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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY                                     Dl71gg CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1                                   .a 400 Chestnut Street Tower II
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Dl71gg CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1
              $/ cW -C3]s '
.a 400 Chestnut Street Tower II
varch 16,1981 HTRD-50-518, -519. -5. : , -521/81-05                         4M 2        I    's O R[[[./j
$/ cW -C3]s '
                !!r. James P. O'Reilly, Director 0
arch 16,1981 v
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
HTRD-50-518, -519. -5. :, -521/81-05 4M R(([./jI
              -U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                       [O'' W,4 dl/L g 0 p g -3,
's 2
!              Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street                                         S k g/,,      ,/
!!r. James P. O'Reilly, Director O
g
0 dl/L g 0 p g -3,
                                                                                                -/
[O'' W,4 Office of Inspection and Enforcement k g/
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 M'  'N /
-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-/
Region II - Suite 3100
,,,/
101 Marietta Street S
g M' 'N /
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


==Dear Mr. O'Reilly:==
==Dear Mr. O'Reilly:==
 
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT - REFORTABLE DEFICIENCY - DEFICIENT DRAWING AND DOCUMENT CONTROL - HTRD-50-518, -519, -520, -521/81-05 The subject deficiency was initially reported to ifRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector R. W. Wright on January 27 and February 3, 1981, as HT-G-81-06 deficiencies 1 and 2, respectively.
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT - REFORTABLE DEFICIENCY - DEFICIENT DRAWING AND DOCUMENT CONTROL - HTRD-50-518, -519, -520, -521/81-05 The subject deficiency was initially reported to ifRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector R. W. Wright on January 27 and February 3, 1981, as HT-G-81-06 deficiencies 1 and 2, respectively.       In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 Cr'R Part 50, we are enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency. This nonconformance was resolved along with TVA's response to your letter dated January 30, 1981, Confirmation of Action.
In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 Cr'R Part 50, we are enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency. This nonconformance was resolved along with TVA's response to your {{letter dated|date=January 30, 1981|text=letter dated January 30, 1981}}, Confirmation of Action.
If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l
If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l
L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure                                                               -
L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, L1 rector (Enclosure)
Mr. Victor Stello, L1 rector (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 l
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 l
Si 8107310307 810316 PDR ADOCK 05000518                   An Ecual 0;:porturuy E:,u' oyer S                  PDR
Si 8107310307 810316 PDR ADOCK 05000518 S
PDR An Ecual 0;:porturuy E:,u' oyer


