ML20058F949
| ML20058F949 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1990 |
| From: | Denton R BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-90-117 NUDOCS 9011090239 | |
| Download: ML20058F949 (4) | |
Text
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l BALTIMORE :
GASAND EL2? TIC 4
CHARLES CENTER e P.O. BOX-1475
- BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 1475 l
R E.DENTON GFNERAL MANAGER CALVERT CLIFFS 1
- l November 5,1990
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
Washington,DC 20555
- i ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk (
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant:
Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-318 -
Fire Barrier Penetration Special Report ;
j Technical Soccification 3.7.12 ' CTION requirement a A
Gentlemen:
Per the requirements of Technical. Specification 3.7.12 ACTION requirement a, we hereby submit 1
the attached Special Report concerning an-inoperable fire barrier penetration, specifically.a gap between a ventilation duct penetrating the floor and wall between the Unit 2 45 taot and 27 foot elevation switchgear rooms made the fire barrier penetration inoperable for greater than 7 days.
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Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with
- i you.
Very truly'yours, -
M.
RED /CRS/bjd i
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Document ControlDcsk:
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November 5,1990 -
4 Pagc 2-cc:
_ D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. A. Capra, NRC D. G. Mcdonald, Jr., NRC T. T. Martin, NRC
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L E. Nicholson, NRC R. I. McIxan, DNR :
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A1TACIIMENT(ik PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER '
SfECIAL REPORT
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BACKGROUND s
h On September 29,,1990 it was discovered that the' barrier between the Unit 2 45 foot Elevation j
Switchgear Room and'the Unit 2 27 foot Elevation Switchgear. Room was inopchabich Akmall gap.
(1/2 inch by 42 inches) was found between a ventilation duct ' penetrating the floor and the wall.-
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-I Upon discovery of this condition it was reported to the Shift Supervisor. ACTION requirement a of :
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12 was entered immediately by verifying that fire detection was OPERABLE on at least one side of the barrier and instituting an ho'urly' fire watch patrol; AE temporary seal was provided in accordance with Calvert Cliffs Instructions I3 and the barrier was declared operable on October 8,19901The ACTION requirement was then exited..The barric' 'was r
considered inoperable for 9 days.
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To fulfill the ACr10N requirement of TS 3.7.12 a Special Report is to =be prepared for the.
1 Commission when a barrier is inoperable for 7 days or more. This Special Report, pursuant to.
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TS 6.9.2, is to outline actions taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedules l to restore the penetration to operable status. JIhe information contained in this document fulfills 1
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these requirements.
I EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATION l
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- Upon discovery that there was a small gap in the barrier between the two Unit 2 Switchgear Roon s j
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the barrier was declared inoperab'.,.and the appropriate TS. ACTION requirement _wu entered.
. Unit 2 was defueled from the time the ACTION requirement 'was entered until the time il v.e 1
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exited.
L-While the barrier was inoperable the affect on fire protection was mitigated by ihe following:
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A*ITACllMENT (1) 3 j
SPECIAL REPORT H
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4 Both sides of the barrier are protected with fire detection which provides early warning of a j
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s Both sides of the barrier are protected by total flooding Halon System." The small size of? ~
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.a the gap should have resulted in little effect on the ability of the Halon System from achieving'
-:i. j an effective extinguishing concentreion.; In fact, it is likely. tiiatlthis gap was prescht when -
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,ii the Halon System was subjected to th e acceptance concentration test.
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,$i ay TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCEI 1
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The' gap between the: ventilation duct and the wall was found as parttof the Surveillance Test Ti Procedure (STP F-592-2) that fulfilt the surveillance requirements of'I1S "'t.7.12E This surveillance
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is complete for' Unit 2'an$is to be; initiated for Unit:1 in'the near future. This surveillance is.
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p mtended to find items such as this gap. When similar items were discovered th'e appropriate actions :;
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were taken and the items repaired in less than 7 days.
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