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#REDIRECT [[NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8]]
| number = ML16071A187
| issue date = 03/03/2016
| title = Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8
| author name =
| author affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000321, 05000348, 05000364, 05000366, 05000424, 05000425
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = NL-15-1898
| package number = ML16071A108
| document type = License-Application for Facility Operating License (Amend/Renewal) DKT 50
| page count = 45
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:RS2[(1'orc Ari Lctrclcrcnc\
initialing
( ontdition:
Spcna{ fue pool cevel at (scite cpeeitie'
.. Lee "3 dec,,rip,.,,,l\xcl'4...:,
., 3.1()p rat in c M ode cn pplcbi pool \!c1 o(it peteLec .lu~ I3[his I( add~resss a sic]i licantys iof !:nt >nrfoci pool in' color> control and nakcup cap;ahil ii>leading to 1 MI1NI N I foci daniagc.
lhIn condition eittads-tems From niaHo tafl nrcs of plantFonctimsn nccded For pr-otccrion ot rhc p01>1' and t-hu&-x~
r nt a Site \rcrr I 'nici cncxdccIa ration.Ii i> rccorrni/cd that rifts I(' xsonid Iikcl> not bc ncr nntli rclI ai'tcr anothcr Nlic \rca lnmrcoecnc\
I ( xas nict iht o c r, it is inclu dcd to idc ci a> ifiLcnion!
di ~crsi0.I ,,cafLnion
.oi thc crncra-cnc
.ciant icar ion lcI e **v e ..........
'
I(' Rn I or R.io2... ....... .. ..... ... .. ..e,.......
.:N.... ..... .. .. eMcn : e112/e 1 Acernica wun inc accrnn Cr ~crauen Cl jn~1rumcnurucn ucee IC aei~eec~ceI I 36 RA1ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greaterthan 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that therelease duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions toisolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL # 1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actualmeteorology are available.
(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for1 5 minutes or longer:t ~(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDEor 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond i ,sker t dce receptcri~ii~iMilD~updafT (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that wouldresult in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point) for one hour of exposure.
(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hs* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutesor longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for onehour of inhalation.
Basis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actualoffsite doses greater than or equal to 1%4,-pcrcent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.
Releases of this magnitude represent an37t t actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety ef4ie phlant as indicated bya radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).
Radiological effluent EALs are atse-included to provide a basis for classiflying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.
[he monitor reading threshold valuesare determined using a dose a~ssessment method thai hack calculates from the dose valuesspecitied in the IC. The meteorology and source term Inoble gases. particulates, and halogens) used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in ICs RGiI andRS1 IThis protocol maintains intervals betwe.en the threshold
\,alues fbr the three classitications, Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed.and that the threshold values are based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 1t0 mR/hour wholebody' or 50 ink,/hour thy roid, er is more limiting.
The TEDE dose is set at 1%-percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroidCDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroidCDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.
If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due toactions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid forclassification purposes.
Escalation of the emergency classification level weel-!dbe
-iatuses IC RSI1.providec:
clacci.leatian diversity.
and may be uced to claczig' eventz that wou'ld not. reach the.ame ECL- baoed cn plant ztatuz or the fizsion product matrix -pl.n.. Far.man...
f the rBnand the c.mm... effectiv.
e .doze equivalent (CEDE),t:
or ac the thyro'd e..mitted dozee -ilet. .... E), apiCc definied in , 10 FR 20.isuz,.d ino lieu, o"._..u o E.D. E :.an CEDE+ .Tha~e"Xn EPf PAe guid'ne poie-frth-z o dlttyoi oe ovrgo:aeo hoevr cmezatz ae ecdd o ae rtetieaeiczonchl tyri CE3Ncl8
* The effluent meniter readingc cheuld ee~recpcnd te a dece cC 10 rnrem TEDE cr50 mremthyre~d CDE at the ~'cite epecitie dccc recepter peint" (cencictent with the ealeulatien methedelegy emplayed) fcr ene heur efexpecure.
* Meniter readingc will be calculated ucing a cet of accumed meteerolegical data oratmeephene diepercian faetcc'c:
the data er f~eterc celeeted for uce eheuld be the c~c acthece en~leyed te calculate the menitor readingc for ICc RS I and RG 1. Acceptable ceureecefthic infcrmatien
: include, but are net limited to, the RETS!ODCM and valuec uced in thecite'c emergency dece aececement methedelegy.
* The calculation efmenitor readinge will alec require uce cf an accumed releace icetcpie mix:the celected mix chould be the came aa that empK'ed to calculate monitor readingc fcr lC~RSI and RGI Acceptable ceureec efthic informatien
: include, but are net limited te, theRETS'ODCM an! valuec uced in the s~tcc emergency dee: accecement methedelegy.
* Depending upen the methedelegy uced to e~e ulate the EAL valuec. there may be everlap etcame valuec between different ICs. Develeperc will need te addrecc thic everlap by adjusting thece valuec in a manner that encurec a legical ecealatien in the ECL.The "site cpeei fie decereceptorpoint" is the distance(s) andior lecatiene used by theliecacee te dictinguich between en cite and ctTcite decec. The celected dictanee(c) andierlecaticac cheuld reflect the centent ef the emergency plan, and the precedural methedelegy ucedte determine effcite decec and Pretective Aetien Reeemmendatier.c.
The variotien in celeeteddccc recepter peints meane there may be came diffcreneec in the dictanee frem the releace pointte the calculated dccc paint frem cite tc cite.Developers cheuld research radiatien menitor design decuments er ether infc~ation coureec te encure that I) the [AL value being considered is within the ucable recpence anddisplay range ef the instrument, and 2) there are ne autematie features that may render themoniter reading in'.'alid (e.g.. an auta purge feature triggered at a particular indicatien level).It is recegnized that the cenditien deccribed b~ thic IC may result in a radialegical emuent value beyond the operating er dicplay range of the inctalled effluent menitor.
In theseeaces, [AL valuec cheuld be deteni~ined with a margin cufficient te ensure that an accuratemeniter reading ic available.
Fer example, an [AL meniter reading might be set at 90% te 95%ef the h~ghcct aeeumtc meniter reading.
This previcien natwithctanding, if theestimatedicalculated menitar reading ic greater thai appreximately 110% cC the highect accuratemeniter reading, then develepers ma~ ~ n~t ta include the meniter ac an indicatian andidentify an alternate EAL thresheld.
the IC ~ TOfl~2 generally
~ .ini..-Ajtheugh
~ .~, ~ r~uu~ are ~ as a"~hele bedy" dese rate. Far thic reacen, the field sur.ey [AL specifies a 'elaced windew"§af~ey-reedffig~
Indicatienc frem a real time ~ pr~j~tI~n system are net included in the generic EALc.Many lie.. n....d.,n.A have thic capability.
Fer these that do, the capability may net be ithinthe ceope cf the plant Technical Spceifieationc.
A licencee may requect to include an [AL ucingred time dccc prejeetien system recults; appreval will be cencidered an a cace by ease becic.lndieadcnc from a perimeter menitering syctem are net included in the generic EALc.Many Ileenceec do not have thic capability.
Far thoce that do, thece monitars may net becontrelled and maintained to the came level as plant equipment, er within the ceepe of the plantTechnical Specificatiane.
In additia~
readingc may be influenced b~ environmental or ether39 0O'JZIt :~ngu~~ iUZWU~i ~' 133o~uz n uc ~ IH~ jOAOJddU RA2ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by alarms on ANY efthe Ile!winT~l RI radiation monitors:
[~ps~,tpd(
U3~ V4AIamoseP~e~a~
R~ qr.4r~tM~4j ItiitM~ i~rs_______________________________
Ft Pop#re~4-l~ Pluitt~-Kt ~PY~tc~IRI3~tS4I 121 Y4 Mann poP 4~reJ~.f~nnce I~MW~(3) 1 mcdinu of" spent foci pool cxi t~eo ..... pecific Le', l 2 v,,,luz)Leel,
_.4 See D-e'cieper Basis:RI FW 'l IN(i lPA IiIlWAY:
I his includes thc rceator caOit;\,
the transfecr canal, and the spcnl Iuelpool.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuelassembly, or a signifi cant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool+(ae-Dei'ael,9p Not-*. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.
As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety cefhe plat.41 This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loadedstorage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of theCONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU 1.Escalation of the emergency weldbii based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL #1IThis EAL escalates from RU2. ifr ha-the- ...... Ilhc loss of level, in the affected portion of theREFUELING PATHWAY; is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images),
as-welIas-significant changes in water andradiation levels, or other plant parameters.
Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-offcurve). Classification of an event using this EAL should be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.
While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of waterlevel in some portion of the REFUELING
: PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliableindication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered.
To the degree possible, readingsbe considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, ordropping a heavy load onto an assembly.
A rise in readings on radiation monitors shoud4-w ill beconsidered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damagingevent (e.g., a fuel handling accident).poM'I X~JtCI It\eI &ii ihbi, x ailc K. \\ilhiil Ihe I}\\cr ndR u{th ilcI\CI ncgc nccc~>ziI t.2\ci ti s.nicnIti]a~
dn>;c li,.n dircct galm i to pclsoll pcl'o' IIiflopcral nns in ll>c i icinitx of thc >pcnl l'bcl pool. ihis Cofldilion wetlccts it >ii~iii liciltt los ol'Ilnflftid pool xxab.ir mi-i Celho .mod ta*is--i4-b:
alse--a prtKurorU tI a los ohc zbi[ll> to 8dcqatdl\lI coolthec irrmdtnl.d fuel stored in lkc poo1.
of the emergency classification level woild-,be-viaeusc.
ICs RSl1 or RS2 .P2Dc'gclapcr Nores}."FzrEAL1~
I4Far EALU242 andurce alre" chudnotanth",rdato ntre that couldA cnie~ : ;'~ be, ".ed!to idesntif damagt.....r.adi natmnt ad f21acmby(~.
tnei m ator nof r.......
of fc...n..roduat gacec ...rom.For EALc ftIard#coreec.to encurc tha avi)athe
[Ar "-a. Te being spncidi ered 2c vihnue"i s!. the ucbe epnte runmonitor r.a.in. inald e., sadq ate n .. :aut ..o... pur , fe atutrgere:
a.. .tn. a patclr indicanting level)d It is..!n the cgnced tha thle. cniindcrbdb hsI a euti aito aLCtrl Aece .....t Attrt..t.,
c: .I .2 .k t an
* J. "1243 RA3ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normalplant operations, cooldown or shutdown.
Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (I or 2)SNote: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
(I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:C ontrol area radiation moninor 1!D 2 :C 't 5AamtSposPoduo1a I,.entral Akirm ontaion sur\,* Ccntrcl R, or* Central Alar.m Statian(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to anyefthe-fo!!ewifngl able Ill plant rooms or areas:Buihling Rooms~ Appicable M1odesl)iesel acencrator building All A\lllJnit h.2 130" AllReactor building I, nitd 112 SI l)ia onals (RI tR) Altinitl 12 NI D~iagonals (RI IR) AllBasis:l INIPtANNtIlI):
A parmneter change or an c~ cut that is not !i t he result of an i ntcndcd c\ oR uttionor 2) an expected plant responsec to a transicnt.
I]hc cause of thc palra.meter chanlc o~r ecntl max/h. knoxxn or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/ or areas sufficient to precludeor impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or toperform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown.
"
i-represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-of he--pIant.
The emergency director shouldconsider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may beapplicable.
For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be,procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevatedradiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actuallynecessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impededif extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected44 room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of theelevated radiation levels).
For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increaseoccurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not requireentry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keepingnature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).
* The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would notactually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level weal~d-be-44auscs Recognition Category R, C orF ICs.Th-e "other si!te specific areasz/reoms"'
should include any, ar"ea or rooms requiring coantinuoue's occupancy' to maintain normal pant operation, or to peror a.......a..............an.
1sA! Th... ...sit.e* specific list. ef plant rooms or a....a. ... th .. nt.ry, rel ........'*at applicability' identified" a.. spe..if..d.in operating procedures u...d fo n ..m..! plant operatic,"...
.......n nd shtown..
...perfor.ed.
