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{{#Wiki_filter:Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 June 21, 2011 10 CFR 50.36 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 NRC Docket No. 50-391
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==Subject:==
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 -Response to NRC Staff Comments on Developmental Revisions of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) and Technical Specifications Bases (TS Bases); Submittal of Developmental Revision F TVA's letter to NRC dated March 4, 2009 (Reference 1), included Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 TS and TS Bases. Developmental Revisions B through E were submitted to the NRC by TVA's letters dated February 2, 2010; August 16, 2010; October 12, 2010; and January 27, 2011, respectively (References 2 through 5).TVA's letter dated February 16, 2011 (Reference 6), provided supplemental information to assist the NRC staff in Review of Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 TSs and TS Bases.In mid-April 2011, the NRC staff provided TVA with a CD containing the Unit 2 TS and TS Bases with staff comments noted. Applicable pages from the TS and TS Bases and TVA's response are provided in Enclosures 1 through 4.A recurring NRC comment concerning TVA not justifying Unit 2's deletion of verbiage similar to"movable incore detectors" is not included because the staff considered this comment resolved based on TVA input that noted that Unit 2's incore detectors are fixed. For example, Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 4.4.5.1 (Incore Instrumentation) includes "core characteristics for all core quadrants using fixed incore neutron detector information." Enclosures 5 through 8 provide Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS and TS Bases to incorporate changes resulting from TVA's review of the NRC comments.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 21, 2011 Enclosure 9 provides a list of the new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If you have any questions, please contact Bill Crouch at (423) 365-2004.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 211day of June, 2011.Respectfully, David Stinson Watts Bar Unit 2 Vice President
 
==References:==
: 1. TVA to NRC letter dated March 4, 2009, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 -Operating License Application Update" (ADAMS Accession No. ML090700378)
[Developmental Revision A]2. TVA to NRC letter dated February 2, 2010, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -Unit 2 -Developmental Revision B of the Technical Specifications (TS), TS Bases, Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), TRM Bases; and Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)" (ADAMS Accession No. ML1100550326)
: 3. TVA to NRC letter dated August 16, 2010, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -Unit 2 -Change to Developmental TS Section 4.2.2, 'Control Rod Assemblies"' (ADAMS Accession No. ML102290075)
[Developmental Revision C]4. TVA to NRC letter dated October 12, 2010, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -Unit 2 -Change to Developmental Technical Specification (TS) Sections 3.6.11, 'Ice Bed,' and 3.1.8, 'Rod Position Indication"' (ADAMS Accession No. ML1028505200)
[Developmental Revision D]5. TVA to NRC letter dated January 27, 2011, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -Unit 2 -Change to Developmental Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.1.8, 'Rod Position Indication"' (ADAMS Accession No. MLl 10270108)
[Developmental Revision E]6. TVA to NRC letter dated February 16, 2011, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 -Supplemental Information For Review of Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) and Technical Specifications Bases (TS Bases)" (ADAMS Accession No. ML110490570)7. TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 -Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) -Response to NRC Required Action Items" (ADAMS Accession ML110980637)8. CD provided to the NRC for use in conjunction with the information submitted via Reference 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 June 21, 2011
 
==Enclosures:==
: 1. NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 2. TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 3. NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 4. TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 5. Proposed Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 6. Marked-up Version of Unit 2 Technical Specifications With Justifications for Revisions 7. Proposed Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 8. Marked-up Version of Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases With Justifications for Revisions 9. New Regulatory Commitments U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 June 21, 2011 cc (Enclosures):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 NRC Resident Inspector Unit 2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 ENCLOSURE 1 NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)QPTR 3.2.4 LCO 3.2.4 APPLICABILITY:
The QPTR shall be < 1.02.MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. QPTR not within limit.move up from page 3.2-10 A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER _> 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR> 1.00.AND A.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.1 and reduce THERMAL POWER >_ 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR> 1.00.AND A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1.2 hours Once per 12 hours thereafter 24 hours AND Once per 7 days thereafter Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 (continued)
AND A.4 Reevaluate safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under this condition.
EJllZZ Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.2-9 A Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM QPTR 3.2.4 delete and move up to page 3.2-9 j ACTIONS CONDITION J REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME V-AND A. (continued)
A.5-NOTE -------------
Perform Required Action A.5 only after Required Action A.4 is completed.
Calibrate excore detectors to show QPTR of 1.0.AND A.6-NOTE -------------
Perform Required Action A.6 only after Required Action A.5 is completed.
Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 Within 24 hours after reaching RTP OR Within 48 hours after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1.B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 50% RTP.Time not met.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.2-10 A Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One channel inoperable.
---------------
NOTE ---------The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours POWER to < P-7.N. One Reactor Coolant -----------------
NOTE ---------Flow -Low channel One channel may be bypassed for inoperable, up to 12 hours for surveillance testing.N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR N.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours POWER to < P-.Discrepancy:U1 A68 (TSTF-169) shows P-8 revised-to P-7 (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-5 A Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 1. Manual Reactor Trip 1,2 3 (a), 4 (a) 5 (a)2 2 B C SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA NA NA 2. Power Range Neutron Flux a. High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7'('c SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 " SR 3.3.1.15111.4%RTP 109% RTP b. Low 1 (-), 2 4 E< 27.4% 25% RTP 3. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate a. High Positive Rate 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 (L(SR 3.3.1.11 b. High Negative Rate -DELETED'R 5% RTFI h with timq constant nt 2 sec c R 25% RTI'R 25% RTI 4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux 1 (-d), 2 (`2)2 F, G SR 3.3.1.8"N SR 3.3.1.11 2 (0.1 2 H SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 TP (continued)(a) With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.(b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at tie completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances applV to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance orocedures (fie H.LHH.; .f; k.U 1III H.HHIHI 4-HHHH dl HH.d ; H I UHHHO ;I Qd ,Jt. UH .t Al HU dIU 1d~ V I~d ;r. A OLd..Hd XA/I AnLl H C U; ..HH se no, o con rm c anne Pe rmance. e om na r o e po n an a owa e va ues are spec e n I U,, eLpo n Methodoloqy for Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left tolerances are defined in the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.(d) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-15 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 5. Source Range Neutron Flux 2 '(")2 2 I, J J, K 3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a)3 (eg). 4 (,)1 L SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 bI'c SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1,1 SR 3.3.1.8 bUc SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7'MpC SR 3.3.1.10 '&#xfd;'Uc SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7Lgb(c SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.151.5 E5 1.0 E5 C cps< 1.5 E5 1.0 E5 cps cps I 6. Overtemperature AT 7. Overpower AT 1,2 1,2 4 4 W W N/A Refer to Note 1 (Page 3.3-21)Refer to Note 2 (Page 3.3-22)N/A Refer to Note 1 (Page 3.3-21)Refer to Note 2 (Page 3.22)8. Pressurizer Pressure a. Low 1 (41)4 X SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 fL=SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15> 1964.8 psig 1970 psiI b. High 1,2 4 W_< 2390.2 2385 psig psig I (continued)(a) With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.(b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at tie completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are dkU~LJLdUIC L)IUVIUCU LIIdL LI He d~IUUI U OH U dOICIL LUICIdIIUC~
OULJIV Lu LIIC OULUOI OCLLLUIIIL iiIiIJieiIiUIiLeU III LI IC JUl VLjIIIdIIIjC LJIUI..CUUIC~
IIIt&#xb6;fL accepLab e proviye L aL L e as- Uno an as- e Lo erances aPPIV LO Me aCtUa seLPOInt implememe n Lhe burvemance procedures I ielp setting) to confirm channel performance.
The Nominal Trip Setpoint and allowable values are specified in WCAP 17044, Setpoint Methodology for Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left tolerances are6defined in the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.(f) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(g) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provi e reactor trip but does provide indication.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-17 Rs e a UFSAR (developmental) specify a uFSAR Ec~un.B Open Pending Receipt of Information Table 3.3 Reactor Trip S A47 and A68 retained 89.7%.NTSP. JFD-8(TSTF-493) shown in Bases markup does not apply to AV changes. Bases JFD-7 describes change as specific to Unit 1; Bases text changes AV from % indicated loop flow to %thermal design flow.EICB needs to confirm.imentation 3.3.1 APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEIL ANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIRE NTS VALUE SETPOINT 9. Pressurizer Water 1 3 X SR 3.3.1.1 92.7% 92% spa Level-High SR 3.3.1.7 span SR 3.3.1.10 10. Reactor Coolant 1 M) 3 per loop N SR 3.3.1.1 _ 89.6-% 90% flo Flow -Low SR 3.3.1.7 b flow SR 3.3.f1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 11. Undervoltage RCPs 1 -1 per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 > 4734 V 4830 V SR 3.3. 1.10 '--SR 3.3.1.15 12. Underfrequency 1 (L) 1 per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 _ 56.9 Hz 57.5 Hz RCPs SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 (continued) then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is I (b)(c)If the as-found channel setnoint is outside its oredefined as-found tolerance functioning as required before returning the channel to service._rk ; # i k I f ; f k 11 k f f I fk f ; ifk; 4k 1 44 f 1 A +k KI ; I T ; 0 f ; .#e ns rumen c anne -uo n s a e rese .a -ue a .w n e as- e o erance aroun e orn na r p e no a .completion of the surveillance:
otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are OLH..OLJ~cI4I AI AVUO LI lAl .IH I~U U l U01 1 3001H.0aLLHyUHIH OIU I IVLJH AL HI 13010 LO N, IH ~ 010 1. HU.OUO IOL 4 accePLa e Prov e L a e as- un an as- e o erances app V 0 L e aCLua seLpo nL inip erneme n L e urve ance proce ures I e settina) to confirm channel oerformance.
The Nominal Trip Seto int and allowable values are specified in WCAP 17044. Setpoint Methodology for Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left tolerances are defined in the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.(h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) sFRRevise Note (c) to speciiofy .aUFSAR 3.3-19 B Open Pending Receipt of Information RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER REQUIRED ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED CHANNEL SURVEILLANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS S CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 13. SG Water Level -Low-Low Coincident with: a) Vessel AT Equivalent to power_< 50% RTP With a time delay (T,) if one steam generator is affected 1,2 3/SG U SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7'b=
SR 3.3.1.10'SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.7'U(21 SR 3.3.1.10'=
> 16.4%of narrow range span Vessel AT variable input< 52.6%RTP 1,2 3 V licensee1.01 T, confirmatory item (Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)17% of narrow ranbe span Vessel A variable in4jut 50% RTP T&#xfd;(Refer t(Note 3, Page 3.3-43)Tm (Refer tc Note 3, Page 3.3-43)Vessel At variable in~ut 50% RTP or A time delay (Tm) if two or o more stea generat are affect 0- 1.01 Tm (Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)Vessel AT variable input52.6%RTP b) Vessel AT Equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (T. and Tm= 0)1,2 3 V SR 3.3.1.7b-'1 SR 3.3.1.10 L Provide plant-specific design to justify not applying footnotes (a) and (b) per TSTF-493.3 0 SIR 331.1 SR 3.3.1.14 14. Turbine Trip a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure S0)1 ('_> 43 psig 45 psig I 4 Y SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.14 n107 1% open (continued)(i) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-20 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLEr MODES OR APPROVED OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED By Carl Schulten at 3:32 pm, Aug 03, 2010 FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS C .. ........ ...,.., ...... ....... ..... ........15. Safety Injection (SI) 1,2 2 trains P SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
: a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 (1) Enable Manual Block of SR Trip (2) Auto Reset (Unblock Manual Block of SR Trip)b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-1 0 2 ('.l)2 _1,2 2 2 1 per train 4 4 4 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 NA 1.66E-041/
RTP>_ 7.65E- 0.47E-4&deg;)5% RTP RTP belo*N setpoint NA_ 50.4%RTP NA 48% RTP SR 3.3.1.11 52.4% 50% RTP SR 3.3.1.12 RTP SR 3.3.1.11 _7.6% 10%RTP SR 3.3.1.12 TP and< 12.4%RTP f. Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13 1 2 S SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.12< 12.4%full-power pressure 10%full-power pressure (continued)(f) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-21 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. One Steam Generator Water Level -High High channel inoperable.
1.1- ---------
NOTE------
One channel may be APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 12:27 pm, Jul 22, 2010 OR 1.2.1 Place channel in trip.Be in Mode 3.72 hours 78 hours ILicense Amendment No.?GRAND I 1.2.2 Be in Mode 4.84 hours J. One or morn urbine Driven J.1 Restore channel to 48 hours Main Feedwater Pumps trip OPERABLE status.channel(s) inoperable.
OR J.2 Be in Mode 3. 54 hours K. One channel inoperable.
K.1 ----------
NOTE------
One channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing.Place channel in bypass. 72 hours OR K.2.1 Be in Mode 3. 78 hours AND K.2.2 Be in Mode 5. 108 hours (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-28 B Open Pending Receipt of Information SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ,-NO REVIEWED Refer to Table 3.3.2-1 to determine which SRs aL By Carl Schulten at 3:28 pm, Jul 30, 2010 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.2.2 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.2.3 Perform MASTER RELAY TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.2.4 Perform COT. 184 days SR 3.3.2.5 ---------------------
NOTE ---------------
Slave relays tested by SR 3.3.2.7 are excluded from this surveillance.
Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST. 92 days OR 18 months for Westinghouse type AR and Potter &Brumfield MDR Sen relays JFD7. RAI: Need staff SE approving 18 Frequency for MDR relay tests.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-31 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 9)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Safety Injection a. Manual Initiation
: b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 2 2 trains B C SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.7 NA NA NA NA c. Containment Pressure -High d. Pressurizer Pressure -Low e. Steam Line Pressure -Low 1,2,3 3 D 1, 2, 31a)1, 2, 3"e)3 3 per steam line D D SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 ,h)lI, SR 3.3.2.9 "" "'SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 b,(c1 SR 3.3.2.10< 1.6 psig 1.5 psig I> 1864.8 psig 1870 psig> 666.6"1" psig 675"J psif 2. Containment Spray a. Manual Initiation
: b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 2 per train, 2 trains 2 trains B C SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 NA NA NA NA c. Containment Pressure -High High 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 b) 10 SR 3.3.2.9 L5c SR 3.3.2.10< 2.9 psig 2.8 psig (a)(b)Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure)
Interlock.
If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as-found tolerance, then the channel c~,,eI, ,,,FcrI en ,n~rif,, th~I it ic f, ,nctinnjnn ,c rcnl rim,) I bridil Ljt&#xfd;evaluated to verif that it is functionin as rewred*" before returning the channel to service."" " (c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion o the surveillance:
otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance.
The Nominal Trio Setpoint and allowable values are specified in WCAP 17044. Setpoint Methodeloqgfor Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left tolerances are defined in the Nuclear En gineerin g Setpoint and Scalin g Documents.
1\t lfelt Time constants used in the lead/lao controller are tl > 50 seconds and t2 < 5 seconds.Revise Note (c) to 3.3-33 specify a UFSAR citation.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 9)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 3. Containment Isolation a. Phase A Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation (2) Automatic 1, 2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.3 Logic and SR 3.3.2.5 Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Injection b. Phase B Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train, B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation 2 trains (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.3 Logic and SR 3.3.2.5 Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays (3) Containment 1, 2, 3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 < 2.9 psig 2.8 psig Pressure -SR 3.3.2.4 lb K)High High SR 3.3.2.9 fbI .I SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)(b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as-found tolerance then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion csurveIInce:
L, eII c, Iarln, srlall be ec areu IIIUe-rItL)e.
otpoU rts moreur co.srvrlrVeLl an trler [r i ts re ac.(.;eptadUIe LfIa, MeI lUDuTI and as-IeIR LUI0 T rl ir, StJiCl LU LIO the LUaI SeLLUl In IIiidlTe Il LC Ill tin e ourVellrdT prld UT u ureT 1s I .I SLL, TIelL L I U UUTIF I T Cl UT illrlil pe ~rT!r dic .I lie INOIIIIIISI I 11.1 .ddtUUIIIt dilu SIIUWSUid VUIUtTS did SL.,dUlIId~
III LVL.~Mi~ I lUqq, Cewuuilt rvieirruuuruuv UT 055115 Cdl UIITI C. life SSIUUIIU dliii dbTdii tiiididili.
~j -NoinaIlTl r .eLJUIIIL anId allowable va::lues are specL~lIL Ill vn,,ir -IU, u-, beL0UUIII IVILr13UUIU0qy lor V"dtts oa:r unitI 2. 1 Me] a:s-IUlIunJ and{ a-lelt tlUIFerancu are defined in the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.
I -Revise vis Note(c)to specify a UFSAR citation.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-34 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 9)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 4. Steam Line Isolation a. Manual Initiation 1, 2 3 1 1/valve F SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA b. Automatic 1, 2 (, 3 ( 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays c. Containment 1, 2 3, 3 (t 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 < 2.9 psig 2.8 psig Pressure -SR 3.3.2.4 High High SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 d. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1, 2 ('., 3 lt5 3 per D SR 3.3.2.1 > 666.6 675 (h-)psi steam line SR 3.3.2.4 ' -"-  SR 3.3.2.9 L SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Negative 3 _ 3 per D SR 3.3.2.1 < 108.5 ('9) psi 100 (6)ps)Rate -High steam line SR 3.3.2.4-'-
SR 3.3.2.9 (b)ic SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)(b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of _e survefllance:
otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found ,nd as-left tolerances apply tothe actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance.
The Nominal Trn Setogint and allowable values are specified in WCAP 17044 Setpoint Methodologv for Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left tolerances are defined L the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.(d) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are ti > 50 seconds and t 2 < 5 seconds.(e) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.(f) Function automatically blocked above P-11 (Pressurizer Interlock) setpoint and is enabled below P-1 when safety injection on Steam Line Pressure Low is manually blocked.(g) Time constants utilized in the rate/lag controller are t 3 and t 4 > 50 seconds. Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-35 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 9)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation a. Automatic 1, 2 (, 3 ( 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays b. SG Water Level -1, 2 , 3 (- 3 per SG I SR 3.3.2.1 < 83.1% 82.4%High High (P-14) SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 c. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
: d. North MSV Vault 1, 2 -3 per 0 SR 3.3.2.6 < 5.31 inches 4 inches Room Water vault room SR 3.3.2.9 'Level -High e. South MSV Vault 1, 2 -3 per 0 SR 3.3.2.6 < 4.56 inches 4 inchesl Room Water vault room SR 3.3.2.9 I I Level -High (continued)(b) If the as-fouind channel setpoint is outside its redefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance:
otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance.
The Nominal Trip Setpoint and allowable values are specified in WCAP 170440etooint Methodology for Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left tolerances are defined in the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.(h) Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by losed manual valve.(i) Mode 2 if Turbine Drven Main Feed Pumps are operating.
Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-36 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 9)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 6. Auxiliary Feedwater a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1,2,3 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 NA NA b. SG Water Level-Low Low Coincident with: 1) VesselAT Equivalent to power< 50% RTP With a time delay (T.) if one SG is affected 1,2,3 3 per SG M SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 151(10> 16.4%17.0%1,2 3 N Vessel AT variable input< 52.6% RTP licensee 5 1.01 T, (Note 1, confirmatory item Page 3.340)Or<A time delay (Tr) if two or mrore SGs are afece Vessel A4 variable inriut 50% RTP T s (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)Tm (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)Vessel Alt variable indut 50% RTP 1.01 Tm (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)Vessel AT variable input_ 52.6% RTP 2) Vessel AT equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (T. and Tm = 0)c. Safety Injection 1,2 3 N SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.(continued)(b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion o the surveillance:
otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance.
The Nominal Trip Setpoint and allowable values are specified in WCAP 17044, Setp iot Methodoloqy for Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left toleranc( s a re d e fi n e d in th e N u c le a r E n g in e e rin g S e to oin t a n d S c a lin g D o c u m e n ts .R v s N Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-37 Revise (developmental) specify a UFSAR B citation.
Open Item JFD 8. Notes (b) &By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM (c) not reviewed on AS Instrumentation this page. 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (.e 6 of 9)Engineered Safety Featw FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRE REVIEWED *NA.CHANNEL RIP By Carl Schulten at 12:31 pm, Jul 22, 2010 POINT 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
: d. Loss of Offsite Power e. Trip of all Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps 1,2,3 4 per bus F Refer to Function 4 of Table 3.3.5-1 for SRs and Allowable Values.1,11 1 per pump APPROVED By Cart Schu1ten at 3:33 pm, Ju1 30. 2010I J SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 IJaJ SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10> 48 psig 50 psig I f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Train A and B Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure -Low 1,2,3 3 F A) > 0.5 psig B) > 1.33 psig A) 1.2 psig B) 2.0 psig 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b. Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)Level -Low 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 2 trains 4 C K SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 NA> 155.6 inches from Tank Base NA 158 inches from Tank Base Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Safety Injection and" And.Coincident with Containment Sump Level -High 1,2,3,4 K SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10> 37.2 inches above el. 702.8 ft 38.2 inches above el. 702.8 ft (continued)(b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance.
The Nominal Trin Setpoint and allowable values are specified in WCAP 17044 Setpoint Methodology for Watts Bar Unit 2. The as-found and as-left tolerances are defined in the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.(j) Entry into Condition J may be suspended for up to 4 hours when placing the second Turbine Driven Mai Feedwater (TDMFW) Pump in service or removing one of two TDMFW pumps from service.(k) When one or more Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump(s) are supplying feedwater to steam generators.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-38 Revise Note (c) to (developmental) s ify a UFSAR B speciftat Icitation.
Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 8 of 9)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 8. ESFAS Interlocks
: a. Reactor Trip, P-4 1,2,3 1 per train, F SR 3.3.2.11 NA NA 2 trains b. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 (1) Unblock 1,2,3 3 L SR 3.3.2.1 < 1975.2 psig 1970 psig (Auto Reset SR 3.3.2.4 {Lh of SI Block) SR 3.3.2.9 I (2) Enable 1, 2, 3 3 L SR 3.3.2.1 > 1956.8 psig 1962 psig Manual SR 3.3.2.4 ' I Block of SI SR 3.3.2.9 I (b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as-found tolerance then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setnoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP( at the completion o the surveillance:
otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance orocedures (field settingt to confirm channel perfornmance.
The Nominal Trio Setnoint and allowable values are soecified in WVCAP 17044. Setnoint Methodtoloov for Watts 2cr Unit 2. The as-found and as-left toleranc, Nominal Trip Setgoint and allowable values are specified in WCAP 17044 Setpoint Methodolonv for Watts Bar Unit 2 The as-found and as-left toleranc are defined in the Nuclear Engineering Setpoint and Scaling Documents.
Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-39 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 Post b Acidn Moioi By1 EV WEcarl Schulten at3:51 pJul 2,20101 Table 3.3.3-1 (pa REVIEWED Post Accident Monitoring By Cr cutnat 3:1pm, Jl21, 21 (a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Justify deviations (b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks from WBN1 on this (c) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interl cks page (d) Not required for isolation valves whose associate enetrati is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed anual valv , blind flange, pressure relief valve, or check valve with flow through e valve sec ed.(e) A channel consists of two core exit ther couples (CET/.(f) The lGGMCommon Q Post Accident onitorinq Syste provides these functions on a plasmaflat screen display.(g) Regulatory Guide 1.97, non-Type A, Category 1 Varables.(h) This function is displayed on the IGCM- pasmaCommon Q Post Accident Monitoring_
System flat screen display and digital panel meters.(i) Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication channel.(j) Watts Bar specific (not required by Regulatory Guide 1.97) non-Type A Category 1 variable.Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-46 (developmental)
B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System LCO 3.3.4 APPLICABILITY:
The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3i t d ACTIONS ,l ltJ I----------------------------------
I'JJ " r --------------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days Functions inoperable.
Function to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-47 A Open Pending Receipt of Information Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REVIEWED N ,By Carl Schulten at 3:40 pm, Jul 30, 2010----------------------------------
NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Containment Vent Isolation Function.SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.6.2 ---------------------
NOTE -------------------
This surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation.
Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.3 -- ------------------
NOTE ---------------
This surveillance is only applicable to the master relays of the ESFAS instrumentation.
Perform MASTER RELAY TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.4 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.6.5 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST. 92 days OR 18 months for Westinghouse type AR and Potter &Brumfield MDR Series relays JFD7. RAI: Need staff SE approving 18 Frequency for JMDR relay tests.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-56 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 (p REVIEWED Containment Vent Isolat By Carl Schulten at 12:17 pm, Jul22, 20101 REQUIRED CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE FUNCTION 1. Manual Initiation
: 2. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 2 2 trains SR 3.3.6.6 SR 3.3.6.2 SR 3.3.6.3 SR 3.3.6.5 NA NA 3. Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation Monitors 4. Safety Injection 2 SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.4 SR 3.3.6.7< 8.41E-02 Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrur all initiation functions and requirem((b) Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-58 B Open Pending Receipt of Information RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below: a. Pressurizer pressure > 2214 psig;b. RCS average temperature
:_ 593.2 0 F; and c. RCS total flow rate > 380,000 gpm (process computer or control board indication).
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1.------ ---------------------------------
NOTE ----------
Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during: a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or b. THERMAL POWER step> 10% RTP.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours parameters not within limits, parameter(s) to within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met.Explain what changes were made to Developmental A.Note that TS A47 revised page 3.4-2, but not page 3.4-1.B Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-1 APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 10:01 am, Aug 05, 2010 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 Verify pressurizer pressure is > 2214 psig. 12 hours SR 3.4.1.2 Verify RCS average temperature is  593.2 0 F. 12 hours SR 3.4.1.3 Verify RCS total flow rate is > 380,000 gpm (process 12 hours computer or control board indication).
SR 3.4.1.4 ---------------------
NOTE ---------------
Required to be performed within 24 hours after_ 90% RTP.Verify by precision heat balance -18 months method that RCS total flow rate&#xfd;'_> 380','000 gpm.A47 change made for WBN1 is deleted for WBN2 Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-2 B Open Pending Receipt of Information 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4,6 RCS Loops -MODE 4 RCS Loops -MODE 4 3.4.6 LCO 3.4.6 Two loops shall be OPERABLE, and consist of either: a. Any combination of RCS loops and residual heat removal (RHR)loops, and one loop shall be in operation, when the rod control system is not capable of rod withdrawal; or SRXB Confirmatory item APPLICABILITY:
: b. Two RCS loops, and both loops shall be in operation, when the rod control system is capable of rod withdrawal.
------------------------------
NOTE---------------------------------
RCP shall be started with any RCS cold leg temperature
< 3 t502Fthe COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR unless the secondary side water temperature of each steam generator (SG) is _< 50&deg;F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MODE 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Only one RCS loop A.1 Initiate action to restore a Immediately OPERABLE.
second loop to OPERABLE status AND Two RHR loops inoperable.
B. One required RHR loop B.1 Be in MODE 5. 24 hours inoperable.
AND No RCS loops OPERABLE.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-9 B Open Pending Receipt of Information 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.7 RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled 3.4.7 LCO 3.4.7 One residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation, and either: a. One additional RHR loop shall be OPERABLE; or b. The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators (SGs) shall be greater than or equal to 6% narrow range.-- -------------------------------
NOTES ------------------
SRX13 1,. One required RHR loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for Confirmatory item surveillance testing provided that the other RHR loop is OPERABLE*an operation.
: 2. No reactor c t pump shall be started with one or more RCS cold leg temperatures-
=the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR unless the secondary side water temperature of each SG is_< 50&deg;F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.
: 3. All RHR loops may be removed from operation during planned heatup to MODE 4 when at least one RCS loop is in operation.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 5 with RCS loops filled.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR loop inoperable.
A.1 Initiate action to restore a Immediately second RHR loop to AND OPERABLE status Required SGs secondary OR side water levels not within limits. A.2 Initiate action to restore Immediately required SG secondary side water levels to within limits (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-12 B Open Pending Receipt of Information 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10 LCO 3.4.10 Three pressurizer safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings>_ 2410 psig and < 2560 psig.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1,2, and 3.-MODE 4 with all RCS cold lea temoeratures
> the COMS armina/ temperature specified in the PTLR.-NOTE-litem The lift settings are not required to be within the LCO limits during MODE 3 and MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures
> the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR for the purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) conditions.
This exception is allowed for 54 hours following entry into MODE 3 provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup.ACTIONS CNIINREQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One pressurizer safety A.1 Restore valve to 15 minutes valve inoperable.
OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B. Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 4 with any 12 hours CS cold leg temperature Two or more pressurizer
< the COMS arming safety valves inoperable.
temperature specified in the PTLR.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-18 B Open Pending Receipt of Information 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)COMS 3.4.12 LCO 3.4.12 A COMS System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one charging pump and no safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and either a or b below.a. Two RCS relief valves, as follows: 1. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings within the limits specified in the PTLR, or 2. One PORV with a lift setting within the limits specified in the PTLR and the RHR suction relief valve with a setpoint_> 436.5 psig and < 463.5 psig.b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent capable of relieving
>475 gpm water flow.SRXB confirmtr
-item APPLICABILITY:
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
-------------------
---NOTE ----------------------
: 1. Two charging pumps may be made capable of injecting for less than or equal to one hour for pump swap operations.
: 2. Accumulator may be unisolated when accumulator pressure is less than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in the PTLR.(MODES 4 3nd 5,MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperature
< the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR, MODE 5, and MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on 3.4-23 B Open Pending Receipt of Information COMS 3.4.12 ACTIONS-NOTE.LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable when entering MODE 4.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more safety injection A.1 Initiate action to verify no Immediately pumps capable of injecting safety injection pumps into the RCS. are capable of injecting into the RCS.B. Two or more charging B.1 Initiate action to verify a Immediately pumps capable of injecting maximum of one charging into the RCS. pump is capable of injecting into the RCS.C. An accumulator not isolated C.1 Isolate affected 1 hour when the accumulator accumulator.
pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.D. Required Action and D.1 Increase RCS cold leg 12 hours associated Completion temperature to Time of Condition C not > 250-Fthe COMS arming met. temperature specified in the PTLR.ISRXB OR item D.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours accumulator to less than the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-24 B Open Pending Receipt of Information SRXB confirmatory item COMS 3.4.12 (continued)
ACTIONS (continued)
(CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One required RCS relief E.1 Restore required RCS 7 days valve inoperable in M 4 relief valve to with any RCS cold leq OPERABLE status.temperature
< the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR.F. One required RCS relief F.1 Restore required RCS 24 hours valve inoperable in MODE 5 relief valve to or 6. OPERABLE status.G. Two required RCS relief G.1 Depressurize RCS and 8 hours valves inoperable, establish RCS vent.OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, D, E, or F not met.OR COMS inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, B, C, D, E, or F.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-25 B Open Pending Receipt of Information COMS 3.4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.12.5 Verify PORV block valve is open for each required 72 hours PORV.SR 3.4.12.6 Verify both RHR suction isolation valves are locked 31 days open with operator power removed for the required RHR suction relief valve.SR 3.4.12.7 --------------------
NOTE. -------------------
SRXB con Required to be met within 12 hours after g oitema RCS cold leg temperature to < 35O017the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR.Perform a COT on each required PORV, excluding 31 days actuation.
SR 3.4.12.8 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each required 18 months PORV actuation channel.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-27 B RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.14 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage LCO 3.4.14 APPLICABILITY:
Leakage from each RCS PIV shall be within limit.MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4, except valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) flow path when in, or during the transition to or from, the RHR mode of operation.
ACTIONS--------------------------------------
NOTES --------------------------
: 1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each flow path.2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by an inoperable PIV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more flow paths with ------------
NOTE ---------leakage from one or more Each valve used to satisfy Required RCS PIVs not within limit. Action A.1 must have been verified to meet SR 3.4.14.1 and be in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.A.1 Isolate the high pressure 4 hours portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by use of one closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check valve."I (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-30 A RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.14 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
AND _--- delete ''AND''_A.2 Restore RCS PIV to 72 hours within limits B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time for Condition A not AND met.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-31 A RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.15 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation LCO 3.4.15 No deviations result from markup.Why is this Developmental B?APPLICABILITY:
The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE: 2. One lower containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor-I n.,or~s. m' ',A r~,.4rm m~+r t4clovVU0 mri a -,U ca V .I f'~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required containment A.1 Perform SR 3.4.13.1.
Once per 24 hours pocket sump level monitor inoperable.
AND A.2 Restore required 30 days containment pocket sump level monitor to OPERABLE status.B. Required containment B.1.1 Analyze grab samples of Once per 24 hours atmosphere particulate the containment radioactivity monitor atmosphere.
inoperable.
OR B.1.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1.
Once per 24 hours AND B.2 Restore required 30 days containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor to OPERABLE status.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-33 B (REVIEWED 1 By Carl Schulten at 1:45 pm, Jul 21, 2010 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.15 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours D. All required monitors D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable.
Make change per LCO 3.4.15.2.Make conforming SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS change to WNB1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.15.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK of the r quired 12 hours containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor.SR 3.4.15.2 Perform COT of the required ent 92 days atmosphere particulate radioactivity leveI monitor.SR 3.4.15.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required 18 months containment pocket sump level monitor.SR 3.4.15.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required 18 months containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-34 B (APPROVED 1 By Carl Schulten at 1:28 pm, Jul 22, 2010 Accumulators 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)3.5.1 Accumulators LCO 3.5.1 Four ECCS accumulators shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with pressurizer pressure > 1000 psig.Bases 3.5 , item 1 7 JFC Rev B TS/TS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION &#xfd;COMPLETION TIME A. One accumulator A.1 Restore boron 2 hours inoperable due to boron concentration to within concentration not within limits.limits./B. One accumulator B.1 Restore accumulator to 424 hours inoperable for reasons other OPERABLE status.than Condition A.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met.C.2 Reduce pressurizer 12 hours pressure to _< 1000 psig.D. Two or more accumulators C.3 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.5-1 B Accumulators 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify each accumulator isolation valve is fully open. 12 hours SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borated water volume in each accumulator is 12 hours> 7630 gallons and < 8000 gallons.SR 3.5.1.3 Verify nitrogen cover pressure in each accumulator is 12 hours_ 610 psig and < 660 psig.SR 3.5.1.4 Verify boron concentration in each accumulator is 31 days> 3000 ppm and _< 3300 ppm.AND..--------
NOTE ---------Only required to be performed for affected accumulators Once within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of_> 75 gallons, that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank SR 3.5.1.5 Verify power is removed from each accumulator 31 days Fa eerator when pressurizer pressure is (1000 psig.-<<- xNeed to justify deviation from Unit 1 which includes TPBARs. Revise page to Developmental B.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.5-2 A Open Pending Receipt of Information RWST 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)Justifications for Rev B Changes to TS/TS Bases 3.5 (3.5.1-3.5.5) item 2 references Westinghouse letter WBT-D-1 177 dated October 19, 2009 as affecting TS 3.5.4 (see report page E2-3 of 11). Justify why RWST TS are unchanged from Developmental A.LCO 3.5.4 APPLICABILITY:
The RWST shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RWST boron concentration A.1 Restore RWST to 8 hours not within limits. OPERABLE status.OR RWST borated water temperature not within limits.B. RWST inoperable for B.1 Restore RWST to 1 hour reasons other than OPERABLE status.Condition A.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.5-8 A LAPPROVED By Carl Schulten at 11:30 am, Nov 08, 2010 Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
A.2 --------NOTES------
: 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative Matches U1 RA ---A.2 Notes. Why is 2. Isolation devices that this Developmental are locked, sealed, or B? otherwise secured may be verified by use o, ad io nstrtive Verify the affected Once per 31 days for penetration flow path is isolation devices isolated.
outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-8 B LAPPROVED By Carl Schulten at 1:49 pm, Jul 22, 2010 Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. -------NOTE -----------
B.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one closed two containment isolation and de-activated valves. automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge valve or shield building bypass leakage not within limit.C. -------NOTE--------
Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system.One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable.
Matches U1 RA C.2 Notes. Why is this Developmental B?C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange 4 hours AND C.2 --------NOTES------
: 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative ea s.2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-9 B
[APPROVED 1 By Carl Schulten at 1:50 pm, Jul 22, 2010 Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each containment purge valve is closed, 31 days except when the containment purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be open.SR 3.6.3.2 ---------------------
NOTE---------------
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative controls.Verify each containment isolation manual valve and 31 days blind flange that is located outside containment, the containment annulus, and the Main Steam Valve Vault Rooms, and not locked, sealed, or otherwise/secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation alves that are open under administrative controls.SR 3.6.3.3-----------------
NOTE--------
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may ,e verified by use of administrative controls.Matches U1; why -Development B? Verify each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located inside containment, the containment annulus, and the Main Steam Valve SVault Rooms, and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.3.4 Verify the isolation time of each power operated and In accordance with each automatic containment isolation valve is within the Inservice Testing limits. Program or 92 days (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-12 B MSSVs 3.7.1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)LCO 3.7.1 Five MSSVs per steam generator shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTIONS------------------
NOl Separate Condition entry is allowed for each N"59" is from 1-11 A31 which is not in U2.E------------------------------
ISSV. I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTI N COMPLETION TIME A. One or more steam A.1 Reduce THER AL 4 hours generators with one MSSV POWER to < 51 % RTP.inoperable.
