ML18041A058

Forwards Rev 15 to NMPNS Unit 1 Updated Fsar,Including Changes to QA Program Description & Annual 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Summary Rept

ML18041A058
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/07/1997
From:	TERRY C D NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18041A059	List: ML18041A058
References
NMP1L-1265, NUDOCS 9711170030
Download: ML18041A058 (225)

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{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY1I~"REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)'IVACCESSIONNBR:9711170030DOC.DATE:97/11/07NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETFACIL-50-220NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe0500022(AUTH;NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONTERRY,C.D.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.RECIP..NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlesk)

SUBJECT:

.Forwardsrev15toNMPNSUnit1updatedFSAR,includingchangestoQAprogramdescription&annual10CFR50.59safetyevaluationsummaryrept.DISTRIBDTIONCODE:A053DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR1ENCLjSIZE:(268TITLE:ORSubmittal:UpdatedFSAR(50.71)andAmendmentsNOTES:RECIPIENTZDCODE/NAMEPD1-1PDILECENTER0EXTERNAL:IHSNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL10102211'1RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEHOOD,DAEOD/DOA/IRBRGN1NOAC-COPIESLTTRENCL11111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLIS'.ORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTRCDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR10ENCL8 tl'-' NIACARA.MOHAWK6ENER'ATIONBUSINESS-CROUPCARLD.TERRYVicePresidentNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupponNINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONAAKEROAO.P.O.BOX63.LYCOMING.NEWYORK13093/TELEPHONE(315)349.7263FAX(315)349-4753November7,1997NMP1L1265U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555RE:NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-22010C.F.R.$50.71(e)10C.F.R.$50.54(a)(3)10C.F.R.$50.59(b)(2)

Subject:

SubmittalofRevision1$tothe¹ineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1EinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated),IncludingChangestotheQualityAssuranceProgramDescription,andtheAnnual10C.F.R.5$0.$9SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportGentlemen:Pursuanttotherequirementsof10C.F.R.$50.71(e),10C.F.R.550.54(a)(3),.and10C.F.R.g50.59(b)(2),NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationherebysubmitsRevision15to)theNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated),includingchangestotheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationQualityAssuranceTopicalReport,andtheannualSafetyEvaluationSummaryReport.One(1)signedoriginalandten(10)copiesoftheUnit1FSAR(Updated),Revision15,areenclosed.CopiesarealsobeingsentdirectlytotheRegionalAdministrator,RegionI,andtheSeniorResidentInspectoratNineMilePc.'nt.TheUnit1FSAR(Updated)revisioncontainschangesmadesincethesubmittalofRevision14inJune1996.Inaddition,ChapterXVIIoftheUnit1FSAR(Updated)hasbeenreformattedinitsentiretytoeliminateblankpages,establishauniformleft-marginjustificationformat,andtoreorganizetheinformationinto"Text/Table/Figure"order.Also,manychaptershavebeenreissuedtochangetheheaderfrom"NineMilePointUnit1FSAR"to"NineMilePointUnit1UFSAR."Thecertificationrequiredby10C.F.R.$50.71(e)isattached.97fif70030'gI7ii07PDRADOCK05000220KPDR~itrIIIIIIIIIII!IIIIIIIIIJIIII!HIIIIIIIIII '4Iw1fpI'=s~'II'4ii44 aUNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONPIntheMatterof=NiagaraMohawkPoweiCorp'orationV(NineMilePointUnit1)))+Is~))DocketNo.'0-220CERTIFICATIONCarlD.Terry,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisVicePresidentNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation;thatheisauthorizedonthepartofsaidCompanytosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatoryCommissionthiscertification;andthat,inaccordancewith10C.F.R.$50.71(e)(2),theinformationcontainedintheattachedletterandupdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportaccuratelypresentschangesmadesincetheprevioussubmittalnecessarytoreflectinformationandanalysessubmittedtotheCommissionorpreparedpursuanttoCommissionrequirementandcontainsanidentificationofchangesmadeundertheprovisionsof$50.59butnotpreviouslysubmittedtotheCommission.CarlD.TerryVicePresidentNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportSubscribedandsworntobeforeme,aNotaryPublicinandfortheStateofNewYorkandCountyof,this&dayof<<~~<<,1997.NotaryPublicinandforCounty,NewYorkMyCommissionExpires:8ekzMIblI9UNAN.tANEfmOAryPubtc,SteteotXewYo4RegistretionNo.i908015CuaMied4JeffersonCountyCoorroissionExpiresOctoberl3.19lt' 'tI1 Page2EnclosureA-provides'theidentification,reason,andbasisforeachchangetothequalityassuranceprogramdescription,'nitiFSAR(Updated)AppendixB,in,accordancewith10C.F.R.$50.54(a)(3)(ii).Theenclosedannual'SafetyEvaluationSumma'ryReport.(Enclosure'B)containsbrief-.-descriptionsofchangestothefacilitydesign,piocedures,tests,andexperiments.NoneoftheSafetyEvaluationsinvolvedanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10C.F.R.$50.59(a)(2).Verytrulyyours,CarlD.TerryVicePresidentNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportCDT/LWB/cmkEnclosuresxc:Mr.H.J.Miller,RegionalAdministratorMr.D.S.Hood,SeniorProjectManager,NRRMr.B,S.Norris,SeniorResidentInspectorRecordsManagement ~ppcpe,A'4\4n~h ,ENCLOSUREA'.TONMP1L1265Q~'IDENTIFICATIONOFCHANGES,REASONSANDBASESFORNMPC-QATR-1(UFSARAPPENDIXB)' J,~1(,~f4r ENCLOSUREAIDENTIFICATIONOFCHANGES,REASONS,ANDBASESFORQhPROGRAMDESCRIPTIONCHANGES(UMTIUFSARAPPENDIXB)-UFSARAppendixB=,;"..:."Pa"Section'.'.".'ageB.1-2,SectionB.1.2.1.1secondandthirdparagraphsPageB.14,SectionB.1.2.1.1.4.b,Identi6catioiiofC"e-"Changed"ManagerHumanResourceDevelopment"toDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment".Deleted"andtheGeneralSupervisorLaborRelations".DeletedpreviousItemb.:....Reistonfor,~'e",",'<<~6+>7~ReorganizationthatestablishedthepositionDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment.ThispositionreportstotheChiefNuclearOQicerandhasresponsibilityforEmployeeandLaborRelations,OccupationalSafetyandHealth,QualityFirstProgram(QIP)administrativeissues,andtheFitnessforDutyProgram.TheDirectorQ1PcontinuestoreporttotheChiefNuclearOfficeronmattersrelatedtoQlPconcerns.ThesechangesimpmveNMPC'sabilitytomaintainasafetyconsciousworklace.Reorganization.ThefunctionsweremovedtotheotherQAsupervisors.-,-'.Hasiifor.'Conciik"ButflIieRiVised'heassiyunentoftheserespoaaMitiestotheDirectorHumanResourceDevelopmentpmvidesdearmanagementcontmloverrelatedfunctional,areas.Therqiorting,ofthefuncttonstotheChief,-"NudearOIBcerensureseffectivi:1mesofcommunication.'hcJobfunctionsandresponaMitiesassignedtothediffeientgroups'-"remainthesame.'Zlienfore,the'revisedpmgram-continuestosatisfy'thecriteriaof10CFR50'ppendixBandthe'QAIRcommitmentspreviouslyacceptedbytheNRC.ReorgmizationiaipmvesQualityAsstnance'ffectivenessandvaluetotheNudearDivision.AllreslensiMitiesassociatedwiththepositionoftheSupervisorQualityVeri6catioa/SafetyAssessmentwereassumedby'tboSupervisorQualityAssessmentand/orGeneralSupemsorQualityServices.The--sameqmdi6edindividualscontinuetoperformthosefunctions.Also,thequali6cations'nece.mryto'erformthosefunctfons'remainthesame. W.It'0tWtwv%plwprlwrr!IrI4l4prIfIr.r'!I0T4aP\t~4"ae~4f.rI'IgH~t~Ir '-:.:<UFSARAppendixB'-'.';';.".::i:-'.Pae/Section..PageB.14,SectionsB.1.2.1.1.4.bandB.1.2.1.1.4.cPageB.14,SectionB.1.2.1.1.4.dPageB.24,SectionB.2.2.11.1PageB.24,SectionB.2.2.11.2PageB.5-2,SectionB.5.2.6.3:,".'."-,'.IdentificationofChari"'.-"-:":.:..'cnumbezedItemctobandItemdtocChanged"SupervisorQualityAssuranceAudits"to"SupervisorQualityAssessment."Added"andconductingperformance-basedsuzveillances"after"QAaudits".RcnumbcrcdItemetod.Added"assessmentsdeterminingapplicabilityofindustryandin-plantoperatingexperience,assistinginmotcauseevaluationswhenrequested,DERtrendanalysis,"after"documentcontml".Changed"Engineering"to"Implementing".Changed"AppendixB"to"SafetyClassification".Deleted"emergencyplanimplementingpzoccdllfes.Added"full"between"A"and"revision".':"..."':Reasonfor.CIiaii'*K~.>;-.~'~Reorganization.Combinedsurveillanceandauditfunctionsintothesinglefunctionalarea"QualityAssessment".CombinedallplantsupportandadministrativefunctionsunderQualityServices.Clarification.Thecriteriausedtoidentifystructures,systemsandcomponentsforwhichtheQAPmgramapplieswaschangedtoaNuclearImplementingPmcedurefmmaNuclearEngineeringPmccduze.ThetitleoftheprocesschangedfmmAppendixBDeterminationtoSafetyClassiTicationDetermination.Clarification.Movedtheemergencyplanimplementingpmccdurestothenextparagraph.PeriodicreviewsrequireafullIevlsloIL~Pghsis'for,,CoJic}u'di.thetheRevised.Pmgtasa-.-@.+Conthiucs.to'Satisfy,'10-O~ihx'8'i'(44ReorganizationimpmvesQualityAssuranceeffcctivcziessandvaluetotheNuclearDivision.SuzveiHanceresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththepositionoftheSulervisorQualityVerification/SafetyAssessmentwereassumedbytheSupervisorQualityAssessmeat.Thesamequaiificdindividualscontinuetoperformthosefunctions.Also,thequalificationsnecessarytopezfozmthosefunctionsremainthesame.ReorganizationimpmvesQualityAssuranceeffectivenessandvaluetotheNuclearDivision.Plantsupportandadministz3&eresponsibilitiesassociatolwiththcpositionoftheSupervisorQualityVerification/SafetyAsscssmeatwereassumedbytheGeneralSupervisorQualityServices.Thesamequalificdindividualscontimietoperformthosefunctions.Also,thequalificationsnecessarytoormthosefunctionsremainthesame.ThepmceduretodeterminethesafetyclassificationremainedessentiallythesameaadcontinuestomeetNMPCand10CHt50AppczuiixBcriteriaThepmceduzetodhteraiinethesafetyciassificationremaiaedessentiallythesameandcontinuestomeetNMPCand10CFR50AdixBcriteriaTheperiodicfrequencywasshortened;therefore,thelevelofcommitmeatpreviouslyacceptedbytheNRCwasnotreduced.AfullrevisionismoierestrictiveandisrequiredbyNMPCprocedurestoqualifyasaperiodicreview. 'ttwwkMAOtaataattta~KBL&l~tIMttt'wAwt,Jtahtthal~,I7Ija~I4agea44I6<<~\P'lI4LI-tI4.IpgI'II~<<4Ir4Rj'ghhrI4l4I~hl~"~~I','>>C~.ptItt'.tmay1ttI4I<<'tgg,II,If<<I47P1~\:rr7rhati')rgfCtlIaj4,~ i'<<<<-*-"',UFSARAppendIxB.':".'..;.;-::<<::.-':Pa'/Section".:.'-.";:"',~','..',:.Identlficatiori'ofChan':,;'.,,.',';'.:ReaseiforChaiic":".'.;";:le~<'~yBasjs'for.'Concluding'thatOeNkiJ'sckProgaua%$c~~~~~PageB.5-2,SectionsB.5.2.6.4Added"Emergencyplanimplementingproceduresarereviewedatleastannuallyandrevisedasappropriate.Afullrevisionofapmcedure,ordetailedscrutinyofaprocedureaspartofadocumentedtrainingprogram,drill,simulatorexerciseorothersuchactivity,constitutesarocedurereview".ImplementationofthenquirementsofTheperiodic&xgzueywasslertcncd;therefore,theNUREG4654Revision01andRegulatorylevelofcommitmcntpreviouslyacccI~bytheGuide1.101.NRCwasnotreduced.PageB.15-1,SectionB.15.1,secondparagraphPageB.15-1,SectionB.15.2.2PageB.15-2,SectionB.15.2.12PageB.15-2,SectionB.15.2.13PageB.16-1,SectionB.16.2.2Deletedentireparagraph.Deleted"departmental".Deleted"departmental".Changed"seniornucleardivisionandcorporatemanagement"to"nucleardivisionmanaement".Deleted"departmental".Editorial.NMPCcurrentlyusesonlyonetypeofsystem(Deviation/EventReport)toidentify,contmlanddispositionnonconformingconditionsinmaterials,artscornnentsorservices.Editorial.NMPCcurrentlyusesonlyonetypeofsystem(Deviation/EventReport)toidentify,contmlanddispositionnonconformingconditionsinmaterials,cornnentsorservices.Editorial.NMPCcurrentlyusesonlyonctypeofsystem(Deviation/EventReport)toidentify,contmlanddispositionnonconformingconditionsinmaterials,artscornnentsorservices.Reorganization.TolincupwiththecurrentmanagementorganizationdescribedinSectionsB.1andB.2.Editorial.NMPCcurrentlyusesonlyonetypeofsystem(Deviation/EventReport)toidentify,controlanddispositionnonconformingconditionsinmaterials,parts,componentsorservices.NuclearImplementingPnxedurcsweregeneratedseveralyearsago.MP-ECA41"Deviation/EventReport"(DER)wasdevelopedtoincorporatethedifferendepartmentalsystems.Theretuimnentsof10CFR50AdixBcontirmetobemet.NuclearImplementingPmcoluresweregeneratedsevensyearsago.MP-ECA41"Deviation/EventReport"(DER)wasdevelopedtoincorporatethedifferendepartmentalsytNms.TherotuircruentsofIOCFR50AdixBcontinuetobemet.NuclearImplementingPmcohreswercgeneratedseveralyearsago.NIP-ECA41"Deviation/EventReport"(DER)wasdevelopedtoincorporatethedifferentdepartmentalsystems.Therequirementsof10CFR50AdixBcontinuetobemet.RcorgaruzationappmvcdbyNRCviaUnit1LicenseAmendment157andUnit2LicenseAmendment71datedFeb201996.NuclearImplementingPmceduresweregeneratedseveralyearsago.NIP-ECA41"Deviation/EventReport"(DER)wasdevelopedtoincorporatethedifferendepartmentalsystcrM.Therepnrementsof10CFR50AppendixBcontinuetobemet f[f,Piaff'.->f'kv.f~~cf~f,b1%4I(5Wr.'ei~'C~fdfI~fggflfV'~3A~)~CC',ffIh~~4c~sff UFSARAppendixBPae/Section'ageB.17-1,SectionB.17.2.2PageB.17-1,SectionB.17.2.3PageB.17-2,SectionB.17.2.8IdentificationofClianAdded"QualityAssurance"between"considered"and"records".Deleted'Theserecordsinclude:1.Resultsof...calibrationproceduresandreports.Added"Additionally,theRecordsManagementProgramincludesthoserecordsidentifiedinplantTechnicalSpecifications."Changed"permanent"to"lifetime".Changed"Exceptforrecordsthatarestoredasoriginals,suchasradiographs...orfeaturesareused"to"Recordsarestoredinappropriatefireratedfacilities,orinremotedualfacilitiestopreventdamage,deterioration,orlossduetonaturalorunnaturalcauses.".Reason-forChanClarification.Theadditionofthewords"QualityAssurance"providesamorepreciseandaccuratedescriptionofwhatthesedocumentsareconsidereduponcompletion.ThedescriptionofwhattypesofdocumentsbecomerecordsuponcompletioniscontainedinthefirstsentenceofSectionB.17.2.2.Thespecificlistofrecordswasremovedsinceitwasnotanall-inclusivelist.Theadditionofthestatement"Additionally,theRecordsManagement...inplantTechnicalSpecifications"ensuresthatthosexecordsidentifiedinTechnicalSpecificationsasrequiringretention,butwhichdonotmeetthedefinitionofaQualityAssurancerecord,willbecapturedundertheRecordsManagementPmgram.Clarification.TobeconsistentwiththetermsusedinNQA-1toavoidanytentialconfusion.ClariTicationbyeliminatingredundantexceptionforrecordsstoredasoriginals.Whenonlyasingleoriginalcanberetained,itwillobviouslynotbestoredinaremote,dualfacility..'-.-;.-~Basis:for-Coacludingth@iljeR'eviicKPxograxa~~Adding"QualityAssmaace"between"considered"j,and"records"isconsistentwiththewordingin10CHt50AppendixBSectionXVKThechangeisconsideredaclarificationofanexistiagcommitmeut'nd,therefore,doesaotcontradictoralteranycommitmentspreviouslyapprmedbytheNRG/Theadditiontothesecondstatexaeatisconsistentwith10CFR50AppendixBSectionXVIIandANSI/ASMBNQA-101983(17,17S-I).InclusionofapartiallistofdocumentsconsideredtoMintothiscategoryallowsthereaderunaecessaxymomforuusintexpxetatioa.Whilea'readermayinterpretthatapaxticuhrdocumentneedaotbecoatmlledbyprocedurebecausethatdocumentdidnotappearonthelistofexamplespmvidedintheQATR,nosuchmisinterpretationcanbemadeifthepaxtiallistiseliminated.Ifthelistisnotall~usiveandstand-aloneitshouldaotbeinchided.(IItThethirdstatementensuxeithatthoserecordsidentifiedinplantTechnicalSpecificationsasreqixiringretentioa,butwhichdonotmeetthedefinitionofaQualityAssuiaacerecord,willbecaundertheThetexns"lifetime"and"permanent,"whenappliedtoQualityAsmaacerecords,are0ous.Theintentofthissectionwasaotaltered.Thisclarificatieliminatesaredundantexceptionforrecordsstoredasoriginals. 4WW<*JF~~y~4aabSJUFFkk~RXhXFX'FX'Ftt,Fi>~Cf1xxC".A>>iPNIVF'F5FF4">>LFxXFexFJF~~A* <~:;"-UFSAR-AppendixB',:::;TableB-3,Sheet4of8<...'::~,:..'Identification'ofChan'"-.'."';;"';;:ChangedExceptionwordinginItem3.rto"InstalledplantinstrumentationcalibrationstatusistrackedthroughthePMSTdatabase.Calibrationstatusofportablemeasurementdttestequipment(MATE)maybelabeledonthecaseorattachedtothedevice.Forinstanceswheresizeorapplicationprecludesattachingthecalibrationlabelsonthedevice,thedeviceshallbeuniquelyidentifiedandtraceabletoitscalibrationrecord.'"",';.";=:....;:"-ReasonforC~Ci"7:."".~$;~,"'2%ThiswaspartofthecorrectivefpreventiveactionsfromaDERwrittenduringanISEGassessment.Thesitewasnotimplementingtheexceptionasitwaswritten.g.Basid;for';Conch'Hing.'"'Uk('ReRiiRPiogQikTheuseofthePMSTdatabaseforin~lantequipmentallowsfor.bettertaichngandschedulingofthecalibrationofthisequipmerit.Thisdatabase'saddressedintheprocerturesandusedintraining."TheportableMkTBsti11arerequiredtomaintainthesametypeofcalibrationhibelingastheoriginalexception.'HiereqmrenientsofANSI/ANS 2and10CFR50Appendix;Bcontimietobemet.TableB-3,Sheet5of8ChangedExceptioninItem4.cfrom"PersonnelwhoperformauditsfortheSRABarenotrequiredtobesoqualified,sincetheseauditsareoutsidethescopeoftheauditprogramdescribedinSectionB.18ofthisQATR"to"PersonnelwhoperformSRABauditsthatareoutsidethescopeof10CFR50AppendixBarenotuiredtobesoualified."Clarification.SomeoftheSRABraImredClarification.SomeoftheSRABrotuiredauditsareauditsareinthescopeofSectionB.18ofinthescopeofSectionB.18oftheQA'IKtheQATR.~\' ~I,4~~'.ValiCMW:x..crw14$9ih-~-~,~Ilf\P>rL~,r,,i~~p1~~4.f~~Qfrr~4't>kYs-Cs4I~yrml>~,~~s EnclosureBtoNMP1L1265~-iNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONSUMMARYREPORT1997DocketNo.50-220LicenseNo.DPR-63 '-II3b4fI4~tll'"iI"..IgtIhI SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage1of68.,-SafetyEvaluationNo.:91:-'002'mplementation.DocumentNo.-.'->....>;Mod;:N1-86-085~..-.~.~--.g;-,,>-,-=,.>--.;UFSARAffectedPages:N/A'~".-'1,g\QpSystem:4~~TitleofChange:600VACand480VACDistributionSystemsgAKBreakerOvercurrentTripDevice:ReplacementTO&l~~~DescriptionofChange:gThismodificationreplacedtheGeneral.ElectricECelectromechanicalovercurrent.tripdevicesintheAKbreakerswithWestinghousesolid-stateAmptectorovercurrentdevices.DuetotheageoftheECdevicesandtheinherentdesignprincipleoftheelectromechanicaltypetripdevice,theseECdeviceshadexperiencedanunusuallyhighfailurerateduringtestingofapproximately50percent.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theovercurrenttripfunctionalreadyexistsandthemodificationonlychanges.themethodofperformingthefunction.Thefailuremodesandeffectswerefoundtobeidenticaltothemodesandeffectsofthecurrentlyinstalleddevices,andthenewovercurrenttripdevicesaremuchmorereliable.Thenewdevicesalsopermitgreaterflexibilityintripsettings,allowingbetterachievementofproperselectivityandcoordinationinthelow-voltagedistributionsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. =-SafetyEvaluation--.-SummaryReport'-'Page2of68-.~='=SafetyEvaluationNo.:tg-ImplementationDocument9'2-041No-'"~--'ISTProgram.Plan'-"'.::"-'."'-~-'=-.-t:-"'<~i~....-.QFSARAffectedPages:'""X-'16System:TitleofChange:Contr'olRodDrive(CRD)UpdateofFSARtoReflectRevisedTesting'equirementsofCRDPumps011and012.'DescriptionofChange:'heCRDpumpsarenotsafetyrelated;therefore,theIn-ServiceTestingProgramdoesnotneedtotestandt'rendthesepumpsinaccordancewithASMESection"XI.Theonlyrequirementsfo'rthepumpswithrespecttoTechnicalSpecifications=-isthattheybecapableofdelivering40gpmtothereactorvesselasmakeupflow.'ThischangeupdatedtheUFSARtostatethatmonitoringwillbedoneunderthequarterlysurveillancetest.Thepurposeofthesurveillancetest(N1-ST-02)istoassurethattheTechnicalSpecificationrequirementismet.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thequarterlysurveillancetestwillprovideanopportunitytodetermineifandwhenpumpdegradationisoccurring.Also,itwillassureperformanceinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Thischangeinthemechanismusedfortrendinghasinnowayhadanyimpactonsystemavailabilityorcapability.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluatIonSummaryReport.Page3of68..',.,:.;,.SafetyEvaluationNo.:-"P.',<"94-066~,'tmplementationDocumentNo:-"'-~:-'".'ProceduresN1-RTP-31,.N1-OP-50A..',;.:",";.'FSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:TableXll-8AreaRadiationMonitoringJustificationforRemovalof,ARM-13From-ServiceDescriptionofChange:Arearadiationmonitor(ARM)number13hasbeenretiredinplaceinRadwastePumpRoomEl.225'..Thepumproomwasusedasa"drummingoperation",wherebydrumswerefittedandelevatedtoaloadingdockfortransport;,Allequipmentassociatedwiththatoperationhasbeenremovedaspartofthecleanupeffort.ThisARMhasnotbeenrequiredforservicesince1981whenEl.225'ftheradwastecontaminationlevelbecametoohighforfurtheruse.Allradwasteoperationswereceasedatthattime.Whenthedecontaminationeffortwascompletedin1993,anattemptwasmadetoreturnARM13tonormalservice,butitwasdiscoveredthatthecablestotheARMwereseveredandthattheARMitselfwaspaintedover.SafetyEvaluationSummary:OnlytwoARMsarecreditedduringorfollowinganaccident;theyaretheControlRoomventandRefuelFloorhighrangemonitors.TheARMslocatedintheReactorBuildingareemployedinexecutingEmergencyOperatingProcedurestomonitorsecondarycontainmentradiationlevels.ThepurposeofARM13istodetecthighratesofexposureduringradwasteoperations(existingorplanned).SincetheRadwastePumpRoom(El.225')isnolongerusedforradwasteoperationsandARM13isnotcreditedforanyaccident,thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. ,,SafetyEvaluation'ummaryReport<.-'Page.4of6895-007Rev.1&2.Safety.EvaluationNo.:'Implementation'ocumentNo.~.:'<<.,Mod.N1-94-003l'";-.*i:n;~:-0;:,:-;~i:-.;i.e~,,r;--.,~'UFSARAffectedPages:.."=<<'N/A,System:TitleofChange:ReactorVessel(RXVE)CoreShroudRepairInstallationDescriptionofChange:cgkl4'1.~I~ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheshroudrepairinstallationactivitiesandsupplementsSafetyEvaluations94-080"CoreShroudRepairand96-018--':->-',"Modificationtothe.CoreShroudRepairTieRodAssemblies."TheNRCissuedGenericLetter94-03duetoobservedcrackinginthecoreshroudsofseveralboilingwaterreactors.Thisgenericletterrequiredinspectionof'theshroudand/orrepair,ifnecessary.Revision0ofthissafetyevaluationevaluatedworkperformedduringRFO13andRevision1evaluatedworkperformedduringRFO14.Revision2evaluatedtheuseofthe25-tonauxiliaryhoist.NMPCperformedapreemptiverepairoftheshroudduringRFO13.TheNMP1reactorcoreshroudrepairwasdesignedtostructurallyreplaceshroudweldsH1throughH8.Theinstallationoftheentirerepairinvolvedelectricaldischargemachining(EDM)oftheshroudsupportconeandshrouditself,whichgeneratedveryfineparticlescalledswarf;theattachmentofatrolley/buggytotherefuelbridge;theadditionofanauxiliarybridgeonReactorBuildingEl.340;andotherspecialconsiderationsfortheshroudrepair.DuringRFO14,the270azimuthaltierodassemblyinstalledduringRFO13wasremovedandreplacedwithamodifiedsparetierodassembly.Also,thelowerspringcontactagainsttheshroudwasmodifiedtoextendbeyondtheH6Aweldonallfourtierodassemblies.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theinstallationofthecoreshroudrepairrequiresthatspecialequipmentandprocessesbeusedtominimizethein-vesseldebrisgenerationandprovideminimalimpactonotherworkbeingperformedonReactorBuildingEl.340.Thedesignandfunctionofthespentfuelpoolcooling(SFP)andthereactorwatercleanupsystemsarenotbeingalteredduringtherepairinstallation.Bothsystemshavebeenevaluatedandwillcontinuetoperformasdesignedduringandaftertherepairinstallation. Ig-SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport."'Page5of68;,,;:-;SafetyEvaluation-No.:'afetyEvaluationSummary:';=.;-95-;007Rev.18c2(cont'd.)~:~....al(cont'.d.)'gty~tt+~A~C'hAQQ/Pj.,Eral~&~',"The"SFP:systemisdesignedtoremoveparticlesassmallas1micron.TheswarfparticlesfromtheEDMprocesswhichentertheskimmersfromthetankoverflowwillbealmostentirelyremovedinthefilters.Theremainingparticleswillbeless:'han1microninsizeandwillnotaffectthefunctionoftheSFPsystem.~~~IaThecleanupsystemisdesignedtomaintainhighreactorwaterpuritybycontinuouslypurifyingaportionoftherecirculationflow.Thedebrissizeexpectedfromtheshroudrepairis1to50micron;therefore,anyparticlesthatthecleanupsystemcannotremoveareassumedtobesmallenoughthataparticleofthatsizecouldcurrentlybeinthesystemandisnotaconcern.ThevolumeofparticlesexpectedtoremaininthevesselandSFPsystemfollowingtherepair,after-filtering;isconsideredinsignificantwhencomparedtothetotalvolumeofwater-.inthevessel.Theauxiliarybridgeandrefuelbridgebuggywill,notbeusedformovingfuel.'Theauxiliarybridgehasbeenanalyzedandisacceptableforuseoverirradiatedfuel.Therefuelbridgebuggywillnotbemovedoverfuelunlessitistiedofftotherefuelbridge.TherequirementsofNUREG-0612willbemetthroughtheuseofN1-MMP-GEN-914,whichisreferencedintheGeneralElectricshroudrepairprocedures.Thetoolingfor"heavyloads"hasbeendesignedandwillbeusedinaccordancewithNUREG-0612.DuringRFO14,theremovalandinstallationofthe270'ierodmeetstherequirementsofNUREG-0612byusingliftingdeviceswhichmeetNUREG-0612.Thedoseratesresultingfromtheremovalofthe270'ierodassemblyandtheinstallationofextensionpieceswillhaveminimalradiologicalimpactandtheradiologicalcontrolsusedduringtheremovalandinstallationwillensurethattherearenoadverseimpactsonthe10CFR20limits.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage6of68SafetyEvaluationNo.:..-.I'=95-01'1Rev.13mplementatlonDocumentNo.:;N/A-'~UFSARAffectedPages:System:--,'.1-15,IV-12,IV-32,V-,21';XV-79""-~'~Various-TitleofChange:OperationofNMP1.Reload13/Cycle12>Iy~tDescriptionofChange:ThischangeconsistedoftheadditionofnewfuelbundlesandtheestablishmentofanewcoreloadingpatternforReload13/Cycle12operationofNMP1.Two,i"Hundred'(200)newfuelbundlesoftheGE11designwereloaded.All164oftheP8x8RbundlesfromCycle10,and36oftheGE8x8EBbundlesfromCycle11,.weredischargedtothespentfuelpool.Variousevaluationsandanalyseswereperformedtoestablishappropriateoperatinglimitsforthereloadcore.Thesecycle-specificlimitsweredocumentedintheCoreOperatingLimitsReport.Revision1ofthisSafetyEvaluationincorporatedthechangesnecessarytotheoperatinglimitsasaresultoftherevisedGeneralElectricSupplementalReloadLicensingReport.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThereloadanalysesandevaluationsareperformedbasedontheGeneralElectricStandardApplicationforReactorFuel,NEDE-24011-P-A-10andNEDE-24011-P-A-10-US(GESTARII).Thisdocumentdescribesthefuellicensingacceptancecriteria;thefuelthermal-mechanical,nuclear,andthermal-hydraulicanalysesbases;andthesafetyanalysismethodology.ForReload13,theevaluationsincludedtransientsandaccidentslikelytolimitoperationbecauseofMCPRconsiderations;overpressurizationevents;loss-of-coolantaccident;andstabilityanalysis.Appropriateconsiderationofequipmentout-of-servicewasincluded.Limitsonplantoperationwereestablishedtoassurethatapplicablefuelandreactorcoolantsystemsafetylimitsarenotexceeded.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatNlVIP1canbesafelyoperatedduringReload13/Cycle12andthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. C'.-~SafetyEvaluation=--.==.-SummaryReportPage'7of68,;,,.;,;..';-:SafetyEvaluationNo.:95-012>':-'-=ImplementationDocumentNo'.:-=~'--".ProcedureN'i-MMP-GEN-904.;-..":::-.-.::;-;-""UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:X-'38,XKO,X&2>-N/AReactorServicingPlatformThischangeremovedreferencesintheUFSARregardingtheuseofthereactorservicingplatformfordisassembling/assemblingthe.steamseparatorassemblyfromthecorestructureduringrefuelingactivities;ThereactorservicingplatformwasprovidedbyGeneralElectricCompanytofacilitaterefueling.activitiesduringtheoriginalconstructionoftheplant.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theabilitytoremove/installthesteamseparatorwithouttheuseofthereactorservicingplatformwillnotbeaffected.NotusingtheplatformwillnotcontributetotheinitiationofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation.SummaryReportPage8of68r~<<<<<<,,SafetyEvaluationNo.:-'95-024-:*-'.ImplementationDocume'ntNo.':"'~Mod::N1~95-003-;~=,;:~;:<n~.'.-<a;=.".~;~.'.UFSAB,AffectedPages:g~~System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:SewageTreatment~<<<<-SewageTreatmentSystemPlantr<<PlantDechlorination--*<<e<<+w<<(,<<<<>~<<<<vvi<<<<<<i~t<<~ggi~<<slg"i,mqygl.P.5g~'jap'4<<;IThismodificationinstallednewmeteringpumps,flowcontrollers,tanksandmixerstoprovidesodiumsulfitetotheSewageTreatmentPlanteffluenttodechlorinate~-.theeffluentandcomplywithSPDESpermitlevelsforchlorine.ThiswasrequiredduetothedecreaseinpermittedeffluentchlorinelevelsasdelineatedintherevisedSPDESpermitissuedDecember1994.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thedesignandoperationofthenewequipmentassociatedwiththeinjectionofsodiumsulfitetoreducethetotalresidualchlorinelevelinthesewageplanteffluentisinaccordancewithapplicablecriteria.Themeteringpumpswillbeautomaticallycontrolledbythetotalplanteffluentsignalandcoverthefullrangeofeffluentflowfrom0-120,000gpd.ThesodiumsulfitesolutionconcentrationandcalibratedflowratearedeterminedbytheSewageTreatmentPlantOperatortoproducethedesiredconcentrationintheprocessstream.Thematerialusedtomanufacturethepumps,tubingandtanksisdesignedformildchemicalusage,whichincludeshypochloriteandsodiumsulfiteattheconcentrationsusedinthefacility.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. ';-.-'=':~;:SafetyEvaluation'".'=,:SummaryReport-"-:>.Pigs9of68,,-,-,'"e!-,.:Safety'-EvaluationNo.:I';;.','."-'-.::..ImplementationDocumentNo.=-'-:95-101:s'5-:"";-'-DER 95-2151"~'~<<~-..>;.(.".!'UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:I-'12,IX-22,IX-24,IX-26,10A-61'125'VDCSystemReclassificationofBattery14andBattery.Board14fromNon-SafetyRelatedto0-RelatedforStationBlackoutDescriptionofChange:~IIThecontrolroomdcemergency.lightingcircuit12andpagingsysteminverterareloadswhicharerequired.tocopewithastationblackoutevent.Althoughtheseloadsarenonsafetyrelated,theirpowersuppliesarerequiredtobequalityrelated(0).ThischangereclassifiesBattery14andBatteryBoard14mainbreakers,bus,andfeederbreakerswhichfeedthesetwoloads,as0related.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThereclassificationofBattery14andBatteryBoard14fromnonsafetyrelatedto0relatedensuresthatthefutureprocurementofreplacementcomponentsorpartsandtheinstallation,maintenanceandtestingarecompletedinconformancewithdesignrequirements.ThischangealsoassuresBattery14hassufficientcapacitytocopewithastationblackouteventinaccordancewithapplicabledesigncriteria.Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability,consequencesorcreateadifferenttypeofaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. -SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport"Page=10of'6895-103...,,,'.SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:.r-.'DER':1.-95-2643.-..:f:":t:>u':C":-,'--.;.-,'UFSARAffectedPages:'".t:.-FigureVill-14.i:.;;;m.-;..~;;.;p",;..':',.:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:NeutronMonitoringtNMS)~APRMRodBlockCalibrationUFSARFigureVill-14previouslyshowed.theTechnicalSpecificationrodblockasahorizontallinebetween100%and120%ofrecirculationcoreflow.Thiswasbeinginterpretedtorequirethattherodblocksetpointbedemonstratedtobecalibratedtowithinthenominaltripsetpoint,asdescribedinSpecificationE133,at100%and120%ofrecirculationflow.Inaddition,thehardwarewasnotcapableofproducingahorizontalline(setpolnt).Thereisapositiveslope;i.e.,thesetpointincreaseswithincreasingrecirculationflow.Becauseof'thisslope,thesetpointat100%flowwaslowerthannecessary,sothatthesetpointat120%flowcouldbesetwithinthetolerancedescribedinthespecification.Hence,thesetpointat100%flowcausedunnecessaryrodblocks.ThischangerevisedtheUFSARfiguretoallowforcalibrationoftheAPRMrodblocksetpointat107.1%recirculationflow.Thiswasachangetothemethodofcalibrationonlyanddidnotrequireahardwarechange.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheAPRMrodblockrespondstoaccidentsandtransientsand,therefore,bydesigncannotinitiateanaccidentortransient.TheAPRMrodblockisnottakencreditforinanyaccidentsortransientsdescribedintheUFSAR.Inaddition,thescramsetpointisnotaffected.TheAPRMrodblockwillstillprovidemargintoensurefueldesignlimitsaresatisfied.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. .SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage11of68:95-106Safety'EvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo=..",.a>'~.'N/A"=;OFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:FigureIII-1N/ADemolitionofTemporaryStructuresInsidetheProtectedArea,EastoftheUnit2StructuresDescriptionofChange:a:~Thissafetyevaluationaddressesthedemolitionofthefollowingbuildings'locatedeastofthe.Unit2plantstructures.tCarpenter'sshop2.Paintshop3.ElectricfabshopAllofthesebuildingswerebuiltforuseastemporarybuildingsduringthe.constructionofUnit2.Thesebuildingshavebeendemolishedandactivitiesconsolidatedwithintheremainingbuildings.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AllofthebuildingstobedemolishedarelocatedinanareathatwasnotusedasaflowchannelfortheProbableMaximumPrecipitationanalysis.Removalofthesebuildingsandtheconsequentreductionintherunoffcoefficientwouldmaketheanalysismoreconservative.ThesebuildingshavenoimpactonthepreviouslycalculatedX/Qvalues.Thedesignmarginsforthecontrolroomfreshairintakesarenotcompromised.Locationofdemolitionactivitiesareadequatelyseparatedfromsafety-relatedsystemsandstructurestoprecludeanyadverseimpactfromconstructionactivities.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage12ef68-.,-.,SafetyEvaluationNo.:.,ImplementationDocumentNo.:.95-108wS'>(r~rgA4~Procedure,GAP.-.RPP.-01;:u-.....~~t>'~i:,-'FSARAffectedPages:-..-';.N/A~~=.-.'ystem:N/A,~"~il;-10CFR19RequiredTrainingForPersonnelOutsidetheRestrictedArea1!'itleofChange:-~DescriptionofChange:<<ya~<~y~i'lW5~Thissafetyevaluationevaluatedthechangeto.ProcedureGAP-RPP-01.whichnowrequirestrainingbeprovidedforallindividualswho,in.thecourseoftheiremployment,arelikelytoreceiveanoccupationaldosein.excessof100mRemperyear.Thischangecomplieswiththerevisedrequirementsidentifiedin10CFR19.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedchangeinvolvestrainingforpersonnelintheUnrestrictedAreaofthesiteandwillmeettheintentoftherevised10CFR19andsatisfyapplicableportionsofregulatoryguidelines.TrainingofpersonneloutsidetheRestrictedAreawhoarelikelytoreceiveanoccupationaldoseof100m/RemwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanalreadyanalyzedintheSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. Safety.Evaluation,SummaryReportPage13of68:96-001Safety:.EvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:.'-.t'.DER.1-94-0462;.,;.-,<~"....:~ia"UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Xll-17,XII-18;FigureIIIXN/A'ChangestoRP-Facilities,SectionXIIandSectionIIIDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedthefollowingchangestotheUFSAR:-4~~~1~1.Theinstrumentstorageroom.isnow;intheadministrationbuildingnearthemainaccesspoint.=2.Anauxiliarycountinglaboratoryforportablecount-rateinstrumentsisnowlocatedintheoldinstrumentstorageroom.3.a.Thecurrentinstrumentstorageroomisalsousedforanalysisofradiationprotectionsamplesusingcount-rateandgammaspectroscopyinstruments.Theauxiliarycountingroomisnowbeingusedtohouseapanoramicirradiatorforcalibrationofdosimetrydevicesandtestingofradiationdetectioninstruments.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangestotheUFSARdescribethecurrentconfigurationofradiationprotectionfacilitiesintheTurbineBuilding.Storageofportableradiationprotectioninstruments,calibrationofcount-rateinstruments,analysisofradiationprotectionsamples,andlocationofthepanoramicirradiatorintheauxiliarycountingroomdonotaffectanyequipmentmalfunctionsorproceduralerrorsthatinitiateanyoftheaccidentsanalyzedintheSAR,andthuswouldnotincreasetheirprobabilityofoccurrence.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. Safety&valuation..SummaryReport~Page14of68'afetyEvaluationNo;:9&402-PImplementationDocumentNo.:.-'-"-.--ProcedureNIP-FPP-.01~:..UFSARAffectedPages:--;.i->'-'=-X&6;~10A-13;10A-%8plQA-'56,:10B-196.'