NRC Generic Letter 1981-35: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:* ,UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY | {{#Wiki_filter:* ,UNITED STATES | ||
COMMISSIUN | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIUN | ||
WASHINGTON. | WASHINGTON. D. C.205 r | ||
* ha August 31, 1981 TO ALL BWR APPLICANTS FOR CP's, HOLDERS OF CP's. AND APPLICANTS FOR OL's Gentlemen: | |||
SUBJECT: SAFETY CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH PIPE BREAKS IN THE BWR SCRAM | |||
SYSTEM (GENERIC LETTER 81-35) | |||
In April 1981 the NRC staff sent a letter to each BWR license applicant irequesting certain information on this subject. We indicated that this item must be resolved prior to issuance of an operating license. Sub- sequently, on July 7, 1981 the NRC staff sent a letter to all BWR | |||
licensees informing them that the generic review of this issue had been completed. We indicated that a NUREG report describing the results of this review would be issued. | |||
This letter forwards NUREG-0803, "Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping," dated August 1981. | |||
Section 5 of NUREG-0803 presents the staff's generic conclusions on this issue. Briefly, the staff has concluded that the SDV piping system design is acceptable, provided certain conditions are satisfied on a plant specific basis. The staff further concluded that the safety | |||
As stated cc: Service List -5 8112170388 | - concerns associated with a postulated failure of the SDV piping system do not represent a dominant contribution to the risk of core melt, | ||
810831 PDR NUREG 0803 C PDR | - provided certain assumptions used in the risk assessment are validated on a plant specific basis. | ||
-NUREG-08Q3 provides the staff's guidance and schedule for implementa- tion. As provided in our April 1981 letter, cited above, plant specific responses should be provided for all plants with Mark I and Mark II | |||
containments to support issuance of an operating license. Plant speci- fic responses conforming to the guidance contained in NUREG-0803 will satisfy the information requested in our April 1981 letter. This letter is being provided to applicants with Mark III containments for information purposes, since the staff has concluded that this is not a safety issue for the Mark III containment design. | |||
Sincerely, CA | |||
Division of icensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
:, 6 Enclosure: | |||
As stated cc: Service List -5 | |||
8112170388 810831 PDR NUREG | |||
0803 C PDR}} | |||
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Latest revision as of 03:06, 24 November 2019
| ML031110044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/31/1995 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0803 GL-81-035, NUDOCS 8112170388 | |
| Download: ML031110044 (1) | |
- ,UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIUN
WASHINGTON. D. C.205 r
- ha August 31, 1981 TO ALL BWR APPLICANTS FOR CP's, HOLDERS OF CP's. AND APPLICANTS FOR OL's Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: SAFETY CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH PIPE BREAKS IN THE BWR SCRAM
SYSTEM (GENERIC LETTER 81-35)
In April 1981 the NRC staff sent a letter to each BWR license applicant irequesting certain information on this subject. We indicated that this item must be resolved prior to issuance of an operating license. Sub- sequently, on July 7, 1981 the NRC staff sent a letter to all BWR
licensees informing them that the generic review of this issue had been completed. We indicated that a NUREG report describing the results of this review would be issued.
This letter forwards NUREG-0803, "Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping," dated August 1981.
Section 5 of NUREG-0803 presents the staff's generic conclusions on this issue. Briefly, the staff has concluded that the SDV piping system design is acceptable, provided certain conditions are satisfied on a plant specific basis. The staff further concluded that the safety
- concerns associated with a postulated failure of the SDV piping system do not represent a dominant contribution to the risk of core melt,
- provided certain assumptions used in the risk assessment are validated on a plant specific basis.
-NUREG-08Q3 provides the staff's guidance and schedule for implementa- tion. As provided in our April 1981 letter, cited above, plant specific responses should be provided for all plants with Mark I and Mark II
containments to support issuance of an operating license. Plant speci- fic responses conforming to the guidance contained in NUREG-0803 will satisfy the information requested in our April 1981 letter. This letter is being provided to applicants with Mark III containments for information purposes, since the staff has concluded that this is not a safety issue for the Mark III containment design.
Sincerely, CA
Division of icensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- , 6 Enclosure:
As stated cc: Service List -5
0803 C PDR