B. One or more steam B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours generators with two or more POWER to less than or MSSVs inoperable, equal to the Maximum Allowable
% RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 for the number of OPERABLE MSSVs.AND-------------------
NOTE ------.Only required in MODE 1.B.2 Reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux -High reactor trip setpoint to less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable% RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 for the number of OPERABLE MSSVs.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-1 A CST 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)LCO 3.7.6 APPLICABILITY:
The CST level shall be > 200,000 gal.MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CST level not within limit. A.1 Verify by administrative 4 hours means OPERABILITY of ERCW backup water AND supply. Once per 12 hours thereafter AND A.2 Restore CST level to 7 days within limit.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4, without 18 hours reliance on steam generator for heat removal.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-14 A AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
AND A.3 Restore offsite circuit to 72 hours OPERABLE status.AND Cor firmatory 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO B. One or more-reequ'ed DG(s)in Train A inoperable.
OR One or more requ~ed DG(s)in Train B inoperable.
I B.1 AND Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuits.Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG(s)inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable B.2 1 hour AND Once per 8 hours thereafter 4 hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours 24 hours AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure.OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG(s).AND (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.8-2 B AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued)
B.4 Restore required DG to. 14 days OPERABLE status.AND 17 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO K C. Two.required DGs in C.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour Train A inoperable, the offsite circuits.OR AND Once per 8 hours Two required DGs in thereafter Train B inoperable.
AND C.2 Declare required 4 hours from feature(s) supported by discovery of the inoperable DGs Condition C inoperable when its concurrent with required redundant inoperability of feature(s) is redundant inoperable, required feature(s)
AND C.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DUs 12 hours are not inoperable due to cause failure.OR C.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 12 hours OPERABLE DOs.AND_ (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-2a Amendment 32 AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME--_- _ _ --_ _ --_ _ I/iI C. (continued)
C.4 Restore at least one required DG to OPERABLE status.72 hours AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO-4, ~-.-,J-I D. Two offsite circuits inoperable.
D.1 Declare required feature(s) inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
12 hours from discovery of condition D concurrent with inoperability of redundant required features AND D.2 I Restore one offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.24 hours (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-3 Amendment 30, a Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.1 Site 4.1.1 Site and Exclusion Area Boundaries The site and exclusion area boundaries shall be as shown in Figure 4.1-1.4.1.2 Low Population Zone (LPZ)The LPZ shall be as shown in Figure 4.1-2 (within the 3-mile circle).4.2 Reactor Core 4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies The reactor shall contain 193 fuel assemblies.
Each assembly shall consist of a matrix of ZPrca4ly-or-Zirlo fuel rods with an initial composition of natural or slightly enriched uranium dioxide (U0 2) as fuel material.
Limited substitutions of zirconium alloy or stainless steel filler rods for fuel rods, in accordance with approved applications of fuel rod configurations, may be used. Fuel assemblies shall be limited to those fuel designs that have been analyzed with applicable NRC staff approved codes and methods and shown by tests or analyses to comply with all fuel safety design bases. A limited number of lead test assemblies that have not completed representative testing may be placed in nonlimiting core regions.4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 57 control rod assemblies.
The control material shall be boron carbide with silver indium cadmium tips as approved by the NRC.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 4.0-1 B Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued) 4.3 Fuel Storage 4.3.1 Criticality 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks (shown in Figure 4.3-1) are designed and shall be maintained with: a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.95 + 0.055-O weight percent;b. keff < 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which, includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Sections 4.3.2.7 and 9.1 of the FSAR;c. Distances between fuel assemblies are a nominal 10.375 inch center-to-center spacing in the twenty-four flux trap rack modules.d. Fuel assemblies with enrichments less than or equal to 3.80 weight percent U-235 are allowed unrestricted storage.e. Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments greater than 3.80 weight percent and less than a maximum of 5 percent enrichment (nominally 4.95 +/- 0.05 percent) may be stored in the spent fuel racks in one of four arrangements with specific limits as identified below: 1. Spent fuel assemblies may be stored in the racks without further restrictions provided the burnup of each assembly is in the acceptable domain identified in Figure 4.3-3, depending upon the specified initial enrichment.
: 2. New and spent fuel assemblies may be stored in a checkerboard arrangement of 2 new and 2 spent assemblies, provided that each spent fuel assembly has accumulated a minimum burnup in the acceptable domain identified in Figure 4.3-4.3. New fuel assemblies may be stored in 4-cell arrays with 1 of the 4 cells remaining empty of fuel (i.e. containing only water or water with up to 75 percent by volume of non-fuel bearing material.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 4.0-2 (developmental)
B
[APPROVED 1 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals By Carl Schulten at 12:41 pm, Jul 26, 2 010 5.7 5.7 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7.2.12 Steam Generator (SG) Program (continued)
: 2. Accident induced leakage performance criterion:
The primary-to-secondary accident induced leakage rate for any design basis accident, other than an SG tube rupture, shall not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the accident analysis in terms of total leakage rate for all SGs and leakage rate for an individual SG. For design basis accidents that have a faulted steam generator, accident induced leakage is not to exceed 1.0 gallon per minute (gpm)for the faulted steam generator and 150 gallons per day (gpd) for the non-faulted steam generators.
For design basis accidents that do not have a faulted steam generator, accident induced leakage is not to exceed 150 gpd per steam generator.
: 3. The operational leakage performance criterion is specified in LCOO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE." c. Provisions for SG tube repair criteria.
Tubes found by inservice inspection to contain flaws with a depth equal to or exceeding 40% of the nominal tube wall thickness shall be plugged.d. Provisions for SG tube inspections.
Periodic SG tube inspections shall be performed.
The number and portions of the tubes inspected and methods of inspection shall be performed with the objective of detecting flaws of any type (e.g., volumetric flaws, axial and circumferential cracks) that may be present along the length of the tube, from the tube-to-tubesheet weld at the tube inlet to the tube-to-tubesheet weld at the tube outlet, and that may satisfy the applicable tube repair criteria.
The tube-to-tubesheet weld is not part of the tube. In addition to meeting the requirements of d._1-, d.2, and d.3 below, the inspection scope, inspection methods, and inspection intervals shall be such as to ensure that SG tube integrity is maintained until the next SG inspection.
An assessment of degradation shall be performed to determine the type and location of flaws to which the tubes may be susceptible and, based on this assessment, to determine which inspection methods need to be employed and at what locations.
: 1. Inspect 100% of the tubes in each SG during the first refueling outage following SG replacMcent.(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 5.0-16 (developmental)
B Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7 5.7 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7.2.12 Steam Generator (SG) Program (continued)
Open Pending Receipt 2 Of liforMati,/
What's justification for the deviation.
Inspect 100% of the tubes at sequential periods of 144,108, 72, and thcreafter, 60 effective full power months. The first sequential period shall be considered to begin after the first inservice inspection of the SGs. In addition, insp..t 50% of-the tub-es by the refucling outage ncarest the midpoint of the-pcried and the remaining 5094 by the refuelfing outage-nearest the end Of tho period. No SGs shall operate for more than 247-2 effective full power months or onethree refueling outages (whichever is less) without being inspected.
: 3. If crack indications are found in any SG tube, then the next inspection for each SG for the degradation mechanism that caused the crack indication shall not exceed 24 effective full power months or one refueling outage (whichever is less). If definitive information, such as from examination of a pulled tube, diagnostic non-destructive testing, or engineering evaluation indicates that a crack-like indication is not associated with a crack(s), then the indication need not be treated as a crack.e. Provisions for monitoring operational primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE.5.7.2.13 Secondary Water Chemistry Program This program provides controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry to inhibit SG tube degradation and low pressure turbine disc stress corrosion cracking.
The program shall include: a. Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control points for these variables;
: b. Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables;
: c. Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in leakage;d. Procedures for the recording and management of data;(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 (developmental) 5.0-17 B Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7 5.7 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals (continued) 5.7.2.13 Secondary Water Chemistry Program (continued)
: e. Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and f. A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.5.7.2.14 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems at the frequencies specified in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2; ASME N510-1989, and the exceptions noted for each ESF system in Tables 6.5-1, 6.5-2, 6.5-3, and 6.5-4 of the FSAR.a. Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration and system bypass within acceptance criterion when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, the exceptions noted for each ESF system in Tables 6.5-1, 6.5-2, 6.5-3, and 6.5-4 of the FSAR, and ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below.ESF VENTILATION ACCEPTANCE SYSTEM CRITERIA FLOW RATE Reactor Building Purge < 1.00% 14,000 cfm + 10%Emergency Gas < 0.05% 4,000 cfm + 10%Treatment Auxiliary Building Gas < 0.05% 9,000 cfm + 10%Treatment Control Room Emergency
< 1.00% 4,000 cfm + 10%(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 (developmental) 5.0-18 B Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7 5.7 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7.2.14 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) (continued)
: b. Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows a penetration and system bypass within acceptance criterion when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, the exceptions noted for each ESF system in Tables 6.5-1, 6.5-2, 6.5-3, and 6.5-4 of the FSAR, and ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below.ESF VENTILATION ACCEPTANCE SYSTEM CRITERIA FLOW RATE Reactor Building Purge < 1.00% 14,000 cfm + 10%Emergency Gas Treatment
< 0.05% 4,000 cfm + 10%Auxiliary Building Gas < 0.05% 9,000 cfm + 10%Treatment Control Room Emergency
< 1.00% 4,000 cfm + 10%(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 (developmental) 5.0-19 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM 5.7 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7 5.7.2.14 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) (continued)
: c. Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and the exceptions noted for each ESF system in Tables 6.5-1, 6.5-2, 6.5-3, and 6.5-4 of the FSAR, shows the methyl iodide penetration less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of < 300C and greater than or equal to the relative humidity specified below.METHYL IODIDE RELATIVE ESF VENTILATION SYSTEM PENETRATION HUMIDITY Reactor Building Purge < 10% 95%Emergency Gas Treatment
< 0.175% 70%Auxiliary Building Gas < 0.175% 70%Treatment Control Room Emergency
<1.0% 70%d. Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the entire filtration unit is less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, the exceptions noted for each ESF system in Tables 6.5-1, 6.5-2, 6.5-3, and 6.5-4 of the FSAR, and ASME N510-1989 at the system flowrate specified below.ESF VENTILATION SYSTEM PRESSURE DROP FLOW RATE Reactor Building Purge < 4.7 inches water 14,000 cfm + 10%Emergency Gas < 7.6 inches water 4,000 cfm + 10%Treatment Auxiliary Building Gas < 7.6 inches water 9,000 cfm + 10%Treatment Control Room Emergency
< 3.5 inches water 4,000 cfm + 10%(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 (developmental) 5.0-20 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM Reporting Requirements 5.9 5.9 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.9.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) (continued)
: 1. WCAP-9272-P-A, WESTINGHOUSE RELOAD SAFETY EVALUATION METHODOLOGY," July 1985 (W Proprietary). (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 -Moderator Temperature Coefficient, 3.1.6 -Shutdown Bank Insertion Limit, 3.1.7 -Control Bank Insertion Limits, 3.2.1 -Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, 3.2.2 -Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, 3.2.3 -Axial Flux Difference, and 3.9.1 -Boron Concentration).
2a. WCAP-16009-P-A, "Realistic Large-Break LOCA Evaluation Methodology Using the Automated Statistical Treatment of Uncertainty Method (ASTRUM)," January 2005 (W Proprietary). (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 -Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, and 3.2.2 -Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor).WCAP 12915 P A, Volume !(Revision
: 2) and Volumes 2 through 5 (ReVision 1), "Code Qualification IDo,,ument fo9r- B-est- Est imate LOSS of CoGIant AnalySiS," MaFrh 1998 (\A Proprietary). (Methodology for Speciffication 3.2.1 Heat FluxHo Channel Factor, And 3.2.2 ,NhucleJar Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor).2b. WCAP-1 0054-P-A, "Small Break ECCS Evaluation Model Using NOTRUMP Code," August 1985. Addendum 2, Rev. 1: "Addendum to the Westinghouse Small Break ECCS Evaluation Model using the NOTRUMP Code: Safety Injection into the Broken Loop and COSI Condensation Model," July 1997. (W Proprietary). (Methodology for Specifications 3.2.1 -Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, and 3.2.2 -Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor).3. WCAP-10216-P-A, Revision 1A, "RELAXATION OF CONSTANT AXIAL OFFSET CONTROL F(Q) SURVEILLANCE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION," February 1994 (W Proprietary). (Methodology for Specifications 3.2.1 -Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (W(Z) Surveillance Requirements For F(Q) Methodology) and 3.2.3 -Axial Flux Difference (Relaxed Axial Offset Control).)
: 4. WCAP-12610-P-A, "VANTAGE + FUEL ASSEMBLY REFERENCE CORE REPORT," April 1995. (W Proprietary). (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 -Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor).(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 5.0-30 B Open Pending Receipt of Information Reporting Requirements 5.9 5.9 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.9.6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)a. RCS pressure and temperature limits for heatup, cooldown, low temperature operation, criticality, and hydrostatic testing as well as heatup and cooldown rates shall be established and documented in the PTLR for the following:
LCO 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits b.LC.U 3.4.12 Ged Overpressure Mitigation tiystem (UJUM6)The aRnalytical methods used te temperature limits shall be those 48termin1e trio M6 pressure an ref-;V-le u sly reviewed and approved by the.The acceptability of the analytical methods is documented in NRC i-- -,AIA-l-rT DAMAD I IT%11- 4 A"-C'r-DTAikl r- r -CD Dr--i-r-D i--(K'iklt''
fr"%SRXB confirmation PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS METHODOLOGY AND PRESSURE that changes per TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (TAG M89048)"', Sptember 22, 19 95 Westinghouse and "EXEMPTION FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR Part 50.60, ACCEPTANC-E CRITERIA FOR FRACTURE PREVENTION MEASURES datedDece342erFOR LIGHTWATER NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS FOR NORMAL dated December OPERATION' WNATTS BRAR Ni INU CLAR PLANT (TAG INOG. MI@063)." 10,2009 are per September 29, 1997. Specifically, the analytical methods are des.ribed in acceptable.
the following ,refereces:The power operated relief valve lift settings required to support the Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) and the COMS arming temperature shall be established and documented in the PTLR for the following:
LCO 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System c. The analytical methods used to determine the RCS pressure and temperature limits and Cold Overpressure Mitigation System setpoints shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents:
: 1. WCAP-14040-A, Rev. 4 "Methodology Used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves.Letter, VV. j. Museler to NRC, regarding-request for exemnption fro.m 10- CFR 50.60, March 10Q, 1994.2. The PTLR will contain the complete identification for each of the TS reference Topical Reports used to prepare the PTLR (i.e., report number, title, revision, date, and any supplements).
Letter, D. E. Nunn te NRC, regarding heatup and coeodown curves for normal eperatien (sub,,mitting WCAP 1176 and WCAP 14040, Rev. 1), December 23, (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 (developmental) 5.0-32 B Reporting Requirements 5.9 3- Lettor, R. R. Baron to NRC, r...ondng to NRC July 11, 1995, request fo-r aditoaliformation, July 31, 19945.4, Letter, R. R. BaFro to NRC providing mn~eor i~nfrationR regardin~g co~ld everprossure mitigating system setpoints, September 8, 1995.Lottor, J. A. ScAlice to NRC, rogarding rogeE6LSt for oeemption fromA 10 CFIR 50.60, cocrnn ue of Code Case N 511 to determine LTOP setpoints, dated June 20, 1997.rd..The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluencey period and for any revision or supplement thereto.(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 2 (developmental) 5.0-33 B Open Item By Carl Schulten on 03/17/2011 9:29 AM Reporting Requirements 5.9 5.9 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.9.7 EDG Failures Report If an individual emergency diesel generator (EDG) experiences four or more valid failures in the last 25 demands, these failures and any nonvalid failures experienced by that EDG in that time period shall be reported within 30 days.Reports on EDG failures shall include the information recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3, Regulatory Position C.4, or existing Regulatory Guide 1.108 reporting requirement.
5.9.8 PAMS Report When a Report is required by Condition B or FG of LCO 3.3.3, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.5.9.9 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report A report shall be submitted within 180 days after the initial entry into MODE 4 following completion of an inspection performed in accordance with the Specification 5.7.2.12, Steam Generator (SG) Program. The report shall include: a. The scope of inspections performed on each SG, b. Active degradation mechanisms found, c. Nondestructive examination techniques utilized for each degradation mechanism, d. Location, orientation (if linear), and measured sizes (if available) of service induced indications, e. Number of tubes plugged during the inspection outage for each active degradation mechanism, f. Total number and percentage of tubes plugged to date, g. The results of condition monitoring, including the results of tube pulls and in-situ testing, and h. The effective plugging percentage for all plugging in each SG.Watts Bar-Unit 2 5.0-34 (developmental)
B ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 1. Page number/Item:
3.2-9 and 3.2-10 / "AND" between REQUIRED ACTIONS A.4 and A.5.NRC Comment(s):
Move the "AND" from the top of page 3.2-10 to the bottom of page 3.2-9.TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS moves the "AND" from the top of page 3.2-10 to the bottom of page 3.2-9.A search of the Unit 2 TS for the same issue on other pages resulted in the same changes being made to the following page pairs: 3.4-30 / 3.4-31 and 3.8-1 / 3.8-2.2. Pa-qe number I Item: 3.3-5 / REQUIRED ACTION N.2 NRC Comment(s):
Discrepancy:
U1 A68 (TSTF- 169) shows P-8 revised to P-7.TVA Response(s):
Amendment 68 to the Unit 1 TS revised "P-8" to "P-7." The review matrix provided by Reference 1 noted that changes made by Amendment 68 would be implemented on Unit 2.This change was inadvertently missed.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS revises TS LCO 3.3.1, REQUIRED ACTION N.2 to read, "Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-7." instead of "Reduce THERMAL POWER to< P-8."3 3. Page number / Item: 3.3-15 / ALLOWABLE VALUE column for items 3.a. and 4. (three places)NRC Comment(s):is split such that "R" is at the end of the first line and 'TP" is on the next line.TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 TS inadvertently caused formatting issues such as this one.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS corrects font size and column widths in affected instrumentation tables. Change bars are not shown for these format changes.E2-1 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 4. Page number / Item: 3.3-15 / Note "(c)" NRC Comment(s):
The following comment is shown for the last two sentences of this note: "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS includes TSTF-493 changes to applicable instrumentation tables and (where applicable)
SRs. This comment is addressed by these changes.5. Page number / Item: 3.3-17 / APPLICABLE MODES ... column for the third line for Item 5.NRC Comment(s):
'b9)" is separated from "5" on the previous line.TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 3.6. Page number / Item: 3.3-17 / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.7. Page number / Item: 3.3-19 / ALLOWABLE VALUE column for Item 10.NRC Comment(s): "A47 and A68 retained 89.7%. NTSP. JFD-8 (TSTF-493) shown in Bases markup does not apply to A V changes. Bases JFD-7 describes change as specific to Unit 1; Bases text changes A V from % indicated loop flow to % thermal design flow. EICB needs to confirm.TVA Response(s):
: 1. Per setpoint calculation WCAP-17044, Rev. 0 (Setpoint Methodology for Watts Bar Unit 2), the ALLOWABLE VALUE for item 10. Of Unit 2 TS Table 3.3.1-1 (Reactor Coolant Flow -Low) should be 89.7%. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS (corrects) this value.2. TSTF-493 does not apply to this change.E2-2 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 3. The NTSP and AV units are correctly specified in the TS as % flow.4. The response to Item 15.b. of Enclosure 4 (TVA Response to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases) addresses the portion of the comment concerning
% indicated loop flow vs. % thermal design flow adjusted for uncertainties (95,000 gpm).8. Page number / Item: 3.3-19 / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.9. Page number / Item: 3.3-20 / FUNCTION column for Items 13.a) and 13.b)NRC Comment(s):
The "OR"just prior to Item 13.b. should be "or." TVA Response(s):
During TVA meeting with NRC staff on May 10, 2011, it was decided that the "OR" just prior to Item 13.b. needs to be deleted.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS deletes the "OR" just prior to Item 13.b.10. Page number / Item: 3.3-20 / ALLOWABLE VALUE column for the first time delay portion of Item 13.a)NRC Comment(s): "licensee confirmatory item" [This comment is for the "(Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)" verbiage in the column.]TVA Response(s):
The note is currently on the referenced page. TVA will ensure that this and any other cross-reference type items remain correct throughout the TS / TS Bases process.E2-3 ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 11. Page number / Item: 3.3-20 / SR 3.3.1.10 for Item 14.a.NRC Comment(s): "Provide plant-specific design to justify not applying footnotes (a) and (b) per TSTF-493." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4. As part of these changes, the footnotes were added for SR 3.3.1.10 for Item 14.a.12. Page number/Item:
3.3-20 / ALLOWABLE VALUE column for item 14.b.NRC Comment(s): "open" is split such that "o" is at the end of the first line and 'pen" is on the next line.TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 3.13. Page number / Item: 3.3-21 /ALLOWABLE VALUE column for item 16.e.NRC Comment(s): "RTP" is split such that "R" is at the end of the first line and "TP" is on the next line.TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 3.14. Page number/Item:
3.3-28 / CONDITION J.NRC Comment(s): "License Amendment No. ?" TVA Response(s):
As noted in the TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2, this change was made as a result of Amendment 75 to the Unit 1 TS.No change is required.E2-4 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 15. Page number/Item:
3.3-31 / FREQUENCY for SR 3.3.2.5 NRC Comment(s): "JFD7. RAI: Need staff SE approving 18 Frequency for MDR relay tests." TVA Response(s):
The safety evaluation that approved 18 month frequency for the Potter and Brumfield MDR series relays was documented in NRC to Westinghouse letter dated July 12, 2000, "Review of Westinghouse Topical Reports WCAP-13877, Revision 2-P and WCAP-13878-P, Revision 2 on Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Slave Relays (TAC No. MA7264)." The first paragraph of this letter stated, 'The NRC staff has completed its review of the subject Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) topical reports (TRs) which were submitted by letter dated November 5, 1999. The NRC staff had previously reviewed and approved Revision 1 of these TRs. A May 31, 1996, letter from Bruce A. Boger of the NRC to Tom Green, Chairman of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), documents the NRC's acceptance of WCAP-1 3878, Revision 1, and an October 26,1998, letter from Thomas E. Essig of the NRC to Louis F. Liberatori of the WOG documents the NRC acceptance of WCAP-13877, Revision 1. However, WEC subsequently discovered certain errors in the TRs and therefore submitted Revision 2 of these TRs to the NRC for review and approval.
WEC has further determined that the changes do not affect the conclusions of the WCAPs and the NRC safety evaluations.
The NRC staff has reviewed the changes and finds them acceptable.
The enclosed safety evaluation (SE) confirms the acceptability of the proposed changes." 4.0 (Conclusion) of WCAP-13878, Revision 1, read as follows: "Based on the review of the WCAP-13878, Rev. 1., WCAP-14117, Rev. 1, and WCAP-13900, Rev. 0, the staff concludes that the failure data provided for P&B MDR slave relays support the proposed test interval extension to every refueling outage.The staff, therefore, finds the above topical reports acceptable for proposed extensions of P&B MDR ESFAS slave relay tests to a refueling outage frequency.
However, the staff further concludes that if two or more P&B MDR ESFAS subgroup relays fail in a 12-month period, a referencing licensee should reevaluate the adequacy of the extended surveillance interval.
The reevaluation should consider design, maintenance and testing of all P&B MDR ESFAS subgroup relays. If the licensee determines that the surveillance interval is inadequate for detecting a single relay failure, the surveillance interval should be decreased.
The revised surveillance interval should be such that the licensee can detect an ESFAS subgroup relay failure prior to the occurrence of a second failure.Additionally, licensees that use WCAP-13878, Rev. 1 and WCAP-13900, Rev. 0 to implement plant specific TS changes for test interval extensions involving P&B MDR relays for ESFAS slave applications should also: 1. Confirm the applicability of the WCAP-13878, Rev. 1 analyses for their plant.E2-5 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 2. Ensure that their procurement program for P&B MDR relays is adequate for detecting the types of failures that are discussed in.References 9, 10, 11 and 12.3. Ensure that all pre-1992 P&B MDR relays which are used in either normally energized or a 20% duty cycle have been removed from ESFAS applications.
: 4. Ensure that the contact loading analysis for P&B MDR relays has been performed to determine the acceptability of these relays." TVA will address the items in the paragraph as follows: The WBN Maintenance Rule program implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 and provides instructions for initiation, analysis, retrieval, trending, and periodic reporting of data relative to performance indicators of plant systems and components.
The program includes guidance for trending and reporting of repetitive preventable failures of functions which are within the scope of the Maintenance Rule.It also includes performance of cause determinations for failures to meet performance criteria and for repetitive failures.
The program assigns plant system engineers responsibility for identifying when performance criteria are not met and increased monitoring under paragraph (a)(1) of the Maintenance Rule is required, along with the corrective actions necessary to restore acceptable performance.
The functions performed by the slave relays are in the scope of the program.Applicable attachment(s) of WBN Technical Instruction TI-1 19, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, And Reporting, will be revised prior to implementation of the approved Unit 2 TS. This procedure change will require that the surveillance interval be evaluated and reduced, when needed, if two or more P&B MDR series relays used for Unit 2 TS LCOs 3.3.2 and 3.3.6 fail within a 12-month interval.TVA addressed each of the numbered items above as follows: 1. Prior to implementation of the approved Unit 2 TS, TVA will confirm the applicability of the WCAP-13878, Rev. 1 analyses for P&B MDR series relays.2. Prior to implementation of the approved Unit 2 TS, TVA will develop a Procurement Engineering Group package for procurement of P&B MDR series relays. This document will ensure TVA's procurement program for P&B MDR relays is adequate for detecting the types of failures that are discussed in References 9, 10, 11 and 12 of WCAP-13878, Revision 1.3. WBN Unit 2 did not install any P&B MDR series relays as SSPS slave relays until the SSPS output cabinet refurbishment in 2010. P&B MDR series relays for the SSPS refurbishment were procured new.4. Calculation WBNEEBIDQ00209920100002, Rev. 0 (SSPS ESFAS Slave Relay Contact Loading) concludes that the contact loading analysis for P&B MDR relays is acceptable.
E2-6 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 16. Pa-ge number/Item:
3.3-33 (page 1 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.17. Page number/ Item: 3.3-34 (page 2 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.18. Page number/Item:
3.3-35 (page 3 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.19. Page number / Item: 3.3-36 (page 4 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.E2-7 ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 20. Page number / Item: 3.3-37 (page 5 of Table 3.3.2-1) / FUNCTION column for Item 6.b.1) and 6.b.2)NRC Comment(s):
: a. The "Or" between the two time delay items should be "or." b. The "OR"just prior to Item 6.b.2) should be "or." TVA Response(s):
: a. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS corrects this typographical error.b. During TVA meeting with NRC staff on May 10, 2011, it was decided that the "OR" just prior to Item 6.b.2) needs to be deleted.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS deletes the "OR" just prior to Item 6.b.2).21. Page number / Item: 3.3-37 (page 5 of Table 3.3.2-1) / ALLOWABLE VALUE column for the first time delay portion of Item 6.b.1)NRC Comment(s): "licensee confirmatory item" [This comment is for the "(Note 1, Page 3.3-40)" verbiage in the column.]TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 10.22. Page number / Item: 3.3-37 (page 5 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.23. Page number I Item: 3.3-38 (page 6 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Top of the page NRC Comment(s): "JFD 8. Notes (b) & (c) not reviewed on this page." TVA Response(s):
Comment withdrawn by NRC staff during May 10, 2011, meeting with TVA.E2-8 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 24. Page number / Item: 3.3-38 (page 6 of Table 3.3.2-1) / FUNCTION column for Item 7.b.NRC Comment(s):
The "And"just prior to the last portion of Item 7.b. should be "and." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS corrects this typographical error.25. Page number / Item: 3.3-38 (page 6 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 4.26. Page number / Item: 3.3-39 (showed as page 8 of Table 3.3.2-1; was actually page 9 of Table 3.3.2-1) / Note "(c)", last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "Revise Note (c) to specify a UFSAR citation." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS includes TSTF-493 changes to applicable instrumentation tables and (where applicable)
SRs. This deletes the footnotes for SRs 3.3.2.4 and 3.3.2.9 for Functions 8.b.(1) and 8.b.(2).The review of TS Table 3.3.2-1 to address this item noted the discrepancy in the"(Page X of y)" portion of the table header. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS also corrects this.E2-9 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 27. Page number / Item: 3.3-46 / Items (f) and (h)NRC Comment(s): "Justify deviations from WBN1 on this page." TVA Response(s):
The portion of revision of interest is the replacement of "ICCM" with "Common Q." The TS markup did not provide justification for this change. The markup of the equivalent TS Bases provided the following justification for its changes: "Revised for Unit 2 specific configuration." The marked-up pages for Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS include a corrected markup with the applicable justification.
: 28. Page number /Item: 3.3-47 / APPLICABILITY NRC Comment(s): "Insert period (.)" [following "MODES 1, 2, and 3"]TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS corrects this editorial
/ formatting error with the APPLICABILITY.
A search of the Unit 2 TS for the same issue on other pages resulted in the correction of editorial
/formatting error with the APPLICABILITY on the following pages: 3.1-15, 3.4-20, 3.4-18, 3.4-23, 3.4-28, 3.4-38, 3.5-6, 3.6-2, 3.6-22, 3.6-31, 3.7-1, 3.7-18, 3.7-21, 3.7-24, 3.9-1, 3.9-2, and 3.9-3.29. Page number / Item: 3.3-56 / FREQUENCY for SR 3.3.6.5.NRC Comment(s): "JFD7. RAI: Need staff SE approving 18 Frequency for MDR relay tests." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 15.E2-10 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 30. Pa-qe number / Item: 3.3-58 / ALLOWABLE VALUE for Item 3.NRC Comment(s): "WBN1 deviation not justified" TVA Response(s):
As noted in the TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2, this portion of the Unit 2 TS was revised to be consistent with change made to Unit 1 TS by Amendment 74.However, the values in parentheses are not consistent with the Unit 1 values contained in parentheses.
A review of calculations 1 -RE-90-130 (Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation For Containment Building Purge And Exhaust Monitors) and 2-RE-090-130 (Containment Building Purge Air Exhaust Monitors) confirms that the ALLOWABLE value for item 3. of TS Table 3.3.6-1 is correct as shown in both the Unit 1 TS and the Unit 2 TS.The values in parentheses are different for the two units because of differences in the detector sensitivities for the instruments in Units 1 and 2. The cpm values in the Unit 2 TS reflect the preliminary detector sensitivity values provided by the manufacturer.
The detector has been assembled and tested, and the final sensitivity value is different from the preliminary value.TVA will revise the calculation and submit a change to the Unit 2 TS using the manufacturer's final detector sensitivity value.31. Page number / Item: 3.4-1 / "B" in lower right hand corner (i.e., the revision number)NRC Comment(s): "Explain what changes were made to Developmental A. Note that TS A47 revised page 3.4-2, but not page 3.4-1." TVA Response(s):
Comment withdrawn by NRC staff during May 10, 2011, meeting with TVA.32. Page number / Item: 3.4-2 / SR 3.4.1.4 NRC Comment(s): "A47 change made for WBN1 is deleted for WBN2" TVA Response(s):
The TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2 noted the following for TS 3.4.1: "A47 amended the Unit 1 TS to allow an alternate method for the measurement of RCS total flow rate via measurement of the RCS elbow tap differential pressures.
This change will not be made on Unit 2 at this time.E2-1 1 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications NRC approved A47 via letter dated 10/03/2003." The justification provided in Reference 8 for this change provided the following: "Revised to delete TS A47 Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement Using Elbow Tap Methodology and associated open item in TS 3.4 Bases: In TS A47, NRC approved the use of an alternative method for measurement of reactor coolant system (RCS) total flow rate via measurement of the RCS elbow tap differential pressures (Ap).Unit 2 may implement the elbow tap methodology at a future date; however, for now, Unit 2 will use the precision calorimetric flow measurement methodology." No change is required.33. Page number / Item: 3.4-9 / NOTE NRC Comment(s): "SRXB Confirmatory item"points toward "the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR." TVA Response(s):
Reference 7 provided the responses to several of the required action items contained in Appendix HH of NUREG-0847, Supplement 22, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2." Required action 45. and the response to it from that letter were: "45. TVA stated in its response to RAI 5.3.2-2, dated July 31, 2010, that the PTLR would be revised to incorporate the COMS arming temperature. (Section 5.3.2)Response:
Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to the Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001) was revised to reflect the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, Section 3.2 (Arming Temperature) states, "COMS shall be armed when any RCS cold leg temperature is <225&deg;F." This is a Confirmatory item for the NRC.No change is required.E2-12 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 34. Page number / Item: 3.4-12 / NOTE 2.NRC Comment(s): "SRXB Confirmatory item"points toward "the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR." TVA Response(s):
See the response to item 33.35. Page number / Item: 3.4-18 / APPLICABILITY, NOTE, and REQUIRED ACTION B.2 NRC Comment(s): "SRXB Confirmatory item"points toward: S"... > the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR." in the APPLICABILITY,' "the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR" in NOTE 2; and* "with any RCS temperature
< the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR." In REQUIRED ACTION B.2.TVA Response(s):
See the response to item 33.36. Page number / Item: 3.4-23 / APPLICABILITY NRC Comment(s): "SRXB Confirmatory item" points toward ". < the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR." in the APPLICABILITY.
TVA Response(s):
See the response to item 33.37. Page number / Item: 3.4-24 / REQUIRED ACTION D.1 NRC Comment(s): "SRXB Confirmatory item" points toward> the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR.TVA Response(s):
See the response to item 33.E2-13 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 38. Page number / Item: 3.4-25 / CONDITION E.NRC Comment(s): "SRXB Confirmatory item" points toward ".. < the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR." TVA Response(s):
See the response to item 33.39. Page number / Item: 3.4-27 / NOTE for SR 3.4.12.7 NRC Comment(s): "SRXB Confirmatory item" points toward ". < the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR." TVA Response(s):
See the response to item 33.40. Page number / Item: Pages 3.4-30 and 3.4-31 / "AND" between REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1 and A.2.NRC Comment(s):
Move the "AND" from the top of page 3.4-31 to the bottom of page 3.4-30.TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 1.41. Page number / Item: 3.4-33/ LCO 3.4.15, portion 2.NRC Comment(s): "No deviations result from markup. Why is this Developmental B?" TVA Response(s):
The second page of the cover letter for Reference 2 noted, 'The Developmental Revision B of the TS and TS Bases was compared to the WBN Unit 1 TS and TS Bases through Amendment 82 and Revision 100, respectively." The TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2 noted the following: "A71 amended the Unit 1 TS to remove the operability requirement for the containment atmospheric gaseous radiation monitor. This change is to be applied to Unit 2.E2-14 ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications NRC approved A71 via letter dated 11/25/2008." No change is required.42. Page number / Item: 3.4-34 / SR 3.4.15.2 NRC Comment(s): "Make change per LCO 3.4.15.2.
Make conforming change to WNB1." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS deletes "level" from SR 3.4.15.2 to be consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.4.15.43. Paqe number / Item: 3.5-1 / COMPLETION TIME for REQUIRED ACTION B.1 NRC Comment(s): "JFC Rev B TS/7S Bases 3.5, item 1" TVA Response(s):
The TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2 noted the following: "A81 amended the Unit 1 TS to extend the Completion Time for TS LCO 3.5.1, Condition B from 1 hour to 24 hours. This change is to be applied to Unit 2.NRC approved A81 via letter dated 09/09/2009." Reference 8 provided the following justification for the change to page 3.5-1: "A81 amended the Unit 1 TS to extend the Completion Time for TS LCO 3.5.1, Condition B from 1 hour to 24 hours. R98 made the associated changes to the Unit 1 TS Bases.These changes are to be applied to Unit 2.NRC approved A81 via letter dated 09/09/2009." No change is required.44. Page number / Item: 3.5-2/"> 1000 psig" portion of SR 3.5.1.5 NRC Comment(s): "Need to justify deviation from Unit 1 which includes TPBARs. Revise page to Developmental B." E2-15 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications TVA Response(s):
This value has not been revised since the initial approval / issuance of the Unit 1 TS; Unit 2 TS is consistent with the Unit 1 TS.During TVA meeting with NRC staff on May 10, 2011, it was noted that this comment should have been made against SR 3.5.1.4.Unit 2's SR 3.5.1.4 is different than Unit l's because the Unit 1 version includes information concerning the number of TPBARS. The boron concentration ranges are the same.Information previously provided concerning Unit 1 TS Amendments to this SR include: a. The review matrix provided by Reference 1 noted: "A40 amended the Unit 1 TS to allow Watts Bar to irradiate up to 2304 Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) in the reactor core each fuel cycle. TPBARS will NOT be used on Unit 2.NRC approved A40 via letter dated 09/23/2002.