='ystem:Titleof'Change:N/AilFireBrigadeMembershipRequirementsandRevisionofNlP-FPP-01DescriptionofChange:\~ThisevaluationexaminedtherequirementsforFireBrigademembership-andthestaffwhichmaybequalifiedformembershipintheFireBrigade.Previously,theFireBrigadeleaderandtwooftheFireBrigademembers.wererequiredtobepartofthefireprotectionstaff.ThischangeallowsplantstaffmemberswhoarequalifiedinaccordancewiththeFireBrigadetrainingprogramtoserveasFireBrigademembersattheleveltowhichtheyareassigned.SafetyEvaluationSummary:NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationhastraditionallystaffedtheFireBrigadeatNineMilePointwith"professional"firafighters,basedontheconceptthatpersonnelassignedtotheFireBrigadewerededicatedtofireprotectionduties.ln1994,thecompositionoftheFireBrigadewasmodifiedtoallowtwooftheFireBrigadememberstobenon-fireprotectionstaffpersonnel.Partofthephilosophyforthatmodificationwasthateachfireattackteamcouldstillhaveonefull-timefireprotectionstaffmember,a"professional"firefighter,assignedtoleadthefirehoseattackinfiresuppressionactivities.Astheseteamsconsistingoffireprotectionandnon-fireprotectionstaffpersonnelhavepracticedasteamsandmaturedasFireBrigademembers,ithasbecomeapparentthatnon-fireprotectionpersonnelcanperformfiresuppressionactivitieseffectively,givenadequatetrainingandpracticesessions(drills).Basedonthis,theFireBrigademembershiprequirementsarebeingrevisedtoallowanyindividualreceivingadequatetrainingandpracticetobeassignedtotheFireBrigade.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. 'SafetyEvaluationSummary.ReportPage'15of68'afetyEvaluationNo:-implementationDocumentNo.:96-004'ER.1-'96-'0418.-:"..:,:,".~'n":.;-.:Ž>")~-=.--,.<.UFSAR'AffectedPagesSystem:N/Af74)8"~~LiquidRadwasteProcessingSystems(Thermex)TitleofChange:TreatmentofSanitaryWastebyRadwasteSystems*DescriptionofChange:Aftercompletingacitywateroutageforroutinemaintenance,waterwasdiscoveredcomingoutofthetopofthesewagelinelocatedonTurbineBuildingEl.250betweenthecablespreadingroomandtheremoteshutdownpanel.Furtherinspectionrevealedthepipehaddevelopedacrackapproximatelythreefeetinlengthanduptothreeincheswideonthetopofthepipe.Duetotheinitialsurgeofwaterandcontinuedwaterusage(becauseoffixturevalvesnotclosing),thesanitarywasteleakedfromthepipeontothefloor.Thesanitarywaste/watermixtureenteredplantfloordrainsandwaspumpedfromtheturbinebuildingsumpsintotheutilitycollectortankintheradwastefacilitywhereradwasteoperatorswereabletopreventitfromprocessingthroughtheThermex'ystem.Thissafetyevaluationevaluatedtreatmentofthesanitarywastewhichenteredtheplantwithexistingradwasteequipment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thewater/sewagemixtureiscontainedintheutilitycollectortank.ThetreatmentschemewillbetoraisethepHofthetank'scontentsforthepurposeofdissolvingtheorganicandinorganicmatterandforkillinganybiologicalorganismswhichmaybegrowinginthetank.ThesolutionwillbemaintainedatapHofapproximately10-10.5.Thesolution'spHwillthenbeadjusteddownwardtoeliminatedepletionofradwasteresin.Anysolidswhichdonotdissolvewillberemovedbyfiltration.Solublematerialwillberemovedbyacombinationoffiltrationbycharcoal,reverseosmosismembranes,andbydemineralization.Ultravioletlightsareavailableandcanbeusedifnecessarytooxidizeorganicmaterialforeasierremoval.Theeffluentwaterwillbeevaluatedusingexistingchemistryproceduresbeforethewaterisreleasedtothecondensatestoragetanksforreuse. '--SafetyEvaluation-"Summary"Report"Page16'of68.-.-;-,.--.,~=-"=-SafetyEvaluation'-SafetyEvaluationNo.:::96-004..{contd.)Summary:=-;.{cont.d.i:..--'.""-.'i'."i~-"",~.~~Qnou::-sr~arr,--';.<<=,','The'resultingwastewillbeinaformwhichwillallowfordisposalinaccordance-;withcurrentlicensebasisdocuments.,<<rg<<iBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.IR>>~>><<$<<I<<~~'>>>>C>>~[~~ I'SafetyEvaluationSummary'ReportPage17of68,~"..".;=.:"96-005z...,--SafetyEvaluatIonNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:;Procedut'e'N1-STP.-56q;~.....-..:>;-:='UFSARAffected'Pages:System:TitleofChange:.'N/A~".~Feedwater~-ProcedureN1-STP-56,Feedwater{Rhf)HeaterLeakTest-DescrlptlonofChange:Tracertechnologyhasbeenusedtocalibratefeedwater.flowventurisandtoconductsteampurityevaluations.Dueto.theradiologicalconcernsassociatedwiththeuseoftheradioactivetracer,sodium-24,potassiumnitrate(KNO,)wasselectedforuseatNMP1inordertoquantifythefeedwaterheatexchangertubeleaks;Potassiumnitrateisaneutralsaltwhichissolubleinwaterandcompletelydissociates.Theuseofthisnonradioactivetracerprovidedthenecessarylevelofdetectionwithouttheradiologicalchallengesofaradioactivetracer.ProcedureN1-STP-56determinedtheFWheaterswhichhadtubeleaks.Thetestalsowasabletoestimatethesizeofleaks.Thelocationandamountoftheleakwasneededtodeterminethebesteconomicalsolutiontotheproblem.TheinjectionpointwasthroughsamplevalvesdownstreamofFWboosterpumps.Thesamplepointsaredownstreamofthesamplesystemheatexchangers.Coolingwaterwassuppliedfromservicewater,andmixingwaterwassuppliedfromdemineralizedwater.Thewastecoolingwaterandsamplewaterwasreleasedtothefloordrains.Theequipmentrequireda5gpmcoolingwaterflowrate.Thepowerrequirementsweresuppliedby240VACweldingoutletforthevendor-suppliedinjectionequipmentand110VACforthevendor-suppliedcontrolequipment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theplantwillnotbesignificantlyaffectedbythistestandthemarginofsafetyisunchanged. .SafetyEvaluation-.:SummaryReportPage=18of68,'.".,;..':;.'..-SafetyEvaluationNo.:-86-'.005(cont'd.):."Fi:.ai'~'~.,-.',...";SafetyEvaluationSummary!',':=ll'r<~>"(cont-'4-)'.',~~n-.'.nua=~.n".lzr.-:-;ia~r.'i<..-.:.~~PotassiumnitrateisreadilyavailableQrlthextremelylowchemicalcontamlnants.:-'Thlsmateriallsidealfortracerquantificationsinceitisnonvolatileandformsno-harmfulby-productsInanuclearenvironment.~Thistypeoftesthasbeendone.--successfullyatotherboilingwaterreactorplants..~'Theinjectionandsamplingequipmentwillbeattachedtononsafety-relatedsampleanddrainconnections.Ifanyproblemsoccur,theequipmentcanbeisolatedfromtheplantsystems.Theflowofcoolingwaterfromservicewatermaybe..:..::...approximately5gpmandradwasteisabletoreceiveandprocessthiswater.Thereisnosignificantincreased=risktotheplantsystemsfrominstallationofthe-.:testequipmentortothefuelfrominjectionofthetracerchemical.Theabilityof:.-theplanttoshutdown,andremainshutdown,willnotbe'impactedbyinjectionofthechemicaltracer.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport'age19of68Mod.N1-.95-006;;e~~~:=-..Safety,EvaluationNo.:,.l.",';,;";'96-007implementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:~'..',N/A-:"."..;.:-',-=,".::---;."-Ii.-~-~a<::~:~::.~a~System:SpentFuelPoolSpentFuelStorageRack-8202-11tDescriptionofChange:I~~'Thisdesignchangerelocatedthecontrolrodblade(CRB)holderstothecaskdropprotectionsystem(CDPS);removedtheworktable(WP1),1000-lb.testweight,.andseismicrestraintsinfrontofthespentfuelgates;installedthe198-cellspent.fuelrack,8202-11,asafreestanding.structureinthislocation;andinstalledtheHoltecoverheadplatform(HOP)ontopofthesouthwestcornerspentfuelrack.Engineeringworkscopeincludedtheseismicqualificationoftherackasafreestandinguncoupledstructure,evaluationoflocalizednucleate.boilingwithintherackandcalculationofmaximumcladdingtemperature,andcalculationforalltheriggingrequiredtoensurecompliancewithNUREG-0612.SafetyEvaluationSummary:InordertoremovetheworkplatformWP1,theCRBholderscurrentlyboltedt'othetableneedtoberelocatedtotheCDPStemporarilyandasrequiredtosupportfuturebladeexchanges.TheCRBholdershavebeenevaluatedinCalculationNo.S10RX340SPRIG23asfreestandingstructuresintheCDPS,eitherloadedorunloadedwithcontrolblades.TheanalysiscompletedinaccordancewiththeapplicablecriteriaconcludesthatnodamagewilloccurtothespentfuelpoolorCDPSduetoaseismiceventorotherabnormaltransient.NodamagetofuelorfuelrackswilloccurastheCDPSisisolatedfromtheremainderofthespentfuelpool.TheCRBholdersintheCDPSwillbeusedasrequiredtosupportcontrolbladeexchangestoandfromthereactorandtoandfromthesinglebladeholdersonthespentfuelpoolcurb.ThedurationthatcontrolbladeswillactuallybestoredintheCRBholdersintheCDPSissmall,andtheconsequencesofatransientoraccidentinvolvingcontrolbladesisinsignificant.CalculationNo.S10RX340SPRIG23demonstratesthattheCRBholderswillnotoverturnduringaseismiceventandnodamagetotheCDPScanoccur.Theworktable,restraintsandtestweightwillbepressurewashedduringremovalfromthepooltominimizecontaminationandexposure.Theequipmentwillbe SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport'Page20of68w-liIf\ifpj'LM~'li~i'96-007(cont'd.)+v<ZeDAWpiwisgttP6wi3fi%3ifi~1...:-.:,-.SafetyEvaloaSonNo.:\a1Safety-EvaluationSummary':-~-""'-"'-=---'-'-'<(corit'd)placedinthedesignatedlaydownareaandwrapped'atthedirectionofRadiation=.".:Protection.Theaccidentsrelevanttoaspentfuelrackandthespentfuelpoolinclude'afuelbundle.drop,anInadvertentcriticality,andalossofspentfuelpoolcooling.HeavyloadswillnotbehandledoverspentfuelwiththeexceptionoftheHOP.TheHOPwillbeinstalledutilizingthe125-toncrane.Inaddition,allheavyloads.'illbehandledinaccordancewithNUREG-0612andapplicableNMPCprocedures.Assuch,aheavyloaddropishighlyimprobable,anddoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentevaluateddn'the-UFSAR.Thespentfuelpoolactivities;.,requiredtoinstall.'the~198-cellspentfuelrackandHOPincludetherelocationoftheCRBholders,theremovalof.theexisting'worktable;seismic'restraintsand1000-lb.testweight,andassociatedpreoperationaltestingrequirementsforthe'rack.NoneoftheseactivitiesareinitiatorsoftheaccidentsdescribedintheUFSAR.Whilespentfuelwillberelocatedpriortoandaftertheinstallationofthisdesignchange,thiswillbecompletedinaccordancewiththeapplicablefuelhandlingproceduresandhasbeenpreviouslyevaluated.Thedesigncodes,calculations,materials,installationproceduresandpost-installationtestingassurethattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentassociatedwiththespentfuelandspentfuelpoolwillnotbeincreased.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport,Page21of68.SafetyEvaluationNo.:.ImplementationDocumentNo'..".96-.008'.i-:DDC~1E00045:.;.";",q.'""<.<<,:Q:~.<".:~",~;UFSARAffectedPages:~;,:III-16'-:"-'."=:,>a;..~;~:~'~z';-.."'~.i.'ystem:RadwasteBuildingHeating8cVentilation(HVW)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:WasteBuildingControlRoomAlarmThischangeretiredinplacetheRadwasteBuildinghighradiationalarm.ThecontinuousairmonitoringsystemwarnspersonneloccupyingorenteringtheRadwasteBuildingofsignificantairbornecontaminationlevels,andahighradiationsignalstillalarmsinthemaincontrolroom.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedchangeremovesonlytherequirementfortheRadwasteBuildingventilationradiationalarminthewastecontrolroom.Theabilitytodetecthighradiationlevelsisprovidedinthemaincontrolroomandvialocalalarms.Deletingthealarmcannotincreasetheprobability.ofanaccidentbecauseitsfunctionisalarmonly.Itdoesnotprovideatrip,nordoesitcontrolothercomponents,i.e.,valves,pumps,etc.ItisnotdiscussedintheSARaspartofanytransientoraccidentanalysis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluatlon-Summary.Report".Page22of68'='lll~~~>>4(Va>>->aj'<<AI.>>...SafetyEvaluationNo.:96-0.'IO"~a'mplementationDocumentNo;:",'<9.ProcedureNEP-POL&1:.-.-'.-'Gri-"-.'4.-name!qm..UFSAR.AffectedPages;"'ystem:TitleofChange:Figul'e"Xlll-3N/ARestructuringofUnit1EngineeringinAccordancewithRevisedProcedureNEP-POL-01RkoI~~-[g>>>>~>>DescriptionofChange:~I~l~>>,~a~=J(~~f."~ProcedureNEP-POL-01,"NuclearEngineeringDepartmentOrganization,"hasbeenrevised-toreflectorganizationalchangesinUnit.1Engineering.TheUnit.1Plant.Evaluationgroup,consistingofasupervisorandoneengineer,hasbeenmergedwiththeUnit1ProjectManagementgroup.TheSupervisor-PlantEvaluationpositionhasbeeneliminated.BothindividualsinthePlantEvaluationgroupnowreporttotheUnit1Supervisor-ProjectManagement.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theseprocedurechangesestablishdepartmentalresponsibilitiesandlinesof.authority,responsibility,andcommunicationwithintheNuclearSBU.TheproposedorganizationalstructuresatisfiesthecriteriaofSRP13.1.1.Theproposedchangesdonotimpactaccidentormalfunctioninitiationorconsequences.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport---.Page23of68.96-011.;-SafetyEvaluationNo.:E~,(h1ImplementationDocumentNo.:,.:.,DER:,1-94-1980';,i,:--.,-.;.;.;.:r:",-..:,,;-,VFSARAffectedPages:~System:TitleofChange:N/A-"-<'"<.ControlRoomAirTreatment,ReactorBuildingEmergencyVentilationRevisiontotheBasesforTechnicalSpecification3.44/4.44and3.4.5/4.4.5DescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedupdatingthecharcoalsamplingtechniquecurrentlydescribedintheTechnicalSpecificationBasesforTechnicalSpecification3.4.4/4.4.4,EmergencyVentilationSystem,and.TechnicalSpecification3.4.5/44.5,ControlRoomAirTreatmentSystem.ThecollectionmethodpreviouslydescribedintheseTechnicalSpecification.baseswasnotpossibleonthecontrolroomairtreatmentsystem,andwasnotpracticalfortheReactorBuildingemergencyventilationsystem.ThechangetotheTechnicalSpecificationBasesallowsforperformanceofalternatecharcoalsamplingtechniques.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ChangingthecollectiontechniquetoalternatemethodsendorsedbyANSI/ASMEN510-1980iswithinthelicensingbasisofthesystem.Theproposedalternativetechniquessamplethecharcoalbedswithminimaldisturbanceofthefiltermedia.Thisresultsinsampleswhicharerepresentativeoftheconditionofthecharcoalbeds,thusensuringthatthetestresultsaccuratelyreflecttheabilityofthefiltertrainstoremovethepotentialreleaseofparticulatesfromtheairstream.Thisprovidesanaccuratecheckoftheefficiencyofthecharcoalfilters.Whentheefficienciesofthefiltertrainsaremaintainedasspecified,theresultingdoseswillbelessthanthe10CFR100guidelinesfortheaccidentsanalyzed.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation..SummaryReportPage24of-68.;SafetyEvaluationNo.:96-012-Rev;051'$~NT'ImplementationDocumentNo.'-"""-""-ProcedureNl-TTP~"""""-"ao"-'.'>"-'-::.-',=':.UFSARAffectedPages:"-:XI-9'r~s<'-.=.="i-s~~~System:CirculatingWaterSystem,CondenserOffgas,Condensate/FeedwaterTitleofChange:SulfurHexafluoride(SFo)InjectiontoDetectCondenserTubeLeaks*+R~IDescriptionofChange:.=I~4Thissafetyevaluationevaluatedinjectionofsulfurhexafluoridegas(SF,)and-heliumintothecirculatingwaterandturbinebuildingservicewatertolocatecondensertubeleaksoroffgasventcoolerleaks.Itwasalsodispersedinthevicinityofthemaincondensertodetectairin-leakage.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Sulfurhexafluoride,fluorideandheliumdonothaveconcentrationlimitsforthereactorcoolantsincethesechemicalsarenotnormallyexpectedandpresentindetectableconcentrations.NoadverseconsequencesareexpectedfromtheconcentrationscalculatedinS1.1-74-F002.ThiscalculationassumesamaximumusageofSF,of250SCFandapostulatedtubeleakofupto5gpm.Heliumuseupto250SCFispermitted.ShouldadditionalSF6orheliumberequired,engineeringshallbecontactedtoevaluateitsuse,Reactorwatersulfateconcentrationactionlevel1is5ppb.BycalculationtheexpectedincreaseinsulfatesduetodissolutionofSF6willbelessthan5ppb.Inaddition,sulfateswillberemovedbythereactorwatercleanupsystem.FeedwaterandreactorwaterconductivityshouldbeunaffectedbytheuseofSF6orheliumandcanbemonitoredduringthistest.TechnicalSpecificationlimitsforchloridesandconductivityshallstillbemonitoredandadheredto.ConformancetoNDD-CHEguidelinesassuresthatintergranularstresscorrosioncracking(IGSCC)isnotincreasedbythistest.Sulfurhexafluorideandhelium,attheconcentrationexpected,haveanegligibleimpactontheproduction,moderationorabsorptionofneutrons.Reactivitywillbeunaffectedbythepresenceofthesechemicals.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation*SummaryReport-..-...Page25of68-':-,SafetyEvaluationNo;:.'96-013:ImplementationDocuinentNo.'.:""~','.DDC1F00109.t;.'='-;:".UFSAR'AffectedPages:System:FigureX-8SpentFuelPoolTitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:ReplaceBV-54-70,3"Chapman-CraneGateValvewith3"WorcesterControlsBallValve~I"ThevalvestemnutfailedonsuctionvalveBV-54-70forthespentfuelpoolfilter"precoattank.Thefailurewasassumedtobecausedbyresinsbeingpackedbetweenthevalveseats.Whenthevalvedidnotcloseproperly,thehandlemayhavebeenover-tightenedcausingthestemnuttofail.IThischangereplacedthe3-inch,150-poundflangedChapman-Cranealuminumgatevalvewitha3-inch,150-poundflangedWorcesterControlsstainlesssteelballvalve.Thisreplacementvalveboltedintothesystemwithoutanypipingorsupportchanges.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thefunctionandoperatingcharacteristicsofthesystemareunchanged.Thegatevalveandballvalvesarefullyportedandtheflowcharacteristicsareunchanged.Theballvalveincreasestheweightatthislocationto43pounds,whichisaninsignificantchangeforthedesignofthepiping.Theballvalvemeetsorexceedsthedesignrequirementsofthespentfuelpoolsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation'SummaryReport.Page'26of'68.SafetyEvaluation

No::-,-.,l96-01:4-'~Implementation:DocumentNo.30l'OORDesfgnChange.N1-.9M)30;(<riolgp;ri~;;,-'q:...UFSARAffected'Pages:-'-"B.i:IV-17;SIV-18,IV-23,IVe24<iVll.-.22;.Vil-23;;-~.-'.-',--."F'."VII~,XV-46,XV-47,XV-82;FiguresIV-4,IV~System:ControlRodDrive14~t,~tTitleofChange:UseofModifiedBWR-6OriginalEquipmentControlBladesatNMP1;lDescriptionofChange:1~~4rThissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheuseofmodifiedGeneralElectricBWR-6~OriginalEquipmentcontrolblades(M6CB)asstandardreplacementcontrolbladesatNMP1.ThesecontrolbladesweremodifiedbyreplacingtheexistingrollerswithrollersofcorrectdiameterforuseintheBWR-2latticeatNMP1.Thismodificationwasperformed'byGeneralElectric.BrownsFerryNuclearPlant(GEBWR-4),witha"D"latticewatergapdimensionequaltoNMP1,hasoperated20M6CBsincontrolcellcorelocationssinceJune1993.ThissafetyevaluationalsoevaluatedchangingtheNMP1UFSARmaximumcontrolroddropvelocityfrom5ft/secto3.11ft/secconsistentwithTechnicalSpecificationBasis3.1.1.b.3.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheM6CBnominalsheaththickness,absorbertubeoutsidediameter,rollerdimensions,andwingthicknessareequivalenttothosedimensionsusedintheDuralife230controlblade.TheDuralife230controlbladewasevaluatedtoensurethatitcouldbeinsertedduringnormal,abnormal,emergencyandfaultedmodesofoperationwithinthelimitsassumedintheplantanalyses.Theanalysesconsideredtheeffectsofmanufacturingtolerances,swellingandirradiationgrowthandincludesthetime-dependenteffectsofcorrosion.TheDuralife230controlbladewasapprovedforuseinaBWR-2bytheNRCandseveralarecurrentlyinuseatNMP1.Additionally,theweightoftheM6CBisequivalenttotheBWR-2OriginalEquipmentcontrolbladedesign.Therefore,themechanicalperformanceoftheM6CBwillnotdifferfromcontrolbladescurrentlyusedatNMP1.TheM6CBcontrolbladeshaveapproximatelythesamehotandcoldreactivityworthastheBWR-2OriginalEquipmentcontrolblade(matchedworth).Therefore,theM6CBhasthesamenuclearperformancepropertiesasbladescurrentlyinstalledinNMP1.

.SafetyEvaluation:SummaryReport.Page27of68SafetyEvaluationNo.::96-014(cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:-":"'.-l:(cont'd;:)'.=.-".<':-"~"...'"".:-"'.-','i:-"::-v':"-:.Basedon'theevaluationperformed,it'iswoncludedthatthesechangesdonot.:,involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. -".-SafetyEvaluation.;.SummaryReport"Page28of;68='=-Safety.EvaluationNo.:~~I"ImplementationDocument',No.:~+p<~a~\ytr<e'i+a+'->a>t'g~:>>96-015~>4r'5ge"~,':.ProcedureEPMP;EPP;,02~;3no:qi.;.:.~..=:--.-",-'rUFSARAffectedPages:,::.:~,>..10A-1?.,':.-,-,:-:pq,-0,'=;~-..:-.'=-.-,>>yi,;~System:TitleofChange:N/ADescriptionofFireBrigadeEquipmentLocationinUnit1FSAR-~".-DescriptionofChange:Appendix10A(FireHazardsAnalysis)oftheUnit1UFSARlistedareaswithintheplantwherefirefightingequipmentisstored.Specifically,theUFSARidentifiedlocationsintheTurbine,Reactor,Offgas,andAdministrationBuildings,aswellastheUnit1MaintenanceShop,asstoragelocationsforfirefightingequipment.ThischangeremovedreferencetothesespecificlocationsfromtheUFSAR,.thusallowingtheFireBrigademoreflexibilityinchoosingthebeststoragelocationforfirefightingequipment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:lnaccordancewithindustrycodes,standards,andguidelines,referencesto.specificplantlocationsregardingstorageoffirefightingequipmenthasbeen'emovedfromtheUnit1UFSAR.Appendix10AoftheUFSARprovidesspecificequipmentlocationsindetailfarexceedingtheindustrynorm.EquipmentinventoryandlocationsareadministrativelycontrolledviaapprovedNMPCProcedureEPMP-EPP-02,"EmergencyEquipmentInventoriesandChecklists."ThechangeprovidestheFireBrigadewithmoreflexibilityinchoosingthebeststoragelocationforfirefightingequipmentbasedonimprovedfirefightingtechnology,trainingandsite-rundrills,andsite-specificknowledge.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation-SummaryReport..Page29of-68,.SafetyEvaluationNo.:~:;-ImplementationDocumentNo;-.~96.-016/~NFPA16,DER.1-95;2856,'-UFSARAffectedPages:~10A-51,10A-52,10B-78System:Foam-WaterTitleofChange:ClarificationofFoam-WaterFireSuppressionSystemArrangementDescriptionofChange:Thefoam-watersystematNMP1providesprotectionaround,theturbinegeneratorintheeventofanoilfire.Sixfoam-waterdelugespraysystemsexistasfollows:fourprotecttheTurbineBuildingEl.300areaaroundtheturbine,andoneeachintheturbineoilreservoirandhydrogensealoilrooms.Thewaterportionofthefourturbineareasystemsisautomaticallyinitiatedbycross-zonedthermaldetection.ActuationoftheseopenheaddelugesystemsprovidesWATERONLYtothecoveredareas.Whiledetectoractuationopensthesupplymotor-operatedvalve(foamandwater)totheselines,thefoampumpmustbemanuallystartedinordertogetfoamconcentrateinjection.ThismodeofoperationisincompliancewithNationalFireProtectionAssociationCode16(NFPA'16),"InstallationofDelugeFoam-WaterSprinklerandFoam-WaterSpraySystem,"andisperthe.originalsystemdesign.DiscrepanciesexistedbetweenthesystemdescriptionsectionsoftheUnit1UFSARandNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)regardingautomaticvs.manualstartingofthefoaminjectionpumps.ThesediscrepancieswereminorinnatureanddidnotaffecttheFireProtectionProgramatNMP1.TheNMP1UFSARhasbeenrevisedtoindicatethefoaminjectionpumpscanonlybestartedmanually,andtheNRCSERdiscrepancieshavebeenidentifiedanddiscussed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedchangesclarifyandupdatetheUFSARandreconciletheUFSARandNRCSER.Thechangesarestrictlyeditorialinnatureandreflectwhathasalwaysbeenthedesignbasisforthefoam-watersystem.Thisclarificationandreconciliationhavenophysicaleffectonanyplantstructure,systemorcomponent,oranydesignbasisoraccident.ThisupdatewillclarifythemethodandmodeofoperationoftheNMP1foam-watersystemasdescribedintheFireHazardAnalysisandSafeShutdownAnalysis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationNummary.ReportPage30of68...-SafetyEvaluationNo.

-'ImplementationDocumentNo.:-"~<"9&4170~l'"GER"1-96-0738o<"'">r<."-"-'-':"-'-'r'>""'"-'-"-UFSARAffectedPagesSystem:TitleofChange:ScreenWashClosureofStandbyScreenWashPump~IntertieValvesDescriptionofChange:~,II41iwI\%PiTheconfigurationoftheheader'intertievalvesforthestandbyscreenwashpumpwaschangedfromopentoclosed.Thepositionchangewasreqvestedtoreduce-backflowthroughpump13andavoid.simvltaneousfeedofthevpperandlowerscreenwashheaders'intheeventpump13initiated.Screenwashpump13isastandbypumpusedasabackuptoeitherpump'11or12.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Sincetheintertievalvesaremanual,isolationofupstreameqvipmentcanbeobtainedasnecessarybyclosingthevalves.Withthevalvesnormallyclosed,backflowthrovghpump13isprevented,assuringfullflowtothescreensfrompump11and12andreducingthepotentialfordamagetopump13.Closingbothintertievalveswillrequiremanualactiontoopeneithertheupperheadervalveorthelowerheadervalvebeforeputtingthepumpinservice.Thisispreferabletorunningwiththevalvesopensince:1)runningwiththevalvesopencausesrecirculationofflowfrompump11or12,resultinginlessflowtothescreensandpotentialdamagetoseals;and2)thedevelopmentofdifferentialpressureacrossthescreenisnotexpectedtooccurrapidly(byengineeringjudgmentandoperatingexperience),allowingsufficienttimeforoperatoraction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

-SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport-Page31of68~,.',,;..-SafetyEvaluatioriNo'.:"'ImplementationDocumentNo.:""96-'018Rev.0&1'iMod.:N1-94-003'=UFSAR:Affecte'd'PagesrSystem:TitleofChange:-,'~'IV-29,XVI-12,XVI-14;TableXVI-9a..~ggg~ReactorVesselModificationtotheCoreShroudRepairTieRodAssemblies".DescriptionofChange:~=4Theas-builtconfigurationofthelowerspringcontactoneachofthefourcoreshroudrepairstabilizers(tierods)didnotencompassshroudweldH6Aaswasintendedbytheoriginalshroudrepairdesign.ThischangemodifiedthelowerspringcontacttoextendbeyondtheH6Aweld.Thismodificationrestoredthecontacttoitsintendeddesigncondition.Also,thelowerspringofthe270'zimuthstabilizerwasbearingontheblendradiusofarecirculationnozzle.Anadditionalchangereplacedthe270'ierodandspringassemblywithouthavingaspringontheoppositesideofthetierod.Thismodificationrelocatedthespringtobearonthereactorpressurevesselasintended.DuringRFO14,clearancewasfoundbetweenthetoggleboltsandtheshroudsupportconethatcouldaffecttheaxialtightnessofthestabilizerassemblies.'heclearancebetweenthetoggleboltsandtheshroudsupportconewasremoved,restoringthestabilizerassembliestotheiroriginallyintendeddesign.Thelowerwedgelatcheshadthepotentialtobecomeloadedduetodifferentialverticaldisplacementgreaterthanintendedbytheoriginaldesignofthelatches.Newmodifiedlatcheswereinstalledwhicharemoretolerantofdifferentialverticaldisplacement.SafetyEvaluationSummary:GESafetyEvaluationGE-NE-B13-01739-5andNMPCSafetyEvaluation94-080evaluatedthedesign,fabricationandconstructionofthecoreshroudstabilizersatNMP1,Theevaluationoftheshroudmodificationhardwareincludeddesign,code,materials,fabrication,structural,systems,installationandinspectionconsiderations.TheevaluationconcludedthattheproposedmodificationisinaccordancewiththeBoilingWaterReactorVessel&InternalsProject(BWRVIP)CoreShroudRepairDesignCriteria.TheshroudrepairdesignanalyseswerealsoreviewedandapprovedbytheNRCasdocumentedintheCommission'ssafetyevaluationreport(SER)datedMarch31,1995;however,theNRCSERrequired ...>iSafetyEvaluation-.-.,'='-Summary.Report=,.::::Page32'of68j...>'"Safety=EvaluationNo.:'."~-r~J96-..018Rev.""..-"SafetyEvatuatIonSummary:>'-::"'-'E.-"'(cont'd:)=-'0h1(cont'd.),-'.Ii1~c>>'L'sP>4<8~i(t%.~Oe+~$1%4VJPf40>>I'$~<'"'thatcorrectly"actionsbeimplementedtoaddressthelackofcoverageofweld==:,.H6A.TheNRCprovidedNMPCwithaSERonMarch3,1997,whichapproved'themodificationstocaptureweldH6Aandtoremovethe'lowerwedgefromthe-recirculationnozzle.TheNMP1repairmodificationofthecoreshroudwasperformedasanalternativetoASMESectionXlaspermittedby10CFR50.55a(a)(3).Consequently,NRCapprovalofthisrepairapproachwasrequired.TheBWRVIPReport(EPRI.;TR-105692,BWRVIP-04),entitledGuideforFormatandContentofCoreShroud~-'epairDesignSubmittals,"requiresthatasafetyevaluation-ofcoreshroudrepairs.'bemadeandthattheconclusionsbeprovidedtotheNRC:.Thissafetyevaluationdocuments.theNMPCreviewoftherepairinaccordancewith.theprovisionsof10CFR50.59.Theevaluationincludedareviewoftheplantlicensing'bases.'-Theevaluationdemonstratesthattheproposedmodificationscanbeimplemented1)withoutanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluated,2)withoutcreatingthepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofanewordifferentkindfromanypreviouslyevaluated,and3)withoutreducingthemarginofsafety.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummary-ReportPage33of68,-Safety-EvaluationNo.:c.*k>.~'ImplementationDocument~IdgUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:96-'039No.:,"..~.':Site~Emergency.Plan.o;.".&~9r.""~".:e.".~r;"->>,:;~'ry$A~p'Xlll-13PEmergencyOperationsFacility(EOF)EmergencyOperationsFacility(EOF)MoveFromtheNuclearLearningCenterat9MilePointtotheExistingEOFonRoute176inFulton,NewYorkDescriptionofChange:TheEOFisasupportfacilityforthemanagementofoveralllicenseeemergencyresponse,coordinationofradiologicalandenvironmentalassessments,anddeterminationofrecommendedpublicprotectiveactions.TheEOFisequippedwithadministrative,communication,andcomputerequipmentthatmeettherequirementsoflicensebasisdocumentsincludingNUREG-0696,SiteEmergencyPlan(SEP),Unit1UFSAR,Unit2USAR,andTechnicalSpecifications.TheEOFhasbeenrelocatedfromtheNuclearLearningCenter(NLC)toanewfacilitylocatedonRoute176bytheOswegoCountyAirportinFulton,NewYork,approximately11milesfromNineMilePoint.ThenewlocationisalsousedastheNewYorkPowerAuthorityEOF.SafetyEvaluationSummary:RelocationoftheEOFwillsatisfytheNRCrecommendationthattheEOFbelocatedoutsidethe10MileEmergencyPlanningZone(EPZ).ThiswillalsoeliminatetheneedforNMPCtomaintainanAlternateEOFoutsidethe10MileEPZ.TheEOFlocatedattheNLCdoesnotprovideplantcontrolfunctionsandisnotconnectedtoanysystemusedtomitigateanaccident.TheEOFoperatesinaccordancewithdesignconfigurationandsiteprocedurestocomplywithNUREG-0696,SEP,Unit1UFSARandUnit2USAR.ChangestotheSEPandUnit1UFSAR,asaresultofrelocatingtheEOF,willnotaffectanyplantsystemusedtomitigateanaccidentoranysystemassociatedwithaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation~SummaryReport'Page34of68.'=SafetyEvaluation=No.:-96-021i)~0<<)vy-.4ImplementationDocumentUFSARAffectedPages:NSystem:TitleofChange:No.:vi:;,~~.'alculations'-S7-RX340-W01,,-,~i:~,=;~'>>,;.-",.S4RX340BLDG01,S4TB300BLDG01'~Illl-3,VI-17,XVI-70;TableXVI-31Sh1**~~~t<<N/AUFSARChangesforReactorBuildingandTurbineBuildingPressureReliefPanelFailureLoads.DescriptionofChange:TheUFSARhasbeenrevisedtoshowthenewblowout:load.ofTurbineBuilding(TB)pressurereliefpanelsas62psf,newwallpanelareaof1900sq.ft.,andthefailureloadofsuperstructuresasatleast135psf.ThischangealsoshowsthenewblowoutloadofReactorBuilding(RB)pressurereliefpanelsas65psf,newwaltpanelareaof2400sq.ft.,andthefailureloadofsuperstructuresasatleast117psf(internalpressure).TheUFSARhasalsobeenrevisedtoindicatetheratioofreliefareatobuildingvolumeas1.6ft'/1000ft'ortheReactorBuildingand0.21ft/1000ft'ortheTurbineBuilding.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thefailureblowoutpressures(internalpressure)of65psf(RB)and62psf(TB)aresufficiently<117psf(RB)and<135psf(TB)andprovideadequateprotectionofReactorBuilding/TurbineBuildingsuperstructuresagainstinternalpressure,where117psfand135psfaretheminimuminternalpressuresthatshouldreachinsidetheReactorBuildingandTurbineBuildingsuperstructures,respectively,forfailure,asdocumentedinCalculationsS4RX340BLDG01andS4TB300BLDG01.Theblowoutpanelshavebeenreturnedtoaconfigurationfunctionallyequivalenttotheoriginaldesign,i.e.,3/16"diameterboltsspacedat12"O.C.havetheequivalentstrengthof1/4"diameterboltsspacedat24"O.C.,withthesametensilestrength.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. .;.,Safety.EvaluationSummary.Report='"-Page35of6896-023.Safety'EvaluationNo.:~I-;.;.'mplementationDocumentNo.::"-".-"'~~'"DER.1.-.95-3438='-""-.UFSAR.-AffectedPages:"".-=X-24iie'JpA.>'wme"ry,,it~System:ServiceWater(SW)TitleofChange:ServiceWaterStrainersMeshSizeDiscrepancy.DescriptionofChange:The.UFSARpreviouslystatedthateachSWpumpwasprovidedwitha.010-inch,..meshautomaticself-cleaningstrainer.Althoughtheinitialmeshsizechosenforthesestrainerswas.01inch,.duetofrequentclogging'ofthestrainers,"themeshsizewaschangedto.03inch;ThischangeprovidesclarificationintheUFSARoftheSWstrainermeshsizetoconformtotheas-builtconditionofthestrainer.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thereisnodefinedindustrycriteriafortheselectionofstrainermeshsizes.Thedecisionregardingthesizeisprimarilybasedonpastexperienceandengineeringjudgment.Factorssuchasamountandsizeofparticulatematterinthefluid,flowvelocitiesinpipingandcomponents,andpropensityofanyequipmenttodevelopclogging,normallyformsthebasisforengineeringjudgmentregardingselectionofthestrainermeshsize.Thepresentinstalledmeshsizeof.03inchonthenormalSWpumpstrainersisofappropriatedesignanddoesnotadverselyimpactnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. .'afetyEvaluation;,,SummaryReport-,Page36of68=.-SafetyEvaluationNo':,'implementationDocumentNo::4..>>~.PCE.toProcedure.N1-OP-6;:.r"-:-.,=,CalculationS14-54-HX08~p'll]a~'FSARAffectedPages:X-33SpentFuelPoolCooling(SFC)f4+~Ag~System:PTitleofChange:SecuringtheSpentFuelStoragePoolFilteringandCoolingSystemforMaintenance.~DescriptionofChange:~t:4~-~N~~ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedchangestoProcedure.N1-OP-06,SpentFuel-'.StoragePoolFilteringandCoolingSystem,toallowsecuringspentfuelcoolingformaintenance,providedSFCtemperaturesarealternatelymonitoredandcontrolledbelow125F,andincorporatedadescriptionofspectacleflangesdownstreamoftheheatexchangerswhichallowindependentisolationoftheSFCsubsystems.Therearecommoncomponentsinthesystem.Further,theeffluentofeachoftheredundantcoolingandfilteringtrainsisboundedbyacheckvalveandaspectacleflange.Thesystemmustbesecuredtodocorrectivemaintenanceonacommoncomponent.Thesystemmustalsobesecuredforashortperiodformaintenanceoneachredundanttraintoallowtimetoreversethespectacleflange,becausetheassociateddischargecheckvalvecannotbeconsideredasecureboundaryforpersonnelsafety.AccordingtotheUFSAR,theSFCsystemmustmaintainthepooltemperaturebelow125'Fandmaintainacceptablewaterclarity.Thissafetyevaluationconsideredpoweroperation,notrefuelingoutages;therefore,reactorcavityandequipmentstoragepitlevelfunctionsareunaffected.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheSFCsystemmaybesecuredforalimitedtimeformaintenanceoncommoncomponents,orcomponentswhichrequiresecuringcommoncomponentsforpersonnelsafety.Duringthisperiod,thepooltemperaturewillbemonitoredsothetemperatureofthepoolwillnotexceedthedesignlimitof125F.Evaporative,radiative,andconductiveheatlossesarenotconsideredinCalculationS14-54-HX08.Theseheatlossesarenotexpectedtoactuallycoolthepool;therefore,pooltemperaturewillremainabove68FandK~forthehigh-densityrackswillremain<0.95.K,inthelow-densityracksincreaseswith ,'-.'.:SafetyEvaluatIon.";;SummaryReporti-.-Page'.37'of68...-':".Safety.EvaluatioiiNo.:"96-'104(cont'd.)'<<I':-:SafetyEvaluationSummary:"-'=='-:(cont'd.)'temperature;butis<0.91at125'Fandsomeetsthe<0.95criterion;;;;',.Evaporativeinventorylossesareconsiderednegligible;however,thefireandcondensatetransfersystemswillbeavailableasmakeupwatersupplieswhilethesystemissecured.TheproposedmaintenanceontheSFCsystemwillhavenobearingonotherequipmentimportanttosafetyand,specifically,willhavenoeffectontheRBEVsystem,whichis'necessarytomitigatetheeffectsofthemostrelevantanalyzedaccident,adroppedfuelbundle.SecuringtheSFCsystemforalimitedperiodcanbeaccomplishedwhileremainingwithinthedesignlimitof125'Fandwillensurethereisnonegative.effectonotherequipmentimportanttosafety.Basedonthe'evaluationperformed;itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport-Page38of68...Safety,EvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:.:.."~-.96-196.~TemporaryMod.96-008,,UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:.N/A.