ML060690151

Memo from L. Rubenstein, NRR, to W. Johnston, NRR, Safety Evaluation Report Input for Section 9.5.1 - Fire Protection Concerning Safe Shutdown Capability and Alternative Shutdown Capability

ML060690151
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek, Callaway
Issue date:	05/09/1983
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Johnston W Division of Engineering
References
FOIA/PA-2006-0095 NUDOCS 8305180009
Download: ML060690151 (9)

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Dittribution Docket File

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FiLe ASBfMem'*bers, LRubenstein Docket Nos: 50-482/483 MAY O:0 MEMORAfDUH:FOR:

William V.' John:tont Assistant Director for Materials, Chemical 1nd Envirorrital1 Technology, Division of Engineering i ::

FROMt:

Lo S. Rubsnsta,: isistant Director'for Core and Plant Systm Divis10 of Systems Intgraton

SUBJECT:

SAFETY EVALUATION RORTINPUT FOR SECTION 9.5.1 - FIRE PROTECTION CORWNING, SAFE SHUTDON CAPADILITY MD

-ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY - SNUPPS (CALUAWAY AND tWOLF CEK)

Enclosed Is the Auxiliary Syst isragh's valuation if the SNUPPS Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability and Alternativ' Shutdown Capability.

The systems nseded for shutdown were evaluated,' aganst Sections 2lI.G and

, III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part S0.. We conclude that the systems identi-fled tor shutdown and th methodology applied by the applicants to identify plant areas of noncompliance with Section 111.G.2 arelacceptable.

We further conclude that the design of the reote shutdown sy tam meets the requirements oA Section pp1.e of Appndix R. 'n b Chemical Euigineoring Branch should review the dequacy of the barriers outside containoent Identified by the applicant and the combustibles inside contaltient to assure the adequacy of separation withfi1n the containment.

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L S RubensteingAssistant Director I,` for Core and Plant System

!IM~ion Of Systemn Integration

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

R. Mattson

0. Edison D. Elsenhut J. Holonich

' T. Novak

0. Parr 4 P. Triplett V.s j1n ey8

/ R. Capra R. Forguson B. J. Youngblood W. LeFave 8

Contact:

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Z.V APPENDX"R SECTION S £11. AND '.I.L.

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NSL' IS"AO SNUPPS,UCLEARIPLANT,:'CALLAVAY AND VOLF CREEK)

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AUXSLSAII'Y SStES RANCH',

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Our review of the' SNUPPI fire protection of sale shutdown cap-ability included the lIst -of equipment and components identi-It.

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lied in Section 3.IICS)' of th'sSNUPPS Finat Safety Analysis Report (tfSAR) as being nocessaryfor hot and/or cold Shutdowni the safe cotd shutdown analysis in FSAR Section S.4A, the j

remote shutdown capabitlity described in FSAR Section 7 4o the I

cable separation discussed in tSAR Section 34 and the fire hazards analysis and design comparison with Appendix R in FSAR Section 9.5. VI also reviewed the control room fire hazards j

' analysis submitted by letter dated November 15v 1982.

The applicant's safe shutclown analysis and fire hazards anatys demonstrated that redundancy exists for, Systems needed for hot and cold shutdown. The saft shutdown analysis included con-ponents. cabling and support equipment needed to achieve hot and cold shutdown.

Thuso In tho event of a fire anywhere in t planto at least one train of systems would be available to

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ngtrMIS iW,::d be used fo r oO M n 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> aft er a fIr e. The aVattablLty

'of thes lfl~Sd stone IncI'tod the COMPonentu, cabL ing Aae nctudes~h Id is, J

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• r The itPPtilcant's firs, hazalrds lanalysis 'demonstrated that except

'for' Inside cantainmeont and inside the controL room, redundant

-SYStem1s and cneehodtd. fogfe 'shutdown are cabling separated In acordance.4ith, I2l.O.2.

b, or, c of Appendix R.

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For the cont tr'fl~teapiathas8 Provided alternate shultdr'om, thebpplican hud ncpbity

~Outslfdo t.w II room In accordance w it h rZ X g

~ o A p n l I s id e th e, COnt ain ment there Is at L eta st 12fetbtenredundant Wae IShutdoawn dlvistons or bet ween djIverst systems such; as the letdown flotation valvts and the 1~

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power operated retief and blockvalves.,.Thus, the requirements of IIX.G.2.d are net for separation inside containment.

The applicant performed an etec'tricat train separation study in order to ensure that at tea'st one train of the above equipment is avaitable tn the event of a tiro in areas which might affect these components.

Safeshutdown equipment and'cabling.was identified and traced through each fire area irou'the components

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-V to the power source. Additional equipment and cabLing considered as associated either because of it shared common power source or common encLosure or whose fir' induced spurious operation couLd affect shutdown were atso identified.

Extensive use of computer I..

program checks were used to ensure separation. Each circuit and raceway is identified in the computer programi and the identi-fication includes the appLicable separation group.

The program is used to check that cables oat-particular separation group are routed through the appropriato raceways.

We have reviewed the applicant's method of determining that the separation crite' a of Appendix A are mJt and have reviewed the

• ssociated circuits identified by the applicant and the actions necessary or modifications made to prevent spurious operation that would affect safe ptant shutdown. Bosed on our review we VI 0

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conctude that 'the api i iaot hasi'*dequately Addreised the effects 47

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conclude 'that the applicant a athodology fdor veretyint that N

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.Separation is, in oc~ordanc* withAppendix RF1 It fn SSS.G.2 is., therefore.