(e.g., an ectian to .add san off.. norm.. or em.'ergency
...iio. " su:chae as emerge:ncy pl, m.. de as) during whiche entry w-ould be required for ..a.h.r..m.or area.of an administrativ'e or record keeping nature (.e.g.. norma' rouands or rou.tine inspct~ions).
If the equipment in ,th. li:ted room or ...ea.wa. alread, : ....... c, or... .u ^f ... :advearse impact beyo'ndq~
that alre'ady, alloe;:d by, Technical Specifications at the ti!me. of te eveont.Cefitf! ReeR.45 EUL A~zgnrnznt Attrltutzz:
2.12.C46 RU1ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (-site-effluent redease ccentrolling dccument)OI)CM' limits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that therelease duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions toisolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
(1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the OIX R'l,.sie-wseei'*
ffluznt-+
....... zontr........
....). lihmits for 60 minutes or longer:Rq&[ $4]: ~TZRad Mon or C~Ici~tion J~Ah~imu~
(2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpointestablished by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.(3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rategreater than 2 times th )IX zt zp " fi cf: untrz.zaz
.............
d.........)
limitsfor 60 minutes or longer.Basis:This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time(e.g., an uncontrolled release).
It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological
: release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.
47 Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment.
: Further, there r... adr:i-o,,atv:,,
in* .,v cotrlsarestablished to prevent unintentional
: releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases.
The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment i&-. !die'ativ'e iindi cat cs 0f-degradation in these features and/or controls.
Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classify'ing events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.
Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.
If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due toactions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid forclassification purposes.
Releases should not be prorated or averaged.
For example, a release exceeding 4 times releaselimits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL #1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases frommonitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.
EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitorreadings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EALwill typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways(e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected bysample analyses or environmental
: surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills ofradioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level wveuildbe-viauses IC RAI.De~ep.-No48 value f.. r thcse m. nit. r sh..u. d d' ermi.. :d using the most applicable dosc/rc'cosc limitspr-c-"---d in.;
RET or^ ODrC,. It. is rcccgnizcd that a calclataedl EAL v'alue may be below.;th. m. nit. a r.....ad; in tha ...... thc monitor does not need to b" i:cluded in the list.related r....irc....t.;
theref.r.,
it is important that the a...ociate EAL rand basis ideti. an ..... aticas on th... use .... avahiaiit of these monitore.
.....in 2:- time a1 r.l.... cntr... limi. ll- The controlling document typically describes be used to dctcrmine EAL values. In cases where a methodology is not adequately defined,cevelopers-snoul.a ocerm,"',line valudes eon-istc~inx
-w,1t" contirol rcguianansr, (e.g., tU For EAL #2 Valuecs in this EAL should be 2 times the secpoint established by theDevelcpers shouald research radiation monitor design documents or other infor,'at.icn sources.to.ens....that..).the......alue.being.conside.ed.is.within.the.usabl response randdisplway' of the instrument, and 2) hr a. re......-
no a-atmatic features that may rende *'..monito re..ading invalid (e.g., an auto purge feature-trigere at ...a par.icula indiation:-
l...lIt is reegn.ized that the condition described by this IC may result in a of the highest accurate monitor reading.
This provsison notw;ithstanding, if theIndications from a real time dose prjetin ysemar not......
included~
in generic EA^s.Iniations
.. om a. .. ri.ete monitoring sstem....
r n..... included in the generic EALs."D:evlapecr chzudd kcsp in rnind t1e rcquirzmsntz of ! 0 CFR ..... c a hs guidance 1os.:'ided by, !NPO rch~tcdts ssmsrgsny rzspznsc equiprrenrt "WhS," sscn!ierirng ihs additics zf zthrx sifus'-e~nitzmnt.
49 Tzchnicai Sp~iticati3n~.
In additicn, r~adingz ma; bz influzn~zd by ~nv~rcnmznt~
zr zthzrtaztcrz.
A II~cnzzz may rc~uz~t tz incIu~L an EAL u~m~ ~ Dcrirnctcr rncnitcrin~
~y~tzm:ant~rcvaI will bz ccr.~idzrc~l zn a c~ b;' Z~Z.... I .....EUL A~wnmcr.t AttrItutc~:
J.I.l.B50 RU2ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels:(1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated byANY of the following:
I 'ersonneil CO 01or flon ,,ater le'el c:pccitiz lv.-el indicaticn4).
ANDb. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors.
cPPSRWItSd{
~5~: V6 SF~ J~veI .owAw~wsoia~r
~jWI-Mfl A -R LI~atIL lop Atea~J-~4 Rp1P~so~N ~lStot ca~1~I3 ll~ fl 2 fialFtqor22W;Ii ii~ ~l l i~ i i .. .2! $1i iV2R$M~iutor~afruiauon Basis:R!1H1IpoolIVN~ PAll tl\VA\: Ihis includes the reactor tac itv. the translibr canal. and the spent fuel[N P1AN NI ): A parameter change or an event that is not t ) the resnit 01'an i mended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.
I he cause ol the paranctetr change or e'vent mayhe kno\\ru or unrkno\\sn This IC addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevatedradiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is alsoindicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of plant safety-ef the-plan',.
A water level decrease will be primarily determined by indications from available levelinstrumentation.
Other sources of level indications may include reports from plant personnel 51 (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available).
A significant drop inthe water level may also cause an increase in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can bedetected by monitors in those locations.
The effects of planned evolutions should be considered.
For example, a refueling bridge arearadiation monitor reading may increase due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactorvessel head or movement of a fuel assembly.
Note that this EAL is applicable only in caseswhere the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance w.ith Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level wvou4 be "-'4uc IC RA2i Th, e "z', e , peci tic lEUELindiaic PATHWAY ' .......i. n tha ..... be-' ..... :^ta moniterl....l..n..the...................
of .... ..U.....G....T......
Seef the m ded. .b!:applicability
,of a partkultr indcait,"on it ia! r:'.ctaalbe i al nc.TEL 'Asit ,:eaecfc t A f ,reatc:3.!
rai.Ation' 3.ni1.a 1.1 dcoti tocarardi 52 74 COLD SHUTDOWN
/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALSGENERAL SITE AREAEMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENTCG1 Loss of RPV CS1 Loss of RiPV CA1 Loss of RPV CUI UNPLANNED inventory affecting inventory affecting inventory, loss of RPV inventory fuel clad integrity with core decay heat Op. Modes: Cold for 15 minutes orcontainment removal capability.
: Shutdown, Refueling longer.challenged.
Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: ColdOp. Modes:" Cold Shutdown, Refueling
: Shutdown, Refueling
: Shutdown, Refueling CA2 Loss of all CU2 Loss of all butoffsite and all onsite one AC power sourceAC power to to emergenieysscntial eimer~genycyssecniiaI buses for 15 minutes orbuses for 15 minutes or longer.longer. Op. Modes:" ColdOp. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling,
: Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled______________De fueledCA3 Inability to CU3 UNPLANNED maintain the plant in increase in RCScold shutdown, temperature.
Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes:" ColdShutdown, Refueling
: Shutdown, Refueling CU4 Loss of VitalDC power for 15minutes or longer.Op. Modes: ColdShutdown, Refueling CU5 Loss of allonsite or offsitecommunications capabilities.
Op. Modes: ColdShutdown, Refueling, De fueledCA6 Hazardous event affecting aSAFETY SYSTEMneeded for the currentoperating mode.Op. Modes: ColdShutdown, Refueling 53 CG1ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (l or 2)INote: The emergency director eheudd-wx ill declare the General Emergency promptly upondetermining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) a. RPV level less than sI5 ~A~ ite specific le-vel) for 30 minutes or longer.ANDb. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (se-e.....lew+(
, '!(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
*UNPLANNED level increase in (cite ....fi cum.....
andc .....in Wthc,fol Iox\ ing Iev'els-of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery:
1~Iua~17I:V7RPV1*v~1
(-t~~') Ia ~utner cite specine :noiepwcncj ANDc. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table 4eee °''"- .... .- 'Containment Challenge Table (Ii£ Secndac.-
....a.n. n .....adiati meaniter rea.ding abov (..ite:.
cpe:,e ...lue)54
* If CONTAINMEN'.T CLOSURLEccondar)
(()N I AINMFNI IN fI is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a GeneralEmergency is not required.
Basis:(ON ['AlNMI'N I INl[I ERIlIY: lPrimary Containment OPI-LRABI.I-per Technical Speciticat ion3.6. I I. See ndar. (ontainment O)PERAI, I.[ per Technical Specitication 3.6.4. ItJNPI ANNH)l: A parameter change or an cx nt thai is n01 I )the result of an intended cx olutionor 2t an expected plant response to a transient,
[he cause of the parameter chancge or e3ve.nt [/a.Ihe known ot unk nowxn.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of activefuel with containment challenged.
This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.
Releases can bereasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Water lex el toar top of active fuel is calculated at -1I58.4"'.
Although slightly moore e.the -I155"' t()P o'r top of actise fuel is provided for this [A/\1 to aid in operator recognition of" the ex ent.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat willcause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-g&reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.
With CONTAINMENT CLOSURESecondaix
( ONi AINMENI IN ILEiRI I Y not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment.
If CONTAtNMENT CLOSURESecondarx
(( ONTAIN MI[NI IN UI ~(iRI IFY is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is notrequired.
The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity.
It therefore represents a challenge toContainment integrity.
In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a coreuncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment.
If all installed hydrogen gasmonitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not bepossible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listedindications to assess whether or not containment is challenged.
In EAL 2.b, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to accountfor various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).
It also allows sufficient time55 for pcri'ermaieneeef-actions to terminate
: leakage, recover inventory control/
or makeupequipment, and/or restore level monitoring.
The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, orwater level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.
If water level cannot bemonitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes insump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against otherpotential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG- 1449, Shutdownand Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; andNUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.
1119 and NUMARC 91 06~....r.ugh ......u. aproin ...... and... re..u.ling eva'lutians.
patiularly for a PWR. Asthoat.th ability to manitor lee ....':;:thin the range required b perat...n.
pro.. d.r.. will....
n, t bepr..dur. n therCodae Sh -tdh And Reuln oesmyb2).cet(~.
nroe)tatan ailobil f nsaley level idcfhh!hatins auchthate
:'nthis leel alueg ten bedet'ecr mine duringd Tin Cl fi:hur orom Refacumeln modifesthen, daenot iclue E : hI'~ (classificationf, il.be56 Far BWR~ that da nat ha~e in~taIled rad;atkrn manitar~
capable afir.dieoting care unco~ery, alternate aite epecific level indicoxian5 of core uneovery ehould be uzcd if available.
Far EAL ft2.b aecand bullet Pac~t IMI accident ztudi.x indicated that the inctalled PWRnuclear trumentatian will aperate erratically when the care ic uncavered and that thic chauldbe uced ac a teal fcr making euch determinatiaca.
Becauce BWR Scurce Range Monitor (SRM)nucleor inatrumentotiar.
detectara arc typically lacated belac; care mid plane, thia may nat be aviable indicatar af care uncavery for BWRe.Far EAL #2.b ~ird bullet Enter ~y "eitc epecific cump cn~'or t~k" levels that could bepected ta c~ge if there were a lace of inventary of cufficient magnitude to indicate coreuneovery.
Specitie level valuec may be included if desired.For EAL #2.b fourth bullet Develapers chauld determine if other reliable indieptara exist taidenti~'
fuel wleavery (e.g.. remote vie~ing ucing c~nerac).
The gcal Ic ta identify any uniqueor cite epecific indicatianc, nat already uced elce~vhere.
that will pramate timely and accurateemergency elaccificatian.
Far ~e Containment Challenge Table:Site chutda~ car.tingeney plane typically prcvide fcr re ectabliching CONTAINMENT CLOSURE fol!awing a lace afRCS heat remaval ar inventa~'
central functione.
Far "Explacive mixture",
developer:;
may enter the minimum ear.tainment atmoepheric hydrageneaneentratian neecee~ ta cuppurt a hydragen bum (i.e.. the la~r deflagmtion limit). Acaneurrent eantamment oxygen eancentratian may be included if the plant hac thia indicatiar.
available in the Central Roam.Far BWRs, the uce af eccondary cantainment radiatian manitarc chould pravide indication atincreaced releoce that may be indicative af a challenge ta aecandary cor.tair.ment.