~r~PgMainTurbine,FeedwaterPlant-OperationwithFeedwater.Pump13StubShaftUncoupledDescriptionofChange:1,J~>I~s>,S=~qI'>>~<<y=iG1)>)~~pg~ps~The¹1:3feedwaterpumplsmechantcallyconnectedto,anddriven.by,the,main.:-.,turbinegenerator.Themechanical.connectionincludes-aclutchassembly..comprisedofa.fluidfrictionclutchand,ageared(dental)clutchwhichworkinparallel.Damagewassustainedtothedentalclutchandremovalforrepairoftherotatingelementwasrequired.Thistemporarymodificationinstalledastubshaftasareplacementpartwithintheclutchhousing.Thestubshaftiscoupledtotheturbineattheshearshaftandmaybecoupledtothe¹13feedwaterpumpgearsetatalaterdate.SafetyEvaluationSummary:installationofthestubshaftinlieuoftheclutchrotatingelementisanoriginal'esignfeatureoftheclutchintheeventofmajormechanicalfailure.Theshaftiscapableoftransmitting10,000hpat1800rpmfromthemainturbinethroughtheclutchhousingtothe¹13feedwaterpumpstep-upgear.Theinputendoftheshaftisequippedwithacouplingflangetomatetotheshearshaftattheturbine.TheoutputendofthestubshaftissuitableformountingtheexistingThomasflexiblehalfcoupling.Thismountingisashrinkfit.Thistypeofmountingassuresthecouplingwillnotdetachfromthestubshaftatratedspeed.TheThomascouplingbetweentheclutchandstep-upgearisremovedtodefeatoperationofthe¹13feedwaterpump.Removalofthecouplingdoesnotposeasafetyhazard,asthehousingcoverwillbeinstalledasdesigned.Thethrustbearingintheclutchensuresstabilityofthefreecouplinghub.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. ÃSafetyEvaluation-SummaryReportPage39of68..=,,,SafetyEvaluationNo.:97-.'901".'".E~~ImplementationDocumentNo.'..'",.'.Simple"DesignChangeSC1-0122-92.,'..-,=UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:.V-5:~8~~~~'AFloorDrains,EquipmentDrainsDWEDTLevelInstrumentUpgradeThissimpledesignchangeinstallednewlevelsensorsforthedrywellequipmentandfloordraintanksthatwillprovideinputtonewprogrammablelogiccontrollers(PLC),whichwillcalculate.therateofriseofwaterinthefloordraintanksandperformthealarmfunctionbasedonthatrate.ThissafetyevaluationalsoevaluatedthechangesrequiredtotheexistingPLCsinstalledindrywellleakdetectioncabinetsA&B.AdditionalcircuitboardswereinstalledtoaccommodatethesignalssuppliedbythenewlevelsensorsandtoprovideoutputsignalstotheControlRoomchartrecorders.Softwarechangeswererequiredtosupportthenewhardwareandfunctions.AllchangesweretransparenttoControlRoomoperations.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheexcessiveleakagedetectionsystemprovidestheControlRoomwithanannunciatorwarningofanincipientreactorcoolantsystem(RCS)failure.Thisisdeterminedbythemeasurementofidentifiedandunidentifiedleakageinsidethedrywell.ThisleakageiscollectedintankswherelevelchangesareusedtodeterminetherateofRCSleakage.AnannunciatorisalarmediftherateofleakageexceedslimitssetinTechnicalSpecification3.2.5.Asecondaryfunctioniscontrolofthetanksumppumps.Thepresentsystemconsistsofmanyoriginalplantcomponentsthatareatorneartheendofusefullife.Themethodofcalculatingtherateofriseintanklevelwilldifferslightlyfromtheoriginalmethod,butfullconformancewithallTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsisdemonstratedinthissafetyevaluation.Thechangewillhavenoeffectonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport-Page40of68-SafetyEvaluation-No.:.ImplementationDocumentUFSARAffectedPages:System:97-.'002;=No.:,"..>~;.!:DER'1=96-2795.'oMc'~..n.aVl-32-'py0'~pt~~C'~jgp%h,~E.~tfl.-es~L9)PI%.ReactorBuildingNormalVentilationTitleofChange:ReactorBuildingNormalVentilationIntakeandExhaustLocalFlowIndication'~-Cr~-IW4"W14DescriptionofChange:I~*~ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionVI-F.5.1toindicatethatflowswitchesin:the-supplyandexhaustlinesprovideforlowflowalarmsintheControlRoomforthe.reactorbuildingnormalventilationsystemflow.Previously,theUFSARindicated:localflowrateindicationwasprovidedinthesupplyandexhaustlines.Neither.thecurrentdesignnortheoriginalcompletedplantdesignprovideforthisflowrateindication.Theflowindicationwasremovedduringplantconstruction.Flowrateindicationisonlyrequiredfortheemergencyventilationsystem.Reactorbuildingnormalventilationsystemincludingflowindication/alarmisnotsafetyrelated.SafetyEvaluationSummary:LocalflowindicationwasoriginallydiscussedintheFSARbecausetheoriginalplantdesignonceincludedlocalflowindicationinboththeintakeandexhaustofthereactorbuildingnormalventilationsystem.Theindicationwasremovedbeforeoriginalconstructionwascompleted.Flowindicationswerealsoaddedtotheemergencyventilationsystemsuchthatbothtrainsofthesystemwouldhaveflowmonitoringcapability,whilethelocalflowindicationsforthenormalreactorventilationsystemwereremoved.Nojustificationordocumentedmodificationwasfoundfortheremovaloftheflowindications.Thefinalas-builtdesigndidnotincludethemandthereisnoevidencethatlocalflowindicationwaseveractuallyinstalledintheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage41of68SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:~~"p"~~'h~l~atliglv~'FSARAffectedPages:97-003ProcedureNIP-FFD-02,:;.N/A=;:-\~~kP~~System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:4N/A"~ChangetoNIP-FFD-02WhichExtendsRespiratorPhysicalstoOncePer2Yearsfor.SelectGroupsofPersonnelThischangerevisedtheUFSARtoreflectthe10CFRPart20changesmadeinFebruary1995regardingrespiratorqualifications.Itisnowrequiredthatrespiratorqualificationsincludeaphysician'sdeterminationpriortoinitialfittingofrespiratorsandperiodicallyatafrequencydeterminedbyaphysicianthattheindividualismedicallyfittousetherespiratoryprotectionequipment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangestoNIP-FFD-02arebasedonthecurrentregulationsof10CFRPart20asprescribedbythecompanyphysician.Thesechangesmeetorexceedallcurrentrequirementsforrespiratorqualificationphysicalfrequency.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. ,SafetyEvaluation.SummaryReport==Page42-of68.'.-.SafetyEvaluatIonNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo::-:-"<UFSAR.AffectedPages.97-005=.!NEDE'24011-'P-'A-"I0'~~"<;>""'~A4l>~">~:<"-i;"~NEDE-24011-P.-A-10-US{GESTARII)jRNci59Js~iBjig~4lw4l'4I-10,I-15;IV-7,IV-12,IV-32,V-2'I,'VII-20,XV-3,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-13,XV-15,-:XV-68,XV-79,XV-82;TableV-1Sh2System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:.Various-OperationofNMP1Reload14/Cycle13ll~Y~1Thischangeconsistedof1headditionofnewfuelbundlesandtheestablishmentofanewcoreloadingpatternforReload14/Cycle13operationofNMP1.Onehundredeightyeight(188)newfuelb'undiesoftheGE11designwereloaded.Variousevaluationsandanalyseswereperformedtoestablishappropriateoperatinglimitsforthereloadcore.Thesecycle-specificlimitsweredocumentedintheCoreOperatingLimitsReport.SafetyEvaluationSummary:rThereloadanalysesandevaluationsareperformedbasedontheGeneralElectricStandardApplicationforReactorFuel,NEDE-24011-P-A-10andNEDE-24011-P-A-10-US(GESTARII).Thisdocumentdescribesthefuellicensingacceptancecriteria;thefuelthermal-mechanical,nuclear,andthermal-hydraulicanalysesbases;andthesafetyanalysismethodology.ForReload14,theevaluationsincludedtransientsandaccidentslikelytolimitoperationbecauseofminimumcriticalpowerratioconsiderations;overpressurizationevents;loss-of-coolantaccident;andstabilityanalysis.Appropriateconsiderationofequipment-out-of-servicewasincluded.Limitsonplantoperationwereestablishedtoassurethatapplicablefuelandreactorcoolantsystemsafetylimitsarenotexceeded.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatNMP1canbesafelyoperatedduringReload14/Cycle13andthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. I~Safety'EvaluationSummaryReportPage43of6897-006.,:.=--SafetyEvaluationNo.:I'.ImplementationDocumentNo..'.."."'"UFSARAffectedPages:DER1-.'96-2971....:i';";<....-,~iii.;i~<~XI-11System'."'itleofChange:'FeedwaterShaft-andMotor-DrivenFeedwaterPumpCapacitiesDescriptionofChange:ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionXI-B.9.0tochangethestatedcapacityoftheshaft-drivenfeedwaterpumpfrom6,400,000Ib/hrto5,500,000Ib/hr;andtochangethestatedcapacityforthemotor-drivenpumpsfrom1,900,000Ib/hrto1,250,000Ib/hr.ThesevalueswereincorrectlychangedinUFSARRev.0.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedchangesmaketheUFSARconsistentwiththeas-builtplantfeedwaterpumpcapacities.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR,sincehigh-pressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)systemperformancewasbasedontheas-builtcapacitiesofthemotor-drivenpumps.Theshaft-drivenpumpdoesnotperformaHPCIfunction;therefore,thechangetotheshaft-drivenpumpratinghasnoimpactonHPCIperformance.Further,HPCIisnotanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisnotconsideredinanyloss-of-coolantaccidentanalyses.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSiimmaryReportPage44of68SafetyEvaluationNo.:-i'-.~qi'.SImplementationDocumentNo;:97-'007.'"',DER196-3180'=:UFSARA'ffectedPag'esSystem:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:Vll-'7CoreSpray(CSS)%,l~CoreSpraySystemPumpandValveTesting4ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionVII-A.4.0todeletethereferencetotestingoftheCSS'umpandvalveshaftsealsbyapplyingpressuretoalanternringbetweensectionsofpackingandvisuallyobservingleakage.-TestingofthecorespraypumpandvalveshaftsealswasneverperformedinthemannerpreviouslydescribedintheUFSAR.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TestingoftheCSSpumpandvalvesealsisgovernedbyTechnicalSpecification4.2.6,"ISI/IST,"and6.14,"SystemsIntegrity,"andtheirrespectiveimplementingprograms(SecondTen-YearPressureTestingProgramPlanandLeakageReductionProgram).Thesetestingrequirementshavebeenreviewedanddetermined.adequatebytheNRC.TheproposedchangetotheUFSARwillresultinamoreaccuratedescriptionofactualCSSpumpandvalvetesting.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReyortPage45of68,,-SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:"..."~97-008DER1-97-0002.;;"UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:VII-2:ICoreSpray(CSS)CoreSpraySystemDesignPressures...ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionVll-A.2.1tocorrecttheCSSequipmentandpipingdesignpressurestoreflecttheoriginaldesignspecificationsandas-builtconstructionofthesystem.Thedesignpressureof'CSSequipmentandpipingbetweenthesuppressionchamberandthetoppingpumpshasbeen.changedfrom340psigto310psig.ThedesignpressureofCSSequipmentandpipingfromthesuctionofthetoppingpumphasbeenchangedfrom465psigto470psig,andclarifiedtoindicateafterthetoppingpump.TheUFSARhasalsobeenrevisedtoclarifythatthecorespraypumpmotorcoolingcoilsaredesignedto100psig.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheprimaryfunctionoftheCSSisaccidentmitigation.ThesystemisnotidentifiedintheUFSARasaninitiatortoanyoftheaccidentsdescribedintheUFSAR.TheproposedchangeswillcorrecttheUFSARCSSequipmentanddesignpressurestomakethemconsistentwithoriginaldesignspecificationsandas-builtconstructionoftheCSS.Therefore,theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation"SummaryReportPage46of68...,.SafetyEvaluationNo.:97.-01$q."...'ImplementationDocumentNo..'."'"";.DDC:.IM00336.;p';..;"~;;;..UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Figure1V-7t~4lControlRodDrive(CRD).FSARUpdateforChangeinCRDinternals.DescriptionofChange:4Thecontrolroddrivemechanism(CRDM)isusedtorapidlyinsert(scram)thecontrolrodsinresponsetomanual.or-automaticsignalsfromthe-reactorprotectionsystem(RPS).TheCRDMisalsousedtochangethepositionofthecontrolrods.~withinthecoreinresponsetothereactormanualcontrolsystemforthecontrolofreactivity.TheCRDMsareprovidedbyGeneralElectric,theoriginalequipmentmanufacturer.Thissafetyevaluationevaluatedaredesignoftheinnerfilterandspud;achangeinmaterialtoXG-Mstainlesssteelfortheconstructionoftheindextubeandpistontubeassemblies;achangeindesignoftheuncouplingrodand0-ringspacer;andanupgradetoamulti-portcoolingwaterorifice.ThesechangesweremadetoimprovereliabilityoftheCRDandminimizeCRDinstallationerrors.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThesechangesweremadetotheCRDbyGeneralElectrictoincorporateplantoperatingandmaintenanceexperience.ThechangesdonotadverselyaffecttheabilityoftheCRDtoscramthereactorinresponsetosignalsfromtheRPS,nordotheyadverselyaffecttheabilityoftheCRDstocontrolreactivity.TheresultsofthesechangesincludedincreasedCRDreliabilityandminimizedinstallationerrorsafterCRDrefurbishment,suchthatthereiscontinuedassurancethattheCRDwillcontinuetobeabletoperformthesedesignfunctions.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage47of68SafetyEvaluadonNo.:97-015ImplementationDocumeritNo..6"8!:DER'.1'-'96-1894"i';:-..-.-~~:.o.;-,.:.prp}mrg~UFSARAffectedPages:"'Vill-38"~Lt'System:TideofChange:RodWorthMinimizer(RWM)RevisiontoUFSARSectionVill,DescriptionofRWMDescriptionofChange:~~t~ThischangerevisedtheUFSARtoagreewiththeas-builtplant;TheUFSAR,indescribingthefunctionofthebypassingofRWMcontrolabovethereactorpowerlevelcalledthe"lowpowersetpoint,"previouslystatedthatonlyfeedwaterflowprovidesthelowpowersetpointtrip,whereasbothfeedwaterflowandsteamflowprovideredundantinputstotheRWMasindirectmeasurementsofreactorpower.Ondecreasingpower,eitherthesteamflowinputorthefeedwaterflowinputwilltriptolowpowersetpointabove20%reactorpowertoenabletheRWM.Onincreasingpower,bothsteamflowandfeedwaterflowinputsarerequiredtodisabletheRWMabovethelowpowersetpoint.Afterthelowpowersetpointhasbeenexceeded,theRWMdoesnotinhibitrodselectionormovement.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheRWMsystemsupplementsproceduralcontrolstopreventaninadvertentcontrolroddropaccident.TheproposedchangeonlycorrectstheUFSARdescriptionoftheinputstotheRWManddoesnotchangethedesignfunctionofthesystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation.Summary'ReportPage48of68=----SafetyEvaluationNo.:97:016'"IImplementation'DocumentNo;i'~":f-B'DERs'f-96-2933j1~9'6-2947~4-96-.2948,;~.-...1-96-2949(j;yt<~v~.>~~UFSARAffectedPages:X-7,X-8,X-'!0,X-11,X-52;FigureX-3System:5TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:ControlRodDrive(CRD)CRDSystemUFSARChangesTheUFSARhasbeenrevisedas=-follows:"w4~aI.,SectionX-C.2.1hasbeenrevisedtostate:"Onepumpisratedet85gpmataheadof3,760ft.'itha250HPmotor."Asentence.hasbeenaddedtoread:"Theotherisratedat87gpmataheadof3,740ft.witha250HPmotor."SectionX-C.2.2hasbeenrevisedtostate:"Thetwoparallelfilterswillremove99percentofforeignmateriallargerthan40micronsfromthehydraulicsystemwater."gANlSectionsX-C.2.0andX-C.2.4havebeenrevisedtoindicatethesecond-stagepressureismaintainedatapproximately"250-270"psiabovereactorpressure.SectionX-C.2.10hasbeenrevisedtostate:"Thescramdumpvolumehasacapacitytoaccommodateafreevolumeof3.34gal.perdriveuptoanin-leakageofapproximately0.5gpmperdrive.Asentencehasbeenaddedtostate:"Foranin-leakageofgreaterthan0.5gpmperdrive,thefreevolumewillfallbelow3.34gallonsperdrive;however,thesystemfunctionwillbemaintained."SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheCRDsystemisnotidentifiedasaninitiatorofanytransientsoraccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.TheCRDpumpsarenotdesignatedasanelementoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS),eventhoughtheymayaidinmitigationofsmallhigh-pressurelinebreaks.TheproposedchangeswillnotimpactCRDperformance,andwillprovidelicensingbasisconsistencywiththe Safety,Evaluation=SummaryReportPage49of68..SafetyEvaluationNo.:97.-'0'l6'(cont'-d.)"-"~"...;.>,r~-.,SafetyEvaluation,Summary:'-.."'(contd.)'-',;:~:;.'nŽ<:;,-*a-.-,.,-;-~.;.~1as-builtdesign.'Therefore,the'.proposed'changes<do,not~increasethe:probability;-*'.-ofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.~'aBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnot-'nvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.a~ Safety.Evaluation.=-:SumrrlaryReportPage50-of68"~~~;..">.::.'97-'018-'a'fetyEvaluation'No.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:.~04~4"+IAlod."N1-97-005':4;.<..",rli:<c.v>r:".",.i!e;,9'~g.:.:UFSAR'Affected'Pages:.'System:::"."Vl-'2G,"Vl-'25;:TableVl-3aSh28c3;.;FigureVl-22ShutdownCooling(SDC),PostaccidentSampling(PASS)TitleofChange:AdditionofThermalOverpressureProtectiononPenetrationsX-7,X-8andX-139DescriptionofChange:ThischangeaddedarupturedisktoPASSpenetrationX-139.Therupturediskdischargesintoanenclosedexpansionchamberlocatedoutsideprimarycontainment.Theexpansionchamberisattachedtoexistingsupportsteelandpipedintothecavitybetweenisolationvalves110-127and110-128.Theexpansionchamberisflangedtoaccommodateperiodicreplacementoftherupturedisk.Thenewvalvebetweentherupturediskandtheprocesspipingwaslockedopenafterinstallationwascomplete.OverpressureprotectionoftheSDCpenetrationswasprovidedbyaddingabypasslinewithaflowrestrictingorificeandacheckvalve.Thenewlineisusedtoventfluidfromtheisolatedpenetrationstotheupstreamsideofinboardisolationvalve38-01.TheSDC'atersealtiespenetrationsX-7andX-8togetherviathecommonsealpiping.Thisallowstheuseofasinglebypasslooptoaccommodatethermalexpansioninbothpenetrations.Theuseofasinglebypassloopminimizesthelossofsealwaterthroughtheline.Theflowrestrictingorificeissizedto:1)passtheflowraterequiredtooffsetthermalexpansioninbothSDCpenetrations,2)maintaintheintegrityoftheSDCwaterseal,and3)passthelargestexpecteddebristoprecludeplugging.Acheckvalveisinstalledinthebypasslooptomaintaincontainmentandreactorcoolantisolation.Thebypassloopisflangedtoallowremovalfordecontamination.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationprovidesoverpressureprotectionforpenetrationsX-7,X-8andX-139.ContainmentandreactorcoolantisolationisstillmaintainedfortheSDCbypasslineviaacheckvalve.ThesemodificationsinsurethatproperthermalreliefisprovidedasrequiredbyGenericLetter96-06.AppendixJandSectionXIrequirementsareinstitutedintothephysicaldesignofthetwochanges.ThePASSandSDCsystemconfigurationsmeetorexceedthedesigncriteriafortheexistingsystemsandthereactorcoolantsystem. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage51of68~1PSafetyEvaluationNo.:97-018(cont'd.)SafetyEva'luatlonSummary:(cont'd.)j'eBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanUnreviewedsafetyquestion.~ .:...SafetyEvaluation.SummaryReport'-Page52of68.:.!SafetyEvaluatlbnNo.:"t'ImplementationDocument:l"UFSARAffectedPages::System:-.~97-019Rev.0L1'gg1ic+fj.4v'iNo.:'rocedureS-MMP-GEN-014"ye>vg~~I~\~q.L~4"1$(,~g"s"N/A~'ZReactorWaterCleanup(RWCU)TitleofChange:...-..-installationofFreezeSealForIV33-01RorIV33-02R.DescriptionofChange:ThistemporarychangeinstalledfreezesealsonsectionsofRWCUpipingtoassistincompletionofthetestingandrepairofIV33-01RandIV33-02Rinthereactorvesselandreactorrecirculationloop¹11,respectively.Revision1ofthissafetyevaluationclarifiedthatcarbonsteelpipeisbrittlebelow-40'F.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitywillbeperformedduringRFO14whenthereactorheadisremovedandtheentirereactorcorewillbeoffloadedtothespentfuelpool.,Withthefueloffloadedandtheinnerortheouterspentfuelpoolgateclosed,thefuelissufficientlyprotectedandcannotbeuncovered.Additionally,freezesealshavebeenshowntobeeffectiveupto10,000psi.Sincethefuelissafeguardedandfreezesealshavebeenprovenreliable,theprobabilityoffueldamageduetoalossofwaterinventoryisnotincreased.SecondaryContainmentwillbeavailableandimplementedifrequiredinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecifications.Althoughcontainmentisolationisnotineffectforthiswork,maintenanceofthewaterinventoryinthereactorcavity,internalsstoragepit,andspentfuelpoolisnecessary.Thefreezesealswillperformthevesselisolationfunctionwhileinstalled.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. -SafetyEvaluation=-'SummaryReport~Page63of68-,97-022-SafetyEvaluationNo.:~ImplementationDocumentNo.:'..:Mod.N1-97-012=74'UFSARAffectedPages:"Vll-42System:TitleofChange:Feedwater/HPCIRPVOverfillPreventionBackupTimeDelayTripofHPCIPumpsDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledbackuptimedelayrelaysinthebreakertrip.circuitryof.thehigh-pressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)pumpmotors.ThisprovidesatripoftheHPCIpumpsifreactorpressurevessel(RPV)levelissustainedabove95inches.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thenew/additionaltriplogichasadelay,whichissetinaccordancewiththeanalysisdocumentedinCalculationS22.1-XX-G025NF,topreventRPVoverfill.Thenewtriplogicwillnotbeinterlockedwiththeflowcontrolvalvepositionswitches.Therefore,animproperlyadjustedorfaultyvalvepositionswitchwillnotpreventatripofthemotor-drivenfeedwaterpumpifRPVwaterlevelissustainedabove95inches.Theexistingtriplogic,includingthehighlevelresetlogic,willnotbealtered.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

-

.-..Safety'Evaluation-.;-'.SummaryReport."-~",Page54of68~~"."=...SafetyEvaluationNo.:'i~*Implementation.Document4JI+tUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:-=.97.-'025Rev.1J~ItNo.':."..'==":IGE-NE-523-B13-01869-043Rev.0;;.:;.'..-~GE-NE-523-113-0894Rev.1,BWRVlP-07IV-25,IV-26,IV-32~IReactorVesselInternalsCoreShroudVerticalWeldCrackingDescriptionofChange:Inspectionofthecoreshroudverticalweldsidentifiedintergranularstresscorrosioncracking(IGSCC)ofthe-verticalwelds.TheinspectionsrevealedfairlysignificantcrackingonweldsV-4,V-9,.andV-10;relativelyminorcrackingonweldsV-3,V-12,V-15andV-16;nocrackingontheaccessibleportionsofV-7,V-8,andV-11.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheverticalweldcrackinghasbeenanalyzedanddeterminedtoprovidetherequiredASMESectionXImarginsconsideringbothfractureandlimitloadmechanismsfor10,600hoursofoperationbeforethenextrequiredinspection.Thismarginismaintainedwithallowanceforthefollowing:ThismarginismaintainedwithnocreditforanyofthehorizontalweldsH1throughH7whicharestructurallyreplacedbytheshroudstabilizerassemblies.Aboundingcrackgrowthof5E-5inchesperhourisusedtodefinethenextinspectioninterval.TheGeneralElectricanalysishasdemonstratedthatthe5E-5growthrateisapplicableandconservativelyboundingfortheNMP1coreshroudverticalweldcracking.AllowanceismadeforcracksizinguncertaintyconsistentwiththeNRC-approvedBWRVIP-03requirements.Alluninspectedregionsareassumedcrackedthroughwall.Inadditiontothestructuralmargin,allthedesignbasisrequirementsandcriteriahavebeendemonstratedtobesatisfied.TheNDEinspectionsperformedofthecoreshroudverticalweldsandadjacentbasemetalhavedemonstratedthatthe SafetyEvaluation'ummaryReportPage55of68PgBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthattheverticalweldcrackingidentifiedintheRFO14shroudverticalweldinspectionsdoesnotinvolvean.unreviewedsafetyquestion.4SafetyEvaluationNo.:'7-'025Rev;.1tcont'd.).fSafetyEvaluationSummary:.,':Ž;,".'i."'!:.(cont',d.).'>'.==';>p~.;--."".;-,",-,.;~'..~...--.,verticalweld.cracking'isIGSCCb'oundedbyNRGreview.ofithecoreshroudIGSCCcrackingaddressedbytheBWRVlPcoreshroudinspectionandevaluationdocuments.Theboundingcoreshroudcrackgrowthrateof5E-5,approvedbytheNRCforgenericapplication,isapplicabletothecoreshroudverticalweldcracking.TheNMP'lTechnicalSpecificationregardingreactorcoolantchemistryhasbeenreviewedanddeterminedtobeconsistentwiththeapplicationoftheboundingcrackgrowthrate.-Basedonthisreview,nounreviewedsafetyquestionexistsassociatedwiththeverticalweldcrackingidentifiedintheRF014shroud...,verticalweldinspections,providedaninspectionintervalof10;600hoursisestablishedfortheverticalwelds.The10,600hourinspectionintervalisbased.onhotoeratintimeabove200'F.

~.*-Safety'Evaluation~-"Summary.Report~-'<'age66of68UFSARAffectedPages:WSystem:=--TitleofChange:vIDescriptionofChange::=-.SafetyEvaluationNo.:"'-a.",':<<.ImplementationDocume'ntNo.:-':97-100aijigig'ai~"'alculationSO-GOTHIGRB01.Rev,.01'"i-"-XV-68XV-76'-:>'"a-.:;~:~,-;:,"a+~hReactorWaterCleanupReactorWaterCleanupSystemHighEnergyLineBreakRe-Analyses~~tl~g~Thefollowingchangestotheplantconfigurationhavebeenperformed:1.Allresistancetemperaturedetectors(RTD)inthecleanupsystemareashavebeenaddedtotheEquipmentQualification(EQ)program.2.EightofthetwelvecleanupareaRTDs,-whichwereoriginallyMINCOModelS1255,havebeenreplacedwithPYCOModel122-7026.3.TwoRTDshavebeenrelocatedtotheauxiliarycleanuppumproom.Onewasrelocatedfromthecleanuppumpareaandtheotherfromtheheatexchangerroomarea.4.High-energylinebreak(HELB)temperatureandpressureprofilesintheReactorBuildinghavebeenrevised.5.AdditionalcomponentshavebeenincludedintheEQprogram.6.ThebackupSCRAMsolenoidvalveshavebeenreclassifiedfromsafety-relatedactivetosafety-relatedpassive.7.ThecleanupsystemHELBanalysishasbeenrevised;thenewanalysisassumesthattheisolationisinitiatedbyhightemperaturedetection.ThecleanupsystemasconfiguredandanalyzedmeetsthedesignandlicensingbasiscommitmentsasdefinedintheUFSARandotherdesignandlicensingbasisdocuments. SafetyEvaluation.SummaryReportPage67of68....='7-100(cont'd.)~'ISafetyEvaluationNo.:.-'iirr-".fi~g4'I'II&IISafetyEvaluationSummaryi'i"~~.;.:.-..='i'.".i'.':i"~'~..~"-i-."."i.:-.ii~i<~-;el:~:.II~~I)IgAllequipmentnecessary'tomitigatetheconsequencesofacleanupsystemline-..:iIbreakortoinitiateandmaintainasafeshutdownduringorfollowingacleanup";,systemlinebreakhavebeenverifiedtobequalifiedfortherevisedHELBprofiles.I~P~IWithhighareatemperaturedetectorslocatedinappropriatelocations,itcanbeconcludedthattheguillotinelinebreakisaboundingeventforthecleanup..;:".--,system.Theguillotinebreakatfullpowerisboundedbythemainsteamlinebreak.NMP1hasinherentfeaturesandcapabilitieswhichprovideabasisforreasonable<<assurancethatleaksandsmallbreakswillbedetectedwithindesignbasislimits.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation-Summary.ReportPage:58'o'f68NMP-SOT-001,",~'=,."w-.."v"-',-::::NMPBOT002vc,:>"-.vIt'p~'l~g~4+Mr)a)~6g)ega~g~gplgl"N/AIReactorVessel,CoreShroud,ReactorWater~~teel()ted&,~JPi)It<UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:CoreShroudBoatSampleRemoval~.Safety-EvsiuatIonNo.!"':~'-'.;97-101Rev.1ImplementationDocumentNo.:'rocedureNo.Thissafetyevaluationanalyzedtheimpactofremovingtwo-boat-shapedsamplesfromtheUnit1coreshroud.Theboatsampleswereapproximately1.7"long,*1.13"wideand0.85"deep.Thecoreshroudhasbeenstructurallyanalyzedconsideringtheremovalofthissampleandtheremainingstructuralligamentandprobabilityofintergranularstresscorrosioncracking(IGSCC).Inaddition,thegenerationandimpactofswarf,duetotheelectricaldischargemachining(EDM)process,ontheplantsystemshasbeenevaluated.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheEDMoftwoboat-shapedsamplesfromthecoreshroudhasbeenanalyzedfor.conformancetoUFSARandTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Astructuralanalysisofthecoreshroudhasbeenperformedanddemonstratesthestructuraladequacyofthecoreshroud.Thegenerationandimpactofswarfonplantsystems,includingreactorwatercleanup,spentfuelpoolfilteringandcooling,reactorrecirculation,controlroddrive,andcondensateandfeedwater,hasbeenconsideredandfoundacceptable.Theintegrityofthecoreshroudassuresthatthecoresprayspargers,coregeometry,coreflowdistributionandcontrolbladesfunctionasrequired.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation,Summary;Report=Page-59of68.SafetyEvaluationNo.Imptementation:Document,No'.'-'-"-.-:97-,-'1.02-'-iDCR.',1)-97-'UFS-:043i.-";;-"...;.'"-'i;>'.Jh>.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:XII-14AreaRadiationMonitoringTitleofChange:ChangetoSectionXII-B.2.1.1.2ofUnit1UFSARDescriptionofChange:eTheUFSARhasbeenupdatedtoclarifythedesignbasisofthearearadiationmonitor(ARIVI)inthenewfreshfuelstoragevaulttoshowitisnotsubjecttosuddenchangesinradiationlevelsand,therefore,doesnotrequirebothanalarmintheControlRoomandintheareawherethemonitorislocated.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheARMinthefreshfuelstoragevaultisnotsubjecttosuddenchangesinradiationlevelsduetotheinherentdesignofthebundlesintherackwheregeometricspacingisusedtoprecludecriticality.ThischangeonlyprovidesclarificationintheUFSARregardingtheuseoftheARMalreadyinplaceinthevaulttoshowthatitiswithintheNMP1designbasis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itis-concludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport.'age80-of88-~~,SafetyEvaluationNo.:..*Imple'mentationDocumentNo;:.'.'97-1.03'".'-:Mod.N1-94-003:.i~--.-;.-,->>..-,.UFSARAffectedPages:'"i.~'ystem:iN/Aif:;".*ReactorVessel)ip)4<<1fl&.Titleof.Change:DescriptionofChange:InstallationofModifiedShroudRepairLatchesPriortoNRCApprovalofAdequacyUnder10CFR50.55a(a)(3)~~<<<<TheUFSARdescribestheshroudtierodlowerlateralspringasbeingincontactwiththeshroudandthereactorpressurevessel(RPV),andisdesignedtorestrainlateralmovementoftheshellbetweenweldsH5andH6Aviathecoreplateboltsandwedges,theringbetweenweldsH6AandH6B,andtheshellbetweenH6BandH7.Forthisanalysis,thelowerlateralspringwaspresumednottobeincontactwiththeshroudandRPVandnotcapableofprovidinghorizontalrestraint.LateralmovementofthelowershroudisrestrainedbytheremainingligamentofgoodmetalatweldsH4throughH7.ThismodificationinstalledamodifiedlatchdesignwithoutpriorNRCapprovalofthemodificationand,therefore,takesnocreditforthelatchtoperformitsdesignbasisfunction.Theanalysiswasperformedwiththerestrictionthatthereactorremaininthecoldshutdownorhotshutdowncondition.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThisevaluationanalyzedtheabilityofthetierodassemblytoproviderestrainttotheshrouddifferentlythanthatcurrentlydescribedintheUFSAR.Theanalysisdemonstratesthatthemodifiedlowerwedgelatchesarenotrequiredtoperformtheirintendeddesignbasisfunctionduringthecoldshutdownandhotshutdowncondition,i.e.,thecombinationofthestructuralintegrityprovidedbyshroudhorizontalweldsH4throughH7,andthetierodcomponentscreditedintheanalysis,hasdemonstratedthattheshroudwillperformitsdesignbasisfunctionsduringnoncriticalhydrotestingabove212F,and/orcontrolroddrive(CRD)scramtimetestingwiththereactorvesselbeltlinedowncomerwatertemperatureasrequiredtosatisfyTechnicalSpecification3.2.2.e.CompliancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationrequiresthereactorbeconsideredinthehotshutdowncondition.Inaddition,duringhotshutdownseveralleakratetestsandCRDscramtimetestsare SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage61of68--:;.'.:.."..:-.SafetyEvaluationNo.-..-'..97:l03(cont'd.)r,-SafetyEvaluation'Summa'ry:"-6I'8-CRr"-{c'one!d.)-;....:.c.'V.,mam>8"vQ~vgi;;,oem.-i,;,.->"80>IF-CWV-i4->9.performed.'hesetestshavenoimpactontheconditionsevaluatedintheanalysissection.Thisreviewdemonstratesthat'duringtheshutdownconditionstheshroudisoperableanditsrepairassembliesareoperable1)withoutanIncreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluated,2)withoutcreatingthepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofa"new'rdNerentkindfromanypreviouslyevaluated,and3)withoutreducingthemarginofsafetyinthebasesofaTechnicalSpecification.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnot"-.-involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage52of58..:SafetyEvaluationNo.:i'--"'7104ImplementatIonDocumentNo.:lGE-)IE523-B13-01869-043Rev.0,:=-......GE-NE-523-113-0894Rev.1,BWRVIP-07"">>-'>tlljc).'Ai'9":l5J)d.a'i's,".~~~-,~i"Nq~ip';cpu,'~i!~,'=I<::.g~i;-q>:yl'~;-,;.:~UFSARAffectedPages:'-.':~.--N/ASystem:;,TitleofChange:,ReactorVesselInternalsCoreShroudVerticalWeldCracking,ColdandHotShutdownDescriptionofChange:Inspectionofthecoreshroudverticalwetdsidentifiedintergranularstresscorrosioncracking(IGSCC)oftheverticalwelds.TheinspectionsrevealedfairlysignificantcrackingonweldsV-4,V-9,andV-10;relativelyminorcrackingonweldsV-3,V-12,V-15andV-16;nocrackingontheaccessibleportionsofV-7,V-8,andV-11.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheverticalweldcrackinghasbeenanalyzedanddeterminedtoprovidetherequiredASMESectionXImarginsconsideringbothfractureandlimitloadmechanismsforthereloadcondition.Thismarginismaintainedwithallowanceforthefollowing:ThismarginismaintainedutilizingshroudstabilizerassembliesandhorizontalweldsasapprovedinSafetyEvaluation97-103.Aboundingcrackgrowthof5E-5inchesperhourisusedtodefinethenextinspectioninterval.TheGeneralElectricanalysishasdemonstratedthatthe5E-5growthrateisapplicableandconservativelyboundingfortheNMP1coreshroudverticalweldcracking.Crackgrowthrateisinsignificantforthetemperatureandreactorwaterchemicalconditionsduringtheseconditions.Evenwhenconsidered,theresultingcrackgrowthisimmeasurablefortherequireddurationofthetesting.AllowanceismadeforcracksizinguncertaintyconsistentwiththeNRC-approvedBWRVIP-03requirements.Alluninspectedregionsareassumedcrackedthroughwall. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage63of68SafetyEvaluationNo.:..97-104(cont'd.)......~"-:~".':-:".-~~~'pSafetyEvaluationSummary:"'"'"-""="(cont'd.);-...5';,".e.i.~ri.-'='".e.ts:."r~-.r-.=-'".,:4eI.4-~"gF'C".'2'-"Yin,additiontothestructural,margin,allthedesignbasisrequirementsandcriteriahavebeendemonstratedtobesatisfied.Iav~*Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatverticalweldcrackingidentifiedintheRFO14shroudverticalweldinspectionsforthecoldandhot-=shutdownmodes,includingnoncriticalhydrotestingandCRDscramtimetesting,doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage64of681~g.o;,,,...',,SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocument,C'IIfa,~.~1T+~~~l>t0u~UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:..;"~ea)87-'107No.:NuclearDivisionPolicy,(POL)Rev.10,NuclearSafetyAssessment8cSupport..-~.Policy(NSAS-POL-01)Rev~)0k~.)ACXlll-1,Xlll-3,XIII-4;FiguresXlll-1,XIII-4~~.':N/A't:OrganizationofQ1P,LaborRelations,HRD..andOccupationalSafetyandHealthUndertheNewlyCreatedPositionofDirectorHumanResourceDevelopmentDescriptionofChange:TheNuclearDivisionPolicy(POL)andNSAS-POL-01havebeenrevisedtoreorganizethefunctionsofEmployee/LaborRelations,Leadership/CareerDevelopment,OccupationalSafetyandHealth,QualityFirstProgram(Q1P)administrativeissues,andtheFitnessforDutyProgramunderthenewlycreatedpositionof"DirectorHumanResourceDevelopment."SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theproposedorganizationalchangesestablishresponsibilitiesandlinesofauthorityandcommunicationsforthenewlycreatedpositionof"DirectorHumanResourceDevelopment."TheproposedorganizationalstructuresatisfiesthecriteriaofSRP'13.1.1andconformswiththerequirementsofSection6.2.1.aoftheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theproposedchangesdonotimpactaccidentormalfunctioninitiation,orradiologicalconsequences.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. ISafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage65of68~~SafetyEvaluationNo;:97-108~<VVImplementationDocumentNo.::..">-,DER 97-1433";".-:,;.;;-;,.;;:.."c,Cft'-'I)0g4y1gUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:IV-20,X-8,X-12,X-14~ControlRodDrive(CRD)UFSARUpdateforControlRodWithdrawalSpeedDescriptionofChange:I4pThissafetyevaluationevaluatedachangetotheUFSARintheallowedtoleranceforcontrolrodwithdrawalratefrom3in/secto3~20%(i.e.,24-3.6)in/sec,,-whichcorrespondstoafullwithdrawaltimeof38.4-57.6seconds.Additionally,thechangeallowsoperationwithwithdrawspeedsupto5.0in/seccorrespondingtoa28-secondstroketime.AnanalysisbyGeneralElectricconcludedthatsuchoperationisboundedbytheassumptionsusedintherodwithdrawalerror(RWE)analysisandtheminimumcriticalpowerratiosafetylimitanalyses..ThissafetyevaluationalsoevaluatedoperatingwithCRDdrivewaterpressurelessthan250psid.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AdditionofthebasesusedintheRWEformaximumcontrolrodwithdrawaltimeprovidesinformationwhichcanbeusedtodetermineoperabilityofacontrolrodifthestroketimeisfoundoutofspecification.LoweringdrivewaterpressuretocompensatefordegradedCRDsealsorhydrauliccontrolunitleakageisaconservativeactionwhichcanbeusedtomaintainCRDstroketimewithindesign.TheoriginaldesignandfunctionoftheCRDsystemareunchanged;theabilityoftheCRDtofunctionasdescribedintheUFSARisnotaffected;andtheperformancerequirementsasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationsarenotaffectedbytheproposedchange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage66of68~~SafetyEvaluationNo.:',-..".,,"97-121ImplementatIonDocumentNo.:""~,Mod.'N1-87-032:;'~UFSARAffectedPages'.:"'-"'-:,:."".BOA-34.eJtt'~4~/l,'J~(System:TitleofChange:SmokeDetectionAdditionofSmokeDetectorinZoneDA-2022S;DescriptionofChange:~'saresultofwalkdownsconductedbytheSecurityDepartmenttodetermineifunauthorizedaccessmaybeobtained;itbecameevidentthatopeningsintheUninterruptiblePowerSupply(UPS)BatteryRoomandUPSRoom(TBEl.250'):maypermitunauthorizedaccesstotheserooms.Thismodificationprovidedbarriersdesignedtocontrolaccesstotheseareasand..installedanadditionalsmokedetectorinsidetheUPSRoom.