ML20205G859

Revised Application for Renewal of License SNM-1513,revising Introduction,Program Goal,Radiation Protection Committee & Key Analytical Technology Div Personnel

ML20205G859
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Site:	07001703
Issue date:	02/09/1987
From:	EASTMAN KODAK CO.
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APPLICATION FOR A SPECIFIC LICENSE FOR THE POSSESSION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Eastman Kodak Company Analytical Technology Division Rochester, New York g!

I March 31, 1981 O'

Revised January 21, 1982 Revised April 7, 1982 Revised December 17, 1984 Revised May 8, 1985 r

L Revised May 8, 1986 l

Revised December 9, 1986 Revised February 9, 1987 I

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8703310363 870310 PDR ADOCK 07001703 Ct PDR

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APPLICATION FOR SPECIAL L :'

NUCLEAR MATERIALS LICENSE q

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l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l.0 ihtroduction 2.0 Eastman Kodak Radiation Protection Program O9 2.1 Pr ram Goal t

2.2 Rad ation Protection Committee

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2.3 Radiation Safety Supervisors

• 3.0 Key Analytical Technology Division Personnel 3.1 Director'i 4'

3.2 Unit Director 3.3 Group Leader.

,. ;) 'A 3.4 Radiation Safety Supervisor W N '

3.5 Radiation Worker M

3.6 Maintenance Workers 4.0 Facility 4.1 Location O

4.2 _ Laboratory 4.3' Californium Neutron Flux Multiplier (CFX) 4.3.1 General design features - (cavity)

~4.3.2 Security 4.3.3 General design features - (CFX assembly) bj' 4.3.3.1 Flux trap 4.3.3.2 Fuel assembly 4.3.3.3 Reflector 4.3.3.4 Safety rods 4.3.3.5 Outer shield 5.0 Radiation Safety 5.1 Interlocks, Monitors, Alarms 5.1.1 Interlocks 5.1.2 Plug box 5.1.3 Gate interlock 3,1.4 CFX Ecdiation Monitors 5.2 Moriitoring 4

5.2.1 Gamma 3

5.2.2 Neutron 5.2,3 Wipe tests 5.2.4 Portable meters 5.2.5 Pocket dosimeters 5.2.6 Intrusion alarm 5.2.7 Film bad es

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5.2.8 Critical ty monitoring 5.2.9 Calibration 5.3 Administrative Controls

6.0 Operating Procedures O

6.1 Review and Approval of Procedures for Experiments 6.2 control of Access to the Radiation Cavity 6.3 operating Procedure for CFX 6.4 operating Limitations 7.0 Emergency Procedures 7.1 General 7.2 Fire 7.3 Flood 7.4 Airborne Activity 7.5 Contamination 8.0 Maintenance and Disposal of CFX 8.1 Maintenance 8.2 Disposal Appendix (Demonstration Section)

A1.0 Personal Resumes A1.1 Research Personnel l

A1.2 Radiation Protection Comrtb.ee

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A2.0 Instrumentation A3.0 Performance and Design Characteristics of CFX (Tables I and II)

A4.0 Statistical Summary of Film Badge Monitoring Results A5.0 Supporting Document from IRT O

l.0 Introduction O

In 1974, Eastman Kodak Company purchased from Intelcom Rad Tech of San Diego, California, a Californium Neutron Flux Multi-plier (CFX) which utilizes 1583 grams of Uranium-235.

The use and possession of this Special Nuclear Material is the subject of this license application.

Eastman Kodak Company is incorporated in the state of New Jersey.

The Company is engaged in the manufacture and processing of photographic products and the manufacture of chemicals.

Kodak is a world-wide organization with principal offices located at 343 State Street in Rochester, New York 14650.

There is no control exercised over Eastman Kodak Company by any alien, foreign corporation or foreign government.

The names, addresses and citizenship of the principal officers of Eastman Kodak Company are listed below.

CITIZEN NAME OF POSITION ADDRESS Colby H. Chandler U.S.

Chairman of the 51 Taylor Road Board of Directors Honeoye Falls, l

and Chief NY 14472 Executive Officer O

Kay R. Whitmore U.S.

President 35 South Ridge Trail

Fairport, NY 14450 R. Frederick Porter U.S.

Vice President 41 Mill Valley Rd.

Assistant General Pittsford, NY Manager 14534 Manufacturing Resources Division i

The Analytical Technology Division of Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York, is a centralized organization which supplies analytical support for the company's manufacturing and research and develop-ment activities.

One section of this division is a specially designed and equipped area for neutron activation analysis and radiotracer work.

It is in this area where the CFX is installed for neutron activation analyses and for the testing of recording t

materials for neutron radiography.

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2.0 Eastman Kodak Company Radiation Protection Procram 2.1 Procram Goal The goal of the Radiation Protection Program is to ensure Company compliance with all pertinent State and Federal regula-tions, and to keep radiation exposures and releases of radio-active materials to the environment as low as reasonably achievable.

2.2 Radiation Protection Committee The Radiation Protection Committee encompasses those members of the Health and Environment Laboratories (HAEL) who administer the radiation safety program.

The HAEL provides' technical support to Kodak Plants on health related matters, including industrial hygiene and health physics.

The radiation safety program is managed by Industrial Hygiene, a section of the Occupational Health Laboratory (OHL) of HAEL.

The Director of OHL reports to the Director of HAEL, who in turn, reports to the Senior vice-president and Director of corporate relations.

The Radiation Protection Committee is concerned primarily with radiation policy decisions and unusual radiation problems.

The committee consults technical specialists--both internal and external to Kodak when necessary.

The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) is in charge of the overall radiation safety program.

The RSO screens plant radi-ation activities and speaks for the committee on routine matters.

Matters which may have significant impact on the radiation protection program are brought to the attention of the Committee.

The RSO manages the surveillance programs, licensing activities, inventories, and approves new purchases of sources of ionizing radiation.

The RSO is assisted by one or more Assistant Radiation Safety Officers (ARSO).

The RSO and ARSOs are consultants to approximately 100 Radiation Safety Supervisors (RSSs) and users of ionizing radiation, disseminat:.ng information of legal require-ments and responsibilities.

The Radiation Protection Committee shall meet at least twice a year or more frequently as required.

The Committee Secretary (RSO) shall keep minutes of these meetings which shall be retained for three years.

The Director of the OHL shall be a member of the Committee, providing an informational channel between plant radiation safety activities and high level management.

The Committee chairman shall have a Bachelor's degree in science or engineering (or the equivalent) and have at least one year of experience in management.

This individual shall also O

have at least one year of experience involving ionizing radiation.

The chairman is a management resource with experience in ionizing radiation.

The Committee secretary is the Company Radiation Officer s

(RSO).

The RSO shall have a Bachelor's degree in science or engineering (or the equivalent), a formal course in radiation safety, and one year of work experience involving ionizing radiation.

The qualifications must be acceptable to the Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York.

ARSO's shall have at least a two year degree in science (or equivalent) and one year of experience with ionizing radiation.

2.3 Radiation Safety Supervisors A Radiation Safety Supervisor (RSS) is appointed for each area in which there are sources of ionizing radiation.

The RSS is a member of the Department or Division which owns and uses the sources and therefore is in close contact with the sources and their use.

It is the general duty of the RSS to work with departmental supervisors to assure that radiation sources are used in a safe and legal manner.

The RSS shall be appointed by their department and division managers and approved by either the RSO or ARSO.

A completed standard appointment form shall be filed with the RSO.

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3.0 Key Analytical Technoloav Division Personnel The CFX is part of the neutron activation facility of the Analytical Technology Division.

The organizational responsibilities for the CFX and the neutron activation facility will reside with the following:

3.1 The Director of the Analytical Technology Division has the administrative responsibility for the CFX.

3.2 The Atomic Spectroscopy Unit Director is responsible for the supervision of the neutron activation analysis area and work.

This responsibility includes the CFX and its applications.

i 3.3 The Group Leader's responsibility includes the neutron activation analysis work and the safe operation of the CFX.

The position requires a BS level degree in the physical sciences.

l The group leader or another professional assigned to the group I

will have a minimum of two years experience working with ionizing i

radiation.

If the professional personnel are absent, the responsibility for safe operation of the CFX will be with the Radiation Safety Supervisor.

3.4 The Radiation Safety Supervisor (RSS) is responsible for routine radiation monitor:,ng, testing, record retention, main-taining calibration schedules and serving as the liaison with the Radiation Protection Committee.

The RSS has authority to halt O

any operations judged unsafe and will prescribe the action to be taken when monitoring indicates that a person is contaminated.

In the absence of the RSS, the Group Leader, with support from the Radiation Safety Officer, will serve as RSS.

The RSS shall have a Bachelor's degree in science (or the equivalent), two years' experience working with radioactive i

materials and/or x-ray equipment and a formal course in radiation safety.

3.5 other authorized personnel working with the neutron sources will be under the immediate supervision of the Group i

Leader and will be at least high school graduates, but usually have higher educational background.

Before any actual work is performed in the area, the new personnel will be instructed in the general nature of radiation hazards and general radiation protection principles by the Radiation Safety Supervisor.

Specific instruction on potential hazards and safe practices associated with the CFX will be jointly provided by the Group Leader and Radiation Safety Supervisor.

Training on potential hazards and safe practices will be repeated at least once each year.

The effectiveness of the training will be monitored by the Group Leader, RSS and Unit Director.

Deficiencies in job performance will be corrected with whatever actions are necessary, including removal from the neutron activation group.

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3.6 Maintenance workers and visitors require special approval before entering the neutron cavity and will be protected as necessary to limit exposure to that permitted for nonradiation workers. --.-- -

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Facility: Description of Radiation Facility in Which the CFX O.

4.0 Is Located 4.1 The CFX Location and Buildino Descriotion The CFX is located in the building designated as Building 82 on the northeast corner of the Kodak Park plant site.

Figure 1 is a map of part of Kodak Park showing the location of Building 82.

This is a modern eight-story building with a full basement.

The building has approximately 614,000 sq. ft. of floor space.

The laboratories in this building are designed largely for chemical and photographic research.

The laboratories in the northwest 4

corner of the basement are specially designed and equipped for radiotracer work and neutron activation analyses.

The latter activity also utilizes an underground radiation cavity at sub-basement level which houses 14 MeV neutron generators and the californium-252 neutron multiplier.

In the neutron activation area, one laboratory serves as a control and counting room and access to the radiation cavity is from this room.

The basement area floor plan of the part of the basement area which includes the radiotracer and neutron activation facility is shown in-Figure 2.

A larger scale drawing of the control room,

" preparatory laboratory," and radiation cavity (the latter at j

sub-basement level) is shown in Figure 3.