A48 amended the Unit 1 TS to revise the boron concentration requirements and limit the number of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) that could be loaded and irradiated in the core to a corresponding value. TPBARS will NOT be used on Unit 2.NRC approved A48 via letter dated 10/08/2003.
A67 amended the Unit 1 TS to revise the maximum number of TPBARs that can be irradiated in the Unit 1 reactor core to 400. TPBARS will NOT be used on Unit 2; however, the boron concentration changes per this amendment will be used on Unit 2.NRC approved A67 via letter dated 01/18/2008." b. The TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2 noted: "A77 amended the Unit 1 TS to revise the maximum number of TPBARs that can be irradiated in the Unit 1 reactor core to 704. TPBARS will NOT be used on Unit 2.NRC approved A77 via letter dated 05/04/2009." No change is required.E2-16 ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 45. Page number / Item: 3.5-8 / NRC's comment in the upper right hand corner NRC Comment(s): "Justifications for Rev B Changes to TSITS Bases 3.5 (3.5.1-3.5.5) item 2 references Westinghouse letter WBT-D- 1177 dated October 19, 2009 as affecting TS 3.5.4 (see report page E2-3 of 11). Justify why RWST TS are unchanged from Developmental A." TVA Response(s):
The only change made to the Bases for 3.5.4 was minor and did not use a Westinghouse letter as justification.
No change is required.46. Page number / Item: 3.6-8 / REQUIRED ACTION A.2, NOTE 2.NRC Comment(s): "Matches U1 RA A.2 Notes. Why is this Developmental B?" TVA Response(s):
The second page of the cover letter for Reference 2 noted, 'The Developmental Revision B of the TS and TS Bases was compared to the WBN Unit 1 TS and TS Bases through Amendment 82 and Revision 100, respectively." Additionally, the TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2 provided the following: "A79 amended the Unit 1 TS to allow administrative means of position verification for locked or sealed containment isolation valves. This change is to be applied to Unit 2.NRC approved A79 via letter dated 09/30/2009." No change is required.47. Page number / Item: 3.6-9 / REQUIRED ACTION C.2, NOTE 2.NRC Comment(s): "Matches U1 RA C.2 Notes. Why is this Developmental B?" TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 46.E2-17 ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 48. Page number / Item: 3.6-12 / SR 3.6.3.2 and SR3.6.3.3 NRC Comment(s): "Matches U1. Why Developmental B?" TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 46.49. Pacie number/Item:
3.7-1 / REQUIRED ACTION A.1 NRC Comment(s):
"'59' is from U1 A31 which is not in U2.""TVA February 16, 2011 Letter, Enclosure 5, Commitments, Item #1, future Developmental Revision to revise the RTP value in Required Action A. 1." TVA Response(s):
Item 1 of Enclosure 5 of Reference 3 stated, "A future Developmental Revision to the Unit 2 TS will correct the '58%' value in Unit 2 TS LCO 3.7.1, REQUIRED ACTION A.1 to '59%."'Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS corrects the "58%" value in Unit 2 TS LCO 3.7.1, REQUIRED ACTION A.1 to "59%." 50. Page number / Item: 3.7-14 / REQUIRED ACTION A.1 NRC Comment(s): "Spell out 'ERCW." TVA Response(s):
Unit 2 TS is consistent with Unit 1 TS.No change is required.E2-18 ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 51. Paqe number /Item: 3.8-2 / as indicated NRC Comment(s):
: a. Just after REQUIRED ACTION A.3: "Confirmatory" b. CONDITION B.: "Justify Unit 2 difference." [two places]c. lower right corner of page: "Verify Unit 2 deviation." TVA Response(s):
: a. This is a Confirmatory item for the NRC.No change is required.b. The TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2 provided the following: "A request was submitted to the NRC via letter dated 11/30/2009 to change the AOT from'14 days' to '72 hours.' This change was made to Unit 2 TS in revision A.This information is being provided for continuity purpose." Reference 8 provided the following justification for the changes to this page: "Deleted'required' from Condition B to remain consistent with TVA license amendment request submittal dated November 30, 2009 (ADAMS Accession ML093640790), requesting a similar change for Unit 1." The NRC approved the requested changes for Unit 1 as Unit 1 TS Amendment 84 on July 6, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101390154).
Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 TS is the same as that approved by the NRC in Unit 1 TS Amendment 84.c. This is a Confirmatory item for the NRC.No change is required.E2-19 ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 52. Page number / Item: 4.0-1 / 4.2.1 NRC Comment(s): "Justify U2 deviation." TVA Response(s):
The TS -TS Bases Review matrix provided by Reference 2 provided the following:
Reference 8 provided the following justification for this change: "To provide accurate information for fuel composition.
The revised information is consistent with information provided in FSAR 4.0." No change is required.53. Page number / Item: 4.0-2 / 4.3.1.1 .a.NRC Comment(s): "Justify U2 deviation." TVA Response(s):
Reference 8 provided the following justification for this change: 'This is an editorial change;provides consistency with FSAR 4.3.2.7." During TVA meeting with the NRC staff on May 10, 2011, the decision was made to go back to"5.0 weight percent." Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS revised "4.95 + 0.05" to "5.0." E2-20 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 54. Page number / Item: 5.0-16 / 5.7.2.12.d.
1.NRC Comment(s): "Justify U2 deviation." TVA Response(s):
Reference 8 provided the following justification for this change: "Revised various typographical and minor editorial errors." The version of 5.7.2.12.d.1.
prior to the change made per Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 TS was based on wording approved by NRC for Unit 1 via Amendment 65 on November 3, 2006. The change was based on TSTF-449 and was approved in conjunction with SG replacement.
Per Westinghouse Letter WBT-D-1323, dated December 3, 2009, 'The Guidelines still require 100% inspection of the tubes during the first In-Service inspection following the first refueling outage .....""Guidelines" mean the Steam Generator Program Guidelines, NEI 97-06. Indirectly, this refers also to the EPRI Steam Generator Guidelines, which are six documents referenced in Section 1.5 of NEI 97-06.No change is required.E2-21 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications
: 55. Page number / Item: 5.0-17 / 5.7.2.12.d.2.
NRC Comment(s):
'What's the justification for the deviation." TVA ResDonse(s):
Reference 8 provided the following justification for this change: "Corrected
/ updated information in response to Westinghouse Letter WBT-D-1 323, dated December 3, 2009." The version of 5.7.2.12.d.2.
prior to the change made per Developmental Revision B was based on wording approved by NRC for Unit 1 via Amendment 65 on November 3, 2006. The change was based on TSTF-449 and was approved in conjunction with SG replacement.
Per Westinghouse Letter WBT-D-1323, dated December 3, 2009, 'The inspection intervals in the draft tech spec are appropriate for a plant with alloy 690 thermally treated tubing. Watts Bar 2 has Alloy 600 Mill-Annealed tubing, and the above change makes the tech spec consistent with the guidelines." A review of TSTF-449, R4 shows that the changes made by Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 TS match the first proposed version of d.2. in the TSTF. The Unit 1 TS version of this paragraph matches the third (last) proposed version of d.2. in the TSTF.References to the "Guidelines" mean the Steam Generator Program Guidelines, NEI 97-06.Indirectly, this refers also to the EPRI Steam Generator Guidelines, which are six documents referenced in Section 1.5 of NEI 97-06.Section 5 (Frequency of Verification of SG Tube Integrity) of TSTF-449 includes, 'The.maximum inspection interval requirement for Alloy 600 mill annealed tubing (600MA) is'Inspect 100% of the tubes at sequential periods of 60 effective full power months. The first sequential period shall be considered to begin after the first inservice inspection of the SGs.No SG shall operate for more than 24 effective full power months or one refueling outage (whichever is less) without being inspected.'
This Frequency is at least as conservative as the current technical specification requirement." WBN Unit 2 has the original model D3 steam generators, which have Alloy 600 mill-annealed tubing. Thus, the wording proposed for 5.7.2.12.d.2 by Developmental Revision B is that specified by TSTF-493.No change is required.56. Page number / Item: 5.0-18 / 5.7.2.14 and 5.7.2.14.a. (three places)NRC Comment(s): "Justify U2 deviation." E2-22 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications TVA Response(s):
Reference 8 provided the following justification for the changes on this page: "Revised various typographical and minor editorial errors." The 'Table 6.5" is not a valid number for either unit's FSAR. The table numbers provided in Developmental Revision B provide the complete / accurate table numbers for the systems as shown below:* Table 6.5-1: EGT* Table 6.5-2: ABGT* Table 6.5-3: Reactor Building Purge* Table 6.5-4: Control Room These changes were made for completeness
/ consistency with the NRC.No change is required.57. Page number / Item: 5.0-19 / 5.7.2.14.b.
NRC Comment(s): "Justify U2 deviation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 56.58. Page number / Item: 5.0-20 / 5.7.2.14.c.
NRC Comment(s): "Justify U2 deviation." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 56.59. Page number / Item: 5.0-30 / 5.9.5.2a.NRC Comment(s): "Justify U2 deviations." TVA Response(s):
Reference 8 provided the following justification for the change on this page: "Corrected
/updated information in response to Westinghouse Letter WBT-D-1 177, dated October 19, 2009." E2-23 ENCLOSURE2 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications The revision to 5.9.5.2a.
replaced WCAP-12945-P-A with WCAP-16009-P-A.
As noted in Section 15.4 of the Unit 2 FSAR: "A LOCA evaluation methodology for three- and four-loop Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)plants based on the revisedl0 CFR 50.46 rules was developed by Westinghouse with support of EPRI and Consolidated Edison and has been approved by the NRC (WCAP-12945-P-A
[46]).More recently, Westinghouse developed an alternative methodology called ASTRUM, which stands for Automated Statistical TReament of Uncertainty Method (WCAP- 16009-P-A
[49]).This method is still based on the CQD methodology and follows the steps in the CSAU methodology (NUREG/CR-5249
[45]). However, the uncertainty analysis (Element 3 in the CSAU) is replaced by a technique based on order statistics.
The ASTRUM methodology replaces the response surface technique with a statistical sampling method where the uncertainty parameters are simultaneously sampled for each case. The ASTRUM methodology has received NRC approval for referencing in licensing calculations in WCAP-16009-P-A
[49]." No change is required.60. Page number/ Item: 5.0-32 and 5.0-33 / 5.9.6.a. and 5.9.6.c.2 through 5.9.6.c.5 NRC Comment(s): "SRXB confirmation that changes per Westinghouse WBT-D- 1342, dated December 10, 2009 are per acceptable." TVA Response(s):
This is a Confirmatory item for the NRC.No change is required.61. Page number/ Item: 5.0-34 / 5.9.8 NRC Comment(s): "Validate" (Confirm that the "or F" portion of the first sentence is correct.).
TVA Response(s): "F" is the correct reference for the second Condition LCO 3.3.3 that has a REQUIRED ACTION that requires a report per 5.9.8.Developmental Revision B deleted Condition D. which resulted in Condition G. being renumbered as Condition F. Thus, "F" is the correct reference.
No change is required.E2-24 ENCLOSURE 3 NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases IREVIEWED 1 By Carl Schulten at 2:44 pm, Jul 30, 2010 SDM -Tavq < 200&deg;F B 3.1.2 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.2.1 In MODE 5, the SDM is verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the following reactivity effects: a. RCS boron concentration;
: b. Control bank position;c. RCS average temperature;
: d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy ge eration;e. Xenon concentration;
: f. Samarium concentration; and g. Design isothermal temperature coefficient ITC).Using the ITC accounts for Doppler reactivity this calculation because the reactor is subcritical, and the fuel tempe ure will be changing at the same rate as the RCS.The Frequency of 24 hours is based on tl} enerally slow change in required boron concentration and on the/ow 1probability of an accident occurring without the required SDM. T !s allows time enough for the operator to collect the required data, w ich includes performing a boron concentration analysis, and complete E culation.REFERENCES JFD1: Editorial correction.
Tech Br. Confirmatory item 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Re ulatio s, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 26 "Rea tivity Control System Redundancy and Capabilit Watts Bar FSAR, Sectio&#xfd;15.2.4, Uncontrolled Boron Dilution." IA-r" sz,.t 1vv/-. I -D-7909, "Tennessee Valley Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit Numbers 1 and 2, Uncontrolled' Boron Dilution Event Reanalysis and Interim Operating Procedure, FSAR Revision Section 15.2.4 and Licensina Verification Onen Item Report OILV-4060 R0". March 31. 1989.Licensing Verification Open Item ReDort OILV-4060 RO" March 31 1_989.Open Pending Receipt of Information Watts Bar- Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.1-10 B APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 2:29 pm, Jul 22, 2010 Rod Position Indication B 3.1.8 BASES (continued)
REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 13, "Instrumentation and Control." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.1, "Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal From a Subcritical Condition." 3. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.2, "Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal At Power." 4. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.3, "Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment." 5. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.4, "Uncontrolled Boron Dilution." 6. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.5, "Partial Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow." 7. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.2.13, "Accidental Depressurization of the Main Steam System." 8. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.3.4, "Complete Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow." 9. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.3.6, "Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal At Full Power." 10. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.4.2.1, "Major Rupture of Main Steam Line." 11. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.4.4, "Single Reactor Coolant Pump Locked Rotor." 12. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.4.6, "Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection)." Confirmatory 13.approval needed from SCPB 14.15.Watts Bar FSAR, Section 4.3, "Nuclear Design." Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.7.1.3.2, "Main Control Room Rod Position Indication." WCAP-12472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," Augqust 1994 (Addendum 2, April 2002).Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.1-55 B LAPPROVED 1 By Carl Schulten at 2:34 pm, Jul 22, 2010 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions
-MODE 1 B 3.1.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.9.4 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Using the ITC accounts for Doppler reactivity in the calculation because the reactor is subcritical, and the fuel temperature will be changing at the same rate as the RCS.The Frequency of 24 hours is based on the generally slow change in required boron concentration and on the low probability of an accident without the required SDM.REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B,"Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants." 2. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments." 3. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," August 1978, 4. ANSI/ANS-19.6.1, "Reload Startup PHYSICS TESTS for Pressurized Water Reactors," American National Standards Institute.
P5. WCAP-9272-P-A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology Report," July 1985.6. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 14.2, "Test Program." 7. WCAP-1 1618, "MERITS Program -Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application," dated November 1987, including Addendum 1, April 1989.8 .WCAP-12472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitorinq and Operations SuDoOrt System." Auaust 1994 (Addendum
: 2. Anril 2002).I Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.1-62 B APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 1:40 pm, Jul 30, 2010J BASES (continued)
PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions
-MODE 2 B 3.1.10 6 REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Re ulations, Part 50, Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclea Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants." 2. Title 10, Code of Federal Regula ions, Part 50.59, "Changes, Tests and Experiments." 3. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," August 1978.4. ANSI/ANS-19.6.1, "Reload Startup Physics Tests for Pressurized Water Reactors," American National Standards Institute.
: 5. WCAP-9272-P-A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology Report," July 1985.'6. WCAP- 618, "MERITS Program -Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application," dated November 1987, including Addendum 1, April 1989.Watts Bar D-aWing 1[ " Gompliancc Tables.""FEIectrical Tech Spec Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.1-69 B REVIEWED By Carl Schulten at 9:58 am, Jul 23, 2010 I FQ(Z)B 3.2.1 BASES REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors." 2. Regulatory Guide 1.77, Rev. 0, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating a Control Rod Ejection Accident for Pressurized water Reactors," May 1974.3. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A,"General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," GDC 26,"Reactivity Control System Redundancy and Capability." 4 WCAP 7308 L P A, "Ev-l'n erta ies," u n, 8 .-ation of N'-clear Hot Channel Fact;or APPROVED -4._4.By Carl Schulten at 2:17 pm, Jul 30, 2010 WCAP-12472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994, (Addendum 2, April 2002).Westinghouse Technical Bulletin (TB) 08-4, "Fo Surveillance at Part Powers," July 15, 2008.Revision 99 to WBN1 TS Bases per Westinghouse Technical Bulletin 08-04. Technical Branch Confirmatory Open Pending Receipt of Information Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.2-10 B FNAH B 3.2.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Operation outside the LCO limits may produce unacceptable consequences if a DNB limiting event occurs. The DNB design basis ensures that there is no overheating of the fuel that results in possible cladding perforation with the release of fission products to the reactor coolant.APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Limits on FNAH preclude core power distributions that exceed the following fuel design limits: a. There must be at least 95% probability at the 95% confidence level (the 95/95 DNB criterion) that the hottest fuel rod in the core does not experience a DNB condition;
: b. During a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the peak cladding temperature (PCT) must not exceed 2200&deg;F for small breaks, and there must be a high level of probability that the peak cladding temperature does not exceed 2200&deg;F for large breaks (Ref. 3);c. During an ejected rod accident, the energy deposition to the fuel must not exceed 280 cal/gm (Ref. 1); and d. Fuel design limits required by GDC 26 (Ref. 2) for the condition when control rods must be capable of shutting down the reactor with a minimum required SDM with the highest worth control rod stuck fully withdrawn.
For transients that may be DNB limited, FNAH is a significant core parameter.
The limits on FNAH ensure that the DNB design basis is met for normal operation, operational transients, and any transients arising from events of moderate frequency.
The DNB design basis is met by limiting the minimum local DNB heat flux ratio to a value which satisfies the 95/95 criterion for the DNB correlation used. Refer to the Bases for the Reactor Core Safety Limits, B 2.1.1, for a discussion of the applicable DNBR limits. The W-3 Correlation with a DNBR limit of 1.3 is applied in the heated region below the first mixing vane grid. In addition, the W-3 DNB correlation is applied in the analysis of accident conditions where the system pressure is below the range of the WRB 1 corrclatfin for VANTAGE 5H and VANTAGE+ fuel or the WRB-2M correlation for RFA-2 fuel with IFMs. For system pressures in the range of 500 to 1000 psia, the W-3 correlation DNBR limit is 1.45 instead of 1.3.Application of these criteria provides assurance that the hottest fuel rod in the core does not experience a DNB.(continued)
Open Pending Receipt of Information RAI: JFD 3.Editorial correction to delete non-applicable Tech Branch Confirmatory item.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.2-13 A AFD B 3.2.3 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.2.3.1 The AFD is monitored on an automatic basis using the unit process computer, which has an AFD monitor alarm. The computer determines the 1 minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for two or more OPERABLE excore channels is outside its specified limits.This Surveillance verifies that the AFD, as indicated by the NIS excore channel, is within its specified limits and is consistent with the status of the AFD monitor alarm. With the AFD monitor alarm inoperable, the AFD is monitored every hour to detect operation outside its limit. The Frequency of 1 hour is based on operating experience regarding the amount of time required to vary the AFD, and the fact that the AFD is closely monitored.
With the AFD monitor alarm OPERABLE, the Surveillance Frequency of 7 days is adequate considering that the AFD is monitored by a computer and any deviation from requirements is alarmed.REFERENCES 11.Confirmatory approval needed 2.from SCPB WCAP-8385 (Proprietary), "Power Distribution Control and Load Following Procedures," Westinghouse Electric Corporation, September 1974.R. W. Miller et al., "Relaxation of Constant Axial Offset Control: FQ Surveillance Technical Specification," WCAP-1 0216-P-A, June 1983.3. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.7, "Control Systems." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.2-22 A APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 10:54 am, Jul 23, 2010]QPTR B 3.2.4 BASES The synmmetric thimble flux Map can be used to generate symmeti thimble "tilt.' This can be compared to a reference symnmetric thimble tilt, from the mos.t Fr.ocent fu11 core flux map, to genReate an i'ncre QPTR.Therefore, QPTR can be used to confirm that QPTR is within limits.With one NIS channel inoperable, the indicated tilt may be changed from the value !ndicated with all four hanneis OPERABLE.
To confirm that no change in tilt has actually occurr.ed, which might cause the QPTR Ilmit to be exceeded, the ..inc...e result mqay be compared against previeus flux maps either us~ing the symnmetric thimbles as described above or a complete flux map. Nominally, quadrant tilt frGM the SUr~eillaRce should be within 2% o-f the tilt sqhown by the most recent flux mnap data.-REFERENCES Confirmation needed from SCPB 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors." 2. Regulatory Guide 1.77, Rev. 0, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating a Control Rod Ejection Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors," May 1974.3. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A,"General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," GDC 26,"Reactivity Control System Redundancy and Capability." 4. WCAP-12472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994 (Addendum 2, April 2002).Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.2-30 B APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 1:27 pm, Aug 03, 2010 J RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
: 3. Solid State Protection System (SSPS), including input, logic, and output bays: initiates proper unit shutdown and/or ESF actuation in accordance with the defined logic, which is based on the bistable, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs from the signal process control and protection system; and 4. Reactor trip switchgear, including reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and bypass breakers:
provides the means to interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or "rods," to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs at power.Field Transmitters or Sensors Open Pending Receipt of Information
[ REVISED o 2:39 pm, Sep 13, 2010 To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as five, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters.
To account for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the Trip SetpeiRtNTSP and Allowable Values. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor is determined by either can be evaluated ,w-hen its "as found" calibration data evaluated during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel behaviour observed fr449 performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.are-comnpared against its dourmndrted acceptain e criter.m Sianal Process Control and Protection System Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments.
The process control equipment provides aRaleg conversinr (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning-comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with setpee-s-NTSPs derived from Analytical Limits established by the safety analyses.
These-setpeh:4sAnalytical Limits are defined in Reference
: 6. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable, setpoint comparator, or contact is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays. However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing.
Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-4 B APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 1:27 pm, Aug 03, 2010 I RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 f BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Signal Process Control and Protection System (continued)
Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.
These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 2.Two logic trains are required to ensure no single random failure of a logic train will disable the RTS. The logic trains are designed such that testing required while the reactor is at power may be accomplished without causing trip.Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints The Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables, setpoint comparators, or contact trip outputs are set. Any bistable or trip output is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy.The Trip Setpoints used in the bistables, setpoint comparators, or contact trip outputs are based on the analytical limits stated in Reference
: 6. The se!eGtm9R calculation of t-hesethe Nominal Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RTS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5), the F~p Setponts specified in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits.(continued)
Open Pending Receipt of Information 3REVISED 2010 3:04 pm, Sep 13, 21 Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-5 B APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 1:27 pm, Aug 03, 2010 RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES (continued)
BACKGROUND Trip Sctpoints and Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints (continued) (continued)
A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable ValuesTip-Setpeints and NTSP, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in the "West!Rgheose Setpoint Methodology for P-reteetie-Systems, Watts Bar 1--a+4Unit 2" (Ref. 6). The -ncertainties for Reactor Coolant FloW LOW fUnction Y ui.. the elbow tap Ap flow measurement methoedolgy are pr.vided in Reference
: 1. .The as-left tolerance and as-found tolerance band methodology is provided in Reference
: 6. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NTSP and corresponding Allowable Value. The trip setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for measurement errors detectable by the COT. The Allowable Value serves as the as-found Technical Specification OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the COT. The Source Range and S ntermediate Range Neutron detector setpoints are based on the Open Pending Rwelplequirements and recommendations of ISA 67.04 (Reference 10).standard andI recomenPeded practice.:
The actual nEFomial Trip Setpoint of Information entered ito the.bi.tabc....
mparatr is more conse....
atiVe. than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for chane inrando measuremet errors detectable by a COT. One examqple of suchG chaRge i measurement error is drif durig the surveillance inea. If the m.easured setpeint does not exceed the All.wable Value, the histable iS consied OPERABLE.=
The NTSP is the value at which the bistable is set and is the expected value to be achieved during calibration.
The NTSP value is the LSSS and ensures the safety analysis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adjusted based on stated channel uncertainties.
Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as-left" NTSP value is within the as-left tolerance band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertainty allowance (i.e., + rack calibration and comparator setting uncertainties).
The NTSP value is therefore considered a "nominal" value (i.e., expressed as a value without inequalities) for the purposes of COT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION. ,etpintS in accord.ance with the Allowable Value ensure that S1.s are net violated durFing AO~s (and that the consequenceS Of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated fromq within the LCOs at the onset of the AOGO or DRBA and the equipment functions as designed).
Note that in th e -accom*RpanRying LCOQ 3.3.1, the Trip Setpoints of Table 3.3.1 1 arc the LS9S.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-6 (developmental)
B IAPPROVED By Carl Schulten at 1:28 pm, Aug 03, 2010 BASES (continued)
RTS Instrumentation B 3.
 
==3.1 BACKGROUND==
(continued)
Open Pending Receipt of Information REVISED 3:05 pm, Sep 13, 2010 Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints (continued)
Nominal Trip Setpoints, in conjunction with the use of as found and -a lcft tolerances, together with the requirements of the Allowable Value ensure that SLs are not violated durinq AOOs (and that the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the AOO or DBA and the equipment functions are designed).-Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line to verify that the signal or setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements of Reference
: 2. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated.
SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section.Note that the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 are the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS, or a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST that requires trip setpoint verification.
The Process Protection System is designed to permit any one channel to be tested and maintained at power in a bypassed mode. If a channel has been bypassed for any purpose, the bypass is continuously indicated in the control room.The NTSPTFip SetpeiF4s and Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 are based on the methodology described in References 6 and 10413,and dSA-67.04 (Ref. 4-), which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each TrFp SetpeWnt.
All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.
Open Pending Receipt of Information REVISED 3:10 pm, Sep 13, 2010 Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of setpoint comparator trip outputs, contact outputs, and bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment.
To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided.
If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide reactor trip and/or ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-7 B Open Pending Receipt RTS Instrumentation of Information B 3.3.1 BASES (continued)
When any one train is taken out of service for testing, the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed.
The testing device is semiautomatic to minimize testing time.APPLICABLE The RTS functions to maint n -preserve the SLs during all AQOs and SAFETY mitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in which the Rod ANALYSES, Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not LCO, and fully inserted.RTBs are closcd.APPLICABILITY Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RTS Functions.
The accident analysis described in Reference 3 takes credit for most RTS trip functions.
RTS trip functions that are retained yet not specifically credited in the accident analysis are quaitatP,-implicitly credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These RTS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance.
They may also serve as backups to RTS trip Functions that were credited in the accident analysis.Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not explicitly modeled in the Safety Analyses.These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.The LCO requires all instru...ntation performing an RTS Func. tion, listed in Table 3.3.1 1 in the ; acompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE.
Failure of any r endrc- the affected channel(s) ine;r'able aRnd  the roliability of the affected FunctiOns.The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an RTS Function, listed in Table 3.3.1-1 to be OPERABLE.
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that the channel can have Deinfrato is to be --&#xfd;when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as-found setpoint is informtion i to he as-found tolerance and is conservative with the respect to the retained or deleted.
duringq a CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL-IqT (COT). As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amourl [gqreater than or] equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval.
In this manner, the actual setting of the channel (NTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of the time as long as the channel has not drifted beyond expected tolerances during the (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-9 (developmental)
B Open Pending Receipt of Information RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Bases JFD 9 page 7.2-22 FSAR 7.2.2.1.2 Reactor Coolant Flow Measurement The elbow taps used on each loop in the primary coolant system are instrument devices that are used to indicate reactor coolant flow.The basic function of this measurement is to ensure that thermal design flow is achieved.??For Unit 2, precision colorimetric flow measurement used in lieu of elbow tap methodology.
FSAR and TS Bases don't align with JFD 9.??Bases JFD 7 FSAR 15.4.2.1.2 Analysis of Effects and Consequences page 15.4-17 (9) A thermal design flowrate of 372,400 gpm is used which accounts for the 10%steam generator tube plugging level and instrumentation uncertainty.
?? 95,000 gpm doesn't align with 372,400 gpm??10. Reactor Coolant Flow -Low (continued)
In MODE 1 above the P-8 setpoint, a loss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions in the core because of the higher power level. In MODE 1 below the P-8 setpoint and above the P-7 setpoint, a loss of flow in two or more loops is required to actuate a reactor trip because of the lower power level and the greater margin to the design limit DNBR. Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on low flow are automAtically blocked since there is insufficient heat production to ge te DNB conditions.
The Reactor Coolant Flow-L Trip tpoint and Allowable Value are specified in % 1epthermal desiqn flow adiusted for uncertainties (95,000 a however, the Eagle-21 T M values entered through the I are specified in an equivalent
%differential pes 11. Undervoltaq eactor Coolant Pumps m The Un rvoltage RCPs trip Function ensures that protection is provi d against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in tw or more RCS loops. The voltage to each RCP is monitored.
ove the P-7 setpoint, a loss of voltage detected on two or more RCP buses will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow -Low Trip Setpoint is reached in two or more RCS loops. The loss of voltage in two loops must be sustained for a length of time equal to or greater than that set in the time delay. Time delays are incorporated into the Undervoltage RCPs channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary electrical power transients.
The LCO requires one Undervoltage RCP channel per bus to be OPERABLE.In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint, the Undervoltage RCP trip must be OPERABLE.
Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7 setpoint, the reactor trip on loss of flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-23 B Open Pending Receipt of Information RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
: e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 (continued)
OPERABILITY in MODE 1 ensures the Function is available to perform its decreasing power Functions in the event of a reactor shutdown.
This Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 2 to ensure that core protection is provided during a startup or shutdown by the Power Range Neutron Flux -Low and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trips. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not at power and the Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip provides core protection.
Markup uses JFD 8 (TSTF-493);
Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13 provide corrected JFD The Tur se Pressure, P-13 interlock is actuated when the pressuR the&WSt St at the inlet of the high pressure turbine is greater than approximately 10% of the rated full load pressure.
This is determined by one-out-of-two pressure detectors.
The LCO requirement for this Function ensures that one of the inputs to the P-7 interlock is available.
The LCO requires two channels of Turbine Impulse Markup uses JFD Pressure, P-13 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1.8 (TSTF-493); 8rovide (cSrF4ctd The Turbine Impuls ChamberPressure, P-13 interlock must be OPERABLE when the turbine generator is operating.
The interlock Function is not required OPERABLE in MODE 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 because the turbine generator is not operating.
: 17. Reactor Trip Breakers This trip Function applies to the RTBs exclusive of individual trip mechanisms.
The LCO requires two OPERABLE trains of trip breakers.
A trip breaker train consists of all trip breakers associated with a single RTS logic train that are racked in, closed, and capable of supplying power to the CRD System. Thus, the train may consist of the main breaker, bypass breaker, or main breaker and bypass breaker, depending upon the system configuration.
Two OPERABLE trains ensure no single random failure can disable the RTS trip capability.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-35 B Open Pending Receipt of Information RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
APPROVED By Carl Schulten at 2:29 pm, Jul 30, 2010 IA82 deviation
-I moveable incores not justified.
SR 3.3.1.2 (continued)
The Frequency of every 24 hours is ad quate. It is based on unit operating experience, considering instru ent reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. Together ese factors demonstrate the change in the absolute difference between IS and heat balance calculated powers rarely exceeds 2% in any ,4 hour period.In addition, control room operators periodically onitor redundant indications and alarms to detect deviations in ch nel outputs.3.3.1.3 S SR 3.3. ompares the power distribution measure nt to the NIS channel AF .ystem to the NIS chann. l output e ery 31 EFPD. If the absolute difference is > 3%, the NIS channel is still O ERABLE, but must be readjusted.
If the NIS channel cannot be properl \readjusted, the channel is declared inoperable.
This Surveillance is perormed to verify the f(AI) input to the Overtemperature AT Function.
The incore power distribution measurement is obtained using the GP.ERA- L Power"Distribution Monitorina System (PDMS) (Ref. 16).Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.3. Note 1 indicates that the excore NIS channel shall be adjusted if the absolute difference between the incore and excore AFD is > 3%. Note 2 clarifies that the Surveillance is required only if reactor power is _> 15% RTP and that 96 hours is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 15% RTP. This surveillance is typically performed at greater than or equal to 50% RTP to ensure the results of the evaluation are more accurate and the adjustments more reliable.
Ninety-six (96) hours are allowed to ensure Xenon stability and allow for instrumentation alignments.
The Frequency of every 31 EFPD is adequate.
It is based on unit operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. Also, the slow changes in neutron flux during the fuel cycle can be detected during this interval.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-54 B Open Pending Receipt RTS Instrume3t.t3 BASES of Information REFERENCES
: 5. 10 CFR Part 50.49, "Environmental Qualifications of Electric (continued)
Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." 6 WCAP-1-209617044, Rev. 7-0, Cni o Methodology for Protection System, Watts Bar 1-and 2," March Confirmatory
-9;EIoB required 7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Rev. 1,"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," May 1986 and June 1990.8. Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System Response Times." 9. Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-1 0271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar, Westinghouse Letter WAT-D-10128.
: 10. ISA-DS-67.04, 1982, "Setpoint for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation Used in Nuclear Power Plants." APPROVED 11. WCAP-1 3632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor By Carl Schulten at 9:57 am, Au 05,201 Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996 Per A7WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Per JFD 9 A47 Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.added the ...reference to 13. DeletedWGAP 16067 P, Rev. 0, "RCS Fl ..w Measurm.ent Using WBN1. Justify the Elbow Tap Methodology at Watts Bar Unit 1," April 2003.deletion.
: 14. WCAP-14333 P-A, Revision 1, "Probablistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998.5. WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003 APPROVED 16. WCAP-12472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations By Carl Schullen at 2:31 pm. Jul 30, 2010 Support System," August 1994 (Addendum 2, April 2002).Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-65 (developmental)
B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...beinq capable of performinq its safety functions(s)." Relyinq solely on the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protection channel settinq durinq a surveillance.
This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a settinq that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected.
This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodoloqy for calculatinq the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" settinq of the protection channel. Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the established as-left tolerance around the NTSP to account for further drift durinq the next surveillance interval.During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more times durina the unit life, the accentable limits are:* I 12 [ 3 5 p s i a I., -.-.1. e De arture from Nucleate Boilin Ratio DNBR shall be ma-tined above the Safet Limit SL value to prevent departure from nuc te boilin DNB 2. Fuel centerline m hall not occur, and 3. The RCS pressure SL of 2 7500 ' .baA4- &#xfd; Ope ration[new paragraph
' e sof Spe~cificatioqn 2.0, "Safety Limits (S s.).,".also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100 criteria durinq AOOs.Accidents are events that are analyzed even thouqh they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit durinq accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident cateqories are allowed a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.
Meetinq the acceptable dose limit for an accident cateqory is considered havinq acceptable consequences for that event.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-65 B
[ REVIEWED 1 By Carl Schulten at 8:00 am, Sep 13, 2010 REVISED 8:00 am, Sep 1 3, 2010 I ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BS BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The ESFAS instrumentation is segmented into three distinct but interconnected modules as identified below: " Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal or contact actuation based on the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured;* Signal processing equipment including process protection system, and field contacts:
provide analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning, setpoint comparison, process algorithm actuation (Digital Protection System), compatible electrical signal output to protection system d8eiGeschannels, and control board/control room/ miscellaneous indications; and" Solid State Protection System (SSPS) including input, logic, and output bays: initiates the proper unit shutdown or engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the defined logic and based on the bistable, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs from the signal process control and protection system.Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as five, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters.
In many cases, field transmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the Reactor Trip System (RTS).In some cases, the same channels also provide control system inputs. To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the T-SFepeW4NTSP and Allowable Values. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can bc ovaluatod whcn its "as found" calibration data ar. coMpacd agai,-t its do.um.ntcd aocceptance critoria.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-66 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND Signal Processing Equipment (continued)
Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments.
The process control equipment provides analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and lanalytical limits comparison of measured input signals with setpeWsNTSPs derived from' ,Analytical Limits established by the safety analyses.
These setpeintS SPs are defined in Reference
: 6. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a setpoint comparator or contact is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays.However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing.
Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.
These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 2.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-67 (developmental)
B
[REVIEWED 1 REVISED o1 ESFAS Instrumentation By Carl Schulten at 8:52 am, Sep 13, 2010 J 8:52 am, Sep 13, 2010 B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND T-ripSetEe4ntsNTSPs and Allowable Values (continued)
The Trip Setpeiats are the nominal values at which the setpoint comparators or contact outputs are set. Any output is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy.The Tp- Setpe cts used in the bistables, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs are based on the analytical limits stated in Reference
: 6. The selection of thesecalculation of the Nominal Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for Allowable Values calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and and ESFAS vironment errors for those ESFAS channels that must function in harsh enviro as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5), the T4p-SetpeiF4NTSPs specified in 3.3.2-1 in the accompanying LCO are conservatively adjusted with respect to I ical limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate t NTSPs Tr-i getpe4.4S, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in the"WeSgt4ghese "Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Watts Bar 1-aRa4Unit 2" (Ref. 6). The as-left tolerance and as-found tolerance band methodology is provided in Reference 6.-The aet-al nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the comparator or contact output is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a COT.GQe-example of SUch a changei m easremet error is drift duFrigth surveillance nt'a.If the csuc setpoint does no~t exceed the All...able Value, the isGGR,;odred F The NTSP is the value at which the bistables are set and is the expected value to be achieved during calibration.