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AdditionofthisextrasmokedetectorprovidesfiredetectionmonitoringfortheUPSRoom.Thisenhancestheabilityofplantpersonneltodetectandrespondtopotentialfires.Thus,thischangehasnoadverseeffectontheprobabilityofoccurrenceofafireinanyplantareawhichisdifferentfromanyfireoraccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion. SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage67of68>.Saay.~~~~aS-'.'>rtr~,":'97-124SafetyEvaluationNo.:Implemen'tationDocumentNo.:IS~qaaaaaap~~".an)pa,~Saa,.',~~,SV>>aS1~UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:l.IGE-.NE-523-B'13-01869-043Rev..0;>>:=~-.":<~BGE-NE-523;113-0894Rev..1,BWRVIP-07~~s.'asf(.-~~I~st')$~asa,Ah~s)+4)f":-=f4baaq*~a>>a~Jsa,all)staaas~'AL"~~-aaa~aaaSIPN/A>>*~a=wa'a.g(~qa~~~>>a>>>>~~a~aa>>aaa~ReactorVesselInternals.CoreShroudVerticalWeldCrack,ColdShutdown(RefuelingandMajorMaintenance)DescriptionofChange:Inspectionofthecoreshroudverticalweldsidentifiedintergranularstresscorrosioncracking(IGSCC)oftheverticalwelds.TheinspectionsrevealedfairlysignificantcrackingonweldsV-4,V-9,andV-10;relativelyminorcrackingonweldsV-3,V-12,V-15andV-16;nocrackingontheaccessibleportionsofV-7,V-S,andV-11.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheverticalweldcrackinghasbeenanalyzedanddeterminedtoprovidetherequiredASMESectionXImarginsconsideringbothfractureandlimitloadmechanismsforthereloadcondition.Thismarginismaintainedwithallowanceforthefollowing:ThismarginismaintainedwithnocreditforanyofthehorizontalweldsH1throughH7whicharestructurallyreplacedbytheshroudstabilizerassemblies.Aboundingcrackgrowthof5E-5inchesperhourisusedtodefinethenextinspectioninterval.TheGeneralElectricanalysishasdemonstratedthatthe5E-5growthrateisapplicableandconservativelyboundingfortheNMP1coreshroudverticalweldcracking.Crackgrowthrateneednotbeappliedfortherefuelingmode.AllowanceismadeforcracksizinguncertaintyconsistentwiththeNRC-approvedBWRVIP-03requirements.Alluninspectedregionsareassumedcrackedthroughwall. SafetyEvaluationSummaryRepoit=-,Page68of68'I*C,~,Safety,EvaluatIonNo.:.=-'-.-',:".:-',.'97-,'I24(cont'd.)~t.SafetyEvaluation".Summary-"~".:Dkr.-(cont'.A.)=;".!'"'r::n-":."~~.."-"iZ-';-..t,".'..=.;lInadditiontb'theStructuraf'margin,-allthedesignbasisrequirementsandcriteriahavebeendemonstratedtobesatisfied.gBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatverticalweldcrackirigidentifiedintheRFO14shroudverticalweldinspectionsfortherefuelingmodedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.4 pA~/6Wii7/<7PP~~~~~<>"U.S."NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIO-DOCKET0-220LICENSED-3NINEMILEPOINTNUCLARSTATIONU'T1FINALSAFTYANALYSISREPRT(UPDATED)VOLUME1JUNE1996REVISION14NIAG&&MOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONS&&CUSE,NEWYORK 0 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTSSectionTitlePacaeSECTIONIA.1.02.03.04.05.06~07.08.09.010.0B.1.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.010.011.012.013.014.015.016.0C.D.E.SECTIONIIA.1~0TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLESLISTOFFIGURESINTRODUCTIONANDSUMMARYPRINCIPALDESIGNCRITERIAGeneralBuildingsandStructuresReactorReactorVesselContainmentControlandInstrumentationElectricalPowerRadioactiveWasteDisposalShieldingandAccessControlFuelHandlingandStorageCHARACTERISTICSSiteReactorCoreFuelAssemblyControlSystemCoreDesignandOperatingConditionsDesignPowerPeakingFactorNuclearDesignDataReactorVesselCoolantRecirculationLoopsPrimaryContainmentSecondaryContainmentStructuralDesignStationElectricalSystemReactorInstrumentationSystemReactorProtectionSystemIDENTIFICATIONOFCONTRACTORSGENERALCONCLUSIONSREFERENCESSTATIONSITEANDENVIRONMENTSITEDESCRIPTIONGeneralI-2I-2I-2I-2I-4I-5I-6I-8I-8I-8I-8I-9I-9I-9I-9I-9I-9I-10I-10I-10I-11I-11I-11I-11I-11I-12I-12I-12I-13I-14I-15II-1II-1II-1UFSARRevisionJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectio2.03.0B.1.01~12.02.12.22.3C.D.E.F.G.SECTIONIIITitlePhysicalFeaturesPropertyUseandDevelopmentDESCRIPTIONOFAREAADJACENTTOTHESITEGeneralPopulationAgriculture,IndustrialandRecreationalUseAgriculturalUseIndustrialUseRecreationalUseMETEOROLOGYLIMNOLOGYEARTHSCIENCESENVIRONMENTALRADIOLOGYREFERENCESBUILDINGSANDSTRUCTURESPacaeII-1II-2II-3II-3II-3II-3II-3II-3II-4II-5II-6II-7II-8II-9III-1A.1.01.11~21~31.41.52.02.12.22.32.43.0B.1'1.11~21.31.41.52'2.1TURBINEBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesHeatingandVentilationSystemSmokeandHeatRemovalShieldingandAccessControlSafetyAnalysisCONTROLROOMDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesIII-3III-3III-3III-3III-3III-4III-4III-4III-5III-5III-7III-7III-7III-9III-9III-9III-9III-9III-9III-9III-10III-10UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section2.22.32.43.0C.1.01.11.21'1.41.52.02.12.22.33.0D.1.01.11.21'1.41.52.02.12.22.33.0E.1.01.111'.21.1.311.1.51.21'.11.2.21'-31.32.0F12.1.1TitleHeating,VentilationandAirConditioningSystemSmokeandHeatRemovalShieldingandAccessControlSafetyAnalysisWASTEDISPOSALBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesHeatingandVentilationSystemShieldingandAccessControlSafetyAnalysisOFFGASBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesHeatingandVentilationSystemShieldingandAccessControlSafetyAnalysisNONCONTROLLEDBUILDINGSAdministrationBuildingDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeating,CoolingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesHeating,VentilationandAirConditioningAccessControlSafetyAnalysisSewageTreatmentBuildingDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPacaeIII-11III-11III-12III-12XII-13III-13III-13IIX-13III-13III-14III-'14III-14III-14III-15III-17III-17III-19III-19IXI-19IIX-19III-19III-19III-19III-19III-19III-20III-20III-20III-22III-22III-22III-22III-22III-22III-23III-23III-23III-23III-24IXI-24III-24XII-25III-25III-25UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section22.1-32.1.42.1.52.1.62.1.72.22~212'.22'.33.0F13'.133'.33.1.43.1.53'3.2.13.2.23.2.3TitledingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandXnternalLoaElectricalDesignFireandExplosiveGasDetectioHeatingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesVentilationSystemAccessControlEnergyInformationCenterDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesHeatingandVentilationSystemAccessControlPacaeIII-25III-25III-25IIX-25III-26III-26III-26XII-26III-27III-28III-28III-28III-28III-28III-28III-29III-29III-29III-29III-29III-30F.1.01.11~1~11.1.21.1.31.1.41.1.51.22.02.12'3.0G.1.01~11.21.31.42.03.03.13.2SCREENHOUSE,INTAKEANDDISCHARGETUNNELSScreenhouseDesignBasisWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilationShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignIntakeandDischargeTunnelsDesignBasesStructureDesignSafetyAnalysisSTACKDesignBasesGeneralWindLoadingSeismicDesignShieldingandAccessControlStructureDesignSafetyAnalysisRadiologyStackFailureAnalysisZII-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31XII-33III-33XII-33III-34III-35III-35III-35IXX-35III-35III-35III-35III-36III-36III-37UFSARRevision14ivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section3.2.13'.23.2.3H.TitleReactorBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenandPumpHouseSECURITYBUILDINGANDSECURITYBUILDINGANNEXPacaeIII-37III-38III-38III-391~01~11.21'1.41~52.02'2.22.33.0RADWASTESOLIDIFICATIONANDSTORAGEBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeating,VentilationandAirConditioningShieldingandAccessControlStructureandDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesHeating,VentilationandAirConditioningShieldingandAccessControlUseIIX-40III-40III-40III-40XXX-40IIX-40III-40III-41IIX-41IXI-41IXI-43IIX-43SECTIONIVA.1.02.03.0B.1.02.02.12'2~2~12.2'2'3.03~13.1.133.1.2.13.1.2.2REFERENCESREACTORDESIGNBASESGeneralPerformanceObjectivesDesignLimitsandTargetsREACTORDESIGNGeneralNuclearDesignTechniqueReferenceLoadingPatternFinalLoadingPatternAcceptableDeviationFromReferenceLoadingPatternReexaminationofLicensingBasisRefuelingCycleReactivityBalanceThermalandHydraulicCharacteristicsThermalandHydraulicDesignRecirculationFlowControlCoreThermalLimitsExcessiveCladTemperatureCladdingStrainIII-45IV-1IV-1IV-1IV-1IV-2IV-3IV-3IV-4IV-5IV-6IV-6IV-6.IV-7IV-7IV-7IV-7IV-7IV-8IV-9UFSARRevision14vJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section3.1.2.33'3.2.13.2.23.2.F13.2.2.23'4.04.14.25.05.15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.55.1.65.1.76.06.16.1.16.1.26.26.2.16.2.26.36.47.07.17.1.17.1.27~l..37.1.47.1.57.1.67.1'7.1.87.1.9C.7.27'TitleCoolantFlowThermalandHydraulicAnalysesHydraulicAnalysisThermalAnalysisFuelCladdingIntegritySafetyLimitAnalysisMCPROperatingLimitAnalysisReactorTransientsStabilityAnalysisDesignBasesStabilityAnalysisMethodMechanicalDesignandEvaluationFuelMechanicalDesignDesignBasesFuelRodsWaterRodsFuelAssembliesMechanicalDesignLimitsandStressAnalysisRelationshipBetweenFuelDesignLimitsandFuelDamageLimitsSurveillanceandTestingControlRodMechanicalDesignandEvaluationDesignControlRodsandDrivesStandbyLiquidPoisonSystemControlSystemEvaluationRodWithdrawalErrorsEvaluationOverallControlSystemEvaluationLimitingConditionsforOperationandSurveillanceControlRodLifetimeReactorVesselInternalStructureDesignBasesCoreShroudCoreSupportTopGridControlRodGuideTubesFeedwaterSpargerCoreSpraySpargersLiquidPois'onSpargerSteamSeparatorandDryerCoreShroudStabilizersREFERENCESDesignEvaluationSurveillanceandTestingPacaeIV-9IV-9IV-9IV-11IV-11IV-12IV-13IV-14IV-14IV-14IV-15IV-15IV-15IV-15IV-16IV-16IV-16IV-16IV-16IV-17IV-17IV-17IV-19IV-20IV-20IV-21IV-23IV-23IV-24IV-24IV-25IV-25IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-27IV-30IV-29IV-29UFSARRevision14viJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionSECTIONVTitleREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMPacaeV-1A.1.02.03.04.05.0B.1~01.11.21.31.41.52.03.04.05.0C.1'2'3'4.04.14'4.34'4.55.05.15.25.36.0D.1.02.02.12.2DESIGNBASESGeneralPerformanceObjectivesDesignPressureCyclicLoads(MechanicalandThermal)CodesSYSTEMDESIGNANDOPERATIONGeneralDrawingsMaterialsofConstructionThermalStressesPrimaryCoolantLeakageCoolantChemistryReactorVesselReactorRecirculationLoopsReactorSteamandAuxiliarySystemsPipingReliefDevicesSYSTEMDESIGNEVALUATIONGeneralPressureDesignHeatupandCooldownRatesMaterialsRadiationExposurePressure-TemperatureLimitCurvesTemperatureLimitsforBoltupTemperatureLimitsforIn-ServiceSystemPressureTestsOperatingLimitsDuringHeatup,Cooldown,andCoreOperationPredictedShiftinRT>>~MechanicalConsiderationsJetReactionForcesSeismicForcesPipingFailureStudiesSafetyLimits,LimitingSafetySettingsandMinimumConditionsforOperationTESTSANDINSPECTIONSPrestartupTestingInspectionandTestingFollowingStartupHydroPressurePressureVesselIrradiationV-1V-1V-1V-2V-3V-3V-4V-4V-4V-4V-4V-5V-5V-5V-6V-7V-7V-9V-9V-9V-10V-11V-11V-11V-12V-12V-12V-12V-12V-13V-13V-13V-15V-15V-15V-15V-15UFSARRevision14viiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionE.1.02'3'F13'3'3.44.04.14'F.SECTIONVITitleEMERGENCYCOOLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignandOperationDesignEvaluationRedundancyMakeupWaterSystemLeaksContainmentIsolationTestsandInspectionsPrestartupTestSubsequentInspectionsandTestsREFERENCESCONTAINMENTSYSTEMPacaeV-16V-16V-16V-17V-17V-18V-18V-18V-19V-19V-19V-20VI-1A.1.02.02.12'2'3.0B.1.01~11~21~31.41.51.61.72.0212.22.32.42.52.62'C.1.01.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENT-NARKICONTAINMENTPROGRAMGeneralStructurePressureSuppressionHydrodynamicLoadsSafety/ReliefValveDischargeLoss-of-CoolantAccidentSummaryofLoadingPhenomenaPlant-UniqueModificationsPRIMARYCONTAINMENT-PRESSURESUPPRESSIONSYSTEMDesignBasesGeneralDesignBasisAccident(DBA)Containment,HeatRemovalIsolationCriteriaVacuumReliefCriteriaFloodingCriteriaShieldingStructureDesignGeneralPenetrationsandAccessOpeningsJetandMissileProtectionMaterialsShieldingVacuumReliefContainmentFloodingSECONDARYCONTAINMENT-REACTORBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsVI-2VI-2VI-2VI-2VI-3VI-4VI-5VI-6VI-6VI-6VI-6VI-8VI-8VI-8VI-9VI-9VI-9VI-9VI-11VI-12VI-13VI-13VI-14VI-14VI-16VI-16VI-16UFSARRevision14viiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectic1'1.31.42.02.1D.1.01.12'3.0E.1.01.11'2.02.12.2F.1.01.11.22.02.12.23.04.05.05.15.25.3G.SECTIONVIIA.1.02.02'2.23.04.0TitlePressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignShieldingStructureDesignGeneralStructuralFeaturesCONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEMDesignBasesContainmentSprayAppendixJWaterSealRequirementsSystemDesignTestsandInspectionsCONTAINMENTVENTILATIONSYSTEMPrimaryContainmentDesignBasesSystemDesignSecondaryContainmentDesignBasesSystemDesignTESTANDINSPECTIONSDrywellandSuppressionChamberPreoperationalTestingPostoperationalTestingContainmentPenetrationsandIsolationValvesPenetrationandValveLeakageValveOperabilityTestContainmentVentilationSystemOtherContainmentTestsReactorBuildingReactorBuildingNormalVentilationSystemReactorBuildingIsolationValvesEmergencyVentilationSystemREFERENCESENGINEEREDSAFEGUARDSCORESPRAYSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignGeneralOperatorAssessmentDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsPacaeVI-16VI-17VI-17VI-17VI-17VI-20VI-20VI-23VI-24VI-26VI-27VI-27VI-27VI-27VI-28VI-28VI-28VI-30VI-30VI-30VI-30VI-31VI-31VI-31VI-32VI-32VI-32VI-32VI-33VI-33VI-33VII-1VII-2VII-2VII-2VII-2VII-5VII-6VII-6UFSARRevisionixJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~SectioB.1.02.02.13.04.0C.1.02.0'~13.04.05.0D.1.02.03.03'3.23.34.0E.1.02.02.13.04.0F.1.02.03.04.0G.1.02.02'2'3.03.13.24.0TitleCONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignOperatorAssessmentDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsLIQUIDPOISONXNJECTIONSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignOperatorAssessmentDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsAlternateBoronInjectionCONTROLRODVELOCITYLXMITERDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationGeneralDesignSensitivityNormalOperationTestsandInspectionsCONTROLRODHOUSINGSUPPORTDesignBasesSystemDesignLoadsandDeflectionsDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsFLOWRESTRICTORSDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsCOMBUSTIBLEGASCONTROLSYSTEMDesignBasesContainmentInertingSystemSystemDesignDesignEvaluationContainmentAtmosphericDilutionSystemSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsPacaeVII-8VII-8VII-8VII-11VII-12VII-13VII-15VII-15VII-15VII-18VII-19VII-20VIX-20VII-22VII-22VIX-22VII-24VII-24VII-24VII-25VII-25VII-26VII-26VII-26VII-28VII-28VII-29VII-30VII-30VII-30VII-30VII-31VII-32VII-32VII-32VIZ-32VII-33VII-33VII-33VII-35VII-35UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~SecticH.1.02.02.13.04.0I~1.02.03.04.0SECTIONA.1.01~11.22.02'2.23.0B.1.02.02.12.22'2.43.03.13'3.33.4C.1.01.11.1.11.1.21.1.31.1.41.1.5VIIITitleEMERGENCYVENTILATIONSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignOperatorAssessmentDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsHIGH-PRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsREFERENCESINSTRUMENTATIONANDCONTROLPROTECTIVESYSTEMSDesignBasesReactorProtectionSystemAnticipatedTransientsWithoutScramMitigationSystemSystemDesignReactorProtectionSystemAnticipatedTransientsWithoutScramMitigationSystemSystemEvaluationREGULATINGSYSTEMSDesignBasesSystemDesignControlRodAdjustmentControlRecirculationFlowControlPressureandTurbineControlReactorFeedwaterControlSystemEvaluationControlRodAdjustmentControlRecirculationFlowControlPressureandTurbineControlReactorFeedwaterControlINSTRUMENTATIONSYSTEMSNuclearInstrumentationDesignSourceRangeMonitorsIntermediateRangeMonitorsLocalPowerRangeMonitorsAveragePowerRangeMonitorsTraversingIn-CoreProbeSystemPacaeVII-36VII-36VII-36VII-38VII-39VII-39VII-41VII-41VII-41VII-42VII-43VII-44VIII-1VIII-1VIII-1VIII-1VIII-4VIII-4VIII-4VIII-10VIII-10VIII-12VIII-12VIII-12VIII-12VIII-12VIII-13VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-15VIII-15VIII-15VIII-17VIII-18VIII-19VIII-19VIII-21UFSARRevision14XiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section1.21.2.111.2'1.2.42'2.12.1.122.1.32.22.2.12.2'2.2'3.03.13~1~13.1.23'4.04.14.1.14.1.25.05.15.25.35.45.4.15.4.25.4.35.4.45.5TitleEvaluationSourceRangeMonitorsIntermediateRangeMonitorsLocalPowerRangeMonitorsAveragePowerRangeMonitorsNonnuclearProcessInstrumentationDesignBasesNonnuclearProcessInstrumentsinProtectiveSystemNonnuclearProcessInstrumentsinRegulatingSystemsOtherNonnuclearProcessInstrumentsEvaluationNonnuclearProcessInstrumentsinProtectiveSystemNonnuclearProcessInstrumentsinRegulatingSystemsOtherNonnuclearProcessInstrumentsRadioactivityInstrumentationDesignBasesRadiationMonitorsinProtectiveSystemsOtherRadiationMonitorsEvaluationOtherInstrumentationRodNorthMinimizerDesignBasesEvaluationRegulatoryGuide1.97(Revision2)InstrumentationLicensingActivities-BackgroundDefinitionofRG1.97VariableTypesandInstrumentCategoriesDeterminationofRG1.97TypeAVariablesforUnit1DeterminationofEOPKeyParametersforUnit1DeterminationBasis/ApproachDefinitionofPrimarySafetyFunctionsAssociationofEOPstoPrimarySafetyFunctionsIdentificationofEOPKeyParametersUnit1RG1.97Variables,VariableType,andAssociatedInstrumentCategoryDesignationsPacaeVIII-21VIII-22VIII-23VIII-25VIII-25VIII-26VIII-26VIII-26VIXI-28VIII-29VIII-31VIII-31VIII-3gVIII-31VIXI-32VIII-32VIIX-32VIII-34VIXI-36VIXI-37VIII-37VIII-37VIII-38VIII-39VIII-39VIII-39VIII-41VIII-42VIII-42VIII-43VIII-43VXXX-44VIII-44UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionTitleParcae5.65.6~15.6.25.6'5.6'5.6.55.6.65.6.75.6.85.6.95.6.105.6.115.6.12D.SECTIONIXA.B.1-01~11.22.02~12.2SummaryoftheRG1.97InstrumentDesignandImplementationCriteriathatwereEstablishedforUnit1asPartoftheUnit11990RestartActivitiesNoTypeAVariablesEOPKeyParametersSingleTapfortheFuelZoneRPVWaterLevelInstrumentNonredundantWide-RangeRPVWaterLevelIndicationUpgradingEOPKeyParameterCategory1InstrumentLoopComponentstoSafety-RelatedClassificationSafety-RelatedClassificationofInstrumentationforRG1.97VariableTypesOtherthantheEOPKeyParametersRoutingandSeparationofChannelizedCategory1InstrumentLoopCablesElectricalIsolationofCategory1InstrumentLoopsfromAssociatedComponentsthatarenotSafetyRelatedPowerSourceInformationforCategory1InstrumentsMarkingofInstrumentsofControlRoomPanels"Alternate"InstrumentsforMonitoringEOPKeyParametersIndicationRangesofMonitoringInstrumentsREFERENCESELECTRICALSYSTEMSDESIGNBASESELECTRICALSYSTEMDESIGNNetworkInterconnections345-kVSystem115-kVSystemStationDistributionSystemTwo+24-VDcSystemsTwo120-V,60-Hz,Single-Phase,UninterruptiblePowerSupplySystemsVIII-45VIII-46VIII-46VIII-46VIII-48VIII-48VIII-49VIII-49VIII-50VIII-51VIII-51VIII-51VIII-52VIII-53IX-1IX-1ZX-2IX-2IX-2IX-3IX-9IX-12IX-12UFSARRevision14XiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectio2.32.42.53.03.13.23.33.43.4.13.4.23.4.33.53.5.13.5.24.04.14.24.35.05.15.25.36.06.16.26.36.46.56.6TitleTwo120-V,57-60Hz,One-Phase,ReactorTripPowerSuppliesOne120/208-V,60-Hz,InstrumentandControlTransformerOne120/240-V,60-Hz,Three-Phase,ComputerPowerSupplyCablesandCableTraysCableSeparationCablePenetrationsProtectioninHazardousAreasTypesofCablesPowerCableControlCableSpecialCableDesignandSpacingofCableTraysTrayDesignSpecificationsTraySpacingEmergencyPowerDieselGeneratorSystemStationBatteriesNonsafetyBatterySystemTestsandInspectionsDieselGeneratorStationBatteriesNonsafetyBatteriesConformancewith10CFR50.63StationBlackoutRuleStationBlackoutDurationStationBlackoutCopingCapabilityProceduresandTrainingQualityAssuranceEmergencyDieselGeneratorReliabilityProgramReferencesPacaeIX-13IX-14IX-14IX-14IX-14IX-15IX-15IX-15IX-16IX-16IX-16IX-17IX-17IX-17IX-17IX-17IX-20IX-22IX-23IX-23IX-24IX-24IX-24IX-25IX-25IX-27IX-27IX-28IX-29SECTIONXREACTORAUXILIARYANDEMERGENCYSYSTEMSX-1A.1.02.03.04.0B.1.02.03.04.0REACTORSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluationTestsandInspectionsREACTORCLEANUPSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluationTestsandInspectionsX-1X-1X-1X-2X-2X-3X-3X-3X-4X-5UFSARRevision14xivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~SecticC.1~02'2'2'2'2.42.52.62.72.82.92.102'12'22~132.143.03'3.23.33.43.54.05.0D.1~02'3.04.0E.1.02.03.04.0F.1.02.03.04.0TitleCONTROLRODDRIVEHYDRAULICSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignPumpsFiltersFirstPressureStageSecondPressureStageThirdPressureStageExhaustHeaderAccumulatorScramPilotValvesScramValvesScramDumpVolumeControlRodDriveCoolingSystemDirectionalControlandSpeedControlValvesRodInsertionandWithdrawalScramActuationSystemEvaluationNormalWithdrawalSpeedAccidentalMultipleOperationScramReliabilityOperationalReliabilityAlternateRodInjectionReactorVesselLevelInstrumentationReferenceLegBackfillTestsandInspectionsREACTORBUILDINGCLOSEDLOOPCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsTURBINEBUILDINGCLOSEDLOOPCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsSERVICEWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsPacaeX-6X-6X-6X-7X-7X-7X-8X-8X-9X-9X-10X-10X-10X-11X-11X-12X-13X-13X-13X-14X-14X-15X-15X-15X-16X-17X-17X-17X-19X-20X-21X-21X-21X-22X-23X-24X-24X-24X-25X-26UFSARRevision14XVJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionG.1.02.03.04.0H.1.02.03.04.01.02.03.04.01.02.02.12.1.12.23.04.0K.1.01.11.21.31.41.51.62.02.1TitleMAKEUPWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluationTestsandInspectionsSPENTFUELSTORAGEPOOLFILTERINGANDCOOLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsBREATHING,INSTRUMENTANDSERVICEAIRSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsFUELANDREACTORCOMPONENTSHANDLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDescriptionofFacilityCaskDropProtectionSystemOperationoftheFacilityDesignEvaluationTestsandInspectionsFIREPROTECTIONPROGRAMProgramBasesNuclearDivisionDirective-FireProtectionProgramNuclearDivisionInterfaceProcedure-FireProtectionProgramFireHazardsAnalysisAppendixRReviewSafeShutdownAnalysisFireProtectionandAppendixRRelatedPortionsofOperationsProcedures(OPs,SOPs,andEOPs)andDamageRepairProceduresFireProtectionPortionsoftheEmergencyPlanProgramImplementationandDesignAspectsFireProtectionImplementingProcedurespacaeX-27X-27X-27X-28X-29X-30X-30X-31X-33X-33X-34X-34X-34X-36X-37X-38X-38X-38X-38X-41X-42X-42X-43X-44X-44X-44X-44X-44X-45X-45X-45X-45X-45UFSARRevision14xviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section2.22.32.43.03.13.24.0TitleFireProtectionAdministrativeControlsFireProtectionSystemDrawingsandCalculationsFireProtectionEngineeringEvaluations(FPEEs)MonitoringandEvaluatingProgramImplementationQualityAssuranceTopicalReportFireBrigadeManning,Training,DrillsandResponsibilitiesSurveillanceandTestsPacaeX-46X-46X-46X-46X-46X-46X-47L.1.02.03.04.0M.1.02.03.04.0N.REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluationTestsandInspectionsSAFETYPARAMETERDISPLAYSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluationTestsandInspectionsREFERENCESX-48X-48X-48X-48X-49X-50X-50X-50X-50X-51X-52APPENDIX10AFIREHAZARDSANALYSISAPPENDIX10BSAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISSECTIONXIA.B.1.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.010'STEAM-TO-POWERCONVERSIONSYSTEMDESIGNBASESSYSTEMDESIGNANDOPERATIONTurbineGeneratorTurbineCondenserCondenserAirRemovalandOffgasSystemCirculatingWaterSystemCondensatePumpsCondensateDemineralizerSystemCondensateTransferSystemFeedwaterBoosterPumpsFeedwaterPumpsFeedwaterHeatersXI-1XI-1XI-2XI-2XI-4XI-5XI-9XI-9XI-9XI-10XI-11XI-11XI-11C.SYSTEMANALYSISXI-13UFSARRevisionXvllJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionD.SECTIONXIITitleTESTSANDINSPECTIONSRADIOLOGICALCONTROLSPacaeXI-16XII-1A.1.01.11.21.2.1112.02~12~1~12~1~22.1.32.1.42.22.2.12.2'2.2.32.2.42.32.3.12.3.23.04.04.14.24.34.3.14.3'B.1.0111.21.2.11.2.21.2.31~32.02.12~1~12.1.22.1.3RADIOACTIVEWASTESDesignBasesObjectivesTypesofRadioactiveWastesGaseousWasteLiquidWastesSolidWastesSystemDesignandEvaluationGaseousWasteSystemOffgasSystemSteam-PackingExhausterSystemBuildupVentilationSystemsStackLiquidWasteSystemLiquidWasteHandlingProcessesSamplingandMonitoringLiquidWastesLiquidWasteEquipmentArrangementLiquidRadioactiveWasteSystemControlSolidWasteSystemSolidWasteHandlingProcessesSolidWasteSystemEquipmentSafetyLimitsTestsandInspectionsWasteProcessSystemsFiltersEffluentMonitorsOffgasandStackMonitorsLiquidWasteEffluentMonitorRADIATIONPROTECTIONPrimaryandSecondaryShieldingDesignBasesDesignReactorShieldWallBiologicalShieldMiscellaneousEvaluationAreaRadioactivityMonitoringSystemsAreaRadiationMonitoringSystemDesignBasesDesignEvaluationXII-1XII-1XII-1XII-1XII-1XII-1XII-2XII-2XII-2XII-3XII-3XII-3XII-3XII-4XII-4XII-6XII-6XII-6XII-7XZI-7XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-10XII-11XII-11XII-11XII-12XII-12XII-12XII-12XII-13XII-13XII-13XII-13XII-14XII-15UFSARRevision14xviiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionTitlePacae2.22~2.122'.33'F13.1.13'.233'.43.23'.13'.23'3'.133.23'.33.43'.13.53~5.13'.23.5.33.5.43.5.54'4.14.24.34'4'.14'.24'AreaAirContaminationMonitoringSystemDesignBasesDesignEvaluationRadiationProtectionFacilitiesLaboratory,CountingRoomandCalibrationFacilitiesChangeRoomandLaundryFacilitiesPersonnelDecontaminationFacilityToolandEquipmentDecontaminationFacilityRadiationControlShieldingAccessControlContaminationControlFacilityContaminationControlPersonnelContaminationControlAirborneContaminationControlPersonnelDoseDeterminationsRadiationDoseRadiationProtectionInstrumentationCountingRoomInstrumentationPortableRadiationInstrumentationAirSamplingInstrumentationPersonnelMonitoringInstrumentsEmergencyInstrumentationTestsandInspectionsShieldingAreaRadiationMonitorsAreaAirContaminationMonitorsRadiationProtectionFacilitiesVentilationAirFlowsInstrumentCalibrationWellShieldingRadiationProtectionInstrumentationA.1.01~11~1~11.1'ORGANIZATIONANDRESPONSIBILITYManagementandTechnicalSupportOrganizationNuclearDivisionVicePresidentandGeneralManager-NuclearVicePresidentNuclearEngineeringSECTIONXIIICONDUCTOFOPERATIONSXII-15XII-15XII-16XII-16XII-16XII-17XII-17XII-18XII-18XII-18XII-19XII-19XII-20XII-21XII-21XZI-21XII-22XII-23XII-23XII-24XII-24XII-24XII-25XII-25XII-25XII-26XII-26XII-26XII-27XII-27XII-27XII-27XII-27XIII-1XIII-1XIII-1XIII-1XIII-1XIII-2UFSARRevision14X1XJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section1.1.31.1.41~1~51.1.61.22.02.12'3.04.0B.1.02.03.04.04.14.24.34.3.14.3.24.3.34.3.44.3.54.3.64.3'4'5.0C.D.E.F.1.01.11'1.31.4TitleVicePresidentNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportDirectorNuclearCommunicationsandPublicAffairsManagerHumanResourceDevelopmentGeneralManagerBusinessManagementCorporateSupportDepartmentsOperatingOrganizationPlantManagerGeneralManagerBusinessManagementQualityAssuranceFacilityStaffQualificationsQUALIFICATIONSANDTRAININGOFPERSONNELThisSectionDeletedThisSectionDeletedThisSectionDeletedTrainingofPersonnelGeneralResponsibilityImplementationQualityForOperatorTrainingForMaintenanceForTechniciansForGeneralEmployeeTraining/RadiationProtectionandEmergencyPlanForIndustrialSafetyForNuclearQualityAssuranceForFireBrigadeTrainingofLicensedOperatorCandidates/LicensedNRCOperatorRetrainingCooperativeTrainingwithLocal,StateandFederalOfficialsOPERATINGPROCEDURESEMERGENCYPLANANDPROCEDURESSECURITYRECORDSOperationsControlRoomLogBookStationShiftSupervisor'sBookRadwasteLogBookWasteQuantityLevelShippedPacaeXIII-2XIII-4XIII-4XIII-4XIII-4XZZI-5XIII-5XIII-8XIII-8XIII-8XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-11XIII-12XIII-13XIII-15XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16UFSARRevision14XXJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section2.03.03'3.23.33.43.54.05.06.07.0G.1.01.12'F13.0SECTIONXIVTitleMaintenanceRadiationProtectionPersonnelExposureBy-ProductMaterialasRequiredby10CFR30MeterCalibrationsStationRadiologicalConditionsinAccessibleAreasAdministrationoftheRadiationProtectionProgramandProceduresChemistryandRadiochemistrySpecialNuclearMaterialsCalibrationofInstrumentsAdministrativeRecordsandReportsREVIEWANDAUDITOFOPERATIONSStationOperationsReviewCommitteeFunctionSafetyReviewandAuditBoardFunctionReviewofOperatingExperienceINITIALTESTINGANDOPERATIONSPacaeXIII-16XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-19XIII-19XIII-19XIII-19XIII-19XIII-20XIV-1A.TESTSPRIORTOINITIALREACTORFUELINGXIV-1B.1'1.11.21.32.02.12'3.04.05.06.0SECTIONXVA.INITIALCRITICALITYANDPOSTCRITICALITYTESTSInitialFuelLoadingandNear-ZeroPowerTestsatAtmosphericPressureGeneralRequirementsGeneralProceduresCoreLoadingandCriticalTestProgramHeatupfromAmbienttoRatedTemperatureGeneralTestsConductedFromZeroto100PercentInitialReactorRatingFull-PowerDemonstrationRunComparisonofBaseConditionsAdditionalTestsatDesignRatingSAFETYANALYSISINTRODUCTIONXIV-5XIV-5XIV-5XIV-5XIV-7XIV-9XIV-9XIV-9XIV-10XIV-12XIV-12XIV-13XV-1XV-1UFSARRevision14xxiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~SecticB.1.02.03.03.133.1.233.1.43.23.2.133.2'3'3.3.13.3.23.3.33.3.43'3.4.13.4.23.4.33.4.43.53.5.13.5.23.5.33.5.43.63.6.13.6~23.6.33.6.43.73.F13.7.233.7.43.83.8.13.8.23.8.33.8.43.93.9.1TitleBOUNDARYPROTECTIONSYSTEMSTransientsConsideredMethodsandAssumptionsTransientAnalysisTurbineTripWithoutBypassObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsLossof100'FFeedwaterHeatingObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsResultsFeedwaterControllerFailure-MaximumDemandObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsControlRodWithdrawalErrorObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsMainSteamLineIsolationValveClosure(WithScram)ObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsInadvertentStartupofColdRecirculationLoopObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsRecirculationPumpTripsObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsRecirculationPumpStallObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsRecirculationFlowControllerMalfunction-IncreaseFlowObjectivesPacaeXV-2XV-2XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-4XV-4XV-4XV-4XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-6XV-6XV-6XV-6XV-6XV-7XV-7XV-7XV-7XV-7XV-8XV-9XV-9XV-9XV-9XV-9XV-10XV-10XV-10XV-10XV-10XV-11XV-11XV-11UFSARRevision14xxiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectio3.9.23.9.33.9.43'03.10.13.10'3.10.33.10'3'13.11~13.11.23.11.33.11.43~123.12.13.12.23.12.33.12.43'33.13'3.13.23.13.33.13.43.143.14.13.14.23.14.33'4.43.153.15.13.15.23.15.33.15.43.163.16.13.16.23.16.33.16.43.173.17'3.17.23.17.3TitleAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsFlowControllerMalfunction-DecreaseFlowObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsInadvertentActuationofOneSolenoidReliefValveObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsSafetyValveActuation(OverpressurizationAnalysis)ObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsFeedwaterControllerMalfunction(ZeroDemand)ObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsTurbineTripwithPartialBypass(LowPower)ObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsTurbineTripwithPartialBypass(FullPower)ObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditions~CommentsResultsInadvertentActuationofOneBypassValveObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsOneFeedwaterPumpTripandRestartObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsPacaeXV-11XV-11XV-11XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-13XV-13XV-13XV-13XV-13XV-14XV-14XV-15XV-15XV-15XV-15XV-15XV-16XV-16XV-16XV-16XV-16XV-17XV-17XV-17XV-17XV-17XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-19UFSARRevision14XxiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section3.17.43.183.193.19.13.19.23.19.33.19'3.203.20.13.20.23.20.33.20.43.213.21.13.21.23.21.33.21.43.223.22.13.22'3.22.33.22.43.233.23.13.23.23.23.33.23.43.243.24.13.24.23.24.33.24.43.253.25.13.25.23.25.33.25.4C.1.01.11.21.2.11.2'1.2.31.2.4TitleResultsLossofMainCondenserVacuumLossofElectricalLoad(GeneratorTrip)ObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsLossofAuxiliaryPowerObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsPressureRegulatorMalfunctionObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsInstrumentAirFailureObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsDcPowerInterruptionsObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsFailureofOneDieselGeneratortoStartObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsPowerBusLossofVoltageObjectivesAssumptionsandInitialConditionsCommentsResultsSTANDBYSAFEGUARDSANALYSISMainSteamLineBreakOutsidetheDrywellIdentificationofCausesAccidentAnalysisValveClosureInitiationFeedwaterFlowCoreShutdownMixtureLevelPacaeXV-19XV-19XV-19XV-19XV-19XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-21XV-21XV-21XV-21XV-21XV-22XV-22XV-22XV-22XV-22XV-26XV-26XV-26XV-26XV-26XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-28XV-28XV-29XV-29XV-29XV-29XV-30XV-30XV-30XV-30UFSARRevision14xxivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectio1.2.51.2.61.2.71.2.81.31.3.1112.02.12.22.2.12.2.22.2.32.2.42.32.42.4.122.4.32.4.3.12.4.3.22.4.43.03'3'3'3.3'3.3.23'3'4.04.14.24.34.44.54.5.14.5.25.05.15.1.1TitleSubcooledLiquidSystemPressureandSteam-WaterMassMixtureImpactForcesCoreInternalForcesRadiologicalEffectsRadioactivityReleasesMeteorologyandDoseRatesComparisonwithRegulatoryGuide1.5Loss-of-CoolantAccidentIntroductionInputtoAnalysisOperationalandECCSInputParametersSingleFailureStudyonECCSManually-ControlledElectrically-OperatedValvesSingleFailureBasisPipeWhipBasisDeletedAppendixKLOCAPerformanceAnalysisComputerCodesDescriptionofModelChangesAnalysisProcedureBWR/2GenericAnalysisUnit1-SpecificAnalysisBreakSpectrumEvaluationAnalysisResultsRefuelingAccidentIdentificationofCausesAccidentAnalysisRadiologicalEffectsFissionProductReleasesMeteorologyandDoseRatesComparisontoRegulatoryGuide1.25ControlRodDropAccidentIdentificationofCausesAccidentAnalysisDesignedSafeguardsProceduralSafeguardsRadiologicalEffectsFissionProductReleasesMeteorologyandDoseRatesContainmentDesignBasisAccidentOriginalRecirculationLineRuptureAnalysis-WithCoreSprayPurposePacaeXV-30XV-31XV-31XV-31XV-31XV-32XV-32XV-33XV-34XV-34XV-35XV-35XV-35XV-35XV-36XV-36XV-36XV-36XV-37XV-37XV-37XV-38XV-38XV-40XV-40XV-41XV-44XV-44XV-45XV-45XV-45XV-45XV-46XV-46XV-47XV-47XV-48XV-50XV-50XV-50XV-50UFSARRevision14xxvJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectic5.