The location of the CFX multiplier in the cavity is indicated.

C012F, and C012E (paratory laboratory" C012J and Rooms C012L,see Fig. 2) are equ 4.2 The " pre l

fume hoods for handling radioactive materials.

These hoods are exhausted through filters at the hoods.

These exhaust systems are independent of the exhaust system for the rest of the building.

The radiotracer and ntLtron activation laboratories are under negative pressure with respect to the rest of the building and the radiation cavity is under negative pressure with respect to the neutron activat:.on and radiotracer laboratories.

The cavity is air-conditioned with a separate exhaust system to maintain air circulation in the area.

The exhaust passes through a high effi-ciency filter (0.3 micron, DOP smoke test is 99.994) and is vented.

to the outside air on the rooftop of Building 82.

An automatically activated set of sump pumps is provided to discharge seepage groundwater from around the cavity to the base-ment sewer system.

As indicated on Figure 3, the sump pumps are located in the labyrinth leading into the cavity.

4.3 Californium Neutron Flux Multiplier (CFX) 4.3.1 General desion features - (cavity) - The radiation cavity is located underground, outside and adjacent to the north-westcornerofBuildinp82.

The walls, floor and ceiling of the

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cavity are two-feet thick high-density poured concrete.

There is at least eight feet of earth above the ceiling of the cavity.

Seven and one-half feet (measured in a horizontal plane) of earth.

fill lie between the cavity wall and control room wall (outer l

west basement wall of Building 82).

The shortest distance between the cavity ceiling and control room floor is eight and one-half feet through earth fill.

The CFX is at the opposite side of the cavity from the control room.

The dimensions of the cavity are 15 ft. x 24 ft. x 9 ft. high.

As indicated in Figure 3, access to the cavity is through a labyrinth which is entered from the control room by means of a circular stairway (not shown).

The entrance to the labyrinth is closed by a folding, accordion-type steel gate with a lock which is part of the Interlock System described later.

The circular stairway and the folding gate are i

shown in Figure 4 which is a photograph taken from the control roor-Figure 5 is a photograph taken through the gate into the labyrinth.

Figure 6 is a photograph of the inside of the radi-ation cavity showing the californium-252 neutron multiplier.

I The shielding provided by the earth and concrete barriers of the radiation cavity are adequate to assure that sources in the cavity will produce no detectable radiation above 0.2 mR/hr in l

the control room or at ground level above the cavity outside of l

Building 82.

Surveys are performed periodically to verify this radiation level.

The integral shielding of the CFX unit (see description of the CFX) and the direction of the neutron beam for radiography (Figure 3) are such that the cavity provides adequate radiation protection for people outside the labyrinth and cavity when the CFX is operating at full power and the radiographic port i

is open. Under these conditions, there is a dose rate of <0.2 Q

mrem /hr in the control room and a higher dose rate in the cavity, which approaches 50 mrem /hr near the CFX (neutron generators off);

except in the direct radiographic beam where a dose rate of a few rem /hr is possible.

As will be described later, there is an i

interlock system to prevent entry into the cavity when the CFX is I

on with the radiographic port open or when a 14 MeV neutron gener-ator is on.

The radiation cavity also possesses its own exhaust system with a design flow rate of 1,000 cubic feet per minute.

The air flow is filtered with a high efficiency particulate filter (0.3 g - DOP smoke test is 99.99% efficient) before entering the 115 foot high emission stack.

4.3.2 Security - All provisions of the commission approved Physical Security Plan, which is titled " Licensee.

Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance" dated May 14, 1986, will be maintained and fully implemented.

In addition, we will submit a transportation security plan to the NRC at least 120 days prior to any anticipated shipments or receipts of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or 10 kilograms or more of low strategic significance.

As shown in Figure 2, entrance to the radiotracer and neutron activation area is from a basement corridor into a

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hallway on either side of which are offices (C012A, C012B, C012C, and C012M) of the personnel who work in this area.

The doors._- _

from C012F and C012L to the basement corridor can be opened only O

from the inside and are for emergency exit only.

Only authorized persons are permitted to go beyond the office area without special permission from the supervisory people who are responsible for this area.

All outside entrances to Building 82 lie within restricted

, areas which are surrounded by an eight-foot high chain link fence topped with barbed wire.

The outside entrances of Building 82 are kept locked except during working hours.

9 3uilding 82 can also be entered from an immediately adjacent Kodak Park building, Building 83.

All outside entrances to this building, except the main entrance, are also in the restricted area enclosed by a chain link fence.

The main entrance to Building 83 opens directly onto a main city street (Lake Avenue).

' Access to Building 83 can also be obtained by an enclosed bridge across Lake Avenue at the third floor level which connects Building 83 with Building 81.

All outside entrances, except the main entrance to Building 81, lie in a restricted area surrounded by a chain link fence.

The main entrance of Building 81 can be entered from Lake Avenue.

This entrance is unlocked only during normal working hours, and at these times is under surveillance by a trained guard.

All entrances to the complex are always under surveillance of a trained guard when they are unlocked.

Only employees with proper picture-passes are permitted to enter the area without obtaining special permission.

This permission can

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be given by the Division Directors and Unit Directors of those divisions whose personnel work in the building.

These people can give permission for entry into those areas for which they have direct responsibility.

In addition to the above described restrictions on entry into Building 82, Buildings 81 and 83 are patrolled by trained guards during nonworking hours (5:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. on working days and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays). The guards tour the building every four hours and check specified locations along their assigned routes.

One such checkpoint is the control room in the neutron activation area.

As a part of the check at this location, the guard descends to the entrance of the labyrinth leading to the radiation cavity and determines that the gate across the entrance is locked.

An intrusion alarm has been installed in the labyrinth which is activated after working hours.

This is described in section 5.2.6.

In addition to the security provided by restricted and controlled entry to Building 82 and the radiation cavity, additional security for the Special Nuclear Material contained in the CFX is provided by the fact that its removal would require the significant disassembly of the CFX.

Unauthorized removal of the Special Nuclear Material is not a credible event.

4.3.3 General desian feature (CFX assembly) - Perfor-O mance and design characteristics of CFX are appended in Table I, Demonstration Section A3.0. _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

4.3.3.1 Flux trao - The flux trap is a small cube O

of high-density polyethylene selected for its excellent moderating power.

The trap is surrounded on all sides by a fueled region of polyethylene and thin aluminum-clad uranium-aluminum alloy plates.

The reflector is a region of polyethylene surrounded by-the reflector / shield.

Clad metallic fuel is used, since it pro-vides for retention of fission products, particularly gaseous ones; hence, the system requires no special air monitoring or filtering.

4.3.3.2 Fuel assembly - The fuel consists of MTR-type fuel plates.

Eachplatehasa0.02gggnch-thickcoreof uranium-aluminum alloy (93% enriched in U) sandwiched between two 0.010-inch plates of aluminum.

This type of fuel has been extensively used throughout the world at many low-power reactor facilities.

The inherent safety of the plates has been proven over the past 20 years at burnups of up to 45 percent.

At the maximum power of 3.8 watts, the burnup over the anticipated life-time of the CFX, even if operated continuously, is negligible.

Approximately 96 percent of the fuel is loaded in four rec-tangular boxes which are arranged as shown in Figure 7.

The remaining fuel is loaded in a small region above and below the central flux trap.

Fuel plates are separated by sheets of poly-ethylene such that the hydrogen-to-uranium ratio is 500:1, i.e.,

the optimum for the minimum critical mass (Figure 8).

Conse-quently, any credible rearrangement of the fuel and polyethylene

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moderator will result in a less-than-optimum ratio and a less reactive system.

Each of the four major fuel containers has a pressure plate at one end to insure that no voids exist between the fuel and the moderator plates.

4.3.3.3 Reflector - The reflector consists of 4-inch thick polyethylene slabs that completely surround the fuel region.

There are several penetrations through the reflector other than the safety rods that are described below.

The neutron radiography port is a horizontal rectangular cone that penetrates into the center of the flux trap.

The hole through the fuel region is one-inch square.

There are two penetrations for activation analysis irradia-tions: one into the central flux trap and another that penetrates approximately halfway into the center of one of the fuel boxes. A thirdpenetration,jggothecentralfluxtrapregion,containsa guide tube for the Cf source.

During the normal operation of the CFX, thesourcewillgb21 cated in the flux trap.

When the system is shut down, the Cf source is automatically moved into a storage pig at a location outside the reflector.

4.3.3.4 Safety rods - The system has four verti-cally mounted blade-type safety rods that are made of 0.020-inch thick aluminum-clad cadmium.

A pair of rods, held magnetically as shown in Figure 9, is driven by one of two independent safety

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rod drives.

If a scram condition is met, or a power failure occurs, the electromagnet is turned off and the rods fall by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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gravity action into the fuel region.

The detectors for flux monitoring are located on two sides of the assembly just outside 0

the reflector.

4.3.3.5 Outer shield - The assembly is completely surrounded by a 4-inch polyethylene reflector which provides initial shielding.

The remaining shielding designed for the system consists of a lead slab (5 1/4 inches thick) in front of the

' assembly and an outer shield of water extended polyester and concrete blocks.

A shutter door constructed of lead, polyethylene

,and cadmium, is provided for the radiography port.

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5.0 Radiation Safety O

5.1 Interlocks, Monitors. Alarms 5.1.1 Interlocks - The shielding of the CFX reduces

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the exposure rate at the surface (refer to A3.0 Table II) when the CFX is operating at full power.

Thus, personnel can be in the radiation cavity when the CFX is on if the radiographic port is closed.

The following interlocks limit access to the CFX cavity when the radiographic port is open.

5.1.2 Pluo box system - This system consists of a plug box mounted near the limited access gate (at the entrance to the labyrinth), a microswitch and associated electronic circuitry on the CFX shutter and limited access gate, and a lock on the CFX radiographic shutter.

As shown in Figure 10, either the radio-graphic shutter must be closed or the gate must be closed and all plugs (six) returned to the plug-box for the interlock circuitry of the CFX to be activated; thus, thc CFX may be operated only when at least one of these two conditions is met.

Administrative control will require each person entering the cavity to carry with him/her one plug from the plug-box.

The lock on the radio-graphic shutter is opened by a key which is on a closed ring with the key which turns on the CFX.

The CFX must, therefore, be shut down before the key which opens the shutter can be removed from the control room area.

Administrative rules will require the shutter to be locked closed immediately after each use of the CFX O

radiographic facility.

5.1.3 Gate interlocks - This system consists of a Kirk interlock installed on the limited access gate (at the entrance to the labyrinth).

This interlock operates such that if the gate is opened when the radiography port is open, the CFX will shut down.