The NTSP value is the LSSS and ensures the safety analysis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adiusted based on stated channel uncertainties.
Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the"as-left" sete&Rt NTSP value is within the b as-left tolerance for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertainty allowance (i.e., +/- rack calibration and comparator setting uncertainties).
The NTSP value is therefore considered a "nominal value" (i.e., expressed as a value without inequalities) for the purposes of the COT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-68 (developmental)
B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Nominal Trip Setpoints, in coniunction with the use of as-left and as-found tolerances together with the requirements of the accordanco with the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the equipment functions as designed.Note that the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.2-1 are the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, COT, or a TADOT.Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements of Reference
: 2. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated.
SRs for the channels are specified in the SR section.The T-Fh-,Setpeh4tNTSPs and Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.2-1 are based on the methodology described in Reference 6, which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each etpGi4NTSP.
All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-69 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND Solid State Protection System (continued)
The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment.
To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided.
If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation; generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation; and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.The outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients.
If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition.
Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases.Each SSPS train has a built in testing deviee that can automatically test the decision logic matrix functions and the actuation while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken out of service for testing, the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed.
The testing deeiAee is semiautomatic to minimize testing time.The actuation of most ESF components is accomplished through master and slave relays. Some ESF components are actuated by relay logic.The SSPS energizes the master relays appropriate for the condition of the unit. Each master relay then energizes one or more slave relays, which then cause actuation of the end devices. The master and slave relays are routinely tested to ensure operation.
The test of the master relays energizes the relay, which then operates the contacts and applies a low voltage to the associated slave relays. The low voltage is not sufficient to actuate the slave relays but only demonstrates signal path continuity.
The SLAVE RELAY TEST actuates the devices if their operation will not interfere with continued unit operation.
For the latter (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-70 (developmental)
B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function listed in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE.
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that the channel can have when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as-found setpoint is within the as-found tolerance and is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount[greater than or] equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval.
In this manner, the actual setting of the channel (NTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the channel has not drifted beyond expected tolerances during the surveillance interval.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
If the actual setting of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE but degraded.
The degraded condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTSP (within the allowed tolerance) and evaluating the channel response.
If the channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance.Failure of any instrument renders the affocted channel(s) inoperable -and re-ducoGs the reliability of the affected Functions.
A trip setpoint may be set more conservative than the NTSP as necessary in response to plant conditions.
However, in this case, the operability of this instrument must be verified based on the [field setting]and not the NTSP. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-72 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
: c. Safety Iniection
-Containment Pressure -Hiah (continued)
Containment Pressure -High provides no input to any control functions.
Thus, three OPERABLE channels are sufficient to satisfy protective requirements with a two-out-of-three logic. The transmitters (d/p cells) and electronics are located outside of containment, inside the containment annulus, with the sensing line (high pressure side of the transmitter) located inside containment.
Thus, the high pressure Function will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the NTSP reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.The transmitters and electEronmts arc lcated inside the oerntainant annulu., but oultsido containment, and experience more adverse enviFronmental co~nditionS than if they~ wre locatcd outside contairnment altogether.
However, the enviFronmental effects are less seve~re th-An if the transmitters wore located inside con-t-ainm~ent.
The TrFip Setpoeint rofloctS the inclusion of both steady state instrumnet uncertainties and slightly moree adverse enviFronmental instrument Lunccraonties.
Containment Pressure -High must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, there is insufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-76 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
License amendment No.?e. Auxiliary Feedwater
-Trip Of All Main Turbine Driven Feedwater Pumps A Trip of both turbine driven MFW pumps is an indication of a loss of MFW and the subsequent need for some method of decay heat and sensible heat removal to bring the reactor back to no load temperature and pressure.
A turbine driven MFW pump is equipped with one pressure switch on the control oil line for the speed control system. A low pressure signal from this pressure switch indicates a trip of that pump.A trip of both turbine driven MFW pumps starts the motor driven and turbine driven AFW pumps to ensure that enough water is available to act as the heat sink for the reactor.This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. This ensures that at least one SG is provided with water to serve as the heat sink to remove reactor decay heat and sensible heat in the event of an accident.
Mode 2 applicability is when one or more turbine driven MFW pump(s) are supplying feedwater to the steam generators.
In Mode 2 the AFW system pump(s) will be used for startup/shutdown conditions.
During startup, a turbine driven MFW pump is placed in service along with the operating AFW System pump(s). During the process of placing the first turbine driven MFW pump in service, the anticipatory AFW auto-start channel for the non-operating turbine driven MFW pump is placed in "bypass" (electrical control circuit is de-energized) to prevent inadvertent AFW auto-start during rollup trip testing and overspeed trip testing. Once the operating turbine driven MFW pump has established sufficient feed flow to maintain SG level, the anticipatory AFW auto-start channel for the non-operating turbine driven MFW pump is placed in the "trip" condition, and the AFW pumps secured.Under these conditions, the AFW auto start circuit will be in a half trip condition (one-out-of-two) in Mode 2 and during transitions from Mode 2 to Mode 1. If the operating turbine driven MFW pump were to trip during this time period, an AFW auto start signal would be generated causing all three AFW pumps to start. Having the reguirement for auto start of the AFW pumps to be reguired only when one or more turbine driven MFW pumps are in service limits the potential for an overcooling transient due to inadvertent AFW actuation.
Mode 1 applicability allows (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-96 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE
: e. Auxiliary Feedwater
-Trip Of All Main Turbine Driven SAFETY Feedwater Pumps (continued)
ANALYSES, LCO, and entry into LCO 3.3.2, Condition J to be suspended for up to APPLICABILITY 4 hours when placing the second turbine driven MFW pump (continued) in service or removing one of two turbine driven MFW pumps from service. This provision will reduce License administrative burden on the plant. Plant safety is not amendment No.? compromised during this short period because the safety grade AFW auto start channels associated with steam generator low-low levels are operable.
In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the RCPs and MFW pumps may be normally shut down, and thus neither pump trip is indicative of a condition requiring automatic AFW initiation.
: f. Auxiliary Feedwater
-Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure -Low A low pressure signal in the AFW pump suction line protects the AFW pumps against a loss of the normal supply of water for the pumps, the CST. Three pressure switches are located on each motor driven AFW pump suction line from the CST. A low pressure signal sensed by two switches of a set will cause the emergency supply of water for the respective pumps to be aligned. ERCW (safety grade) is then lined up to supply the AFW pumps to ensure an adequate supply of water for the AFW System to maintain at least one of the SGs as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal.Since the detectors are located in an area not affected by HELBs or high radiation, they will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the T40-Setpe*ntNTSP reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.
These Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure a safety grade supply of water for the AFW System to maintain the SGs as the heat sink for the reactor. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is not enough heat being generated in the reactor to require the SGs as a heat sink.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-97 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2 (continued)
To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray and Phase B containment isolation, the inoperable channel should not be placed in the tripped condition.
Instead it is bypassed.
Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 72 hours, is sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The Completion Time is further justified based on the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status, or place it in the bypassed condition within 72 hours, requires the plant be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one OPEN ITEM UI/U2 channel in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance WCAP-14333 (Ref testing. The channel to be tested can be tested in bypass with the 17) did not approve inoperable channel also in bypass. The time limit is justified in testing a channel in Reference 17.bypass with the inopeabe cihanel F.1, F.2.1, and F.2.2 inoperable channel also in bypass. Condition F applies to:* Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation; 0 Loss of Offsite Power;0 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure -Low; and* P-4 Interlock.
For the Manual Initiation and the P-4 Interlock Functions, this action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS. For the Loss of Offsite Power Function, this action recognizes the lack of manual trip provision for a failed channel. For the AFW System pump suction transfer channels, this action recognizes that placing a failed channel in trip during operation is not necessarily a conservative action. Spurious trip of (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-107 (developmental)
A ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS K.1, K.2.1 and K.2.2 (continued)
However, placing a failed channel in the tripped condition could result in a premature switchover to the sump, prior to the injection of the minimum volume from the RWST. Placing the inoperable channel in bypass results in a two-out-of-three logic configuration, which satisfies the requirement to allow another failure without disabling actuation of the switchover when required.Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 72 hours is sufficient to ensure that the Function remains OPERABLE, and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The 72 hour Completion Time is justified in References 10, 17, and 19. If the channel cannot be returned to OPERABLE status or placed in the bypass condition within 72 hours, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 5 within the next 30 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 5, the plant does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.OPEN ITEM UI/U2 The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one WCAP-14333 (Ref channel in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance
: 17) did not approve testing. The channel to be tested can be tested in bypass with the didtino apprnel iinoperable channel also in bypass. The time limit is justified in testing a channel in .eference 17.bypass with the inoperable channel L.1, L.2.1 and L.2.2 also in bypass.Condition L applies to the P-1i1 Interlock.
With one channel inoperable, the operator must verify that the interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition.
This action manually accomplishes the function of the interlock.
Determination must be made within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 to initiate shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of ESFAS function.
If the interlock is not in the required state (or placed in the required state) for the existing plant condition, the plant must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-111 (developmental)
A ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.2.1 (continued)
Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and reliability.
If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The SSPS is tested every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, using the semiautomatic tester. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation.
Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function.
In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity.
This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and that there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is justified in Reference 18.SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity.
This test is performed every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 18.SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a COT.A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
Setpoints must be found 4iWWh he Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.24-1.(counservative wit respet to(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-115 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.4 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of Reference 6.The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 18, except for Function 7. The Frequency for Function 7 is justified in References 10 and 18.SR 3.3.2.4 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
-------------------
REVIEWER'S NOTE ------------------
The bracketed section 't[NTSP and the]' of the sentence in Note (c) in Table 3.3.2-1 is not required in plant-specific Technical Specifications which include a [Nominal Trip Setpoint]
column in Table 3.3.2-1.The second Note also requires that the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [insert the name of a ued)document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 such as the Technical Watts Bar -Unit 2 Requirements Manual or any document incorporated into the facility (developmental)
FSAR]. A ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST for slave relays K603A, K603B, K604A, K604B, K607A, K607B, K609A, K609B, K612A, K625A, and K625B. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment which may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment.
Actuation equipment which may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the slave relay test circuit.For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. This test is performed every 18 months. The Frequency is justified by TVA correspondence to the NRC dated November 9, 1984 (Ref. 9) and Design Change Notice W-38238-A associated documentation (Reference 12), and for relays K607A, K607B, and K612A, Westinghouse letter to TVA (Ref. 11).SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pumps. It is performed every 18 months. The Frequency is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation functions.
The manual initiation functions have no associated setpoints.
SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Justify deviation from TSTF-493 Bases for F.6.e, Trip of All Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps see Bases page B 3.3.2-60, B 3.3.2-61 for replacement text.A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the Watts Bar setpoint methodology.
The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-118 A ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.9 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of sensor/transmitter drift in the setpoint methodology.
This SR is modified by a Note stating that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable.
For channels with a trip time delay (TTD), this test shall include verification that the TTD coefficients are adjusted correctly.
SR 3.3.2.9 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The-----------------------
first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition REVIEWER'S where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found NOTE ----------------
tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.---- Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will The bracketed section continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and'[NTSP and the]' of the the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The sentence in Note (c) in Table purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel 3.3.2-1 is not required in performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels plant-specific Technical determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to Specifications which include service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the a [Nominal Trip Setpoint]
plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program column in Table 3.3.2-1. will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The-----------------------
second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned-----------------------
to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be The second Note also applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that requires that the [NTSP and sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
the] methodologies for If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-calculating the as-left and the left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
as-found tolerances be in _[insert the name of a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 such as the This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIMES are less Technical Requirements than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.Manual or any document Response Time testing acceptance criteria are included in Technical incorporated into the facility Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2 (Ref. 8). Individual component FSAR]. response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the value at the sensor, to the point at which (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-119 (developmental)
A ESFAS Instrumentation
[NOT APPROVED1 B 3.3.2 BASES REFERENCES (continued) 6.7.OPEN Confirmatory item -need license amendment for change to Unit 1 8.licensing basis?9.10.11.2.13.WCAP-1-2-9617044, Rev. 7-0, "WestWaheUSe-Setpoint Methodology for Protoction Syctom, Watts Bar I-a dUnit 2,2 AM;rh WCAP-1 0271-P-A, Supplement 1 and Supplement 2, Rev. 1,"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System." May 1986 and June 1990.Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2,"Engineered Safety Feature Response Times." TVA Letter to NRC, November 9, 1984, "Request for Exemption of Quarterly Slave Relay Testing, (L44 841109 808)." Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-1 0271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar, Westinghouse letter to TVA WAT-D-10128.
Westinghouse letter to TVA (WAT-D-8347), September 25, 1990,"Charging/Letdown Isolation Transients" (T33 911231 810).Unit 1 Design Change Notice W-38238 and Unit 2 Enqineering Document Construction Release 53352 and associated documentation.
WCAP-13877-P-A, Revision 2.-1-, "Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays Used As SSPS Slave Relays," August 4998.14. Not Applicable for Unit 2 15. WCAP-1 3632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996.Unit 1 & Unit 2 16. WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Open Item Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.17. WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1, "Probablistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998 WCAP-14333 did not approve and therefore cannot be used as a basis for plant-specific approval to perform testing with two channels in bypass...(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-122 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES REFERENCES (continued)
OPEN Confirmatory item -need license amendment for change to Unit 1 license basis 18. WCAP-1 5376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003 19. Westinghouse letter to TVA, WAT-D-1 1248, "Revised Justification for Applicability of Instrumentation Technical Specification Improvements to the Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump Signal," June 2004.-k&#xfd;20.21.2.Letter from John G. Lamb (NRC) to Mr. Preston D. Swafford (TVA)dated March 4, 2009, Includes Enclosures (a) Amendment No. 75 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and (b) NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) for Amendment No. 75.Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety Related Instrumentation," Revision 3.WCAP-1 3878-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Potter &Brumfield MDR Series Relays." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-123 B Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 BASES (continued)
REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A,"General Design Criteria 19, "Control Room." 2. Watts Bar FSAR Section 7.4, "Systems Required for Safe Confirmatory item -Shutdown." reference
#3 3. TVA Calculation WBN-OSG4-193, "Auxiliary Control System applies to Unit 2. Required Equipment per GDC 19." 4. Design Criteria WB-DC-40-58, "Auxiliary Control System." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-135 A LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 6 months. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a check of the four functions.
The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 6 months is based on operating experience and is justified by the assumption of a 6-month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.SR 3.3.5.3 SR 3.3.5.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as shown in Reference 1.A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the four functions.
The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18-month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.REFERENCES
: 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 8.3, "Onsite (Standby)
Power System." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analysis." Confirmatory item -reference
#3 3. TVA Calculation WPE2119202001, "6.9 kV Shutdown and Logic applies to Unit 2. Boards Undervoltage Relays Requirements/Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation." (continued)
Watts Bar- Unit 2 B 3.3-141 (developmental)
B LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES A similar reference was not provided for LCO 3.3.1 or LCO 3.3.2 TSTF-493 Surveillance Requirement Notes.Why?14.5.Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation-espnse-Times." TVA Calculation TDR SYS.21 1-LV1, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation TDR SYS.211-LV1." (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-142 B Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.6.6 SR 3.3.6.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).SR 3.3.6.6 ("oRtinRed)
For these tests, the relay trip setpoints are verified and adjusted as necessary.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.SR 3.3.6.7 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance." 2. NUREG-1 366, "Improvement to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements," December 1992.OPEN Confirmatory item -3. WCAP-13877-P-A, Revision 2,Rev---. "Reliability Assessment of need a licensing Westinghouse Type AR Relays Used as SSPS Slave Relays-.'-
basis for deviation Aug,'t!998.,from Unit 1.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-150 B Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES REFERENCES
: 4. WCAP-1 5376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the (continued)
RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003 5. WCAP-1 3878-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Potter &Brumfield MDR Series Relays." OPEN Confirmatory item -need a licensing basis for deviation from Unit 1.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-151 B RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.3 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) Open Pending Reeipt B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits of Information BASES BACKGROUND All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.
The PTLR contains P/T limit curves for heatup, cooldown, inservice leak and hydrostatic (ISLH) testing, and data for the maximum rate of change of reactor coolant temperature (Ref. 1).Each P/T limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal operation.
The usual use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, when pressure and temperature indications are monitored and compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation is within the allowable region.The LCO establishes operating limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component most subject to brittle failure, and the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel. The limits do not apply to the pressurizer, which has different design characteristics and operating functions.
10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 2), requires the establishment of P/T limits for specific material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials.
Reference 2 requires an adequate margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. It mandates the use of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section 1__4, Appendix G (Ref. 3).The neutron embrittlement effect on the terial toughness is reflected by increasing the nil ductility reference te erature (RTNDT) as exposure to neutron fluence increases.
CPNB to verify acceptability of deviation from WBN1. (JFD-5) (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.4-10 (developmental)
B RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)B 3.4.7 RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 5 with the RCS loops filled, the primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay heat and the transfer of this heat to either the steam generator (SG) secondary side coolant or the component cooling water via the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers.
While the principal means for decay heat removal is via the RHR System, the SGs are specified as a backup means for redundancy.
Even though the SGs cannot produce steam in this MODE, they are capable of being a heat sink due to their large contained volume of secondary water. As long as the SG secondary side water is at a lower temperature than the reactor coolant, heat transfer will occur. The rate of heat transfer is directly proportional to the temperature difference.
The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for soluble neutron poison, boric acid.In MODE 5 with RCS loops filled, the reactor coolant is circulated by means of two RHR loops connected to the RCS, each loop containing an RHR heat exchanger, an RHR pump, and appropriate flow and temperature instrumentation for control, protection, and indication.
One RHR pump circulates the water through the RCS at a sufficient rate to prevent boric acid stratification.
The number of loops in operation can vary to suit the operational needs.The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one RHR loop for decay heat removal and transport.
The flow provided by one RHR loop is adequate for decay heat removal. The other intent of this LCO is to require that a second path be available to provide redundancy for heat removal.UOIPN confirmatory item The LC for redundant paths of decay heat removal capability.
Unit 1, Revision 79, he first path can be an that must be OPERABLE and in A61 changes do o ration. The second path can be an ERABLE RHR loop or not apply to U2 main iping two SGs with secondary side water leve'Mmu-IM 6% narrow range to provide an alternate method for decay heat removal.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.4-34 A REVIEWED By Carl Schulten at 1:39 pm, Jul 22, 2010J Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 Every 12 hours, borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure are verified for each accumulator (Refer to the note below.). This Frequency is sufficient to ensure adequate injection during a LOCA. Because of the static design of the accumulator, a 12-hour Frequency usually allows the operator to identify changes before limits are reached. Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.Note: In the discussion contained in the Applicable Safety Analyses of this Bases section, the borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure specified for SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 account for instrument accuracYstet pAr 81 SR 3.5.1.4 The boron concentration should be verified to be within required limits for each accumulator every 31 days since the static design of the accumulators limits the ways in which the concentration can be changed.The 31-day Frequency is adequate to identify changes that could occur from mechanisms such as stratification or inleakage.
Sampling the affected accumulator within 6 hours after a 75 gallons (1% volume)increase will identify whether inleakage has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the required limit. This is consistent with the recommendation of NUREG-1366 (Ref. 5).SR 3.5.1.5 Verification every 31 days that power is removed from each accumulator isolation valve operator when the pressurizer pressure is 1000 psig ensures that an active failure could not result in the undetected closure of an accumulator motor operated isolation valve. If this were to occur, only two accumulators would be available for injection given a single failure coincident with a LOCA. Since power is removed under administrative control, the 31-day Frequency will provide adequate assurance that power is removed.This SR allows power to be supplied to the motor operated isolation valves when pressurizer pressure is < 1000 psig, thus allowing operational flexibility by avoiding unnecessary delays to manipulate the breakers during plant startups or shutdowns.
Even with power supplied to the valves, inadvertent closure is prevented by the RCS pressure interlock associated with the valves.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.5-7 B CST B 3.7.6 BASES APPLICABLE The limiting event for the condensate volume is the large feedwater line SAFETY break coincident with a loss of offsite power. Single failures that also ANALYSES affect this event include the following: (continued)
: a. Failure of the diesel generator powering the motor driven AFW pump to the unaffected steam generators (requiring additional steam to drive the remaining AFW pump turbine);
and b. Failure of the steam driven AFW pump (requiring a longer time for cooldown using only one motor driven AFW pump).These are not usually the limiting failures in terms of consequences for these events.A non-limiting event considered in CST inventory determinations is a break in either the main feedwater bypass line or AFW line near where the two join. This break has the potential for dumping condensate until terminated by operator action. This loss of condensate inventory is partially compensated for by the retention of steam generator inventory.
Because the CST is the preferred source of feedwater and is relied on almost exclusively for accidents and transients, the CST satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO As the preferred water source to satisfy accident analysis assumptions, the CST must contain sufficient cooling water to remove decay heat for was "102", A31, I 2 hoIr. following a ed~Lur trip trnm 00.6% RTP, and then to cool down Rev 41 not on U2.I the RCS to RHR entry conditions, assuming a coincident loss of offsite power and the most adverse single failure. In doing this, it must retain sufficient water to ensure adequate net positive suction head for the AFW pumps during cooldown, as well as account for any losses from the steam driven AFW pump turbine, or before isolating AFW to a broken line.The CST level required is equivalent to a usable volume of_> 200,000 gallons, which is based on holding the unit in MODE 3 for 2 hours, followed by a cooldown to RHR entry conditions at 50&deg;F/hour.
This basis is established in Reference 4 and exceeds the volume required by the accident analysis.The OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the minimum required level.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.7-34 (developmental)
A IREVISED 1 1:44 pm, Mar 14, 2011 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.2 (continued)
The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both: a. An inoperable DG exists; and b. A required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) is inoperable.
If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one or more DGs inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.Discovering one or more required DGs in Train A or one or more DGs in Train B inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time or repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.B31aB.3.2 Required Action .1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABL G(s). If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does n xist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performe .If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered if the other For the perfromance of a Surveillance, Required Action B.3.1 is considered satisfied sicne the cause of the DG being inoperable is apparent.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.8-8 A AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Prior to poreforancc of thiG SR in Modoc I or9 2, actiGnc aro taken to octablich that adequate t fo&#xf7;r oe. f the SR. The..quircd acti'n. arc dcfi"cd in Ba"es Table 3.8.1 2.SR 3.8.1.15 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. The minimum voltage and frequency stated in the SR are those necessary to ensure the DG can accept DBA loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency levels. Stable operation at the nominal voltage and frequency values is also essential to establishing DG OPERABILITY, but a time constraint is not imposed. This is because a typical DG will experience a period of voltage and frequency oscillations prior to reaching steady state operation if these oscillations are not dampened out by load application.
This period may extend beyond the 10 seconds acceptance criteria and could be a cause for failing the SR.In lieu of a time constraint in the SR, WBN will monitor and trend the actual time to reach steady state operation as a means of ensuring there is no voltage regulator or governor degradation which could cause a DG to become inoperable.
The 10 seconds time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1.The DG engines for WBN have an oil circulation and soakback system that operates continuously to preclude the need for a prelube and warmup when a DG is started from standby.This SR is modified by a Note to ensure that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions.
Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-26 (developmental)
A ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 1. Page number / Item: B 3.1-10 / Reference 3 NRC Comment(s): "JFD 1: Editorial correction.
Tech Br. Confirmatory item." Also, "Open Pending Receipt of Information" is noted at the bottom of the page (i.e., just below Reference 3).TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following as the justification for this change: "Editorial correction to provide missing information." No change is required.2. Page number / Item: B 3.1-55 / Reference 15.NRC Comment(s): "Confirmatory approval needed from SCPB." TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following justification for this change: "Revised to incorporate the Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) (Reference WCAP-12472-P-A, 'BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System,' August 1994, and WCAP-12472-P-A, 'BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System,'Addendum 2, April 2002).Amendment 82 amended the Unit 1 TS to implement the Beacon Core Power Distribution and Monitoring System. A change similar to this is to be applied to Unit 2.NRC approved A82 via letter dated 10/27/2009.
The Bases is being revised as needed to agree with the TS amendment." No change is required.3. Page number / Item: B 3.1-62 / References 5 and 8 NRC Comment(s): "Confirmatory approval needed from SCPB." TVA Response(s):
See response to Item 2.E4-1 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 4. Page number / Item: B 3.1-69 / References 5 and 6 NRC Comment(s): "Confirmatory approval needed from SCPB." TVA Response(s):
Comment withdrawn by NRC staff during May 10, 2011, meeting with TVA.5. Page number / Item: B 3.2-10/Reference 5 NRC Comment(s): "Revision 99 to WBN1 TS Bases per Westinghouse Technical Bulletin 08-04. Technical Branch Confirmatory." Also, "Open Pending Receipt of Information" is noted at the bottom of the page (i.e., just below Reference 5).TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following justification for adding Reference 5: "Revision 99 to the Unit 1 TS Bases revised the Bases to incorporate Westinghouse Technical Bulletin (TB) 08-04. This change is to be applied to Unit 2.This revision was approved on 10/09/2009." No change is required.6. Page number / Item: B 3.2-13 / change in next to last paragraph NRC Comment(s): "RAI: JFD 3. Editorial correction to delete non-applicable Tech Branch Confirmatory item." Also, "Open Pending Receipt of Information" applies to the same change.TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following justification for the change to this page: "Editorial correction to delete information that is not applicable to the Unit 2 fuel." No change is required.E4-2 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 7. Page number / Item: B 3.2-22 / References
: 1. and 2.NRC Comment(s): "Confirmatory approval needed from SCPB." TVA Response(s):
Comment withdrawn by NRC staff during May 10, 2011, meeting with TVA.8. Page number / Item: B 3.2-30 / Reference 4 NRC Comment(s): "Confirmation needed from SCPB." TVA Response(s):
See response to Item 2.9. Page number / Item: B 3.3-4 / middle paragraph NRC Comment(s):
Last sentence should end with "behaviour observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK." versus "behaviour observed furing performance of the CHANNEL CHECK." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases replaced "behaviour observed furing performance of the CHANNEL CHECK." with "behavior observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK." 10. Page number / Item: B 3.3-5 / last paragraph NRC Comment(s):
The last sentence should read, ".. (Ref. 5), the NTSP specified in..." instead of ".. (Ref. 5), the Trip Setpoints specified in ..." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised the last sentence to read "...(Ref. 5), the Allowable Values specified in ..." This verbiage is consistent with TSTF-493.E4-3 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 11. Page number / Item: B 3.3-6 / middle of first paragraph NRC Comment(s): "Licensee to justify the setpoint basis." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised the first sentence of the paragraph to read, "A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values, NTSPs, and as left and as found tolerance bands is provided in Reference 2." Reference 2 is "Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.0, 'Instrumentation and Controls."'
: 12. Page number/Item:
B 3.3-7 / first paragraph NRC Comment(s):
: a. In the first sentence, replace "as found and as left" with "as-left and as-found." b. Add the following after the existing first sentence of this paragraph: "NEW PARAGRAPH:
Note that the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3. 1-1 are the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL OPERA TIONAL TESTS, or a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERA TIONAL TEST that requires trip setpoint verification." c. Add a paragraph break just prior to the existing sentence that begins with "Each channel TVA Response(s):
: a. TVA has noted inconsistent use of "as found," "as-found", "as left," and "as-left." Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases made changes such that these words are used consistently, and that a hyphen is not used.b. The noted paragraph to be added already existed as the second paragraph on the page.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases deleted the verbiage, "Each channel ...SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section." from the end of the first paragraph.
End result is that the NRC comment is incorporated.
: c. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised this section to align it with the standard and the TSTF changes. The initial incorporation of the TSTF changes resulted in duplication of information and was hard to follow. This paragraph contained information discussed elsewhere in the section, albeit maybe different wording. The cited paragraph was deleted.E4-4 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 13. Page number/Item:
B 3.3-7 / second paragraph NRC Comment(s):
In the second sentence, replace 'Trip Setpoint" with "NTSP." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised this section to align it with the standard and the TSTF changes. The initial incorporation of the TSTF changes resulted in duplication of information and was hard to follow. This paragraph contained information discussed elsewhere in the section, albeit maybe different wording. The paragraph was deleted.14. Page number / Item: B 3.3-9 / last paragraph NRC Comment(s): "Decide if[I information is to be retained or deleted." TVA Response(s):
The TS Bases submitted to the NRC by Reference 1 showed the brackets as being deleted.The brackets do not apply. Note that the marked-up version which showed the brackets was not submitted.
A search of Developmental Revision E of the Unit 2 TS shows that brackets remain in three locations:
: a. page B 3.3-73: This set of brackets should have been removed previously.
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases deleted this set of brackets.b. page B'3.6-64:
The set of brackets used on this page is used intentionally.
This is consistent with the equivalent page in the Unit 1 TS Bases (i.e., page B 3.6-70). This was approved with Unit 1 TS Amendment A33 which was approved by the NRC on November 29, 2001. No change is required.c. page B 3.6-73: The set of brackets used on this page is used intentionally.
This is consistent with the equivalent page in the Unit 1 TS Bases (i.e., page B 3.6-78). This was approved as part of Unit 1 TS Amendment A25 which was approved by the NRC on July 17, 2000. No change is required.E4-5 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 15. Page number / Item: B 3.3-23 / second paragraph under item 10 NRC Comment(s):
: a. Bases JFD 9 page 7.2-22 FSAR 72.2.1.2 Reactor Coolant Flow Measurement The elbow taps used on each loop in the primary coolant system are instrument devices that are used to indicate reactor coolant flow. The basic function of this measurement is to ensure that thermal design flow is achieved.??For Unit 2, precision colorimetric flow measurement used in lieu of elbow tap methodology.
FSAR and TS Bases don't align with JFD 9. ??b. Bases JFD 7 FSAR 15.4.2.1.2 Analysis of Effects and Consequences page 15.4-17 (9) A thermal design flowrate of 372,400 gpm is used which accounts for the 10% steam generator tube plugging level and instrumentation uncertainty.
?? 95,000 gpm doesn't align with 372,400 gpm??TVA Response(s):
: a. The marked-up version of the TS Bases provided by Reference 5 provided the following justification for the changes to the last paragraph of item 10: "Revised for Unit 2 specific configuration." Item (4)(a) (Low Reactor Coolant Flow Trip portion of Reactor Trips) on the bottom of page 7.2-7 of the Unit 2 FSAR discusses this RTS value. The TS, TS Bases, and FSAR are consistent.
No change is required.b. The change made per Developmental Revision B should not have been made on this page; the previous version was consistent with Unit 1, and was correct.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases corrects "% thermal design flow adjusted for uncertainties (95,000 gpm)" to read, "% indicated loop flow." As defined in Unit 2 FSAR Chapter 15, the thermal design flow value of 372,400 gpm is the "minimum measured flow" minus measurement (instrument) uncertainty.
The minimum measured flow value is 380,000 gpm (rounded) or 95,000 gpm/loop.
The ALLOWABLE VALUE and NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT values for item 10. of Unit 2 TS Table 3.3.1-1 are the same for either the precision calorimetric or the elbow tap dp methods of flow measurement.
E4-6 ENCLOSURE 4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 16. Page number / Item: B 3.3-35 / item f.NRC Comment(s):
: a. first paragraph: "Markup uses JFD 8 (TSTF-493);
provide corrected JFD." b. last paragraph: "Markup uses JFD 8 (TSTF-493);
provide corrected" TVA Response(s):
: a. The change was required due to physical differences in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbines.
The justification was in error.No change is required.b. See response to "a." 17. Page number / Item: B 3.3-54 / as indicated NRC Comment(s):
Last sentence of first paragraph of SR 3.3.1.3: "Editorial recommendation....
the use of OPERABLE in the sentence is unnecessary, and begs more questions than it provides answers to." TVA Response(s):
The use of "OPERABLE" is consistent with the Unit 1 TS Bases; no change is recommended.
: 18. Page number / Item: B 3.3-65 (one for B 3.3.1) / as noted below NRC Comment(s):
: a. References 6, 7, 14, and 15: "Confirmatory approval from EICB required." b. Reference 13: "Per JFD 9 A47 added the reference to WBN1. Justify the deletion." TVA Response(s):
: a. Reference 5 provided the following justification for the change to Reference 6: "Incorporated Technical Specification Tracking Form (TSTF) 493, R4." This is the reference to the setpoint methodology for Unit 2.References 7, 14, and 15 were not affected by Developmental Revision B.No change is required.E4-7 ENCLOSURE 4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases b. Reference 5 provided the following justification for this change: "Revised to delete TS A47 Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement Using Elbow Tap Methodology and associated open item in TS 3,4 Bases: In TS A47, NRC approved the use of an alternative method for measurement of reactor coolant system (RCS) total flow rate via measurement of the RCS elbow tap differential pressures (Ap).Unit 2 may implement the elbow tap methodology at a future date; however, for now, Unit 2 will use the precision calorimetric flow measurement methodology." No change is required.19. Page number/Item:
B 3.3-65 (one for 3.3.2) / item 3.NRC Comment(s):
: a. "2750 psia" should be "2735 psia." b. Add paragraph break after the first sentence.TVA Response(s):
: a. 2750 psia -14.7 = 2735 psig.Unit 2 TS 2.1.2 (RCS Pressure SL) states, "In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the RCS pressure shall be maintained
< 2735 psig." It is not apparent why the TS uses psig and the TS Bases uses psia; however, they are both correct as is.The use of "2750 psia" in the Bases for 3.3.2 is consistent with the same usage in Unit 1 TS Bases 3.3.1 and Unit 2 TS Bases 3.3.1.A search of the TS Bases for the RCS pressure SL showed that "2735 psig" is used in TS Bases 2.1.2 and 3.4.10.For consistency and clarity, Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised TS Bases 2.1.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.4.10 such that references to the RCS pressure SL use"2735 psig (2750 psia)." b. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases added the paragraph break as noted.E4-8 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 20. Page number / Item: B 3.3-66 / last sentence of last paragraph NRC Comment(s):
: a. Replace "can be evaluated when its" with "is determined by either." b. Replace "are compared against its documented acceptance criteria" with "evaluated during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel behavior observed during performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised the last sentence to read, "The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor is determined by either 'as found' calibration data evaluated during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel behavior observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK." 21. Page number / Item: B 3.3-67 / third sentence of first paragraph NRC Comment(s):
Replace "NTSPs" with "analytical limits." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases replaced, "These NTSPs are defined in Reference 6." with "Analytical Limits are defined in FSAR ..." 22. Page number / Item: B 3.3-68 / as indicated NRC Comment(s):
: a. The first sentence of the first paragraph should read 'The field setting..." instead of 'The Trip Setpoints
..." b. The first sentence of the second paragraph should read, "The trip setpoints
..."instead of"the Trip Setpoints
..." c. Eleventh line of the second paragraph: "Allowable Values and ESFAS" points towards"NTSPs." [Does this mean to replace the existing wording with the new wording?]d. Fifteenth line of the second paragraph:
Add the following after "Reference
: 6. ": The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NTSP and corresponding Allowable Value." E4-9 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases e. Sixth line of the last paragraph:
this line should read "... 'as-left' NTSP value is within the as-left tolerance for..." instead of "... 'as-left' setpoint NTSP value is within the band as-left tolerance for..." TVA Response(s):
: a. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised this section to align it with the standard and the TSTF changes. The initial incorporation of the TSTF changes resulted in duplication of information and was hard to follow. This paragraph contained information discussed elsewhere in the section, albeit maybe different wording. The cited paragraph was deleted.b. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised the sentence to read, 'The trip setpoints
..." instead of "the Trip Setpoints
..." c. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised the sentence to read, "A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate NTSPs and as left and as found tolerance bands is provided in Reference 2." instead of "A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the NTSPs including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in the 'Setpoint Methodology for Watts Bar Unit 2' (Ref. 6)." Reference 2 is "Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.0, 'Instrumentation and Controls."'