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.55.1.65~1.75'.85.1.8.15'.8.25.25.2.15.2.25.2.35.2.45.2.55.2.65.35.3.15.3.25.3.35.3.3.15.3.3.25.3.3.35.3.3.45.3.46.06.16.26.37.07'7'7.37.47.57.67.7~iticAnalysisMethodandAssumptionsCoreHeatBuildupCoreSpraySystemContainmentPressureImmediatelyFollowingBlowdownContainmentSprayBlowdownEffectsonCoreComponentsRadiologicalEffectsFissionProductReleasesMeteorologyandDoseRatesOriginalContainmentDesignBasisAccidentAnalysis-WithoutCoreSprayPurposeCoreHeatupContainmentResponseFissionProductReleasefromtheFuelFissionProductReleasefromtheReactorandContainmentMeteorologyandDoseRatesDesignBasisReconstitutionSuppressionChamberHeatupAnalysisIntroductionInputtoAnalysisDBRSuppressionChamberHeatupAnalysisComputerCodesAnalysisMethodsAnalysisResultsforContainmentSprayDesignBasisAssumptionsAnalysisResultsforEOPOperationAssumptionsConclusionsNewFuelBundleLoadingErrorAnalysisIdentificationofCausesAccidentAnalysisSafetyRequirementsMeteorologicalModelsUsedinAccidentAnalysesGroundReleasesStackReleasesVariabilityExfiltrationGroundDepositionThyroidDoseWholeBodyDosePacaeXV-51XV-51XV-52XV-53XV-54XV-55XV-56XV-56XV-59XV-59XV-59XV-59XV-60XV-61XV-61XV-61XV-61XV-61XV-62XV-63XV-63XV-63XV-64XV-65XV-66XV-66XV-66XV-67XV-67XV-68XV-68XV-68XV-69XV-70XV-76XV-77XV-77UFSARRevision14xxviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLE.OFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionD.SECTIONXVIA.1~02.02.12.22.2.12.32.42.4.12.52.62.6.12.6.22.6.32.6.42.6.52.72.7'2.7.22.72'2.7.2.32.7.32.7.3.12.7.3.22.83.03.13.24.04.14.25.0TitleREFERENCESSPECIALTOPICALREPORTSREACTORVESSELApplicabilityofFormalCodesandPertinentCertificationsDesignAnalysisCodeApprovalAnalysisSteady-StateAnalysisBasisforDeterminingStressesPipeReactionCalculationsEarthquakeLoadingCriteriaandAnalysisSeismicAnalysisforCoreShroudRepairModificationReactorVesselSupportStressDesignCriteriaandAnalysisStrainSafetyMarginforReactorVesselsIntroductionStrainMarginFailureProbabilityResultsofProbabilityAnalysisConclusionsComponentsRequiredforSafeReactorShutdownDesignBasisLoadCombinationsExpectedStressandDeformationRecirculationLineBreakSteamLineBreakEarthquakeLoadingsStressesandDeformationsatWhichtheComponentisUnabletoFunctionandMarginofSafetyRecirculationLineBreakSteamLineBreakSafetyMarginsAgainstDuctileFractureInspectionandTestReportSummaryMaterialsFabricationandInspectionSurveillanceProvisionsCouponSurveillanceProgramPeriodicInspectionCoreShroudStabilizerDesignDescriptionPacaeXV-79XVI-1XVI-1XVI-1XVI-2XVI-2XVI-3XVI-3XVI-4XVI-4XVI-5XVI-5XVI-7XVI-7XVI-8XVI-9XVI-11XVI-11XVI-11XVI-12XVI-12XVI-12XVI-13XVI-13XVI-14XVI-14XVI-15XVI-17XVI-18XVI-18XVI-18XVI-20XVI-20XVI-21XVI-21UFSARRevision14xxviiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~secticB.1.02.02.12'2.32.42.52.5.12.62.72.82.8.12.8.22.8'2.8.42.8.52.8.62.8.72.8.82.93.03.13.23'3~3~13.3.23.3.2-13.3.2.23.3.2.33.3.2.43'.2.5C.1.01.11'TitlePRESSURESUPPRESSIONCONTAINMENTApplicabilityofFormalCodesandPertinentCertificationsDesignAnalysisCodeApprovalCalculationsUnderRatedConditionsUltimateCapabilityUnderAccidentConditionsCapabilitytoWithstandInternalMissilesandJetForcesFloodingCapabilitiesoftheContainmentDrywellAirGapTestsandInspectionsBiologicalShieldWallCompatibilityofDynamicDeformationsOccurringintheDrywell,Torus,andConnectingVentPipesContainmentPenetrationsClassificationofPenetrationsDesignBasesMethodofStressAnalysisLeakTestCapabilityFatigueDesignMaterialSpecificationApplicableCodesJetandReactionLoadsDrywellShearResistanceCapabilityandSupportSkirtJunctionStressesInspectionandTestReportSummaryFabricationandInspectionTestsConductedDiscussionofResultsResultsEffectofVariousTransientsAmbientTemperatureandSolarHeatingofShellThermalLagThroughReferenceChamberWallCondensationinReferenceChamberVolumeChangesDuetoThermalTransientsOverpressureTest-PlateStressesENGINEEREDSAFEGUARDSSeismicAnalysisandStressReportIntroductionMathematicalModelPacaeXVI-22XVI-22XVI-23XVI-23XVI-23XVI-23XVI-24XVI-25XVI-26XVI-26XVI-28XVI-30XVI-30XVI-30XVI-31XVI-31XVI-31XVI-32XVI-32XVI-33XVI-33XVI-34XVI-34XVI-34XVI-36XVI-36XVI-36XVI-36XVI-37XVI-37XVI-37XVI-38XVI-39XVI-39XVI-39XVI-40UFSARRevision14XXViiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~eectic1.31.3.11.3'21.3~31.3~41.3.51.3.611.42.02.12.1~12.1.22.1~32.1.42.22.2'D.1.01~11~1~11.1~21.21.32.02~12.1~12.1.1.12.1.1.22.1~22.1~32.23.04.0E.F.G.TitleMethodofAnalysisFlexibilityorInfluenceCoefficientMatrixNormalModeFrequenciesandModeShapesTheSeismicSpectrumValuesDynamicModalLoadsModalResponseQuantitiesTheCombinedResponseQuantitiesBasicCriteriaforAnalysisDiscussionofResultsContainmentSpraySystemDesignAdequacyatRatedConditionsGeneralCondensationandHeatRemovalMechanismsMechanicalDesignLoss-of-CoolantAccidentSummaryofTestResultsSprayTestsConductedDESIGNOFSTRUCTURESgCOMPONENTSIEQUIPMENT,ANDSYSTEMSClassificationandSeismicCriteriaDesignTechniquesStructuresSystemsandComponentsPipeSupportsSeismicExposureAssumptionsPlantDesignforProtectionAgainstPostulatedPipingFailuresinHigh-EnergyLinesInsidePrimaryContainmentContainment.IntegrityAnalysisFluidForcesImpactVelocitiesandEffectsSystemsAffectedbyLineBreakEngineeredSafeguardsProtectionOutsidePrimaryContainmentBuildingSeparationAnalysisTornadoProtectionEXHIBITSCONTAINMENTDESIGNREVIEWUSAGEOFCODES/STANDARDSFORSTRUCTURALSTEELANDCONCRETEPacaeXVI-40XVI-41XVI-41XVI-42XVI-43XVI-43XVI-43XVI-44XVI-44XVI-45XVI-45XVI-45XVI-45XVI-50XVI-51XVI-52XVI-52XVI-53XVI-53XVI-55XVI-55XVI-58XVI-59XVI-60XVI-61XVI-61XVI-61XVI-62XVI-62XVI-63XVI-67XVI-69XVI-69XVI-69XVI-72XVI-110XVI-121UFSARRevision14xxixJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)SectionH.TitleREFERENCESSECTIONXVIIORIGINALENVIRONMENTALSTUDIESPacaeXVI-122XVII-1A.1.02.03.03.13.1'3.1.233.23.33.43.4.14.04.14.24.34.3.14'4.4.14.4.24.54.64.6.14.6.24.6.34.75.0B.1'2.03.03.13.2METEOROLOGYGeneralSynopticMeteorologicalFactorsMicrometeorologyWindPatterns200-FootWindRosesEstimatesofWindsatthe350-FootLevelComparisonBetweenTowerandSatelliteWindsLapseRateDistributionsTurbulenceClassesDispersionParametersChangesinDispersionParametersApplicationstoReleaseProblemsConcentrationsfromaGround-LevelSourceConcentrationsfromanElevatedSourceRadialConcentrationsMonthlyandAnnualSectorConcentrationsLeastFavorableConcentrationsOveranExtendedPeriodGround-LevelReleaseElevatedReleaseMeanAnnualSectorDepositionDoseRatesfromaPlumeofGammaEmittersRADOSProgramCenterlineDoseRatesSectorDoseRatesConcentrationsfromaMajorSteamLineBreakConclusionsLIMNOLOGYIntroductionSummaryReportofCruisesDilutionofStationEffluentinSelectedAreasDilutionofEffluentattheLakeSurfaceAbovetheDischargeDilutionofEffluentattheSiteBoundariesXVII-1XVII-1XVII-2XVII-2XVII-2XVII-2XVII-2XVII-16XVII-19XVII-19XVII-19XVII-39XVII-45XVII-46XVII-53XVII-55XVII-55XVII-83XVII-83XVII-86XVII-87XVII-90XVII-90XVII-91XVII-100XVII-103XVII-106XVII-107XVII-107XVII-107XVII-109XVII-109XVII-114UFSARRevision14XXXJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectic3~2~13.2.23.2.33.33.3'333.3.43.3.53.3.63.43.54.04.14.1.14.1.24.25.0C.1.02.03.03.13.24.04.14.24.34'4.5SECTIONXVIIIA.1.0TitleGeneralDilutionofEffluentattheEasternSiteBoundaryDilutionofEffluentWestoftheStationSiteDilutionofEffluentattheCityofOswegoIntakeTiltingoftheIsothermalPlanesandSubsequentDilutionDilutionasaFunctionofCurrentVelocityPercentofTimeEffluentWillBeCarriedtotheOswegoAreaMixingwithDistanceOswegoRiverWaterasaBuffertoPreventEffluentFromPassingOvertheIntake.SummaryofAnnualDilutionFactorsfortheCityofOswegoIntakeDilutionofEffluentattheNineMilePointIntakeSummaryofDilutionintheNineMilePointAreaPreliminaryStudyofLakeBiotaOffNineMilePointBiologicalStudiesPlanktonStudyBottomStudySummaryofBiologicalStudiesConclusionsEARTHSCIENCESIntroductionAdditionalSubsurfaceStudiesConstructionExperienceStationAreaIntakeandDischargeTunnelsCorrelationWithPreviousStudiesGeneralGeologicalConditionsHydrologicalConditionsSeismologicalConditionsConclusionHUMANFACTORSENGINEERING/SAFETYPARAMETERDISPLAYSYSTEMDETAILEDCONTROLROOMDESIGNREVIEWGeneralPacaeXVII-114XVII-116XVII-122XVII-123XVII-123XVII-124XVII-127XVII-127XVII-127XVII-127XVII-128XVII-128XVII-129XVII-129XVII-129XVII-129XVII-130XVII-130XVII-132XVII-132XVII-132XVII-138XVII-138XVII-139XVII-140XVII-140XVII-140XVII-142XVII-142XVII-142XVIII-1XVIII-1XVIII-1UFSARRevision14xxxiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)~Sectic2.03.03'3.23.33.43.53.63.73.84.04.14.24.2.14.2.25.06.06.16.26.36.47.0B.1.02.03.04.05.05.15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.25.2.15.2.2TitlePlanningRequirementsfortheDCRDRDCRDRReviewProcessOperatorSurveyHistoricalReviewTaskAnalysisControlRoomInventoryControlRoomSurveyVerificationofTaskPerformanceCapabilitiesValidationofControlRoomFunctionsCompilationofDiscrepancyFindingsAssessmentandImplementationAssessmentImplementationIntegratedCosmeticPackageFunctionalFixesReportingContinuingHumanFactorsProgramFixVerificationsMultidisciplinaryReviewTeamAssessmentsHumanFactorsManualforFutureDesignChangeOutstandingHumanFactorsItemsReferencesSAFETYPARAMETERDISPLAYSYSTEMIntroductiontotheSafetyParameterDisplaySystemSystemDescriptionRoleoftheSPDSHumanFactorsEngineeringGuidelinesHumanFactorsEngineeringPrinciplesAppliedtotheSPDSDesignNUREG-0737,Supplement1,Section4.1.aConciseDisplayCriteriaPlantVariablesRapidandReliableDeterminationofSafetyStatusAidtoControlRoomPersonnelNUREG-0737,Supplement1,Section4.1.bConvenientLocationContinuousDisplayPacaeXVIII-1XVIII-2XVIII-2XVIII-2XVIII-3XVIII-3XVIII-3XVIII-3XVIII-4XVIII-4XVIII-4XVIII-4XVIII-5XVIII-5XVIII-6XVIII-6XVIII-6XVIII-7XVIII-7XVIII-7XVIII-7XVIII-8XVIII-10XVIII-10XVIII-10XVIII-11XVIII-11XVIII-11XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-13XVIII-13XVIII-13UFSARRevision14xxxiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.)Section5.35.3.15.3.25.45.4.15.4.25.56.06.16.27.0TitleNUREG-0737,Supplement1,Section4.1.cProceduresandTrainingIsolationofSPDSfromSafety-RelatedSystemsNUREG-0737,Supplement1,Section4.1.eIncorporationofAcceptedHumanFactorsEngineeringPrinciplesInformationCanbeReadilyPerceivedandComprehendedNUREG-0737,Supplement1,Section4.1.f,SufficientInformationProceduresOperatingProceduresSurveillanceProceduresReferencesPacaeXVIII-13XVIII-13XVIII-13XVIII-14XVIII-14XVIII-14XVIII-15XVIII-15XVIII-15XVIII-15XVIII-16APPENDIXAAPPENDIXBUnusedNIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONQUALITYASSURANCEPROGRAMTOPICALREPORT(NMPC-QATR-1),NINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONUNITS1AND2OPERATIONSPHASEUFSARRevision14XXXiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLESTable~NuberII-1II-2II-3II-4II-5II-6II-7II-8V-1V-2V-3V-4V-5VI-1VI-2VZ-3aVI-3bVI-4VI-5VII-1VIIZ-1VIII-2VIII-3Title1980PopulationandPopulationDensityforTownsandCitiesWithin12MilesofNineMilePoint-Unit1CitiesWithina50-mileRadiusoftheStationWithPopulationsover10,000RegionalAgriculturalUseRegionalAgriculturalStatistics-CattleandMilkProductionIndustrialFirmsWithin8km(5mi)ofUnit1PublicUtilitiesinOswegoCountyPublicWaterSupplyDataforLocationsWithinanApproximate30-MileRadiusRecreationalAreasintheRegionReactorCoolantSystemDataOperatingCyclesandTransientAnalysisResultsFatigueResistanceAnalysisCodesforSystemsConnectedtotheReactorCoolantSystemTimetoAutomaticBlowdownDrywellPenetrationsSuppressionChamberPenetrationsReactorCoolantSystemIsolationValvesPrimaryContainmentIsolationValves-LinesEnteringFreeSpaceoftheContainmentSeismicDesignCriteriaforIsolationValvesInitialTestsPriortoStationOperationPerformanceTestsAssociationBetweenPrimarySafetyFunctionsandEmergencyOperatingProceduresListofEOPKeyParametersTypeandInstrumentCategoryforUnit1RG1.97VariablesZX-1XII-1XII-2XII-3XII-4XII-5XII-6MagnitudeandDutyCycleofMajorStationBatteryLoadsFlowsandActivitiesofMajorSourcesofGaseousActivityQuantitiesandActivitiesofLiquidRadioactiveWastesAnnualSolidWasteAccumulationandActivityLiquidWasteDisposalSystemMajorComponentsSolidWasteDisposalSystemMajorComponentsOccupancyTimesUFSARRevision14xxxivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.)TableNumberTitleXII-7XII-8XIII-1XV-1XV-2XV-3XV-4XV-5XV-6XV-7XV-8XV-.9XV-9AXV-10XV-llXV-12XV-13XV-14XV-15XV-16XV-17XV-18XV-19XV-20XV-21XV-21AXV-21BXV-21CXV-21DXV-21EXV-22XV-23XV-24XV-25XV-26XV-27XV-28XV-29XV-29aXV-29bGammaEnergyGroupsAreaRadiationMonitorDetectorLocationsANSIStandardCross-ReferenceUnit1TransientsConsideredTripPointsforProtectiveFunctionsTableDeletedInstrumentAirFailureBlowdownRatesIodineConcentrations(pCi/gm)FractionalConcentrationsinCloudsMainSteamLineBreakAccidentDosesSignificantInputParameterstotheLoss-of-CoolantAccidentAnalysisCoreSpraySystemFlowPerformanceAssumedinLOCAAnalysisECCSSingleValveFailureAnalysisSingleFailuresConsideredinLOCAAnalysisTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedAnalysisAssumptionsForNineMilePoint1CalculationsTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedReactorBuildingAirborneFissionProductInventory(curies)StackDischargeRates(curies/sec)FuelHandlingAccidentDoses(REM)FissionProductReleaseAssumptionsAtmosphericDispersionandDoseConversionFactorsEffectonDoseofFactorsUsedintheCalculationsNobleGasReleaseHalogenReleaseWettingofFuelCladdingbyCoreSprayAirborneDrywellFissionProductInventory(curies)UFSARRevision14xxxvJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.)TableNumberTitleXV-29cXV-29dXV-30XV-31XV-32XV-32aXV-33XV-34XV-35XV-36XVI-1XVI-2XVZ-3XVI-4XVI-5XVI-6XVZ-7XVI-8XVI-9XVZ-9aXVI-10XVI-11XVI-12XVI-13XVI-14XVI-15XVI-16XVI-17XVI-18XVZ-19XVI-20XVI-21XVI-22XVI-23XVI-24ReactorBuildingAirborneFissionProductInventory(curies)StackDischargeRates(curies/sec)AirborneDrywellFissionProductInventory(curies)ReactorBuildingAirborneFissionProductInventory(curies)StackDischargeRates(curies/sec)SignificantInputParameterstotheDBRContainmentSuppressionChamberHeatupAnalysisDownwindGroundConcentrationsMaximumGroundConcentrationsDiversityFactorsforGroundConcentrationsReactorBuildingLeakagePathsCodeCalculationSummarySteady-State-(1004FullPowerNormalOperation)PertinentStressesorStressIntensitiesListofReactionsforReactorVesselNozzlesEffectofValueofInitialFailureProbabilitySingleTransientEventforReactorPressureVesselPostulatedEventsMaximumStrainsfromPostulatedEventsCoreStructureAnalysisRecirculationLineBreakCoreStructureAnalysisSteamLineBreakCoreShroudRepairDesignSupportingDocumentationDrywellJetandMissileHazardAnalysisDataDrywellJetandMissileHazardAnalysisResultsStressDuetoDrywellFloodingAllowableWeldShearStressLeakRateTestResultsOverpressureTest-PlateStressesStressSummaryHeatTransferCoefficientsasaFunctionofDropDiameterHeatTransferCoefficientasaFunctionofPressureRelationshipBetweenParticleSizeandTypeofSprayPatternAllowableStressesforFloorSlabs,Beams,Columns,Walls,Foundations,etc.AllowableStressesforStructuralSteelAllowableStresses-ReactorVesselConcretePedestalDrywell-AnalyzedDesignLoadCombinationsSuppressionChamber-AnalyzedDesignLoadCombinationsUFSARRevision14xxxviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.)TableNumberTitleXVI-25XVI-26XVI-27XVI-28XVI-29XVI-30XVI-31XVII-1XVII-2XVII-3XVII-4XVII-5XVII-6XVII-7XVII-8XVII-9XVII-10XVII-11XVII-12XVII-13XVII-14XVII-15XVII-16XVII-17XVII-18XVII-19XVII-20ACICode505AllowableStressesandActualStressesforConcreteVentilationStackAllowableStressesforConcreteSlabs,Walls,Beams,StructuralSteel,andConcreteBlockWallsSystemLoadCombinationsHigh-EnergySystems-InsideContainmentHigh-EnergySystems-OutsideContainmentSystemsWhichMayBeAffectedbyPipeWhipCapabilitytoResistWindPressureandWindVelocityDispersionandAssociatedMeteorologicalParametersRelationofSatelliteandNineMilePointWindsFrequencyofOccurrenceofLapseRates-1963and1964RelationBetweenWindDirectionRangeandTurbulenceClassesStackCharacteristicsDistributionofTurbulenceClassesBySectorsSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorAElev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorBElev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorCElev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorD,Elev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorD~Elev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorEElev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorFElev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorGElev.350SectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorAGroundHeightSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorBGroundHeightSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorCGroundHeightSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorD,GroundHeightSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorDzGroundHeightSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorEGroundHeightUFSARRevision14XXXViiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.)TableNumberXVII-21XVII-22XVII-23XVII-24XVII-25XVII-26XVII-27XVII-28XVII-29XVII-30XVIII-1TitleSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorFGroundHeightSectorConcentrations-1963-64-SectorGGroundHeightEstimatesoftheLeastFavorable30Daysin100YearsConcentrationsintheLeastFavorableCalendarMonth-1963-64AnnualAverageSectorDepositionRates(Vg=0.5cm/sec)AnnualAverageSectorDepositionRates(Vg=2.5cm/sec)PrincipalRadionuclidesinGaseousWasteReleaseCorrectionFactorstoObtainAdjustedCenterlineDoseRatesforSectorEstimatesAnnualAverageGammaDoseRatesDilutionCalculationforEastwardCurrentsBasedonWaterAvailabilitySPDSParameterSetUFSARRevision14xxxviiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURESFigureNumineII-1II-2II-3II-4II-5II-6III-1III-2III-3III-4III-5III-6III-7III-8III-9III-10III-11III-12III-13IZZ-14III-15III-16III-17III-18III-19III-20III-21III-22III-23IV-1IV-2IV-3IV-4IV-5IV-6IV-7IV-8TitlePiping,InstrumentandEquipmentSymbolsStationLocationAreaMapSiteTopographyPopulationDistributionWithina12MileRadiusoftheStationCountiesandTownsWithin12MilesoftheStation1980PopulationDistributionWithina50MileRadiusoftheStationPlotPlanStationFloorPlan-Elevation225-6StationFloorPlan-Elevations237-0and250-0StationFloorPlan-Elevation261-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations277-0and281-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations281-0and291-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations298-0and300-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations317-6and318-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations320-0,333-8,340-0and369-0SectionBetweenColumnRows7and8SectionBetweenColumnRows12and14TurbineBuildingVentilationSystemLaboratoryandRadiationProtectionFacilityVentilationSystemControlRoomVentilationSystemWasteDisposalBuildingVentilationSystemWasteDisposalBuildingExtensionVentilationSystemOffGasBuildingVentilationSystemTechnicalSupportCenterVentilationSystemCirculatingWaterChannelsUnderScreenandPumpHouse-NormalOperationCirculatingWaterChannelsUnderScreenandPumpHouse-SpecialOperationsIntakeandDischargeTunnelsPlanandProfileStack-PlanandElevationStackFailure-CriticalDirectionsLimitingPower/FlowLine(Typical)FigureDeletedFigureDeletedTypicalControlRod-IsometricFigureDeletedControlRodDriveandHydraulicSystemControlRodDriveAssemblyTypicalControlRodtoDriveCoupling-IsometricUFSARRevision14xxxixJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberTitleIV-9ReactorVesselIsometricV-1V-2V-3V-4V-5V-6V-7V-8VI-1VI-2VI-3VI-4VI-4aVI-5VI-6VI-7VI-8VI-9VI-10VI-11VI-12VI-13VI-14VI-15VI-16VI-17VI-18VI-19VI-20VI-21VI-22VI-23ReactorEmergencyCoolantSystemReactorVesselNozzleLocationReactorVesselSupportFigureDeletedPressureVesselEmbrittlementTrendFigureDeletedFigureDeletedEmergencyCondenserSupplyIsolationValves(Typicalof2)DrywellandSuppressionChamberElectricalPenetrations-HighVoltageElectricalPenetrations-LowVoltagePipePenetrations.-HotClamshellExpansionJointTypicalPenetrationForInstrumentLinesReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-AccelerationEast-WestDirectionReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-DeflectionsEast-WestDirectionReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.BuildingShearEast-WestDirectionReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.BuildingMomentEast-WestDirectionReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-AccelerationNorth-SouthDirectionReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-DeflectionsNorth-SouthDirectionReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.BuildingShear-North-SouthDirectionReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.BuildingMoment-North-SouthDirectionReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.AccelerationReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.DeflectionReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.ShearReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.MomentTypicalDoorSealsDetailsofReactorBuildingAirLocksInstrumentLineIsolationValveArrangementTypicalFlowCheckValveIsolationValveSystemDrywellCoolingSystemUFSARRevision14xlJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberVI-24VII-1VII-2VII-3VIX-4VII-5VII-6VII-7VII-8VII-9VII-10VII-11VXI-12VII-13VII-14VII-15VII-16VII-17VIII-1VIII-2VIII-3VIII-4VIII-5VIII-6VIII-7VIII-8VIII-9VIII-10VIII-11VIII-12VIII-13VIXI-14VIII-15VIII-16VIII-17VIII-18TitleReactorBuildingVentilationSystemCoreSpraySystemCoreSpraySpargerFlow,PerSparger,forOneCoreSprayPumpandOneToppingPumpContainmentSpraySystemFigureDeletedFigureDeletedLiquidPoisonSystemMinimumAllowableSolutionTemperatureFigureDeletedTypicalControlRodVelocityLimiterControlRodHousingSupportHydrogenFlammabilityLimitsCombustibleGasControlSystemH~-O,SamplingSystemHydrogenandOxygenConcentrationsinContainmentFollowingLossofCoolantAccidentNitrogenAddedbyContainmentAtmosphericDilutionOperationFollowingLossofCoolantAccidentContainmentPressurewithContainmentAtmosphericDilutionOperation-ZeroContainmentLeakageFeedwaterDeliveryCapability(ShaftDrivenPump)toTimeAfterTurbineTripfor1000psigReactorPressureand1.0InchHGABSExhaustPressureProtectiveSystemFunctionReactorProtectionSystemElementaryDiagramProtectiveSystemTypicalSensorArrangementRecirculationFlowandTurbineControlNeutronMonitoringInstrumentRangesSourceRangeMonitor(SRM)SRMDetectorLocationIntermediateRangeMonitor(IRM)IRMCoreLocationLPRMLocationWithinCoreLatticeLPRMandAPRMCoreLocationLocalPowerRangeMonitor(LPRM)andAveragePowerRangeMonitors(APRM)APRMSystem-TypicalTripLogicforAPRMScramandRodBlockTraversingIn-CoreProbeRodPatternDuringStartupRadialPowerDistributionforControlRodPatternShowninFigureVXII-16DistancefromWorstControlRodtoNearestActiveIRMMonitorUFSARRevisionxliJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberVIII-19VIII-20VIII-21VIII-22VIII-23VIII-24VIII-25VIII-26VIII-27VIII-28VIII-29IX-1IX-2IX-3IX-4IX-5IX-6IX-7X-1X-2X-3X-4X-5X-6X-7X-8X-9X-10X-11XI-1XI-2XI-3XI-4XI-5XI-6XI-7TitleMeasuredResponseTimeofIntermediateRangeSafetyInstrumentationEnvelopeofMaximumAPRMDeviationbyFlowControlReductioninPowerEnvelopeofMaximumAPRMDeviationforAPRMTrackingWithOnUnitsControlRodWithdrawalMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorReactorBuildingVentilationRadiationMonitorOffgasSystemRadiationMonitorEmergencyCondenserVentRadiationMonitorStackEffluentandLiquidEffluentRadiationMonitorsContainmentSprayHeatExchangerRawWaterEffluentRadiationMonitorContainmentAtmosphericMonitoringSystemRodWorthMinimizerA.C.StationPowerDistributionControlandInstrumentPowerTraysBelowElevation261TraysBelowElevation277TraysBelowElevation300DieselGeneratorLoadingFollowingLoss-of-CoolantAccidentDieselGeneratorLoadingforOrderlyShutdownReactorShutdownCoolingSystemReactorCleanupSystemControlRodDriveHydraulicSystemReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingSystemTurbineBuildingClosedLoopCoolingSystemServiceWaterSystemDecayHeatGeneration,Qvs.DaysAfterReactorShutdown',SpentFuelStoragePoolFilteringandCoolingSystemBreathing,Instrument,andServiceAirReactorRefuelingSystemPictorialCaskDropProtectionSystemSteamFlowandReheaterVentilationSystemExtractionSteamFlowMainCondenserAirRemovalandOffGasSystemCirculatingWaterSystemCondensateFlowCondensateTransferSystemFeedwaterFlowSystemUFSARRevision14xiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberXII-1XIII-1XIII-2XIII-3XIII-4XIII-5XV-1XV-2XV-3XV-4XV-5XV-6XV-7XV-8XV-9XV-10XV-11XV-12XV-13XV-14XV-15XV-16XV-17XV-18XV-19XV-20XV-21XV-22XV-23XV-24XV-25XV-26XV-27XV-28XV-29XV-30XV-31XV-32XV-33XV-34XV-35XV-36XV-37XV-38TitleRadioactiveWasteDisposalSystemNMPCUpperManagementNuclearOrganizationNineMilePointNuclearSiteOrganizationNuclearEngineeringOrganizationNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportOrganizationSafetyOrganizationStationTransientDiagramFigureDeletedPlantResponsetoLossof100FFeedwaterHeaFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedStartupofColdRecirculationLoop-PartialRecirculationPumpTrips(1Pump)RecirculationPumpTrips(5Pumps)RecirculationPumpStallFlowControllerMalfunction(IncreasedFlow)FlowControllerMalfunctionDecreasingFlowInadvertentActuationofOneSolenoidReliefFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFeedwaterControllerMalfunction-ZeroFlowTurbineTripWithPartialBypassIntermediatePowerTurbineTripWithPartialBypassInadvertentActuationofOneBypassValveOneFeedwaterPumpTripandRestartLossofElectricalLoadLossofAuxiliaryPowerPressureRegulatorMalfunctionMainSteamLineBreak-CoolantLossFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedtingPowerValveUFSARRevision14xliiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberXV-39XV-40XV-41XV-42XV-43XV-44XV-45XV-46XV-47XV-48XV-49XV-50XV-51XV-52XV-53XV-54XV-55XV-56XV-56AXV-56BXV-56CXV-56DXV-56EXV-56FXV-56GXV-56HXV-57XV-58XV-59XV-60XV-60aXV-60bXV-61XV-62XV-63XV-64XV-65XV-66TitleFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedLoss-of-CoolantAccident-WithCoreSprayCladdingTemperatureLoss-of-CoolantAccidentDrywellPressureLoss-of-CoolantAccidentSuppressionChamberPressureLoss-of-CoolantAccidentContainmentTemperature-WithCoreSprayLoss-of-CoolantAccidentCladPerforationWithCoreSprayContainmentDesignBasisCladTemperatureResponse-WithoutCoreSprayContainmentDesignBasisMetal-WaterReactionContainmentDesignBasisCladPerforationWithoutCoreSprayContainmentDesignBasisContainmentTemperature-WithoutCoreSprayDBRAnalysisSuppressionPoolandWetwellAirspaceTemperatureResponse-ContainmentSprayDesignBasisAssumptionDBRAnalysisSuppressionPoolandWetwellAirspaceTemperatureResponse-EOPOperationAssumptionsReactorBuildingModelExfiltrationvs.WindSpeed-NortherlyWindReactorBuildingDifferentialPressureExfiltrationvs.WindSpeed-SoutherlyWindReactorBuilding-IsometricReactorBuilding-CornerSectionsUFSARRevision14xlivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberXV-67XV-68XV-69XV-70XV-71XV-72TitleReactorReactorReactorReactorReactorReactorBuildingBuildingBuildingBuildingBuildingBuilding-RoofSections-PaneltoConcreteSections-ExpansionJointSectionsExfiltration-NortherlyWindExfiltration-SoutherlyWindDifferentialPressureXVI-1XVI-2XVI-3XVI-4XVI-5XVI-6XVI-7XVI-8XVI-9XVI-10XVI-11XVI-12XVI-12aXVI-12bXVI-13XVI-14XVI-15XVI-16XVI-17XVI-18XVI-19XVI-20XVI-21XVI-22XVI-23XVI-24XVI-25XVI-26XVI-27XVI-28SeismicAnalysisofReactorVesselGeometricandLumpedMassRepresentationReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.MomentReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.ShearReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.DeflectionReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevationvs.AccelerationFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedReactorVesselSupportStructureStressSummaryThermalAnalysisFailureProbabilityDensityFunctionAdditionStrainsPast44RequiredtoExceedDefinedSafetyMarginShroudWeldsCoreShroudStabilizersLossofCoolantAccident-ContainmentPressureNoCoreorContainmentSpraysFigureDeletedDrywelltoConcreteAirGapTypicalPenetrationsBiologicalShieldWallConstructionDetailsVentPipeandSuppressionChamberPrimaryContainmentSupportandAnchorageSealDetails-DrywellShellSteelandAdjacentConcreteDrywellSliding-Acceleration,Shear,andMomentShearResistanceCapability-InsideDrywellShearResistanceCapability-OutsideDrywellDrywell-SupportSkirtJunctionStressesPointLocationforContainmentSpraySystemPipingHeatExchangertoDrywellComparisonofStaticandDynamicStresses(PSI)SeismicConditions-ContainmentSpraySystemHeatExchangertoDrywellConductioninaDropletLossofCoolantAccident-ContainmentPressureUFSARRevision14xlvJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberXVI-29XVI-30XVI-31XVI-32XVI-33XVI-34XVI-35XVI-36XVI-37XVI-38XVI-39XVI-40XVI-41XVI-42XVI-43XVI-44XVI-45XVI-46XVI-47XVI-48XVI-49XVI-50XVI-51XVI-52XVI-53XVI-54XVI-55XVI-56XVI-57XVI-58XVI-59XVI-60XVI-61TitleLossofCoolantAccident-ContainmentPressureNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof80psigNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof80psigNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof30psigNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof30psigSeismicAnalysis-ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-DrywellReactorSupportStructure-SeismicSeismicAnalysis-WasteBuildingSeismicAnalysis-ScreenhouseSeismicAnalysis-TurbineBuilding(NorthofRowC)SeismicAnalysis-TurbineBuilding(SouthofRowC)SeismicAnalysis-ConcreteVentilationStackReactorBuildingMathematicalModel(North-South)ReactorSupportStructure-SeismicReactorSupportStructure-ReactorBuildingReactorSupportStructure-ReactorBuildingandSeismicPlanofBuildingWallSection1WallSection1-Detail"A"WallSection1-Detail"B"WallSection1-Detail"C"WallSection1-Detail"D"WallSection1-Detail"E"WallSection2WallSection3WallSection3A-DetailsWallSection4WallSection4-Detail1WallSection4-Detail2WallSection5WallSection6WallSection7XVII-1XVII-2XVII-3XVII-4XVII-5XVII-6XVII-7XVII-8XVII-9XVII-10XVII-11AverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesforJanuary'63-'64forFebruary'63-'64forMarch'63-'64forApril'63-'64forMay'63-'64forJune'63-'64forJuly'63-'64forAugust'63-'64forSeptember'63-'64forOctober'63-'64forNovember'63-'64UFSARRevision14xlviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)FigureNumberTitleXVII-12XVII-13XVII-14XVII-15XVII-16XVII-17XVII-18XVII-19XVII-20XVII-21XVII-22XVII-23XVII-24XVII-25XVII-26XVII-27XVII-28XVII-29XVII-30XVII-31XVII-32XVII-33XVII-34XVII-35XVII-36XVII-37XVII-38AverageWindRosesforDecember'63-'64AverageWindRosesfor'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateJanuary'63-'64,February'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateMarch'63-'64,April'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateMay'63-'64,Junei63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateJuly'63-'64,August'63-64AverageDiurnalLapseRateSeptember'63-'64,October'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateNovember'63-'64,December'62-'63LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforJanuary'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforFebruary'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforMarch'63-64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforApril'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforMay'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforJune'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforJuly'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforAugust'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforSeptember'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforOctober'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforNovember'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulenceClassesforDecember'63-'64SectorMapCenterlineConcentrations-TurbulenceClassICenterlineConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIICenterlineConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIIICenterlineConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIVCenterlineConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIIBecomingClassIVat2kmandClassIIat23kmCenterlineConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIVBecomingClassIIat16kmUFSARRevision14xlviiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.)Figuregum~beTitleXVII-39XVII-40XVII-41XVII-42XVII-43XVII-44XVII-45XVII-46XVII-47XVII-48XVII-49XVII-50XVII-51XVII-52XVII-53XVI1-54XVII-55XVII-56XVII-57XVII-58XVII-59XVII-60XVII-61XVII-62XVII-63XVII-64XVII-65CenterlineConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIVBecomingClassIIat2kmRadialConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIRadialConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIIRadialConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIIIRadialConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIVRadialConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIIBecomingClassIVat2kmandClassIIat23kmRadialConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIVBecomingClassIIat16kmRadialConcentrations-TurbulenceClassIVBecomingClassIIat2kmCenterlineGammaDoseRates-TurbulenceClassICenterlineGammaDoseRates-TurbulenceClassIICenterlineGammaDoseRates-TurbulenceClassZIICenterlineGammaDoseRates-TurbulenceClassIVCenterlineGammaDoseRates-TurbulenceClassIIBecomingClassIVat2kmandClassIIat23kmCenterlineGammaDoseRates-TurbulenceClassIVBecomingClassIIat16kmCenterlineGammaDoseRates-TurbulenceClassIVBecomingClassIIat,2kmAssumedConcentrationandDoseRateDistributionsClosetotheElevatedSourceGammaDoseRateasaFunctionofayat1kmFromtheSourceSoutheasternLakeOntarioDilutionofRisingPlumeEstimatedLakeCurrentsatCoolingWaterDischargeTemperatureProfilesinanEastwardCurrentattheOswegoCityWaterIntakeSubsurfaceSectionPlotPlanLogofBoring(BoringCB-1)LogofBoring(BoringCB-2)LogofBoring(BoringCB-3)LogofBoring(BoringCB-4)AttenuationCurvesUFSARRevision14xlviiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARSECTIONIINTRODUCTIONANDSUMMARYThisreportissubmittedinaccordancewith10CFRPart50.71(e)entitled"PeriodicUpdatingofFinalSafetyAnalysisReports"forNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation's(NMPC)NineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit1(Unit1).TheStationislocatedonthesoutheastshoreofLakeOntario,inOswegoCounty,NewYork,7minortheastofthecityofOswego.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARA.PRINCIPALDESIGNCRITERIAThefollowingparagraphsdescribingtheprincipaldesigncriteriaareorientedtowardthetwenty-sevencriteriaissuedbytheUnitedStatesAtomicEnergyCommission(USAEC).