 | |||
SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5 | |||
: d. High Steam Flow 2(b) ~ 3(b) 2 p r F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 0.66E6 s 0.4E6 1 ~ steam "SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr g ibm/hr g line SR 3.3.2.5 1005 psi 1005 psig Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements. | |||
Coincident with 12 3 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 a 543 F a 545 F T~ -Low loop SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5 | |||
: e. High -High Steam Flow 1,2( ),3( ) 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 3.7E6 s 3.6E6 steam SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr g Ibm/hr g line SR 3.3.2.5 755 psig 755 psig Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements. | |||
(cont>nu ) | |||
(b) Except when both MSIVs are closed and de-activated. | |||
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3-26 Amendment No. 61 | |||
I~ | |||
0 4 P | |||
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'A, Q) 1 4 | |||
U}} |
Latest revision as of 17:55, 29 October 2019
ML17264B039 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Ginna ![]() |
Issue date: | 09/29/1997 |
From: | ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML17264B034 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 9710020027 | |
Download: ML17264B039 (8) | |
Text
Attachment II Marked Up Copy of R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications Included Pages:
3.3-26 B 3.3-82*
, B 3.3-84" These bases pages are being provided for information only to show the changes RG8cE intends to make following NRC approval of the I.AR. The bases are under RGB control for all changes in accordance with Specification 5.5.13.
9710020027 970929 PDR ADQCK 05000244 P PDR
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3 '-1 (page 2 of 3)
Engineered safety Feature Actuation system Instrwlentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOMABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 4. Steam Line Isolation
- a. Manual Initiation (b) 3(b) 1 per D,G SR 3.3.2.4 NA loop
- b. Automatic Actuation 1 2(b) 3(b) 2 trains E,G SR 3.3.2 ' NA Logic and Actuation Relays
- c. Contaiment Pressure -High High 2(b) 3(b) -F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 20 psig 1
RR 3.3.2.2 (C.RR-I 3.3.2.5 s~
SR 0.( I (=.(
- d. High Steam Flow 1 2(b) 3(b) 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 0.4E6
~ ~
steam SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr 9 ibm/hr oI line SR 3.3.2.5 i%i-ps+ ~vpsl g IOUS Pr I OOS Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements.
Coincident with 122 3 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 a 543 F a 545 F T,~ -Low loop SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5
- e. High -High Steam Flow 1,2,3 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 < 3.7E6 s 3.6E6 steam SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr 9 ibm/hr a line SR 3.3.2.5 755 pslg 755 pslg Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements.
(continued)
(b) Except when both MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3-26 Amendment No. 61
It ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE c. Steam Line Isolation Containment SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure Hi h Hi h (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY Containment Pressure -High High must be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3, because there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. This would cause a significant increase in the containment pressure, thus allowing detection and closure of the MSIVs. The steam line isolation Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless both MSIVs are closed and de-activated. In MODES 4, 5, and 6 the steam line isolation Function is not required to be OPERABLE because there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment Pressure High High setpoint.
- d. Steam Line Isolation Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In 'ection and Coincident With T Low This Function provides closure of the MSIVs~w<'+'P an SLB or inadvertent openjyg of@g4G 'uring atmospheric relief or safety valv8to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment.
(continued)
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-82 Revision 6
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE d. Steam Line Isolation Hi h Steam Flow Coincident SAFETY ANALYSES, With Safet In 'ection and Coincident With LCO, and T Low (continued)
APPLICABILITY This Function must be OPERABLE in HODES I, 2, and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines. The Steam Line Isolation Function is required to be OPERABLE in HODES 2 and 3 unless both HSIVs are closed and de-activated.
This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in HODES 4, 5, and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the plant to have an accident.
- e. Steam Line Isolation Hi h Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In 'ection tion provides closure of the HSI dur~in a team line brea (or dna ent openin
+of an SG~aeÃp er>c re i s valve to ann a east one unfaulted SG as a eat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy Value- release to containment.
~~ " c+po~ tin~~
FlOOWnlaid te <-'
ba+5 po~ i tnv44 Two steam required to line flow channels per steam be OPERABLE line for this Function.
are These (oQQ c are combined in a one-out-of-two logic t,o qp ~or indicate high high steam flow in one steam line.
FT-464 and FT-465 are the two channels required for steam line A. FT-474 and FT-475 are the two channels required for steam line B. Each steam line is considered a separate function for the purpose of this LCO. The steam flow transmitters provide control inputs, but the control function cannot initiate events that the Function acts to mitigate. Therefore, additional channels are not required to address control protection interaction issues.
S+ta~
o~ ~o Alai +lAL a ~~
o ~OdlJ) A co~i iooapQ, ~~4~w, ~g c, HAII Q'ieo~ ~'ELJ clod~og
'L gi a ~+ io~eo ~ cw~~~h wi (continued)
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-84 Revision 6
Attachment III Proposed Technical Specifications Included Pages:
3.3-26
e ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 3)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrwentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED 'URVEILLANCE ALLOHABLE TRIP FUNCTION COHDIT IOHS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 4. Steam Line Isolation
- a. Manual Initiation 1 2(b) 3(b) 1 per D,G SR 3.3.2.4 HA HA loop
- b. Automatic Actuation 1,2( ) 3( ) 2 trains E,G SR 3.3.2.7 HA HA Logic and Actuation Relays
- c. Containment Pressure -High High 2(b) 3(b) F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 20 psig s 18 psig 1
SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5
- d. High Steam Flow 2(b) ~ 3(b) 2 p r F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 0.66E6 s 0.4E6 1 ~ steam "SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr g ibm/hr g line SR 3.3.2.5 1005 psi 1005 psig Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements.
Coincident with 12 3 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 a 543 F a 545 F T~ -Low loop SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5
- e. High -High Steam Flow 1,2( ),3( ) 2 per F,G SR 3.3.2.1 s 3.7E6 s 3.6E6 steam SR 3.3.2.2 ibm/hr g Ibm/hr g line SR 3.3.2.5 755 psig 755 psig Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all Safety Injection initiation functions and requirements.
(cont>nu )
(b) Except when both MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3-26 Amendment No. 61
I~
0 4 P
~
'A, Q) 1 4
U