ENCLOSURE HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT DRAWING CONTROL PROGRAM AUDIT HT-G-81-06 DEFICIENCIES 1 AND 2
ENCLOSURE HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT DRAWING CONTROL PROGRAM AUDIT HT-G-81-06 DEFICIENCIES 1 AND 2 10CFR50.55(e)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ~                                              ~-
~
10CFR50.55(e)         -
~-
REPORT NO. 2 (FINAL)                                                       _
REPORT NO. 2 (FINAL)
On January 27, 1981, TVA informed NRC-0IE Region II Inspector, R. W.
On January 27, 1981, TVA informed NRC-0IE Region II Inspector, R. W.
Wright, of a potentially reportable condition under 10CFR50.55(e) regarding the recurrence of drawing control deficiencies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     This is the final report on this deficiency.
Wright, of a potentially reportable condition under 10CFR50.55(e) regarding the recurrence of drawing control deficiencies.
Description of Deficiency The TVA CONST QA Unit at Hartsville performed an audit of the drawings being used on the site. The auditor surveyed 469 drawings being maintained by engineering and crafts pe'sonnel and found 26 drawings which were cut of date ar'i/or superseded by later revisions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       A similar "inding was reported to NRC-0IE Region II on August 15, 1980, in which 30 out of 155 drawings were found.to be superseded.
This is the final report on this deficiency.
The auditor also surveyed controlled documents other than construction drawings which are maintained in manuals onsite. This survev revealed that 12 C. F. Braun specifications and associated Engineering Change                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             -
Description of Deficiency The TVA CONST QA Unit at Hartsville performed an audit of the drawings being used on the site. The auditor surveyed 469 drawings being maintained by engineering and crafts pe'sonnel and found 26 drawings which were cut of date ar'i/or superseded by later revisions.
l                                                                    Notices (ECM's) were not.sufficiently controlled in that document
A similar "inding was reported to NRC-0IE Region II on August 15, 1980, in which 30 out of 155 drawings were found.to be superseded.
!                                                                    recipients did not have up-to-date revisions and the DCU master file contained superseded material.
The auditor also surveyed controlled documents other than construction drawings which are maintained in manuals onsite. This survev revealed that 12 C. F. Braun specifications and associated Engineering Change l
Notices (ECM's) were not.sufficiently controlled in that document recipients did not have up-to-date revisions and the DCU master file contained superseded material.
Safety Implications 5
Safety Implications 5
If any construction er inspection activities were conducted to the requirements of out-of-date or superseded drawings or c icuments, those activities may not conform to current requirements. Therefore, this could have led to the construction of some plant feature in an incorrect configuration which could Have adversely affected plant safety.
If any construction er inspection activities were conducted to the requirements of out-of-date or superseded drawings or c icuments, those activities may not conform to current requirements.
Corrective Action
Therefore, this could have led to the construction of some plant feature in an incorrect configuration which could Have adversely affected plant safety.
: 1.                             The Hartsville Site QA Unit conducted a 100-percent audit of safety-related site-issued dracings. This audit revealed that out of approximately 40,000 drawings, 1155 superseded d.awings were being held by engineering and quality control inspection personnel. An extended survey of other selected controlled documents was also conducted.                                                                                                                                                                                 All superseded drawings and J                                                                                                   documents have been replaced with current revisions.
Corrective Action 1.
_ - - . _ . _ . _ - _ - _ . . - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - - . _ _ - _ - _ . _ . _ - . _ - . - - _ _ . _ _ - - - . . _ _ _ _ - - - - . - _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . _ . . _ . _ . ~ _ _ . . - . _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - -___-.-.____ .__._ _-__.--_ ____
The Hartsville Site QA Unit conducted a 100-percent audit of safety-related site-issued dracings. This audit revealed that out of approximately 40,000 drawings, 1155 superseded d.awings were being held by engineering and quality control inspection personnel. An extended survey of other selected controlled documents was also conducted.
All superseded drawings and J
documents have been replaced with current revisions.
. ~


