ML20058F949

Special Rept:On 900929,discovered That Fire Barrier Penetration Inoperable

ML20058F949
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/05/1990
From:	Denton R BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-90-117 NUDOCS 9011090239
Download: ML20058F949 (4)

Text

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l BALTIMORE :

GASAND EL2? TIC ,

4 CHARLES CENTER e P.O. BOX-1475

• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 1475 l R E.DENTON GFNERAL MANAGER CALVERT CLIFFS 1

l November 5,1990 :i

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

Washington,DC 20555

i ATTENTION: Document Control Desk ( -

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant:

, Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-318 -

Fire Barrier Penetration Special Report ; j Technical Soccification 3.7.12A' CTION requirement a Gentlemen: '

Per the requirements of Technical. Specification 3.7.12 ACTION requirement a, we hereby submit 1 the attached Special Report concerning an-inoperable fire barrier penetration, specifically.a gap between a ventilation duct penetrating the floor and wall between the Unit 2 45 taot and 27 foot elevation switchgear rooms made the fire barrier penetration inoperable for greater than 7 days.

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Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with -

i you.

Very truly'yours, -

• M.

RED /CRS/bjd i NRC 90-117 - 1 l

. Attachment r3l$

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9011090239 901105 1 p j PDR ADOCK 05000318 $ l

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Document ControlDcsk:

November 5,1990 - 4 -

Pagc 2-cc: _ D. A. Brune, Esquire -:

J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. A. Capra, NRC D. G. Mcdonald, Jr., NRC  ;  ;

T. T. Martin, NRC  :" 4

.'i L E. Nicholson, NRC .

R. I. McIxan, DNR : 1 3 j i

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A1TACIIMENT(ik PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER '

SfECIAL REPORT

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BACKGROUND .

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h On September 29,,1990 it was discovered that the' barrier between the Unit 2 45 foot Elevation j

Switchgear Room and'the Unit 2 27 foot Elevation Switchgear. Room was inopchabich Akmall gap .

(1/2 inch by 42 inches) was found between a ventilation duct ' penetrating the floor and the wall.- i

-I Upon discovery of this condition it was reported to the Shift Supervisor. ACTION requirement a of :  !

Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12 was entered immediately by verifying that fire detection was OPERABLE on at least one side of the barrier and instituting an ho'urly' fire watch patrol; AE temporary seal was provided in accordance with Calvert Cliffs Instructions I3 and the barrier was declared operable on October 8,19901The ACTION requirement was then exited. .The barric' r'was considered inoperable for 9 days.  !

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To fulfill the ACr10N requirement of TS 3.7.12 a Special Report is to =be prepared for the . 1

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Commission when a barrier is inoperable for 7 days or more. This Special Report, pursuant to.

TS 6.9.2, is to outline actions taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedules l i

to restore the penetration to operable status. JIhe information contained in this document fulfills 1 a

these requirements.

I EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATION l

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- Upon discovery that there was a small gap in the barrier between the two Unit 2 Switchgear Roon s j

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the barrier was declared inoperab'.,.and the appropriate TS. ACTION requirement _wu entered.

. Unit 2 was defueled from the time the ACTION requirement 'was entered until the time il v.e 1 v ]y exited.

L-While the barrier was inoperable the affect on fire protection was mitigated by ihe following:

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4 A*ITACllMENT (1) 3 j

j PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER SPECIAL REPORT H 'j-I I

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- Both sides of the barrier are protected with fire detection which provides early warning of a

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- Both sides of the barrier are protected by total flooding Halon System." The small size of? ~ ,j

.a the gap should have resulted in little effect on the ability of the Halon System from achieving' -:i. j an effective extinguishing concentreion.; In fact, it is likely. tiiatlthis gap was prescht when - _

-a the Halon System was subjected to th e acceptance concentration test. *

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,$i ay TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCEI 1  ;

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The' gap between the: ventilation duct and the wall was found as parttof the Surveillance Test Ti Procedure (STP F-592-2) that fulfilt the surveillance requirements of'I1S "'t.7.12E This surveillance

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L is complete for' Unit 2'an$is to be; initiated for Unit:1 in'the near future. This surveillance is.

] a p mtended to find items such as this gap. When similar items were discovered th'e appropriate actions :;

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L were taken and the items repaired in less than 7 days.

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