ML19347A827: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:..                                                                                    1 ATH E NS, AL A. 3 5611
{{#Wiki_filter:1 ATH E NS, AL A. 3 5611
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* Of       ;$h Chatrsan, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H St. NW Washington, D.C. 20055
Of
                                                                                                  .
;$h Chatrsan, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H St. NW Washington, D.C. 20055 Dear Sir; I question the safety design o f the Brown's Ferry Nuclear P1, ant in the following arecs.
Dear Sir; I question the safety design o f the Brown's Ferry Nuclear P1, ant in the following arecs. Although I think some calculations about the drop-ping of a spent fuel bundle and breaka'ge of came were made, I an concerned
Although I think some calculations about the drop-ping of a spent fuel bundle and breaka'ge of came were made, I an concerned about the possibility of a plane crashing accidently or by terrorists, into the secondary containment with spent fuel outside the reactor.
                                            ,
I think the dropped fuel accident assumes that the secondary contain=ent remains intact.
about the possibility of a plane crashing accidently or by terrorists, into the secondary containment with spent fuel outside the reactor. I think the dropped fuel accident assumes that the secondary contain=ent remains intact. What if the plane     ca=c through the roof into the reactor core or into the spent fuel pool?     I don't think the FSAR included this possibility or the possibility of a plane crash at the intake structure.
What if the plane ca=c through the roof into the reactor core or into the spent fuel pool?
g                                Such a crash could possibly cut off all sources of cooling water with the
I don't think the FSAR included this possibility or the possibility of a plane crash at the intake structure.
  '
Such a crash could possibly cut off all sources of cooling water with the g
exception of the condensate storage tanks. Of course a fire in the intake tunnel or building ci;;ht possibly result in the dame cutoff. With all the redundancy and seperatione of systems, I still don't understand why all the intake water pu=p wiring for all 3 units was routed through the same cotson tunnel. I know that temporary wiring and pumps could i:e installed on such e an occasion. Nihat I do not know is whether the design pressure of the pri=ary containment is high enough to contain the pressure until such temporary =easures were effected. Do you.know?
exception of the condensate storage tanks.
                                .
Of course a fire in the intake tunnel or building ci;;ht possibly result in the dame cutoff.
Thank You,
With all the redundancy and seperatione of systems, I still don't understand why all the intake water pu=p wiring for all 3 units was routed through the same cotson tunnel.
                                      .
I know that temporary wiring and pumps could i:e installed on such e an occasion.
Y George Smith 3
Nihat I do not know is whether the design pressure of the pri=ary containment is high enough to contain the pressure until such temporary =easures were effected.
    @b                                 -
Do you.know?
                                  '
Thank You, Y
8009800325
George Smith 3
                                                                                              .  .      .
@b 8009800325
_ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
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Latest revision as of 06:42, 24 December 2024

Questions Safety Design of Facilities
ML19347A827
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/24/1980
From: Galen Smith
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML19347A822 List:
References
NUDOCS 8009300325
Download: ML19347A827 (1)


Text

1 ATH E NS, AL A. 3 5611

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Of

$h Chatrsan, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H St. NW Washington, D.C. 20055 Dear Sir; I question the safety design o f the Brown's Ferry Nuclear P1, ant in the following arecs.

Although I think some calculations about the drop-ping of a spent fuel bundle and breaka'ge of came were made, I an concerned about the possibility of a plane crashing accidently or by terrorists, into the secondary containment with spent fuel outside the reactor.

I think the dropped fuel accident assumes that the secondary contain=ent remains intact.

What if the plane ca=c through the roof into the reactor core or into the spent fuel pool?

I don't think the FSAR included this possibility or the possibility of a plane crash at the intake structure.

Such a crash could possibly cut off all sources of cooling water with the g

exception of the condensate storage tanks.

Of course a fire in the intake tunnel or building ci;;ht possibly result in the dame cutoff.

With all the redundancy and seperatione of systems, I still don't understand why all the intake water pu=p wiring for all 3 units was routed through the same cotson tunnel.

I know that temporary wiring and pumps could i:e installed on such e an occasion.

Nihat I do not know is whether the design pressure of the pri=ary containment is high enough to contain the pressure until such temporary =easures were effected.

Do you.know?

Thank You, Y

George Smith 3

@b 8009800325

.