r
r 2.
: 2. Of the 1155 superseded drawings identified under action item 1,16 were identified as being in use. Each case is described below.
Of the 1155 superseded drawings identified under action item 1,16 were identified as being in use. Each case is described below.
I               4KE5603-2K-02 R3 - This drawing was used for acceptance (1 cor' -                 inspe:tions on P:op-fabricated items. The             -
I 4KE5603-2K-02 R3 - This drawing was used for acceptance (1 cor' -
change effected by revision 4 involves a 1
inspe:tions on P:op-fabricated items. The 1
!              assigned to j              QA Civil Unit)           feature on the Mk. No. 4-frames. None of these I                                         frames were inspected during the time that this
assigned to change effected by revision 4 involves a QA Civil Unit) feature on the Mk. No. 4-frames. None of these j
;                                          superseded drawing was in use.
I frames were inspected during the time that this superseded drawing was in use.
1 S-515221FP1-1 R0 - These were used to fabricate a single support.
1 S-515221FP1-1 R0 - These were used to fabricate a single support.
l               S-515221FP1-2 R0         The support was installed on August 18, 1980.
l S-515221FP1-2 R0 The support was installed on August 18, 1980.
S-525221FP1-3 R0         These drawings were revised on October 26, (4 copies each-           1980. Sequence Control Charts are being
S-525221FP1-3 R0 These drawings were revised on October 26, (4 copies each-1980. Sequence Control Charts are being I
* I              assigned to               changed to modify this support as required.
assigned to changed to modify this support as required.
;              STRIDE Project
STRIDE Project Engineering Hanger Unit)
:                Engineering Hanger Unit)
S-514A44FP1-1 RO '- Member size was changed by revision 1 to e S-514A44FP1-2 RO smaller size. Since we are still fabricating (1 copy each -
S-514A44FP1-1 RO '- Member size was changed by revision 1 to e S-514A44FP1-2 RO         smaller size. Since we are still fabricating (1 copy each -           and installing this support, t' design change assigned to               will be implemented.
and installing this support, t' design change assigned to will be implemented.
l             STRIDE Project l               Engineering                                                                             ,
l STRIDE Project l
;                Hanger Unit) i l               S321200AP2 R1 - No changes in the fabrication or installation of l               (1 copy -       this supoort are necessitated by this change                             ,
Engineering Hanger Unit) i l
!                assigned to                                                                               l
S321200AP2 R1 - No changes in the fabrication or installation of l
!                STRIDE Project                                                                             I
(1 copy -
!                Engineering i
this supoort are necessitated by this change assigned to STRIDE Project Engineering i
Han6er Unit)
Han6er Unit) 3 A team consisting of GA engineers from the staff of TVA's Office of Engineering Design and Construction (OEDC) and the Quality 1
!          3   A team consisting of GA engineers from the staff of TVA's Office                           ;
i Assurance Branch of the Division of Construction (CONST) conducted an investiration to determine why the brea'<down in drawing control occurred after full compliance was reported to have been achieved as of October 8,1980. The investigation was f
of Engineering Design and Construction (OEDC) and the Quality                             1 i               Assurance Branch of the Division of Construction (CONST) conducted an investiration to determine why the brea'<down in drawing control occurred after full compliance was reported to
conducted on February 12-14, 1981. The following is a summation of the results of this investigation.
!                have been achieved as of October 8,1980. The investigation was f               conducted on February 12-14, 1981. The following is a summation                           l of the results of this investigation.                                                     l
\\
                                                                                                            \
(a) No individual or organization was responsible for the entire drawing control process from receipt of a drawing until it was retrieved.
(a) No individual or organization was responsible for the entire                           l drawing control process from receipt of a drawing until it was retrieved.
I (b) There were too many individuais and stations where groups of controlled drawings were located which contributed to the increase in the number of drawings.
I (b) There were too many individuais and stations where groups of controlled drawings were located which contributed to the increase in the number of drawings.
j i
j i
!                                                                                +
+
I
I


                                              -_=                           -.              . - -
-_=
(c) No restraints were placed on personnel requesting drawings or
(c) No restraints were placed on personnel requesting drawings or
                              -complete sets of drawings from the Document Control Unit which also contributed to the increase in the number of                                             .
-complete sets of drawings from the Document Control Unit which also contributed to the increase in the number of drawings.
drawings.                                                   -
(d) Vendor drawings were not adequately identified and controlled.
(d) Vendor drawings were not adequately identified and controlled.
( f) Construction working drawings were not identified as controlled drawings.
( f) Construction working drawings were not identified as controlled drawings.
(g) Field Change Requests (FCR's) were not being incorporated on                                                     +
(g) Field Change Requests (FCR's) were not being incorporated on
+
C. F. Braun drawings.
C. F. Braun drawings.
(b) The Drawi43 Index ras not maintained in an accurate status.
(b) The Drawi43 Index ras not maintained in an accurate status.
: 4. At1 TVA construction site QA units were directed to conduct audits ta determine if the Hartsville drawing control problems existed at other TVA nuclear facilities. All audit scopes were expanded beyond drawing control in order to evaluate other areas of document control,'i.e., Field Change Requests (FCR's),
4.
Construction Engineering Procedures (CEP's), Quality Control Instructions (QCI's), etc. With the exception of Hartsville,                                                           ,
At1 TVA construction site QA units were directed to conduct audits ta determine if the Hartsville drawing control problems existed at other TVA nuclear facilities. All audit scopes were expanded beyond drawing control in order to evaluate other areas of document control,'i.e., Field Change Requests (FCR's),
there were no audit findings evaluated and deemed "significant."
Construction Engineering Procedures (CEP's), Quality Control Instructions (QCI's), etc. With the exception of Hartsville, there were no audit findings evaluated and deemed "significant."
Line and CA management reviewed the audit and investigation                                           - -
Line and CA management reviewed the audit and investigation findings on February 18, 1981. No document control procedure changes were necessary for Sequoyah, Watts Bar, or Bellefonte.
findings on February 18, 1981. No document control procedure changes were necessary for Sequoyah, Watts Bar, or Bellefonte.
The drawing control procedure did require adjustments for Hartsville, Phipps Bend, and Yellow Creek Nuclear Plants.
The drawing control procedure did require adjustments for Hartsville, Phipps Bend, and Yellow Creek Nuclear Plants.                                         A revision to Construction Engineering Procedure, CEP-6.01, " Drawing Control,," was drafted on February 26, 1981, and is intended to prevent recurrence of the causes of this deficiency listed in part
A revision to Construction Engineering Procedure, CEP-6.01, " Drawing Control,," was drafted on February 26, 1981, and is intended to prevent recurrence of the causes of this deficiency listed in part 3 above. For all plants, line management emphasis is being implemented to achieve and maintain full compliance with procedural requirements of drawing and document control, and l
;                        3 above. For all plants, line management emphasis is being implemented to achieve and maintain full compliance with procedural requirements of drawing and document control, and l                       accelerated auditing will be used to assure compliance. We
accelerated auditing will be used to assure compliance. We believe that the program adjustments, line management emphasis, direct supervision, employee training and accelerated auditing will preclude recurrence of significant deficiences in our drawing l
,                        believe that the program adjustments, line management emphasis,
!                        direct supervision, employee training and accelerated auditing will preclude recurrence of significant deficiences in our drawing l
and document control program.
and document control program.
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Latest revision as of 08:19, 21 December 2024