The "citeepecitic value enoulo ne cacco on tne nut'eacily recognizable and have a defined bacic.ECL Aceignment Attributee:
: 3. l.1.Bria'umum sate vaiucs cecauce mccc vajue.. are57 CS1ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Note: The emergency director sheoild-\vill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upondetermining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) a. ....N....I ....E ...T CL SU~ Ctndar) (CON I'AINMLNTI IN'I LI' IU Y notestablished.
ANDb. RPV level less thanL~ ~jte-speeific lev).(2) a. C......................Secondary CON FAINMXN I INTI (GRITYestablished.
ANDb. RPV level less than I (I F4 ....
(3) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
* JNPlANNl4D leveI increase in aim ofrthc hdlowving of suf'ficient utagnitude to indicate core uncover}':
* (Site epecifie rZdiaticn monitar) reading greater than (site zpeeifie
',alue)* Ermtie ceuree range manitor indicatien
[PWRJILrUN PLANNED riEn.cre ae in *zt petc~m n/rtn)i~~
tztiin* i~utner site ~peeiiic Inalepuens)
Basis:(ON IAINMN'ILI INTEiRIIFY:
IPrimary Containment per iTehnical Specification 3.6.1. t. Secondary Containment OPFRAHILL per Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.58 I NP I ANNt I): A parametecr change or an evecm thai is I to I ) thc rcsu It of an intended ev olutiionor 2) an expected plant rcsiponsc to a transient.
lhc caose of thc parameter changc or evecnt ma)bc known or unknowxn, This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss of RPV inventory control and makeupcapability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. The lost inventory may be due to a RCScomponent
: failure, a loss of configuration
: control, or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant.These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and4itis-warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.
\\ atci evel ibr top of activc fuecl is calcnlatcd at -1 58.44" Although slightiy niorc conscrxiitivc.
thc -1I55- li()P v'aluc tbr top of actix c Fetc is prox idcd Ibr this FAI, to aid in opcrator rccognition of thc evecnt.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat willcause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-C-reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.
Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying
..O....I....NT..........Sccondar)
(ON I AIN MEN I' IN I E(IRIlY following a loss ofheat removal or RCS inventory control functions.
The difference in the specified R-C--reactor vessel levels of EALs 1.b and 2.b reflects
#the-fee~tlhat with CO1ITAP RTMEN~T..........
cc dax CON IAINMEN I IN I l;(RlI Y established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment.
In EAL 3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to accountfor various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).
It also allows sufficient timefor pef~:c factions to terminate
: leakage, recover inventory contro1¢ or makeupequipment.
and/or restore level monitoring.
The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, orwater level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.
If water level cannot bemonitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes insump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against otherpotential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdownand Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; andNUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.
Escalation of the emergency classification level ......d-be-;i4*uscs IC CG1 or RG I.dzp....n upan the a.'..unt of timzainc
°:...u..d
..... r.z.cr t-, ....ri Lctz 17. SE nCY~ 912°8. N1JREcG 111~9 an-dI N! rMARC 91 06.59 that the a~biit t... :onito l .... ..ithin th. r....g .. r :.ire by. operating prs.cedures wi'll not beint........
Th"ie instrumentation ran'ge necessary3 to ....... implem..n...ti:n of opcrating prcdurermine y th me C dSutdong and,. Refuelin may. beo di cn (.g.., narrow.cr th ,ntht equi;Sctr, dwing moe higp!her thn aColdae Stdwn. Fcr AL #b th "sie spcifi levl'~ i.- " bee th otmI ftcRSlo.Ti doe wign andpertioEnte af "tcre ~cvfel ntramcn.tatn isnsuch tha.t thi-s leve valuc tnodeet b~ethasiiatithe c illben ac....mplisby hed! a',.... in acrdse .aith , E ... ft3... ... ...:...v.ail-a"biligy of tnhae lev.. l indicatin i... such tha thi level...
valu can be.. deter,,n durinsaete'..e shu !than mdesgor c'e~ndtios bto enatrethar.then spcifya nther meadeiepndent a- nd!abeFrcnfigurtoian stte drin ic the ls~.r- t n~evtel niaini phal.I h ein and opntf a aratian-'eEA trsb!acmplisr:ee!dhe
~ed in acodnewthe EAL te ).:d naaprree!-e f :'bminbtwe core... wil ,.incras.Ene a' ..sit... sp..ci.c radition m.......".th..ticould.be.
us df u detect cagnrdeunoe;ad h saite iesecfcvle indicatecr ceey eee ;e"-.....ive
:.a, are uncover.
I s eagi60 ide.tify'.
fel.......
un .........
.i.wi .u:I .amras...
The geal. is t.a i..n.if.
an uni. .. "uear site ....p:eifi indiAtiar;....
na already usedA elsewher,+.
t1,at w.ill pr.m.t tim÷ely.
ond accuratFor EAL il !.b "site specific le...el" is the, L... L, .... E ..CCS, ...uati. setpoint
/Levetl I. Tha e I 1.. I ..L.. La L... [CCSP setaint; I ... l 1 w.... chesen beauseo it is ainetion systedmats w ould autm.tihaghesta and... ttmon tor readtor, RP. le.el. T .i.. ... a ....smignifcatly auv the Tiapr eaf! AcieFulTOFtrehd specified in teELt ul na EapLpr #e2.ForobrEato 2bTetwe monitor rpeadifi level thaudb ohe tap actiesfuelt.
F Fr[A # P.b fthat bullet Ashater lt!eve rinathen rea t-or vse lawarse hef !doseaten borethcare will incree. ... Ente n...site sp..cifi.
radiatian mecangter mothatcoul eue eetcrindiator and thre asnciatrd "sit spcfc au"iniaie fcr uRvr. ti ecieeCamLe Aa3n [Lmanito rending:
mih e.'.t90 o9% fte ihs a.rt mni61 CA1ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Loss of RPV inventory.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: The emergency director sheould-w'ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level less than (Lv2 aeualt (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longerANDb. UNPLANNED level increase in (zit ......i :¢u.....
anda .....i.a. of thefollow ing 1evels-due to a loss of RPV inventory=:
Basis:U NPI ;kNNI)D:
A4 paramleter change or an event that ik not I) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.
I he cause of the parameter change or exent naybe knowxn or nnknoxxn.
This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately coolirradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).
This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.For EAL #1, a lowering of water level below (zt pcfi zz)35" (lecxel 2 actuation setpoint) indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of the coolant will increase as the available water inventory isreduced.
A continuing decrease in water level will lead to core uncovery.
Although
: related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a residual heatremoval suction point). An increase in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removalcapability is evaluated under IC CA3.For EAL #2, the inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or powerfailures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.
If water levelcannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing
~04 2~~enR~62 changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated againstother potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EALduration specified in IC CS IIf the RPV inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency IC CSI.D:vz!oper L-njeetisn systrems w.'ukl autamaticatty t.art. and is a ;valu.e significanqtly below: the Lw:, RPYPFo.r EAL "ft,, The. typ and range ..f............i...trum
.ntati ..n ma .ar durin...
anoutage as the planto mo-ves thro~ugh
-various pe~rating modcs an'd.-r"fueling.,
......luti+.on,"+....v--:'
partiularl imnplementation of operating provecdurcs in the Cold Sh'atdo';.an
".d Recfueling mo..des may bedifferent (e.g., nr:"..rower) than that requi:red
.. durin .node than Cold. Su...÷. ..Enter any ...it. speci..c sump n/rtn" eesta c.......
uld.......
be e.p..t.d.to.........i.ther..werAssig...ent Atr;ibutes:
3.1 .2I".B63 CA2ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergencycsscential busesfor 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling, DefueledEmergency Action Levels:Note: The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to ACsent~iaBse l2E,1il s I~ ite specifie emergency buses) for !15 minutes or longer.I ~ 17~J; Vu4IO~AC~
D~ueeIdoimation IDBasis:This IC addresses a total loss of AC power (sCC 1-abic S 1 abho~c) that compromises theperformance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power. including those necessary foreInerge~eycs, enrial core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure
: control, spent fuel heatremoval, and the ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a SiteArea Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergeaeyessential bus toservice.
Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lowertemperatures and pressures in various plant systems.
4-wsr-,When in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe-plwi.nt Fifteen minutes was' as n.i' flu threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level "¢,o,'ad-be
;*ian ses IC CS 1 or RS i.minimu,...m,,
.. number cf aperating, gcncratzr:
fur that .......t. pr-'idcaequae
.............
(. ... t oz .....pcit : ncrctcr .+izcd t fed AC" ..........
bu., the EAL md Ba+/-i64 tAttup~ p'-cr tan th clactrinol diztrEA tio mayztcmrtd a S~aFETrY SYSt aEMS hthat apertinc fthie anrd i can tr-al-le...
in .:a.:erdanc
;;i.,th ,-bnarmc. , ...r..n .apt.i......
prc-ducr
, becn d" ei: n ; ba l a. .. id ent " r cpen:ee g:u:ideit (eay .FLEX~ eu pp.........
guieliLtL/.~eIgnmenL;uErInute;:
J.i.e.u65 CA3ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheii4d-xs ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than f2I2 F~site-speitfie Technical Spcif....
e ce.ld+ ...
.... pcr.....
limit)"-:
for greater than the durationspecified in the-f..........
bl I .. able (:2.... ......~ t~ .... .... -... .... o d .... ... .Table(k:
RCS leal-nup Duration T~hreshohls R~-4M ~ CotINmt I C(;RI : Stautus "eat-up-iav oINtact butabc it reuced minutes*vR04PR1 eEstablished 2t mntes* If R aR RCist e ''a yte ci operationn ithim this time frame andPC teprteisbngcdcdte RAI, tips ueicbig Itueth A i e applicable.
(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site epci~fic preceure S(Thie EAL d-ces+ net apply duriSng "water :elid plant cenditie~n:.
[PIJR°])Basis:(t N I A INMI NI IN I lE(iRI I Yt Primary tontaiuntent
()I'l-RABI3II pcr Ilechnical Speciticat ion3.6.1I I Secondars (ontainienct OlPI R \Itl I per "I ethnical Specilication 3,h.4, I,INPI .A\Nl~t).
A paranicter changc or an ev ent 1thu:t is nlot I ) thc rcsult of an intended cevolution or 2) an expelctd plant response to a transient, I he cause of the paramecter ehange or c,,cut nia)he k noss il or unlknqossn+
Vt4R~tsdtu&w*
66 This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition ofheat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed.
Either condition represents anactual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety efhe-plan+.
A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.
Ihe RtiS I leat-up Il)uration lhresholds table addresses the case wshere there is an increase inR(TS temperature.
the RCS is not intact, and Secondary (iO N 1 AINMIN 1 INrt!GRl IFY is notestablished.
In this case, no heat-uip duration is ici~.. (0 minutes).
Ibhis is because ! t theev aporated reactor coolant max be released directly into the containment atmosphere ands ubsqtientlly to lie eiiviro me nt. and 2) Ihere is redutced reactor coolant invent ory abhove th~e top:of irradiated fuel.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an increase in RCS temperature when.....T......E........SURE (O(N I AtNMI N I IN I EGRI INY is established but theRCS is not intact, or RCS inventory is reduced (e.g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.
tinal lx. the RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCStemperature with the RCS intact. The status of C..N..AIN...E.T
..C ...SURE condar y(ON lAINMEN I INI K( R, I Y is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release.
The 60-minute time frame should allowsufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plantsafety.
iin thc ease .hecre there is, an increas:e in RCS tem.'perature, the RCS is nct intact er is atredu...ced
..........
[PflR]. ,an CONrTAINM ENT CLOSU RESecandar'y CONTAINrMENT rINTEG"R-ITY is neat establishc ed, no h....at up .. duri is alle,;wed (i.e., 0 Thi:s is becausesubse....ntl.
to th.. "n.ir. nm..nt. and 2) there is, recd r...act...r ceolant inv'entoty abave th-e t-pef ir"radaiated fuel.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level wevu~d-be
;ia*uses IC CSl1 or RSl1.* ,here indicateda.