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' 'l contadnven t nwdere redundant davire ansds not suparated by barriers in accordance with St:.4*2 is the control room.

Alternute shutdownracti s wlnt perevrequired for the u

ontrol root An order to assure the availability of the safe shutdown systens.

.4 Sn the event that a fire dcsables tho o ontrot roov the rfyote shurtdown panel associted with trapn t

equipment Located in a separate fire area of the aux111^zy bultdi~ng provides an otter-I native to fire protection separatilon vitoln thi'control room.

The control functionalyis indicatdhons protdtedntatb outxoie shutdown pmnet are rtectrnantdivisoitondaor otherwse separate andrrndependont wron the eontrol roon Atfor to rection V.C of thns SER tor surther dasausbion of lternatave shutdown capsstmsty.

n sed on tht abovet the dysteas tdentcoted for rchievnt r

nete n-shtdnng spae ehutdown ln the event oft o

fre oers cceptrate nd I.

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J JO4 the methodotogy used to assure -ado quato. protection of safe shutonsstm sinacrace Wiih,Section 11ZS.Gof Appendix R and thlrefoue'ii acceptable.

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V.C 'Alternative Shutdown Capab t

Section 7.4'of the SNUPPS.FSAR describes the remote shut-4 4,;

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4 down panels' capabIlity.

Section SA ot theF$SAR and thet

-control roo fire'hazoard' nsLysisrdsted Novexber 1S, i

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1982i describe remote shutdown capability for equipment not on the remote shutdown panel. The design objective of I

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,i the'remote'shutdown systema,'or the purposes of this evalu-

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ation isto achieve and'maintaln cold shutdown in the event ofa fire In the control rooa. The train' remote shutdown panet wilt b tlhe primary alternative shutdown panel since the necessary instruments and controls on this panel are isolated or isolable trom the control room.

The turbine driven ANU pumpotrain O

motor driven AfU punpf associated ANf cont-il^,lthe jtxosphereic'dunp valves for steam generators l ind 0, the group 0 pressuri-

er backup heaters, andithe train S letdown Isolotion valve can be controlled at the train 0 alternate shutdown panel for maintaining hot standby. 'Separate isotrtion o

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'swlthts rov1Jd tao'cs L-.stat 1ons'"foricontrct ot supportr;!

lystems,nd'ioclp shu~tdown syst~ems w1,l L b, "'se in co unction with '-0procedurst Approach -using pre-ptanned oprto ttn o na ints in *)t;,,standby, and to achieve

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and maintain cold shutdown,'w'ithln 72 'houirs.

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h 3/4 ih Tho desig f h riiotoeshut Own'ryst* C co PL t *sW t h

.the performance goais' outtin'sd_ n'Section SIS.L ot Appendix R. Romct'vJty-~controlrisaccomplished by asnual scram before the optrator ltvoi the contrat room and

,4 boron addition via the chemica1 *nd votunecontrol I-ktr.j

'I system using the refueltng,'water storage tank CRWST) and

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4 the charoind pudps. The reactorn cootant onkeuprlunctionr

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.:i lsotlting sll possibte pathsot,o,41nvontor;y Lost such as PORasn RHR suction hultonq'wiormth 7nd excss tdown its 41,,',,j j! l and the reactor vesseL head vents, l~ll these operations I,

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nTheudeingn ofacthr sra~moe shua ow systemp complifes wiOthl the penrfo rmance goats tout~l'ne bnestireonvZ!Z.

hof hu-down is cccotploshed by the AN systom tbrough the'bstyan a, D scram eore thd tospherato leave thie. contro roo an boo adito vi h hmcl'n oueoto

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-removalto' cold shutdownis achieved by the'residuaL heat renoval soThejtowing'nstruments on the Alter-nat shutdown, panel uill be used to *onitor process

!Pressurizer Level R

Reactr' coolant system pressure (wide range)

Steam generator Level (widi range)

ANW fltow.

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A.iX liv Rector coolant cold log temperature CTO)

Reactor, coolant hot leg temperature CT )

H Source range nuclear instrument The above.instrunentation wilt all be isolated from the control room on the,train 3' alternate shutdown panel.

Isolated valve position indication for the AFM system.-

Letdown isolation' alve#,and the atmospheric dump valves are also located on the train B panel.

t We have reviewed Actions"required by the procedures for achieving and maintaining saft plant shutdown following a fire.

For hot standby the -immediate actions are mainly precautionary oessureosto atisure no spurious operations occur due to the control ProCIN fire.

tome operations require cutting al'ontrol power cable at tOe equipment V

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'conditionI."-These ctions wittbe doscribed inthe pro-

'c4durese.S*For, achieving and mantaning cold ct 1

loc operation of RHi.i thoeton trlvelp Lotdownovatees Iw 4

and qertain CCp oystetion

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be In the cold shutdotwn procdurpsu We havo revie ted the proposedactilons nd mnpower rre enmento i

nd con-ct nue they fr in accordance with mitai4 n nd tta.L.5 to A ppendix R sinceh'they icon beo ccobplescbd exlunive of fire brige

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tr4igtforward &nd uncompti-cated such toat cohd shutdown can be t

chleved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> r'e I

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Based on aur rvyiews we eoncluds that the q ltuedntive shutdown colda hutdo orrthe control rae herts the i

equere-psonts od AppRndix th Sectnbn acomLi snd cs therieore acetptabLee

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