: d. As part of the revision to this paragraph made by Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases, parts of two sentences were combined into one which reads, "All of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel are factored into the determination of each NTSP and corresponding Allowable Value." e. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised this sentence to read, "Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the 'as left' setpoint NTSP value is within the as left tolerance band for ..." E4-10 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 23. Page number/ Item: B 3.3-69 / second paragraph NRC Comment(s): "COMMENT (JFD7) TADOT surveillances do not have performance NOTES. Why is the TADOT included." TVA Response(s):
The change implements TSTF-493 for SRs including 3.3.2.8 (i.e., the TADOT for Auxiliary Feedwater start on trip of all Main Feedwater Pumps).No change is required.24. Page number / Item: B 3.3-70 / first and fifth lines of fourth paragraph NRC Comment(s):
Replace "device" with "channel." (two places)TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases replaced "device" with "channel" in the two places.25. Page number/ Item: B 3.3-72 / as indicated NRC Comment(s):
: a. Ninth line of the first paragraph:
for "[greater than or]": "COMMENT (JFD8) reconcile the application of the bracketed information to WBN-2" b. Third line of the last paragraph:
comment sticky is next to '[field setting]";
however, no comment is contained in it. It appears that the comment for item a. applies here also.TVA Response(s):
See response to Item 14.E4-11 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 26. Page number / Item: B 3.3-76 -second paragraph NRC Comment(s):
'What is amendment made these Bases changes?" TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following justification: "Incorporated Technical Specification Tracking Form (TSTF) 493, R4." No change is required.27. Page number / Item: B 3.3-96 / last paragraph NRC Comment(s): "License amendment No. ?" TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following justification: "A75 amended the Unit 1 TS to modify the TS requirements related to Mode 1 and 2 applicability for Function 6.e of TS Table 3.3.2-1, 'Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,'
and the Bases for TS 3.3.2. In addition, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.2, Condition J, has been revised to be consistent with the design basis for WBN Unit 1.This change is to be applied to Unit 2.The NRC approved A75 in a letter dated March 4, 2009." No change is required.28. Page number / Item: B 3.3-97 / first paragraph NRC Comment(s): "License amendment No. ?" TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 27.E4-12 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 29. Page number / Item: B 3.3-107 / second paragraph, last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "OPEN ITEM U1/U2: WCAP- 14333 (Ref 17) did not approve testing a channel in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass." TVA Response(s):
The Unit 1 TS were issued by an NRC to TVA letter dated November 9, 1995 (Issuance of Facility Operating License No. NPF-20, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 [TAC M91489]).ACTIONS E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2 of Revision 0 of the Unit 1 TS Bases read as follow: "Condition E applies to: " Containment Spray Containment Pressure-High High;" Steam Line Isolation Containment Pressure-High High; and" Containment Phase B Isolation Containment Pressure-High High.None of these signals has input to a control function.
Thus, two-out-of-three logic is necessary to meet acceptable protective requirements.
However, a two-out-of-three design would require tripping a failed channel. This is undesirable because a single failure would then cause spurious containment spray initiation.
Spurious spray actuation is undesirable because of the cleanup problems presented.
Therefore, these channels are designed with two-out-of four logic so that a failed channel may be bypassed rather than tripped. Note that one channel may be bypassed and still satisfy the single failure criterion.
Furthermore, with one channel bypassed, a single instrumentation channel failure will not spuriously initiate containment spray.To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray and Phase B containment isolation, the inoperable channel should not be placed in the tripped condition.
Instead it is bypassed.Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 6 hours, is sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The Completion Time is further justified based on the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status, or place it in the bypassed condition within 6 hours, requires the plant be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one additional channel to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing. Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 hours for testing purposes is acceptable based on the results of Reference 7." Reference 7 was 'WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1 and Supplement 2, Rev. 1, 'Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation E4-13 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases System,' and 'Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System,' May 1986 and June 1990." Reference 10 for this section was "Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar." Thus, the approval for testing a channel in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass is Revision 0 of the Unit 1 TS, and not WCAP-14333.
No change is required.30. Page number / Item: B 3.3-111 / third paragraph, last two sentences NRC Comment(s): "OPEN ITEM U1/U2: WCAP- 14333 (Ref 17) did not approve testing a channel in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass." TVA Response(s):
The Unit 1 TS were issued by an NRC to TVA letter dated November 9, 1995 (Issuance of Facility Operating License No. NPF-20, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 [TAC M91489]).ACTIONS K.1, K.2.1 and K.2.2 of Revision 0 of the Unit 1 TS bases read as follows: "Condition K applies to RWST Level -Low Coincident with Safety Injection and Coincident with Containment Sump Level -High.RWST Level -Low Coincident With SI and Coincident With Containment Sump Level -High provides actuation of switchover to the containment sump. Note that this Function requires the comparators to energize to perform their required action. The failure of up to two channels will not prevent the operation of this Function.
However, placing a failed channel in the tripped condition could result in a premature switchover to the sump, prior to the injection of the minimum volume from the RWST. Placing the inoperable channel in bypass results in a two-out-of-three logic configuration, which satisfies the requirement to allow another failure without disabling actuation of the switchover when required.
Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 6 hours is sufficient to ensure that the Function remains OPERABLE, and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The 6 hour Completion Time is justified in Reference
: 7. If the channel cannot be returned to OPERABLE status or placed in the bypass condition within 6 hours, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 5 within the next 30 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 5, the plant does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.E4-14 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing. The total of 12 hours to reach MODE 3 and 4 hours for a second channel to be bypassed is acceptable based on the results of Reference 7." Reference 10 for this section was "Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-10271 -P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar." Thus, the approval for testing a channel in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass is Revision 0 of the Unit 1 TS, and not WCAP-14333.
No change is required.31. Page number / Item: B 3.3-115 / last line NRC Comment(s):
Should read "conservative with respect to the Allowable Values..." instead of 'Within the Allowable Values TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases replaced "within the Allowable Values ..." with "conservative with respect to the Allowable Values ..." 32. Page number I Item: B 3.3-116 / last paragraph NRC Comment(s):
: a. "The bracketed section 't[NTSP and the]' of the sentence in Note (c) in Table 3.3.2-1 is not required in plant-specific Technical Specifications which include a [Nominal Trip Setpoint]column in Table 3.3.2-1." b. The second Note also requires that the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [insert the name of a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 such as the Technical Requirements Manual or any document incorporated into the facility FSAR]." TVA Response(s):
These comments appear to be suitable to the TS instead of the TS Bases. For example, see TS comment 4 and the response to it.No change is required.E4-15 ENCLOSURE 4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 33. Page number / Item: B 3.3-118 / SR 3.3.2.8 NRC Comment(s): "Justify deviation from TSTF-493 Bases for F.6.e, Trip of All Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps see Bases page B 3,3.2-60, B 3.3.2-61 for replacement text." TVA Response(s):
Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases revised SR 3.3.2.8 to be consistent with TSTF-493 by adding a new paragraph.
: 34. Page number / Item: B 3.3-119 / end of SR 3.3.2.9 NRC Comment(s):
: a. "The bracketed section '[NTSP and the]' of the sentence in Note (c) in Table 3.3.2-1 is not required in plant-specific Technical Specifications which include a [Nominal Trip Setpoint]column in Table 3.3.2-1." b. 'The second Note also requires that the [NTSP and the] methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [insert the name of a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 such as the Technical Requirements Manual or any document incorporated into the facility FSA R]." TVA Response(s):
See the response to Item 32.35. Page number / Item: B 3.3-122 / as indicated NRC Comment(s):
: a. References 6, 12, and 13: OPEN Confirmatory item -need license amendment for change to Unit 1 licensing basis?b. Reference 17: "Unit 1 & Unit 2 OPEN ITEM The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one channel in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing. The channel to be tested can be tested in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass. The total of [12] hours to reach MODE 3 and [4] hours for a second channel to be bypassed is acceptable based on the results of Reference 10.Issue: Reference 10 cannot be WCAP- 14333. WCAP- 14333 did not approve and therefore cannot be used as a basis for plant-specific approval to perform testing with two channels in bypass." -E4-16 ENCLOSURE 4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases TVA Response(s):
: a. Reference 5 provided the following justifications for the noted references:
* Reference 6: "Incorporated Technical Specification Tracking Form (TSTF) 493, R4." This is the reference to the setpoint methodology for Unit 2.* Reference 12: "Revised for Unit 2 specific configuration."" Reference 13: "Editorial" b. See response to Items 29 and 30.36. Page number / Item: B 3.3-123 / References 20, 21, 22 NRC Comment(s): "OPEN Confirmatory item -need license amendment for change to Unit 1 license basis" TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following justifications for the noted references: " Reference 20: "A75 amended the Unit 1 TS to modify the TS requirements related to Mode 1 and 2 applicability for Function 6.e of TS Table 3.3.2-1, 'Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,'
and the Bases for TS 3.3.2. In addition, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.2, Condition J, has been revised to be consistent with the design basis for WBN Unit 1.This change is to be applied to Unit 2.The NRC approved A75 in a letter dated March 4, 2009."" Reference 21: "Incorporated Technical Specification Tracking Form (TSTF) 493, R4." This is the reference to the setpoint methodology for Unit 2." Reference 22: "Revised for Unit 2 specific configuration." No change is required.E4-17 ENCLOSURE 4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 37. Page number / Item: B 3.3-135 / Reference 3 NRC Comment(s):
Confirmatory item -reference
#3 applies to Unit 2.TVA Response(s):
This reference was not affected by Developmental Revision B.No change is required.38. Page number / Item: B 3.3-141 / Reference 3 (for B 3.3.5)NRC Comment(s):
Confirmatory item -reference
#3 applies to Unit 2.TVA Response(s):
This reference was not affected by Developmental Revision B; however, during discussion of this comment during TVA's meeting with the NRC on May 10, 2011, TVA noted that the calculation number is incorrect.
Review of the calculation's cover sheet shows that it has"001 & 002" in the UNITS field.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases corrects 'WPE2119202001" to'WBPE2119202001." 39. Page number / Item: B 3.3-142 / Reference 4 (for B 3.3.5)NRC Comment(s):
'A similar reference was not provided for LCO 3.3. 1 or LCO 3.3.2 TSTF-493 Surveillance Requirement Notes. Why?" TVA Response(s):
Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS Bases have references to similar TRM sections: " The Bases for SR 3.3.1.15 refers to "Ref. 8." Reference 8 is 'Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.1, 'Reactor Trip System Response Times'."* The Bases for SR 3.3.2.10 refers to "Ref. 8." Reference 8 is 'Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2, 'Engineered Safety Feature Response Times'." During the review of the TS Bases to respond to this comment, TVA noted that Reference 4 on page B 3.3-153 is not used in TS Bases 3.3.5.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases deletes existing Reference 4 and renumbers existing References 5 and 6 (and references to them).E4-18 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 40. Page number / Item: B 3.3-150/ Reference 3 NRC Comment(s): "OPEN Confirmatory item -need a licensing basis for deviation from Unit 1." TVA Response(s):
Reference 5 provided the following justification for this change: "Revised for Unit 2 specific configuration." No change is required.41. Page number/ Item: B 3.3-151 / Reference 5 NRC Comment(s): "OPEN Confirmatory item -need a licensing basis for deviation from Unit 1." TVA Response(s):
Refer to response to Item 15 of the TS comments.42. Paqe number/ Item: B 3.4-10 / fifth paragraph NRC Comment(s): "CPNB to verify acceptability of deviation from WBN1. (JFD-5)" Also, "Open Pending Receipt of Information" at the top of the page.TVA Response(s):
Reference 1 provided the following justification for this change: "Corrected
/ updated information in response to Westinghouse letter WBT-D-1342, dated December 10, 2009. This Westinghouse letter provides the final Pressure Temperature Limits Report and associated FSAR, Technical Specifications and TS Bases markups." This paragraph of the Unit 2 TS Bases states, "10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 2), requires the establishment of P/T limits for specific material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials.
Reference 2 requires an adequate margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. ..." IV.2.b. of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G states, "The pressure-temperature limits identified as 'ASME Appendix G limits' in Table 3 require that the limits must be at least as conservative as limits obtained by following the methods of analysis and the margins of safety of Appendix G of Section Xl of the ASME Code." Thus, the change from "Section II'" to "Section Xl" is justified.
E4-19 ENCLOSURE 4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 43. Page number / Item: B 3.4-34 / last paragraph NRC Comment(s):
: a. "OPEN confirmatory item Unit 1, Revision 79, A61 changes do not apply to U2" b. In the last sentence, replace "greater than or equal to" with "above." TVA ResDonse(s):
: a. The review matrix for TS Bases 3.4.7 provided by Reference 4 stated: "R79 revised the Unit 1 TS Bases to reflect changes to the Unit 1 TS approved by Unit 1 TS A61 (authorize change in SG level requirement from greater than or equal to 6% to greater than or 32% following SG replacement).
This change will NOT be made on Unit 2 at this time.NRC approved A61 via letter dated 05/05/2006." No change is required.b. The existing wording is consistent with the Unit 1 TS Bases; STS uses">." No change is required.44. Page number / Item: B 3.5-7 / Note following SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 NRC Comment(s): "stet per A81" TVA ResDonse(s):
This deletion was, intentional and consistent with deletion of similar verbiage in other Unit 2 TS Bases portions.No change is required.E4-20 ENCLOSURE 4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases 45. Page number / Item: B 3.7-34 / "100.6%" in third line of first paragraph under LCO NRC Comment(s): "was '102; A31, Rev 41 not on U2." TVA Response(s):
This was not affected by Unit 2 Developmental Revision B.The review matrix for TS Bases 3.7.6 provided by Reference 4 stated: "R41 revised the Unit 1 TS Bases to reflect changes to the Unit 1 TS approved by A31 (approve Power Uprate using Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM) for Unit 1}.This change will NOT be implemented on Unit 2 at this time.NRC approved A31 via letter dated 01/19/2001." No change is required.46. Page number / Item: B 3.8-8 / as indicated NRC Comment(s):
: a. sticky at top of page: "Revision 50, Amendment 39 is not on U2. The added sentence is from U 1 and should apply to U2, but was omitted." b. last paragraph on page: add the following after the second sentence: "For the performance of a Surveillance, Required Action B.3. 1 is considered satisfied since the cause of the DG being inoperable is apparent." TVA Response(s):
: a. The review matrix for TS Bases 3.8.1 provided by Reference 4 included the following: "R50 revised the Unit 1 TS Bases to reflect changes to the Unit 1 TS approved by Unit 1 TS A39 (revise LCO 3.8.1's allowed outage time to restore an inoperable emergency diesel generator to operable status from 72 hours to 14 days). This change will NOT be applied to Unit 2.NRC approved A39 via letter dated 07/01/2002." No change is required.b. The review matrix for TS Bases 3.8.1 provided by Reference 4 Included the following: "R65 revised the Unit 1 TS Bases to clarify that a common cause assessment is not required when a DG is made inoperable due to the performance of a surveillance.
This change is to be applied to Unit 2.R65 was provided to NRC via letter dated 04/20/2004." E4-21 ENCLOSURE4 TVA Responses to NRC Comments on Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases This change was inadvertently omitted. Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases added the missing sentence.47. Page number / Item: B 3.8-26 / SR 3.8.1.14 NRC Comment(s): "I'VA February 16, 2011 Letter, Enclosure 5, Commitments, item #2; a future Developmental revision to delete the Revision 50, Amendment 39 U1 paragraph lined out on page B 3.8-28" TVA Response(s):
Item 2 of Enclosure 5 of Reference 3 stated, "A future Developmental Revision to the Unit 2 TS Bases will remove the 'Prior to performance of this SR in Modes 1 or 2, actions are taken to establish that adequate conditions exist for performance of the SR. The required actions are defined in Bases Table 3.8.1-2.'
wording from the TS Bases for SR 3.8.1.14.Developmental Revision F of the Unit 2 TS Bases deleted the 'Prior to performance of this SR in Modes 1 or 2, actions are taken to establish that adequate conditions exist for performance of the SR.' The required actions are defined in Bases Table 3.8.1-2. 'verbiage from the TS Bases for SR 3.8.1.14."'
E4-22 ENCLOSURE 5 Proposed Unit 2 Technical Specifications Rod Position Indication 3.1.8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.8 Rod Position Indication LCO 3.1.8 APPLICABILITY:
The Rod Position Indication (RPI) System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1 and 2.ACTIONS------------------
NOTE -----------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable rod position indicator per group and each demand position indicator per bank.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-NOTE -----------------
A.1 Verify the position of the Once per 8 hours Rod position monitoring by rods with inoperable Required Actions A.2.1 and position indicators by A.2.2 may only be applied to using the PDMS.one inoperable RPI and shall only be allowed: (1) until the OR end of the current cycle, or (2) until an entry into MODE 5 A.2.1 Verify the position of the 8 hours of sufficient duration, whichever rod with the inoperable occurs first, when the repair of position indicator by using AND the inoperable RPI can safely the PDMS. Once every 31 days be performed.
Required thereafter Actions A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3 shall not be allowed after the AND plant has been in MODE 5 or other plant condition, for a 8 hours, if rod control sufficient period of time, in system parameters which the repair of the indicate unintended inoperable RPI could have movement safely been performed.
A. One RPI per group AND inoperable for one or more groups.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.1-15 IF QPTR 3.2.4 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be < 1.02.APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. QPTR not within limit.A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER _ 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR> 1.00.AND A.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.1 and reduce THERMAL POWER _> 3% from RTP for each 1 % of QPTR> 1.00.AND A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1.2 hours Once per 12 hours thereafter 24 hours AND Once per 7 days thereafter Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A. 1 (continued)
AND A.4 Reevaluate safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under this condition.
AND Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.2-9 F QPTR 3.2.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION [COMPLETION TIME A.A.5-- -------------
NOT-------E
-----Perform Required Action A.5 only after Required Action A.4 is completed.
Calibrate excore detectors to show QPTR of 1.0.AND A.6-- -------------
NOTE-------
-----Perform Required Action A.6 only after Required Action A.5 is completed.
Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1.Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 Within 24 hours after reaching RTP OR Within 48 hours after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to _ 50% RTP.Time not met.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.2-10 F RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One channel inoperable.
---------------
NOTE ---------The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours POWER to < P-7.N. One Reactor Coolant -----------------
NOTE ---------Flow -Low channel One channel may be bypassed for inoperable, up to 12 hours for surveillance testing.N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR N.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours POWER to < P-7.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-5 F RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Manual Reactor Trip 1,2 2 B SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA 3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 2 C SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA 2. Power Range Neutron Flux a. High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 _111.4% RTP 109% RTP SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b")c SR 3.3.1.15 b. Low 1 (d), 2  4 E SR 3.3.1.1 <27.4% RTP 25% RTP SR 3.3.1.7 1b)(c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.15 3. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate a. High Positive 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c) < 6.3% RTP 5% RTP Rate SR 3.3.1.11 (")(c' with time with time constant constant 2 sec 2 sec b. High Negative Rate -DELETED 4. Intermediate Range 1 (d), 2 (e) 2 F, G SR 3.3.1.1 < 40% RTP 25% RTP Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 (b(c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(C)2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1 - 40% RTP 25% RTP SR 3.3.1.8 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(c)(continued)(a) With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as found tolerance; then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at t le completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.(d) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(e) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(f) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-15 IF RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 5. Source Range 2 2 I, J SR 3.3.1.1 1.5 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cps Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 1b)1C)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(c)3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 2 J, K SR 3.3.1.1 <1.5 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cps SR 3.3.1.8 (b)lc)SR 3.3.1.11 (bloe)SR 3.3.1.15 3 (), 4 (), 5 () 1 L SR 3.3.1.1 N/A N/A SIR 3.3.1.11 (b)(Cl 6. Overtemperature AT 1,2 4 W SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 Note 1 SR 3.3.1.6 (Page 3.3-21) (Page 3.3-21)SR 3.3.1.7 (b)CC1 SR 3.3.1.10 (b)CCl SR 3.3.1.15 7. Overpower AT 1,2 4 W SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.7 CbDC) Note 2 Note 2 SR 3.3.1.10 (b))c) (Page 3.3-22) (Page 3.3-22)SR 3.3.1.15 8. Pressurizer Pressure a. Low 1 (h) 4 X SR 3.3.1.1 _1964.8 psig 1970 psig SR 3.3.1.7 CbD))SR 3.3.1.10 (bD)C)SR 3.3.1.15 b. High 1,2 4 W SR 3.3.1.1 <2390.2 psig 2385 psig SR 3.3.1.7 (b)CC)SR 3.3.1.10 (D1(c)SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)(a) With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at t le completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.(f) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(g) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide indication.(h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-16 F RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 9. Pressurizer Water 1 (h) 3 X SR 3.3.1.1 _92.7% span 92% span Level-High SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(c)10. Reactor Coolant Flow -1 (h) 3 per loop N SR 3.3.1.1 > 89.7% flow 90% flowj Low SR 3.3.1.7 (b)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.15 11. Undervoltage RCPs 1 (h) 1 per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 > 4734 V 4830 V SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.15 12. Underfrequency RCPs 1 (") 1 per bus M SR 3.3.1.9 >_ 56.9 Hz 57.5 Hz SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at tt e completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.(h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-17 F RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 13. SG Water Level -Low-Low Coincident with: a) Vessel AT Equivalent to power 50% RTP 1,2 3/SG U SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 b(C)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.15 V SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(c)> 16.4% of narrow range span 17% of narrow range span 1,2 3 With a time delay (T.) if one steam generator is affected or A time delay (T.n)if two or more steam generators are affected Vessel AT variable input< 52.6% RTP< 1.01 Ts (Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)_ 1.01 Tm (Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)Vessel AT variable input< 52.6% RTP Vessel AT variable input 50% RTP T&#xfd;(Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)(Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)1 Vessel AT variable input 50% RTP b) Vessel AT Equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (T.and Tm= 0)14. Turbine Trip a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure 1,2 3 V SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(c)1 (i)3 4 0 SR 3.3.1.18 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.14 Y SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.14>_ 43 psig 1% open 45 psig 1% open (continued)(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2. I (I) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-18 IF RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 15. Safety Injection (SI)Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
: a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 (1) Enable Manual Block of SR Trip (2) Auto Reset (Unblock Manual Block of SR Trip)1,2 2 trains P SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA 2 I)2 2 2 R SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 R SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 NA 1.66E-04%RTP> 7.65E-5% 0.47E-4% RTP RTP below setpoint b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 f. Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13 1 1 per train 4 4 4 2 S SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 S SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 S SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 R SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 S SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.12 NA NA< 50.4% RTP 48% RTP<52.4% RTP 50% RTP 1,2> 7.6% RTP and< 12.4% RTP< 12.4%full-power pressure 10% RTP 10%full-power pressure (continued)(f) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-19 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.6 -- ------------------
NOTE ---------------
Verification of relay setpoints not required.Perform TADOT. 92 days SR 3.3.2.7 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST on slave relays 18 months K603A, K603B, K604A, K604B, K607A, K607B, K609A, K609B, K612A, K625A, and K625B, SR 3.3.2.8 ---------------------
NOTE---------------
Verification of setpoint not required for manual initiation.
Perform TADOT. 18 months SR 3.3.2.9 ---------------------
NOTE---------------
This Surveillance shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
18 months SR 3.3.2.10 --------------------
NOTE---------------
Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours after> 1092 psig in the steam generator.
Verify ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within limit. 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.2.11 --------------------
NOTE---------------
Verification of setpoint not required.Perform TADOT. Once per reactor trip breaker cycle Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-32 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Safety Injection a. Manual Initiation 1, 2, 3, 4 2 B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA b. Automatic 1, 2, 3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays SR 3.3.2.7 c. Containment 1,2,3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 < 1.6 psig 1.5 psig Pressure -High SR 3.3.2.4 (b oI)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.10 d. Pressurizer 1, 2, 3(a) 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 > 1864.8 psig 1870 psig Pressure -Low SR 3.3.2.4 (bo)(SR 3.3.2.9 (bI(c)SR 3.3.2.10 e. Steam Line 1, 2, 31a8 3 per D SR 3.3.2.1 > 666.61"1 psig 6 7 5 Id psig Pressure -Low steam line SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.9 (bI(C)SR 3.3.2.10 2. Containment Spray a. Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 2 per train, B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA 2 trains b. Automatic 1, 2, 3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays c. Containment 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 < 2.9 psig 2.8 psig Pressure -SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(C)High High SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(I)SR 3.3.2.10 (a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure)
Interlock.(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) al the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.(d) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are t1 > 50 seconds and t2 < 5 seconds.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-33 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 3. Containment Isolation a. Phase A Isolation 1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation
: 2) Automatic 1, 2, 3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.3 Logic and SR 3.3.2.5 Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays 3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Injection b. Phase B Isolation 1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train, B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation 2 trains 2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.3 Logic and SR 3.3.2.5 Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays 3) Containment 1, 2, 3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 < 2.9 psig 2.8 psig Pressure -SR 3.3.2.4 (1) 1c)High High SR 3.3.2.9 (bI(C)SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-34 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 4. Steam Line Isolation a. Manual Initiation 1, 2 (e), 3 (e) 1/valve F SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA b. Automatic 1, 2 (e), 3 (e) 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays c. Containment 1, 2 (e 3(e) 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 < 2.9 psig 2.8 psig Pressure -SR 3.3.2.4 (b)C1)High High SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(0)SR 3.3.2.10 d. Steam Line Pressure 1) Low 1, 2 (e), 3 (a))e) 3 per D SR 3.3.2.1 > 666.6 (d)psig 675 (d)psig steam line SR 3.3.2.4 (hb(C)SR 3.3.2.9 "'1(o" SR 3.3.2.10 2) Negative 3 (e((f( 3 per D SR 3.3.2.1 < 108.5 (9)psi 100 ( psi Rate -High steam line SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(C)SR 3.3.2.9 (b) c)SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) a the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.(d) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are ti > 50 seconds and t 2 < 5 seconds.(e) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.(f) Function automatically blocked above P-11 (Pressurizer Interlock) setpoint and is enabled below P-11 when safety injection on Steam Line Pressure Low is manually blocked.(g) Time constants utilized in the rate/lag controller are t 3 and t4 > 50 seconds.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-35 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation a. Automatic 1, 2 (h), 3 (h) 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays b. SG Water Level -1 ,2 (h), 3 (h) 3 per SG I SR 3.3.2.1 < 83.1% 82.4%High High (P-14) SR 3.3.2.4 (bhoc)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.10 C. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
: d. North MSV Vault 1, 2 (h)(i) 3 per 0 SR 3.3.2.6 < 5.31 inches 4 inches Room Water vault room SR 3.3.2.9 Level -High e. South MSV Vault 1, 2 (h)(i) 3 per 0 SR 3.3.2.6 < 4.56 inches 4 inches Room Water vault room SR 3.3.2.9 Level -High (continued)(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.(h) Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.(i) Mode 2 if Turbine Driven Main Feed Pumps are operating.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-36 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 6. Auxiliary Feedwater a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1,2,3 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 NA NA b. SG Water Level-Low Low Coincident with: 1) Vessel AT Equivalent to power< 50% RTP 1,2,3 3 per SG M SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.9 (b) (c)> 16.4%17.0%1,2 3 N With a time delay (T.) if one SG is affected or A time delay (T,,) if two or more SGs are affected Vessel AT variable input< 52.6% RTP< 1.01 T, (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)< 1.01 Tm (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)Vessel AT variable input< 52.6% RTP Vessel AT variable input 50% RTP Ts (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)Tm (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)1 Vessel AT variable input 50% RTP 2) Vessel AT equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (T. and Tm = 0)1,2 3 N SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)c. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.(continued)(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-37 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
: d. Loss of Offsite 1, 2, 3 4 per bus F Refer to Function 4 of Table 3.3.5-1 for SRs and Power Allowable Values. Notes (b) and (c) are applicable tdl SR 3.3.5.2 for this function.e. Trip of all 1 ), 2 (k) 1 per pump J SR 3.3.2.8 (b)(C) > 48 psig 50 psig Turbine Driven SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)Main Feedwater S R 3.3.2.10 Pumps f. Auxiliary 1, 2, 3 3 F SR 3.3.2.6 A) _ 0.5 psig A) 1.2 psig Feedwater SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)Pumps SR 3.3.2.10 B) > 1.33 psig B) 2.0 psig Train A and B Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure -Low 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump a. Automatic 1, 2, 3, 4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays b. Refueling Water 1,2,3,4 4 K SR 3.3.2.1 > 155.6 inches 158 inches Storage Tank SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(c) from from (RWST) SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(C) Tank Base Tank Base Level -Low SR 3.3.2.10 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Safety Injection and Coincident with 1,2,3,4 4 K SR 3.3.2.1 > 37.2 inches 38.2 inches Containment SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(c) above above Sump SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c) el. 702.8 ft el. 702.8 ft Level -High SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)(b) If the as found channel setpoint is outside its redefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) al the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.() Entry into Condition J may be suspended for up to 4 hours when placing the second Turbine Driven Main Feedwater (TDMFW) Pump in service or removing one of two TDMFW pumps from service.(k) When one or more Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump(s) are supplying feedwater to steam generators.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-38 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 7 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 8. ESFAS Interlocks
: a. Reactor Trip, P-4 1,2,3 1 per train, F SR 3.3.2.11 NA NA 2 trains b. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 (1) Unblock 1, 2, 3 3 L SR 3.3.2.1 < 1975.2 psig 1970 psig (Auto Reset SR 3.3.2.4 of SI Block) SR 3.3.2.9 (2) Enable 1, 2,3 3 L SR 3.3.2.1 > 1956.8 psig 1962 psig Manual SR 3.3.2.4 Block of SI SR 3.3.2.9 Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-39 F ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 8 of 8)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation NOTE 1: Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low Trip Time Delay: Ts = A(P)3 + B(P)2 + C(P) + D T, = (p)3+ F(Pf + G(P) + H Where: p = Vessel AT Equivalent to power (% RTP), P < 50% RTP.Ts = Time Delay for Steam Generator Water Level -Low-Low Reactor Trip, one Steam Generator affected.Tm = Time Delay for Steam Generator Water Level -Low-Low Reactor Trip, two or more Steam Generators affected.A = -0.0085041 B = 0.9266400 C = -33.85998 D = 474.6060 E = -0.0047421 F = 0.5682600 G = -23.70753 H = 357.9840 Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-40 (developmental)
F Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS.li[---- ----------------------------
I*%l I I-----------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days Functions inoperable.
Function to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-47 F Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4,10 Pressurizer Safety Valves LCO 3.4.10 APPLICABILITY:
Three pressurizer safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings> 2410 psig and _< 2560 psig.MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures
> the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR.--------------------------
NOTE ----------------------
The lift settings are not required to be within the LCO limits during MODE 3 and MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures
> the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR for the purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) conditions.
This exception is allowed for 54 hours following entry into MODE 3 provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One pressurizer safety A.1 Restore valve to 15 minutes valve inoperable.
OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 4 with any 12 hours RCS cold leg temperature Two or more pressurizer
< the COMS arming safety valves inoperable, temperature specified in the PTLR.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-18 F Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)LCO 3.4.11 APPLICABILITY:
Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more PORVs A.1 Close and maintain 1 hour inoperable and capable of power to associated block being manually cycled, valve B. One PORV inoperable and B.1 Close associated block 1 hour not capable of being valve manually cycled.AND B.2 Remove power from 1 hour associated block valve.AND B.3 Restore PORV to 72 hours OPERABLE status (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-20 F COMS 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)LCO 3.4.12 A COMS System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one charging pump and no safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and either a or b below.a. Two RCS relief valves, as follows: 1. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings within the limits specified in the PTLR, or 2. One PORV with a lift setting within the limits specified in the PTLR and the RHR suction relief valve with a setpoint_> 436.5 psig and < 463.5 psig.b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent capable of relieving
>475 gpm water flow.--------------------
--NOTE ----------------------
: 1. Two charging pumps may be made capable of injecting for less than or equal to one hour for pump swap operations.
: 2. Accumulator may be unisolated when accumulator pressure is less than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in the PTLR.APPLICABILITY:
MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperature
< the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR, MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-23 F RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 APPLICABILITY:
RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and d. 150 gallons per day primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCS operational LEAKAGE A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to 4 hours not within limits for reasons within limits.other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.OR Primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-28 IF RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.14 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage LCO 3.4.14 APPLICABILITY:
Leakage from each RCS PIV shall be within limit.MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4, except valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) flow path when in, or during the transition to or from, the RHR mode of operation.
ACTIONS----------------------------------
NOTES --------------------------
: 1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each flow path.2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by an inoperable PIV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more flow paths with ------------
NOTE ---------leakage from one or more Each valve used to satisfy Required RCS PIVs not within limit. Action A.1 must have been verified to meet SR 3.4.14.1 and be in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.A.1 Isolate the high pressure 4 hours portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by use of one closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check valve.AND (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-30 F RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.14 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
A.2 Restore RCS PIV to 72 hours within limits B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time for Condition A not AND met.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-31 F RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.15 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours D. All required monitors D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.15.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK of the required 12 hours containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor.SR 3.4.15.2 Perform COT of the required containment 92 days atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor.SR 3.4.15.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required 18 months containment pocket sump level monitor.SR 3.4.15.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required 18 months containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-34 F SG Tube Integrity 3.4.17 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity LCO 3.4.17 SG tube integrity shall be maintained AND All SG tubes satisfying the tube repair criteria shall be plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS------------------
NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SC:: -------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more SG tubes A.1 Verify tube integrity of the 7 days satisfying the tube repair affected tube(s) is criteria and not plugged in maintained until the next accordance with the Steam refueling outage or SG Generator Program tube inspection AND A.2 Plug the affected tube(s) Prior to entering in accordance with the MODE 4 following Steam Generator the next refueling Program outage or SG tube inspection B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SG tube integrity not maintained Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-38 F ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)3.5.3 ECCS -Shutdown LCO 3.5.3 APPLICABILITY:
One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE.MODE 4.ACTIONS----------------------------
NOTE-------------------------------
LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to ECCS high head (centrifugal charging) subsystem.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required ECCS residual --------------
NOTE ---------heat removal (RHR) The required ECCS residual heat subsystem inoperable, removal (RHR) subsystem may be inoperable for up to 1 hour for surveillance testing of valves provided that alternate heat removal methods are available via the steam generators to maintain the Reactor Coolant System Tavg less than 350&deg;F and provided that the required subsystem is capable of being manually realigned to the ECCS mode of operation from the main control room.A.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately required ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.5-6 F Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks LCO 3.6.2 APPLICABILITY:
Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS------------------------
N-NOTES -------------------------------
: 1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock components.
: 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more containment
-------------
NOTES ---------air locks with one 1. Required Actions A.1, A.2, containment air lock door and A.3 are not applicable if inoperable, both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.2. Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-2 F EGTS 3.6.9 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.9 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)LCO 3.6.9 APPLICABILITY:
Two EGTS trains shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One EGTS train inoperable.
A.1 Restore EGTS train to 7 days OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.9.1 Operate each EGTS train for _> 10 continuous hours 31 days with heaters operating.
SR 3.6.9.2 Perform required EGTS filter testing in accordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-22 F Divider Barrier Integrity 3.6.13 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.13 Divider Barrier Integrity LCO 3.6.13 APPLICABILITY:
Divider barrier integrity shall be maintained.
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. -------NOTE -----------
A.1 Restore personnel 1 hour For this action, separate access doors and Condition entry is allowed equipment hatches to for each personnel access OPERABLE status and door or equipment hatch. closed positions.
One or more personnel access doors or equipment hatches between upper and lower containment open or inoperable, other than for personnel transit.B. Divider barrier seal B.1 Restore seal to 1 hour inoperable.
OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-31 F MSSVs 3.7.1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)LCO 3.7.1 Five MSSVs per steam generator shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS--------------
I)r --------------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more steam A.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours generators with one MSSV POWER to _< 59 % RTP.inoperable.
B. One or more steam B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours generators with two or more POWER to less than or MSSVs inoperable, equal to the Maximum Allowable
% RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 for the number of OPERABLE MSSVs.AND-------------------- -NOTE------
Only required in MODE 1.B.2 Reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux -High reactor trip setpoint to less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable% RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 for the number of OPERABLE MSSVs.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-1 F ERCW 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System LCO 3.7.8 APPLICABILITY:
Two ERCW trains shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One ERCW train A.-1 --------NOTES-----
inoperable.
: 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources- Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ERCW.2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by ERCW.Restore ERCW train to 72 hours OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-18 F CREVS 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE., -- ---------------------------
I'JL I--------------------------------------------
The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train to 7 days inoperable for reasons other OPERABLE status.than Condition B.B. One or more CREVS trains B.1 Initiate action to Immediately inoperable due to implement mitigating inoperable CRE boundary actions.in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.AND B.2 Verify mitigating actions 24 hours ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological and chemical hazards will not exceed limits and CRE occupants are protected from smoke hazards.AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary to 90 days OPERABLE status.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-21 F CREATCS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)LCO 3.7.11 APPLICABILITY:
Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREATCS train A.1 Restore CREATCS train 30 days inoperable, to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met AND in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CREATCS train in Time of Condition A not met operation.
in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel OR assemblies.
C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
D. Two CREATCS trains D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, irradiated fuel assemblies or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
E. Two CREATCS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-24 IF AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources -Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE: a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and b. Four diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS------------------
NOTE-LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour inoperable.
OPERABLE offsite circuit.AND Once per 8 hours thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours from feature(s) with no offsite discovery of no offsite power available power to one train inoperable when its concurrent with redundant required inoperability of feature(s) is inoperable, redundant required feature(s)
AND (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.8-1 F AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
A.3 Restore offsite circuit to 72 hours OPERABLE status.AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO B. One or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable.
OR One or more DG(s) in Train B inoperable.