+1.0GeneralTheStationisintendedasahighloadfactorgeneratingfacilitytobeoperatedasanintegralpartoftheNMPCsystem.TherecirculationflowcontrolsystemdescribedinSectionVIIIcontributestothisobjectivebyprovidingarelativelyfastmeansforadjustingtheStationoutputoverapreselectedpowerrange.Overallreliability,routineandperiodictestrequirements,andotherdesignconsiderationsmustalsobecompatiblewiththisobjective.CarefulattentionhasbeengiventofabricationproceduresandadherencetoCoderequirements.Therigidrequirementsofspecificportionsofvariouscodeshavebeenarbitrarilyappliedtosomesafety-relatedsystemstoensurequalityconstructioninsuchcaseswherethecompleteCodedoesnotapply.Forpiping,theASAB31.1-1955Codewasusedandwhereexceptionsweretaken,safetyevaluationswereperformedtodocumentthatanadequatemarginofsafetywasmaintained.Periodictestprogramshavebeendevelopedforrequiredengineeredsafeguardsequipment.Thesetestscovercomponenttestingsuchaspumpsandvalvesandfullsystemtests,duplicatingascloselyaspossibletheaccidentconditionsunderwhichagivensystemmustperform.2.0BuildingsandStructuresTheStationplotplan,designandarrangementofthevariousbuildingsandstructuresaredescribedinSectionIII.Principalstructuresandequipmentwhichmayserveeithertopreventaccidentsortomitigatetheirconsequencesaredesigned,fabricatedanderectedinaccordancewithapplicablecodestowithstandthemostsevereearthquake,floodingcondition,windstorm,icecondition,temperatureandotherdeleteriousnaturalphenomenawhichcanbeexpectedtooccuratthesite.3.0Reactor1~Adirect-cycleboilingwatersystemreactor(BWR),describedinSectionIV,isemployedtoproducesteam(1030psiginreactorvessel,956psigturbineinlet)foruseinasteam-driventurbinegenerator.Theratedthermaloutputofthereactoris1850MWt.2~ThereactorisfueledwithslightlyenricheduraniumdioxidecontainedinZircaloycladfuelrodsdescribedUFSARRevision14I-2June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3~4~inSectionIV.Selectedfuelrodsalsoincorporatesmallamountsofgadoliniumasburnablepoison.I,kToavoidfuel'damage,theminimumcriticalpowerratio(MCPR)ismaintainedgreaterthanthesafetylimitCPR.ThefuelrodcladdingisdesignedtomaintainitsintegritythroughouttheanticipatedfuellifeasdescribedinSectionIV.Fissiongasreleasewithintherodsandotherfactorsaffectingdesignlifeareconsideredforthemaximumexpectedburnup.5.Thereactorandassociatedsystemsaredesignedsothatthereisnoinherenttendencyforundampedoscillations.AstabilityanalysisevaluationisgiveninSectionIV.6.Heatremovalsystemsareprovidedwhicharecapableofsafelyaccommodatingcoredecayheatunderallcrediblecircumstances,includingisolationfromthemaincondenserandlossofcoolantfromthereactor.Eachdifferentsystemsoprovidedhasappropriateredundantfeatures.Independentauxiliarycoolingmeansareprovidedtocoolthereactorunderavarietyofconditions.ThenormalauxiliarycoolingmeansduringshutdownandrefuelingistheshutdowncoolingsystemdescribedinSectionX-A.Aredundantemergencycoolingsystem,describedinSectionV-E,isprovidedtoremovedecayheatintheeventthereactorisisolatedfromthemaincondenserwhilestillunderpressure.Additionalcoolingcapabilityisalsoavailablefromthehigh-pressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)systemandthefireprotectionsystem.7~Redundantandindependentcorespraysystemsareprovidedtocoolthecoreintheeventofaloss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA).Automaticdepressurizationisincludedtorapidlyreducepressuretoassistwithcoresprayoperation(seeSectionVII-A).Operationofthecorespraysystemassuresthatanymetal-waterreactionfollowingapostulatedLOCAwillbelimitedtolessthan1percentoftheZircaloyclad.Reactivityshutdowncapabilityisprovidedtomakeandholdthecoreadequatelysubcritical,bycontrolrodaction,fromanypoint.intheoperatingcycleandatanytemperaturedowntoroomtemperature,assumingthatanyonecontrolrodisfullywithdrawnandunavailableforuse.UFSARRevision14I-3June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThiscapabilityisdemonstratedinSectionIV-B.AphysicaldescriptionofthemovablecontrolrodsisgiveninSectionIV-B.Thecontrolroddrive(CRD)hydraulicsystemisdescribedinSectionX-C.Theforceavailabletoscramacontrolrodisapproximately3000lbatthebeginningofascramstroke.Thisiswellinexcessofthe440-lbforcerequiredintheeventoffuelchannelpinchingofthecontrolrodbladeduringaLOCA,asdiscussedinSectionXV.Evenwithscramaccumulatorfailureaforceofatleast1100lbfromreactorpressureactingaloneisavailablewithreactorpressuresinexcessof800psig.8~9.Redundantreactivityshutdowncapabilityisprovidedindependentofnormalreactivitycontrolprovisions.Thissystemhasthecapability,asshowninSectionVII-C,tobringthereactortoacoldshutdowncondition,K~<0.97,atanytimeinthecorelife,independentofthecontrolrodsystemcapabilities.Aflowrestrictorinthemainsteamline(MSL)limitscoolantlossfromthereactorvesselintheeventofaMSLbreak(SectionVII-F).4.0ReactorVessel1~Thereactorcoreandvesselaredesignedtoaccommodatetrippingoftheturbinegenerator,lossofpowertothereactorrecirculationsystemandothertransients,andmaneuverswhichcanbeexpectedwithoutcompromisingsafetyandwithoutfueldamage.Abypasssystemhavingacapacityofapproximately40percentofturbinesteamflowforthethrottlevalveswideopen(VWO)conditionpartiallymitigatestheeffectsofsuddenloadrejection.ThisandothertransientsandmaneuverswhichhavebeenanalyzedaredetailedinSectionXV.2~Separatesystemstopreventseriousreactorcoolantsystem(RCS)overpressureareincorporatedinthedesign.Theseincludeanoverpressurescram,solenoid-actuatedreliefvalves,safetyvalvesandtheturbinebypasssystem.AnanalysisoftheadequacyofRCSpressurereliefdevicesisincludedinSectionV-C.3~Powerexcursionswhichcouldreactivityadditionaccidenteitherbymotionorrupture,impairoperationofrequiredresultfromanycrediblewillnotcausedamage,tothepressurevesselorsafeguardssystems.UFSARRevision14I-4June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR4~Themagnitudeofcrediblereactivityadditionaccidentsiscurtailedbycontrolrodvelocitylimiters(SectionVII-D),byacontrolrodhousingsupportstructure(SectionVII-E),andbyproceduralcontrolssupplementedby'rodworthminimizer(RWM)(SectionVIII-C).PowerexcursionanalysesforcontrolroddropoutaccidentsareincludedinSectionXV.Thereactorvesselwillnotbesubstantiallypressurizeduntilthevesselwalltemperatureisinexcessofnilductilitytransitiontemperature(NDTT)+60'F.TheinitialNDTTofthereactorvesselmaterialisnogreaterthan40'F.ThechangeofNDTTwithradiationexposurehasbeenevaluatedinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide(RG)1.99Revision2.Vesselmaterialsurveillancesamplesarelocatedwithinthereactorvesseltopermitperiodicverificationofmaterialpropertieswithexposure.5.0Containment1~Theprimarycontainment,includingthedrywell,pressuresuppressionchamber,andassociatedaccessopeningsandpenetrations,isdesigned,fabricatedanderectedtoaccommodate,withoutfailure,thepressuresandtemperaturesresultingfromorsubsequenttothedouble-endedrupture(DER)orequivalentfailureofanycoolantpipewithinthedrywell.TheprimarycontainmentisdesignedtoaccommodatethepressuresfollowingaLOCAincludingthegenerationofhydrogenfromametal-waterreaction.PressuretransientsincludinghydrogeneffectsarepresentedinSectionXV.TheinitialNDTTfortheprimarycontainmentsystemisabout-20'FandisnotexpectedtoincreaseduringthelifetimeoftheStation.ThesestructuresaredescribedinSectionsVI-A,BandC.Additionaldetails,particularlythoserelatedtodesignandfabrication,areincludedinSectionXVI.2~Provisionsaremadefortheremovalofheatfromwithintheprimarycontainment,forreasonableprotectionofthecontainmentfromfluidjets'rmissilesandsuchothermeasuresasmaybenecessarytomaintaintheintegrityofthecontainmentsystemaslongasnecessaryfollowingaLOCA.Redundantcontainmentspraysystems,describedinSectionVII,pumpwaterfromthesuppressionchamberthroughindependentheatexchangerstospraynozzleswhichdischargeintothedrywellandsuppressionUFSARRevision14I-5June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARchamber.Watersprayedintothedrywellisreturnedbygravitytothesuppressionchambertocompletethecoolingcycle.StudiesperformedtoverifythecapabilityofthecontainmentsystemtowithstandpotentialfluidjetsandmissilesaresummarizedinSectionXVI.3~Provisionismadeforperiodicintegratedleakageratetests(ILRT)tobeperformedduringeachrefuelingandmaintenanceoutage.Provisionisalsomadeforleaktestingpenetrationsandaccessopeningsandforperiodicallydemonstratingtheintegrityofthereactorbuilding.TheseprovisionsarealldescribedinSectionVI-F.4~Thecontainmentsystemandallothernecessaryengineeredsafeguardsaredesignedandmaintainedsuchthat,offsitedosesresultingfrompostulatedaccidentsarebelowthevaluesstatedin10CFR100.TheanalysisresultsaredetailedinSectionXV.5.DoubleisolationvalvesareprovidedonalllinesdirectlyenteringtheprimarycontainmentfreespaceorpenetratingtheprimarycontainmentandconnectedtotheRCS.Periodictestingofthesevalveswillassuretheircapabilitytoisolateatalltimes.TheisolationvalvesystemisdiscussedindetailinSectionVI-D.6.Thereactorbuildingprovidessecondarycontainmentwhenthepressuresuppressionsystemisinserviceandservesastheprimarycontainmentbarrierduringperiodswhenthepressuresuppressionsystemisopen,suchasduringrefueling.ThisstructureisdescribedinSectionVI-C.Anemergencyventilationsystem(SectionVII-H)providesameansforcontrolledreleaseofhalogensandparticulatesviafiltersfromthereactorbuildingtothestackunderaccidentconditions.6.0ControlandInstrumentation1~TheStationisprovidedwithacontrolroom(SectionIII-B)whichhasadequateshieldingandotheremergencyfeaturestopermitoccupancyduringallcredibleaccidentsituations.2~Interlocksorotherprotectivefeaturesareprovidedtoaugmentthereliabilityofproceduralcontrolsinpreventingseriousaccidents.Interlocksystemsareprovidedwhichblockorpreventrodwithdrawalfromamultitudeofabnormalconditions.ThecontrolrodblocklogicisshownonFiguresVIII-6UFSARRevision14I-6June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARandVIII-8,respectively,forthesourcerangemonitor(SRM)andintermediaterangemonitor(IRM)neutroninstrumentation.Inthepowerrange,averagepowerrangemonitor(APRM)instrumentationprovidesbothcontrolrodandrecirculationflowcontrolblocks,asshownonFigureVIII-14.ReactivityexcursionsinvolvingthecontrolrodsareeitherpreventedortheirconsequencessubstantiallymitigatedbyacontrolRWM(SectionVIII-C.4.0)whichsupplementsproceduralcontrolsinavoidingpatternsofhighrodworths,alowpowerrangemonitor(LPRM)neutronmonitoringandalarmsystem(SectionVIII-C.1.1.3),andacontrolrodpositionindicatingsystem(SectionIV-B.6.0),bothofwhichenabletheOperatortoobserverodmovement,thusverifyinghisactions.AcontrolrodovertravelpositionlightverifiesthatthebladeiscoupledtoawithdrawnCRD.ArefuelingplatformoperationinterlockisdiscussedinSectionXV,RefuelingAccident,which,alongwithotherproceduresandsupplementedbyautomaticinterlocks,servestopreventcriticalityaccidentsintherefuelingmode.AcoldwateradditionreactivityexcursionispreventedbytheproceduresandinterlocksdescribedinSectionXV,StartupofColdRecirculationLoop(TransientAnalysis).Security(keycardandalarms)andproceduralcontrolsforthedrywellandreactorbuildingairlocksareprovidedtoensurethatcontainmentintegrityismaintained.3~Areliable,dual-logicchannelreactorprotectionsystem(RPS),describedinSectionVIII-A,isprovidedtoautomaticallyinitiateappropriateactionwhenevervariousparametersexceedpresetlimits.Eachlogicchannelcontainstwosubchannelswithcompletelyindependentsensors,eachcapableoftrippingthelogicchannel.Atripofone-of-twosubchannelsineachlogicchannelresultsinareactorscram.Thetripineachlogicchannelmayoccurfromunrelatedparameters,i.e.,highneutronfluxinonelogicchannelcoupledwithhighpressureintheotherlogicchannelwillresultinascram.TheRPScircuitryfailsinadirectiontocauseareactorscramintheeventoflossofpowerorlossofairsupplytothescramsolenoidvalves.Periodictestingandcalibrationofindividualsubchannelsisperformedtoassuresystemreliability.TheabilityoftheRPStosafelyterminateavarietyofStationmalfunctionsisdemonstratedinSectionXV.UFSARRevision14I-7June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR4~Redundantsensorsandcircuitryareprovidedfortheactuationofallequipmentrequiredtofunctionunderpostaccidentconditions.Thisredundancyisdescribedinthevarioussectionsofthetextdiscussingsystemdesign.7.0ElectricalPowerSufficientnormalandstandbyauxiliarysourcesofelectricalpowerareprovidedtoassureacapabilityforpromptshutdownandcontinuedmaintenanceoftheStationinasafeconditionunderallcrediblecircumstances.ThesefeaturesarediscussedinSectionIX.8.0RadioactiveWasteDisposal1~Gaseous,liquidandsolidwastedisposalfacilitiesaredesignedsothatdischargeofeffluentsisinaccordancewith10CFR20and10CFR50AppendixI.ThefacilitydescriptionsaregiveninSectionXII-AwhilethedevelopmentofappropriatelimitsiscoveredinSectionII.2~GaseousdischargefromtheStationisappropriatelymonitored,asdiscussedinSectionVIII,andautomaticisolationfeaturesareincorporatedtomaintainreleasesbelowthelimitsof10CFR20and10CFR50AppendixI.9.0ShieldingandAccessControlRadiationshieldingandaccesscontrolpatternsaresuchthatdoseswillbelessthanthosespecifiedin10CFR20.ThesefeaturesaredescribedinSectionXII-B.10.0FuelHandlingandStorageAppropriatefuelhandlingandstoragefacilitieswhichprecludeaccidentalcriticalityandprovideadequatecoolingforspentfuelaredescribedinSectionX.UFSARRevision14I-8June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARB.CHARACTERISTICSThefollowingisasummaryofdesignandoperatingcharacteristics.1.0SiteLocationSizeofSiteSiteandStationOwnershipNetElectricalOutput2.0ReactorOswegoCounty,NewYorkState900AcresNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation615MW(Maximum)ReferenceRatedThermalOutputDomePressureTurbineInletPressureTotalCoreCoolantFlowRateSteamFlowRate3.0CoreCircumscribedCoreDiameterActiveCoreHeight+Assembly4.0FuelAssemblyNumberofFuelAssembliesFuelRodArrayFuelRodPitchCladdingMaterialFuelMaterialActiveFuelLengthCladdingOutsideDiameterCladdingThicknessFuelChannelMaterial1850MW1030psig956psig67.5x10'lb/hr7.32x10'lb/hr167.16in171.125in532SRLR+Reference3Reference3UO,andUO,-Gd,03Reference3Reference3Reference3Reference35.0ControlSystemNumberofMovableControlRodsShapeofMovableControlRodsPitchofMovableControlRodsControlMaterialinMovableControlRodsTypeofControlDrives129Cruciform12.0inB4C-704TheoreticalDensity;HafniumBottomEntry,HydraulicActuatedUFSARRevision14I-9June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARControlofReactorOutputMovementofControlRodsandVariationofCoolantFlowRate6.0CoreDesignandOperatingConditionsMaximumLinearHeatGenerationRateHeatTransferSurfaceAreaAverageHeatFlux-RatedPowerInitialCriticalPowerRatioforMostLimitingTransientsCoreAverageVoidFraction-CoolantwithinAssembliesCoreAverageExitQuality-CoolantwithinAssembliesCoreOperatingLimitsReportCoreOperatingLimitsReport7.0DesignPowerPeakingFactorTotalPeakingFactorGE8x8EB-2.90GE11-2.94**2'2***8.0NuclearDesignDataAverageInitialVolumeMetricEnrichmentBeginningofCycle12-CoreEffectiveMultiplicationandControlSystemWorth-NoVoids,20C+UncontrolledFullyControlledStrongestControlRodOutReference31.0950'490'82*Theseparametersarerecalculatedforeachreloadbecauseoftheirdependencyoncorecompositionandexposure.ThesecalculatedvaluesareintermediatequantitiesthatdonotrepresentdesignrequirementsoroperatinglimitsandthusarenotseparatelyreportedintheSRLR+.Maximumtotalpeakingfactorfortheportionofthebundlecontainingpartlengthrods.*Maximumtotalpeakingfactorfortheregionabovethepartlengthrods.UFSARRevision14,I-10June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARStandbyLiquidControlSystemCapability:ShutdownMargin(dR)20CXenonFreeSRLR~~SRLR~>9.0ReactorVesselInsideDiameterInternalHeightDesignPressure17ft-9in63ft-10in1250psigat575'F10.0CoolantRecirculationLoopsLocationofRecirculationLoopsNumberofRecirculationLoopsandPumpsPipeSize11.0PrimaryContainmentTypeDesignPressureofDrywellVesselDesignPressureofSuppressionChamberVesselDesignLeakageRate12.0SecondaryContainmentContainmentDrywell28inPressureSuppression62psig35psig0.5weightpercentperdayat35psigTypeInternalDesignPressureDesignLeakageRate13.0StructuralDesignSeismicGroundAccelerationSustainedWindLoadingControlRoomShieldingReinforcedconcreteandsteelsuperstructurewithmetalsiding40lb/ft1004freevolumeperdaydischargedviastackwhilemaintaining0.25-inwaternegativepressureinthereactorbuildingrelativetoatmosphere0.11g125mph,300ftabovegroundlevelDosenottoexceedhourlyequivalent(basedon40-hrweek)ofmaximumpermissiblequarterlydosespecifiedin10CFR20UFSARRevision14I-11June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR14.0StationElectricalSystemIncomingPowerSourcesOutgoingPowerLinesOnsitePowerSourcesProvidedTwo115-kVtransmissionlinesTwo345-kVtransmissionlinesTwodieselgeneratorsTwosafety-relatedStationbatteriesOnenonsafety125-Vdcbatterysystem15.0ReactorInstrumentationSystemLocationofNeutronMonitorSensorsIn-coreRangesofNuclearInstrumentation:FourStartupRangeMonitorsEightIntermediateRangeMonitors120PowerRangeMonitorsSourceto0.014ratedpowerandto104withchamberretraction0.00034to104ratedpower14to1254ratedpower16.0ReactorProtectionSystemNumberofChannelsinReactorProtectionSystemNumberofChannelsRequiredtoScramorEffectOtherProtectiveFunctionsNumberofSensorsperMonitoredVariableineachChannel(Minimumforscramfunction)UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARC.IDENTIFICATIONOFCONTRACTORSTheGeneralElectricCompany(GE)wasengagedtodesign,fabricateanddeliverthenuclearsteamsupplysystem(NSSS),turbinegenerator,andothermajorelementsandsystems.GEalsofurnishedthecompletecor'edesignandnuclearfuelsupplyfortheinitialcoreandiscurrentlyfurnishingreplacementcores.NMPC,actingasitsownarchitect-engineer,specifiedandprocuredtheremainingsystemsandcomponents,includingthepressuresuppressioncontainmentsystem,andcoordinatedthecompleteintegratedStation.StoneandWebsterEngineeringCorporation(SWEC)wasengagedbyNMPCtomanagefieldconstruction.Currently,NMPCutilizesvariouscontractorstoassistincontinuousStationmodifications.UFSARRevision14I-13June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARD.GENERALCONCLUSIONSThefavorablesitecharacteristics,criteriaanddesignrequirementsofallthesystemsrelatedtosafety,thepotentialconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents,andthetechnicalcompetenceoftheapplicantanditscontractors,assurethatUnit1canbeoperatedwithoutendangeringthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.UFSARRevision14I-14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARE.REFERENCES1.USAECPressReleaseH-252,"GeneralDesignCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlantConstructionPermits,"November22,1965.2~3.GENE24A5157,Revision0,"SupplementalReloadLicensingReportforNMPl,Reload13,Cycle12,"January1995.GEFuelBundleDesigns,GeneralElectricCompanyProprietary,NEDE-31152P,February1993.UFSARRevision14I-15June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARSECTIONIISTATIONSITEANDENVIRONMENTA.SITEDESCRIPTION1.0GeneralTheNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit1(Unit1),ownedbyNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation(NMPC),islocatedonthewesternportionoftheNineMilePointpromontory.Approximately300ftdueeastisNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit2(Unit2).TheeasternportionofthepromontoryiscomprisedoftheJamesA.FitzPatrickNuclearPowerPlant,ownedbytheNewYorkPowerAuthority(NYPA).ThesiteisonLakeOntarioinOswegoCounty,approximately5minorth-northeastofthenearestboundaryofthecityofOswego.FigureII-1showstheStationlocationonanoutlinemapofthestateofNewYork.Itis230minorthwestofNewYorkCity,143.5mieast-northeastofBuffalo,and36minorth-northwestofSyracuse.FigureII-2isadetailedmapoftheareawithinabout50mioftheStation.2.0PhysicalFeaturesFigureII-3isadetailedsitemapshowingStationlocation;anassociatedplotplanispresentedasFigureIII-1ofthefollowingsection.Stationbuildingsaresituatedinthewesternquadrantofa200-acreclearedareacentrallylocatedalongthelakeshore.Sitepropertyconsistsofpartially-woodedlandformerlyusedalmostexclusivelyforresidentialandrecreationalpurposes.Formanymileswest,east,andsouthofthesitethecountryischaracterizedbyrollingterrainrisinggentlyupfromthelake.Gradeelevationatthesiteis10ftabovetherecordhighlakelevel,whileunderlyingrockstructureisamongthemoststructurallystableintheUnitedStates(U.S.)fromthestandpointoftiltingandfolding.Thereisnorecordofwaveactivity,suchasseicheortsunami,ofsuchamagnitudeastomakeinundationofthesitelikely.Ashoreprotectiondikecomposedofrockfillfromtheexcavationseparatesthebuildingsandthelake.AllelevationsinthisreportrefertotheUnitedStatesLandSurvey(USLS)1935data.1.Toconvertelevationsto1955InternationalGreatLakesData(IGLD1955),subtract0.375m(1.23ft).UFSARRevision14II-1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.Toconvertelevationsto1985InternationalGreatLakesData(IGLD1985),subtract0.217m(0.71ft).Exclusiondistancesforthesiteareapproximately1mitotheeast,amiletothesouthwest,andoveramiletothesouthernsiteboundary.3.0PropertyUseandDevelopmentTherearenoresidences,agriculturalorindustrialdevelopments(otherthantheJamesA.FitzPatrickNuclearPowerPlant)onthesite;allformersummerhomesandfarmbuildingshavebeenremoved.Siteboundariesandtheformercountryroadwhichtraversesthesitearepostedasprivateproperty.TheareaimmediatelyaroundtheStationbuildingsisfenced,withbuildingaccesscontrolledbyStationsecuritypersonnel.Avisitors'nergyInformationCenter,mannedbyNMPCandNYPApersonnel,andtheNiagaraMohawkNuclearLearningCenterarelocatedabout1,000ftwestoftheStation,perFigureII-3.Theseinstallationsmaybereachedbythepublicoverprivatedrivesmaintainedbythecompany.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARB.DESCRIPTIONOFAREAADJACENTTOTHESITE1.0GeneralTheStationislocatedontheLakeOntariocoastinthetownofScribainthenorth-centralportionofOswegoCounty,approximately5minorth-northeastofthenearestboundaryofthecityofOswego.1.1PopulationPopulationgrowthinthevicinityoftheStationhasbeenveryslow,withthecityofOswegoshowingadecreaseinpopulation.The1960censusenumerated22,155residentscomparedtoapproximately19,793peoplein1980.However,countypopulationincreasedfrom86,118in1960to113,901in1980.Thetotal1980populationwithin12mioftheStationisestimatedtobe46,349(seeFigureII-4).Thisareacontainsallorportionsofonecityandtentowns.PopulationandpopulationdensityforthetentownsandonecitywithinthisareaareshowninTableII-1.CountiesandtownswithinthisareaareshownonFigureII-5.Transientpopulationwithin12mioftheStationislimitedduetotherural,undevelopedcharacterofthearea.Thereare,however,anumberofschool,industrial,andrecreationalfacilitiesintheareathatcreatesmalldailyandseasonalchangesinareapopulations.Thepopulationwithina50-miareasurroundingtheStationwasapproximately914,193in1980(seeFigureII-6).ThecityofSyracuseisthelargestpopulationcenterwithinthisarea,withapopulationof170,105in1980.TableII-2listscitieswithinthis50-miradiuswithpopulationsover10,000.The50-miradiuscontainsportionsofthreeCanadianCensusDivisionslocatedintheprovinceofOntario:PrinceEdward,Frontenac,andAddington/Lennox.The1976populationcountstotaled22,559,108,052,and32,633,respectively.2.0Agriculture,IndustrialandRecreationalUse2.1AgriculturalUseTheareawithina50-miradiusofthesiteencompassesallorportionsoftenNewYorkcounties:Cayuga,Jefferson,Lewis,Madison,Oneida,Onondaga,Ontario,Oswego,Seneca,andWayne.Approximately37percentofthelandwithinthisten-countyregionisusedforagriculturalproduction.TablesII-3andII-4presentagriculturalstatisticsforthisten-countyregion.2.2IndustrialUseSeveralindustrialestablishmentsarelocatedinOswegoCounty,withtheAlcanAluminumCorporationandtheIndependenceUFSARRevision14II-3June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARGenerationPlantoperatedbySitheEnergiesUSAbeinglocatednearesttotheStation.ThelakeshoreeastofOswegoisthemostindustriallydevelopedareanearthesite.ThecitiesofFultonandMexicoaretheonlyotherindustrialsiteswithin15miofthesite.Twonaturalgaspipelinesliewithin8kmoftheplant;onepipelinesuppliestheIndependencePlantandtheothersuppliesIndeckEnergy.Bothpipelinesarelocatedonthenorth-southandeast-westtransmissionlinecorridors.ThemajorindustrialestablishmentsinOswegoCounty,theirlocations,andtheirprincipalproductsarelistedinTablesII-5andII-6.ThenearestpublicwatersupplyintakeinLakeOntarioislocatedapproximately8misouthwestoftheStationlocation.ThisintakesuppliesthecityofOswegoandOnondagaCounty.DataontheseandothervicinitypublicwatersuppliesarelistedinTableII-7.FigureII-2showsthelocationsofthecommunitieslisted.2.3RecreationalUseSeventeenstateparksandonenationalwildliferefugearelocatedwithina50-miradiusoftheStation.TableII-8identifiesthestateparksandtheirfacilities,capacities,andvisitorcounts.TheMontezumaNationalWildlifeRefugeislocatednorthofCayugaLakeinSenecaCounty,approximately44misouthwestoftheStation.UFSARRevision14II-4June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARC.METEOROLOGY~~~~Anoriginal2-yrstudywasperformedtodeterminethesitemeteorologicalcharacteristics.ThisstudyispresentedinSectionXVII-A.Themeteorologicalmonitoringsystemmeasuresparameterstoprovidedatathatarerepresentativeofatmosphericconditionsthatexistatallgaseouseffluentreleasepoints.MeteorologicaldataiscompiledforquarterlyperiodsinaccordancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.Thisdataisusedtoprovideinformationwhichmaybeusedtodevelopatmosphericdiffusionparameterstoestimatepotentialradiationdosestothepublicresultingfromactualroutineoraccidentalreleasesofradioactivematerialstotheatmosphere.UFSARRevision14II-5June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARD.LIMNOLOGYAcomprehensiveresearchprogram,designedtomonitorvariousparametersoftheaquaticenvironmentinthevicinityofNineMilePoint,wasbegunin1963.Thisdetailedlakeprogramwascontinuedthrough1978.Currently,anaquaticecologystudyprogram(closelycoordinatedwithJamesA.FitzPatrickNuclearPowerPlant)isconductedinthevicinityofNineMilePointonLakeOntariotomonitortheeffectsofplantoperationwithrespecttoselectedecologicalparameters,andtoperformimpingementstudiesonthetravelingscreensintheintakescreenwell.ThisprogramiscarriedoutandresultsreportedinaccordancewiththestationStatePollutantDischargeEliminationSystem(SPDES)DischargePermit.UFSARRevision14II-6June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARE.EARTHSCIENCES~~Apreconstructionevaluationofthegeology,hydrology,andseismologyoftheNineMilePointpromontoryispresentedinSectionXVII-C.Subsequentinspectionofrockexposedduringexcavationsforthereactorandcoolingwatertunnelsallowedforamoredetailedstudyofsubsurfaceconditions.Nofaultswereencounteredandnounusualconditionswereobserved.Thestructuresrestonafirm,almostimperviousrockfoundation.Stationseismicdesigncriteriawerebaseduponaconservativeevaluationofthemaximumearthquakegroundmotionwhichmightconceivablyoccuratthesite.Thisconditionwascalculatedbyassumingthattheworstshockeverobservedwithinaneffectiverangeofthesitemightbelocatedat,theclosestpositiontothesiteatwhichanearthquakeofanyintensityoccurred.The"maximumpossible"shockassumedforStationstructureaccelerationcalculationsisofmagnitude7ata50-miepicentraldistance.DamesandMooreestimatesthatthisshockwillprobablyneveroccurunlessunusualregionalgeologicchangestakeplace.UFSARRevision14II-7June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARF.ENVIRONMENTALRADIOLOGYControlledreleasesofradioactivematerialsinliquidandgaseouseffluentstotheenvironmentispartofnormalStationoperation.ARadiologicalEnvironmentalMonitoringProgramensuresthatthereleaseratesforalleffluentsarewithinthelimitsspecifiedin10CFR20andthereleaseofradioactivematerialabovebackgroundtounrestrictedareasconformswithAppendixIto10CFR50.Comprehensivestudieswereoriginallyconductedtoestablishtheeffluentemissionrateswhichwouldproducetheabovelimitingconditionsintheuncontrolledenvironment.Currently,aRadiologicalEnvironmentalMonitoringProgram~,inclusiveofUnit1,isinoperation.Thisprogramdetailsthedesignobjectivesforcontrolofliquidandgaseouswastes,includingspecificationsforliquidandgaseouswasteeffluents,.andspecificationsforliquidandgaseouswastesamplingandmonitoring.AnannualEnvironmentalOperatingReportandSemiannualRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportsarepreparedandsubmittedinaccordancewiththereportingrequirementsintheTechnicalSpecifications.UFSARRevision14II-8June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARG.REFERENCES~~~1.NineMilePointNuclearStation"TechnicalSpecificationsandBases".UFSARRevision14II-9June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-11980POPULATIONANDPOPULATIONDENSITYFORTOWNSANDCITIESWITHIN12MILESOFNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1CityofOswegoOswego(town)GranbyRichlandScribaVolneyMexicoHannibalPalermoNewHavenMinetto1980Poulation19,7937,8656,3415,5945,4555i3584,7904,0273,2532,4211,905PopulationDensityPeolePerSareMile2665.2302.7142.9105.9137.0119.1108.399'81.882.1325.0UFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-2CITIESWITHINA50-MILERADIUSOFTHESTATIONWITHPOPULATIONSOVER10,000~CitNewarkVillageClayCiceroManliusDewittSyracuseGeddesCamillusOnondagaVanBurenSalinaFultonOswegoOneidaRomeWatertown~CountWayneOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOswegoOswegoMadisonOneidaJeffersonPopulation1980Census10/01752,83823,68928,48926,868170,10518,52824,33317,82412,58537,40013/31219,79310,81043,82627,861UFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-3REGIONALAGRICULTURALUSECountyCayugaJeffersonLewisMadisonOneidaOnondagaOntarioOswegoSenecaWayneAgriculturalUse(squaremiles)560847373407612336511267299Corn(AllPurposes)(acres)84,00242,50114,201"28,00135,60145,00259,10113,20031,50240,499Wheat(acres)11,9994994001,4014,90021,50011,00116,5015,001Fruit(acres)3951732221,0972,33084595425,125Totals(acres)96,39643,00014,20128,57437,22450,99982,93125,04648,95770,625Totals4,630393,61073,20231,141497,953SOURCE:NMP2EnvironmentalReport,Tables2.2-9and2.2-10UPSARRevision141of18une1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-4REGIONALAGRICULTURALSTATISTICS-CATTLEANDMILKPRODUCTIONCayugaCountyJeffersonCountyLewisCountyMadisonCountyOneidaCountyOnondagaCountyOntarioCountyOswegoCountySenecaCountyWayneCountyRegionStateAllCattleandCalves51,00084,00059,00060,00065,00032,50033,00025,50011,50019,000440,5001,780,000BeefCows2,2002,6006001,6002,5002,5001,6002,3001,0001,80018,70085,000MilkCows25,00044,00032,50035,50033,50017,00011,50011,5004,3008,500223,300912,000AverageMilkProduction/Cow(lb)12,20011,10012,30011,80011,30013,20011,90011,40011,20010,40011,68011,488SOURCES:2.3.NewYorkCropReportingService,CattleInventorybyCounty-1980;Albany,NY,1980NewYorkCropReportingService,MilkProduction-1978,Albany,NY.1979NewYorkCropReportingService,NewYorkAgriculturalStatistics-1978,Albany,NY,1979UFSARRevision14lof1June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-5INDUSTRIALFIRMSWITHIN8KM(5MI)OFUNIT1FirmAlcanAluminumCorporationDistance/DirectionfromSitekm4.5/SWProductsAluminumsheetandplateEmloent1,000JamesA.FitzPatrick(1/ENuclearPowerPlantElectricalgeneration500NineMilePointUnit2SitheEnergiesUSAIndependenceGenerationPlantAdjacenttoUnit13.5/SWElectricalgenerationElectricalgeneration1,10075NOTEForcompletelistingofmajorindustriesinOswegoCounty,referenceOswegoCountyIndustrialDirectory.UFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-6PUBLICUTILITIESINOSWEGOCOUNTYNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationNewYorkTelephoneCompanyPennCentralRailroadOswegoCountyTelephoneCompanyAlltelNewYork,Inc.NewYorkPowerAuthorityLocationManysitesManysitesOswegoFultonManysitesServiceGasandElectricCommunications'ShippingCommunicationsCommunicationsGasandElectricUFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEZZ-7PUBLICWATERSUPPLYDATAFORLOCATIONSWITHINANAPPROXIMATE30-MILERADIUSDistancefromSite(miles)DirectionfromSiteTownAverageOutput(mgd)SourceofWater0-1010-2020-30SWSWESEENESSENESEENESSESSWSSWSWNESWOnondaga(County)OswegoMexicoPulaskiFultonSandyCreekCentralSquareOrwellPhoenixBaldwinsvilleFairhavenCatoWolcottAdamsRedCreek3690.50.320.20.08Notavailable0.3510.150.0330.2200.30.03LakeOntario(intakeatOswego)LakeOntarioThreewells>two40-ftdeep,one38-ftdeepSpringsTwelvewells,30-to70-ftdeep;twowells,21-ftdeepTwowells,21-ftdeepOnewell,24-ftdeepSpringTwowells;one25-ftdeep,one45-ftdeepFourwells;one93-ftdeep,threeshallowwellsSpring;onewell,46-ftdeepThreewells;two55-ftdeep,one70-ftdeepLakeOntarioSpringsWellsandspringsSOURCE:NineMilePointUnit2PSARUFSARRevision141of1June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-8RECREATIONALAREASINTHEREGIONParkSelkirkShoresBattleIslandFrenchmanIslandFairHavenBeachSouthwickBeachWestcottBeachLongPointCedarPointBurnhamPointWhetstoneGulfChittenangoFallsVeronaBeachLock23BrewertonGreenLakesClarkReservationDistanceandDirectionfromUnit(miles)9.8NE10.5S26.7SE18.3SW19.1NE29.3NE36.0NE47.8NE45.4NE48.0ENE47.2ENE41.9SE21.6SSE38.7SSE39.1SSECountyOswegoOswegoOswegoCayugaJeffersonJeffersonJeffersonJeffersonJeffersonLewisMadisonMadisonOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaAcreage9802352684547231923122,0001831,7351,101290Activities/FacilitiesCamping,picnicking,hiking,swimmingGolfing,fishing,hikingFishing,hiking,picnicking,boatingCamping,picnicking,boating,fishingCamping,picnicking,boating,fishing,swimming,hikingCamping,picnicking,boating,fishing,swimming,hikingCamping,picnicking,boating,fishing,swimmingCamping,picnicking,boating,fishing,swimmingCamping,picnicking,boating,fishing,swimmingCamping,picnicking,swimming,hikingCamping,picnicking,hikingPicnicking,swimmingPicnicking,boatingCamping,picnicking,hiking,boating,fishing,swimmingPicnicking,hiking,playgroundTotalCapacity(No.ofPeople)3,6463031006,2474,4014,4947541,8535531,9816994,3741193,3611,255VisitorCount(April1979-March1980)305,00040,000352,00070,00072,0009,00060,00015,00028,000115,000305,0001,015,000356,000UFSARRevision14lof2June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEIZ-8(Cont'd.)ParkCayugaLakeChimneyBluffsDistanceandDirectionfromUnit(miles)45.7SSW30.8WSWCountySenecaWayneAcreage135597Activities/FacilitiesCamping,picnicking,swimming,boating,playgroundCamping,picnicking,swimming,boating,playgroundTotalCapacity(No.ofPeople)3,2701,036VisitorCount(April1979-March1980)129,00030,000NOTE:Allfacxlxtesareseasonal(summer)NotavailableUFSARRevision142of2June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARSECTIONIIIBUILDINGSANDSTRUCTURESThestructuraldesignofbuildingsandcomponentsisbasedonthemaximumcredibleearthquakemotionoutlinedinVolumeIIofthePreliminaryHazardsSummaryReport(PHSR).Specifically,thismaximummotionconsistsofamagnitude7(IntensityIX)shockatanepicentraldistanceof50mifromthesite.Themaximumgroundmotionaccelerationis11percentofgravityandthemaximumresponseaccelerationis45percentofgravityforoscillationsintheperiodrangeof0.2to0.3sec.AllcriticalstructuresfortheStationweresubjectedtoadynamicresponseanalysisforthedeterminationofmaximumstressesinthestructure.ClassIstructuresandcomponentswhosefailurecouldcausesignificantreleaseofradioactivity,orwhicharevitaltosafeshutdownandisolationofthereactor,weredesignedsothattheprobabilityoffailurewouldapproachzerowhensubjectedtothemaximumcredibleearthquakemotion.(Accelerationresponsespectrum,PlateC-22,SectionIII,FirstSupplementtothePHSR.)Functionalloadstressesresultingfromnormaloperationwhencombinedwithstressesduetoearthquakeaccelerationsarewithintheestablishedworking*stressesforthematerialinvolvedinthestructureorcomponent.Primaryloadstresses,whencombinedwithstressesduetotemperatureandpressure,togetherwithstressesduetoearthquakeaccelerations,arewithinapplicablecodeorworking*values.ClassIIstructuresandcomponentsweredesignedforstresseswithintheapplicablecodesrelatingtothesestructuresandcomponentswhensubjectedtofunctionaloroperatingloads.Stressesresultingfromthecombinationofoperatingloadsandearthquakeloadsorwindloadshavebeenlimitedtostresses331/3percentaboveworking*stressesinaccordancewithapplicablecodes.ClassIIIstructuresandcomponentsarethoseofaservicenaturenotessentialforsafereactorshutdownandisolation,andfailureofwhichwouldnotresultinsignificantreleaseofradioactivematerials.Thesestructuresweredesignedonthebasisofapplicablebuildingcodeswithseismicandwindrequirements.AllmajorcomponentsintheStationwereclassifiedasaboveandanalyzedtotheappropriatedegree.Vitalfluidcontainerswereanalyzedanddesignedforhydrodynamicpressuresresultingfromearthquakemotion.Asaresultofdeflectiondeterminations,*AlsoseeSectionXVI,SubsectionG.UFSARRevision14III-1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARprovisionsweremadeforrelativemotionbetweenadjacentcomponentsandstructureswheredamagemightresultfromdifferentialmovementandimpactstresses.AlistofthestructuresandcomponentsreviewedforseismicdesigniscontainedonpagesIII-1,III-2andIII-3oftheFirstSupplementtothePHSR.StressesinthevariousstructuralmemberswereinvestigatedaftertheearthquakeanalysiswascompletedtoverifythatstressesareincompliancewiththosespecifiedintheconventionalcodessuchasthoseoftheAmericanInstituteofSteelConstruction,AmericanConcreteInstitute,andotherapplicablecodessuchastheNewYorkStateBuildingCode.AllmajorstructuresarefoundedonverysubstantialOswegosandstonewhichexistsonthesiteatanaverageof11ftbelowgrade.Thiseliminatesthepotentialproblemsofsoilconsolidationanddifferentialsettlement.FigureIII-1isaplotplanshowingtherelationshipofstructures.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARA.TURBINEBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsExteriorloadingsforwind,snowandiceusedinthedesignoftheturbinebuildingmeetallapplicablecodesasaminimum.Theroofanditssupportingstructurearedesignedtowithstandaloadingof40psfofsnoworice.Thewallsandbuildingstructurearedesignedtowithstandanexternalloadingof40psfofsurfacearea,whichisapproximatelyequivalenttoawindvelocityof125mphatthe30-ftlevel.1.2PressureReliefDesignTopreventfailureofthesuperstructureduetoasteamlinebreak,awallareaof1800fthasbeenattachedwithboltsthatwillfailduetoaninternalpressureofapproximately45psf,thusrelievinginternalpressure.Wallorbuildingstructurefailurewouldoccurataninternalpressureinexcessof80psf.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheturbinebuildingisdesignedasaClassIIstructure.ComponentsareeitherClassIIorClassI,asoutlinedonpages-III-1,III-2andIII-3oftheFirstSupplementtothePHSR.Ananalysisoftheturbinebuildingresultedintheuseofthefollowingearthquakedesigncoefficientsforthemajorcomponents.ComonentPercentGravitCommentFeedwaterheatersanddraincoolersupportstructuresTurbinegeneratorfoundation16.0-20.5(calculationused:20.0horizontal10.0vertical)23.4N-Shorizontal26.7E-WhorizontalBasedonspecificdynamicanalysisBasedonspecificdynamicanalysisCondensersupportstructure11.0horizontal5.5verticalBasedonspecificdynamicanalysisForthefollowingcomponents,percentgravitywas20.0horizontaland10.0vertical,basedontheUniformBuildingCode.UFSARRevision14III-3June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARSteelstructuresupportingemergencycondensermakeupwaterstoragetanksanddemineralizedwaterstoragetank,andcondensatedemineralizer(CND)ClassIMotorgenerator(MG)setsforreactorrecirculatingpumpmotors150/35-tonoverheadtravelingcraneStructuralanchorssupportingmainsteam,offgas,etc.,pipingAnchorboltsandassociatedbasesandframeforsupportofalltanks,filtersandpumpsaswellaselectricalequipment.