The CFX cannot be started up (with the p rt open) unless the gate is closed.

sccess to the CFX cavity is permitted when the CFX is in operatio.? only when the radiographic shutter is closed.

5.1.4 CFX radiation monitors - Two ion chamber detectors are located in the CFX to monitor radiation levels from the device.

The readouts from these detectors are located in the CFX control panel in the control room and are always functioning when-ever power is applied to the control panel to operate the CFX.

The conditions monitored by these detectors are the CFX power level in both linear and log scales, and the period of the flux produced by the device.

Each of these conditions has an associated electronic trip level, which is recalibrated every six months, that automatically shuts down the device if one of th0 preset levels is exceeded.

Note: All interlocks will be physically tested by the RSS at intervals of 6 months or less.

5.2 Monitors-Alarms - The radiation level or security in the cavity will be monitored by the following systems...

5.2.1 Gamma monitorinq - A gamma-monitoring system O

probe is located on the north wall of the cavity at the point where the center of the radiographic beam would strike the wall.

A visible readout from the unit is located in the control room and in the cavity.

In addition, there are audible and visible alarms in the cavity and the control room set to trigger when the radiation level at the probe exceeds 10 mR per hour.

As discussed later in the description of the Kirk Interlock System, this will also " freeze" the Kirk Gate Key in its lock on the Control Panel and prevent entry into the cavity.

5.2.2 Neutron counter - A BF3 neutron counter is located along the wall of the cavity near the entrance from the labyrinth to the cavity; the readout is located in the control room.

The counter tube can be located wherever desired in the cavity.

5.2.3 Wipe tests - Monthly radioactive surface contam-ination checks are performed in the radiotracer and neutron activa-tion facility.

Designated areas are wiped with paper discs to sample removable radioactive contamination, then counted for

1. -activity in liquid scintillation spectrophotometers.

If the 1x10gleradioact{vecontaminationlevelinanareagxceeds remova 2

pCi/100 cc for tritium or 1 x 10 pCi/100 cm for other

1. -emitters, that area vill be decontaminated and retested. However, if the contamination observed is near the CFX, the cause will be ascertained to verify the containment of the Special Nuclear

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Material in the fuel plates.

The interior of the device is checked semi-annually by wiping the core area accessible through the radiographic port with a paper disc, and checking the disc for a-activity by scintillation or gas proportional counting.

Five nCi of removable a-activity is considered an indication of leakage from the fuel plates (see Section 7.5).

5.2.4 Portable meters - Personnel entering the CFX cavity are required to carry a portable $/9 meter.

A portable neutron survey meter is ava: lable.

In addi, tion, a neutron dosim-eter sphere is used to monitor the neutron level in the control room.

No detectable signal above background has been observed in the control room with this unit.

5.2.5 Pocket dosimeters - Pocket dosimeters for gamma radiation are required to be worn by all personnel entering the cavity.

5.2.6 Intrusion alarm - An radio frequency ultrasonic intrusion alarm (motion monitor) is located within the CFX cavity.

The alarm annunciators are located within the CFX cavity and at the security offices console in Building 83.

Annunciators consist of a light and/or audible horn.

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5.2.7 Film badoes and dosimeters - The monitoring of radiation exposure to personnel regularly working in the neutron activation and radiotracer areas including the radiation cavity l

O is carried out by the Radiation Safety Supervisor.

His/her findings are reported monthly to the Secretary of the Eastman Kodak Radiation Protection Committee with copies of the report to the Unit Director, and the respective area physician in the Kodak Park Medical Department.

Any whole body exposure beyond 100 mR per month will require immediate investigation by the Unit Director responsible for the area and by the Radiation Safety Supervisor to determine the possible source and to prevent further exposures beyond this level.

The following procedures are used to monitor personnel radiation exposure.

1.

Each neutron activation worker is required to wear at all times a film badge for x, p, 7, ng and ne which is changed and processed monthly.

A statistical summary of film badge moni-toring for recent years, as reported to the NRC, is in the demon-stration section A4.0.

2.

Each neutron activation worker is required to wear at all times a 7-dosimeter.

These are read and the readings recorded each week and reported monthly.

3.

Each person working in the area is required to make a dail:r check with a radiation monitor for hand, foot, and clothing contam:, nation.

If monitoring indicates contamination, the indi-vidual cannot leave the lab area unless cleared by the Radiation Safety Supervisor.

The monitoring of radiation exposure of personnel who occa-sionally enter the radiation cavity for work such as maintenance or to assist in setting up radiographic experiments will be carried out by an authorized person.

Such persons will be required to wear, while in the area, a 7-dosimeter.

The dosimeter will be read and the reading recorded before the person enters the cavity and when he/she leaves the area.

5.2.8 Criticality Monitorina - Exemption from criti-cality monitoring (10 CFR Part 70.24) is hereby requested, based on the supporting documentation in the Appendix.

This information indicates that there are no reasonable, accidental events which could result in criticality.

5.2.9 Calibration - Portable meters are calibrated every 6 months by persons who have an agreement state license that authorizes calibrations of health physics instruments; area monitors are calibrated annually.

5.3 Administrative Controls -

1.

The CFX control keys must be locked in a Uimited Access Drawer in the control room " hen the CFX is not in operation.

The keys to this drawer are under the supervision of the Group Leader or the Acting Group Leader, and the Unit Director.

2.

All readings of the radiation monitors at the control panel must be checked and found to be normal prior to operation.....

of the facility or prior to entry into the cavity.

Abnormal

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readings will require consultation with the Group Leader or RSS before any action is taken except under the conditions described in the Section for Emergency Procedures.

3.

Only authorized persons and those accompanied by an authorized person are allowed to enter the cavity.

4.

Each person entering the cavity must remove a plug from the plug-box and must retain it when in the cavity.

This limits the number of people that can be in the cavity to six at any one time.

5.

It is the responsibility of the authorized person entering the cavity to carry a portable # y radiation monitor into the cavity.

6.

Before leaving the cavity, the authorized person must check to see that all persons have left the cavity.

In the event that a person is inadvertently locked in the cavity, a spare key to the limited access gate at the entrance to the labyrinth is secured in a glass, sealed container mounted on the cavity side of the gate on the labyrinth wall.

A safe exit can be made by breaking the glass, removing the key, and unlocking the gate.

Also, the intrusion alarm, described in Section 5.2.6, will indi-cate any movement within the labyrinth during and after working hours.

7.

When the gate has been closed, the authorized person who has entered the cavity must return the gate key to its position in the control panel and lock the key in place.

8.

It is an administrative requirement that the CFX radio-graphic shutter must be locked shut at all times when operations being carried out do not require the port to be open.

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i 6.0 Operatino Procedures 2

6.1 Review and ADoroval of Procedures for Exoeriments - The CFX has been approved by the Eastman Kodak Radiation Protection' Committee for neutron activation and neutron radiographic use by established procedures.

Radiation surveys of the area are made under the direction of the~ Radiation Safety Supervisor to deter-mine that radiation doses are below regulatory limits for all anticipated modes of operation.

Any departure from established procedure which is likely to increase radiation levels in areas occupied by personnel must be reviewed and approved by the Radia-tion Protection Committee before such changes are made.

The operation of the CFX facility will be the responsibility i

of the Group Leader in charge of neutron activation analysis and i

1 in his absence the Acting Group Leader.

The operations associated with neutron activation analysis will be carried out entirely by these two people and the personnel assigned to the neutron activa-tion area.

Neutron radiography work may. involve people from other divisions in setting up the experiments.

Such people will be permitted to enter the radiation cavity only on approval of the Group Leader in charge and when accompanied by him or by one of the technicians assigned to the neutron activation area who will be responsible for operation of the CFX.

6.2 Control of Access to the Radiation Cavity - Only people l

whose names are on the authorized list for entry into the radiation cavit:r will be permitted to enter without special permission.

The 1:,st of authorized names has been prepared and listed under Section A1.1.

i Persons who are not on the authorized list to enter the radia-tion cavity must obtain permission to do so from the Group Leader in charge and must be accompanied to the cavity by a person on the authorized list.

If the Group Leader in charge is not avail-able to give permission for entry, then permission can be obtained from the Radiation Safety Supervisor, or the Unit Director.

In any of these cases, before granting permission, the person respon-sible will first determine the status of operations in the cavity.

The gate to the radiation cavity is normally locked.

Access to the cavity may be obtained by personnel on the approved list by taking the following steps.

1.

Obtain from the Group Leader in charge or acting leader the key to the locked drawer (Limited Access Drawer) group in the control room in which the Master Key for the Kirk interlock system is kept when not in use.

This key must always be returned to the drawer when not in use and the drawer locked during non-working hours.

By use of the Master Key, the Gate Key can be removed from the control panel of the 14 MeV Generator.

2.

Check the monitor systems in the control room to ascer-O tain that radiation levels in the cavity are not above those normally observed with the 14 MeV neutron generators off and the

i 4

CFX on at full power with the neutron radiography port of the CFX O

closed.

The monitors to be checked are the area gamma-ray monitor and the readings from the ionization chambers of the CFX.

If all readings are normal and no visible or audible alarms are on, remove the Gate Key from the control panel of the 14 MeV Generator and proceed with the next step.

3.

A plug must be removed from the plug-box by each person t

about to enter the cavity.

If the authorized person is accompanied by other persons, the authorized person must see that this proce-dure is followed.

4.

Using the Gate Key for the Kirk interlock system, the gate at the entrance to the labyrinth leading to the cavity is unlocked and the light key removed.

5.

Pick up a portable survey meter to monitor radiation in the cavity.

This survey meter is kept on a table at the entrance 4

l to the cavity when not

,,n use.

Check batteries and response to standard source.

6.

Disarm the motion monitor.

i 7.

Proceed through the labyrinth to the entrance of the cavity where a single-unit Kirk interlock is located.

Insert the Light Key and turn.

This turns on the overhead lights in the

{}

cavity.

8.

When work is completed in the cavity, the authorized l

person mugl check.t.212.1.t]lB1 All other persons have lait..the cavity.

He picks up the portable survey meter and removes the Light Key from the Kirk lock at the cavity entrance.

This turns off the overhead lights.

On leaving the labyrinth area, the motion monitor must be rearmed.

9.

Proceed to the labyrinth entry gate, leave the portable I

survey meter on the table, and close the gate.

l 10.

Insert the Light Key into the double-unit Kirk lock and, using the Gate Key, lock the gate.

See that all plugs are returned to the plug-box.

11.

Return the Gate Key to the triple Kirk unit on the con-trol panel of the 14 MeV Generator and lock it into position.

6.3 operatino Procedure for CFX -

1.