The RCS sheuld beo eansidared intact ar net intact in acccrdaaaee with siteFar EAL fi2 The ....spcii resue radng shud he thea..........
chng in. pressu....t..t e~ be acc.ratel determine usingur insalld nstruenttin bu etls ta 067 Lo3 ^of .H o: ...... A number o.f
.... t. ..........
icn :-o:--;'cxing.
atcamcay h....t. .........
,o loot and. co.rc unco;'cr,
.......ur. NR.C a:nay::c ohbo;w that there arcrcq:ucncco that con oause core unco~very in 15 t o 20 minutco,
_an ..........
,or ........
:ithin npro-"ded by Goncric Lc,".cr 88. 17 anrd bclie-ved to bc conocr.-Containment barrier to fiooicn pro~duct relceoc io comb!iohed.
'ative niven that a low prezoureECL Aooizrnment Attributeo:
3.1.2.1368 CA6ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the currentoperating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels:(1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)
* Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION
* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the ShiftManagerANDb. EITHER of the following:
* Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least onetrain of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis:tl;XPIOSIO)N:
A rapid. ,,iolent and catastrophic failure of a piece of cquipment due tocobtfl stion. chemical reaction or ox erpressuriiation.
A release of steam tfl'oi high energy linesor components) or an electrical component ihilure (causcd by short circuits, grounding, arcing,cet. I should not autoalnuicallx, be considered an explosion.
Such exenis may require a post-es cotinspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.FRIRF,: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drixebelts or ox erheated electrical equipment do not constitute F'IRES. O)bscrx ation of" flame ispreferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat arc observed.
SA.FEVTY SYS l'IM: A system required tor safe plant operation, cooltng doxsn the plant and/orplacing it in the cold shutdoxxt condition, including the [('CS. These are typically systemtsclassified as saztyt-related.
VISIBIJ,"
I)AMA(iE:
D~amage to a component or structure that is readily observable
,aithoutmeasurements,
: testing, or analy sis. I he visual impact olf the damage is sufticient to causeconcern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected comtponent or structure.
69 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. Thiscondition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product harrier,and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety[Al. 1.a identifies hazardous events that could result in damage to plant systems.
A seismicevent is indicated
")3 entry into IC 11t12. Flooding is indlicatedl by a significant increase in w,\aterlevels (external or internal).
I ligh winds are indicate~d by sustained winds at the sitemeteorological tower exceeding 35 mph,The first threshold tbr EAL l.b4- addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is inservice/operation, since indications for it will be readily available.
The indications of degradedperformance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability orreliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.[he second threshold for EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component thatis not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components.
Operators will make this determination based on...........
e~h I .l available event and damage report information.
This is intended to be a briefassessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level ;weu44.be-;'4auses IC CS 1 or RS I.For (ait' peeifie hazards).
devc!per:
sha'uld ecen:der including e~ther zignifiean , ..... owp..ifie-hazar-dz te the bul!eted
!Iist eantained in EAL l.a (e.g., a seieh4)",uc..ar
.........
pln SAET SYSvcvTEM are comprised zfw r+ m.... r... epame .ad trains c~f e.3uipmnt in accordance
-with site desig7n criteria.
ECL Assig:7nment Aifributes:
3.1 .2.B70 CUlECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director shejild-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than lowerlimit ot'lhc controlling lcvel band for 15 minutes or longer.(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored.
ANDb. UNPLANNED lcve! increase in (site. specific sump :and/r tank) lcvcaany, oF thefolloxxing:
Basis:UN P1 ANNE[): A paraneter change or an ex cnt that is no t I) ihc result oFan intended cvohloion or 2) an expected plant response to a transient, lhc cause of thc parameter change or cvcnt otaxbe knlownt or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level(or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPV level concurrent withindications of coolant leakage.
Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-ef the. ~a~t.Refueling evolutions that decrease RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled.
AnUNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limitwarrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required RPV level can change several times during thecourse of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups areimplemented.
This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in theapplicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.
71 The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restoreand maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing abrief lowering of water level.EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine RPV level have been lost. In thiscondition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes insump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against otherpotential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level 4ia-using either IC CAl or CA3.the generic warding i.s adequaec t.. ene ure anda timcy ar if
.....nt ca b... includ,..ed
..thcut m..raking the EAL ............
un:iely e- pat....a..
: i"ea .... t.....wi:th atien. tha.t may be take durin"'g an outage. If epci~ti.e zetpei~nte are incude,d+...
th.z..,aul EA ft 2.b Enter any et pcteem "nd:or tank..l.....that
..................
be ...............
eth.r. we're a Ieee Cf (i.e.. t.he Let inv....nt
..ry .woul ...t.r t.he hated. .... ar tank!).I.lCl Ae" ......t A-ttri-u,,*
..... .172 CU2ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Loss of all but one AC power source to effiege~ieyc.>scnhial buses for 15minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling, DefueledEmergency Action Levels:INote: The emergency director ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) a. AC power capability to 4160VA E I 1JE12, J/(*ies ...cific ...........
b,.u., is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes orlonger.ANDb. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power toSAFETY SYSTEMS.c~n~fled(
3~;V~ 416OVAsm~atInf~m~a~n Gqsu~au~md
( 33~ vi~ 4160 vAC ~uuili~ ~uies 1nfcm~at~oo]
Basis:SA!I;IY SYS'I t".: A s) stc~m required Ibr salb plant npcration, cooling dm>xn thc plant andiorplacing it in Ihc cold condi ion, inclidingi th t!CC S. Those arc tvpic:al!\
S~ VScmsclassilied as saVL'ny-rc~latcd.
This IC describes a significant degradation of off'site and onsite AC power sources such that anyadditional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.
In thiscondition, the sole AC power source ( scc lablc S1 ahtwci may be powering one, or more thanone, train of safety-related equipment.
When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as anAlert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems.
44t*When in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe pl--n:.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an effergefe.%ycsscnlial bus. 8eime-Examples of this condition rFertebelew,includc:
73
* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emefgelieyesscnti~al powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
* A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emefgencyy.sscntial power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emrgene~ycsscntial buses being back-fed from theunit main generator.
* A loss of merege*neycsse~ntial power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single trainof em~ergenyessniaI buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen ' .... ..., minutes ...........
d as ai, the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses ofpower.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert inaccordance with IC CA2.mi'!im~um number of operating gcneratars nec;c."y~
f,.ar,. t.....t .....our.e to pr-..:idc required po;;er toT-h..e ..it. speci.....
em-erg'en........
-b,-a,..
e .s, are the buses fod by, offeite or emergency, AC power sourcesis typiFcally I emergency bus per train cf S.AFETY SYSTEMS.De-'elopers should the bulleted examples pro; ided in the basis ...ti.n above. as. n eededto reflect their site specific pl-+ant ; d ..i.n .and ..pabilitie.
..ingle pow.er source, For examplFe, three independent 315k-V' offite powver circuits (i.e.,that operation cf this sorc L: regnized in AOPc and E.... or byn einbssacdn re...p.n...
guideline.
(e.g. FLEX guidelines).
Suc..a. v r .....ud c~caymethe "Alternate ac sou.rce"'
definition pro-vided in 10 CFP. 50.2.At multi": .... unit stations, the........
ma c......t comp......~
m .easures that arc-and._affected unit via a cross ne to a companion u-nit may credit thL pe..er surce in the EALarov'!ded that the planned cross tic stratce-v meets the recui~remnts
.of 10 CFR. 50.63.ECLP .A,-".......
n 3.1.1 .A74 CU3ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheould-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than
-4" v' !(2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 minutes or longer.Basis:IINPI ANNI ): A parameter change or an ce' nt that is not I) thle result of an intended ceolution or 2) an expected planm response to a transient.
The cause oF the parameter change or event nayhe known or unknown.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-of~he-plant~.
If the RCSis not intact and COT-'xrA
...... )ONlAIN LNT IN I'EWRI I'Y is notestablished during this event, the emergency director shoai4-will also refer to IC CA3.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.
EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS inexcess of that which can currently be removed, sieh-tbowhcer reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications.
During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because thecore decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.
During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactorvessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange arecarefully planned and controlled.
A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory mayresult in a rapid increase in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.
EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions.
and operators wvild-heare unable to monitor keyparameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal.
During this condition, there is noimmediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since thecessation of power operation.
Fifteen minutes wa-s' eleeted-asis a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses ofindication.
75 Escalation to Alert ..... i d-,be-........
ses IC CAI based on an inventory loss or IC CA3 based onexceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.
ECL Asignment, 3.1. i.A76 CU4ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels:INote: The emergency director shetdd-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) Indicated voltage is less than i.~~ilcbsvltg
'lc onSpc 52 ~1Z2~ for 15* minutes or longer.Basis:This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and controloperable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. Inthese modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly
: reduced, and coolant systemtemperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions increase the time available to restore avital DC bus to service.
T-usv-,This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of thelevel of plant safety-e~f he-plan:.
As used in this EAL, "required" means the vital DC buses necessary to support operation of thein-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.
For example, if Train Ais out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable),
then a loss of vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of anUnusual Event. A loss of vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification.
Fifteen minutes selected nz ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level w, il4-dbe-;4auses ICCA I or CA3, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Develeper Nete=:ncaeaary fcr adequate opera~tian af SAFET SYSTEMvequipment.
This alto'age "alu' ....uld; .... .....arl.. e a margin" ..... at leact...
15 minutes of aperatian bfcfre the aneet af to. opertem~nlmu'.m valtage ic apprax:matel, 1......l..
per cell.Li'~aaIgnmemAttrIcutea:
a.i.i.r'.
77 CU5ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling, DefueledEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods:Plhnt telephones (Includes lardo ired and nA ireless)Plant pagePlant radio systems(,gite apeczfic
!!'t eaf czmm:,n'i:ntoan:
methndea)
(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods:INN (I t enrgneQ Notification Newo ork)( ommerejal phones(3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods:I-NS on Federal Iclecornmunecataon.,
Sxstem (F Commercial phones(o.it"'
liat cf cemmunicntizna raetheadL)
Basis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities.
While nota direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROsand the NRC.This IC be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipments-relaying of on-siteinformation via individuals or multiple radio transmission points-;
individuals being sent tooffsite locations,-ete.).
EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.
EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration.
The OROs referred to here are the State of~ieorgia.
Appling ('ount\..left l)avisC (oont\. I atnallI Count) and I oombs (ountmt.
.........
v-.pc .......),EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.
78 EAL ft I The "cite cpeeifie lict cf concmunieaticnc methcd' ehoold include allcommunicatione metho&~ uced far routine plant communicatione (e.g., commercial or Sitetelephones.
page party zyetcmc, radioc, etc.). Thiz licting ohould include inztal!ed plantequipment and componente, and not itemo owr.ed and maintained by indkidualo.
EAL #2 1k "cite epecific lict of communicationo methode" Thould include p1! communicatione methode uced to perform initial cmergdnoy notificatione to OROc no deocribed in the citeEmergcney Plan. 1k licting chould include inatalled plant equipment and componento.
and not:temo owned and maintained by individuaL.
Eeainpl~
methodo are ring duwn'dedieated telephone linco. commercial telephone linec, radioc, oatc!litc telephonec and interact bacedcommunicationo technology.
In the Bacio section, incefl the cite opecific licting of the OROc requiring notification of anemergency declamtion from the Control Room in accordance with the cite Emergency Plan, andtypicalh' within 15 minutec.EAL #3 The "cite opecifie Hot of communicationo methodo" chould include all eammunicationo methodo uced to perfcrn'i initial emergency notiticatieno to the NRC ~ deocribed in the citeEmergency Plan. The licting chould include inc~Ilcd plant equipment and component.
and netitemo owned and maintained by individualo.
Thece methodo are typically the dedicated Emergency Notificatlen Syctem (ENS) telephone line and commercial telephone linec.EC L Ac:ignme~nt Attribuate,:
3.l.1.C79 85 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALSUNUSUAL EVENTE-HUI Damage to a loaded caskCONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.