B.1 AND Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuits.Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG(s)inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable B.2 1 hour AND Once per 8 hours thereafter 4 hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours 24 hours AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure.OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG(s).AND (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.8-2 IF DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify vital battery terminal voltage is _ 128 V (132 V 7 days for vital battery V) on float charge.SR 3.8.4.2 Verify DG battery terminal voltage is > 124 V on float 7 days charge.SR 3.8.4.3 Verify for the vital batteries that the alternate feeder 7 days breakers to each required battery charger are open.SR 3.8.4.4 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days availability for each DG 125 V DC distribution panel and associated battery charger SR 3.8.4.5 Verify no visible corrosion at terminals and 92 days connectors for the vital batteries.
OR Verify connection resistance for the vital batteries is_< 80 E-6 ohm for inter-cell connections,< 50 E-6 ohm for inter-rack connections,_< 120 E-6 ohm for inter-tier connections, and< 50 E-6 ohm for terminal connections.
SR 3.8.4.6 Verify no visible corrosion at terminals and 92 days connectors for the DG batteries.
OR Verify connection resistance for the DG batteries is< 80 E-6 ohm for inter-cell connections,< 50 E-6 ohm for inter-tier connections, and< 50 E-6 ohm for terminal connections.
SR 3.8.4.7 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no 12 months visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.8-22 F Boron Concentration 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration LCO 3.9.1 APPLICABILITY:
Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR.Mode 6.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Boron concentration A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately not within limit. ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.
AND A.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately boron concentration to within limit.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified 72 hours in COLR.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.9-1 F Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves LCO 3.9.2 APPLICABILITY:
Each valve used to isolate unborated water sources shall be secured in the closed position.Mode 6.ACTIONS----------------------------
NOTE-------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each unborated water source isolation valve.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. --------NOTE ---------A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately Required Action A.3 must ALTERATIONS.
be completed whenever Condition A is entered. AND A.2 Initiate action to secure Immediately One or more valves valve in closed position.not secured in closed position.
AND A.3 Perform SR 3.9.1.1. 4 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.2.1 Verify each valve that isolates unborated water 31 days sources is secured in the closed position.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.9-2 F Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation LCO 3.9.3 APPLICABILITY:
Two source range neutron flux monitors shall be OPERABLE.Mode 6.I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required source range A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately neutron flux monitor ALTERATIONS.
inoperable.
AND A.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.
B. Two required source range B.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately neutron flux monitors one source range neutron inoperable, flux monitor to OPERABLE status.AND B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1. 4 hours AND Once per 12 hours thereafter Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.9-3 F Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued) 4.3 Fuel Storage 4.3.1 Criticality 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks (shown in Figure 4.3-1) are designed and shall be maintained with: a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.0 weight percent;b. ke, < 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which, includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Sections 4.3.2.7 and 9.1 of the FSAR;c. Distances between fuel assemblies are a nominal 10.375 inch center-to-center spacing in the twenty-four flux trap rack modules.d. Fuel assemblies with enrichments less than or equal to 3.80 weight percent U-235 are allowed unrestricted storage.e. Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments greater than 3.80 weight percent and less than a maximum of 5 percent enrichment (nominally 4.95 +/- 0.05 percent) may be stored in the spent fuel racks in one of four arrangements with specific limits as identified below: 1. Spent fuel assemblies may be stored in the racks without further restrictions provided the burnup of each assembly is in the acceptable domain identified in Figure 4.3-3, depending upon the specified initial enrichment.
: 2. New and spent fuel assemblies may be stored in a checkerboard arrangement of 2 new and 2 spent assemblies, provided that each spent fuel assembly has accumulated a minimum burnup in the acceptable domain identified in Figure 4.3-4.3. New fuel assemblies may be stored in 4-cell arrays with 1 of the 4 cells remaining empty of fuel (i.e. containing only water or water with up to 75 percent by volume of non-fuel bearing material.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 4.0-2 (developmental)
F ENCLOSURE 6 Marked-up Version of Unit 2 Technical Specifications With Justifications for Revisions Rod Position Indication 3.1.8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.8 Rod Position Indication LCO 3.1.8 APPLICABILITY:
The Rod Position Indication (RPI) System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE.M D ElS / a d MODES I and 2 00K &#xfd;.UC ACTIONS I. I ,% -Ir"------ ------ --- -- ------ ------------ L!-----------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable rod position indicator per group and each demand position indicator per bank.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME............--
NOTE -----....-----
A.1 Verify the position of the Once per 8 hours Rod position monitoring by rods with inoperable Required Actions A.2.1 and position indicators by A.2.2 may only be applied to using the PDMS.one inoperable RPI and shall only be allowed: (1) until the OR end of the current cycle, or (2) until an entry into MODE 5 A.2.1 Verify the position of the 8 hours of sufficient duration, whichever rod with the inoperable occurs first, when the repair of position indicator by using AND the inoperable RPI can safely the PDMS.be performed.
Required Once every 31 days Actions A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3 thereafter shall not be allowed after the AND plant has been in MODE 5 or other plant condition, for a 8 hours, if rod control sufficient period of time, in system parameters which the repair of the indicate unintended inoperable RPI could have movement safely been performed.
A. One RPI per group AND inoperable for one or more groups.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.1-15 El QPTR 3.2.4 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be _ 1.02.APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP.ACTIONS CONDITION I REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. QPTR not within limit.A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER _> 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR> 1.00.AND 2 hours A.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.1 and reduce THERMAL POWER _ 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR> 1.00.AND A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1.Once per 12 hours thereafter 24 hours AND Once per 7 days thereafter Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 (continued)
AND A.4 Reevaluate safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under this condition.
6)Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.2-9 A QPTR 3.2.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME.1.l A. (continued)
A.5--------.--
NOTE-------
Perform Required Action A.5 only after Required Action A.4 is completed.
Calibrate excore detectors to show QPTR of 1.0.AND A.6------- -----------
NT----NOTE-Perform Required Action A.6 only after Required Action A.5 is completed.
Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1.Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 Within 24 hours after reaching RTP OR Within 48 hours after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to < 50% RTP.Time not met.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.2-10 A RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One channel inoperable.
---------------
NOTE----------
The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours POWER to < P-7.N. One Reactor Coolant Flow -Low channel inoperable.
----------------------
NOTE ----------
One channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing.N.1 OR N.2 Place channel in trip.72 hours 78 hours Reduce THERMAL POWER to </ -(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-5 A RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 1. Manual Reactor Trip 2. Power Range Neutron Flux a. High 1,2 3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a)2 2 B C D SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA NA NA 1,2 4 b. Low 1 (d), 2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)lc)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)c)_5111.4%RTP 109% RTP< 27.4% 25% RTP 3. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate a. High Positive Rate 1,2 4 E_< 6.3% R TP with time constant_> 2 sec 5% RTj with tim constant> 2 sec b. High Negative Rate -DELETED 4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux 1 (d), 2 (e)2 2 F, G SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 (bXc)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(C)40% R 25%RTF1 TP40% R 25% RTFI TP 2 (f)H SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b((c)a ro5 Atl I (continued)(a) With.pector Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Cont I tem capable of rod with /(wcon (b) If the ee-.4od-channel setpoint is outside its predefined as.tooild tolerance, thentlhannel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. , (c) The instrument channel setpolnt shall be reset to a value that is within the a@eIs# tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at tt e completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared Inoperable w-g ......rjti"- tho'n thT-r c, Pr~. ........................
.............
'. ..... .... .. .' -..-.......
.- -_.-.-"---
... Ii .. ... .. -' .[le wal, was aw speswe d ip WCAR UEG4 41-.d " (d) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(e) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(f) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-15 B INSERT A The methodologies used to determine the as found and as left tolerances for the NTSP are specified in FSAR Section 7.1.2.
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 5. Source Range Neutron Flux 2 (f)2 2 I, J SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 (b((c)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(C)3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a)3 (g), 4 (g), 5 (g)J, K L 1 6. Overtemperature AT 7. Overpower AT 1,2 1,2 4 4 W W SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.11 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.11 (bl(c)SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.15< 1.5 E5 1.0 E5 cpjs cps<1.5 E5 1.0 E5 cps cps N/A N/A Refer to Note 1 (Page 3.3-21)Refer to Note 2 (Page 3.3-22)Refer to Note 1 (Page 3.3-21)Refer to Note 21 (Page 3. -22)8. Pressurizer Pressure a. Low&b. High: 5 7 Cdj 1 (h)1,2 4 4 X W SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 lb)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.15 2! 1964.8 psig< 2390.2 psig in."3 1970 psi 2385 psig (a) Wi'theactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control 4 fstem capable of rod withdra (continued)(b) If the o.r fed uchannel setpoint is outside its predefined a,4--,-. tolerance, then the riel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. t (c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the a&64,fltolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at tl)e completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared Inoperable.
9ztlzi..ts...r F~.~ seizr~mtii-:
liham 1ha. Al*@T M.A "- 'WA.A-.OWtROg) tc rrFl&Rm ShaRn0l pe~oFRmanc
;;he 1om~finjal TriOtnn -1 llc6z1l YB(M8: 8F apofla ip WS. w .170844, Belpe.t (f) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(g) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide indication.(h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
..J aL ,o f~er+ y~Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-16 B RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 9. Pressurizer Water Level-High
: 10. Reactor Coolant Flow -Low 11. Undervoltage RCPs 12. Underfrequency RCPs I '1 (h)3 x N 1 (h 3 per loop SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)c SR 3.3.1.10 (bu(SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(C)SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(c SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 (b(c SR 3.3.1.15< 92.7%span 92%(h)(h)1 per bus 1 per bus M M-> fo 90% flo 1_4734 V 4830 V_56.9 Hz 57.5 H 1--~I. I JO(J&#xfd; 06A&I V (continued)(b) If t'h-ea, W channel setpoint is outside its predefined -a&.inua tolerance, then the channe shall be uated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. e 5 as )0 (c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the,,J,.4etolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at tte completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
eron. .mg- -w , k- WR ITO ?behdlg fm.. WtLe So. 6Um 2. Th: a: fabin an:: eaf t I iez~~saaedfineei tIA. Ilh ll. d, ,..* ot; 1 alin Beetie A&i~s (h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-17 B RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 9)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER REQUIRED ALLOW- NOMINAL SPECIFIED CHANNEL SURVEILLANCE ABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS S CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 13. SG Water Level -Low-Low Coincident with: a) Vessel AT Equivalent to power< 50% RTP 1,2 3/SG U SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)C)SR 3.3.1.15 SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b11C)1,2 3 V With a time delay (T') if one steam generator is affected or A time delay (Tmn) if two or more steam generators are affected Vessel AT Equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (TJ and Tm= 0)> 16.4%of narrow range span Vessel AT variable input 52.6%RTP< 1.01 T.(Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)_ 1.01 Tm (Refer to Note 3, Page 3.3-23)Vessel AT variable input_< 52.6%RTP 17% of narrow ranbe span Vessel Af variable Inlut 50% RTP T.(Refer tc Note 3 Page 3.3-43)Tm (Refer tc Note 3, Page 3.3-:3)Vessel At variable inl~ut 50% RTP b)1.2 3 V SR 3.3.1.7 (b)(c)SR 3.3.1.10 (b)(G)SR 3.3.1014 14. Turbine Trip a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure 1 0)3 0> 43 psig 45 psig I 1 ()4 Y SR 3.3.1.10 _1% ope SR 3.3.1.14 n 1% open (continued)) B Watts Bar -Unit 2 j(developmental) 3.3-18 I"8e-O-.r4 INSERT B If the as found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.6 -------..........--------...
NOTE --------------
Verification of relay setpoints not required.Perform TADOT. 92 days SR 3.3.2.7 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST on slave relays 18 months K603A, K603B, K604A, K604B, K607A, K607B, K609A, K609B, K612A, K625A, and K625B, SR 3.3.2.8---------NOTE -------- -------Verification of setpoint not required 14 &#xfd;18 months Perform TADOT.SR 3.3.2.9 ---------NOTE--------------
This Surveillance shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
18 months SR 3.3.2.10 -------------------------------
NOTE -------Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours after > 1092 psig in the steam generator.
Verify ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within limit. 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.2.11 ---------NOTE ------------
Verification of setpoint not required.Perform TADOT. Once per reactor trip breaker cycle Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-32 A ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 off)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Syst m Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Safety Injection a. Manual Initiation
: b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays c. Containment Pressure -High 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3 2 2 trains 3 B C D SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 (b) (C)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 (5)(b)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(o)SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 'b) (a)SR 3.3.2.9 (b) (C)SR 3.3.2.10 NA NA1.6 psig NA NA 1.5 psig d. Pressurizer Pressure -Low e. Steam Line Pressure -Low 1, 2, 3(a)1, 2, 3l")3 3 per steam line D D> 1864.8 psig 1870 psig I> 666.6( ") psig 675(d ) psi I 2. Containment Spray a. Manual Initiation
: b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1,2,3,4 2 per train, 2 trains B C SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 2 trains c. Containment Pressure -High High 1,2,3 E SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 (b) (0)SR 3.3.2.9 'b) (c)SR 3.3.2.10< 2.9 psig 2.8 psig IeV&#xfd; 4 (b)(c)Above the Pressure)
Interlock.
if the aar 'r channel setpoint is outside its redefined a.sAuedtolerance, then the c net shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before retuming the channel to service. I The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that Is within thearle& around the Nominal Trip Selpoint (NTSP) at the completion ofi the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
.."-" th. 'Tl' "- "z- ., 1 ..,,, l.'.t ti.k4 ,ka------ --.... --" r'a .' &deg; -s' .f4'! s&deg;t...t..,4 t~. .A w' w. sl-i--g pep". 'T '-a " WSARtar-i U -CP big u IrT i'm-'" p~ p, SW ~ 'bj",' R 4 JV. '-'ipeir r0.1--'l~
JN 2:I z dill Try gl pa.l.r..() Tm- tel c ta uised.. i. thelged g SRItrnon arA S eionds an < s (d) 'rime constants used in the lead/lag_
controller are If > 50 seconds and 1:2 < 5 seconds.p I (continued) to of A S&#xfd;9)Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-33 B ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Systm Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 3. Containment Isolation a. Phase A Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.3 Logic and SR 3.3.2.5 Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Injection b. Phase B Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train, B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation 2 trains (2) Automatic 1, 2, 3, 4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.3 Logic and SR 3.3.2.5 Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays (3) Containment 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 < 2.9 psig 2.8 psig Pressure -SR 3.3.2.4 (b)tc)High High SR 3.3.2.9 (bl)(c)SR 3.3.2.10~(continued)(b)(c)If the as4aweA channel setpoint is outside its redefined
=asdQ,,tolerance, then Ith channe shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the 4=lewtolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion o, the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
+"tr ..aim. M. nab-e .... pm...d. .. .. t..Fen' id. ... ..a d as Ie ...... .. ... ....... ap l .. .. .. N o ... ...... sel n .. .........
...Phis Raip " P440IR! nd nh un'-m a-' 0 Go com in '~ I "~~ UP 09 ep"t11teRO OF- 00811a.d Ja -hA h., la.8W.Agring 5Atpnmn1 Rod Ong' -n-f-71,/A Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-34 B ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Systdm Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 4. Steam Line Isolation a. Manual Initiation 1, 2 ), 3 (a) I/valve F SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA b. Automatic 1, 2 (e), 3 (8) 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays c. Containment 1, 2 ('), 3 (1) 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 < 2.9 psig 2.8 psig Pressure -SR 3.3.2.4 1b)(c)High High SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.10 d. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1,2 r0), 3(a)(') 3per D SR 3.3.2.1 > 666.6 t d)psig 675 1d) psi steam line SR 3.3.2.4 )b)(75 SR 3.3.2.9 )b)(c)SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Negative 3e)(0 3 per D SR 3.3.2.1 < 108.5 (9) psi 100 (g)ps Rate -High steam line SR 3.3.2.4 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c)SR 3.3.2.10_ ,.# (continued)(b)(c)If ath,-,u- channel setpoint is outside its redefined as_ , a..aa.., then th hannel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.The Instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as.LaWtolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of tI e surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Sal-l .., .=O PmIded 1140101,.
.-- -.-- d..... ....as 61 FA... IPPY-0 ARC= AmAn.a 0, A '.of POW I ."..-.4m~~~~~~~~-t A.asa*Iwb.
paflII W 4 (d) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are t1 > 50 seconds and t2 < 5 seconds.(a) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.(f) Function automatically blocked above P-11 (Pressurizer Interlock) setpoint and is enabled belo / -I I when safety injection on Steam Line Pressure Low Is manually blocked.(g) Time constants utilized in the rate/lag controller are t 3 and t4 > 50 seconds.79 Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-35 B ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Syst m Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation a. Automatic 1, 2 ("), 3 (h) 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays b. SG Water Level -1, 2 (h) 3 (h) 3 per SG I SR 3.3.2.1 < 83.1% 82.4%High High (P-14) SR 3.3.2.4 (b)SR 3.3.2.9 (b)1(c0 SR 3.3.2.10 c. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
: d. North MSV Vault 1, 2 (hxi) 3 per 0 SR 3.3.2.q <
4 inchesi Room Water vault room SR 3.3.2J Level- High a. South MSV Vault 1,2 (h)(1) 3 per 0 SR 3.3.2.5e -e4.5 inches 4 Inchesl Room Water vault room SR 3.3.29(!!Level -High (continued)(b) If the ssfana channel setpoint is outside its re da dtolerance, then / channel shall be evaluated to verify that It Is functioning as requIred before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that Is within the-=&Ja, tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpolnt (NTSP) at the completion of the surveilance; otherwIse, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
P f"I'"- P -T1^ t-1 ... --- .. that !h- as as i F W ...... , (gold...........(h)(I)Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-actvated or isolated by a dosed manual valve.Mode 2 if Turbine Driven Main Feed Pumps are operating.
1,A0460 Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-36 B ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of )Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Sys1~m Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 6. Auxiliary Feedwater a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b. SG Water Level-Low Low Coincident with: 1) Vessel AT Equivalent to power< 50% RTP With a time delay (T 8) if one SG is affected 1,2,3 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 NA NA 1,2,3 3 per SG M SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 (f)I(c)SR 3.3.2.9 (b) (1)SR 3.3.2.10> 16.4%1,2 3 N SR 3.3.2.4 (1 (c) Vessel AT SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(1) variable input< 52.6% RTP 1.01 T.(Note 1, Page 3.3-40)17.0%Vessel A4 variable indlut 50% RTP (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)(Note 1, Page 3.3-40)Vessel A-variable inilut 50% RTP&A time delay (Tm) if two or more SGs are affected< 1.01 Tr (Note 1, Page 3.3-40)2) Vessel AT equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (T. and Tm = 0)1,2 3 N SR 3.3.2.4 (bl (ci Vessel AT SR 3.3.2.9 (b)(c) variable Input_ 52.6% RTP c. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety e,- ZIL P,06uAJ --, (b)(c)If the,.k,,.ud channel setpoint Is outside Its redefined a 1--i tolerance, then tP,_fannel shall be evaluated to verify that It is functioning as requirec before returning the channel to service.The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that Is within the.ia",,Ja/tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Sel' --t .I.. -.p r:T ."-' .,. T.. , '.'.:z t.t t..... ..-@A log. ..-apply....the............o Impemented in S omi Ad seoe)p to f Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-37 B ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of )Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Systen Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE NOMINAL MODES OR CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS VALUE TRIP OTHER SETPOINT SPECIFIED CONDITIONS
: 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
: d. Loss of Offsite Power e. Trip of all Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Train A and B Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure -Low 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump 1,2,3 1 ,) 2(k)1,2,3 4 per bus 1 per pump 3 F Refer to Function 4 of Table 3.3.5-1 for SRs and Allowable Values. k J SR 3.3.2.8 > 48 psig 50 p SR 3.3.2.9 (bli1 i /SR 3.3.2.110 l"M sig UkeJ!,ll, 1~F SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.9 (b) (c)SR 3.3.2.10 A) >_ 0.5 psig B) _ 1.33 psig A) 1.2 psig B) 2.0 psig a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b. Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)Level -Low 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 2 trains 4 C K SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 ri)c)SR 3.3.2.9 5o)c)SR 3.3.2.10 NA> 155.6 inches from Tank Base NA 158inches from Tank Base Coincident with Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Coincident with 1, 2, 3,4 Sump Level -High A S~~A 4 K SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.4 (b)Ic)SR 3.3.2.9 (blc)SR 3.3.2.10> 37.2 inches 38.2 inches above above el. 702.8 ft el. 702.8 ft S116 Z /M" kV (b) If the gl.4eawu channel selpoint is outside its redefined -a d tolerance, then/hannel shall be evaluated to verify that It Is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the es,4eftolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
S--^poin'-
--' -.. ....fl.... .-,-p ..... p- id-' l, .t Qr ah to .... ra-R ......ed i8 (odB it )t olii s ale e a e.... ...... ..;94 Q t ao l 114,h= e g fop w l .... ... ,i ... .... fe, .. ............
lef ............
T , (J)(k)Entry Into Condition J may be suspended for up to 4 hours when placing the second Turbine Driven Main Feedw r (TDMFW) Pump in service or removing one of two TDMFW pumps from service.When one or more Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump(s) are supplying feedwater to steam generators.
itts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-38 ., 'Wa (developmental)
B INSERT C Notes (b) and (c) are applicable to SR 3.3.5.2 for this function.
ESFAS Instrumentation-S' I3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page $of )Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 8. ESFAS Interlocks
: a. Reactor Trip, P-4 1,2,3 1 per train, F SR 3.3.2.11 NA NA 2 trains b. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 (1) Unblock 1,2,3 3 L SR 5< 1975.2 psig 1970 psig (Auto Reset SR 3.3 .444 of Sl Block) SR 3. 2.9'" (2) Enable 1,2.3 3 L SIR 3.3.2 1 " > 1956.8 psig 1962 psig Manual SI) R3 323 (J"6 Block of SI SIR 3.3.SR 332 O5~.0nTrn1
~be ore annel to service.(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be rese within the as-Ile e Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion oll the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be dedar aaccgnservatlfve than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found end as-left tolerances a e point implemented in the Surveillance proce to confirm channel performance.
The No n a lowable values are specified in WOAP 17044, Setpoint Method atts Bar Unit s-left toleranci s I F1 Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-39 B ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 ofk)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation'System Instrumentation NOTE 1: Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low Trip Time Delay: Ts = A(P)3  B(P)2 + C(P)+ D S= E(PY + F(P) + G(P)+ H Where: p = Vessel AT Equivalent to power (% RTP), P _< 50% RTP.T = Time Delay for Steam Generator Water Level -Low-Low Reactor Trip, one Steam Generator affected.Tm = Time Delay for Steam Generator Water Level -Low-Low Reactor Trip, two or more Steam Generators affected.A = -0.0085041 B = 0.9266400 C = -33.85998 D = 474.6060 E = -0.0047421 F = 0.5682600 G = -23.70753 H = 357.9840 Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-40 (developmental)
A PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 Table 3.3.3-1 (page 3 of 3)Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.(c) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (d) Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, pressure relief valve, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.(e) nn consists f two core exit thermocouples (CETs).) The 4,ICMCommo Q Post Accident Monitoring System provide e functions on aa pL-ws~flat scre display.Regulato ide 1.97, non-Type A, Ca (h) This function is displayed he IQGM plasmaCom on Q Post Accident Monitoring System flat screen dis ay and digital panel met (i) Only one position indica channel is r ed for penetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication channel.(j) Watts Bar specific (not required by Regulatory Guide 1.97) non-Type A Category I variable.Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.3-46 (developmental)
B Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and ?0 0 ACTIONS--------------------------
-------- ---NOTE ---.-.--.----.-.---
..-----------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.-------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days Functions inoperable.
Function to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.3-47 A Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves LCO 3.4.10 APPLICABILITY:
Three pressurizer safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings> 2410 psig and < 2560 psig.MODES 1,2, an 3, MODE 4 with alsR d leg temperatures
> the COMS arming temperature spe in the PTLR.------NO TE -The lift settings are not required to be within the LCO limits during MODE 3 and MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures
> the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR for the purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) conditions.
This exception is allowed for 54 hours following entry into MODE 3 provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup.ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One pressurizer safety A.1 Restore valve to 15 minutes valve inoperable.
OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 4 with any 12 hours RCS cold leg temperature Two or more pressurizer
< the COMS arming safety valves inoperable, temperature specified in the PTLR.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-18 B Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)LCO 3.4.11 APPLICABILITY:
Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, and 3a ACTIONS----------------
NOTE--Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more PORVs A.1 Close and maintain 1 hour inoperable and capable of power to associated block being manually cycled, valve B. One PORV inoperable and B.1 Close associated block 1 hour not capable of being valve manually cycled.AND B.2 Remove power from 1 hour associated block valve.AND B.3 Restore PORV to 72 hours OPERABLE status (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-20 A COMS 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)LCO 3.4.12 A COMS System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one charging pump and no safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and either a or b below.a. Two RCS relief valves, as follows: 1. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings within the limits specified in the PTLR, or 2. One PORV with a lift setting within the limits specified in the PTLR and the RHR suction relief valve with a setpoint> 436.5 psig and  463.5 psig.b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent capable of relieving
>475 gpm water flow.--~~ ~ ~ --- -[_ I 1. Two charging pumps may be made capable of injecting for less than or equal to one hour for pump swap operations.
: 2. Accumulator may be unisolated when accumulator pressure is less than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the PIT limit curves provided in the PTLR.eud .po. rc-3 rep-APPLICABILITY:
MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg terQ~ierature
< the COMS arming JA --, temperature specified in the PTLR, ODE 5,'>*c MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on I#e U &#xfd; a r&j /"/.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-23 B RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and d. 150 gallons per day primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1,2, 3,and 4,, 6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCS operational LEAKAGE A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to 4 hours not within limits for reasons within limits.other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.OR Primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-28 A RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.14 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage LCO 3.4.14 APPLICABILITY:
Leakage from each RCS PIV shall be within limit.MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4, except valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) flow path when in, or during the transition to or from, the RHR mode of operation.
ACTIONS-------------.-----------------
NOTES--------------
: 1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each flow path.2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by an inoperable PIV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more flow paths with -----NOTE -------------------
leakage from one or more Each valve used to satisfy Required RCS PIVs not within limit. Action A.1 must have been verified to meet SR 3.4.14.1 and be in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.A.1 Isolate the high pressure 4 hours portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion by use of one closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check valve.&/ I (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-30 A RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.14 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
-ANIP 0 A.2 Restore RCS PIV to 72 hours within limits B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time for Condition A not AND met.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-31 A RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.15 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours D. All required monitors D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.15.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK of the required 12 hours containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor.SR 3.4.15.2 Perform COT of the required coeta 92 days atmosphere particulate radioact(06?79 onitor.SR 3.4.15.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required 18 months containment pocket sump level monitor.SR 3.4.15.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required 18 months containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-34 B SG Tube Integrity 3.4.17 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity LCO 3.4.17 SG tube integrity shall be maintained AND All SG tubes satisfying the tube repair criteria shall be plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1,2, 3, and 6 ACTIONS IkI Ifr--- ---- --- ------------
-------------
I'J , _j P r! ---------------------------------------------------------Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG tube.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more SG tubes A.1 Verify tube integrity of the 7 days satisfying the tube repair affected tube(s) is criteria and not plugged in maintained until the next accordance with the Steam refueling outage or SG Generator Program tube inspection AND A.2 Plug the affected tube(s) Prior to entering in accordance with the MODE 4 following Steam Generator the next refueling Program outage or SG tube inspection B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SG tube integrity not maintained Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.4-38 A ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)3.5.3 ECCS -Shutdown LCO 3.5.3 One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODE 00 0 ACTIONS LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to ECCS high head (centrifugal charging) subsystem.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required ECCS residual --NOTE ----------
heat removal (RHR) The required ECCS residual heat subsystem inoperable, removal (RHR) subsystem may be inoperable for up to 1 hour for surveillance testing of valves provided that alternate heat removal methods are available via the steam generators to maintain the Reactor Coolant System Tavg less than 350&deg;F and provided that the required subsystem is capable of being manually realigned to the ECCS mode of operation from the main control room.A.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately required ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.5-6 A Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks LCO 3.6.2 Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2,3, and ,6 69 ACTIONS-------------------
------------
NOTES.--------------
--1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock components.
: 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more containment
-------NOTES----------
air locks with one 1. Required Actions A.1, A.2, containment air lock door and A.3 are not applicable if inoperable, both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.2. Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-2 A EGTS 3.6.9 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.9 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)LCO 3.6.9 Two EGTS trains shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2,3, and 40 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One EGTS train inoperable.
A.1 Restore EGTS train to 7 days OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.9.1 Operate each EGTS train for > 10 continuous hours 31 days with heaters operating.
SR 3.6.9.2 Perform required EGTS filter testing in accordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-22 A Divider Barrier Integrity 3.6.13 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.13 Divider Barrier Integrity LCO 3.6.13 APPLICABILITY:
Divider barrier integrity shall be maintained.
MODES 1, 2,3, and 4 )6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE ------------
A.1 Restore personnel 1 hour For this action, separate access doors and Condition entry is allowed equipment hatches to for each personnel access OPERABLE status and door or equipment hatch. closed positions.
One or more personnel access doors or equipment hatches between upper and lower containment open or inoperable, other than for personnel transit.B. Divider barrier seal B.1 Restore seal to 1 hour inoperable.
OPERABLE status.C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.6-31 A MSSVs 3.7.1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)LCO 3.7.1 Five MSSVs per steam generator shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 6 ACTIONS----- --- ---------NOTE-----Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more steam A.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours generators with one MSSV POWER to <!&#xfd; % RTP.inoperable.
X B. One or more steam B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours generators with two or more POWER to less than or MSSVs inoperable, equal to the Maximum Allowable
% RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 for the number of OPERABLE MSSVs.AND Only required in MODE 1.B.2 Reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux -High reactor trip setpoint to less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable% RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 for the number of OPERABLE MSSVs.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-1 A ERCW 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System LCO 3.7.8 Two ERCW trains shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One ERCW train A.1 ----NOTES -----inoperable.
: 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources- Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ERCW.2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by ERCW.Restore ERCW train to 72 hours OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-18 A CREVS 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE.-NOTE-The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and During movement of irra a fuel assemblies.
0 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train to 7 days inoperable for reasons other OPERABLE status.than Condition B.B. One or more CREVS trains B.1 Initiate action to Immediately inoperable due to implement mitigating inoperable CRE boundary actions.in MODE 1,2, 3, or 4.AND B.2 Verify mitigating actions 24 hours ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological and chemical hazards will not exceed limits and CRE occupants are protected from smoke hazards.AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary to 90 days OPERABLE status.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-21 A CREATCS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)LCO 3.7.11 APPLICABILITY:
Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE.MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and A6)During movement of irradia4d fuel assemblies.
S ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREATCS train A.1 Restore CREATCS train 30 days inoperable, to OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met AND in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CREATCS train in Time of Condition A not met operation.
in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel OR assemblies.
C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
D. Two CREATCS trains D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, irradiated fuel assemblies or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
E. Two CREATCS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.7-24 A AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources -Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE: a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and b. Four diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1 E AC Electrical Power Distribution System.APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONS----....----
.-.------
..------ ... ......-- -- -- -- --- --.-LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.r! ------ ------- -------- ------ ------ ------ ------ -------CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour inoperable.
OPERABLE offsite circuit.AND Once per 8 hours thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours from feature(s) with no offsite discovery of no offsite power available power to one train inoperable when its concurrent with redundant required inoperability of feature(s) is inoperable, redundant required feature(s)
& N-D 01(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.8-1 B AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
--AND-A.3 Restore offsite circuit to 72 hours OPERABLE status.AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO B. One or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable.
OR One or more DG(s) in Train B inoperable.
B.1 AND Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuits.Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG(s)inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable B.2 1 hour AND Once per 8 hours thereafter 4 hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours 24 hours AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure.OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG(s).AND (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.8-2 B DC Sources -Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify vital battery terminal voltage is _ 128 V (132 V 7 days for vital battery V) on float charge.SR 3.8.4.2 Verify DG battery terminal voltage is > 124 V on float 7 days charge.SR 3.8.4.3 Verify for the vital batteries that the alternate feeder 7 days breakers to each required battery charger are open.SR 3.8.4.4 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days availability for each DG 125 V DC distribution panel and associated battery charger SR 3.8.4.5 (9 Verify no visible corrosion at terminals and connectors for the vital batteries.
OR Verify connection resistance for the vital batteries is< 80 E-6 ohm for inter-cell connections, : -X,'ohm for inter-rack connections
<2120 E-6 ohm for inter-tier connections, antg_< 50or terminal connections.5_
--"m r t erm na 92 days 1411 SR .8.4.6 Verify no visible corrosion at terminals and 92 days connectors for the DG batteries.
OR Verify connection resistance for the DG batteries is-< 80 E-6 ohm for inter-cell connections, , 50 E-6 ohm for inter-tier connections, an ohm for terminal connections.
SR 3.8.4.7 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no 12 months visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.8-22 A Boron Concentration 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration LCO 3.9.1 APPLICABILITY:
Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR.V2 Mode ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Boron concentration A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately not within limit. ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.
AND A.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately boron concentration to within limit.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified 72 hours in COLR.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.9-1 A Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves LCO 3.9.2 APPLICABILITY:
Each valve used to isolate unborated water sources shall be secured in the closed position.Mode 6 ACTIONS..................--------
.-.--- NOTE--- --------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each unborated water source isolation valve.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. -------.-...
NOTE -----...----
A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately Required Action A.3 must ALTERATIONS.
be completed whenever Condition A is entered. AND A.2 Initiate action to secure Immediately One or more valves valve in closed position.not secured in closed position.
AND A.3 Perform SR 3.9.1.1. 4 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.2.1 Verify each valve that isolates unborated water 31 days sources is secured in the closed position.Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.9-2 A Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation LCO 3.9.3 APPLICABILITY:
Two source range neutron flux monitors shall be OPERABLE.0 Mode 60 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required source range A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately neutron flux monitor ALTERATIONS.
inoperable.
AND A.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.
B. Two required source range B.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately neutron flux monitors one source range neutron inoperable, flux monitor to OPERABLE status.AND B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1. 4 hours AND Once per 12 hours thereafter Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental) 3.9-3 A Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued) 4.3 Fuel Storage 4.3.1 Criticality 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks (shown in Figure 4.3-1) are designed and shall be maintained with: a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of-T-weight percent;b. keff < 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which, includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Sections 4.3.2.7 and 9.1 of the FSAR;c. Distances between fuel assemblies are a nominal 10.375 inch center-to-center spacing in the twenty-four flux trap rack modules.d. Fuel assemblies with enrichments less than or equal to 3.80 weight percent U-235 are allowed unrestricted storage.e. Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments greater than 3.80 weight percent and less than a maximum of 5 percent enrichment (nominally 4.95 +/- 0.05 percent) may be stored in the spent fuel racks in one of four arrangements with specific limits as identified below: 1. Spent fuel assemblies may be stored in the racks without further restrictions provided the burnup of each assembly is in the acceptable domain identified in Figure 4.3-3, depending upon the specified initial enrichment.
: 2. New and spent fuel assemblies may be stored in a checkerboard arrangement of 2 new and 2 spent assemblies, provided that each spent fuel assembly has accumulated a minimum bumup in the acceptable domain identified in Figure 4.3-4.3. New fuel assemblies may be stored in 4-cell arrays with 1 of the 4 cells remaining empty of fuel (i.e. containing only water or water with up to 75 percent by volume of non-fuel bearing material.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 4.0-2 (developmental)
B JUSTIFICATION(s)
FOR CHANGES 1. Corrects editorial
/ formatting errors with APPLICABILITY verbiage.2. Corrects placement of logical connector.
They are to be located at the bottom of a page versus at the top of the next page..3. Amendment 68 to the Unit 1 TS revised "P-8" to "P-7." This change was to have been made during Developmental Revision A. This corrects this omission.4. Replaces "as-found" and "as-left" with "as found" and "as left", respectively for consistent usage of these terms 5. Makes implementation of TSTF-493 consistent with the FSAR setpoint methodology discussion added by Amendment 102 to the Unit 2 FSAR.Sa. Required by TSTF-493.6. Deletes unneeded logical connector.
: 7. Makes this consistent with the TS Bases for SR 3.3.2.8 which states, "The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation functions.
The manual initiation functions have no associated setpoints." This is consistent with the STS.8. Editorial corrections.
: 9. Float type switches are excluded by TSTF-493.10. TSTF-493 does not apply the notes to TS Section 3.3.5.11. Permissives and interlocks that are derived from a sensor or adjustable device that is tested as part of another Technical Specifications function are excluded by TSTF-493.
P-11 is derived from the pressurizer pressure channels that are tested as required by the SRs for function 3.3.2-1d (Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection).