Operating with radiographic port closed.

a.

Obtain the key for the Limited Access Drawer in the control room from the Group Leader in charge.

b.

Unlock drawer and obtain CFX power key and radio-graphic port key.

I

j c.

Place CFX power key in CFX control panel and proceed O

according to the operating instructions for CFX startup, as fol-lows:

Note the date and time of startup, along with the operator's' initials.

Check that the following trip, interlock and scram mechanisms are functioning properly: manual scram, linear scram, high log scram, period scram; the ten-second period check; the control rod interlock; and if the radiography port is to be used, the shutter interlock.

In addition, an operational check of one of the above gggam mechanisms is to be checked on a rotating basis with the Cf source partially in (5%) and the control rods partially withdrawn (5%).

The results of all of the above tests are to be recorded in the CFX operations log before actual use of the device.

d.

When operation is completed, shut down the CFX and note the date and time of shutdown along with the accumulated run

time, e.

Return key to limited access drawer.

' 2.

Operating with radiographic port open.

a.

Obtain the key for the Limited Access Drawer in the control room from the Group Leader in charge.

' ()

b.

Obtain the Master Key and CFX power key and radio-I' graphic port key from the drawer; ascertain that the CFX is shut down and, using the Procedure for Access to the Radiation Cavity, enter the radiation cavity.

r c.

Unlock the CFX radiographic port and open the shut-ter.

This is a manual operation.

Retain the CFX keys.

I d.

Leave the cavity and close and secure the cavity according to the Procedure for Access to the Radiation Cavity.

e.

Turn on the CFX as described in Ic.

f.

When the operation of the CFX has been completed, shut the CFX down as in Id.

g.

Remove the CFX Keys from the CFX control panel, h.

Proceed to the radiation cavity using the Procedure for Access to the Radiation Cavity.

i.

Close and lock the shutter on the radiographic port of the CFX.

Retain the CFX keys.

j.

Return to the control room using the reverse Proce-O dure for Access to the Radiation Cavity..

k.

Return the Gate Key to the 14 MeV Generator control panel and lock it into the Kirk lock.

1.

Return CFX keys to Limited Access Drawer.

6.4 operatina Limitations -

1.

At least once every seven operating days it is necessary to check that all the controls and interlocks are working properly.

2.

Samples will not be introduced into the neutron activa-tion positions of the CFX without approval of the authorized opera-tors.

It will be the responsibility of the Group Leader to assure that no mhterials of unknown nature, no Special Nuclear Materials, and no materials which may be detonated are permitted to enter the sample activation posations of the CFX.

3.

No samples weighing more than 25 grams will be permitted to be placed in the neutron activation positions of the CFX.

1 4.

Only individuals authorized by the Unit Director or Group Leader responsible for the neutron activation analysis area will be permitted to operate the CFX.

Authorized people will include the Unit Director responsible for the neutron activation analysis area, the Group Leader in charge of neutron activation analysis, and personnel responsible to the Group Leader in charge l

and approved by him to operate the CFX.

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7.0 Emeroency Procedures 7.1 General - In case of an emergency involving the CFX 4

during normal working hours, the declaration of an emergency and initiation of emergency procedures will be the responsibility of the Group Leader in charge or in his absence the Radiation Safety Supervisor.

In the case of absence of both of these people from the immediate area, the senior technical person of the neutron activation analysis group who is present will take charge until the arrival of the. Group Leader or Radiation Safety Supervisor.

The person in charge will see that the CFX and the 14 MeV generator are turned off if they are operating.

He will see that all per-sonnel not needed in the area evacuate the radiation cavity and control room.

He will notify the RSS, the Unit Director respon-sible for the area and the company Radiation Safety Officer.

The Unit Director or in his absence the Division Director will notify if deemed necessary, Plant Security.

In case of an emergency outside normal working hours, the Plant Security Guards, who have discovered the existence of pos-sible emergency conditions while patrolling the area, will notify the Group Leader in charge of the area, or, if he is not available, the Unit Director responsible for the area.

If the Group Leader determines that emergency conditions probably exist, he will notify the Unit Director and the RSS for the area.

These people will proceed immediately to the area.

No one will be permitted to O

enter the cavity until the Group Leader or the Unit Director arrives.

7.2 Zirt - In case of a fire, the Kodak Park Fire Department will be notified.

The firemen will be permitted to enter the cavity only by the Group Leader or other responsible person in charge after that person has determined that there is no radiation i

hazard.

The firemen will be expected to consult with the Group Leader or other responsible person in charge before taking steps to combat the fire.

The cavity is also protected by an automatic sprinkler system and with fire extinguishers located in the cavity and the control room.

Since the cavity is underground and external to the building, the CFX is not likely to be affected by fire in the building.

The Kodak Park Fire Department has been

,nstructed in the special hazards associated with the CFX.

7.3 Flood - In case of a flood in the cavity, the Group Leader or other responsible person in charge will see that the CFX is turned off.

He will call Building Maintenance people and take steps to see that the sump pumps located in the labyrinth leading into the cavity (Figure 3) are operating and if not to get them into operation.

If this fails and water is rising to a flood level, the Kodak Park Fire. Department will be called to pump out the cavity.

It should be noted that a flood would not be a hazard for the CFX.

For more information on flooding and its affect on criticality, see appended letter from C. A. Preskitt,

(}

Vice President of Intelcom Rad. Tech. (A5.0). -

7.4 Airborne Radioactivity - Hazardous exposures to air-borne lll radioactive materials are virtually impossible since the double aluminum housing should contain by-product materials and uranium for the life of the CFX.

There is the very remote possibility that the aluminum housing of the fuel plates could deteriorate to the point at which gaseous by-products could escape.

There is also the possibility that spills of radiolabeled compounds in the radiotracer trea could enter the cavity, since the cavity is at negative pressure relative to the surrounding laboratories.

The activities of agreement materials typically handled in these areas range from fractions of a microcurie to several millicuries.

Tritium could be released from a 6 curie titanium Tritide source sealed in the 14 MeV neutron generator, in the unlikely event that the double wall stainless housing was breached.

i An accident involving the release of radioactivity from the fuel plates will be indicated by abnormally high readings on the portable survey meters and/or the area gamma-ray monitor.

In this' case, the Group Leader, RSS, or other responsible person in charge will evacuate the cavity and shut down the CFX.

He will

{

measure the ambient radiation level in the control room and if it is greater than 0.2 mR/hr, he will determine the source of radia-(

tion and if necessary all nonessential personnel will be evacuated from the control room and the doors leading to the control room from hallway C012H and preparatory laboratory C012J (Figures 2 and 3) will be closed.

The Radiation Safety Supervisor, the Unit O

Director responsible for the area, RSO and the Division Director will be notified.

The radiation level in the control room will be rechecked by the RSS.

If it is found to be over 5 mR/hr, the two doors leading to the control room will be sealed.

The radia-tion level outside these doors will be surveyed by the RSS and a decision made by him on the need for further evacuation of the area.

The RSS and Unit Director responsible for the area will define a control zone in which personnel will not be permitted to enter without permission of the Unit Director.

Following consul-tations with the ATD Division Director, members of the Eastman Kodak Radiation Protection Committee, representatives of Intelcom Rad Tech, and if necessary local, state, and federal regulatory agencies, a decision will be made on the subsequent course of action.

7.5 Contamination -

7.5.1 The following results will be the basis for at least a temporary shutdown of the CFX and an investigation involving the Radiation Safety Officer.

1.

5 nCi or more of removable alpha activity in the radiography port.

2 2.

100 pCi/100 cm or more of beta activity, other ggg than tritium, on or near the CFX.

7.5.2 If monitoring indicates that body surfaces are contaminated, the approval of the Radiation Safety Supervisor is necessary before the contaminated individual can leave the labor-atory area.

Decontamination by methods other than washing with soap and water require consultation with the medical department.

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8.0 Maintenance and Disposal 8.1 Maintenance - Any work which requires manipulation of the aluminum fuel container of the CFX will be performed by IRT or a similar agency which is qualified to work with fuel plates.

8.2 Discosal - There is no special nuclear material waste from the area; however the CFX and 14 Mev neutron generator acti-vate samples contained in sealed polyethylene capsules. These capsules and the other radioactive vaste from the neutron activa-tion and radiotracer area is packaged following the requirements of the DOT and New York State.

The packaged waste is shipped to a government regulated landfill.

When the fuel plates become obsolete, they will be transferred to a licensed disposal agency.

The facility will be decontaminated in accordance with Annex A, Guidelines 12r Decontamination 21 Faci:,itios in,5) Eauioment Prior M Release 12I Unrestricted yte gr n

Term:,nat,on 21 Licenses 12r Bvoroduct, Source. Er Soecial Nuclear Material, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 1976 (or current version).

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i.

t APPENDIX (Demonstration Section)

A1.0 Personal Resumes i

A1.1 Analvtical Technoloav Division Personnel i

Dr. P. D. LaFleur Dr. Philip D. LaFleur was born in Anaconda, Montana, and attended public schools in Idaho Falls, Idaho.

He attended the Idaho State College, Pocatello, Idaho, and received the Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry in 1955.

i After service as an officer in the United States Army, Dr.

LaFleur was employed in the Health and Safety Division of the l

United States Atomic Energy Commission at the National Reactor l

Testing Station (NRTS) in Idaho.

He received a Master of Science degree from the University of Idaho while employed at NRTS.

He entered the University of Michigan in 1962, and received the Doctor l

of Philosophy degree, with a major in physical chemistry, in 1967.

1 Dr. LaFleur joined the staff at the National Bureau of Stan-i dards in 1966.

He was named Chief of the Activation Section of the Analytical Chemistry Division in 1968, and Chief of the Analytical Chemistry Division in 1973.

When the Bureau was reorganized in 1977, he became Director of the Center for l

Analytical Chemistry.

l In 1979, Dr. LaFleur joined the Eastman Kodak Company.

He l

had several assignments in the Analytical Sciences Division of the Research Laboratories, and is presently serving as Director of the Analytical Technology Division, Applied Technology Organ-ization, Kodak Park.

l He has served as a member of the Board of Directors of the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards, a Titular Member of Commission V.2 (Microchemistry and Trace Analysis) of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, the Inter-agency Committee of the Association of Official Analytical Chem-ists, a member of the National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council Committee on Analytical Chemistry, and the Execu-tive Committee of the Analytical Chemistry Division of the American Chemical Society.

He has served as a committee chairman, program chairman, or general chairman for a number of national and inter-national conferences and symposia.