Final Deficiency Rept,Initially Reported 810127 & 0203,re Deficient Drawing & Document Control.Site QA Conducted Audit of safety-related site-issued Drawings.All Superseded Drawings & Documents Have Been Revised
ML20009F564
Person / Time
Site: Hartsville  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 03/16/1981
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8107310307
Download: ML20009F564 (4)


Text

r e

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Dl71gg CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1

.a 400 Chestnut Street Tower II

$/ cW -C3]s '

arch 16,1981 v

HTRD-50-518, -519. -5. :, -521/81-05 4M R(([./jI

's 2

!!r. James P. O'Reilly, Director O

0 dl/L g 0 p g -3,

[O W,4 Office of Inspection and Enforcement k g/

-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-/

Region II - Suite 3100

,,,/

101 Marietta Street S

g M' 'N /

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT - REFORTABLE DEFICIENCY - DEFICIENT DRAWING AND DOCUMENT CONTROL - HTRD-50-518, -519, -520, -521/81-05 The subject deficiency was initially reported to ifRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector R. W. Wright on January 27 and February 3, 1981, as HT-G-81-06 deficiencies 1 and 2, respectively.

In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 Cr'R Part 50, we are enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency. This nonconformance was resolved along with TVA's response to your letter dated January 30, 1981, Confirmation of Action.

If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l

L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:

Mr. Victor Stello, L1 rector (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 l

Si 8107310307 810316 PDR ADOCK 05000518 S

PDR An Ecual 0;:porturuy E:,u' oyer

ENCLOSURE HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT DRAWING CONTROL PROGRAM AUDIT HT-G-81-06 DEFICIENCIES 1 AND 2 10CFR50.55(e)

~

~-

REPORT NO. 2 (FINAL)

On January 27, 1981, TVA informed NRC-0IE Region II Inspector, R. W.

Wright, of a potentially reportable condition under 10CFR50.55(e) regarding the recurrence of drawing control deficiencies.

This is the final report on this deficiency.

Description of Deficiency The TVA CONST QA Unit at Hartsville performed an audit of the drawings being used on the site. The auditor surveyed 469 drawings being maintained by engineering and crafts pe'sonnel and found 26 drawings which were cut of date ar'i/or superseded by later revisions.

A similar "inding was reported to NRC-0IE Region II on August 15, 1980, in which 30 out of 155 drawings were found.to be superseded.

The auditor also surveyed controlled documents other than construction drawings which are maintained in manuals onsite. This survev revealed that 12 C. F. Braun specifications and associated Engineering Change l

Notices (ECM's) were not.sufficiently controlled in that document recipients did not have up-to-date revisions and the DCU master file contained superseded material.