Op. Modes: All80 RS2[(1'orc Ari Lctrclcrcnc\
initialing
( ontdition:
Spcna{ fue pool cevel at (scite cpeeitie'
.. Lee "3 dec,,rip,.,,,l\xcl'4...:,
., 3.1()p rat in c M ode cn pplcbi pool \!c1 o(it peteLec .lu~ I3[his I( add~resss a sic]i licantys iof !:nt >nrfoci pool in' color> control and nakcup cap;ahil ii>leading to 1 MI1NI N I foci daniagc.
lhIn condition eittads-tems From niaHo tafl nrcs of plantFonctimsn nccded For pr-otccrion ot rhc p01>1' and t-hu&-x~
r nt a Site \rcrr I 'nici cncxdccIa ration.Ii i> rccorrni/cd that rifts I(' xsonid Iikcl> not bc ncr nntli rclI ai'tcr anothcr Nlic \rca lnmrcoecnc\
I ( xas nict iht o c r, it is inclu dcd to idc ci a> ifiLcnion!
di ~crsi0.I ,,cafLnion
.oi thc crncra-cnc
.ciant icar ion lcI e **v e ..........
'
I(' Rn I or R.io2... ....... .. ..... ... .. ..e,.......
.:N.... ..... .. .. eMcn : e112/e 1 Acernica wun inc accrnn Cr ~crauen Cl jn~1rumcnurucn ucee IC aei~eec~ceI I 36 RA1ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greaterthan 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that therelease duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions toisolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL # 1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actualmeteorology are available.
(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for1 5 minutes or longer:t ~(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDEor 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond i ,sker t dce receptcri~ii~iMilD~updafT (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that wouldresult in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point) for one hour of exposure.
(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hs* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutesor longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for onehour of inhalation.
Basis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actualoffsite doses greater than or equal to 1%4,-pcrcent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.
Releases of this magnitude represent an37t t actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety ef4ie phlant as indicated bya radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).
Radiological effluent EALs are atse-included to provide a basis for classiflying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.
[he monitor reading threshold valuesare determined using a dose a~ssessment method thai hack calculates from the dose valuesspecitied in the IC. The meteorology and source term Inoble gases. particulates, and halogens) used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in ICs RGiI andRS1 IThis protocol maintains intervals betwe.en the threshold
\,alues fbr the three classitications, Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed.and that the threshold values are based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 1t0 mR/hour wholebody' or 50 ink,/hour thy roid, er is more limiting.
The TEDE dose is set at 1%-percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroidCDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroidCDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.
If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due toactions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid forclassification purposes.
Escalation of the emergency classification level weel-!dbe
-iatuses IC RSI1.providec:
clacci.leatian diversity.
and may be uced to claczig' eventz that wou'ld not. reach the.ame ECL- baoed cn plant ztatuz or the fizsion product matrix -pl.n.. Far.man...
f the rBnand the c.mm... effectiv.
e .doze equivalent (CEDE),t:
or ac the thyro'd e..mitted dozee -ilet. .... E), apiCc definied in , 10 FR 20.isuz,.d ino lieu, o"._..u o E.D. E :.an CEDE+ .Tha~e"Xn EPf PAe guid'ne poie-frth-z o dlttyoi oe ovrgo:aeo hoevr cmezatz ae ecdd o ae rtetieaeiczonchl tyri CE3Ncl8
* The effluent meniter readingc cheuld ee~recpcnd te a dece cC 10 rnrem TEDE cr50 mremthyre~d CDE at the ~'cite epecitie dccc recepter peint" (cencictent with the ealeulatien methedelegy emplayed) fcr ene heur efexpecure.
* Meniter readingc will be calculated ucing a cet of accumed meteerolegical data oratmeephene diepercian faetcc'c:
the data er f~eterc celeeted for uce eheuld be the c~c acthece en~leyed te calculate the menitor readingc for ICc RS I and RG 1. Acceptable ceureecefthic infcrmatien
: include, but are net limited to, the RETS!ODCM and valuec uced in thecite'c emergency dece aececement methedelegy.
* The calculation efmenitor readinge will alec require uce cf an accumed releace icetcpie mix:the celected mix chould be the came aa that empK'ed to calculate monitor readingc fcr lC~RSI and RGI Acceptable ceureec efthic informatien
: include, but are net limited te, theRETS'ODCM an! valuec uced in the s~tcc emergency dee: accecement methedelegy.
* Depending upen the methedelegy uced to e~e ulate the EAL valuec. there may be everlap etcame valuec between different ICs. Develeperc will need te addrecc thic everlap by adjusting thece valuec in a manner that encurec a legical ecealatien in the ECL.The "site cpeei fie decereceptorpoint" is the distance(s) andior lecatiene used by theliecacee te dictinguich between en cite and ctTcite decec. The celected dictanee(c) andierlecaticac cheuld reflect the centent ef the emergency plan, and the precedural methedelegy ucedte determine effcite decec and Pretective Aetien Reeemmendatier.c.
The variotien in celeeteddccc recepter peints meane there may be came diffcreneec in the dictanee frem the releace pointte the calculated dccc paint frem cite tc cite.Developers cheuld research radiatien menitor design decuments er ether infc~ation coureec te encure that I) the [AL value being considered is within the ucable recpence anddisplay range ef the instrument, and 2) there are ne autematie features that may render themoniter reading in'.'alid (e.g.. an auta purge feature triggered at a particular indicatien level).It is recegnized that the cenditien deccribed b~ thic IC may result in a radialegical emuent value beyond the operating er dicplay range of the inctalled effluent menitor.
In theseeaces, [AL valuec cheuld be deteni~ined with a margin cufficient te ensure that an accuratemeniter reading ic available.
Fer example, an [AL meniter reading might be set at 90% te 95%ef the h~ghcct aeeumtc meniter reading.
This previcien natwithctanding, if theestimatedicalculated menitar reading ic greater thai appreximately 110% cC the highect accuratemeniter reading, then develepers ma~ ~ n~t ta include the meniter ac an indicatian andidentify an alternate EAL thresheld.
the IC ~ TOfl~2 generally
~ .ini..-Ajtheugh
~ .~, ~ r~uu~ are ~ as a"~hele bedy" dese rate. Far thic reacen, the field sur.ey [AL specifies a 'elaced windew"§af~ey-reedffig~
Indicatienc frem a real time ~ pr~j~tI~n system are net included in the generic EALc.Many lie.. n....d.,n.A have thic capability.
Fer these that do, the capability may net be ithinthe ceope cf the plant Technical Spceifieationc.
A licencee may requect to include an [AL ucingred time dccc prejeetien system recults; appreval will be cencidered an a cace by ease becic.lndieadcnc from a perimeter menitering syctem are net included in the generic EALc.Many Ileenceec do not have thic capability.
Far thoce that do, thece monitars may net becontrelled and maintained to the came level as plant equipment, er within the ceepe of the plantTechnical Specificatiane.
In additia~
readingc may be influenced b~ environmental or ether39 0O'JZIt :~ngu~~ iUZWU~i ~' 133o~uz n uc ~ IH~ jOAOJddU RA2ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by alarms on ANY efthe Ile!winT~l RI radiation monitors:
[~ps~,tpd(
U3~ V4AIamoseP~e~a~
R~ qr.4r~tM~4j ItiitM~ i~rs_______________________________
Ft Pop#re~4-l~ Pluitt~-Kt ~PY~tc~IRI3~tS4I 121 Y4 Mann poP 4~reJ~.f~nnce I~MW~(3) 1 mcdinu of" spent foci pool cxi t~eo ..... pecific Le', l 2 v,,,luz)Leel,
_.4 See D-e'cieper Basis:RI FW 'l IN(i lPA IiIlWAY:
I his includes thc rceator caOit;\,
the transfecr canal, and the spcnl Iuelpool.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuelassembly, or a signifi cant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool+(ae-Dei'ael,9p Not-*. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.
As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety cefhe plat.41 This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loadedstorage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of theCONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU 1.Escalation of the emergency weldbii based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL #1IThis EAL escalates from RU2. ifr ha-the- ...... Ilhc loss of level, in the affected portion of theREFUELING PATHWAY; is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images),
as-welIas-significant changes in water andradiation levels, or other plant parameters.
Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-offcurve). Classification of an event using this EAL should be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.
While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of waterlevel in some portion of the REFUELING
: PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliableindication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered.
To the degree possible, readingsbe considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, ordropping a heavy load onto an assembly.
A rise in readings on radiation monitors shoud4-w ill beconsidered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damagingevent (e.g., a fuel handling accident).poM'I X~JtCI It\eI &ii ihbi, x ailc K. \\ilhiil Ihe I}\\cr ndR u{th ilcI\CI ncgc nccc~>ziI t.2\ci ti s.nicnIti]a~
dn>;c li,.n dircct galm i to pclsoll pcl'o' IIiflopcral nns in ll>c i icinitx of thc >pcnl l'bcl pool. ihis Cofldilion wetlccts it >ii~iii liciltt los ol'Ilnflftid pool xxab.ir mi-i Celho .mod ta*is--i4-b:
alse--a prtKurorU tI a los ohc zbi[ll> to 8dcqatdl\lI coolthec irrmdtnl.d fuel stored in lkc poo1.
of the emergency classification level woild-,be-viaeusc.
ICs RSl1 or RS2 .P2Dc'gclapcr Nores}."FzrEAL1~
I4Far EALU242 andurce alre" chudnotanth",rdato ntre that couldA cnie~ : ;'~ be, ".ed!to idesntif damagt.....r.adi natmnt ad f21acmby(~.
tnei m ator nof r.......
of fc...n..roduat gacec ...rom.For EALc ftIard#coreec.to encurc tha avi)athe
[Ar "-a. Te being spncidi ered 2c vihnue"i s!. the ucbe epnte runmonitor r.a.in. inald e., sadq ate n .. :aut ..o... pur , fe atutrgere:
a.. .tn. a patclr indicanting level)d It is..!n the cgnced tha thle. cniindcrbdb hsI a euti aito aLCtrl Aece .....t Attrt..t.,
c: .I .2 .k t an
* J. "1243 RA3ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normalplant operations, cooldown or shutdown.
Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (I or 2)SNote: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.
(I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:C ontrol area radiation moninor 1!D 2 :C 't 5AamtSposPoduo1a I,.entral Akirm ontaion sur\,* Ccntrcl R, or* Central Alar.m Statian(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to anyefthe-fo!!ewifngl able Ill plant rooms or areas:Buihling Rooms~ Appicable M1odesl)iesel acencrator building All A\lllJnit h.2 130" AllReactor building I, nitd 112 SI l)ia onals (RI tR) Altinitl 12 NI D~iagonals (RI IR) AllBasis:l INIPtANNtIlI):
A parmneter change or an c~ cut that is not !i t he result of an i ntcndcd c\ oR uttionor 2) an expected plant responsec to a transicnt.
I]hc cause of thc palra.meter chanlc o~r ecntl max/h. knoxxn or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/ or areas sufficient to precludeor impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or toperform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown.
"
i-represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-of he--pIant.
The emergency director shouldconsider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may beapplicable.
For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be,procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevatedradiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actuallynecessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impededif extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected44 room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of theelevated radiation levels).
For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increaseoccurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not requireentry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keepingnature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).
* The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would notactually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level weal~d-be-44auscs Recognition Category R, C orF ICs.Th-e "other si!te specific areasz/reoms"'
should include any, ar"ea or rooms requiring coantinuoue's occupancy' to maintain normal pant operation, or to peror a.......a..............an.
1sA! Th... ...sit.e* specific list. ef plant rooms or a....a. ... th .. nt.ry, rel ........'*at applicability' identified" a.. spe..if..d.in operating procedures u...d fo n ..m..! plant operatic,"...
.......n nd shtown..
...perfor.ed.
(e.g., an ectian to .add san off.. norm.. or em.'ergency
...iio. " su:chae as emerge:ncy pl, m.. de as) during whiche entry w-ould be required for ..a.h.r..m.or area.of an administrativ'e or record keeping nature (.e.g.. norma' rouands or rou.tine inspct~ions).