(Powerboards,controlconsoles,etc.)SupportsformoistureseparatorsandreheatersClassIIClassIIClassIClassesI&IIClassIIStressesresultingfromthefunctionaloroperatingloadsarewithinapplicablecodesrelatingtothesestructuresandcomponents.Stressesresultingfromthecombinationofoperatingloadsandearthquakeorwindloadshavebeenlimitedinaccordancewithapplicablecodestoa331/3-percentincreaseinallowablestresses*.Theadjoiningwallsoftheturbineandreactorbuildingsuperstructuresarestructurallyseparatedtoprovidefordissimilardeformationsduetoearthquakemotion.1.4HeatingandVentilationHeatingandventilationisprovidedforequipmentprotection,personnelcomfortandforcontrollingpossibleradioactivityreleasetotheatmosphere.1.5ShieldingandAccessControlShieldingisprovidedaroundmuchoftheequipmenttolimitdoserates,asdescribedinSectionXII.Normalaccesstotheturbinebuildingisprovidedthroughtheadministrationbuilding.2.0StructureDesignTheturbinebuildinghousesthepowergenerationandalliedequipment.TheequipmentarrangementandprincipaldimensionsareshownonFiguresIII-2throughIII-11.*AlsoseeSectionXVI,SubsectionG.UFSARRevision14III-4June1996 NineMilePoint.Unit1FSAR2.1GeneralStructuralFeaturesThepoured-in-placereinforcedconcretebuildingsubstructureandturbinegeneratorfoundationarefoundedonfirmOswegosandstone15ftto25ftbelowgrade.Themaximumbearingpressureontherock,asrecommendedbyconsultants,is40tons/sqft.Thisresultsinasafetyfactorof18basedonactualunconfinedcompressivestrengthtestsonselectedspecimensofrockcoreextractedfromtestborings.Someoftheactualbearingpressuresontheconfinerockareasfollows.StructureMaximumRockBearinPressureBuildingcolumnpiersCranecolumnpiersWallsbelowgradeTurbinegeneratorfoundation27tons/sqft20tons/sqft13tons/sqft24tons/sqftTheturbinegeneratorfoundationisisolatedfromthefloorsofthebuildingtominimizetransmissionofvibrationtothefloors.Thisfoundationisdesignedforstabilityunderallconditionsofloading,includingvertical,horizontalandtorqueloads,andloadsduetotemperaturechanges,pipingandseismicforces.Elasticdeflectionandverticalshorteningofmembersandstressesresultingfromsuchloadingweretakenintoconsideration.Theturbinebuildingsuperstructureconsistsofanenclosedstructuralsteelframe.Thelower24ftofbuildingiscoveredwith8-inthickinsulatedprecastconcretewallpanels.Fromthe24-ftleveltotheroof,thebuildingisenclosedwithinsulatedmetalwallpanelsmadeupoftypeFK16x16andFKX12x12metallic-coatedinteriorlinerelements,11/2-ininsulationwithaminimumdensityof21/2pcfand16B&SgageF-2porcelainizedaluminumexteriorfacesheets,allmanufacturedbyH.H.RobertsonCompany.Theroofiscoveredwithmetaldecking,insulation,anda4-plytarroofingmaterialflashedattheparapetwalls.Anoverheadrollingdooratthewestendofthebuildingprovidesrailcaraccessintothebuilding.2.2HeatingandVentilationSystemTheturbinebuildingventilatingsystem,shownonFigureIII-12,isdesignedtoprovidefilteredandheatedairatanapproximaterateofonechangeperhour,correspondingto170,000cfm.Twoindependentairsupplysystemsareprovided,eachconsistingofafreshairintake,filter,electricheatingunit,flowcontroldamper,twofans,dampersandductworktodistributeairtoUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARvariousareasintheturbinebuilding.Eachfansystemiscapableofsupplyingone-halfoftherequiredair,andeitherofthetwofansineachsystemisconsideredaninstalledspare.Theairductelectricalheatingunitsareautomaticallycontrolledtomaintainthesupplyairtemperatureatthedesiredlevel.Theexhaustairsystemconsistsoftwofull-capacityfans,withonefanconsideredaninstalledspare,andconnectingductworkdesignedtoinduceflowofairthroughareasofprogressivelyhighercontaminationpotentialpriortofinaldischargetothestack.Anairinletislocatedineachroomandateachpieceofequipmentorotherplacewhereradioactivecontaminationintheformofdust,gasorvaporcouldbereleased.Ductsfromtheseareasleadtoanexhaustairmanifoldwitheachducthavingamanuallysetcontroldamper.Theradiationprotectionandlaboratoryfacilitiesventilatingsystem,shownonFigureIII-13,dischargesdirectlytotheturbinebuildingexhaustduct.Incasepowertotheturbinebuildingventilationsystemislost,analternateoutsidesourceoffilteredandheatedairisavailabletothelaboratoryarea.Thisareaincludesthetechnician'soffice,instrumentstorageroom,highlevellab,lowlevellab,countingroom,auxiliarycountingroomandinstrumentcalibrationroom.Ashuntcircuitdrawsairfromtheexhaustmanifoldandmonitorsitsairborneradioactivity.Thecircuitislocatedsothatitmonitorsbuildingairconditionsandnottheexhaustfromequipmentvents.HighactivitycausesalarmintheStationcontrolroom.Theexhaustsystemdischargesintotheplenumwhichalsoreceivesairfromthecontainmentandotherbuildings,asshownonFigureVI-24.Backflowfromothersystemstotheturbinebuildingispreventedbyinterlockswhichrequirevalvestobeclosediftheexhaustfansarenotinoperation.Theturbinebuildingatmosphereisautomaticallycontrolledatanegativepressureofabout0.1inofwaterrelativetotheoutsidebymodulatingtheflowcontroldampersontheairsupplysystems.Thisistocontrolreleaseofcontaminatedairandpreventout-leakage.Whentheturbinebuildingroofventsareopenedduringoperation,theturbinebuildingdifferentialpressuremayapproachzeroinlocalizedareas.Insuchcases,supplementalmonitoringisinstitutedtopreventanunmonitoredreleasetotheenvironment.ElectricalheatersareprovidedinvariousareasofthebuildingforauxiliaryheatshouldtheventilationsystemnotbeinUFSARRevision14III-6June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARoperationforanyreason.Water-cooledheatexchangercoolingunitsareprovidedinareassurroundingtheextractionheaters,moistureseparators,condensatecirculatingpumpsandreheaterstodissipatetheradiantheatlossfromthisequipmentandtomaintaindesiredtemperaturesforpersonnelcomfortandequipmentprotection.Thecoolingwaterissuppliedfromtheturbinebuildingclosedloopcoolingwater(TBCLCW)system.2.3SmokeandHeatRemovalSmokeandheatremovalcapabilityisprovidedforthethreesmokezonesonel250oftheturbinebuildingandtheupperelevationoftheturbinebuilding.Twelvemotor-operatedventsareinstalledintheroofovertheturbinegenerator,andfivesidewallventsareinstalledinthewallatel351.Afirewhichproduceslowheatbutalargeconcentrationofsmokewillbeventedthroughtheroofandsidewallvents.Thiscapabilityisprovidedbymanualactuationofthemotor-operatedvents.Highheatandhighsmokefireswillautomaticallyopentheroofventswhenthefusiblelinktrips.Inaddition,therailroadaccessdooronel261willberemotelyopenedtoassistinsmokepurging.2.4ShieldingandAccessControlPersonnelaccessintotheturbinebuildingiscontrolledfromtheadministrationbuildingatel248'-0".AnelevatorforoperatingpersonnelservestheentiresevenfloorlevelsintheturbinebuildingandislocatedatHrowbetweencolumnlines11and12(FiguresIII-4throughIII-9).Stairsarealsoprovidedalongsidethepersonnelelevatortoservethesevenfloorlevels.Inadditiontothemainorfull-height.stairs,stairsareprovidedatfourlocationsatgradeforaccessibilitytofloorsabovegrade,andatsevenlocationstoservefloorsbelowatel250and237.Walls,floorsandroofsaroundequipmentcontainingradioactivityaredesignedtohaveconcretethicknesseswhichsignificantlyreduceradiationlevels,asdiscussedinSectionXII.3.0SafetyAnalysisTheturbinebuildingwallsareofnoncombustiblematerialconsistingofpoured-in-placeconcrete,precastconcrete,orinsulatedmetalpanels.Theturbineroominternalroofalsoconsistsofnoncombustiblematerial.Metaldeckingspansthesteelpurlinsandiscoveredwithrigidinsulationand4-plybuilt-uproofingmaterial.Allfloorsareofnoncombustiblematerial:eitherpouredconcreteorsteelgrating.Pressurerelieftopreventfailureofthesuperstructureduetoasteamlinebreakhasbeenprovidedinthemetalwallsidingonthenorthwallofthecranebay(columnRowC).UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARAperipheraldrainattheexteriorofthebuildingprovidesfortheremovalofgroundwaterseepageanddischargesintoasumppitwithpumpatthelowpointofallthebuildings(southwestexteriorcornerofthereactorbuilding).Arockdike1000-ftlongattheshorelineprotectstheStationfromlakewaveactionorpossibleiceaccumulation.Thedikeis2fthigherthanyardgradeandisconstructedofrockfromtheStationexcavation.Largerocksfacethelakesideofthedikeandhaveprovenveryeffectiveinwavedampingandasabarriertofloatingice.Theturbinebuildinggradeflooratel261is12ftabovemaximumlakelevel(el249).Poured-in-placeconcretefoundationsenclosetheturbinebuildingbelowgradefloorlevel,andpreformedrubberwaterstopsareincorporatedintheconcreteconstructionjointsforwatertightness.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARB.CONTROLROOMThecontrolroomislocatedinthesoutheastcorneroftheturbinebuildingatel277.Itisboundedbytheadministrationbuildingofficesonthesouthandeast,theturbineroomonthewest,andthecontrolroombreakarea,instrumentationandcontrol(I&C)officearea,anddieselbuildingonthenorth.1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindandsnowloadingsforthecontrolroomarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsforthecontrolroom.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThestructuraldesignforthecontrolroom,aswellastheauxiliarycontrolroombelowatel261,isClassIseismicbasedonthemaximumcredibleearthquakemotionoutlinedintheintroductiontoSectionIII.ComponentsarealsodesignedasClassI.Theseismicanalysisresultedintheapplicationofaccelerationfactorsof20.0percentgravityhorizontaland10.0percentgravityvertical.Theseaccelerationfactorswerecalculatedfromthedynamicanalysisoftheturbinebuilding.Althoughthecontrolroomisstructurallyapartoftheturbinebuilding,functionalloadstresseswhencombinedwithstressesduetoearthquakeloadingaremaintainedwithintheestablishedworkingstresses*forthestructuralmaterialinvolved.1.4HeatingandVentilationHeatingandairconditioningareprovidedforpersonnelcomfortandinstrumentprotection.Theventilatingsystemalsoprovidescleanairtothecontrolroomfollowinganaccident.1.5ShieldingandAccessControlNormalaccesstothecontrolroomisprovidedfromtheadministrationbuildingthroughsecurity-controlleddoors.Shieldingissuppliedtoallowcontinuousoccupancyduringanyreactoraccident.Themostlimitingaccidentsarethemainsteamline(MSL)breakaccidentandtheloss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA)withoutcorespray,whicharedescribedinSectionXV.As*AlsoseeSectionXVI,SubsectionG.UFSARRevision14III-9June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARstatedintheFirstSupplementtothePHSR,personnelinthecontrolroomwouldnotreceivemorethanthehourlyequivalentofthemaximumpermissiblequarterlyradiationdoseaccordingto10CFR20.Inaddition,theconcentrationofradioactivematerialsinthecontrolroomduringallcredibleaccidentswouldbewithinthelimitsforrestrictedareasgiveninParagraph20.103andTableI,AppendixBof10CFR20.Ifairoutsidethebuildingiscontaminated,theventilatingsystemwillbecontrolledtoassurethatcontaminationwithinthecontrolroomisminimizedandkeptwithintheabovelimits,asshowninSection3.0,following.2.0StructureDesignPlansshowinglocationandprincipaldimensionsareshownonFiguresIII-4,III-5,andIII-6.2.1GeneralStructuralFeaturesThestructuralsteelenclosingthecontrolroomandtheauxiliarycontrolroombelowissupportedonconcretewallsandconcretefoundationsbearingonandkeyedintosoundrock.Actualrockbearingpressuresarelessthanone-thirdoftheallowableworkingbearingpressure.Lateralearthquakeforcesorwindloadsaretransmittedtotheconcretefoundationsbythecombinationofstructuralsteelbracingandconcretewalls.Thecontrolroomwalls,roofandfloorsareframedwithstructuralsteel.Thewestandnorthinteriorwallsare12-insolidreinforcedconcrete.TheeastwallisenclosedwithinsulatedmetalwallpanelsmadeupofFK-16x16metallic-coatedinteriorlinerelements,11/2-ininsulationand16B6SgageF-2porcelainizedaluminumexteriorfacesheets,asmanufacturedbyH.H.RobertsonCompany.Thewallpaneljointsaresealedwithasyntheticelastomercaulkingmaterial.Thiswallisseparatedfromtheadministrationbuildingextensionbya3-inrattlespace.Thesouthinteriorwallconsistsof8-inconcreteblockslaidwithsteel-reinforcedmortarjoints.Aninteriormetalpartitionwallparalleltothesouthwallformsa6'-6"corridorandisprovidedwithwindowsforobservingthecontrolroomoperationsfromthecorridor.Theslabimmediatelyabovethecontrolroomatel300ispinnedtothewallsandprovidesradiationshielding,andconsistsof81/2-inthickpoured-in-placereinforcedconcretesupportedonstructuralsteelbeamframing.Two-thirdsofthisslabareahasaroofaboveatel333whichismadeupof3-indeepmetaldecking,2inofinsulationanda5-plyroofwithslagsurface.Theremainingthirdoftheslabareaprovidesashieldingroofoverthecontrolroomandconsistsofthe81/2-inthickpoured-in-placereinforcedconcreteslabtowhichisapplied11/2inofrigidinsulationanda5-plyroofwithslagsurface.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThecontrolroomfloorispoured-in-placereinforcedconcreteon14-gaugemetaldecking.Thegrossdepthofthefloorslabis8inandtheaveragedepthofconcreteis53/4in.2.2Heating,VentilationandAirConditioningSystemTheventilationsystemshownonFigureIII-14isdesignedtoprovideairatarateofapproximately16,300cfmtothecontrolroomandauxiliarycontrolroomareas.Outsideairentersthesystemthroughalouveredintakeafterwhichitpassesthroughanormalsupplyisolationdamper,whichisinterlockedwithanemergencyventilationinletdamper.Theairthenpassesintotheoutsideairmixdamperwhichissetat100-percentopenposition.Outsideairisneededtorecoupairfromleakageandlosses.Theairisthenmixedwithrecirculatedreturnairfromtherecirculationdamperwhichissetat12,750cfmminimum.Thetotalamountofair(16,300cfm)willthenpassthroughatwo-elementdustfilter.Next,itpassesthroughacoolingcoilwhereitwillbecooled,ifnecessary,tomaintainthecontrolroomtemperatureatapproximately75F.Thecooledairentersthecontrolroomcirculationfanfordistributiontovariousareasthroughducts.Airwillcirculatethroughthecontrolroomtothereturnductworkforrecirculationandmixingwithadditionaloutsideair.Inordertopreventinfiltrationofpotentiallycontaminatedair,doorsareweatherstrippedandpenetrationsaresealedtomaintainapositivepressureofapproximatelyone-sixteenthofaninchofwater.Intheeventofoutsideaircontamination,thenormalsupplydamperswillbeautomaticallyclosed,anduponahighradiationsignal,theemergencyinletdamperswillbeopened.Theoutsideairwillthenflowthrougha15-kWductheaterandthenoneofthetwofull-capacitycontrolroomemergencyventilationfans.Thedesignflowrangeforthecontrolroomemergencyventilationsystemis2875cfm+10percent.Thisistheairflowrangedeterminedtomaintainapositivepressureof0.0625inW.G.Itthenpassesthroughahigh-efficiencyparticulatefilterandthenthroughaheatedactivatedcharcoalfilterunit.Thisairwillthenjointhenormalductworkandentertheoutsideairmixdampertobecirculatedbythenormalventilationfan.Heatingisprovidedbythermostatically-controlledventilationductheaters.Coolingisprovidedbytwochillerunits.TestsandinspectionsonthecontrolroomemergencyventilationfiltersaredoneinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecifications.2.3SmokeandHeatRemovalToassistinmaintainingahabitableatmosphereinthecontrolroomandauxiliarycontrolroom,asmokepurgecapabilityisprovidedfromtwoindependentfans,one6000-cfmmakeupfanandone8000-cfmexhaustfan(FigureIII-14).UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.4ShieldingandAccessControlNormalpersonnelaccesstothecontrolroomisprovidedbythreecontrolledaccessdoorsalllocatedonel277.Thenorthdooropensintothecontrolroombreakarea,thesouthdooropensintotheadministrationbuilding,andthewestdooropensintoacorridor,givingaccesstotheadministrationbuildingatel277andalsomakingavailablethestairwaytoel261oftheadministrationbuilding.Inadditiontotheabove,astairisprovidedwithinthecontrolroom(northwestcorner)downtotheauxiliarycontrolroomonthegroundfloor,shownonFigureIII-4.Incaseofareactoraccident,personnelaccesstoorfromthecontrolroomwouldbefromthesoutherlyextremeofallbuildingsandapproximately400ftfromthecenterofthereactor.Thewalls,roofandfloorsaredesignedtohaveconcretethicknesseswhichprovideshieldingduringthedesignbasisaccident(DBA).3.0SafetyAnalysisThecontrolroomisdesignedforcontinuousoccupancybyoperatingpersonnelduringnormaloperatingoraccidentconditions.Concreteshieldingprovidedintheroofandfloorsaboveandinthewallsfacingthereactorbuildingismorethansufficienttopreventdoseratesfromexceedingthehourlyequivalentofthe10CFR20quarterlyradiationdose.Maintainingpositivepressureinsidethecontrolroomandregulatingthefilteredoutsideairsupplypreventstheconcentrationofradioactivematerialsfromexceedingthelimitsof10CFR20.Inaddition,suppliedairrespiratorsareavailableinthecontrolroomforuseifnecessary.Bothnormalandemergencylightingareprovidedinthecontrolroomtogetherwithcommunications,airconditioning,ventilation,heatingandsanitaryplumbingfacilities.Ifnormalelectricpowerserviceisnotavailable,provisionhasbeenmadetopowerthecooling,ventilatingandheatingunitsfromtheemergencydieselgenerators.Buildingcomponentsandfinishmaterialsarenoncombustibleandcombustiblematerialsarenotstoredinthecontrolroom.Theminimumdistanceofthecontrolroomtothecenterlineofthereactoris330ftandtherearenodirectconnectionsfrompassageways,ventilatingductsortubeconnectionsbetweenthereactorbuildingandthecontrolroom.Thefloorofthecontrolroomis16ftaboveyardgradeand28ftabovemaximumlakelevel(el249).Therefore,thepossibilityoffloodingorinundationisincredible.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARC.WASTEDISPOSALBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsWindandsnowloadingsforthewastedisposalbuildingarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsforthisbuilding.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThewastedisposalbuildingandmajorcomponentswithinaredesignedasClassIstructures.Theanalysisofstresslevelsusedthefollowingearthquakedesigncoefficients.PercentGravitHorizontalVerticalElevations225and229Elevation236-6Elevations246-6,247and24811.011.512.25.55'5.5Elevation261Elevation277(276-6)RoofElevation28917.030.730.77.337.337'3Exteriorwallsofthesubstructurearedesignedforanearthpressureatanydepthequaltothedepthinfeettimes90psf.Theexteriorwallsofthesubstructureandthebaseslabaredesignedtoresisthydrostaticpressureandupliftduetoexteriorfloodingtoel249.Exceptwhereconcentratedloadingduetothehandlingandplacementofequipmentrequiresconstructionofgreaterstrength,thesubstructurefloorsaredesignedfordeadloadsplusthefollowing:UFSARRevision14III-13June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARElevationsLiveLoadsPoundsPerSFt225and229236-6,237and248241and247Unlimited350250Thegradeflooratel261,includingtheconcreteshieldingplugswhichclosehatchwaysoverequipmentinthesubstructure,isdesignedforauniformliveloadof450psf;orintheloadingareaaconcentratedloadingpatternproducedbyanAASHO*H20loading,or1000psf,whicheverrequiresthestrongerconstruction.1.4HeatingandVentilationHeatingandventilationisprovidedforpersonnelcomfort,equipmentprotectionandforcontrollingpossibleradioactivityreleasetotheatmosphere.1.5ShieldingandAccessControlShieldingisprovidedaroundtanksandequipmenttomaintaindoseratesasdescribedinSectionXII.Normalaccesstothewastedisposalbuildingisfromtheturbinebuilding.2.0StructureDesignFloorandroofplans,exteriorelevations,sectionsshowinginteriorwalls,andarchitecturaldetailsofthebuildingareshownonFiguresIII-2throughIII-6andFigureIII-11.2.1GeneralStructuralFeaturesThepoured-in-placereinforcedconcretebuildingsubstructureisfoundedonfirmOswegosandstone.Themaximumbearingpressureontherockasrecommendedbyconsultantsis40tons/sqft.Thisresultsinasafetyfactorof18basedonactualunconfinedcompressivestrengthtestsonselectedspecimensofrockcoreextractedfromtestborings.Thebuildinghasaflatroofconsistingofacellularmetaldeckcoveredwithinsulationandabitumenandfeltroofingmembrane.Theexteriorfacingofthesuperstructurewallsisofsheetmetal,attachedeithertoanexteriorshieldingwallortoinsulatedcellularsheetmetalwall.Theinteriorwallsofthe*AmericanAssociationofStateHighwayOfficials.UFSARRevision14III-14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARsubstructureareofcast-in-placeconcreteandthoseforthesuperstructureareeithercast-in-placeormadeofconcretemasonryunits.Withminorexceptions,allstructuralfloorsarepoured-in-placeconcreteslabs.Thesuperstructureframeisoffabricatedsteel.Thenorthsectionofthebasementisdividedintothreelevels.Thesefloorsareforthestoringofsolidradioactivewasteinmetaldrumsuntilitissuitableforoffsiteshipmenttoapermanentdisposalarea.Eachofthesestorageareasisservedbyapairofliftsfordrums,onebeinglocatedneareachsideofthebuilding.Theintermediatelevelfloorelevationisforthestorageofevaporatorbottomsandfiltersludgepriortosolidification.Thesouthsectionofthebasementprovidesspaceforthetemporarystorage,pumpingandprocessingofradioactiveliquidwasteasdescribedinSectionXII.TheloadingareaforreceivingemptywastedrumsandequipmentasdescribedinSectionXIIislocatedonel261(FigureIII-4).Thedesignedcontrolforspilledliquidistoallowthefluidtoseekalowerleveland,thus,beaccommodatedbythesumpswhichcontainthefluid,andpumpitdirectlytostoragetanks.Alldrainagesumpshavesmoothliningsofsteelplatewithalljointswelded.Thewastedrumfillingareaalsohasadrainagegutterlinedwithhalfofasteelpipe.Thesedesignsaretofacilitatecleanupbypreventingcontaminatedliquidsfrompermeatingtheconcreteshellofthesumppitorgutter.2.2HeatingandVentilationSystemTheheatingandventilatingsystem,shownonFigureIII-15,isdesignedtosupplyfilteredandheatedairatapproximately9,000cfmandexhaustitafterfiltration.Thiscorrespondstoaboutonechangeofairperhour.Noairisdischargedfromthebuildingexceptthroughthestack.Thesupplyfans,exhaustfansandexhaustfiltersareprovidedwithfull-capacitybackups.Eithersupplyfanandeitherexhaustfancanthenbeusedtooperatethesystemwhiletheothermembersofthepairsareonstandby.Outsideairisdrawnintothesystemthroughafixedlouverhousedabovetheroofofthebuildingandprotectedbybirdandinsectscreening.Theairisdrawnthroughafilterdesignedtoremovedust,andanelectricheaterof200-kWcapacity.Theheateristhermostaticallycontrolledtowarmtheairtomaintainatleast70Finaccessibleareas.Beyondtheheatersectionthesupplyductissplitwitheachhalfroutedthroughasupplyfanof9,000cfmcapacity.EachfanisisolatedinitssectionofductbyabutterflyvalvedamperonbothinletanddischargeUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARsides.Beyondthefandischargecontroldampers,theductsrejoinintoacommonmanifoldfromwhichsupplyductsconveyfreshairtovariousareas'ofthebuilding.Atornearthedischargepointofeachoftheseducts,amanuallysetdamperdeterminesthefractionofairdeliveredatthatparticularpoint.Thefreshairsupplypointsarelocatedwheretherateofaircontaminationislowestwhiletheinletstotheexhaustductsarelocatedwheretherateofcontaminationislikelytobethehighest.Anairoutletislocatedineachroomandateachpieceofequipmentorotherplacewhereradioactivecontaminationintheformofdust,gasorvaporcouldbereleased.Ductsfromtheseareasleadtoanexhaustairmanifoldwitheachducthavingamanuallysetcontroldamper.Ashuntcircuitdrawsairfromtheexhaustmanifoldandmonitorsitsairborneradioactivity.Thecircuitislocatedsothatitmonitorsbuildingairconditionsandnottheexhaustfromequipmentvents.HighactivityisalarmedinboththewastebuildingcontrolroomandtheStationmaincontrolroom.Beyondthispoint,theexhaustductdividesintotwofull-sizedparts,eachofwhichcontainsaroughingfilterfollowedbyahigh-efficiencyfilterandanexhaustfanasshownonFigureIII-15.Butterflyvalvesintheducts,beforethefilters,betweenfiltersandfans,andfollowingthefansdeterminewhichofthealternateroutestheexhaustwilltakeandregulatetheamountofairexhausted.Fromhereon,theductsarereunitedanddischargetotheplenumleadingtothestack.Backflowfromothersystemsispreventedbyinterlockswhichrequirevalvestobeclosediftheexhaustfansarenotinoperation.Eachhigh-efficiencyparticulatefilterintheexhaustsystemhasaminimumremovalefficiencyof99.97percentbasedonthe0.3micron"DOP"(dioctylphthalatesmoke)test.Supplementingthisexhaustersystemisa300-cfmcapacityauxiliarysystem,whichexhaustsairdirectlyfromthehydraulicbalerthrougharoughingfilterandahigh-efficiencyfilterbymeansofasmallexhausterfan,anddischargesdirectlyintotheventilationbreaching.Also,a5000-cfmcapacityauxiliarysystemexhaustsdirectlyfromthedrumfillingareathrougharoughingfilterbymeansofasmallexhausterfan,anddischargestotheexhaustductofthebuildingventilatingsystem.EquipmentventsandthesampleStationhooddischargedirectlytotheexhaustduct.Supplementingtheheatsuppliedbythemainintakeairheater,smallheatingunitsareprovidedlocallytomaintaindesiredtemperaturesforcomfortofpersonnelandprotectionofequipment.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTheventilationsystemforthewastebuildingextensionisshownonFigureIII-16.Oneoftwofull-capacityexhaustfansdrawsairatarateof5400cfmfromthewastebuildinganddistributestheairthroughductworktothevariousequipmentroomswithinthewastebuildingextension.Theairthatpassesthroughthesystemisdischargedtothestack.2.3ShieldingandAccessControlNormalpersonnelaccesstothewastedisposalbuildingisfromtheturbinebuildingthroughthewastedisposalcontrolroom.Accessdoorsfromtheturbinebuildingarealsolocatednearthebalerroom.Accessisalsoavailablethroughthetruckloadingbaylocatedatthenortheast,cornerofthebuilding.AllaccesstothebuildingisatgradelevelasshownonFigureIII-4.Alllevelsareaccessiblebysteelstairwaysfromthegradefloorandanemergencyladderwayexitisprovidedforthosepartsofthedrumstorageareawhichareremotefromthestairs.Hatchesareprovidedforaccesstoequipment.Concretethicknessesforbothwallsandfloorsareestablishedtoprovidethedegreeofradiationshieldingofradioactivewasteadjacenttotheshieldedarea.Thereinforcedconcretesubstructurecompletelyisolatesthebasementandservesasshieldingforadjoiningbasementareas.Eachitemorgroupofcloselyassociateditemsofequipmentishousedinaseparateroom,surroundedbyconcreteshieldingwallsofappropriatethicknesstoprovideadequateprotectiontooperatingpersonnelasdeterminedbytheanticipatedintensityofradiationandtimedurationofexposure.Thewastedisposalbuildingcontrolroomiscompletelysurroundedbyshieldingwallsandwithaccesssoarrangedthattheroomwillbeaccessibleatalltimes.3.0SafetyAnalysisThedesignandconstructionofthewastebuildinghasprovidedforallforeseeableconditionsandloads.Allstructuralmaterialusedisnoncombustibleandaccumulationofcombustiblematerialiscarefullyavoided.Asoutlinedinthedetaileddescriptionofthestructure,provisionhasbeenmadethat,shouldsomeunforeseenconditionoraccidentreleasecontaminatedwaste,thehazardwouldbelocalizedandthesizeofthecleanupanddecontaminationjobrestricted.Alltanksaremadeofductilemetalandallsumppitsarelinedsothatthesecontainerscanbesubjectedtosubstantialdistortionwithoutrupture.ThetworoomsforthecentrifugesonthegradeflooraresurroundedbyheavywallswhichserveadualpurposebyprovidingUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARbothradiationandmechanicalshielding.lntheextremelyunlikelyeventthatthecentrifugeshouldsufferamechanicalfailure,itwouldbecontainedwithintheroomandpreventinjurytooperatingpersonnelordamagetotanks,piping,pumpsorotherequipmentoutsidetheroom.Thesubstructureismassivereinforcedconcrete,not.subjecttofracturing.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARD.OFFGASBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsExteriorloadingsforwind,snowandiceusedinthedesignoftheoffgasbuildingarethesameastheturbinebuilding.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsforthisbuilding.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheoffgasbuildingisdesignedasaClassIstructure.Theanalysisofstresslevelsusedthefollowingearthquakedesigncoefficients.ElevationNorth-SouthGEast-WestG28927626124723637.219.315.213.612.032.024'19.016.013.0Theliveloaddesignonthegroundfloorandintermediatesubfloorsis300psf.1.4HeatingandVentilationHeatingandventilationisprovidedforpersonnelcomfort.1.5ShieldingandAccessControlShieldingisprovidedaroundtanksandequipmenttomaintaindoseratesasdescribedinSectionXII.Normalaccesstotheoffgasbuildingisfromtheturbinebuilding.2.0StructureDesignFloorandroofplans,exteriorelevations,sectionsshowinginteriorwalls,andarchitecturaldetailsofthebuildingareshownonFiguresIII-2throughIII-9.2.1GeneralStructuralFeaturesThesubstructureisconstructedofcast-in-placereinforcedconcreteandisfoundedonfirmOswegosandstone.UFSARRevision14III-19June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThemaximumbearingpressureontherockis20tons/sqft.Thisresultsinasafetyfactorof18basedonactualunconfinedcompressivestrengthtestsonselectedspecimensofrockcoreextractedfromtestborings.Thebuildinghasabuilt-uproofconsistingofacellularmetaldeckcoveredwithinsulationandasbestosfeltandagravelsurface.Thesuperstructureisstructuralsteelframewithinsulatedexteriormetalwalls.Theinteriorwallsofthesubstructureareofcast-in-placeconcreteandthoseforthesuperstructureareconcreteblockwitha144-pcfdensityforshielding.Withminorexceptions,allstructuralfloorsarepoured-in-placeconcreteslabs.Thebasementisdividedintotwolevels.El229housesthecharcoalcolumntankroom.Locatedonel232isthechillersystemcompressorsanddeicingwaterbuffertankrooms.Thenextfloorisdividedintothreelevels.Themainlevelel247housesthethreechillerroomsandequipmenthatch.El244'-9"housesthetwopreadsorberrooms,andatel250isgratingsurroundingthecharcoaltanks.Normalpersonnelandequipmentaccessfromtheturbinebuildingislocatedonel261.Alsolocatedonthislevelareequipmentplugs,equipmenthatchandstairopeningstothelevelsbelow.2.2HeatingandVentilationSystemTheheatingandventilationsystemisshownonFigureIII-17.Oneoftwoexhaustfanswithafullcapacityof6,000cfmdrawsairatarateof5400cfmfromtheturbinebuildinganddistributestheairthroughductworktothevariousequipmentroomswithintheoffgasbuilding.Theairthatpassesthroughthesystemisdischargedtothestack.2.3ShieldingandAccessControlNormalpersonnelaccesstotheoffgasbuildingisfromtheturbinebuilding.Anaccessdoorfromthewastedisposalbuildingisalsoprovided.Allaccessislocatedongradelevel261.Alllevelsoftheoffgasbuildingareaccessiblebysteelstairwaysfromthegradefloor.Equipmentplugsandhatchareprovidedforaccesstoequipment.Concretethicknessesforbothwallsandfloorswereestablishedtoprovideadequateradiationshieldingconsistentwithaslowasreasonablyachievable(ALARA)criteria.3.0SafetyAnalysisThedesignandconstructionoftheoffgasbuildinghasprovidedforallforeseeableconditionsandloads.UFSARRevision14III-20June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARAllwalls,floorsandroofareofnoncombustiblematerials.Equipmentishousedinroomswithwalls,floorsandshieldwallsappropriatelydesignedtoprovideadequateshieldingtomeetALARAcriteria.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARE.NONCONTROLLEDBUILDINGS1.0AdministrationBuildingTheadministrationbuildingisaoneandtwo-storystructureadjoiningtheturbinebuildingonthesouthandeast.1.1DesignBases1.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindandsnowloadingsfortheadministrationbuildingarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding.1.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsfortheadministrationbuilding.1.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheadministrationbuildingisdesignedasaClassIIandIIIstructure.TheoriginaladministrationbuildingwasdesignedasaClassIIIstructurewithnospecialseismiccriteria.Thefollowingdesignliveloadswereusedinadditiontothedeadloadsfortheoriginaladministrationbuilding.Elevation261Storeroomandshoproom-1000psfOtherAreas150psfElevation277Officeareas,includingareasforofficeequipmentandpersonnel,corridors,stairwaysandotherrelatedareas-125psfTheadministrationbuildingextensionisdesignedasaseismicClassIIstructure.Aportionoftheextensionislocatedoverthedieselgeneratorroomsrequiringanupgradedseismicclassification.Theextensionisdesignedtoaccommodatethesameseismicloadsasthecontrolroomanddieselgeneratorrooms.Thecriteriausedfortheadministrationbuildingextensionare:1.Normalallowablestress*levelswereused.(However,upto1/3overstresswaspermitted.)*AlsoseeSectionXVI,SubsectionG.UFSARRevision14III-22June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2~3~4~Horizontalnorth-southandeast-westearthquakeswerenotcombinedbutwereconsideredseparately.Verticalaccelerationswereassumedtobe1/2ofthehorizontal.Accelerationsanddeflectionscausedbytheearthquakeare:ElevationNorth-SouthOQEast-West<oG30027726125034.019.013.012.030.018.013.012.01.1.4Heating,CoolingandVentilationHeating,coolingandventilationareprovidedforpersonnelcomfort.1.1.5ShieldingandAccessControl~~~Noshieldingisrequired.1.2StructureDesignTheadministrationbuilding,shownonFiguresIII-3throughIII-5,containsallthefacilitiesrequiredforadministrativeandtechnicalservicingfunctionsrequiredofanucleargeneratingstation.1.2.1GeneralStructuralFeaturesTheadministrationbuildingisasteel-framedstructurewithcellularmetalandconcretefloorsandexteriorwallsofinsulatedsandwichprecastconcreteslabs.Theexteriorwallsoftheadministrationbuildingextensionaremetalsiding.Theexteriorsouthandwestwallsofthewomen'slockerroomandthefoamroomaremasonrywalls.Thebuildinghasthreelevels.Thebasement(el248)housestheonsiteTechnicalSupportCenter(TSC).TheTSCmeetstherequirementsofNUREG-0578.ThelayoutoftheTSCanditsproximitytothecontrolroomisshownonFigureIII-5.Thislevelisalsousedforstorage,additionalofficespace,andentrancetotheturbinebuildingandpersonnellockerroom.UFSARRevision14III-23June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThegroundfloor(el261)isdividedintothreeparts.OneoftheseisassignedtoStationstores.Theremainingtwoareassignedtoshops.Thebalanceofthegroundfloorcontainsananteroomandafoyerforthestairwayandelevatortothegeneralofficesonthesecondfloor.Theroomforequipmentandmaterialswhichproducefireextinguishingfoamisalsointhisarea.Ontheupperlevel(el277)arethestair,elevatorlobby,restrooms,offices,conferencerooms,andasatellitedocumentcontrolstation.Documentcontrol,microfilmingfacilities,andtherecordstoragefacility,inaccordancewithANSIN45.2.9-5(6),arelocatedatNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit2(Unit2).1.2.2Heating,VentilationandAirConditioningVentilationfortheadministrationbuildingandtheadministrationbuildingextensionisprovidedasfollows.Oneself-containedrooftopairconditioningunit,onesupplyfan,threeexhaustfans,andassociatedductworkandequipmentprovideventilationtotheoriginaladministrationbuilding.Fivesupplyfans,associatedductworkandequipmentsupplyairtotheadministrationbuildingextension.Individualheatingandairconditioningunitsareprovidedthroughouttheoriginaladministrationbuildingandtheadministrationbuildingextensionforpersonnelcomfort.TheonsiteTSClocatedonel248isprovidedwithanairfilteringsystemwhichishousedinthecharcoalfilterbuildingatel261(seeFigureIII-18).1.2.3AccessControlNormalaccesstotheadministrationbuildingisprovidedbytwodoorslocatedonthewestsideofthebuilding.Threeoverheaddoorsarelocatedonthesouthsideofthebuildingtoprovideaccesstotheshopsandstoresatthe261ftlevel.1.3SafetyAnalysisNoradioactivitycomplicationsexistatanyofthenoncontrolledbuildings.Firehazardislowsinceconstructionisoffire-resistant,materialsandeachbuildinghasaminimumofcombustibles.UFSARRevision14III-24June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.0SewageTreatmentBuildingThenewsewagetreatmentfacility(STF),whichutilizespartoftheexistingSTF,islocatedinthevicinityofrailroadtrackspurno.3thatwasremovedforconstruction,approximately300ftnorthwestoftheturbinebuildingandduewestofthenorthendofthereactorbuildingasshownonFigureIII-1.ThesitewasselectedbasedonreviewofavailableareasoutsidethefloodplainforaUnit210,000-yrfloodyearflood(rain).TheexistingSTFwasmodifiedtofunctionasarawsewagepumpstationandanequalizationtankforthenewSTF.ThecontrolbuildingforthenewSTFislocatedbetweenandtothesouthofthecircularextendedaerationunits.Thecontrolbuildinghousesanewlaboratory,amotorcontrolcenter(MCC),blowerroom,storageroom,maintenanceroomandhypochloriteroom,aswellasaninfluent/effluentroom.Normalaccesstothetreatmentunitsisfrominsidethecontrolbuilding'sinfluent/effluentroom.Maintenanceandemergencyaccesstothetreatmentunitmaybefromoutsideaccessdoorsoneachtank.2.1DesignBases2.