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Dr. James R. Coleman BS Biology-Chemistry, St. Peter's College, Jersey City, NJ, 1959 MS Biology (Histochemistry - Microscopy) New York University, New York Cit

.PhD Zoology (Biophysics)y, 1961 Duke University, Durham, NC, 1964 Post Doctoral Fellow, Duke University, Durham, NC, 1965 i

Dr. Coleman joined Eastman Kodak in 1982, in the Microscopy Section of the Industrial Laboratory.

In 1985 he became Unit Director of the Microscopy and Surface Science section.

The following year Dr. Coleman became the Unit Director of the Analytical Technology Division's Atomic Spectroscopy and Surface Science section.

Later that year, he was appointed Assistant Division Director of the Analytical Technology Division.

Prior to joining Eastman Kodak he was Associate Professor of Radiation Biology and Biophysics at the University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentastry.

He joined the faculty of the University of Rochester in 1965 and was active in research in-volving electron microscopy, X-ray Microanalysis, molecular genetics and mineral metabolism.

()

Mr. John Tritten B.S. in Chemistry, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1970 M.S. in Analytical Chemistry, Iowa State University, 1974 i

Mr. Tritten joined Eastman Kodak as a chemist in 1974 in the Optical Emission Spectroscopy section of the Industrial i

Laboratory.

The following year he became the group supervisor of the Atomic Absorption Spectroscopy section.

In 1977, he added Inductively Coupled Plasma-Optical Emission Spectroscopy (ICP-i l

OES) as a new company technique and assumed the group leader responsibilities of this area.

Two years later the ICP-OES and Atomic Absorption groups were combined into one section under Mr. Tritten.

In'1982 he became the group supervisor of the Industrial Laboratory's Electrochemistry section.

In 1986, he was made the Director of the Atomic Spectroscopy Unit of the Analytical Technology Division.

Dr. Tim Z. Hossain PhD Chemistry (Radionuclear), University of Kentucky, 1982

'()

Dr. Hossain joined the Eastman Kodak Com any in 1982.

He has done extensive research using neutron act vation methods.

As a graduate student he had experience with the nuclear reactors at -

the University of Missouri and the University of Georgia Tech. He

()

has also done several nuclear engineering experiments at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

Dr. Hossain is trained in the use of neutron absorption in the context of chemical analysis.

Hisdoctorab$2research involved the use of an isotopic neutron source such as Cf, reactor thermal neutrons as well as 14 MeV neutrons obtained from a deuterium-tritium accelerator.

Dr. Hossain is now group leader for the Neutron Activation Analysis Area.

Mr. Craia C. Swanson 2 years (Mathematics major) Theil College, Greenville, PA Mr. Swanson has been employed as a laboratory assistant and technician in the neutron activation area of the Anaalytical Sciences Division since June 17, 1974.

His duties have included the. preparation of samples for neutron activation analysis and the processing of data from such analyses.

This has included samples for activation by the 14 MeV generator and the CFX.

Mr. Walter Mulars Jr.

OU i

AAS, Erie County Community College BS, University of Rochester Mr. Mularz joined Eastman Kodak Company and the Research Laboratories in 1970.

During his first six years of employment, i

he worked in the radiotracer area performing radioisotope labelling and radiotracer studies.

In 1980, he returned to assume the radio-tracer responsibilities.

At this time, Walt became the Radiation Safety Supervisor in the neutron activation-radiotracer laboratory.

He attended a short course in Basic Health Physics at Louisiana State University in the spring of 1980.

O ;

s A1.2 Radiation Protection Committee O

Bruce H. Klanderman, PhD. Director of Occupational Health Laboratory - Dr. Klanderman joined the Company in 1963 as a Research Chemist.

In this Division he advanced to Senior Chemist and Technical Associate.

In 1974, he transferred to the Synthetic Chemicals Division and held a number of staff and line positions including Department Head and Chairman of the TSCA 8(a)

Chemical Inventory Committee.

In 1978, Dr. Klanderman was appointed to the General Management Steff, as Technical Assistant to the General Manager.

He was appointed Director of Environ-mental Technical Services in 1980.

This group merged with the Health and Environment Laboratories (HAEL) in 1984.

He is presently the Director of the Occupaticaal Health Laboratory)of HAEL.

Dr. Klanderman received a,BA' degree in chemistry (ACS 3

from Calvin College in 1959.

He receiwcd a MS and PhD degree in; organic chemistry from the University of Illinois in 1961 and 1963.

E. Scott Harter Committee Chairman - Mr. Harter joined the Industrial Hygiene Section of the Health and Environment Laboratories in 1978 as a staff industrial hygienist and acting Radiation Safety Officer.

In 1979 he became the Radiation Safety Officer and assumed the position of Committee Secretary in 1980.

In 1S85, he was promoted to the position of Industrial Hygiene Section Supervisor.

Mr. Harter received an MS degree in Industrial Hygiene from the University of Cincinnati in 1979.

O His graduate and post graduate course work has included four courses in Health Physics.

His undergraduate work was completed at the Pennsylvania State University where he received a BS in biology in 1976.

Mr. Harter is certified in the Comprehensive Practice of Industrial Hygiene by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene.

John H. Hever Radiation Safet" Officer and Conmittee Secretary - Mr. Heyer joined the Industrual Hygiene Secthon of the Health and Enynronment Laboratories in 1982 as a staff industrial hygienist.

In 1983 he was appointed to the position of Assistant Radiation Safety Officer.

Mr. Heyer received an MS degree in Industrial Health from the University of Michigan in 1981.

His graduate curriculum included a course in Health Physics.

Mr. Heyer attended a one week training course for radia-tion safety officers in 1983, presented by Applied Health Physics.

His undergraduate work was at St. Lawrence University, where he received a BS degree in Biology in 1978.

Mr. Heyer

,s certified in the Comprehensive Practice of Industrial Hygiene by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene.

Sharon M. Rucinski, Assistant Radiation Safety Officer - In 1980 Ms. Rucinski joined the Health and Environmental Laboratories as an industrial hygiene technician.

Prior to working for Eastman Kodak Company she worked as a radiation therapy technologist for O

Strong Memornal Hospital, Rochester, N.Y.

Ms. Rucinski received an AAS degree in Radiation Therapy from Erie Community College in 1976.

In 1980 she attended an ionizing radiation course presented _-

~

by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

~

(NIOSH).

Ms. Rucinski received a BS degree in Natural Sciences 1

from the University of Rochester in 1982, and has completed a j

graduate course in Health Physics.

She was appointed to the position of Assistant Radiation Safety Officer in 1983.

Judith S. Nau, Assistant Radiation Safety Officer - In 1985 Ms.1Nau joined the Health and Environment Laboratories as an industrial hygiene technician.

Prior to this, Ms. Nau worked as a Radiological Technologist for 29 years, the last seven in the Eastman Kodak Medical Department.

In 1958 she. graduated from the Rochester General Hospital School of Medical X-ray Technology.

She is registered with the American Registry of Radiologic Technologist in X-ray Technology.

In 1984 she received an AAS degree from Monroe Community College in Radiologic Technology.

e't Ms. Nau also attended a one week training course for radiation s'ofety officers in 1986-presented by Applied Health Physics.

She was appointed to the position of Assistant Radiation Safety Officer in 1986.

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A2.0 Instrumentation For wipe tests:

Liquid Scintillation Spectrophotometer with an Absolute Activity Analyzer, Alpha Scintillation Counter and Gas Proportional Counter Personnel Monitor Geiger-Mueller Beta-Gamma Hand & Foot Monitor Area Monitors:

A.

Portablt 1.

Beta-Gamma Geiger Counters 2.

BF3 Fast-Slow Neutron Counters 3.

Sphere Neutron Dosimeter (Lil Detector)

B.

Stationary 1.

Geiger-Mueller Ganma'. Monitor 2.

BF3 Neutron Detectors l

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A3.0 O

Table I Performance and Desian Characteristics of CFX 252Cf Source 3 mg 2350 Loading 1582.62 grams Uranium Enrichment 93.4%

Fuel Form Aluminum-Clad Alloy Plates (MTR Type)

Moderator Polyethylene Maximum k,gg 0.990 235 k gg Increase for 20-gram U sample 0.004 Co,ntrol Poison Cadmium, Aluminum Clad shutdown k,gg 0.773 Fission Power Level 11.4 Watts

(

d e.

i A3.0 (Continued)

Table II CFX GAMMA AND NEUTRON INTENSITIES MAy, 1985 Fast Thermal Gamma Neutron Neutron 3 tem Intensity Intensity Intensity Total No.

Neasurement Location (mR/h)

(arem/h) (mrem /h)

(mrem /h) 1 Accelerator Table 1.0 2.3 0.3 3.6 2

Cooling Unit for Accelerator 0.6 1.2 (0.1 1.8 3

10 ft. from Radiographic Port 1.1 3.0 0.4 4.5 4

5 ft. from Radiographic Port 2.0 5.8 0.5 8.3 5

Top of Paraffin Block 6 3 ft.

5.0 12.6 0.8 18.4 from Radiographic Port 6

Top of Paraffin Block 0 1 ft.

12.5 20.2 1.3 34 from Radiographic Port 7

Top of CFX, front edge, above 6.0 25.3 1.5 32.8 Radiographic Port B

Right side of CFX $ 1 ft.

1.6 5.6 0.7 7.9 from CFX panels 9

Right side of CFX 9 3 ft.

2.5 6.8 0.5 9.8 from CFX panels O

10 Left side of CFX 9 1 ft.

3.5 10.1 0.8 14.4 from CFX panels 11 Left side of CFX 0 3 ft.

3.5 8.3 0.3 12.1 from CFX panels 12 Cavity Entrance 1.1 1.8 0.3 3.2 13 Sump Pumps 0.2 0.9 (0.1 1.1 14 Labyrinth Entrance (Gate)

(0.1 (0.1 (0.1 (0.1 15 Control Room (0.1 (0.1 (0.1 (0.1 NOTES:

1). The activity of the Cf-252 source on this date was one Curie.

2) The CFX was at full power during the measurements.

~

3) Reference Industrial Hygiene Report 85153.

4) A permanent guard is installed about three feet from the front panels of the CFX (Fig. 6).

Radiation intensities at this guard will correspond to Item Nos. 5, 9 & 11 in the table.

5) Routine work in the cavity consists of accelerator preparation for approxi-mately five minutes per week. Most of this time is spent at the " Cooling Unit" which corresponds to Item No. 2 in the Table.

6) If personnel plan to work in the cavity for more than two hours on any given day, the proposed work must be reviewed by the RSS. The RSS will consider time, distance, and intensity to be sure that doses will be within legal limits. The RSO reviews film badge reports and will modify time limits if appropriate.