If the equipment in ,th. li:ted room or ...ea.wa. alread, : ....... c, or... .u ^f ... :advearse impact beyo'ndq~
that alre'ady, alloe;:d by, Technical Specifications at the ti!me. of te eveont.Cefitf! ReeR.45 EUL A~zgnrnznt Attrltutzz:
2.12.C46 RU1ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (-site-effluent redease ccentrolling dccument)OI)CM' limits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that therelease duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions toisolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
(1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the OIX R'l,.sie-wseei'*
ffluznt-+
....... zontr........
....). lihmits for 60 minutes or longer:Rq&[ $4]: ~TZRad Mon or C~Ici~tion J~Ah~imu~
(2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpointestablished by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.(3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rategreater than 2 times th )IX zt zp " fi cf: untrz.zaz
.............
d.........)
limitsfor 60 minutes or longer.Basis:This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time(e.g., an uncontrolled release).
It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological
: release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.
47 Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment.
: Further, there r... adr:i-o,,atv:,,
in* .,v cotrlsarestablished to prevent unintentional
: releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases.
The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment i&-. !die'ativ'e iindi cat cs 0f-degradation in these features and/or controls.
Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classify'ing events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.
Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.
If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due toactions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid forclassification purposes.
Releases should not be prorated or averaged.
For example, a release exceeding 4 times releaselimits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL #1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases frommonitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.
EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitorreadings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EALwill typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways(e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected bysample analyses or environmental
: surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills ofradioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level wveuildbe-viauses IC RAI.De~ep.-No48 value f.. r thcse m. nit. r sh..u. d d' ermi.. :d using the most applicable dosc/rc'cosc limitspr-c-"---d in.;
RET or^ ODrC,. It. is rcccgnizcd that a calclataedl EAL v'alue may be below.;th. m. nit. a r.....ad; in tha ...... thc monitor does not need to b" i:cluded in the list.related r....irc....t.;
theref.r.,
it is important that the a...ociate EAL rand basis ideti. an ..... aticas on th... use .... avahiaiit of these monitore.
.....in 2:- time a1 r.l.... cntr... limi. ll- The controlling document typically describes be used to dctcrmine EAL values. In cases where a methodology is not adequately defined,cevelopers-snoul.a ocerm,"',line valudes eon-istc~inx
-w,1t" contirol rcguianansr, (e.g., tU For EAL #2 Valuecs in this EAL should be 2 times the secpoint established by theDevelcpers shouald research radiation monitor design documents or other infor,'at.icn sources.to.ens....that..).the......alue.being.conside.ed.is.within.the.usabl response randdisplway' of the instrument, and 2) hr a. re......-
no a-atmatic features that may rende *'..monito re..ading invalid (e.g., an auto purge feature-trigere at ...a par.icula indiation:-
l...lIt is reegn.ized that the condition described by this IC may result in a of the highest accurate monitor reading.
This provsison notw;ithstanding, if theIndications from a real time dose prjetin ysemar not......
included~
in generic EA^s.Iniations
.. om a. .. ri.ete monitoring sstem....
r n..... included in the generic EALs."D:evlapecr chzudd kcsp in rnind t1e rcquirzmsntz of ! 0 CFR ..... c a hs guidance 1os.:'ided by, !NPO rch~tcdts ssmsrgsny rzspznsc equiprrenrt "WhS," sscn!ierirng ihs additics zf zthrx sifus'-e~nitzmnt.
49 Tzchnicai Sp~iticati3n~.
In additicn, r~adingz ma; bz influzn~zd by ~nv~rcnmznt~
zr zthzrtaztcrz.
A II~cnzzz may rc~uz~t tz incIu~L an EAL u~m~ ~ Dcrirnctcr rncnitcrin~
~y~tzm:ant~rcvaI will bz ccr.~idzrc~l zn a c~ b;' Z~Z.... I .....EUL A~wnmcr.t AttrItutc~:
J.I.l.B50 RU2ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:
AllEmergency Action Levels:(1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated byANY of the following:
I 'ersonneil CO 01or flon ,,ater le'el c:pccitiz lv.-el indicaticn4).
ANDb. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors.
cPPSRWItSd{
~5~: V6 SF~ J~veI .owAw~wsoia~r
~jWI-Mfl A -R LI~atIL lop Atea~J-~4 Rp1P~so~N ~lStot ca~1~I3 ll~ fl 2 fialFtqor22W;Ii ii~ ~l l i~ i i .. .2! $1i iV2R$M~iutor~afruiauon Basis:R!1H1IpoolIVN~ PAll tl\VA\: Ihis includes the reactor tac itv. the translibr canal. and the spent fuel[N P1AN NI ): A parameter change or an event that is not t ) the resnit 01'an i mended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.
I he cause ol the paranctetr change or e'vent mayhe kno\\ru or unrkno\\sn This IC addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevatedradiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is alsoindicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of plant safety-ef the-plan',.
A water level decrease will be primarily determined by indications from available levelinstrumentation.
Other sources of level indications may include reports from plant personnel 51 (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available).
A significant drop inthe water level may also cause an increase in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can bedetected by monitors in those locations.
The effects of planned evolutions should be considered.
For example, a refueling bridge arearadiation monitor reading may increase due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactorvessel head or movement of a fuel assembly.
Note that this EAL is applicable only in caseswhere the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance w.ith Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level wvou4 be "-'4uc IC RA2i Th, e "z', e , peci tic lEUELindiaic PATHWAY ' .......i. n tha ..... be-' ..... :^ta moniterl....l..n..the...................
of .... ..U.....G....T......
Seef the m ded. .b!:applicability
,of a partkultr indcait,"on it ia! r:'.ctaalbe i al nc.TEL 'Asit ,:eaecfc t A f ,reatc:3.!
rai.Ation' 3.ni1.a 1.1 dcoti tocarardi 52 74 COLD SHUTDOWN
/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALSGENERAL SITE AREAEMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENTCG1 Loss of RPV CS1 Loss of RiPV CA1 Loss of RPV CUI UNPLANNED inventory affecting inventory affecting inventory, loss of RPV inventory fuel clad integrity with core decay heat Op. Modes: Cold for 15 minutes orcontainment removal capability.
: Shutdown, Refueling longer.challenged.
Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: ColdOp. Modes:" Cold Shutdown, Refueling
: Shutdown, Refueling
: Shutdown, Refueling CA2 Loss of all CU2 Loss of all butoffsite and all onsite one AC power sourceAC power to to emergenieysscntial eimer~genycyssecniiaI buses for 15 minutes orbuses for 15 minutes or longer.longer. Op. Modes:" ColdOp. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling,
: Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled______________De fueledCA3 Inability to CU3 UNPLANNED maintain the plant in increase in RCScold shutdown, temperature.
Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes:" ColdShutdown, Refueling
: Shutdown, Refueling CU4 Loss of VitalDC power for 15minutes or longer.Op. Modes: ColdShutdown, Refueling CU5 Loss of allonsite or offsitecommunications capabilities.
Op. Modes: ColdShutdown, Refueling, De fueledCA6 Hazardous event affecting aSAFETY SYSTEMneeded for the currentoperating mode.Op. Modes: ColdShutdown, Refueling 53 CG1ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (l or 2)INote: The emergency director eheudd-wx ill declare the General Emergency promptly upondetermining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) a. RPV level less than sI5 ~A~ ite specific le-vel) for 30 minutes or longer.ANDb. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (se-e.....lew+(
, '!(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
*UNPLANNED level increase in (cite ....fi cum.....
andc .....in Wthc,fol Iox\ ing Iev'els-of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery:
1~Iua~17I:V7RPV1*v~1
(-t~~') Ia ~utner cite specine :noiepwcncj ANDc. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table 4eee °''"- .... .- 'Containment Challenge Table (Ii£ Secndac.-
....a.n. n .....adiati meaniter rea.ding abov (..ite:.
cpe:,e ...lue)54
* If CONTAINMEN'.T CLOSURLEccondar)
(()N I AINMFNI IN fI is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a GeneralEmergency is not required.
Basis:(ON ['AlNMI'N I INl[I ERIlIY: lPrimary Containment OPI-LRABI.I-per Technical Speciticat ion3.6. I I. See ndar. (ontainment O)PERAI, I.[ per Technical Specitication 3.6.4. ItJNPI ANNH)l: A parameter change or an cx nt thai is n01 I )the result of an intended cx olutionor 2t an expected plant response to a transient,
[he cause of the parameter chancge or e3ve.nt [/a.Ihe known ot unk nowxn.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of activefuel with containment challenged.
This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.
Releases can bereasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Water lex el toar top of active fuel is calculated at -1I58.4"'.
Although slightly moore e.the -I155"' t()P o'r top of actise fuel is provided for this [A/\1 to aid in operator recognition of" the ex ent.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat willcause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-g&reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.
With CONTAINMENT CLOSURESecondaix
( ONi AINMENI IN ILEiRI I Y not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment.
If CONTAtNMENT CLOSURESecondarx
(( ONTAIN MI[NI IN UI ~(iRI IFY is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is notrequired.
The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity.
It therefore represents a challenge toContainment integrity.
In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a coreuncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment.
If all installed hydrogen gasmonitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not bepossible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listedindications to assess whether or not containment is challenged.
In EAL 2.b, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to accountfor various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).
It also allows sufficient time55 for pcri'ermaieneeef-actions to terminate
: leakage, recover inventory control/
or makeupequipment, and/or restore level monitoring.
The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, orwater level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.
If water level cannot bemonitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes insump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against otherpotential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG- 1449, Shutdownand Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; andNUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.
1119 and NUMARC 91 06~....r.ugh ......u. aproin ...... and... re..u.ling eva'lutians.
patiularly for a PWR. Asthoat.th ability to manitor lee ....':;:thin the range required b perat...n.
pro.. d.r.. will....
n, t bepr..dur. n therCodae Sh -tdh And Reuln oesmyb2).cet(~.
nroe)tatan ailobil f nsaley level idcfhh!hatins auchthate
:'nthis leel alueg ten bedet'ecr mine duringd Tin Cl fi:hur orom Refacumeln modifesthen, daenot iclue E : hI'~ (classificationf, il.be56 Far BWR~ that da nat ha~e in~taIled rad;atkrn manitar~
capable afir.dieoting care unco~ery, alternate aite epecific level indicoxian5 of core uneovery ehould be uzcd if available.
Far EAL ft2.b aecand bullet Pac~t IMI accident ztudi.x indicated that the inctalled PWRnuclear trumentatian will aperate erratically when the care ic uncavered and that thic chauldbe uced ac a teal fcr making euch determinatiaca.
Becauce BWR Scurce Range Monitor (SRM)nucleor inatrumentotiar.
detectara arc typically lacated belac; care mid plane, thia may nat be aviable indicatar af care uncavery for BWRe.Far EAL #2.b ~ird bullet Enter ~y "eitc epecific cump cn~'or t~k" levels that could bepected ta c~ge if there were a lace of inventary of cufficient magnitude to indicate coreuneovery.
Specitie level valuec may be included if desired.For EAL #2.b fourth bullet Develapers chauld determine if other reliable indieptara exist taidenti~'
fuel wleavery (e.g.. remote vie~ing ucing c~nerac).
The gcal Ic ta identify any uniqueor cite epecific indicatianc, nat already uced elce~vhere.
that will pramate timely and accurateemergency elaccificatian.
Far ~e Containment Challenge Table:Site chutda~ car.tingeney plane typically prcvide fcr re ectabliching CONTAINMENT CLOSURE fol!awing a lace afRCS heat remaval ar inventa~'
central functione.
Far "Explacive mixture",
developer:;
may enter the minimum ear.tainment atmoepheric hydrageneaneentratian neecee~ ta cuppurt a hydragen bum (i.e.. the la~r deflagmtion limit). Acaneurrent eantamment oxygen eancentratian may be included if the plant hac thia indicatiar.
available in the Central Roam.Far BWRs, the uce af eccondary cantainment radiatian manitarc chould pravide indication atincreaced releoce that may be indicative af a challenge ta aecandary cor.tair.ment.
