ENS 57652: Difference between revisions
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| emergency class = Non Emergency | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 04/08/2025 01:44 | | notification date = 04/08/2025 01:44 | ||
| retracted = Yes | |||
| notification by = Jack Connolly | | notification by = Jack Connolly | ||
| NRC officer = Jon Lilliendahl | | NRC officer = Jon Lilliendahl | ||
| event date = 04/07/2025 20:00 EDT | | event date = 04/07/2025 20:00 EDT | ||
| last update date = 04/ | | last update date = 04/09/2025 | ||
| title = Auxiliary Feedwater System Inoperable | | title = Auxiliary Feedwater System Inoperable | ||
| event text = The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: | | event text = The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: | ||
On April 7, 2025, at 2000 EDT, it was discovered that all pumps in the auxiliary feedwater system were inoperable due to the loss of control power to the `B' train emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control valve which supplies the `D' | On April 7, 2025, at 2000 EDT, it was discovered that all pumps in the auxiliary feedwater system were inoperable due to the loss of control power to the `B' train emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control valve which supplies the `D' steam generator. The redundant `A' Train EFW flow control valve for the `D' steam generator remains functional, as well as the capability of the auxiliary feedwater system to supply all steam generators. | ||
The `A' and `B' EFW flow control valves are arranged in a series configuration for each steam generator. Failure of any of the 8 EFW flow control valves to meet its surveillance requirements will render all EFW pumps inoperable per technical specifications (TS). | The `A' and `B' EFW flow control valves are arranged in a series configuration for each steam generator. Failure of any of the 8 EFW flow control valves to meet its surveillance requirements will render all EFW pumps inoperable per technical specifications (TS). | ||
This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). | This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). | ||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: | The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: | ||
Troubleshooting is ongoing for the cause of the loss of control power. The licensee is currently in | Troubleshooting is ongoing for the cause of the loss of control power. The licensee is currently in technical specification limiting condition for operation 3.7.1.2 action statement 'D' to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to operable status as soon possible. | ||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2025/ | * * * RETRACTION ON 04/09/2025 AT 1049 EDT FROM BOB MURRELL TO JORDAN WINGATE * * * | ||
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: | |||
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 04/08/2025 at 1344 EDT, EN 57652. Notification of the event to the Nuclear Regulatory Commision was initially made because of declaring all pumps in the emergency feedwater system inoperable in response to discovering the loss of control power to the `B' train emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control valve, which supplies the `D' steam generator. The redundant `A' train EFW flow control valve for the `D' steam generator remained functional, as well as the capability of the EFW system to supply all steam generators. | |||
Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra has concluded that the loss of control power to the `B' train EFW flow control valve did not prevent EFW from fulfilling its safety function. Specifically, the `A' train of EFW was fully capable of fulfilling all EFW safety functions. | |||
Therefore, this event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable pursuant 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). | |||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |||
Notified R1DO (Schussler) | |||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2025/20250410en.html#en57652 | |||
}}{{unit info | }}{{unit info | ||
| Unit = 1 | | Unit = 1 | ||
Latest revision as of 06:20, 10 April 2025
| Where | |
|---|---|
Seabrook  New Hampshire (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.73 h0.0721 days <br />0.0103 weeks <br />0.00237 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Jack Connolly 01:44 Apr 8, 2025 |
| NRC Officer: | Jon Lilliendahl |
| Last Updated: | Apr 9, 2025 |
| 57652 - NRC Website
| |