O A4.0 Statistical Summary of Film Badae Monitorino Results The following tables describe anr.ual whole Body Dose Ranges (Rems) for personnel working in the CFX laboratory area for recent years.

Doses include neutron, beta and gamma exposures and are for the most part a result of radioactive material handling.

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SUGGESTED DRAFT FORMAT FOR THE REPORTING OF RECORDED PERSONNEL WHOLE 500Y EXPOSURES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 19 E istC License No(s).

Licensee Reporting (Name & Address)

Eastman Kodak Company S201-1513 Attn: E. Scott Harter Bldg. 320, Kodak Park Rochester, New York 14650 IF PERSONNEL MONITORING WAS NOT REQUIRED 0

DURING THE YEAR, CHECK THIS BOX.

OTHERWISE, C0WLETE THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

Number of Individuals Annual Whole Body Dose in Each Range Ranges * (Rems) 2 No Measurable Exposure 2

Measurable Exposure Less Than 0.100 0.100 -- 0.250 0.250 -

0.500 0.500 -- 0.750 0.750 -- 1.000 1.000 -- 2.000 2.000 -- 3.000 3.000 -- 4.000 4.000 -- 5.000 5.000 -- 6.000 6.000 -- 7.000 7.000 -- 8.000 8 000 -- 9.000 9.000 - 10.000 10.000 -- 11.000 11.000 -- 12.000

>12.000 4

Total number of individuals reported The above infmnation is submitted for the total nunber of individuals for whom personnel monitoring was (check one):

l required under 10 CFR 20.202(a) or 10 CFR 34.33(a) during the calendar year.

provided during the calendar year.

• Individual values exactly equal to the values separating ecosure ranges shall be reported in the higher range.

Report prepared by:

(716) 722-6927 E. Scott Harter Telephone Nureer Name

SUGGESTED DRAFT FORMAT FOR THE REPORTING 0F RECORDE0.

PERSONNEL WHOLE 800Y EXPOSURES FOR CALENOAR YEAR 19g8 Licensee Reporting (Name & Address)

NRCLicenseNo(s).

s Eastman Kodak Company Bldg. 320, Kodak Park Division SNM - 1513 Rochester, New York 14650 Attn:

E. S. Harter l

IF PERSONNEL MONITORING WAS NOT REQUIRED l

DURING THE YEAR, CHECK THIS 80X.

OTHERWISE. CopFLETE THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

Number of Individuals Annual Whole Body Dose in Each Range Ranges * (Rams) 1 No Measurable Exposure Measurable Exposure Less Than 0.100 0.100 -- 0.250 0.250 -- 0.500 0.500 -- 0.750 0.750 -- 1.000 1.000 -- 2.000 2.000 -- 3.000 3.000 -- 4.000 4.000 -- 5.000 5.000 -- 6.000 6.000 -- 7.000 7.000 -- 8.000 8.000 -- 9.000 9.000 -- 10.000 10.000 -- 11.000 11.000 -- 12.000

> 12.000 Total number of individuals reported 3

The above information is submitted for the total number of individuals for whom personnelmonitoringwas(checkone):

required under 10 CFR 20.202(a) or 10 CFR 34.33(a) during the calendar year.

l /7

] provided during the calendar year.

V

• Individual values exactly equal to the values separating exposure ranges shall be reported in the higher range.

E. Scott Harter (716) 722-6927 Report prepared by:

Telephone Number Name

SUGGESTED DRAFT FORMAT FOR THE REPORTING OF RECORDED PERSONNEL WHOLE BODY EXPOSURES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 19 86

. Licensee Reporting (Nane & Address)

NRC License No(s).

Eastman Kodak Company SMI - 1513 l

Kodak Park, Bldg. 320, HAEL f

Rochester, N.Y. 14650 Attn. John H. Heyer, RSO IF PERSONNEL MONITORING WAS NOT REQUIRE 0 DURING THE YEAR, CHECK THIS BOX.

OTHERWISE, COPFLETE THE FOLLdWING TABLE:

Nunber of Individuals Annual Whole Body Dose in Each Range Ranges * (Rems) no Measurable Exposure 4

3 Measurable Exposure Less Then 0.100 0.100 -- 0.250 0.250 -

0.500 0.500 -- 0.750 0.750 -- 1.000

.1.000 -- 2.000 2.000.- 3.000 3.000 -- 4.000 4.000 -- 5.000 5.000 -- 6.000

,6.000 -- 7.000 7.000 - 8.000 8.000 - 9.000 0.000 - 10.000 10.000 - 11.000 11.000 12.000

>12.000 7

Total number of individuals reported The above information is submitted for the total number of individuals for whom personnel monitoring was (check one):

required under 10 CFR 20.202(a) or 10 CFR 34.33(a) during the calendar 33 _ year.

] provided during the calendar year.

• Individual values exactly equal to the values ' separating exposure ranges shall be reported in the higher range.

Report prepared by:

John H. Heyer 716-722-6942 Nase Telephone Museer

}

D F

A5.0 Supporting Documents from IRT O

O _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

[

Eo'rporation

]

Instrumentation iResearch / Technology O

4 April 3, 1981 Mr. C. F. Oster Kodak *Research Lab Building 82 Rochester, New York 14650

Dear Carl:

The attached copies of correspondence cover our communication with the NRC regarding the risk of inadvertent criticality in the CFX.

The question of accidental criticality was a central issue in the design of the CFX as well as the test program that confirmed the adequacy of the design and resulted in issuance of the CFX license. Our initial authorization allowed loading of the CFX to k gg= 0.950 for the purpose of conducting tests e

to confirm safety. These tests included simulated flooding of the activation and n-ray ports as well as the addition of test samples for activation. The fact that the system was optimally moderated was confirmed, and a small modification to the H/U ratio was made to achieve the exact optimum observed in the tests. Various other reactivity effects were investigated and reported to the NRC.

Altogether, the only means to achieve criticality in the CFX is to add additional 235U to the system. Measurements determined the minimum necessary 235U when added at the activation position.

amount to be 33 grams of I hope this infortcation will satisfy your needs.

If additional information is required, please feel free to call either me or Kay Crosbie.

Sincerely yours, C. A. Preskitt Chief Scientist Nuclear Systems Division CAPado

Enclosure:

NRC Communications 7650 Convoy Court

• P.O. Box 80817

• San Diego, Cafifornia 92138 714 / 565-7171

• Telex: 69-5412

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UNI 5 'ID STATES

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINCTON, D.C. 20545 i

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JUN 191974 L:FFR:JCD 70-1359 SNM-1405, Amendment No.1 l

l I

Intelcom Industries Incorporated I

ATTH:

Dr. C. A. Preskitt, Vice President Intelcom Rad Tech P. O. Box 80817 San Diego, California 92138 Gentlemen:

d Pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, Special Nuclear Material L.icense No. SNM-1405 is hereby amended to authorize the construc-tion and use of a subcritical assembly in accordance with the statements, representations and conditions specified in the licensee's application dated January 24, 1974, except that as a condition of this license amend-ment k,ff of the assembly shall not exceed 0.950.

All other conditions of this license shall remain the same.

l The purpose of issuing this amendment is to enable you to construct the assembly and obtain experimental data to determine the accuracy of your calculations in designing the subassembly. Of particular interest to us i+#i.

are the effects of additional shielding or reflectors, measured radiation levels, function of fail-safe features, the effect of accident conditions, verification of optimum moderation conditions, structural integrity of components, expansion and temperature coefficients and thermal power.

In addition to the experimental data an extrapolation of the data to keff

• 0.990 should be provided.

In addition to the above data some other information is needed before we can further consider operation at k,ff = 0.990 as follows:

1.

Describe the mechanism for automatically moving the Cf source.

Describe also the shielding.

2.

Is the shutter door fail-safe? Describe.

3.

What is to prevent the further withdrawal of a control 0.990 is attained by one of your customers i

red after k

=

or by you?,ff m

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It is anticipated that there may be further questions after the receipt of the above information. Accordingly, it is suggested that you try to have all data to us by July 15, 1974.

j.

l FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMilSSION A

L. C. Rouse, Chief Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Branch e

Directorate of Licensing s

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V August 28, 1974 United States Atomic Energy Commission Attn: Mr. L. C. Rouse, Chief Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Branch Directorate of Licensing Wa shington, D. C.

20545 Gentlemen:

In response to requests in your letter of June 19, 1974 authorizing Amendment No. I to SNM-1405 we submit the following experimental info rmation. These data were obtained in loading the subcritical CFX 235 assembly with up to 1261. 04 grams of U.

The minimum reactivity was determined to be -$8.14 which corresponds to k,ff of. 946 assuming Eeff =. 007.

The reactivity effects of additional shielding or reflectors was determined by covering the 4 inch thick polyethylene reflector with im m 4 to 6 inches of additional poly or parafin over SCF/o of the area.

The reactivity effect was measured to be negligible with a change of Ao of $0. 01 (6k/k = 0. 00007).

The radiation levels around the operating suberitical assembly (k,ff. 95) were measured with only a portion of the final shielding e

present. The final shield configuration, which will primarily consist of a concrete block wall, will allow 10 mr/Lr or less radiation into the The position of the cell where authorized personnel have access.

measured radiation levels were not made with the additional concrete wall in place, only with the lead and blocl s of water-extended-polyester (WEP) mixed with boron that are immediately adjacent to the reflector.

252Cf Scaling the measured data, which was taken with a 108p gram 252 cource in the assembly, to a 1 m gram Cf source we determined the following doses:

h ]p y g/ flf (

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f taso convoy cows. som aos t 7. San Does. comone et13e (?141545-7171

' United States Atomic Energy Commission August 28, 1974 h--

Page 2-I Dose Y

n Position mr/hr mrem /hr e

20' from assembly

7. 7 18.5 6' from assembly 35.2' 120.4 front edge of assembly 315 833 top of assembly 259 93 Assuming the assembly is finally loaded to a reactivity that corresponds to a k,ff of 0 990, these doses should be multiplied by a factor of 5. 4 for a system with the same shielding configuration. The additional con-crete shield is expected to be adequate based on these measurements.

The function of the fail-safe features of the Californium Flux Multiplier (CFX) is to shut down the CFX (f. e. scram the safety rods 25 2Cf source from the core) if the high level flux trips and remove the on either the linear or log channel is exceeded, if the period on the pU log channel is too short, or if power is lost. In addition, the safety rod drive motors are in series with a low level flux trip that must be exceeded before the safety rods can be withdrawn from the core to increase the reactivity of the assembly. These features have been checked daily and found to be functional every day that the CFX has been operated. There have been no malfunctions of the fail-safe features 4

during this period.