The "citeepecitic value enoulo ne cacco on tne nut'eacily recognizable and have a defined bacic.ECL Aceignment Attributee:
: 3. l.1.Bria'umum sate vaiucs cecauce mccc vajue.. are57 CS1ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Note: The emergency director sheoild-\vill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upondetermining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) a. ....N....I ....E ...T CL SU~ Ctndar) (CON I'AINMLNTI IN'I LI' IU Y notestablished.
ANDb. RPV level less thanL~ ~jte-speeific lev).(2) a. C......................Secondary CON FAINMXN I INTI (GRITYestablished.
ANDb. RPV level less than I (I F4 ....
(3) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
* JNPlANNl4D leveI increase in aim ofrthc hdlowving of suf'ficient utagnitude to indicate core uncover}':
* (Site epecifie rZdiaticn monitar) reading greater than (site zpeeifie
',alue)* Ermtie ceuree range manitor indicatien
[PWRJILrUN PLANNED riEn.cre ae in *zt petc~m n/rtn)i~~
tztiin* i~utner site ~peeiiic Inalepuens)
Basis:(ON IAINMN'ILI INTEiRIIFY:
IPrimary Containment per iTehnical Specification 3.6.1. t. Secondary Containment OPFRAHILL per Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.58 I NP I ANNt I): A parametecr change or an evecm thai is I to I ) thc rcsu It of an intended ev olutiionor 2) an expected plant rcsiponsc to a transient.
lhc caose of thc parameter changc or evecnt ma)bc known or unknowxn, This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss of RPV inventory control and makeupcapability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. The lost inventory may be due to a RCScomponent
: failure, a loss of configuration
: control, or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant.These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and4itis-warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.
\\ atci evel ibr top of activc fuecl is calcnlatcd at -1 58.44" Although slightiy niorc conscrxiitivc.
thc -1I55- li()P v'aluc tbr top of actix c Fetc is prox idcd Ibr this FAI, to aid in opcrator rccognition of thc evecnt.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat willcause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-C-reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.
Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying
..O....I....NT..........Sccondar)
(ON I AIN MEN I' IN I E(IRIlY following a loss ofheat removal or RCS inventory control functions.
The difference in the specified R-C--reactor vessel levels of EALs 1.b and 2.b reflects
#the-fee~tlhat with CO1ITAP RTMEN~T..........
cc dax CON IAINMEN I IN I l;(RlI Y established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment.
In EAL 3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to accountfor various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).
It also allows sufficient timefor pef~:c factions to terminate
: leakage, recover inventory contro1¢ or makeupequipment.
and/or restore level monitoring.
The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, orwater level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.
If water level cannot bemonitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes insump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against otherpotential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdownand Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; andNUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.
Escalation of the emergency classification level ......d-be-;i4*uscs IC CG1 or RG I.dzp....n upan the a.'..unt of timzainc
°:...u..d
..... r.z.cr t-, ....ri Lctz 17. SE nCY~ 912°8. N1JREcG 111~9 an-dI N! rMARC 91 06.59 that the a~biit t... :onito l .... ..ithin th. r....g .. r :.ire by. operating prs.cedures wi'll not beint........
Th"ie instrumentation ran'ge necessary3 to ....... implem..n...ti:n of opcrating prcdurermine y th me C dSutdong and,. Refuelin may. beo di cn (.g.., narrow.cr th ,ntht equi;Sctr, dwing moe higp!her thn aColdae Stdwn. Fcr AL #b th "sie spcifi levl'~ i.- " bee th otmI ftcRSlo.Ti doe wign andpertioEnte af "tcre ~cvfel ntramcn.tatn isnsuch tha.t thi-s leve valuc tnodeet b~ethasiiatithe c illben ac....mplisby hed! a',.... in acrdse .aith , E ... ft3... ... ...:...v.ail-a"biligy of tnhae lev.. l indicatin i... such tha thi level...
valu can be.. deter,,n durinsaete'..e shu !than mdesgor c'e~ndtios bto enatrethar.then spcifya nther meadeiepndent a- nd!abeFrcnfigurtoian stte drin ic the ls~.r- t n~evtel niaini phal.I h ein and opntf a aratian-'eEA trsb!acmplisr:ee!dhe
~ed in acodnewthe EAL te ).:d naaprree!-e f :'bminbtwe core... wil ,.incras.Ene a' ..sit... sp..ci.c radition m.......".th..ticould.be.
us df u detect cagnrdeunoe;ad h saite iesecfcvle indicatecr ceey eee ;e"-.....ive
:.a, are uncover.
I s eagi60 ide.tify'.
fel.......
un .........
.i.wi .u:I .amras...
The geal. is t.a i..n.if.
an uni. .. "uear site ....p:eifi indiAtiar;....
na already usedA elsewher,+.
t1,at w.ill pr.m.t tim÷ely.
ond accuratFor EAL il !.b "site specific le...el" is the, L... L, .... E ..CCS, ...uati. setpoint
/Levetl I. Tha e I 1.. I ..L.. La L... [CCSP setaint; I ... l 1 w.... chesen beauseo it is ainetion systedmats w ould autm.tihaghesta and... ttmon tor readtor, RP. le.el. T .i.. ... a ....smignifcatly auv the Tiapr eaf! AcieFulTOFtrehd specified in teELt ul na EapLpr #e2.ForobrEato 2bTetwe monitor rpeadifi level thaudb ohe tap actiesfuelt.
F Fr[A # P.b fthat bullet Ashater lt!eve rinathen rea t-or vse lawarse hef !doseaten borethcare will incree. ... Ente n...site sp..cifi.
radiatian mecangter mothatcoul eue eetcrindiator and thre asnciatrd "sit spcfc au"iniaie fcr uRvr. ti ecieeCamLe Aa3n [Lmanito rending:
mih e.'.t90 o9% fte ihs a.rt mni61 CA1ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Loss of RPV inventory.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: The emergency director sheould-w'ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level less than (Lv2 aeualt (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longerANDb. UNPLANNED level increase in (zit ......i :¢u.....
anda .....i.a. of thefollow ing 1evels-due to a loss of RPV inventory=:
Basis:U NPI ;kNNI)D:
A4 paramleter change or an event that ik not I) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.
I he cause of the parameter change or exent naybe knowxn or nnknoxxn.
This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately coolirradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).
This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.For EAL #1, a lowering of water level below (zt pcfi zz)35" (lecxel 2 actuation setpoint) indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of the coolant will increase as the available water inventory isreduced.
A continuing decrease in water level will lead to core uncovery.
Although
: related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a residual heatremoval suction point). An increase in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removalcapability is evaluated under IC CA3.For EAL #2, the inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or powerfailures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.
If water levelcannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing
~04 2~~enR~62 changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated againstother potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EALduration specified in IC CS IIf the RPV inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency IC CSI.D:vz!oper L-njeetisn systrems w.'ukl autamaticatty t.art. and is a ;valu.e significanqtly below: the Lw:, RPYPFo.r EAL "ft,, The. typ and range ..f............i...trum
.ntati ..n ma .ar durin...
anoutage as the planto mo-ves thro~ugh
-various pe~rating modcs an'd.-r"fueling.,
......luti+.on,"+....v--:'
partiularl imnplementation of operating provecdurcs in the Cold Sh'atdo';.an
".d Recfueling mo..des may bedifferent (e.g., nr:"..rower) than that requi:red
.. durin .node than Cold. Su...÷. ..Enter any ...it. speci..c sump n/rtn" eesta c.......
uld.......
be e.p..t.d.to.........i.ther..werAssig...ent Atr;ibutes:
3.1 .2I".B63 CA2ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergencycsscential busesfor 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling, DefueledEmergency Action Levels:Note: The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to ACsent~iaBse l2E,1il s I~ ite specifie emergency buses) for !15 minutes or longer.I ~ 17~J; Vu4IO~AC~
D~ueeIdoimation IDBasis:This IC addresses a total loss of AC power (sCC 1-abic S 1 abho~c) that compromises theperformance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power. including those necessary foreInerge~eycs, enrial core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure
: control, spent fuel heatremoval, and the ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a SiteArea Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergeaeyessential bus toservice.
Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lowertemperatures and pressures in various plant systems.
4-wsr-,When in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe-plwi.nt Fifteen minutes was' as n.i' flu threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level "¢,o,'ad-be
;*ian ses IC CS 1 or RS i.minimu,...m,,
.. number cf aperating, gcncratzr:
fur that .......t. pr-'idcaequae
.............
(. ... t oz .....pcit : ncrctcr .+izcd t fed AC" ..........
bu., the EAL md Ba+/-i64 tAttup~ p'-cr tan th clactrinol diztrEA tio mayztcmrtd a S~aFETrY SYSt aEMS hthat apertinc fthie anrd i can tr-al-le...
in .:a.:erdanc
;;i.,th ,-bnarmc. , ...r..n .apt.i......
prc-ducr
, becn d" ei: n ; ba l a. .. id ent " r cpen:ee g:u:ideit (eay .FLEX~ eu pp.........
guieliLtL/.~eIgnmenL;uErInute;:
J.i.e.u65 CA3ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheii4d-xs ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than f2I2 F~site-speitfie Technical Spcif....
e ce.ld+ ...
.... pcr.....
limit)"-:
for greater than the durationspecified in the-f..........
bl I .. able (:2.... ......~ t~ .... .... -... .... o d .... ... .Table(k:
RCS leal-nup Duration T~hreshohls R~-4M ~ CotINmt I C(;RI : Stautus "eat-up-iav oINtact butabc it reuced minutes*vR04PR1 eEstablished 2t mntes* If R aR RCist e ''a yte ci operationn ithim this time frame andPC teprteisbngcdcdte RAI, tips ueicbig Itueth A i e applicable.
(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site epci~fic preceure S(Thie EAL d-ces+ net apply duriSng "water :elid plant cenditie~n:.
[PIJR°])Basis:(t N I A INMI NI IN I lE(iRI I Yt Primary tontaiuntent
()I'l-RABI3II pcr Ilechnical Speciticat ion3.6.1I I Secondars (ontainienct OlPI R \Itl I per "I ethnical Specilication 3,h.4, I,INPI .A\Nl~t).
A paranicter changc or an ev ent 1thu:t is nlot I ) thc rcsult of an intended cevolution or 2) an expelctd plant response to a transient, I he cause of the paramecter ehange or c,,cut nia)he k noss il or unlknqossn+
Vt4R~tsdtu&w*
66 This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition ofheat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed.
Either condition represents anactual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety efhe-plan+.
A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.
Ihe RtiS I leat-up Il)uration lhresholds table addresses the case wshere there is an increase inR(TS temperature.
the RCS is not intact, and Secondary (iO N 1 AINMIN 1 INrt!GRl IFY is notestablished.
In this case, no heat-uip duration is ici~.. (0 minutes).
Ibhis is because ! t theev aporated reactor coolant max be released directly into the containment atmosphere ands ubsqtientlly to lie eiiviro me nt. and 2) Ihere is redutced reactor coolant invent ory abhove th~e top:of irradiated fuel.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an increase in RCS temperature when.....T......E........SURE (O(N I AtNMI N I IN I EGRI INY is established but theRCS is not intact, or RCS inventory is reduced (e.g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.
tinal lx. the RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCStemperature with the RCS intact. The status of C..N..AIN...E.T
..C ...SURE condar y(ON lAINMEN I INI K( R, I Y is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release.
The 60-minute time frame should allowsufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plantsafety.
iin thc ease .hecre there is, an increas:e in RCS tem.'perature, the RCS is nct intact er is atredu...ced
..........
[PflR]. ,an CONrTAINM ENT CLOSU RESecandar'y CONTAINrMENT rINTEG"R-ITY is neat establishc ed, no h....at up .. duri is alle,;wed (i.e., 0 Thi:s is becausesubse....ntl.
to th.. "n.ir. nm..nt. and 2) there is, recd r...act...r ceolant inv'entoty abave th-e t-pef ir"radaiated fuel.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level wevu~d-be
;ia*uses IC CSl1 or RSl1.* ,here indicateda.