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindloadingsforthesewagetreatmentbuildingarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding.Thesnowloadingforthebuildingroofis14lb/ft~.2.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsforthisbuilding.2.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThesewagetreatmentbuildingisdesignedasaClassIIIstructurewithnospecialseismiccriteria.Thesystemconformstostateregulationsforsewagesystems.2.1.4ElectricalDesignIncertainareasofthebuilding,electricalcomponentsareprotectedbyexplosion-proofenclosures.2.1.5FireandExplosiveGasDetectionAutomaticfiredetectionequipmentisprovidedintheSTF.ThefiredetectionequipmentactuatesalarmsonlocalfirepanelsintheSTFwhichinformspersonneloffirelocation.Automaticgasdetectionequipmentisprovidedforchlorine,andformethanandotherexplosivegases.ThedetectionequipmentactuatesanalarmbellandwarninglightsinsideandoutsidetheSTF.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARBothsystemsareprovidedforpersonnelsafetyandequipmentprotection.2.1.6HeatingandVentilationHeatingandventilationisprovidedforequipmentprotectionandpersonnelcomfortinaccordancewiththerequiredcodes.2.1.7ShieldingandAccessControlShieldingisnotrequired.2.2StructureDesign2.2.1GeneralStructuralFeaturesThesewagetreatmentplantwillprovidesecondarytreatmentanddisinfectionforaminimumflowof10,000gal/dayandapeakflowof240,000gal/day.WastewaterflowsbygravityfromNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit1(Unit1)facilities,theEnergyInformationCenter(EIC),theNuclearLearningCenter(NLC),andUnit2totheexistingUnit1sewagetreatmentplantbuildingandassociatedpreliminarytreatmentfacilities.Afterpreliminarytreatment,theflowispumpedtotheextendedaerationunits.Flowthroughtheremainderoftheplantisbygravity.Dischargefromtheplantisthrougha12-inoutfallsewertoadrainageditchleadingtoLakeOntario.Flowmeasurementisavailableandisrecordedonstripcharts.Rawsewagewillpassthroughacomminutortoshredlargesolids.Twocomminutorsareprovided,eachcapableoftreatingflowsupto300,000gal/day.Intheeventoffailureofbothcomminutors,abypasshand-cleanedbarscreenisprovidedtoprotecttherawsewagepumpsfromlargesolids.Rawsewageisthenpumpedtothenewtreatmentfacilities.Pumpingafterpreliminarytreatmentminimizestheneedforrockexcavationfordownstreamtreatmentunits.A4-inand6-indual-forcemainisusedtomeettheanticipatedflowrangeof35,000gal/dayto240,000gal/day.Athree-pumprawsewagestationisutilizedwithtwopumpsoperatingandthethirdpumpactingasaninstalledstandby.Wastewaterpumpedtothenewtreatmentfacilitieswillenteraflowdistributionstructureandwillbesplitequallybyweirstotwoextendedaerationunits.Eachunitcontainstwoequally-sizedbasinsof2800cuft,whileaffordingmaximumcontrolandoperationalflexibility.Atdoubleoutagedesignconditions,twounitseachwithtwobasinsofthissizewouldprovideanaveragehydraulicdetentiontimeofapproximately17hrwithanaverageorganicloadingofabout18lbbiologicaloxygendemand(BOD)perdayper1000cuftoftankvolume.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTheaerationsystemfortheactivatedsludgeprocessisacoarse-bubblediffusedairsystem.Atotalofthreeairblowers(includingstandby)areprovided,havingatotalcapacityof700scfm.Theseblowerswillprovideapproximately3200cuftofaerationairperpound.Themixliquoristhensenttotheactivatedsludgesettlingtankwherethesludgesolidsareseparated.Thisproducesawell-clarifiedeffluentlowinBODandsuspendedsolids.Eachtreatmentunit.containsan18-ftdiameterclarifierwith12-ftsidewaterdepth.Thesetanksarecenterfeedclarifierswithradialoutwardflow.Atdoubleoutagedesignconditions,thetankswillhaveanoverflowrateof240and470gal/day/sqftataveragepeakflows,respectively.Scumistoberemovedfromthesurfaceofthefinalsettlingtanksbyarotarywiperarm.Scumfromthesurfaceofthesettlingtankisdrawnoverashortinclinedbeachandisdischargedtoascumtrough.Thescumisthenflushedtoascumwellfromwhichitisairliftedtotheaeratedsludgeholdingtanks.Tomaintaintheactivatedsludgeinanactivecondition,finalsludgeisremovedfromthesettlingtankscontinuously.Sludgewithdrawnfromthefinalsettlingtanksisreturnedtotheaerationtanksataratetomaintainaconstantmixedliquorsuspendedsolidsandsolidsretentiontimeintheaerationtanksandtoavoidexcessivesludgedepthsinthesettlingtanks.Returnsludgeairliftsareusedtoreturnsludgetotheheadoftheaerationtank.Excesssludgesolidswillbewastedfromthesettlingtanksandairliftedtoaeratedsludgeholdingtankstobeconcentratedpriortosludgedewatering.Hypochloriteisusedfordisinfectionofthefinaleffluentatthenewtreatmentfacilities.Eachtreatmentunitincludesaseparatechlorinecontactzoneof170cuftwhichprovides15mindetentiontimeandcontactatthepeakflowof240,000gal/day.Eachtreatmentunitcontainsanaeratedsludgeholdingtankofapproximately2000cufteach.Atdoubleoutagedesignflows,thesetanksprovideinexcessof30dayssludgestorage.Eachtreatmentunitisfurnishedwithanaluminumgeodesicdomecoverforwinterizationprotection.Eachdomeisequippedwithtwoskylightsandonegravityventtoprovidenaturallightingandventilation.Thewallsofthetreatmentunitsareextendedtosupportthedomesandprovideaworkableclearheadroomheightalongtheinteriorcircumferenceofthetreatmentunit.Thedomesaredesignedtoberemovableasacompleteunit.2.2.2VentilationSystemTheSTFisairconditionedandelectricallyheated.Unitairconditionersinthelabroomonlyandheatingcoilsforventilationairarelocatedthroughoutthefacilitywhererequired.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.2.3AccessControlTheequipmenthousehasnowindowsexceptincertaindoorsandalockonthedoorpreventsaccessbyunauthorizedpersonnel.3.0EnergyInformationCenterTheEICisasingle-storyflat-roofedstructurelocatedonaslightpromontory1000ftwestandslightlysouthoftheStation(FigureIII-1).3.1DesignBases3.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsExteriorloadingsforwind,snow,andiceusedindesignoftheEICmeetallapplicablecodesasaminimum.Theroofanditssupportingstructurearedesignedtowithstandaloadingof40psfofsnoworice.Thewallsandbuildingstructurearedesignedtowithstandanexternalorinternalloadingof40psfofsurfacearea,whichisapproximatelyequivalenttoawindvelocityof125mphatthe30-ftlevel.3.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsfortheEIC.3.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheEICandcomponentsaredesignedasClassIIIstructureswithnospecialseismiccriteria.Thefollowingdesignliveloadswereusedinadditiontothedeadloads:Liveloadonstairwaysandallpublicareasexceptrestrooms100psf.Liveloadonallotherfloorareasincludingtheclassroom,officesandconferenceroom-60psf.Allowablebearingpressureonundisturbedsoilfoundationsof1.5tons/sqft.StressesinsteelconstructionarethoseallowedbytheAISC1963SpecificationsfortheDesign,FabricationandErectionofStructuralSteelforBuildingswhenusingASTMA36StructuralSteel.StressesinconcreteconstructionarethoseallowedbytheACI318-63Standardfor3000psiconcretewithintermediategradenewbilletsteelA-15.UFSARRevision14III-28June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.1.4HeatingandVentilationHeatingandventilationisprovidedforpersonnelcomfort.3.1.5ShieldingandAccessControlNoradioactivityiscontainedinornearthebuilding;therefore,noshieldingisrequired.3.2StructureDesign3.2.1GeneralStructuralFeaturesAsshownonFigureIII-1,theprincipalpartofthebuildingisintheformofaregularhexagonwithsides56-ftlong.Awingofirregularshapebutapproximately96-ftlongby36-ftand451/2-ftwideextendstothewest.Thelobbyoccupiesthefullwidthofthesouthwestportionoftheprincipalpartofthebuilding.Totherearofthelobbyareasmalltheater,aroomforamodeloftheStationandaroomforvariousexhibits.Thebuilding'score,centraltotheserooms,containsastorageroom,aprojectionroomforthetheaterandstairsforaccesstothebasement.Publicrestroomsandawomen'sloungearelocatedinthewingandadjointhelobbyontheleft.Thewingalsocontainsaclassroom,aconferenceroom,offices,acentralcorridor,anextensionofthemainlobbyandthreesecondaryentrancestothebuilding.TheEICbuildinghasastructuralsteelframerestingonaconcretesubstructure.Itsexteriorcurtainwallsareofconcreteblockwithaveneerofnativestone,trimmedwithredwood,andwellinsulated.Interiorwallsareplasteredmetalorgypsumlathonsteelstudding.Theroofiscomprisedofabituminouswaterproofingmembraneonrigidinsulationwhichiscarriedbymetalroofdeckingandopenwebsteeljoistpurlins,whichareinturnsupportedbyrolledsteelgirdersandfasciabeams.Aconcreteslab,hexagonallyshapedinplan,about30ftindiameterand4-inthickiscentrallylocatedontherooftoserveasaplatformfortheairconditioningcondensers.3.2.2HeatingandVentilationSystemTheEICisairconditionedandelectricallyheated.Compressors,heatexchangers,heatingcoilsforventilationairandothermechanicalequipmentarelocatedinequipmentroomsinthebasement.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.2.3AccessControlAccesstotheEICisfromaseparateroadthanthatleadingtotherestoftheStation.Eachroomtowhichthepublicwillbeadmittedhasdoorsofamplewidthtotheroomsadjoiningoneithersideand,inaddition,thetheaterandthemodelroomeachhasitsownexitdoortotheoutsideofthebuilding.Alltheseprovideampleegressfromanyareaforanyconceivableemergency.UFSARRevision14III-30June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARF.SCREENHOUSE,INTAKEANDDISCHARGETUNNELS1.0ScreenhouseThescreenhouseadjoinsthenorthwallofthereactorandturbinebuildingsanditssuperstructureiscompletelyisolatedfromthereactorbuilding.1.1DesignBasis1.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindandsnowloadingsforthescreenhousearethesameasfortheturbinebuilding.1.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsforthescreenhouse.1.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThescreenhousesubstructurehasbeendesignedtoconformtotherequirementsforaClassIstructurewhileloadedwithanypossiblecombinationoffilledandunwateredconditionsofthechannelslocatedinthissubstructure.ThesuperstructureisdesignedasaClassIIstructureasdiscussedonPageIII-3oftheFirstSupplementtothePHSR.Theseismicanalysisresultedintheapplicationofaccelerationfactorsof20.0percentgravityhorizontaland10.0percentgravityvertical.1.1.4HeatingandVentilationNoheating,coolingorventilationisprovidedforthescreenhouse.1.1.5ShieldingandAccessControlNoshieldingisrequired.Normalaccesstothescreenhouseisthroughtheturbinebuilding.1.2StructureDesignThesuperstructureofthescreenhouseisofframedstructuralsteelsupportedonareinforcedconcretesubstructurewhichisfoundedonrock.Thebuildinghasaflatroofconsistingofcellularmetaldeckingcoveredwithinsulationandatarandfeltroofingmembrane.Thetwobaysoftheeastwall,whichareacontinuationofaneastwalloftheturbineauxiliariesbuildingextension,areofthesameinsulatedsheetmetalconstruction.Thebalanceoftheexteriorwall,about7/8ofthetotal,isof8-ininternally-insulatedprecastconcretepanelscorrespondingwiththoseinthebaseofthereactorbuildingwalls.WallandUFSARRevision14III-31June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARroofingmaterialandconstructionareidenticalwiththoseusedforthereactorandturbinebuildings.Thescreenhousesubstructurecompriseschannelsfortheflowofverylargequantitiesofrawlakewater,gatesandstoplogsforcontroloftheflow,racksandscreensforcleaningthewaterandpumps.ThewaterchannelsareshownschematicallyonFiguresIII-19andIII-20.Fiveplainverticalgatesnearthenorthendofthesubstructureseparatethechannelsfromthetunnels.GatesAandBseparatetheintaketunnelfromtheforebay.GateCseparatesthedischargechannelfromthedischargetunnel;gateEseparatesthedischargechannelfromtheintaketunnel;andgateDseparatestheforebayfromthedischargetunnel.EachofgatesA,B,C,andDhasadedicatedelectricmotor-drivenhoistforraising,lowering,andmaintainingpositionofthegates.GateEisoperatedusingahydraulicramsystem.NormalcirculationisprovidedbyopeninggatesA,B,andCwithgatesDandEclosed.ReversedflowthroughthetunnelsisobtainedbyclosinggatesA,BandCwithgatesDandEopen.Tempering(partialrecycleflow)isobtainedbypartiallyopeninggateEwithallothergatessetfornormaloperation.Theforebayandthesecondaryforebayareconnectedbythreeparallelcoolwaterchannels,ineachofwhicharelocatedtrashracks,rackrakesandtravelingscreenstoremovetrash,waterplantsandfishfromthewater.EachofthesechannelshasprovisionsforstoplogsateachendsothatanyoneofthemmaybesegregatedandunwateredformaintenanceworkwithoutshuttingdowntheStation.Onthefloorabovethesecondaryforebayaremountedfourcontainmentsprayrawwaterpumpsandtwoemergencyservicewater(ESW)pumpswithastrainerforeach.Alsoonthisfloorandaboveeachofthethreecoolwaterchannelsarethescreenwashpumps.Adjacenttothesecondaryforebay,onitssouthsideandseparatedfromitbychannelsfittedwithstoplogguides,areinletchambersforthetwocirculatingwaterpumpswhichprovidewatertothemaincondensers.Bymeansofstoplogs,eitherofthesechamberscanbeisolatedforunwateringandworkonthecorrespondingpump.Alateralbranchleadsofftotheeastfromthesecondaryforebay.Threechambersoffthisbranch,separatedfromitbysluicegates,supplywatertoeachoftwoservicewaterpumpswithstrainersandapairoffirepumps.Oneofthesefirepumpsisdrivenbyanelectricmotor,theotherbyadieselengine.Thescreenhouseisalsoequippedwithafloor-operatedelectricoverheadtravelingbridgecrane.Thiscraneservesthevariousfunctionsofplacingandremovingstoplogs,andservicingthetrashracks,rackrakesandtravelingscreens,maintenanceofthetwocirculatingwaterpumpsandallpumpsmountedabovethesecondaryforebay.Theservicewaterpumps,theirstrainers,andthefirepumpsareservicedformaintenanceworkbyoverheadbeamruns,trolleysandhoists.UFSARRevision14III-32June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.0IntakeandDischargeTunnelsAsshownonFigureIII-21,waterisdrawnfromthebottomofLakeOntarioabouttwo-tenthsofamileoffshoreandreturnedtothelakeaboutone-tenthofamileoffshore.2.1DesignBasesThewaterintakeanddischargetunnelsaredesignedtoconformtotherequirementsforClassIIstructures.Theintakeanddischargetunnelsareconcrete-linedboresthroughsolidrock.Assuch,theyarehighlyrigidstructureswithextremelysmallnaturalperiodsofvibrationandaseismicresponseofonly11percentofgravityregardlessofthedampingfactor.2.2StructureDesignWaterisadmittedtotheintaketunnelthroughabellmouth-shapedinlet.Theinletissurmountedbyahexagonally-shapedguardstructureofconcrete,thetopofwhichisabout6ftabovethelakebottomand14ftbelowthelowestanticipatedlakelevel.Thestructureiscoveredbyaroofofsheetpilingsupportedonsteelbeams,andeachofthesixsideshasawaterinletabout5-fthighby10-ftwide,withthelatteropeningsguardedbygalvanizedsteelracks.Thisdesignprovidesforwatertobedrawnequallyfromalldirectionswithaminimumofdisturbanceandwithnovortexatthelakesurface,andguardsagainst.theentranceofunmanageableflotsamtothecirculatingwatersystem(CWS).Thewaterdropsthroughaverticalconcrete-linedshafttoaconcrete-linedtunnelintherock,throughwhichitflowstothefootofaconcrete-linedverticalshaftundertheforebayinthescreenhouse.Thefootofthisshaftcontainsasandtraptocatchandstoreanylake-bottomsandwhichmaywashoverthesillsoftheinletstructure.Thetopoftheshafthasabell-moutheddischarge.Waterisreturnedtothelakeatapointaboutone-tenthofamileoffshorethroughabell-mouthedoutletsurmountedbyahexagonal-shapeddischargestructureofconcrete.Thetopofthisstructureisabout4ftabovelakebottomand81/2ftbelowthelowestanticipatedlakelevel.Thegeometryofthestructurecloselyresemblestheinletstructure,althoughreducedinsize.Thesixexitportsareabout3fthighby71/3ftwide.Thedischarge'tunnelfromthescreenhouseisidenticalincross-sectionwiththeintaketunnel.Theverticalshaftconnectingthedischargetunnelwiththedischargechannelunderthescreenhousealsohasasandtrapatitsfoot.Waterisdischargeddirectlytotheverticaldischargeshaft.Asubmergeddiffuserintheverticalshaftensuresagooddilutionbeforedischargetothelake.Samplesaredrawnatalowerpointintheshaft.UFSARRevision14III-33June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.0SafetyAnalysisTheselectionandarrangementofequipmentandcomponentsofthescreenhouseandcirculatingwatertunnelsisbasedontheknowledgegainedovermanyyearsofexperienceinthedesign,constructionandoperationofsuchfacilitiesforcoal-firedsteam-electricstations.Allcomponentsofthesystemwhichmightpossiblybesubjecttounscheduledoutage,andbysuchoutageaffecttheoperabilityoftheStation,areduplicated.Inthecaseoftheduplicatefirepumps,theprimemoversarealsototallyindependent.Thegatesaresimpleandruggedinconstruction,andtheiroperationissimpleandstraightforward,withthepossibilityofinadvertenterroneousoperationcuttoaminimum.Thepumpsuctionsareamplysubmergedbelowthelowestlowwatersurfaceelevationofthelakesurfaceadjustedforthefrictionandvelocitydropsinthesupplytunnelandchannels.Thesupplyofwaterbydirectgravityfromthelakeisinexhaustible.Themainportionofthesuperstructure,asingle-storystructureelasticframeofonebaywidth,hasarelativelylongnaturalperiodofvibration,andbeingboltedhasacomparativelyhighdampingfactor.Asaresult,thedynamicloadswhichcouldbeappliedtoitbywindpressureandalsooperationofthecranearemorecriticalthanthoseduetotheseismicloading.Thus,whilenodynamicanalysisoftheframingwasrequiredormade,itisquiteprobablethatthebuildingsuperstructuremeetsClassIconditionsinsteadofonlyClassII,asspecifiedintheFirstSupplementtothePHSR.Shearingforcesinthewallsandinthebottomchordplaneoftherooftrusssystemareresistedbysystemsofdiagonalbracing.Thesizesofthemembersofthesesystemsweregovernedbydetailandminimumallowableslendernessratherthanbycalculatedforces,whichresultedinexcessstrengthbeingavailableinthesystem.UFSARRevision14III-34June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARG.STACKThestackisafreestandingreinforced-concretechimney,350-fthigh,located100fteastofthenortheastcornerofthereactorbuilding.1.0DesignBases1.1GeneralTheheightofthestackandthevelocityofdischargearetoprovideahighdegreeofdilutionforroutineoraccidentalStationeffluents.ThisisdiscussedonPageIV-8oftheFirstSupplementtothePHSR.1.2WindLoadingAnalysisshowsthattheloadsduetoseismicactionareconsiderablygreaterthanthosewhichwouldbeexertedbythevelocityofwindforwhichtheotherClassIstructuresaredesigned:125mphatthe30-ftlevel.Sincethisistrueforalllevelsofthestack(windvelocitiesandpressuresvaryingaccordingtoelevationaboveground),lateralloadsduetoseismicforcesgovernthedesign.1.3SeismicDesignThedesignandconstructionofthestackmeettheseismicrequirementsofaClassIstructure.SeismicforcesappliedarethoseobtainedfromthevelocityandaccelerationresponsespectraincludedintheFirstSupplementofthePHSRforagroundmotionaccelerationfactorof11percentofgravity(PlateC-22).1.4ShieldingandAccessControlShieldingisrequiredfortheoffgasandglandsealexhaustpiping.Accessisprovidedforinspectionandmaintenanceduringshutdown.2.0StructureDesignThegeneralfeaturesofthestack,includingitsprincipaldimensions,areshownonFigureIII-22.Itisataperedmonolithicreinforced-concretetuberestingonamassiveconcretebasewhichextendstosoundrock.Fromthisbaseitrisesthroughtheturbineauxiliariesbuildingextensionfromwhichitiscompletelyisolatedstructurally.Thetopofthestackisatel611,or212ft6inabovethetopofthereactorbuilding,thenexthigheststructureintheStation.Afterfiltration,allStationventilationexhaustwhichisradioactivelycontaminatedisbroughttothestackthroughUFSARRevision14III-35June1996 NineMilePoint.Unit1FSARbreaching,whichisconnectedabovetheroofofthesurroundingbuilding.Twopipes,6inand12inindiameter,bringradioactivelycontaminatedgasesandvaporsfromtheturbineshaftsealsandfromthecondenser.Thesepipesenterthestackbelowthegradefloorandturnupthroughencasingconcretetoaterminalpointatel335,whichis20ftabovethetopofthebreachingentrancetothestack.Atthispointturbulenceishigh,whichensuresbestmixinganddilutionofthecontaminatedgases.An>>IsokineticProbe"gassamplerislocatedwithinthestackwithitsorificesatel535,or76ftbelowthetopofthestack.Thisdeviceissupportedbyabeamwhichspanstheinteriorofthestackandcantileversoutsidetofacilitatewithdrawalofthedeviceforcleaningandmaintenance.Anopeningisprovidedinthestackwallthroughwhichthedeviceisinstalled.Thisopeningisa16-indiameterpipesleevewithitsouterendclosedbyablindflange.Asmalleradjoiningopeningmakesitpossibletomeasurethegasvelocityprofileinthestackortovisuallyinspecttheprobewithoutwithdrawingit.Theprobeisconnectedtomonitoringequipmentlocatednearthebaseofthestackbytubingwhichdescendsinsidethestack.Accesstotheinteriorofthestackisthroughanairtightdoorfromthebasementofthesurroundingbuilding.Exterioraccesstothetopofthestackandtofourexternalplatformsisfromtheroofofthebuildingbymeansofaguardedladder.Attheprobelevelasmallplatformprovidesaccessandworkingarea.Threeotherplatformscompletelysurroundthestackwhichprovideaccessforexternalmaintenanceandpaintingofthestack.Thestackisprotectedbyfourlightningrodsanddownconductorswhichareinterconnectedatthetop,middleandbottomofthestack,thenconnectedtotheStationgroundinggrid.Thestructuralreinforcingsteel,platformsandladderareinturngroundedbyattachmenttothissystem.Thetopofthestackis,ineffect,an8-ft6-ininsidediameternozzle.Fornormalgasflowsof216,000cfm,thecorrespondingvelocityofthedischargejetis63fps.Thisrelativelyhighvelocityassuresthattheturbulencegeneratedwillthoroughlymix,diluteanddispersethedischargedgasevenattimesoflowwindvelocity.3.0SafetyAnalysis3.1RadiologyIfduringnormaloperationthestackweretobeinoperative,therewouldbenoseriousradiologicalconsequencesforaperiodoftimedependingonthelevelofactivitybeingreleased.Ifthestackweretoremaininoperativeforasignificantlengthoftime,thereactorwouldbeshutdowntopreventexceeding10CFR20UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARlimits.ExfiltrationcasesinvolvinganinoperativestackarediscussedinSectionXV.3.2StackFailureAnalysisIntheeventthatportions,~ofthestackstriketheplant,structuralanalysisindicatedthatthestackwouldtopplewithapproximatelytheupper3/4(280ft)intact.Asastructuralelementthestackisweakincircumferentialbending.Thismeansthatthestackcross-sectionwouldflattentoout-of-roundorovalwhenitstruck,spreadtheloadoveralargerareathanhaditremainedcircular,andabsorbenergyindoingso.Sincethestackisstronglongitudinally,itwouldtendtospanopeningsorspanfromgirdertogirder.Theconsequencesofthestackstrikingtheplanthavebeenevaluatedbywhatisbelievedtobethethreemostcriticaldirections(seeFigureIII-23).1.Southwest,strikingthereactorbuilding2.South,strikingthedieselgeneratorbuilding3.Northwest,strikingthescreenandpumphouse3.2.1ReactorBuildingAconsiderableamountofenergywouldbeabsorbedasthestackfellthroughthebracedwalls,therooftrussesandthecranegirders.Withtheaboveconsiderationstakenintoaccount,itisunlikelythatthestackwouldpenetratethebottomofthefuelpoolortheshieldplugsoverthereactor.Theworstconditionswouldoccurifoneorbothoftheemergencycoolingsystemsweredamaged.Sincetheemergencycoolingreturnlinesareequippedwithcheckvalves,theonlyflowpathwouldbeoutthesupplylinestotheemergencycoolingsystem.Theisolationvalvesinthislinewillautomaticallycloseonhighflowintheline.Hightemperatureinthevicinityofthelineandhighradiationarealarmedinthecontrolroom,resultinginmanualclosureoftheisolationvalves.Becauseoftheangularseparationbetweenthedieselgeneratorandthereactorbuilding,thedieselareawouldnotbeaffectedbyfailureofthestackinthedirectionofthereactorbuilding.Thebatteryroomisoutsidethereachofthestackregardlessofthedirectioninwhichthestackisassumedtofall.Shouldtheybeneeded,allsourcesofelectricpowerremainavailabletosafeguardsystems.Adequateprotectionisthereforeaffordedinthiscase.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.2.2DieselGeneratorBuildingFailureofthestackinthesoutherlydirectioncoulddamagethedieselgenerators.Sincethecontrolroomis350ftfromthestackandtheupper3/4ofthestackisapproximately280ft,itishighlyimprobablethatthecontrolroomwouldbedamaged.Iffailurewereinthesoutherlydirection,thereactorbuildingwouldnotbedamaged.Normalsourcesofelectricpowerwouldbeavailabletoconductasafeshutdown.3.2.3ScreenandPumpHouseIfthestackfellduenorth,thedieselfirepumps,thedieselgeneratorcoolingwaterpumps,andassociatedpipingsystemscouldbecomeinoperative.Ifthestackfellwithinthenorthwestquadrant,thecontainmentsprayrawwater,circulatingwaterandservicewaterpumps,aswellasthelinesfromthedieselfirepumps,couldbedamaged.However,safeshutdowncouldstillbeaffordedbyuseofthenormalsuppliesofelectricpowerandtheemergencycoolingsystem.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARH.SECURITYBUILDINGANDSECURITYBUILDINGANNEXThesecuritybuildingandsecuritybuildingannexarelocatedonthesouthwestcorneroftheStationsecurityperimeter.SeeFigureIII-1.TheprincipalfunctionofthesebuildingsistomonitorcontrolledingressandegressofpersonnelandequipmenttotheStationsecurityperimeter.AdministrativeofficesarecontainedwithinthesebuildingsforsupportofthedutiesassociatedwithStationsecurity.Becauseofthenatureofthissubject,adetaileddescriptionofthesebuildingswillnotbediscussedinthisdocument.Foradditionalinformationregardingthissubject,refertotheStationsecurityplan.UFSARRevision14III-39June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARI.RADWASTESOLIDIFICATIONANDSTORAGEBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsWindandsnowloadingsfortheradwastesolidificationandstoragebuilding(RSSB)aredesignedtomeetorexceedthoseofthewastedisposalbuilding.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirementsforthisbuilding.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadings+Thefoundationmat,structuralwalls,columns,floorsandroofoftheRSSBareclassifiedasprimarystructuralelements.Allprimarystructuralelementsareseismicallydesignedtowithstandtheeffectsofanoperatingbasisearthquake(OBE)inaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide(RG)1.143.Secondarystructureelements,includingplatforms,catwalks,pipesupports,equipmentandvesselsupports,andinternalmasonrywalls,areclassifiedasnonseismic-resistantitemsandaredesignedbyconventionalmethod.1.4Heating,VentilationandAirConditioning+Theheating,ventilationandairconditioning(HVAC)andchilledwatersystemsaredesignedforthefollowingprimaryfunctionalrequirements:heat,ventilateandairconditiontheRSSB;removeairborneparticulatesfromtheRSSBatmosphere;preventunfilteredexfiltrationofairborneradioactivityfromthebuilding;preventinfiltrationofairborneradioactivityintotheRSSBcontrolroomandelectricalroom;controlandprovideameansformonitoring(viathemainstack)thereleaseofairborneradioactivityviatheventilationexhaustsystem;minimizetheeffectsonthefacilityanditsoccupantsfromreleasesofradioactivityintotheRSSBatmosphere;collectandfilterairdisplacedviatheventsfromallRSSBtankscontainingradioactivefluids;continuouslypurgetheRSSBoftruckexhaustfumesandotherhazardousgasestoensuresafeoccupancyatalltimes.1.5ShieldingandAccessControl@Shieldingisdesignedtolimitradiationlevelsonthebuildingexterior,inthecontrolroom,intheelectricalroom,stairwells,andthepassagewaytothetruckbays.AccesstotheexterioroftheRSSBiscontrolledbyaccesstotheprotectedarea,whichiscontrolledbyNuclearSecurity.NormalUFSARRevision14III-40June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARaccesstothebuildinginteriorisviathewastebuildingextension.Twoexteriorrollupdoorsallowaccessforvehiclestothetwotruckbays.Fourexteriordoorsarenormallylockedandprovideemergencyegress.2.0StructureandDesignFloorandroofplansandsectionsshowinginteriorwallsareshownonFiguresIII-3throughIII-8.2.1GeneralStructuralFeatures<'>TheRSSBislocatedtotheeastof,andisadjacentto,theexistingoffgasbuilding,wastedisposalbuilding,andwastebuildingextensionofUnit1.ThearrangementoftheRSSBcanbeconsideredasfollows:process,handlingandstorageareas.Thissectionisrectangularinshapeandapproximately277ftlongbelowgrade,330ftlongabovegrade(north-south),and61ftwide(east-west).Themajorityoftheprimarystructuralcomponentsarereinforcedconcrete.Thefoundationmatisgenerallyfoundedontopofbedrock.Thefinishgradeandtruckentranceandexitopeningsareatel261'-0".Theroofelevationislocatedatel301'-21/2",withthematerialhandlingcranerunninglongitudinallyunderneaththeroofatel292'-61/2".Withtheexceptionofafewfeetaroundtheperimeter,thecranecanservicetheentireinteriorareaofthissection.ThoseportionsoftheRSSBwhichareclassifiedasseismic-resistantelementsaredesignedtomaintaintheirstructuralintegrityduringandafterallcredibledesignloadingphenomena,includingOBE.Thoseitemswhichareclassifiedasseismic-resistantelementsarethefoundationbasemat,structuralconcretewalls,floorsandroof.Nonseismic-resistantstructuralelementsaredesignedtomaintaintheirstructuralfunctionforallanticipated,credibledesignloadingconditionsencounteredduringconstruction,testing,operation,andmaintenanceofthefacility.Thosecompartmentscontaininglargetanks(over2,000gal)ofradioactiveliquidsarelinedwithsteeltocontain1.5tankvolumesintheeventofatankruptureduringaseismicevent.Duringnormaloperation,maintenance,andloadingandunloadingoperations,thestructureprovidessufficientenvironmentalisolationtoensurethattheexposureofplantoperatingpersonnelandthegeneralpublictoradiationisALARA.2.2Heating,VentilationandAir'Conditioning+Freshairisfilteredandconditionedandsuppliedtothecontrolandelectricalrooms,whicharemaintainedataslightlypositivepressurewithrespecttootherareasoftheRSSBandtheadjoiningradwastebuilding.AirfromotherportionsoftheRSSBisnotrecirculatedbacktotheseareas.AirisrecirculatedwithintheRSSBandisprocessedthroughafiltersystempriortoreconditioningandredistribution.TherecirculationfilterUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARsystemiscomprisedofthefollowingprimaryfiltrationcomponents:1.Prefilterstoremovelargerparticlestoreducedustloadingonthehigh-efficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters.2.HEPAfilterswithanindividualefficiencyofatleast99.97percent.AllRSSBventilationexhaustairisprocessedthroughafiltertrainpriortodischargingintothestack.Thefilteriscomprisedofthefollowingprimaryfiltrationelements:1.PrefiltertoremovelargerparticlestoreduceloadingoftheHEPAfilters.2.HEPAfilterswithanindividualefficiencyofatleast99.97percent.3.Twocarbonadsorbersectionsfortheremovalofradioactiveiodinefromtheexhauststream.FinalHEPAfilterswithanindividualefficiencyofatleast99.97percent.AirflowthroughtheprocessareasoftheRSSBisfromareasoflowradioactivecontaminationpotentialtowardareaswithincreasinglyhighercontaminationpotential.Airfromthetwotruckbaysisductedtotheventilationexhaustsystemratherthanreturnedto.therecirculatingatmosphericcleanupsystemtopreventrecirculationoftruckexhaustfumesintheRSSB.TheRSSBatmosphereiscontinuouslypurged(10,250cfm)withcleanoutsideairbyoperationofthefreshairsupplyandventilationexhaustsystems.PurgeairfromtheprocessareasoftheRSSBreplacestheairdrawnfromthetruckbayssuchthattheentirebuildingispurgedviatheexhaustfromthetruckbays.Radioactivetankventsarepipeddirectlyintotheexhaustsystemupstreamofthefilter.Heatingcoils(electrical),cooling(chilledwater),andfansarelocateddownstreamofthefiltercomponentstoprotectthemfromradioactivecontamination.Supplementalheatingisprovidedforthecontrolandelectricalroomsbyductheaters.Stairtowersareprovidedwithspaceheaters.Chilledwaterisproducedinoneoftwo100-percentcapacitywaterchillersandcirculatedbyoneoftwo100-percentcapacitychilledwaterpumps.Singlefailureofanyonefan,heatingcoilorcoolingcoilmayresultinoperatingvariationsfromthedesignbasisihowever,theoveralleffectwithregardtothehealthandsafetyofthebuildingoccupantsorthepublicwillnotbecompromised.FreshairinletandventilationexhaustpenetrationsthroughtheRSSBouterwallsareeachfittedwithtwoseriesmounteddampersdesignedtowithstandaminimumof3psipressuredifferentialresultingfromsevereweatherpressureconditions.AlldesignandspecificationrequirementsareforUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARnonseismic,nonnuclearsafety-relatedsystemsandcomponents.Instrumentationandcontrolsystemsareprovidedtoachieverequiredspacetemperatureconditionsandtomaintainairflowrequirementstoprovideacceptablebuildingandprocessareapressurerelationships.Relativehumidityisnotcontrolled,althoughitismaintainedatreasonablelevelsbytheHVACsystem.Alloperatingcontrolfunctionsareautomatic.Temperaturecontrolsystemsinthefreshairsupplyandrecirculatingatmosphericcleanupsystemsareindependent.Airflowcontrolsystemsinthefreshairsupplysystemandtheexhaustventilationsystemincludeinterlockprovisionstomaintainpressurerelationshipsuponde-energizinganexhaustorsupplyfan.Airflowcontrolsoftherecirculatingatmosphericcleanupsystemareindependentoftheothersystems.Redundanttemperaturesensingandcontrolloopsareprovidedinthefreshairsupplyandrecirculatingatmosphericcleanupsystem.Localinstrumentsandremoteindicationand/orannunciationareprovided.2.3ShieldingandAccessControl~>TheRSSBisdesignedtominimizeexposuretoplantpersonnelandthepublicbyitslocationanddesign.TheRSSBislocatedwithintheprotectedareaandisheavilyshieldedbyreinforcedconcrete.3.0UseTheRSSBwasconstructedwiththespecificintentofprovidingonsitestorageoflow-levelradioactivewaste(LLW).TheneedtostoreLLWonsiteistheresultofthefederalLow-LevelRadioactiveWastePolicyActasamendedin1985,whichinitiatedtheprocessbywhichthethreeexistingLLWdisposalsites(Barnwell,SC;Beatty,NV;andHanford,WA)wouldnolongerberequiredtoreceiveLLW.AlthoughoriginallydesignedtostoreUnit1LLW,theRSSBiscapableofprovidinginterimstorageofLLWproducedatbothUnit1andUnit2.Fromatechnicalstandpoint,thestorageofUnit2wasteatUnit1isconsideredacceptablebasedonthefollowing:1~Theisotopiclibrarytobeconsideredisessentiallythesameforbothunits;2~Theisotopicdistributionsforthetwounitsaresimilar;however,sinceUnit2isazincinjectionplant,thedistributionismoreheavilyweightedtowardZn-65,whileUnit1ismoreheavilyweightedtowardCo-60.ThenetimpactoninterimstorageintheRSSBisnotsignificantsincetheshieldinghasbeendesignedassumingthemorelimitingCo-60levelsofUnit1;3.Theselectivestorageofthehigh-activityLLWfrombothunitsintheRSSB(andthelow-activityLLWatUFSARRevision14III-43June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARUnit2)createsthepotentialforthestorageofgreateraverageactivityconcentrationinthebuilding,althoughnotgreatervolume.However,sincetheRSSBwasdesignedassumingthestorageofincineratedresinswhichrepresentaboundingactivityconcentration,thebuildingdesignisconsideredadequateforthecombinedstoragefrombothunits;4~TotalactivityintheRSSBwillultimatelybecontrolledpertheSiteradiationprotectionprogramtoensurethatbothonsiteandoffsitedoseanddoseratelimitsaremaintained;and5.Thetransferofby-productmaterialbetweenUnit1andUnit2willbeconductedinaccordancewithapprovedradiationprotectionimplementingprocedures.Radioactivepipingisroutedthroughashieldedpipetunnelandinshieldedareastolimitexposure.Majorpiecesofequipmentthatcanbesignificantsourcesofradiationexposureareeachprovidedwithaseparateshieldedcubicle.Thestoragevaultsareshieldedwith48inofconcreteinthestoragezone(belowcrane).Theroofis24-inthick.Thetankcubiclesareshieldedby36inofconcrete.Theeast-west.truckbayisequippedwitharetractingshielddoorintheceilingwhichmitigatesalbedoradiationinthetruckbayfromthestoragevaults.Thelow-levelstorageroomandtheprocessequipmentcubicleareequippedwithslidingshielddoors.AccessiscontrolledadministrativelybytheUnit1RadiationProtectionProgram.PhysicalcontrolofhighradiationareasismaintainedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecifications.UFSARRevision14III-44June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARJ.REFERENCES1.Catalytic,Inc.,ProjectNo.36700,SystemDescriptionforRadwasteSolidificationandStorageBuilding,ProcedureNo.601Revision1,February26,1981.2~3.Catalytic,Inc.,ProjectNo.36700,SystemDescriptionforHeatingVentilatingandAirConditioning(HVAC)and,ChilledWaterSystems,ProcedureNo.204,204.1Revision1,February10,1981.Catalytic,Inc.,ProjectNo.36700,SystemDescriptionforRadiationProtection,ProcedureNo.603Revision0,October14,1981.UFSARRevision14III-45June1996 }}