The effect of accident considerations was experimentally considered by measuring the change in reactivity when the radiography port was completely illled with hi-density polyethylene and the fast neutron activa-tion port with a lucite rod. This corresponds to flooding of these ports with water. The reactivity of the system was found to change by 62d -- -

much less than the $1.44 needed to go critical with the assembly 1oaded to a k,gg of 0 99. The effect of adding 235U to the central region of the CFX was measured by placing a poly vial of UO2 n the central flux trap.

i Total amount of 235U was 16. 21 grams. (The maximum amount a standard l'

2 dram poly vial can hold of 93% enriched UO2 w uld be somewhat less than this, approximately 14 grams). The total change in reactivity 235U. Again this reactivity change was found to be 66d or 4.1d per gram of is insufficient to cause criticality even at the fullloading o'f the CFX.

Indeed, all of these effects taken simultaneously are insufficient to cause

[

criticality.

e

~

Unitad States Atomic Ensrgy Commisci:n August 28, 1974 Page 3 -

l The thickness of the polyethylene moderator plates were varied to investigate the optimum moderation conditions for fuel loading. The reactivity results listed below were obtained for the hydrogen to uranium ratios listed.

1 H/U p($)

511

-8.84-426

-8.68 342

-10. 87.

It appears that the broad peak in the optimum hydrogen to uranium ratio for the CFX is slightly less than the 500 to 1 that we had originally calculated. The final loading of fuel to a k,ff of 0. 990 will be made at a H to U ratio of 426. to 1 These data substantiate our claim that either the addition (flooding) or loss (disassembly) of moderation will result in a loss of reactivity.

(J Dur.ing the initial loading and operating period of the CFX the

. structural integrating of the components has been found to be adequate.

The technique of applying a small amount of pressure to one end of each fuel box has worked very well in maintaining an absence of voids in the fuel region yet allowing for an efficient fuelloading operation.

At the present k,ff the accurate measurement of the temperature coefficient is a very difficult task since it is expected to be on the order of -1. 6 x 10-4 /Co. We would like to defer this measurement until the CFX is loaded to its design value of k,ff = 0. 990. The thermal power produced in the CFX was determined from neutron flux measurements to

0. 8 watts. Consequently, the thermal power output at full fuel loading should be approximately 4. 3 watts.

The additional information requested in your letter is listed below in the same order as the questions.

1) The Cf source drive mechanism assembly drawing is contained 252 in Appendix 2 (RT048J0011A) of the CFX Description and Safety Analysis that was submitted with our license application dated January 24, 1974.

The function of this mechanism is to move the Cf source from a lead storage pig located in the WEP shielding to the central core region and back again. During a scram or when the operate key is turned off the a

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i United States Atomic Energy Commission j;

. August 28, 1974

_(

Page 4

- the source automatically moves to the storage postion. During a scram that is caused by a power failure the Cf source may be moved by a manual crank located on top of the assembly above the WEP shielding.

The radiation shielding for the' CFX is described above. The remaining component of the shielding is the concrete block wall that will e

have a surface radiation level of 10 mr/hr or less when the CFX is

+

operating.

2) The shutter door of the CFX can be open when the CFX is ope rating. However, the shutter door interlock is in parallel with the interlock on the cell door and the personnel plug interlock. If either l

- of these interlocks are opened with the shutter door open then the CFX will scram. The personnel plug interlock is an adminstrative feature that requires all personnel entering the limited acess cell to pull a plug and return it for the duration of the stay in the cell. This adminstrative control is in addition to the access door interlock.

3) There is no automatic control on the safety rods other than O

the high level flux trips, the period trip and the low level trip. The intent is to load the CFX to a'k ff of 0. 990. This k,ff will be achieved only at the full out position of the safety rods and no further increases can be made by an operator. We have shown that even in the most extreme cases, i. e. insertion of hi-density polyethylene in the ports to simulate flooding, or insertion of a sample activation analysis vial containing pure enriched uranium oxide, the' increase in reactivity is less than half that needed to take the system to criticality. Of course, these extreme conditions wn1 be precluded by other controls; however, they do illustrate that the CFX, once it is loaded to its design keff, can-not be taken to criticality under any credible operating conditions.

We suggest that the data and experience obtained to date with the CFX confirms the inherent safety of the system as discussed in our l

license application. Therefore, we respectfully request authorization i

to load the assembly to its design multiplication, k,ff = 0. 990. At that loading we will reconfirm the reactivity effects reported above, and will in addition be able to confirm that the expansion and temper-ature coefficients are within safe limits.

5 t

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e United States Atomic' Energy Commission O

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• 28. 1974 Page 5

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We will be pleased to present any further details required to 8

complete your review, including a technical presentation to your staff in Bethesda if desired.

Sincerely yours,

f. d e

/ A C. A. Pre skitt Group Vice President CAP /km o

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UNITED STATES l' M ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION wAsa moron, o.c.

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CCT 3 1574 L:FFR3#1:JCD 70-1359 SNM-1405, Amendment No. 2 Intelcom Industries Incoroorated ATTN: Dr. C. A. Preskitt', Vice President. Intelcom Rad Tech P. O. Box 80817 San Diego, California 92138 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1405 is hereby amended to authorize the construction and use of a subcritical assembly to be operated at a keff not to exceed 0.990 in accordance with the statements, representa-tions and conditions specified in the licensee's application dated January 24, 1974, and the supplement thereto dated August 28,1974 All other conditions of this license shall remain the same.

The purpose of this amendment which increases the maximum operating keff from 0.950 to 0.990 is to enable you to obtain additional information and to further refine the information previously obtained. The attal-ment to this letter contains our further questions and comments.

You will note that some of the co:rrients pertain to procedures and co,trols to be used by licensees who will have obtained a suberitical assembly manufactured by you. Your replies to these comments will be helpful to us in determining the amount of detailed information your customers will have to supply to us when requesting an AEC license.

FOR ThZ. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIO:1 A

l L. C. Rouse, Chief Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Branch No. 1 Directorate of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated l

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uscuyu.Iu l

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INTELCSM RAD TECH a division of INTELCOM INDUSTCIES INCO2PORATED 7650 Convoy Court P.o Box 80817.

San D ego. California 92138 Tel.: (714) 565 717A November 15, 1974 Mr. L. C. Rouse, Chief Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Branch No.1 Directorate of Licensing U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Gentlemen:

Supplementsland II to this letter are our responses to questions raised in your letters dated October 3,1974 and November 13, 1974.

\\

We would also like to amend our original license application to allow a polyethylene plug to be placed in the radiography collimator during activation analysis operations. This has been experimentally determined to have a negligible effect on the system reactivity; how-i ever,it does change the neutron flux in the activation analysis region b y 1 1 To.

Yours truly, b.(?' @ '

C. A. Preskitt, Vice President CAP: ma Enclosures G

i RAD TECH i

n-.

Supplement 1

,ao 1)

The shielding experiment with hydrogenous reflectors was repeated with a fuel loading for a reactivity of -$1. 53 (keff =.989). We now find a small but measureable effect on reactivity with an additional 4" to 6" thick hydrogenous reflector tightly packed around approximately 70To of the f

permanent polyethylene reflector surface. The change in reactivity was 1

measured to be op = $0. 0 6.

This same experiment was also conducted for concrete blocks packed as tight as possible around the reflector surface. The re-suits were essentially the same with a op = $0. 06. Consequently the shielding (increased reflector) does cause a measurable increase in reactivity however

.the effect is small and can easily be accounted for in the initial fuelloading.

2)

Each of the four fuel boxes in the CFX core has an access port through the top reflector. When the pressure plates are tightened down after loading f

fuel in a box the bottom of the pressure plate is tightened first and the top of the fuel box is visually monitored for voids. We also compared reactivity measure-ments when the pressure plates were tightened down with a torque wench to 10 in - Ibs (much tighter than torque necessary to eliminate voids). There was no noticeable difference in reactivity for the loadings that used the torque wrench and those that did not. In order to create a measureable difference a large total void approximately 1/4" wide was left between the plates, and compared with the same loading without the voids. The difference in reactivity amounted to

$0.24. Consequently, since the total amount of room in the fuel boxes is limited, a really significant change in reacitivity is not possible and the small changes that are possible have a small or negligible effect on the reactivity.

3)

Procedural controls for routine commercial use a) Fuel Handling. For routine commercial usage it will not be J

necessary to perform any operations involving fuel handling; once i.

installed there is no ready access to the fuel region. Therefore procedural controls for fuel handling are not applicable.

i

b) Control Instrumentation. Daily check out procedures and operational check lists are employed which require that information regarding instru-mentation response to the source be logged routinely. This serves as an operational test of each channel. The control panelis equipped with built-in calibration check circuits for the log and period channels.

Linear channel calibration would be accomplished by means of an ex-ternal current source since it is equipped with only a "zero" calibration check. The calibration check is also a part of the daily checkout scheme.

The control instrumentation is solid state and essentially maintenance free and the only required maintenance of the system would be periodic checks on power supply voltages.

~

An instruction manual will be supplied with this unit covering the system check out and operation.

c) There are no specific limits as to the type and amounts of materials which can be irradiated. The volume of the two activation ports are the primary restriction as to the amount of material which can be irradiated.

Samples are pneumatically transferred to the ports in 2 dram vials thereby limiting the volume to about 7.4 cm in each port. Since enriched uranium is the only material which will significantly increase the system reactivity it is recommended that U-235 not be placed in the core unless special provision is made for a specific installation.

All materials which are placed in the core are contained in sealed plastic or metal vials and therefore present no problems regarding chemical reaction with the aluminum tubing in the Fast Port or q

polycarbonate tube in the Thermal Port.

In order to assure that a multiplication factor in excess of 0 99 cannot 4) be attained with the safety rods fully withdrawn, each specific system will have a fixed fuel loading such that the maximum k,ff with the safety rods withdrawn For a normal installation is 0 99 regardless of the material being irradiated.

irradiation of fissile material would be strictly excluded. Fissile material can have a significant effect upon the system and if a specific system is authorized I >

6

to irradiate fissile material the initial fuel loading will be adjusted such that t be exceeded with the largest sample allowed by the specific

(~'%

ak f 0.99 can (g

i df installation license.

If and when a sample of fissile material is used in the system a determination of the system multiplication factor would be made at an interim safety rod position to assure that a k;gg of 0. 99 will not be exceeded with the safety rods fully withdrawn. This can be done by observing the instrumentation readings and determining the reactivity from reactivity-current calibration curves developed for a given loading of fuel in the specific CFX.

