ML20058F949

Special Rept:On 900929,discovered That Fire Barrier Penetration Inoperable

ML20058F949
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/05/1990
From:	Denton R BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-90-117 NUDOCS 9011090239
Download: ML20058F949 (4)

Text

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l BALTIMORE :

GASAND EL2? TIC 4

CHARLES CENTER e P.O. BOX-1475

• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 1475 l

R E.DENTON GFNERAL MANAGER CALVERT CLIFFS 1

l November 5,1990

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

Washington,DC 20555

i ATTENTION:

Document Control Desk (

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant:

Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-318 -

Fire Barrier Penetration Special Report ;

j Technical Soccification 3.7.12 ' CTION requirement a A

Gentlemen:

Per the requirements of Technical. Specification 3.7.12 ACTION requirement a, we hereby submit 1

the attached Special Report concerning an-inoperable fire barrier penetration, specifically.a gap between a ventilation duct penetrating the floor and wall between the Unit 2 45 taot and 27 foot elevation switchgear rooms made the fire barrier penetration inoperable for greater than 7 days.

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Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with

- i you.

Very truly'yours, -

M.

RED /CRS/bjd i

NRC 90-117 -

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Document ControlDcsk:

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November 5,1990 -

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_ D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. A. Capra, NRC D. G. Mcdonald, Jr., NRC T. T. Martin, NRC

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L E. Nicholson, NRC R. I. McIxan, DNR :

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A1TACIIMENT(ik PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER '

SfECIAL REPORT

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BACKGROUND s

h On September 29,,1990 it was discovered that the' barrier between the Unit 2 45 foot Elevation j

Switchgear Room and'the Unit 2 27 foot Elevation Switchgear. Room was inopchabich Akmall gap.

(1/2 inch by 42 inches) was found between a ventilation duct ' penetrating the floor and the wall.-

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-I Upon discovery of this condition it was reported to the Shift Supervisor. ACTION requirement a of :

Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12 was entered immediately by verifying that fire detection was OPERABLE on at least one side of the barrier and instituting an ho'urly' fire watch patrol; AE temporary seal was provided in accordance with Calvert Cliffs Instructions I3 and the barrier was declared operable on October 8,19901The ACTION requirement was then exited..The barric' 'was r

considered inoperable for 9 days.

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To fulfill the ACr10N requirement of TS 3.7.12 a Special Report is to =be prepared for the.

1 Commission when a barrier is inoperable for 7 days or more. This Special Report, pursuant to.

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TS 6.9.2, is to outline actions taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedules l to restore the penetration to operable status. JIhe information contained in this document fulfills 1

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these requirements.

I EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATION l

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- Upon discovery that there was a small gap in the barrier between the two Unit 2 Switchgear Roon s j

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the barrier was declared inoperab'.,.and the appropriate TS. ACTION requirement _wu entered.

. Unit 2 was defueled from the time the ACTION requirement 'was entered until the time il v.e 1

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exited.

L-While the barrier was inoperable the affect on fire protection was mitigated by ihe following:

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A*ITACllMENT (1) 3 j

PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER j

SPECIAL REPORT H

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4 Both sides of the barrier are protected with fire detection which provides early warning of a j

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s Both sides of the barrier are protected by total flooding Halon System." The small size of? ~

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.a the gap should have resulted in little effect on the ability of the Halon System from achieving'

-:i. j an effective extinguishing concentreion.; In fact, it is likely. tiiatlthis gap was prescht when -

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,ii the Halon System was subjected to th e acceptance concentration test.

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,$i ay TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCEI 1

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The' gap between the: ventilation duct and the wall was found as parttof the Surveillance Test Ti Procedure (STP F-592-2) that fulfilt the surveillance requirements of'I1S "'t.7.12E This surveillance

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is complete for' Unit 2'an$is to be; initiated for Unit:1 in'the near future. This surveillance is.

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p mtended to find items such as this gap. When similar items were discovered th'e appropriate actions :;

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were taken and the items repaired in less than 7 days.

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