Safety Implications 5

If any construction er inspection activities were conducted to the requirements of out-of-date or superseded drawings or c icuments, those activities may not conform to current requirements.

Therefore, this could have led to the construction of some plant feature in an incorrect configuration which could Have adversely affected plant safety.

Corrective Action 1.

The Hartsville Site QA Unit conducted a 100-percent audit of safety-related site-issued dracings. This audit revealed that out of approximately 40,000 drawings, 1155 superseded d.awings were being held by engineering and quality control inspection personnel. An extended survey of other selected controlled documents was also conducted.

All superseded drawings and J

documents have been replaced with current revisions.

. ~

r 2.

Of the 1155 superseded drawings identified under action item 1,16 were identified as being in use. Each case is described below.

I 4KE5603-2K-02 R3 - This drawing was used for acceptance (1 cor' -

inspe:tions on P:op-fabricated items. The 1

assigned to change effected by revision 4 involves a QA Civil Unit) feature on the Mk. No. 4-frames. None of these j

I frames were inspected during the time that this superseded drawing was in use.

1 S-515221FP1-1 R0 - These were used to fabricate a single support.

l S-515221FP1-2 R0 The support was installed on August 18, 1980.

S-525221FP1-3 R0 These drawings were revised on October 26, (4 copies each-1980. Sequence Control Charts are being I

assigned to changed to modify this support as required.

STRIDE Project Engineering Hanger Unit)

S-514A44FP1-1 RO '- Member size was changed by revision 1 to e S-514A44FP1-2 RO smaller size. Since we are still fabricating (1 copy each -

and installing this support, t' design change assigned to will be implemented.

l STRIDE Project l

Engineering Hanger Unit) i l

S321200AP2 R1 - No changes in the fabrication or installation of l

(1 copy -

this supoort are necessitated by this change assigned to STRIDE Project Engineering i

Han6er Unit) 3 A team consisting of GA engineers from the staff of TVA's Office of Engineering Design and Construction (OEDC) and the Quality 1

i Assurance Branch of the Division of Construction (CONST) conducted an investiration to determine why the brea'<down in drawing control occurred after full compliance was reported to have been achieved as of October 8,1980. The investigation was f

conducted on February 12-14, 1981. The following is a summation of the results of this investigation.

\\

(a) No individual or organization was responsible for the entire drawing control process from receipt of a drawing until it was retrieved.

I (b) There were too many individuais and stations where groups of controlled drawings were located which contributed to the increase in the number of drawings.

j i

+

I

-_=

(c) No restraints were placed on personnel requesting drawings or

-complete sets of drawings from the Document Control Unit which also contributed to the increase in the number of drawings.

(d) Vendor drawings were not adequately identified and controlled.

( f) Construction working drawings were not identified as controlled drawings.

(g) Field Change Requests (FCR's) were not being incorporated on

+

C. F. Braun drawings.

(b) The Drawi43 Index ras not maintained in an accurate status.

4.

At1 TVA construction site QA units were directed to conduct audits ta determine if the Hartsville drawing control problems existed at other TVA nuclear facilities. All audit scopes were expanded beyond drawing control in order to evaluate other areas of document control,'i.e., Field Change Requests (FCR's),

Construction Engineering Procedures (CEP's), Quality Control Instructions (QCI's), etc. With the exception of Hartsville, there were no audit findings evaluated and deemed "significant."

Line and CA management reviewed the audit and investigation findings on February 18, 1981. No document control procedure changes were necessary for Sequoyah, Watts Bar, or Bellefonte.

The drawing control procedure did require adjustments for Hartsville, Phipps Bend, and Yellow Creek Nuclear Plants.

A revision to Construction Engineering Procedure, CEP-6.01, " Drawing Control,," was drafted on February 26, 1981, and is intended to prevent recurrence of the causes of this deficiency listed in part 3 above. For all plants, line management emphasis is being implemented to achieve and maintain full compliance with procedural requirements of drawing and document control, and l

accelerated auditing will be used to assure compliance. We believe that the program adjustments, line management emphasis, direct supervision, employee training and accelerated auditing will preclude recurrence of significant deficiences in our drawing l

and document control program.

i l

l i

i p

--m

-e.

v-n.

, a,

.