The CFX is designed with a certain minimum shielding to ensure that 5) any additional material, shielding or otherwise, in the immediate vicinity of the unit will have zero effect upon the system reactivity. Atop the core is approxi.

inches of WEP and on the sides and back of the core there is a mately 24 minimum of 4 inches of WEP. The front of the core with the radiography port is shielded with 6 inches of lead. The collimator assembly has 15 inches of WEP shielding and the shutter over the end of the radiography port has 4 inches of polyethylene 4 inches of lead, and 60 mils of cadmium as shielding Any shielding recommendations for a particular installation would material.

depend upon the location and needed accessibility to the unit. Regarding containment, ventilation, and fission produce leakage, there r.re no specific The fuel is uranium aluminum alloy with aluminum cladding recommendations.

and fission produce leakage is not a likely problem with a system operating at essentially room temperature at low power. After receipt of the cold fuel and prior to shipment and installation of the CFX each of the fuel plates is wiped to determine if there is any smearable contamination (fission product leakage).

Since the We have not detected any leakage from any of the present plates.

l' multiplying system operates at only four watts it is not credible that pressures If and would build up sufficient to crack the cladding and/ or the fuel alloy.

when the system is dismantled the core and fuel plates would be surveyed.

j I

6)

The amount of U needed to reach criticality, if added in the same way as the fuel plates, is 72.9 grams of U.

Or stated another way it would -

take approximately 7 more large fuel plates (noninally 10. 3 grams '

U por plate) to reach criticality. If the uranium were added in the central flux the amount needed (D

trap region in a polyvial in the form of 93% enriched UO 2 235 to take the system to criticality would be 33. 26 grams of U.

We have been especially pleased with the reliability and consistancy We have had no of the control instrumentation during the testing period.

malfunctions during this period. Moreover we have found, by doing a daily check, that the electronic level trips have not drifted a noticeable amount.

We have not had a problem with our period scram once the initial noise pro-blems were suppressed. We have found it to be of some operational use in indicating the reactivity of the system by checking the minimum period the system reaches when the safety rod is withdrawn (minimum period for k

= 0.99 is approximately 22 mconds).

ff The calibrating features on the linear, log, and period circuits have The proven to be easy to use and are checked before each days operation.

drift in the circuits have been minimal with only minor adjustments every two This may be due to the fact that instrument power is on at to three weeks.

all times with the separate control power on only when operating the CFX.

We have found that the placement of large amounts of hydrogen i.e.

enough to completely fill the radiography collimator and the thermal neutron activation analysis port with lucite or polyethylene, does not change the Consequently unless the material to be irradiated reactivity of the system.

contains fissionable material it will not have a positive effect on the reactivity.

Of course any neutron poison in sufficient quantities in the central flux trap region could have a significant negative reactivity effect.

Although we have not operated the CFX over an extended period of time under the same operating conditions we have found the operating conditions to be quite reproducable. In some cases reactivity measurements on a reference configuration made over a period of several weeks time, and with a significant core change at a time period between the measurements, have agreed to within I cent in reactivity.

We have experimentally measured the reactivity temperature coefficient by heatingthe entire CFX core and reflector to approximately The temperature coefficient was determined to be negative and 1270F.

to have the value

((C 2 x 10

=

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Supplement II 7

The scram mechanism is to interrupt the current to the magnet which couples the safety rod drive mechanism to the safety rods. This is accomplished through a series of interlocks. The interlocks include cell door, personnel safety plug, and the flux level interlock. The flux level interlock is associated with the high level linear trip, the high level log trip and the period trip; any of these will activate the flex interlock. This series of trips must be reset manually when tripped in order te compic2e the interlock chain to allow the system to There is no h.,1 ding relay as such that is common in reactor systems.

operate.

There Any interlock break or flux trip will effect a scram of the safety rods.

is an additional secondary interlock on the control system associated wth the l

flux level. This is in the form of a flux up iderlock 1.e. the safety rods cannot be moved unless the flux is above a preset level. (T is an additional irJcrivek di ::tly :.:wciated with thie L. ib.i the ::er::.....; elev h: L-th: L. position M fer: the r M : ::: i.....

The control panel, whown in the polaroid picture included, has meter indications of safety rod position and source position. In addition there are limit lights for the out position and scram position (in) for the safety rods,

and in and out lights for the extremes of the source pvaition.

The safety rods are driven in at a constant rate and not stepped in; however.the reactivity rate is not constant due to the nature of the effective worth of the control rods as a function position within the core. The maximum rate' occurs between 50% withdrawn and 75% withdrawn and is 44 cents /sec and at 90% withdrawn the rate is reduced to approximately 7.5 cents /sec and as the rods leave the core and enter the reflector the rate is ~ 3p / sec.

Over

~

the last bit of travel the reactivity rate is reduced to zero.

The source is indeed effective in its withdrawn position and the base current reading will be of the order of 8 x 10 amperes for a 1 mg Cf The low limit interlock which prevents rod movem6nt unless the source.

flux is above a set value would be set above this level consistant with the source in level.

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l RAD TECH January 20, 1975 United States Atomic Energy Commission Attn: Mr. L. C. Rouse, Chief Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Branch Directorate of Licensing Wa shington, D. C.

20545

• Re

Docket 70-1359 SNM-1405 Gentlemen:

In response to requests as per telecon to Mr. K. L. Crosbie from Mr. J. Delaney your office on 31 December 1974, and conversations between Dr. D. Rundquist and J. Delaney on 8 January 1975, the following I'

information concerning the CFX multiplier system is hereby submitted.

Item 1:

Increas ed reflector worth:

In our letter dated 28 August 1974 it was stated that reactivity effects of additional shielding of polyethylene or paraffin over 50% of the area was measured to be negligible with the system at a keff of 0.946. This measurement was repeated with a more reactive system (k

= 0. 989) and it was determined that there is a small but measurable effect associated with the addition of 4" f

to 6" thick hydrogenous reflector (polyethylene and paraffin) or 4" to 8" of concrete over about 70% of the permanent reflector surface. This effect as reported in our letter of 15 Nov 1974 was $0. 06 both for the hydrogenous case and for the concrete.

Polyethylene plugs placed in the access ports, i. e. the Thermal Neutron Activation Analysis Port and radiography port, showed no measurable increase in reactivity.

Item 2:

p..

d Daily check out and organizational check out forms were supplied to your office on 8 Jan 1975. Kodak has our forms and intends to l

modify them to efficiently cover their operation.

hw 3g.

--~1 U. S. Atomic Ensrgy Commiscien Attn: Mr. L. C. Rouse January 20, 1975

(

Page 2 i

i Item 3:

Separation of multiple units --

It is not anticipated that a situation would develop that more than one unit will be installed in any single customer facility.

The possibility does exist that more than one unit may be in development and/or construction at the IRT corporation facility.

The facility as described in our application CFX DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS, INTEL-RT 5052-001is adequate to handle more than a single unit. The unite are effectively de-coupled by virtue of the associated reflectors (a minimum of 4" of high density polyethelene) which completely surround the core and are an integral part of the core support structure.

Additional separation of the units is necessary to provide access for loading operations.

However, in the event that more than one unit is present, administrative controls will be in effect to establish an isolated V

area for each unit. Isolation will be accomplished by distance A

The minimum or intervening shields other than the reflectors.

surface to surface separation distance will be 8 feet of air or Each area will be established as an MBA

+

24 inches of concrete.

for SNM accountability purposes.

1 Item 4:

The CFX core contains 1582. 6 grams of U-235-Item 5:

Fuel loading on site i

All fael handling operations at the installation site which include initial unpackaging of fuel, initial inventory, and fuel loading will be done by IRT personnel. Once loaded there is no need for any l

operation requiring the manipulation of fuel plates.

The fuel will be loaded at the site in precisely the same configuration as it was unloaded at IRT, i. e. each fuel plate and polyethylene A map moderator plate will be in the same location within the core.

ih has been prepared designating fuel plate position and moderator posi-tion.

~

i

,i l

'U. S. Atomic Ensrgy Commission Attn: Mr. L. C. Rouse January 20, 1975

(

)

Page 3 Since the configuration of the system is the same at Kodak as at IRT, the fully loaded core will have the same reactivity as measured at IRT and the loading operation can be performed in a single step.

t To determine that the system is as it was at IRT, flux measure-ments will be made in the thermal neutron activation analysis port with the safety rods at " full in" and at three intermediate positions between

" full in" and full out' prior to total withdrawal of the rods. These measurements will be compared with measurements made atIRT to assure that a k,ff of 0. 990 will not he exceeded with the rods fully withdrawn.

These flux measurements will be made with the same fission counter and associated equipment as used at IRT. In addition to the comparison of flux measurements, power level information from the linear and logarithmic channels (these are also the same as used at IRT) will be compared to further establish that the system is identical.

The safety rods will not be fully withdrawn until it has been deter-mined that the neutron flux is the same as that measured at San Diego when the reactivity was 0. 990.

In our most recent submission dated 15 November 1974 it was stated in Supplement II, paragraph 1, line 12 that "There is an additional interlock directly associated with this in that the source must also be in the position before the rods can be moved. " This is not the case so this sentence should be deleted. Also, in SupplementI, page 3, section 5, line 7 change WEP shielding to lithium carbonate loaded paraffin.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this submittal.

Yours truly, 0.h Y$

4 del (

C. A. la r e skitt Vice President CAP /km

1 UNITE] STATES

~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINGTON. O. C. 20565

.p FEB 11 WS 1

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MF:FF1:JCD 70-1359 SNM-1405 Amendment No. 3 Intelcom Industries Incorporated ATTH: Dr. C. A. Preskitt Vice President Intelcom Rad Tech P. O. Box 80817 San Diego, California 92138 Gentlemen:

Amendment No. 2 to your Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1405 was issued on October 3,1974 authorizing the construction and use of a subcritical assembly to be operated at a keff not to exceed 0.990.

The purpose of that amendment was to enable you to obtain additional information and to further refine the infonnation you had previously obtained during operations at a lower reactivity. By letters dated November 15, 1974, and January 20, 1975, the results of the measure-ments were provided to us.

Ir. addition, you had requested author-ization to allow a polyethylene plug to be placed in the radiography collimator during activation analysis operations. Technical data regarding the effect of the polyethylene plug were included in the January 20, 1975 submittal.

s We have now completed the review of all of the information which you have provided. Accordingly, pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, Special Nuclear License No. SNM-1405 is hereby amended to authorize the construction and use of suberitical assemblies designed to operate at a keff not to exceed 0.990 in accordance with the statements, representations and conditions specified in the licensees application dated January 24,1974, and the supplements thereto dated August 28, and November 15,1974, and January 20, 1975.

All other conditions of this license shall remain the same.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0 fD e. L.

W L. C. Rouse, Chief Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Branch No. 1 Division of Materials and Fuel Cycle Facility Licensing po#%

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