: 12. Corrects information to reflect design change made to Unit 2. The common Q System replaces the outdated ICCM-86 system.13. Makes this wording consistent with that of the LCO.
JUSTIFICATION(s)
FOR CHANGES 14. Editorial change that keeps all portions of the criterion on the same line.15. Restores consistency with Unit 1.16. Required by TSTF-493.17. Amendment 31 to the Unit 1 approved Power Uprate using Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM).The review matrix provided by Reference 1 stated, "This change will NOT be implemented on Unit 2 at this time." The change was inadvertently made to this section.This corrects that error 18. Per setpoint calculation WCAP-1 7044, Rev. 0 (Setpoint Methodology for Watts Bar Unit 2), the ALLOWABLE VALUE for item 10. Of Unit 2 TS Table 3.3.1-1 (Reactor Coolant Flow -Low) should be 89.7%.
ENCLOSURE 7 Proposed Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases RCS Pressure SL B 2.1.2 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The RCS pressurizer safety valves, the main steam safety valves (MSSVs), and the reactor high pressure trip have settings established to ensure that the RCS pressure SL will not be exceeded.The RCS pressurizer safety valves are sized to prevent system pressure from exceeding the design pressure by more than 10%, as specified in Section III of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plant Components (Ref. 2). The transient that establishes the required relief capacity, and hence valve size requirements and lift settings, is a complete loss of external load without a direct reactor trip. During the transient, no control actions are assumed, except that the safety valves on the secondary plant are assumed to open when the steam pressure reaches the secondary plant safety valve settings.The Reactor Trip System setpoints (Ref. 5), together with the settings of the MSSVs (Ref. 8), provide pressure protection for normal operation and AQOs. The reactor high pressure trip setpoint is specifically set to provide protection against overpressurization (Ref. 5). The safety analyses for both the high pressure trip and the RCS pressurizer safety valves are performed using conservative assumptions relative to pressure control devices.More specifically, no credit is taken for operation of the following:
: a. Pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs);b. Steam line power operated relief valve (PORV);c. Steam Dump System;d. Reactor Control System;e. Pressurizer Level Control System; or f. Pressurizer spray valve.SAFETY LIMITS The maximum transient pressure allowed in the RCS pressure vessel, piping, valves, and fittings under the ASME Code, Section III, is 110% of design pressure.
Therefore, the SL on maximum allowable RCS pressure is 2735 psig (2750 psia).(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 2.0-9 F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is a predetermined setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded.
As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the channel (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments).
In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded.
Therefore, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 6).Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
OPERABLE is defined in the Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." Relying solely on the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protection channel setting during a surveillance.
This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected.This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as found" setting of the protection channel.Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the established as left tolerance around the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-2 F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more (continued) times during the unit life, the acceptable limits are: 1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB);2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur; and 3. The RCS pressure SL of 2735 psig (2750 psia) shall not be exceeded.Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0, "Safety Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.
Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.The RTS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct but interconnected modules as illustrated in Figure 7.1-1, FSAR, Section 7 (Ref. 2), and as identified below: 1. Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal or contact actuation based upon the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured;2. Signal Process Control and Protection System, including Process Protection System, Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS), and field contacts:
provides analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning, setpoint comparison, process algorithm actuation (Digital Protection System), compatible electrical signal output to protection system channels, and control board/control room/miscellaneous indications;
: 3. Solid State Protection System (SSPS), including input, logic, and output bays: initiates proper unit shutdown and/or ESF actuation in accordance with the defined logic, which is based on the bistable, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs from the signal process control and protection system; and (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-3 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND
: 4. Reactor trip switchgear, including reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and (continued) bypass breakers:
provides the means to interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or "rods," to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs at power.Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as five, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters.
To account for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the NTSP and Allowable Value.The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor is determined by either"as found" calibration data evaluated during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel behavior observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.Signal Process Control and Protection System Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments.
The process control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with NTSPs derived from Analytical Limits established by the safety analyses.
Analytical Limits are defined in FSAR, Chapter 6 (Reference 1), Chapter 7 (Reference 2), and Chapter 15 (Reference 3). If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable, setpoint comparator, or contact is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays. However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing.
Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.(continued)
Watts Bar- Unit 2 B 3.3-4 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Signal Process Control and Protection System (continued)
Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.
These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 2.Two logic trains are required to ensure no single random failure of a logic train will disable the RTS. The logic trains are designed such that testing required while the reactor is at power may be accomplished without causing trip.Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints The Trip Setpoints used in the bistables, setpoint comparators, or contact trip outputs are based on the analytical limits defined in Reference
: 2. The calculation of the Nominal Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RTS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5), the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO are conservative with respect to the analytical limits.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-5 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints (continued)
A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values, NTSPs, and as left and as found tolerance bands is provided in Reference
: 2. All of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel are factored into the determination of each NTSP and corresponding Allowable Value. The trip setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for measurement errors detectable by the COT. The Allowable Value serves as the as found Technical Specification OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the COT.The NTSP is the value at which the bistable is set and is the expected value to be achieved during calibration.
The NTSP value is the LSSS and ensures the safety analysis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adjusted based on stated channel uncertainties.
Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" NTSP value is within the as left tolerance band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertainty allowance (i.e., + rack calibration and comparator setting uncertainties).
The NTSP value is therefore considered a "nominal" value (i.e., expressed as a value without inequalities) for the purposes of COT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Nominal Trip Setpoints, in conjunction with the use of as found and as left tolerances, together with the requirements of the Allowable Value ensure that SLs are not violated during AOOs (and that the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the AOO or DBA and the equipment functions are designed).(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-6 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints (continued)
Note that the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 are the least conservative value of the as found setpoint that a channel can have during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS, or a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST that requires trip setpoint verification.
Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line to verify that the signal or setpoint accuracy is within the allowance requirements of Reference
: 2. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated.
SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section. The Process Protection System is designed to permit any one channel to be tested and maintained at power in a bypassed mode. If a channel has been bypassed for any purpose, the bypass is continuously indicated in the control room.Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of setpoint comparator trip outputs, contact outputs, and bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment.
To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided.
If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide reactor trip and/or ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The system has been designed to trip in the event of a loss of power, directing the unit to a safe shutdown condition.
The SSPS performs the decision logic for actuating a reactor trip or ESF actuation, generates the electrical output signal that will initiate the required trip or actuation, and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-7 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Solid State Protection System (continued)
The setpoint comparator trip outputs, contact outputs and bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various unit upset and accident transients.
If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will initiate a reactor trip and/or send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition.
Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases.Reactor Trip Switchqear The RTBs are in the electrical power supply line from the control rod drive motor generator set power supply to the CRDMs. Opening of the RTBs interrupts power to the CRDMs, which allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into the core by gravity. Each RTB is equipped with a bypass breaker to allow testing of the RTB while the unit is at power.During normal operation the output from the SSPS is a voltage signal that energizes the undervoltage coils in the RTBs and bypass breakers, if in use. When the required logic matrix combination is completed, the SSPS output voltage signal is removed, the undervoltage coils are de-energized, the breaker trip lever is actuated by the de-energized undervoltage coil, and the RTBs and bypass breakers are tripped open.This allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into the core. In addition to the de-energization of the undervoltage coils, each breaker is also equipped with a shunt trip device that is energized to trip the breaker open upon receipt of a reactor trip signal from the SSPS. Either the undervoltage coil or the shunt trip mechanism is sufficient by itself, thus providing a diverse trip mechanism.
The decision logic matrix Functions are described in the functional diagrams included in Reference
: 2. In addition to the reactor trip or ESF, these diagrams also describe the various "permissive interlocks" that are associated with unit conditions.
Each train has a built in testing device that can automatically test the decision logic matrix Functions and the actuation channels while the unit is at power.When any one train is taken out of service for testing, the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed.
The testing device is semiautomatic to minimize testing time.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-8 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY The RTS functions to preserve the SLs during all AOOs and mitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in which the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted.Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RTS Functions.
The accident analysis described in Reference 3 takes credit for most RTS trip functions.
RTS trip functions that are retained yet not specifically credited in the accident analysis are implicitly credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These RTS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance.
They may also serve as backups to RTS trip Functions that were credited in the accident analysis.Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not explicitly modeled in the Safety Analyses.These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an RTS Function, listed in Table 3.3.1-1 to be OPERABLE.
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is the least conservative value of the as found setpoint that the channel can have when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as found setpoint is within the as found tolerance and is conservative with the respect to the Allowable Value during a CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount greater than or equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval.
In this manner, the actual setting of the channel (NTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the channel has not drifted beyond expected tolerances during the surveillance interval.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as found criteria).(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-9 F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
If the actual setting of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE but degraded.
The degraded condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR.This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTSP (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channel response.
If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance.
After the surveillance is completed, the channel as found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A trip setpoint may be set more conservative than the NTSP as necessary in response to plant conditions.
However, in this case, the operability of this instrument must be verified based on the field setting and not the NTSP. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions.
The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels in each instrumentation Function, two channels of Manual Reactor Trip in each logic Function, and two trains in each Automatic Trip Logic Function.
Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-four configuration are required when one RTS channel is also used as a control system input. This configuration accounts for the possibility of the shared channel failing in such a manner that it creates a transient that requires RTS action. In this case, the RTS will still provide protection, even with random failure of one of the other three protection channels.Three operable instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-three configuration are generally required when there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need for RTS trip and disable one RTS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing without causing a reactor trip.Specific exceptions to the above general philosophy exist and are discussed below.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-10 F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
: 10. Reactor Coolant Flow -Low (continued)
In MODE 1 above the P-8 setpoint, a loss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions in the core because of the higher power level. In MODE 1 below the P-8 setpoint and above the P-7 setpoint, a loss of flow in two or more loops is required to actuate a reactor trip because of the lower power level and the greater margin to the design limit DNBR. Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on low flow are automatically blocked since there is insufficient heat production to generate DNB conditions.
The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value are specified in % indicated loop flow; however, the Eagle-21 T M values entered through the MMI are specified in an equivalent
%differential pressure.11. Undervoltacqe Reactor Coolant Pumps I The Undervoltage RCPs trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in two or more RCS loops. The voltage to each RCP is monitored.
Above the P-7 setpoint, a loss of voltage detected on two or more RCP buses will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow -Low Trip Setpoint is reached in two or more RCS loops. The loss of voltage in two loops must be sustained for a length of time equal to or greater than that set in the time delay. Time delays are incorporated into the Undervoltage RCPs channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary electrical power transients.
The LCO requires one Undervoltage RCP channel per bus to be OPERABLE.In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint, the Undervoltage RCP trip must be OPERABLE.
Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7 setpoint, the reactor trip on loss of flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-23 F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate.
It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every 184 days.A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.Setpoints must be conservative with respect to the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1.The difference between the current "as found" values and the NTSP or previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology.
SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-1 0 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition.
The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 15, except for Function 13. The justification for Function 13 is provided in References 9 and 15.SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-56 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.7 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.8 is no longer required to be performed.
If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for greater than 4 hours, this Surveillance must be performed within 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. Note 2 states that this test shall include verification that the P-6 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition.
The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within 31 days prior to reactor startup and 4 hours after reducing power below P-1 0 and P-6. The Frequency of "prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source and intermediate range instrument channels.
The Frequency of "Four hours after reducing power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate channels)and "Four hours after reducing power below P-6" (applicable to source range channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance.
The Frequency of every 31 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and 4 hours after reducing power below P-10 or P-6.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-57 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.8 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-10 for the intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the source range channels.Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required.
If power is to be maintained
< P-1 0 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required.
This test ensures that the NIS source and intermediate range channels are OPERABLE channels prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P-10 or < P-6) for periods > 4 hours.SR 3.3.1.8 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-58 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.10 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.10 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric performed above 15% RTP. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. This Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1, and is not required for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry into MODE 2, because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-60 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.11 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The 18-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18-month Frequency.
SR 3.3.1.11 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18 months.The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-61 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS As appropriate, each channel's response must be verified every 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices is included in the testing. Response times cannot be determined during unit operation because equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18-month Frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
SR 3.3.1.15 is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response.REFERENCES
: 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 6.0, "Engineered Safety Features." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.0, "Instrumentation and Controls." 3. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analysis." 4. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE-279-1971,"Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," April 5, 1972.5. 10 CFR Part 50.49, "Environmental Qualifications of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." 6. Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety Related Instrumentation," Revision 3.7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Rev. 1,"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," May 1986 and June 1990.8. Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System Response Times." 9. Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-1 0271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar, Westinghouse Letter WAT-D-10128.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-64 (developmental)
F RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)
: 10. Deleted 11. WCAP-1 3632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996 12. WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.13. Deleted 14. WCAP-14333 P-A, Revision 1, "Probablistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998.15. WCAP-1 5376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003 16. WCAP-12472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994 (Addendum 2, April 2002).Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-65 F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ESFAS initiates necessary safety systems, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating core design limits and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, and to mitigate accidents.
This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the ESFAS, as well as specifying LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.
Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSS for variables that have significant safety functions.
LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a protective action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded.
Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.
However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.The NTSP specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is a predetermined setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded.
As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the channel (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments).
In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded.
Therefore, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 6).(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-66 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety functions(s)." Relying solely on the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protection channel setting during a surveillance.
This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected.
This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as found" setting of the protection channel. Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the established as left tolerance around the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more times during the unit life, the acceptable limits are: 1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB), 2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur, and 3. The RCS pressure SL of 2735 psig (2750 psia) shall not be exceeded.Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0, "Safety Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.
Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-67 F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND The ESFAS instrumentation is segmented into three distinct but (continued) interconnected modules as identified below: " Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal or contact actuation based on the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured;" Signal processing equipment including process protection system, and field contacts:
provide analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning, setpoint comparison, process algorithm actuation (Digital Protection System), compatible electrical signal output to protection system channels, and control board / control room / miscellaneous indications; and" Solid State Protection System (SSPS) including input, logic, and output bays: initiates the proper unit shutdown or engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the defined logic and based on the bistable, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs from the signal process control and protection system.Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as five, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters.
In many cases, field transmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the Reactor Trip System (RTS).In some cases, the same channels also provide control system inputs.To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the NTSP and Allowable Value. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor is determined by either "as found" calibration data evaluated during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel behavior observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-68 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND Signal Processing Equipment (continued)
Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments.
The process control equipment provides analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with NTSPs derived from Analytical Limits established by the safety analyses.
Analytical Limits are defined in FSAR, Chapter 6, (Reference 1), Chapter 7 (Reference 2), and Chapter 15 (Reference 3). If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a setpoint comparator or contact is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays.However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing.
Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.
These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 2.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-69 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints (continued)
The trip setpoints used in the bistables, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs are based on the analytical limits defined in Reference
: 2. The calculation of the Nominal Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those ESFAS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5), the NTSPs specified in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accompanying LCO are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits.A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate NTSPs and as left and as found tolerance bands is provided in Reference
: 2. All of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel are factored into the determination of each NTSP and corresponding Allowable Value. The nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a COT. The Allowable Value serves as the as found Technical Specification OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the COT.The NTSP is the value at which the bistables are set and is the expected value to be achieved during calibration.
The NTSP value is the LSSS and ensures the safety analysis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adjusted based on stated channel uncertainties.
Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" setpoint NTSP value is within the as left tolerance band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertainty allowance (i.e., +/- rack calibration and comparator setting uncertainties).
The NTSP value is therefore considered a "nominal value" (i.e., expressed as a value without inequalities) for the purposes of the COT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Nominal Trip Setpoints, in conjunction with the use of as left and as found tolerances, together with the requirements of the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the equipment functions as designed.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-70 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND Note that the Allowable Values listed-in Table 3.3.2-1 are the least (continued) conservative value of the as found setpoint that a channel can have during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, COT, or a TADOT.Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements of Reference
: 2. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated.
SRs for the channels are specified in the SR section. The Process Protection System is designed to permit any one channel to be tested and maintained at power in a bypassed mode.If a channel has been bypassed for any purpose, the bypass is continuously indicated in the control room.Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment.
To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided.
If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation; generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation; and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.The outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients.
If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition.
Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-71 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND Solid State Protection System (continued)
Each SSPS train has a built in testing channel that can automatically test the decision logic matrix functions and the actuation channels while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken out of service for testing, the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed.
The testing channel is semiautomatic to minimize testing time.The actuation of most ESF components is accomplished through master and slave relays. Some ESF components are actuated by relay logic.The SSPS energizes the master relays appropriate for the condition of the unit. Each master relay then energizes one or more slave relays, which then cause actuation of the end devices. The master and slave relays are routinely tested to ensure operation.
The test of the master relays energizes the relay, which then operates the contacts and applies a low voltage to the associated slave relays. The low voltage is not sufficient to actuate the slave relays but only demonstrates signal path continuity.
The SLAVE RELAY TEST actuates the devices if their operation will not interfere with continued unit operation.
For the latter case, actual component operation is prevented by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit, and slave relay contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one or more ESFAS Functions.
One of the ESFAS Functions is the primary actuation signal for that accident.
An ESFAS Function may be the primary actuation signal for more than one type of accident.
An ESFAS Function may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more other accidents.
For example, Pressurizer Pressure -Low is a primary actuation signal for small loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for steam line breaks (SLBs) outside containment.
Functions such as manual initiation, not specifically credited in the accident safety analysis, are implicitly credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance.
These Functions may also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analysis (Ref. 3).(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-72 F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant SAFETY startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not ANALYSES, satisfied, but they are not explicitly modeled in the Safety Analyses.LCO, and These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are APPLICABILITY consistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions (continued) occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function listed in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE.
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is the least conservative value of the as found setpoint that the channel can have when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as found setpoint is within the as found tolerance and is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount [greater than or] equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval.
In this manner, the actual setting of the channel (NTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the channel has not drifted beyond expected tolerances during the surveillance interval.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as found criteria).
If the actual setting of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE but degraded.
The degraded condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTSP (within the allowed tolerance) and evaluating the channel response.
If the channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance.
After the surveillance is completed, the channel as found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-73 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and reliability.
If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The SSPS is tested every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, using the semiautomatic tester. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation.
Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function.
In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity.
This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and that there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is justified in Reference 18.SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity.
This test is performed every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 18.SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a COT.A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
Setpoints must be found conservative with respect to the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-116 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.4 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The difference between the current "as found" values and the NTSP or previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 18, except for Function 7. The Frequency for Function 7 is justified in References 10 and 18.SR 3.3.2.4 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-117 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.7 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST for slave relays K603A, K603B, K604A, K604B, K607A, K607B, K609A, K609B, K612A, K625A, and K625B. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment which may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment.
Actuation equipment which may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the slave relay test circuit.For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. This test is performed every 18 months. The Frequency is justified by TVA correspondence to the NRC dated November 9, 1984 (Ref. 9) and Design Change Notice W-38238-A associated documentation (Reference 12), and for relays K607A, K607B, and K612A, Westinghouse letter to TVA (Ref. 11).SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pumps. It is performed every 18 months. The Frequency is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation functions.
The manual initiation functions have no associated setpoints.
SR 3.3.2.8 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-119 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.8 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the Watts Bar setpoint methodology.
The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of sensor/transmitter drift in the setpoint methodology.
This SR is modified by a Note stating that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable.
For channels with a trip time delay (TTD), this test shall include verification that the TTD coefficients are adjusted correctly.
SR 3.3.2.9 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-120 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.9 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
SR 3.3.2.10 This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIMES are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.Response Time testing acceptance criteria are included in Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2 (Ref. 8). Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the NTSP value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment in both trains reaches the required functional state (e.g., pumps at rated discharge pressure, valves in full open or closed position).
For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to one with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of sequential tests such that the entire response time is measured.Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-121 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS channel. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests), (2) in place, onsite, or offsite (e.g., vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications.
WCAP-13632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements" (Reference 15), provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test.WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests" (Reference 16), provides the basis and methodology for using allocated signal processing and actuation logic response times in the overall verification of the protection system channel response time. The allocations for sensor, signal conditioning and actuation logic response times must be verified prior to placing the component in operational service and re-verified following maintenance that may adversely affect response time. In general, electrical repair work does not impact response time provided the parts used for repair are of the same type and value. Specific components identified in the WCAP may be replaced without verification testing. One example where response time could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter.
ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel.Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions are established.
This deferral is required because there may be insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-122 (developmental)
A ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.11 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.2.11 is the performance of a TADOT as described in SR 3.3.2.8, except that it is performed for the P-4 Reactor Trip Interlock, and the Frequency is once per RTB cycle. This Frequency is based on operating experience demonstrating that undetected failure of the P-4 interlock sometimes occurs when the RTB is cycled.The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Function tested has no associated setpoint.REFERENCES
: 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 6.0, "Engineered Safety Features." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.0, "Instrumentation and Controls." 3. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analyses." 4. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE-279-1971,"Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," April 5, 1972.5. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." 6. Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety Related Instrumentation," Revision 3.7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1 and Supplement 2, Rev. 1,"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System." May 1986 and June 1990.8. Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2,"Engineered Safety Feature Response Times." 9. TVA Letter to NRC, November 9, 1984, "Request for Exemption of Quarterly Slave Relay Testing, (L44 841109 808)." (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-123 (developmental)
F ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES REFERENCES
: 10. Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1, (continued) and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar, Westinghouse letter to TVA WAT-D-1 0128.11. Westinghouse letter to TVA (WAT-D-8347), September 25, 1990,"Charging/Letdown Isolation Transients" (T33 911231 810).12. Unit 1 Design Change Notice W-38238 and Unit 2 Engineering Document Construction Release 53352 and associated documentation.
: 13. WCAP-1 3877-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays Used As SSPS Slave Relays." 14. Not Applicable for Unit 2 15. WCAP-13632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996.16. WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.17. WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1, "Probablistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998 18. WCAP-1 5376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003 19. Westinghouse letter to TVA, WAT-D-1 1248, "Revised Justification for Applicability of Instrumentation Technical Specification Improvements to the Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump Signal," June 2004.20. Letter from John G. Lamb (NRC) to Mr. Preston D. Swafford (TVA)dated March 4, 2009, Includes Enclosures (a) Amendment No. 75 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and (b) NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) for Amendment No. 75.21. Deleted 22. WCAP-1 3878-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Potter &Brumfield MDR Series Relays." Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-124 (developmental)
F LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation.
Undervoltage protection will generate an LOP start if a loss of voltage or degraded voltage condition occurs in the switchyard.
There are four LOP start signals, one for each 6.9 kV shutdown board.Three degraded voltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for detecting a sustained undervoltage condition.
The relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic configuration to generate a supply breaker trip signal if the voltage is below 96% for 10 seconds (nominal).
Additionally, three undervoltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for the purpose of detecting a loss of voltage condition.
These relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic to generate a supply breaker trip signal if the voltage is below 87% for 0.75 seconds (nominal).
Once the supply breakers have been opened, either one of two induction disk type relays, which have a voltage setpoint of 70% of 6.9 kV (nominal, decreasing) and an internal time delay of 0.5 seconds (nominal) at zero volts, will start the diesel generators.
Four additional induction disk type relays, in a logic configuration of one-of-two taken twice which have a voltage setpoint of 70% of 6.9 kV (nominal, decreasing) and an internal time delay of 3 seconds (nominal), at zero volts, will initiate load shedding of the 6.9 kV shutdown board loads and selected loads on the 480 V shutdown boards and close the 480 V shutdown boards' current limiting reactor bypass breaker. The LOP start actuation is described in FSAR Section 8.3, "Onsite (Standby)
Power System" (Ref. 1).Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values The Trip Setpoints used in the relays and timers are based on the analytical limits presented in TVA calculations (References 3, 4, and 5). The selection of these Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and time delays are taken into account.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-147 (developmental)
F LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)
Condition C applies to each of the LOP DG start Functions when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A or B are not met.In these circumstances the Conditions specified in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," or LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources -Shutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately.
The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety.SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to refer to Table 3.3.5-1 to determine which REQUIREMENTS Surveillance Requirements apply for each LOP Function.SR 3.3.5.1 SR 3.3.5.1 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is performed every 92 days. The test checks operation of the undervoltage and degraded voltage relays that provide actuation signals. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the relays and timers and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
This SR has been modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays/timers.
Relay/timer setpoints require elaborate bench calibration and are verified during a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
SR 3.3.5.2 SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as shown in Reference 1.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-151 (developmental)
F LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 6 months. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a check of the four functions.
The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 6 months is based on operating experience and is justified by the assumption of a 6-month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.SR 3.3.5.3 SR 3.3.5.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as shown in Reference 1.A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the four functions.
The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18-month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-152 (developmental)
F LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES REFERENCES
: 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 8.3, "Onsite (Standby)
Power System." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analysis." 3. TVA Calculation WBPE2119202001, "6.9 kV Shutdown & Logic Boards Undervoltage Relays Requirements
/ Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation." 4. TVA Calculation TDR SYS.21 1 -LV1, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation TDR SYS.21 1 -LVI." 5. TVA Calculation TDR SYS.21 1-DS1, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation TDR SYS.211-DS1." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-153 F Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The SR is modified by a Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the master relays of the ESFAS instrumentation.
SR 3.3.6.4 A COT is performed every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
The Frequency is based on the staff recommendation for increasing the availability of radiation monitors according to NUREG-1366 (Ref. 2). This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment vent system isolation.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
SR 3.3.6.5 SR 3.3.6.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment.
Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.This test is performed every 92 days. The Frequency is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry operating experience.
For ESFAS slave relays which are Westinghouse type AR or Potter &Brumfield MDR series relays, the SLAVE RELAY TEST is performed every 18 months. The frequency is based on the relay reliability assessments presented in References 3 and 5. These reliability assessments are relay specific and apply only to Westinghouse type AR and Potter & Brumfield MDR series relays with AC coils. Note that for normally energized applications, the relays may require periodic replacement in accordance with the guidance given in References 3 and 5.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-161 (developmental)
F Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.6.6 SR 3.3.6.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).For these tests, the relay trip setpoints are verified and adjusted as necessary.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.SR 3.3.6.7 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found settings are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance." 2. NUREG-1 366, "Improvement to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements," December 1992.3. WCAP-13877-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays Used as SSPS Slave Relays." (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-162 F CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.7-1 REQUIREMENTS determines which SRs apply to which CREVS Actuation Functions.
SR 3.3.7.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels.
It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability.
If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.SR 3.3.7.2 A COT is performed once every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function.
This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the CREVS actuation.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-168 (developmental)
F CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.7.3 SR 3.3.7.3 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils.In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.SR 3.3.7.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.REFERENCES None Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-169 F ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.8.2 A COT is performed once every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function.
This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the ABGTS actuation.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
SR 3.3.8.3 SR 3.3.8.3 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the manual actuation functions and is performed every 18 months. Each manual actuation function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (e.g., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.SR 3.3.8.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-176 F Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.10 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)B 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves BASES BACKGROUND The pressurizer safety valves provide, in conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, overpressure protection for the RCS. The pressurizer safety valves are totally enclosed pop type, spring loaded, self actuated valves with backpressure compensation.
The safety valves are designed to prevent the system pressure from exceeding the system Safety Limit (SL), 2735 psig (2750 psia), which is 110% of the design pressure.Because the safety valves are totally enclosed and self actuating, they are considered independent components.
The relief capacity for each valve, 420,000 lb/hr, is based on postulated overpressure transient conditions resulting from a complete loss of steam flow to the turbine.This event results in the maximum surge rate into the pressurizer, which specifies the minimum relief capacity for the safety valves. The discharge flow from the pressurizer safety valves is directed to the pressurizer relief tank. This discharge flow is indicated by an increase in temperature downstream of the pressurizer safety valves or increase in the pressurizer relief tank temperature or level.Overpressure protection is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; however, in MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperature
< the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR, MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on, overpressure protection is provided by operating procedures and by meeting the requirements of LCO 3.4.12, "Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)." The upper and lower pressure limits are based on a +/- 3% tolerance.
The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, 3, and MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures
> the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established.
The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents.
OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to 110% of design pressure.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.4-46 (developmental)
F Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that each 24 inch containment lower compartment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to _< 500 is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analyses of References 1 and 2. If a LOCA occurs, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis.
At other times when purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies), pressurization concerns are not present, thus the purge valves can be fully open. The 18-month Frequency is appropriate because the blocking devices are typically removed only during a refueling outage.SR 3.6.3.8 This SR ensures that the combined leakage rate of all Shield Building bypass leakage paths is less than or equal to the specified leakage rate.This provides assurance that the assumptions in the safety analysis are met. The as left bypass leakage rate prior to the first startup after performing a leakage test, requires calculation using maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves). If the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange, then the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. At all other times, the leakage rate will be calculated using minimum pathway leakage.The frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria.Although not a part of La, the Shield Building Bypass leakage path combined leakage rate is determined using the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Type B and C leakage rates for the applicable barriers.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.6-25 (developmental)
F AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.2 (continued)
The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both: a. An inoperable DG exists; and b. A required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) is inoperable.
If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one or more DGs inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.Discovering one or more required DGs in Train A or one or more DGs in Train B inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.B.3.1 and B.3.2 Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DG(s). If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed.
For the performance of a Surveillance, Required Action B.3.1 is considered satisfied since the cause of the DG being inoperable is apparent.
If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered if the other (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-8 (developmental)
F AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.8.1.14 Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph C2.2.9, requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously for an interval of not less than 24 hours, _> 2 hours of which is at a load between 105% and 110% of the continuous duty rating and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to 90% to 100% of the continuous duty rating of the DG. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions.
The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor of > 0.8 and < 0.9. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.
The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
This Surveillance is modified by three Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the power factor limit will not invalidate the test. Note 2 establishes that this SR may be performed on only one DG at a time while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. This is necessary to ensure the proper response to an operational transient (i.e., loss of offsite power, ESF actuation).
Therefore, three DGs must be maintained operable and in a standby condition during performance of this test. In this configuration, the plant will remain within its design basis, since at all times safe shutdown can be achieved with two DGs in the same train.Note 3 establishes that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Examples of unplanned events may include: 1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available; and 2) Post-corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.8-25 F AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.8.1.15 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. The minimum voltage and frequency stated in the SR are those necessary to ensure the DG can accept DBA loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency levels. Stable operation at the nominal voltage and frequency values is also essential to establishing DG OPERABILITY, but a time constraint is not imposed. This is because a typical DG will experience a period of voltage and frequency oscillations prior to reaching steady state operation if these oscillations are not dampened out by load application.
This period may extend beyond the 10 seconds acceptance criteria and could be a cause for failing the SR.In lieu of a time constraint in the SR, WBN will monitor and trend the actual time to reach steady state operation as a means of ensuring there is no voltage regulator or governor degradation which could cause a DG to become inoperable.
The 10 seconds time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1.The DG engines for WBN have an oil circulation and soakback system that operates continuously to preclude the need for a prelube and warmup when a DG is started from standby.This SR is modified by a Note to ensure that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions.
Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.8-26 F DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.13 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to worst case design duty cycle requirements based on References 10 and 12.The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 6) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations or at some other outage, with intervals between tests, not to exceed 18 months.This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test once per 60 months. The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates: the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated one-minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.A modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle.) This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity.
Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test.The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance may perturb the vital electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems.However, this Surveillance may be performed in MODES I, 2, 3, or 4 provided that Vital Battery V is substituted in accordance with LCO Note 1. For the DG DC electrical subsystem, this surveillance may be performed in MODES I, 2, 3, or 4 in conjunction with LCO 3.8.1.B since the supplied loads are only for the inoperable diesel generator and would not otherwise challenge safety system loads which are supplied (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-60 (developmental)
F DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.13 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS from vital electrical distribution systems. Additionally, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Examples of unplanned events may include: 1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available; and 2) Post-corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability.
SR 3.8.4.14 A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.13.
Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.14; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.14 while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.13 at the same time.The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 9) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 5). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer rating. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-61 (developmental)
F ENCLOSURE 8 Marked-up Version of Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases With Justifications for Revisions RCS Pressure SL B 2.1.2 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The RCS pressurizer safety valves, the main steam safety valves SAFETY (MSSVs), and the reactor high pressure trip have settings established to ANALYSES ensure that the RCS pressure SL will not be exceeded.The RCS pressurizer safety valves are sized to prevent system pressure from exceeding the design pressure by more than 10%, as specified in Section III of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plant Components (Ref. 2). The transient that establishes the required relief capacity, and hence valve size requirements and lift settings, is a complete loss of external load without a direct reactor trip. During the transient, no control actions are assumed, except that the safety valves on the secondary plant are assumed to open when the steam pressure reaches the secondary plant safety valve settings.The Reactor Trip System setpoints (Ref. 5), together with the settings of the MSSVs (Ref. 8), provide pressure protection for normal operation and AQOs. The reactor high pressure trip setpoint is specifically set to provide protection against overpressurization (Ref. 5). The safety analyses for both the high pressure trip and the RCS pressurizer safety valves are performed using conservative assumptions relative to pressure control devices.More specifically, no credit is taken for operation of the following:
: a. Pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs);b. Steam line power operated relief valve (PORV);c. Steam Dump System;d. Reactor Control System;e. Pressurizer Level Control System; or f. Pressurizer spray valve.SAFETY LIMITS The maximum transient pressure allowed in the RCS pressure vessel, piping, valves, and fittings under the ASME Code, Section III, is 110% of design pressure.
Therefore, the SL on maximum allowable RCS pressure is 2735 psi7, 0 (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 2.0-9 (developmental)
A RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES B((c j1 ACKGROUND The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is a ontinued) predetermined setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded.
As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the channel (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments).
In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not excee.do.
Therefore, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref.,f).Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of e,. ent required for safe operation of the facility.
OPERABLE is (iO def in he Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." Relying solely on the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would rly restrictive requirement if it were ap lie ILITY limit or thea3fei'6.
value of n c annel setting durnng a surveillance.
This would in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a etting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some eigthat has been dri h setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected.This expe d drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint metho o for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action w Id still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the-4m-fouTT setting of the protection channel.Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the establisheq..
tolerance around the NTSP to account for further drift during the UA surveillance interval.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-2 B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND During AQOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more (continued) times during the unit life, the acceptable limits are: 1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB);& 2. centerline me ha not occur; and 3. The RCS pressure SL o (2750 psi) shall not be exceeded.Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0, "Safety Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.
Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.The RTS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct but interconnected modules as illustrated in Figure 7.1-1, FSAR, Section 7 (Ref. 2), and as identified below: 1. Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal or contact actuation based upon the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured;2. Signal Process Control and Protection System, including Process Protection System, Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS), and field contacts:
provides analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System rsignal conditioning, setpoint comparison, process algorithm ( J]/ actuat'h (Digital Protection System), compatible electrical signal out to protection system channels, and control board/control indications;
: 3. Solid State Protection System (SSPS), including input, logic, and output bays: initiates proper unit shutdown and/or ESF actuation in accordance with the defined logic, which is based on the bistable, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs from the signal process control and protection system; and (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-3 (developmental)
B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND
: 4. Reactor trip switchgear, including reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and (continued) bypass breakers:
provides the means to interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or "rods," to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs at power.Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as five, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters.
To account for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, i statistical allowances are provided in the NTSP and Allowable Value/.The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor is determined by either"as found" calibration data evaluated during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel.l ett observed4wirRI performance of the CHANNEL CHECK. _ r;eii) a /vio Signal Process Control and Protection System Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments.
The process control equipment provides signal conditioning comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with NTSPs derived from Analytical Limits established by the safety analyses.
Analytical Limits are defined in. --. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the p determined setpoint, an output from a bistable, setpoint comparator, or ontact is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel s paration is maintained up to and through the input bays. However, not I unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement andIgnal processing.
Some unit parameters provide input only to the PS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, t' unit computer, and one or more control systems.fSA~~ Pe re14&- e ~Ar 7 (vIf 1~ 2 K/(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-4 (developmental)
B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Signal Process Control and Protection System (continued)
(~c ti..,,d) Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.
These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 2.Two logic trains are required to ensure no single random failure of a logic train will disable the RTS. The logic trains are designed such that testing required while the reactor is at power may be accomplished without causing trip.Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints The Trip setpointe
@CA thne nomonal ualuas at' 'hich the bmstablor, rsotpoin A CnMpnratorS.
an~~ rpo t'I~ira set Any bistablo or tip output i c d- o -bo ..pr.porFly adjuctod Whon. .WAo "ADC. '684" al ei3within TRh bornd fc; C ,HANNEL CALI6 R .TION o -ro .y. -" The Trip Setpoints used in the bistables, setpmnt corparators, o rontact trip outputs are based on the analytical limits.,a 4in Reference
.The calculation of the Nominal Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RTS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5), the Trp Setpoi"!'ryt specified in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accom panying LC are co e.. .-tv!ely adj '_ted with respect to the anal ical li (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-5 (developmental)
B le, RTS Instrumentation 1L4Cr~a~,1,~
'i~'B 3.3.1 BASES -me-BACKGROUl' D Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints (contnue)A detailed descri nof the methodolo 0ysd to calculte the Allowable VZ lie " ,NTS~ the ir' nl~t,, c.i. .. ,I ,Ii k-- t31o~r~3 6nd oc found tolerance ban'i(provided in Refere e .. T ........ f...............
are factored into the det wT1ation of each NTSP and corresponding Allowable Value. The trip-'-etpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative thh d by the Allowable Value to account for measurement el rs detectable byd the COT. The Allowable Value serves as the .asQuw Technical Specification OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the COT. The Seu e.Rango 8rd Intormediate RaOg Ne,-tron detector setpont_ 2Mre bed on 2 4a fa;9_M40 W&%F4.MrQMQA4,G%
GIAW a 9-P ism arng, Rem mee -mT.The NTSP is the value at which the bistable is set and is the expected value to be achieved during calibration.