The RCS sheuld beo eansidared intact ar net intact in acccrdaaaee with siteFar EAL fi2 The ....spcii resue radng shud he thea..........
chng in. pressu....t..t e~ be acc.ratel determine usingur insalld nstruenttin bu etls ta 067 Lo3 ^of .H o: ...... A number o.f
.... t. ..........
icn :-o:--;'cxing.
atcamcay h....t. .........
,o loot and. co.rc unco;'cr,
.......ur. NR.C a:nay::c ohbo;w that there arcrcq:ucncco that con oause core unco~very in 15 t o 20 minutco,
_an ..........
,or ........
:ithin npro-"ded by Goncric Lc,".cr 88. 17 anrd bclie-ved to bc conocr.-Containment barrier to fiooicn pro~duct relceoc io comb!iohed.
'ative niven that a low prezoureECL Aooizrnment Attributeo:
3.1.2.1368 CA6ECL: AlertInitiating Condition:
Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the currentoperating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels:(1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)
* Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION
* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the ShiftManagerANDb. EITHER of the following:
* Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least onetrain of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis:tl;XPIOSIO)N:
A rapid. ,,iolent and catastrophic failure of a piece of cquipment due tocobtfl stion. chemical reaction or ox erpressuriiation.
A release of steam tfl'oi high energy linesor components) or an electrical component ihilure (causcd by short circuits, grounding, arcing,cet. I should not autoalnuicallx, be considered an explosion.
Such exenis may require a post-es cotinspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.FRIRF,: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drixebelts or ox erheated electrical equipment do not constitute F'IRES. O)bscrx ation of" flame ispreferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat arc observed.
SA.FEVTY SYS l'IM: A system required tor safe plant operation, cooltng doxsn the plant and/orplacing it in the cold shutdoxxt condition, including the [('CS. These are typically systemtsclassified as saztyt-related.
VISIBIJ,"
I)AMA(iE:
D~amage to a component or structure that is readily observable
,aithoutmeasurements,
: testing, or analy sis. I he visual impact olf the damage is sufticient to causeconcern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected comtponent or structure.
69 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. Thiscondition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product harrier,and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety[Al. 1.a identifies hazardous events that could result in damage to plant systems.
A seismicevent is indicated
")3 entry into IC 11t12. Flooding is indlicatedl by a significant increase in w,\aterlevels (external or internal).
I ligh winds are indicate~d by sustained winds at the sitemeteorological tower exceeding 35 mph,The first threshold tbr EAL l.b4- addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is inservice/operation, since indications for it will be readily available.
The indications of degradedperformance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability orreliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.[he second threshold for EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component thatis not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components.
Operators will make this determination based on...........
e~h I .l available event and damage report information.
This is intended to be a briefassessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level ;weu44.be-;'4auses IC CS 1 or RS I.For (ait' peeifie hazards).
devc!per:
sha'uld ecen:der including e~ther zignifiean , ..... owp..ifie-hazar-dz te the bul!eted
!Iist eantained in EAL l.a (e.g., a seieh4)",uc..ar
.........
pln SAET SYSvcvTEM are comprised zfw r+ m.... r... epame .ad trains c~f e.3uipmnt in accordance
-with site desig7n criteria.
ECL Assig:7nment Aifributes:
3.1 .2.B70 CUlECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director shejild-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than lowerlimit ot'lhc controlling lcvel band for 15 minutes or longer.(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored.
ANDb. UNPLANNED lcve! increase in (site. specific sump :and/r tank) lcvcaany, oF thefolloxxing:
Basis:UN P1 ANNE[): A paraneter change or an ex cnt that is no t I) ihc result oFan intended cvohloion or 2) an expected plant response to a transient, lhc cause of thc parameter change or cvcnt otaxbe knlownt or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level(or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPV level concurrent withindications of coolant leakage.
Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-ef the. ~a~t.Refueling evolutions that decrease RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled.
AnUNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limitwarrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required RPV level can change several times during thecourse of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups areimplemented.
This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in theapplicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.
71 The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restoreand maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing abrief lowering of water level.EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine RPV level have been lost. In thiscondition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes insump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against otherpotential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level 4ia-using either IC CAl or CA3.the generic warding i.s adequaec t.. ene ure anda timcy ar if
.....nt ca b... includ,..ed
..thcut m..raking the EAL ............
un:iely e- pat....a..
: i"ea .... t.....wi:th atien. tha.t may be take durin"'g an outage. If epci~ti.e zetpei~nte are incude,d+...
th.z..,aul EA ft 2.b Enter any et pcteem "nd:or tank..l.....that
..................
be ...............
eth.r. we're a Ieee Cf (i.e.. t.he Let inv....nt
..ry .woul ...t.r t.he hated. .... ar tank!).I.lCl Ae" ......t A-ttri-u,,*
..... .172 CU2ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Loss of all but one AC power source to effiege~ieyc.>scnhial buses for 15minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling, DefueledEmergency Action Levels:INote: The emergency director ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) a. AC power capability to 4160VA E I 1JE12, J/(*ies ...cific ...........
b,.u., is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes orlonger.ANDb. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power toSAFETY SYSTEMS.c~n~fled(
3~;V~ 416OVAsm~atInf~m~a~n Gqsu~au~md
( 33~ vi~ 4160 vAC ~uuili~ ~uies 1nfcm~at~oo]
Basis:SA!I;IY SYS'I t".: A s) stc~m required Ibr salb plant npcration, cooling dm>xn thc plant andiorplacing it in Ihc cold condi ion, inclidingi th t!CC S. Those arc tvpic:al!\
S~ VScmsclassilied as saVL'ny-rc~latcd.
This IC describes a significant degradation of off'site and onsite AC power sources such that anyadditional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.
In thiscondition, the sole AC power source ( scc lablc S1 ahtwci may be powering one, or more thanone, train of safety-related equipment.
When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as anAlert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems.
44t*When in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe pl--n:.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an effergefe.%ycsscnlial bus. 8eime-Examples of this condition rFertebelew,includc:
73
* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emefgelieyesscnti~al powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
* A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emefgencyy.sscntial power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emrgene~ycsscntial buses being back-fed from theunit main generator.
* A loss of merege*neycsse~ntial power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single trainof em~ergenyessniaI buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen ' .... ..., minutes ...........
d as ai, the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses ofpower.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert inaccordance with IC CA2.mi'!im~um number of operating gcneratars nec;c."y~
f,.ar,. t.....t .....our.e to pr-..:idc required po;;er toT-h..e ..it. speci.....
em-erg'en........
-b,-a,..
e .s, are the buses fod by, offeite or emergency, AC power sourcesis typiFcally I emergency bus per train cf S.AFETY SYSTEMS.De-'elopers should the bulleted examples pro; ided in the basis ...ti.n above. as. n eededto reflect their site specific pl-+ant ; d ..i.n .and ..pabilitie.
..ingle pow.er source, For examplFe, three independent 315k-V' offite powver circuits (i.e.,that operation cf this sorc L: regnized in AOPc and E.... or byn einbssacdn re...p.n...
guideline.
(e.g. FLEX guidelines).
Suc..a. v r .....ud c~caymethe "Alternate ac sou.rce"'
definition pro-vided in 10 CFP. 50.2.At multi": .... unit stations, the........
ma c......t comp......~
m .easures that arc-and._affected unit via a cross ne to a companion u-nit may credit thL pe..er surce in the EALarov'!ded that the planned cross tic stratce-v meets the recui~remnts
.of 10 CFR. 50.63.ECLP .A,-".......
n 3.1.1 .A74 CU3ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheould-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than
-4" v' !(2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 minutes or longer.Basis:IINPI ANNI ): A parameter change or an ce' nt that is not I) thle result of an intended ceolution or 2) an expected planm response to a transient.
The cause oF the parameter change or event nayhe known or unknown.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-of~he-plant~.
If the RCSis not intact and COT-'xrA
...... )ONlAIN LNT IN I'EWRI I'Y is notestablished during this event, the emergency director shoai4-will also refer to IC CA3.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.
EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS inexcess of that which can currently be removed, sieh-tbowhcer reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications.
During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because thecore decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.
During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactorvessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange arecarefully planned and controlled.
A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory mayresult in a rapid increase in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.
EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions.
and operators wvild-heare unable to monitor keyparameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal.
During this condition, there is noimmediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since thecessation of power operation.
Fifteen minutes wa-s' eleeted-asis a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses ofindication.
75 Escalation to Alert ..... i d-,be-........
ses IC CAI based on an inventory loss or IC CA3 based onexceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.
ECL Asignment, 3.1. i.A76 CU4ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels:INote: The emergency director shetdd-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upondetermining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
(1) Indicated voltage is less than i.~~ilcbsvltg
'lc onSpc 52 ~1Z2~ for 15* minutes or longer.Basis:This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and controloperable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. Inthese modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly
: reduced, and coolant systemtemperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions increase the time available to restore avital DC bus to service.
T-usv-,This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of thelevel of plant safety-e~f he-plan:.
As used in this EAL, "required" means the vital DC buses necessary to support operation of thein-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.
For example, if Train Ais out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable),
then a loss of vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of anUnusual Event. A loss of vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification.
Fifteen minutes selected nz ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level w, il4-dbe-;4auses ICCA I or CA3, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Develeper Nete=:ncaeaary fcr adequate opera~tian af SAFET SYSTEMvequipment.
This alto'age "alu' ....uld; .... .....arl.. e a margin" ..... at leact...
15 minutes of aperatian bfcfre the aneet af to. opertem~nlmu'.m valtage ic apprax:matel, 1......l..
per cell.Li'~aaIgnmemAttrIcutea:
a.i.i.r'.
77 CU5ECL: Notification of Unusual EventInitiating Condition:
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Cold Shutdown, Refueling, DefueledEmergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods:Plhnt telephones (Includes lardo ired and nA ireless)Plant pagePlant radio systems(,gite apeczfic
!!'t eaf czmm:,n'i:ntoan:
methndea)
(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods:INN (I t enrgneQ Notification Newo ork)( ommerejal phones(3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods:I-NS on Federal Iclecornmunecataon.,
Sxstem (F Commercial phones(o.it"'
liat cf cemmunicntizna raetheadL)
Basis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities.
While nota direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROsand the NRC.This IC be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipments-relaying of on-siteinformation via individuals or multiple radio transmission points-;
individuals being sent tooffsite locations,-ete.).
EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.
EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration.
The OROs referred to here are the State of~ieorgia.
Appling ('ount\..left l)avisC (oont\. I atnallI Count) and I oombs (ountmt.
.........
v-.pc .......),EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.
78 EAL ft I The "cite cpeeifie lict cf concmunieaticnc methcd' ehoold include allcommunicatione metho&~ uced far routine plant communicatione (e.g., commercial or Sitetelephones.
page party zyetcmc, radioc, etc.). Thiz licting ohould include inztal!ed plantequipment and componente, and not itemo owr.ed and maintained by indkidualo.
EAL #2 1k "cite epecific lict of communicationo methode" Thould include p1! communicatione methode uced to perform initial cmergdnoy notificatione to OROc no deocribed in the citeEmergcney Plan. 1k licting chould include inatalled plant equipment and componento.
and not:temo owned and maintained by individuaL.
Eeainpl~
methodo are ring duwn'dedieated telephone linco. commercial telephone linec, radioc, oatc!litc telephonec and interact bacedcommunicationo technology.
In the Bacio section, incefl the cite opecific licting of the OROc requiring notification of anemergency declamtion from the Control Room in accordance with the cite Emergency Plan, andtypicalh' within 15 minutec.EAL #3 The "cite opecifie Hot of communicationo methodo" chould include all eammunicationo methodo uced to perfcrn'i initial emergency notiticatieno to the NRC ~ deocribed in the citeEmergency Plan. The licting chould include inc~Ilcd plant equipment and component.
and netitemo owned and maintained by individualo.
Thece methodo are typically the dedicated Emergency Notificatlen Syctem (ENS) telephone line and commercial telephone linec.EC L Ac:ignme~nt Attribuate,:
3.l.1.C79 85 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALSUNUSUAL EVENTE-HUI Damage to a loaded caskCONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.
Op. Modes: All80}}

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