ML21217A302: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:NRC Perspective on BWRVIP-100 Nonconservatism Michael L. Benson, Ching Ng, and David Rudland Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange August 10, 2021
 
History of Core Shroud Cracking
* Relatively severe cracking discovered in the 1990s
* NRC issued Generic Letter 94-03
* NRC published NUREG-1544
    - Available via websearch
    - Summary of the cracking experience
    - Summary of industry response, included inspection and repair activities Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 2
 
Aging Management of Core Shroud
* BWRVIP-76, Revision 1-A
  - proprietary
* BWRVIP-100, Revision 1-A
  - proprietary
* Inspection and flaw evaluation guidelines for the core shroud
* ASME Code, Section XI inspection requirements for Core Support Structures
* Generic Aging Lessons Learned reports for license renewal and subsequent license renewal Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 3
 
BWRVIP-100 Nonconservatism
* Affects toughness and fluence threshold assumptions
* Actual toughness could be lower than currently assumed in licensee calculations
* Failure mode could transition from ductile to brittle earlier in life than previously assumed in licensee calculations
* Licensee inspection frequencies for the core shroud could be too long Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 4
 
Staff Flaw Evaluation
* Conservative assumptions
  - Shroud wall thickness
  - Crack size (through-wall and 360° surface flaw)
  - Loading conditions (i.e., accident conditions)
* Staff calculations indicate that the shroud can tolerate a relatively severe flaw Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 5
 
Risk-Informed Decision Making
* NRRs LIC-504 process for dispositioning emergent safety concerns
* Applies key principles of risk-informed decision-making
* Staff weighs options for NRC management consideration
  - Immediate action
  - Longer-term action
  - No action
* The staff does not recommend immediate action Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 6
 
Conclusions
* Licensees should update their inspection programs to account for the new information
* LIC-504 document describes complete NRC risk-informed evaluation of the significance
    - Flaw analysis and risk analysis
    - Currently under internal review
    - May be made public in the future
* NRC is currently assessing options for appropriate oversight of industry actions on this matter Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 7}}

Latest revision as of 17:59, 18 January 2022

02B - NRC - Matl Tech Exchg - BWRVIP-100
ML21217A302
Person / Time
Issue date: 08/09/2021
From: Michael Benson, Ching Ng, David Rudland
NRC/NRR/DNRL
To:
Hiser A
Shared Package
ML21217A247 List:
References
Download: ML21217A302 (7)


Text

NRC Perspective on BWRVIP-100 Nonconservatism Michael L. Benson, Ching Ng, and David Rudland Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange August 10, 2021

History of Core Shroud Cracking

  • Relatively severe cracking discovered in the 1990s

- Available via websearch

- Summary of the cracking experience

- Summary of industry response, included inspection and repair activities Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 2

Aging Management of Core Shroud

- proprietary

- proprietary

  • Inspection and flaw evaluation guidelines for the core shroud
  • ASME Code,Section XI inspection requirements for Core Support Structures

BWRVIP-100 Nonconservatism

  • Affects toughness and fluence threshold assumptions
  • Actual toughness could be lower than currently assumed in licensee calculations
  • Failure mode could transition from ductile to brittle earlier in life than previously assumed in licensee calculations
  • Licensee inspection frequencies for the core shroud could be too long Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 4

Staff Flaw Evaluation

  • Conservative assumptions

- Shroud wall thickness

- Crack size (through-wall and 360° surface flaw)

- Loading conditions (i.e., accident conditions)

  • Staff calculations indicate that the shroud can tolerate a relatively severe flaw Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 5

Risk-Informed Decision Making

  • NRRs LIC-504 process for dispositioning emergent safety concerns
  • Applies key principles of risk-informed decision-making
  • Staff weighs options for NRC management consideration

- Immediate action

- Longer-term action

- No action

  • The staff does not recommend immediate action Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 6

Conclusions

  • Licensees should update their inspection programs to account for the new information
  • LIC-504 document describes complete NRC risk-informed evaluation of the significance

- Flaw analysis and risk analysis

- Currently under internal review

- May be made public in the future

  • NRC is currently assessing options for appropriate oversight of industry actions on this matter Industry/NRC Materials Programs Technical Information Exchange 7