The NTSP value is the LSSS ensures the safety analysis limits are met for the ance interval(selected when a channel is adjusted based o ated channel ,-e itainties.
Any bistable is considered to e properly adjusted when ,' ,'e the !M; WX NTSP value is within the.eae!.a#tolerance band for CHANNEL ( CALIBRATION uncertainty allowance (i.e., + rack calibration and comparator setting uncertainties).
The NTSP value is therefore considered a "nominal" value (i.e., expressed as a value without inequalities) for the purposes of COT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
AlwbeValues and Nominal Trip Setp~oints (continued hv/ Nominal Trip Setpoints, in conjunction with the use of tolerances, together with the requirements of the Allowable Value ensure that SLs are not violated during AOOs (and that the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the AOO or DBA and the equipment functions are designed).
Earc chaennal of the prela-c cormtreI eql'-'pment can .be teirted o-'n in '.'er.&'tha't the or rt;p"int ac"rUFc' is within the sp,. a.l~o;AQnceQ requireoment of Roference 2- Once a derifignated channel ig akon out of ,,- ies for testing, a Eimulated sil.n is injected in plac, of!he field nOtrMumont signal. Tho praocccqipon for- thoA o-hannol1 in toct ia then tcctod, Vo9i48o1, and czali brat.- S0-F+k foGhape lnes are specified in the Sa~cetiowr (continued) kI 'Wafts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-6 B RTS Instrumentation B 3.
 
==3.1 BACKGROUND==
 
Note that the Allowable
%lues listed in Table 3.3.1-1 are the least conservative value of the _.a&4w4 setpoint that a channel can have during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS, or a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST that requires trip setpoint verification.
The Protoctrion System ic designed to permit @my ong Ghcin rl to be tasted @And maintainod a oe in R b';parasd modeo- If a rhannel has b@oon byparaod for; an' puroo tho bypass is. ccntimnuouiislyidctdi tho contrI Arom The hlTqO anld AlloAA~abIGV "ilue listed in TablA 13.1 1 ww 6r9bMo the wethod-Iongy das,'rhad in RafaGrsf -6 2nd 1, wh''h inop Rto all of the knownI WncO~taintigg applicablo for oash ono.Th oitdeg of I(P tar fatQrod irto the Of i I IlI II cnannes are ac~umoa To ODO~2tO wirnin mo aiio'..'ancocot mnoco uncortainty' rnzgnitisdor.
Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of setpoint comparator trip outputs, contact outputs, and bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment.
To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided.
If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide reactor trip and/or ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The system has been designed to trip in the event of a loss of power, directing the unit to a safe shutdown condition.
The SSPS performs the decision logic for actuating a reactor trip or ESF actuation, generates the electrical output signal that will initiate the required trip or actuation, and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.The setpoint comparator trip outputs, contact outputs and bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various unit upset and accident transients.
If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will initiate a reactor trip and/or send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition.
Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-7 B INSERT "A" Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line to verify that the signal or setpoint accuracy is within the allowance requirements of Reference
: 2. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated.
SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section. The Process Protection System is designed to permit any one channel to be tested and maintained at power in a bypassed mode. If a channel has been bypassed for any purpose, the bypass is continuously indicated in the control room.
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 0T The RTS functions to preserve the SLs during all AQOs and mitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in which the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted.Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RTS Functions.
The accident analysis described in Reference 3 takes credit for most RTS trip functions.
RTS trip functions that are retained yet not specifically credited in the accident analysis are implicitly credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These RTS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance.
They may also serve as backups to RTS trip Functions that were credited in the accident analysis.Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not explicitly modeled in the Safety Analyses.These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered nomi lues t regard to measurement accuracy.
as The LCO requires all in mentation p rforming an TS Function, listed in Table 3.3.1-1 to PERABLE. Th Allowable Va!e specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is least conservative alue of the _o Ac-'setpoint that the channel have when tested, su that a channel is OPERABLE if the -.?-fa''n setpoint is within the Q-f84e''d tolerance and is conservative with the respect to the Allowable Value during a CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount greater than or equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval.
In this manner, the actual setting of the channel (NTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point ofJ )6 time as long as the channel has not drifted beyond expected tolerances during the surveillance interval.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the.a6,-'af tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in referenced setpoint methodology
(--left criteria), and confirm o be operating within the statistical
?,-owances of the unce ty terms assigned (as- 4,, (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-9 B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 APPLICABLE If the actual setting of the channel is found to be coservative with SAFETY respect to the Allowable Value b eyond the-a4ew.,6 tolerance band, ANALYSES, the channel is OPERABLE but d graded. The degraded condition of the LCO, and channel will be further evaluate during performance of the SR. This APPLICABILITY evaluation will consist of reset g the channel setpoint to the NTSP (continued) (within the allowed tolerance and evaluating the channel response.
If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the chan eI is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion o the surveillance.
After the surveillance is completed, the channel oes-.fldui-condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A trip setpoint may be set more conservative than the NTSP as necessary in response to plant conditions.
However, in this case, the operability of this instrument must be verified based on the field setting and not the NTSP. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions.
The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels in each instrumentation Function, two channels of Manual Reactor Trip in each logic Function, and two trains in each Automatic Trip Logic Function.Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-four configuration are required when one RTS channel is also used as a control system input. This configuration accounts for the possibility of the shared channel failing in such a manner that it creates a transient that requires RTS action. In this case, the RTS will still provide protection, even with random failure of one of the other three protection channels.Three operable instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-three configuration are generally required when there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need for RTS trip and disable one RTS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing without causing a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the above general philosophy exist and are discussed below.(continued)
Watts Bar- Unit 2 B 3.3-10 (developmental)
B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
: 10. Reactor Coolant Flow -Low (continued)
In MODE 1 above the P-8 setpoint, a loss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions in the core because of the higher power level. In MODE 1 below the P-8 setpoint and above the P-7 setpoint, a loss of flow in two or more loops is required to actuate a reactor trip because of the lower power level and the greater margin to the design limit DNBR. Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on low flow are automatically blocked since there is t heat production to generate DNB conditions.
The Reactor C nt Flow-Low Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value are specified in 01 thorm al d cign flow A-ju -tod for ,-.-.0i.t
.-c (00pw* however, the Eagle-21TM values entered through the MMI are specified in an equivalent
% differential pressure.11. Undervoltacqe Reactor Coolant Pumps The Undervoltage RCPs trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in two or more RCS loops. The voltage to each RCP is monitored.
Above the P-7 setpoint, a loss of voltage detected on two or more RCP buses will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow -Low Trip Setpoint is reached in two or more RCS loops. The loss of voltage in two loops must be sustained for a length of time equal to or greater than that set in the time delay. Time delays are incorporated into the Undervoltage RCPs channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary electrical power transients.
The LCO requires one Undervoltage RCP channel per bus to be OPERABLE.In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint, the Undervoltage RCP trip must be OPERABLE.
Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7 setpoint, the reactor trip on loss of flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-23 B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.6.(continued)
The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate.
It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every 184 days.A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.Setpoints must be conservative with respect to the Allowable Values I specified in Table 3.3.1-1. w"--V 0 er The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit s t hOdology.The ""_as-f ' and ",r.-IX valu-o be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of Refere.oe_
6 _nd 7. apd .(,27 SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-10 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition.
The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 15, excpt f.---..Function 13. The justification for Function 13 is provided i Reference (3 and 15 3 (SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. he first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the conditi where the found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its a&4oRd.d toleraw t conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.uation of channel performance will verify that the channel will.continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service.6 CIL's &#xfd;d Uri J (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-56 B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.7 (continued)
For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the channels will be evaluated under the plant-e.errevtie rogram. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required re w and documentation of the condition.
The second i ote requires that the 4.zag setting for the channel be returned to within'ac-I,"4e tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), Se as-ltt and a~aupA tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance cedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Fimit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the,,-maft-i-Gh'Fnel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the~as-Je of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperabl SR 3.3.1.8 45if:i ~SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.8 is no longer required to be performed.
If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for greater than 4 hours, this Surveillance must be performed within 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. Note 2 states that this test shall include verification that the P-6 interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition.
The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within 31 days prior to reactor startup and 4 hours after reducing power below P-1 0 and P-6. The Frequency of "prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source and intermediate range instrument channels.
The Frequency of "Four hours after reducing power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate channels)and "Four hours after reducing power below P-6" (applicable to source range channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance.
The Frequency of every 31 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and 4 hours after reducing power below P-1 0 or P-6.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-57 B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 6 SR 3.3.1.8 (continued)
The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-1 0 for the intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the source range channels.Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required.
If power is to be maintained
< P-1 0 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required.
This test ensures that the NIS source and intermediate range channels are OPERABLE channels prior to taking the&#xfd;rq critical and after reducing power into the applicable ~Q/yr< P-6) for periods > 4 hours. %eeV *1 ',k4 F SR 3.3.1.8 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the fc'_' setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as  tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the .a,-4.afsetting for the channel be returned to within the 2swlat tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the .a-left and as.G'_'Rd tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as-4a channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the.as-latt tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
IL'2g A 1-n'(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-58 B RTS Instrumentation SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.10 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS (c""" ... SR 3 3B1.3.3s.1
...........
S 3..1 0 ism difie ~cJ two Notes as identified in T ; le 3.3 1 .he first Note requires luation of channel performance f the conditi w here the ._ 'di setting for the channel setpoint is o tside its _a-f ,,nd tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowabl Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the cl annel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis , ssumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint nethodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in doe channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after ret rning the channel to service the e e channels will be ev luated under the plan wective Action Program. ntry into the Cor ctive Action rogram will ensure required revie and documen tion of the condition.
The second Note requires that setting f r the channel be% .t~~ue .a814.tolerance of the NT .Where a setpoint 0L m-ore conservative than the NTSP is used in th lant surveillance procedures ing ,the aaJeft and -tolerances, as ap e, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will nsure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is If the na.sIpft channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the.as.4Q&.tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be ed inoperable.
SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric performed above 15% RTP. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. This Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1, and is not required for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry into MODE 2, because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-60 B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.11 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS-The 18-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has s these components usually pass the Surveillancew*pee ormed the.18-month Frequency.
I SR 3.3.1.11 is modifiek itwo Notes as i' in T ble 3.3. 1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance r the co ition where the setting for the channel setpoint is utside its as-fQnd.tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowa e Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the hannel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysi assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoin methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence i the channel performance prior to returning the channel to servic .For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after r urning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be aluated under the plant Corr c ion Program. try into the C rective Action Pro g will ensure required review d docume tation of the condition.
e second Note requires that the ar, Is setting r the channel be returned to wi *e as~la&tolerance of the NT P. Where a setpoint m nservative than the NTSP is used in th lant surveillance Sprocede as-left and a-_f, -,, tolerances, as ,appft-able, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ,,-etwe-t-"cient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the.as,-lAchannel setting cannot be returned to a setting withi ne.a.eli, tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be eclared inoperable.
SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18 months.The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-61 (developmental)
B RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
As appropriate, each channel's response must be verified every 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices is included in the testing. Response times cannot be determined during unit operation because equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18-month Frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
SR 3.3.1.15 is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response.REFERENCES
: 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 6.0, "Engineered Safety Features." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.0, "Instrumentation and Controls." 3. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analysis." 4. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE-279-1971,"Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," April 5, 1972.5. 10 CFR Part 50.49, "Environmental Qualifications of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." ,,,trk 6. WYCAP1-70441, Ro-" 0, "Sstpoit Mthdol,' for, Wags.. 0a; 2 7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Rev. 1,"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," May 1986 and June 1990.8. Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System Response Times." 9. Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-10271 -P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar, Westinghouse Letter WAT-D-10128.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-64 B INSERT "B" Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety Related Instrumentation," Revision 3.
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 ,,&#xfd;elehj BASES REFERENCES (continued) 10 67 .04 "Satpeipt fop, ,1,ugap oSafety 'Ro ,4td Inm......
n U-co in NcIo, Por Plnt " 11. WCAP-1 3632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996 12. WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.13. Deleted 14. WCAP-14333 P-A, Revision 1, "Probablistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998.15. WCAP-1 5376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003 16. WCAP-12472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994 (Addendum 2, April 2002).Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-65 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ESFAS initiates necessary safety systems, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating core design limits and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, and to mitigate accidents.
This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the ESFAS, as well as specifying LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.
Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSS for variables that have significant safety functions.
LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a protective action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded.
Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.
However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.The NTSP specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is a predetermined setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded.
As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the channel (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments).
In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not 9xceeded.
Therefore, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref._).(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-66 (developmental)
B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROU (continued)
ND Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specificatigo being capable of performing its safety functions(s)."'
.g solely on the TP to define OPERABILITY in Technica would be an overlhestrictive requirement if it weried as an OPERABILITY limit for the "= f@d"E value of a otection channel setting during a surveillance.
This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected.
This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective , ction would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the ,"_-fo ind setting of the protection channel. Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the d .as-leftolerance around the NTSP to ac(&#xfd; urf her drift during the next surveillance interval.During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more times during the unit life, the acceptable limits are: 1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB), 2. ue11 not occur, and 3. The RCS pressure SL o 2750 psi~shall not be exceeded.Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0, "Safety Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.
Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.(continued) 2 755fS~.5 0 Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-67 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The ESFAS instrumentation is segmented into three distinct but interconnected modules as identified below: " Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal or contact actuation based on the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured;" Signal processing equipment including process protection system, and field contacts:
provide analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning, setpoint comparison, process algorithm actuation (Digital Protection System), compatible electrical signal output to protection system channels, and control board/control room/ miscellaneous indications; and" Solid State Protection System (SSPS) including input, logic, and output bays: initiates the proper unit shutdown or engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the defined logic and based on the bistable, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs from the signal process control and protection system.Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as five, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters.
In many cases, field transmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the Reactor Trip System (RTS).In some cases, the same channels also provide control system inputs. To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the NTSP and Allowable Value. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor crn be ,vl, ted , Ahs,,en its. "as f,,nd" ,'librtianA da. ,r--imp-reu agains! it 'ocumentao" aceptaince crtrb.;, , ...........". .. .....1<AOej .(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-68 B INSERT "C" is determined by either "as found" calibration data evaluated during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel behavior observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
%Io Sianal Processina Eauioment Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments.
The process control equipment provides analog to digital conversion (Digital Protection System), signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with NTSPs derived from Analytical Limits established by the safety analyses.
Thocc oro dofino.d in..f~rnc..
: 6. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a setpoint comparator or contact is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays.However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing.
Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy.
The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.
These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 2.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-69 B INSERT "D" Analytical Limits are defined in FSAR, Chapter 6, (Reference 1), Chapter 7 (Reference 2), and Chapter 15 (Reference 3).
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) nomprafrntrc or rnnfact alp t arest Art, o1tP~t i~ onidQrod to be CHANNEL CALBRTIN ccroG.2, Theirip Jetpoints used in the bistables setpoint comparators, contact outputs are based on the analytical limitsetete4in Reference$F.
The calculation of the Nominal Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3. .2-1 is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment S -aweF&4 0 f, -2, r',-o 4A -1,V- 1 e0 that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 R 50.49 (Ref. 5), the NTSPs specified in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accompanyi LCO are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits. A detailed description of the methodology, used to calcula 8 NT.spra inlu...i..
h...... ex.l..t prI, i1A15 14P I~~~~~~~ ~ ~ -M. a .-I C .-M M 1 F r r The nominal Trip Setpoint-&#xfd;into the ..... r-.......
,_ tis more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to ackunt for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a COT_ N b;-fablc The NTSP is the value at which the bistables are set and is the expected value to be achieved during calibration.
The NTSP value is the LSSS and ensures the safety analysis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adjusted based on stated channel uncertainties.
Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted hen the-uJes-teft NTSP value is within the b4ae" 06 tolerance for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertainty allowance (e., + rack calibration and comparator setting uncertainties).
The NTSP/ alue is therefore considered a "nominal value" (i.e., expressed asa value without inequalities) for the purposes of the COT and C, ANNEL CALIBRATION.
a3 1W I&#xfd;&J Nominal T/oSetpoints, in conjunction with the use of a&-Teft and'a&4eet-) olerancsto ether with the requirements of the Allowable Value ensure that the of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptab-e, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the equipment functions as designed.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-70 B INSERT "E" NTSPs and as left and as found tolerance bands is provided in Reference
: 2. All of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel are factored into the determination of each NTSP and corresponding Allowable Value.INSERT "F" The Allowable Value serves as the as found Technical Specification OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the COT.
&#xb6;7 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Note that the Allowable alues listed in Table 3.3.2-1 are the least conservative value of the4& -''setpoint that a channel can have during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, COT, or a TADOT.1 I"6'&#xfd;,4 6,414 Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements of Reference
: 2. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated.
SRs for the channels are specified in the SR section.76-h 141=2r. 2nd Allowable V.ia'u .. listed In "' Th -, 3.0.2 ae basedem +..M.thn.. Irp.. .d.. ..r.he. i-- r...... 6, Which in.P@. .tc.ll of the kpp''~ *~c'~inti~
~plic~'ble for each c-hapnna.Tom'ntdoo H IA RA4QtQ -C4A:-- 4-&#xfd;thcc uncor... intio" oro into tho dotormi.n.tion." cf coah NT,- SP. ^l,, field ,4n nrq nd swign.lI w ,ipment f, r theris ah,-n., ar, aooumFod tc9~rt :'ti h iloacco hc netit Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment.
To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided.
If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation; generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation; and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.The outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients.
If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition.
Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-71 B INSERT 11G" The Process Protection System is designed to permit any one channel to be tested and maintained at power in a bypassed mode. If a channel has been bypassed for any purpose, the bypass is continuously indicated in the control room.
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Each SSPS train has a built in tes &#xfd;in dggi hat can a tomatically test the decision logic matrix functions and the actuation cfannels while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken out ofervice for testing, the other train is capable of providing unit monitori and protection until the testing has been completed.
The testing dee is semiautomatic to minimize testing time.The actuation of most ESF components is accomplished through master and slave relays. Some ESF components are actuated by relay logic.The SSPS energizes the master relays appropriate for the condition of the unit. Each master relay then energizes one or more slave relays, which then cause actuation of the end devices. The master and slave relays are routinely tested to ensure operation.
The test of the master relays energizes the relay, which then operates the contacts and applies a low voltage to the associated slave relays. The low voltage is not sufficient to actuate the slave relays but only demonstrates signal path continuity.
The SLAVE RELAY TEST actuates the devices if their operation will not interfere with continued unit operation.
For the latter case, actual component operation is prevented by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit, and slave relay contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one or more ESFAS Functions.
One of the ESFAS Functions is the primary actuation signal for that accident.
An ESFAS Function may be the primary actuation signal for more than one type of accident.
An ESFAS Function may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more other accidents.
For example, Pressurizer Pressure -Low is a primary actuation signal for small loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for steam line breaks (SLBs) outside containment.
Functions such as manual initiation, not specifically credited in the accident safety analysis, are implicitly credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance.
These Functions may also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analysis (Ref. 3).I (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-72 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not explicitly modeled in the Safety Analyses.These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions.occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE.
The 5  O ,owab*Value specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is the least conservative value"of tht the channel can have when tested, such that he asfo'_'md setpoint is withiiiiiii aa-fwa tolerance and is conservative with respect to t able Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION L OPERATIONAL TEST I e owable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount/greater than o/equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval.
In this manner, the actual setting of the channel (NTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the channel has not drifted beyond expected tolerances during the surveillance interval.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the ai&4@4-tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in th "ferenced setpoint methodology (a%4e4 criteria), and confir ed to be operating within the statistical allo nces of t ternis-assigned Oet!&#xfd;criteria).
4 5" (-A If the actual setting of the channel is found to be conser ve with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the a&4Qwad tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE but degraded.
The degraded condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTSP (within the allowed tolerance) and evaluating the channel response.
If the channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-73 B INSERT "H" After the surveillance is completed, the channel as found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS" 9 v SR 3.3.2.1 (continued)
Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and reliability.
If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure, is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.S R 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The SSPS is tested every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, using the semiautomatic tester. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation.
Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function.
In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity.
This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and that there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is justified in Reference 18.SIR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity.
This test is performed every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 18.SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a COT.A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
Setpoints must be found-wiAtWthe Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1.1i44]SeS'vi, N',4 r"y&/-/ 7' (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-116 B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.4 (continued) o f REQUIREMENTS The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
+r ) OjA & The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions RfQF The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 18, except for Function 7. The Frequency for Function 7 is justified in References 10 and 18.-
ismodified by two Notes as identified in Table 'The first Note reqies evaluation of channel performance for the condi ' n where the r setting for the channel setpoint is outside its a_-fa'md tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be? .BLE but degraded, after returning the channel to servic&#xfd; erformance o ese channels will be evaluated under the tCorrective Action Progra .Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and cumentation of the condition.
The afrt .. te.requires that the ar.-Is# setting for the channel be returned"..- to within the a&-I tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conse ye the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), t easl and a&-fo'.d tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance proce re setpoint.
This will ensure that s cient margin to the Safety Li t and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the channel setting cann t be returned to a setting within the-as 4-ef# tolerance of the NTSP, then t e channel shall be declared inoperable.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-117 (developmental)
B ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (r,  SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST for slave relays K603A, K603B, K604A, K604B, K607A, K607B, K609A, K609B, K612A, K625A, and K625B. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment which may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment.
Actuation equipment which may not be operated in the design mitigation MODE is prevented from operation by the slave relay test circuit.For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. This test is performed every 18 months. The Frequency is justified by TVA correspondence to the NRC dated November 9, 1984 (Ref. 9) and Design Change Notice W-38238-A associated documentation (Reference 12), and for relays K607A, K607B, and K612A, Westinghouse letter to TVA (Ref. 11).SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pumps. It is performed every 18 months. The Frequency is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation functions.
The manual initiation functions have no associated setpoints.
SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
11-&#xfd;A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the Watts Bar setpoint methodology.
The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-119 A INSERT "I" SR 3.3.2.8 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as left setting for the channel be returned to within the as left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the as left and as found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint.
This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.9 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of sensor/transmitter drift in the setpoint methodology.
This SR is modified by a Note stating that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable.
For channels with a trip time delay (TTD), this test re adj usted correctly.
SR 3.3.2.9 is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the con 'on 5 where thdela&#xfd;-'
setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as fe'--R.d tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology.
The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to e of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program_.__e--.Lnsure required revieW d documentation of the condition.
The\second-Noerequires that the as.left.setting for the channel be returned to within the U-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conser, the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field setting), the ft and a_-o-ad tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance proced&#xfd; setpoint.
This will ensure that_s _nt margin to the Safety Limi: and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the t channel setting canno be returned to a setting within the-ee-..-le tolerance of the NTSP, then tho channel s e ared inoperable.
SR 3.3.2.10 .This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIMES are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.Response Time testing acceptance criteria are included in Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2 (Ref. 8). Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the NTSP value at the sensor, to the point at which the (continued)
Watts Bar- Unit 2 B 3.3-120 (developmental)
B 0,r- ESFAS Instrumentation-f/,s' B 3.3.2 BASES REFERENCES
: 6. WCAP 17044, RP, 0, ,",atprnt bMelthbntdAnltgr
\Al~ffQ R~r I nit , (continued)
I 7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1 and Supplement 2, Rev. 1,"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and"Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System." May 1986 and June 1990.8. Watts Bar Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.3.2,"Engineered Safety Feature Response Times." 9. TVA Letter to NRC, November 9, 1984, "Request for Exemption of Quarterly Slave Relay Testing, (L44 841109 808)." 10. Evaluation of the applicability of WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 1, and Supplement 2, Revision 1, to Watts Bar, Westinghouse letter to TVA WAT-D-10128.
: 11. Westinghouse letter to TVA (WAT-D-8347), September 25, 1990,"Charging/Letdown Isolation Transients" (T33 911231 810).12. Unit I Design Change Notice W-38238 and Unit 2 Engineering Document Construction Release 53352 and associated documentation.
: 13. WCAP-1 3877-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays Used As SSPS Slave Relays." 14. Not Applicable for Unit 2 15. WCAP-13632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1996.16. WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests," October 1998.17. WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1, "Probablistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998 (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-123 (developmental)
B INSERT "J" Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety Related Instrumentation," Revision 3.
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES REFERENCES (continued)
: 18. WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003 19. Westinghouse letter to TVA, WAT-D-1 1248, "Revised Justification for Applicability of Instrumentation Technical Specification Improvements to the Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump Signal," June 2004.20. Letter from John G. Lamb (NRC) to Mr. Preston D. Swafford (TVA)dated March 4, 2009, Includes Enclosures (a) Amendment No. 75 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit I and (b) NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) for Amendment No. 75.21.P A P I ln~trumont2tion," Rovicion 3.22. WCAP-1 3878-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Potter &Brumfield MDR Series Relays." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-124 B LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation.
Undervoltage protection will generate an LOP start if a loss of voltage or degraded voltage condition occurs in the switchyard.
There are four LOP start signals, one for each 6.9 kV shutdown board.Three degraded voltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for detecting a sustained undervoltage condition.
The relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic configuration to generate a supply breaker trip signal if the voltage is below 96% for 10 seconds (nominal).
Additionally, three undervoltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for the purpose of detecting a loss of voltage condition.
These relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic to generate a supply breaker trip signal if the voltage is below 87% for 0.75 seconds (nominal).
Once the supply breakers have been opened, either one of two induction disk type relays, which have a voltage setpoint of 70% of 6.9 kV (nominal, decreasing) and an intemal time delay of 0.5 seconds (nominal) at zero volts, will start the diesel generators.
Four additional induction disk type relays, in a logic configuration of one-of-two taken twice which have a voltage setpoint of 70% of 6.9 kV (nominal, decreasing) and an internal time delay of 3 seconds (nominal), at zero volts, will initiate load shedding of the 6.9 kV shutdown board loads and selected loads on the 480 V shutdown boards and close the 480 V shutdown boards' current limiting reactor bypass breaker. The LOP start actuation is described in FSAR Section 8.3, "Onsite (Standby)
Power System" (Ref. 1).Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values tf 7 he&The Trip Setpoints used in the relays and timers aretAped o;re analytical limits presented in TVA calculations (References 3, 1, and A. The selection of these Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and time delays are taken into account.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-147 (developmental)
A LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES ACTIONS C.A (continued)
Condition C applies to each of the LOP DG start Functions when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A or B are not met.In these circumstances the Conditions specified in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," or LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources -Shutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately.
The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety.SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to refer to Table 3.3.5-1 to determine which REQUIREMENTS Surveillance Requirements apply for each LOP Fun /SR 3.3.5.1a SR 3.3.5.1 is the performance of a TADO .This test is performed every 92 days. The test checks operation of t undervoltage and degraded voltage relays that provide actuation
'inals. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the ins ment channel functions as required Io (3 j vedfyin.goe i setting are consistent with those Se$'rT ] sebs ed by the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the relays and timers and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
This SR has been modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays/timers.
Relay/timer setpoints require elaborate bench calibration and are verified during a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
SR 3.3.5.2 SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as shown in Reference 1.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-151 (developmental)
B LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2 (continued) as REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 6 mon EL CALIBRATION is a check of the four functions.
The test verf s that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the neces ry range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifi that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the and, and-fo .inisetting are consistent with those established by the setpoin methodology.
P 0 1 4, o The Frequency of 6 months is based on operating experience an justified by the assumption of a 6-month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.SR 3.3.5.3 SR 3.3.5.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as shown in Reference 1.A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the four functions.
The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the eo,4e@k and e& f-"..d setting are consistent with those established by the s oint met logy.The Frequency of 18 months i based on o erating experience and consistency with the typical in stry refuelin cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18-month c ibration interv in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift i the setpoint an 1P/as U J (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-152 (developmental)
B LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES REFERENCES
: 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Sec on 8.3, "Onsite (Standby)
Power System." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, S 1 ction 15.0, "Accident Analysis." 3. WTA Calculation E21n19202001, "6.9 kV ShUtdown .> Logic Boards Undervoltage Relays Requirements/Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation." J P m 4. iocnnicav l-409wir-owmen r.'anuJI, &#xfd;isction id.i4., 'Lnglo1R@@F9 Safety (98PAS) IRstFuFAenteben." 6 o-'. TVA Calculation TDR SYS.21 1-LV1, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation TDR SYS.211-LV1." 5. -TVA Calculation TDR SYS.21 1-DS1, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation TDR SYS.21 1 -DS1 ." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-153 B Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The SR is modified by a Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the master relays of the ESFAS instrumentation.
SR 3.3.6.4 A COT is performed every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
The Frequency is based on the staff recommendation for increasing the availability of radiation monitors according to NUREG-1 366 (Ref. 2). This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment vent system isolation.
The ,,tpoit shall be l-f4 ....i t -wi,..4, the ..U...nt unit sparifir ,hl.br.tio
.proc.d&#xf7;-ur takaRen..
.There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the--a,,ftl andc' e etting are consistent with those establishe y the setpoint meodology.
sas SR 3.3.6.5 SR 3.3.6.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment.
Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay.This test is performed every 92 days. The Frequency is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry operating experience.
For ESFAS slave relays which are Westinghouse type AR or Potter &Brumfield MDR series relays, the SLAVE RELAY TEST is performed every 18 months. The frequency is based on the relay reliability assessments presented in References 3 and 5. These reliability assessments are relay specific and apply only to Westinghouse type AR and Potter & Brumfield MDR series relays with AC coils. Note that for normally energized applications, the relays may require periodic replacement in accordance with the guidance given in References 3 and 5.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-161 (developmental)
B Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.6.6 SR 3.3.6.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).For these tests, the relay trip setpoints are verified and adjusted as necessary.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.SR 3.3.6.7 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.1The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance." 2. NUREG-1366, "Improvement to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements," December 1992.3. WCAP-1 3877-P-A, Revision 2, "Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays Used as SSPS Slave Relays." (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-162 B INSERT "K" There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as left and as found settings are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.7-1 REQUIREMENTS determines which SRs apply to which CREVS Actuation Functions.
SR 3.3.7.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels.
It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability.
If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.SR 3.3.7.2 A COT is performed once every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function.
This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the CREVS actuation.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the acdase setting are consistent with those established by the set nt(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.3-168 (developmental)
B CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.7.3 SR 3.3.7.3 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils.In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.SR 3.3.7.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the&#xfd; and setting are cons ise established by the setpoint methodol yt..1 j(4. s ) ti)n wt The Frequency is based on ian=s consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.0 REFERENCES None Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-169 B ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.8.2 (continue d) A COT is performed once every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function.
This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the ABGTS actuation.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the =:Z setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
SR 3.3.8.3 SR 3.3.8.3 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the manual actuation functions and is performed every 18 months. Each manual actuation function is tested up to, and including, the relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (e.g., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.9 The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.SR 3.3.8.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the ar,,-4e and A.s f-,".d setti are consistent with th .ose established Wntpo~t methodJt gy>REFERENCES
: 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance." Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.3-176 B Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.10 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)B 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves BACKGROUND The presnzsurizer sfety, vles provide, in conjunction with the Reactor Protection SystemJ overpressure protection for the RCS. The pressurizer safety valves are tally enclosed pop type, spring loaded, self actuated valves with back ressure compensation.
The safety valves are designed to prevent the s stem pressure from exceeding the system Safety Limit (SL), 2735 psig, which is 110% of the design pressure.Because the safety valves are totally enclosed and self actuating, they are considered independent components.
The relief capacity for each valve, 420,000 lb/hr, is based on postulated overpressure transient conditions resulting from a complete loss of steam flow to the turbine.This event results in the maximum surge rate into the pressurizer, which specifies the minimum relief capacity for the safety valves. The discharge flow from the pressurizer safety valves is directed to the pressurizer relief tank. This discharge flow is indicated by an increase in temperature downstream of the pressurizer safety valves or increase in the pressurizer relief tank temperature or level.Overpressure protection is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; however, in MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperature
< the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR, MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on, overpressure protection is provided by operating procedures and by meeting the requirements of LCO 3.4.12, "Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)." The upper and lower pressure limits are based on a +/- 3% tolerance.
The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, 3, and MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures
> the COMS arming temperature specified in the PTLR. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established.
The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents.
OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to 110% of design pressure.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.4-46 (developmental)
B Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that each 24 inch containment lower compartment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to < 500 is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analyses of References 1 and 2. If a LOCA occurs, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis.
At other times when purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies), pressurization concerns are not present, thus the purge valves can be fully open. The 18-month Frequency is appropriate because the blocking devices are typically removed only during a refueling outage.SR 3.6.3.8 This SR ensures that the combined leakage rate of all Shield Buildinglle akage paths is less than or equal to the specified leakage rate.Th es assurance that the assumptions in the safety analysis are et. The bypass leakage rate prior to the first startup after performing a leakage test, requires calculation using maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves). If the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange, then the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. At all other times, the leakage rate will be calculated using minimum pathway leakage.The frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria.Although not a part of La, the Shield Building Bypass leakage path combined leakage rate is determined using the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Type B and C leakage rates for the applicable barriers.Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.6-25 (developmental)
A AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.2 (continued)
The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both: a. An inoperable DG exists; and b. A required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) is inoperable.
If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one or more DGs inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.Discovering one or more required DGs in Train A or one or more DGs in Train B inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.B.3.1 and B.3.2 Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DG(s). If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed.o f the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) uld be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition EoCO 3.8.1 would be entered if the other n6 -ri (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-8 (developmental)
A INSERT "L" For the performance of a Surveillance, Required Action B.3.1 is considered satisfied since the cause of the DG being inoperable is apparent.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.8.1.14 Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph C2.2.9, requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously for an interval of not less than 24 hours, _> 2 hours of which is at a load between 105% and 110% of the continuous duty rating and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to 90% to 100% of the continuous duty rating of the DG. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions.
The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor of > 0.8 and < 0.9. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.
The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
This Surveillance is modified by three Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the power factor limit will not invalidate the test. Note 2 establishes that this SR may be performed on only one DG at a time while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. This is necessary to ensure the proper response to an operational transient (i.e., loss of offsite power, ESF actuation).
Therefore, three DGs must be maintained operable and in a standby condition during performance of this test. In this configuration, the plant will remain within its design basis, since at all times safe shutdown can be achieved with two DGs in the same train.Note 3 establishes that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Examples of unplanned events may include: 1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available; and 2) Post-corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability.
.1L1-&#xfd;coninued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 (developmental)
B 3.8-25 B AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR ' 8 111 &04 -,n19)REQUIREMENTS Prior to porFoRmancQ of the& SR in MdQ6 1 or 2, --4-:n- -arotkon to-A ifbic that 2doGu61tQ codtoW x- orpromAo fth R h rFquircd option" .ro. dcnfind in Boo c. Table 8.8.1 ,2 SR 3.8.1.15 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. The minimum voltage and frequency stated in the SR are those necessary to ensure the DG can accept DBA loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency levels. Stable operation at the nominal voltage and frequency values is also essential to establishing DG OPERABILITY, but a time constraint is not imposed. This is because a typical DG will experience a period of voltage and frequency oscillations prior to reaching steady state operation if these oscillations are not dampened out by load application.
This period may extend beyond the 10 seconds acceptance criteria and could be a cause for failing the SR.In lieu of a time constraint in the SR, WBN will monitor and trend the actual time to reach steady state operation as a means of ensuring there is no voltage regulator or governor degradation which could cause a DG to become inoperable.
The 10 seconds time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1.The DG engines for WBN have an oil circulation and soakback system that operates continuously to preclude the need for a prelube and warmup when a DG is started from standby.This SR is modified by a Note to ensure that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions.
Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-26 (developmental)
A DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4,13 a. 0'REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A battery service test is a special test of battery capability,.
e-fettrrd, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to.worst case design duty cycle requirements based on References 10 and 12.The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 6) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations or at some other outage, with intervals between tests, not to exceed 18 months.This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test once per 60 months. The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates: the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated one-minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.A modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle.) This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity.
Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test.The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance may perturb the vital electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems.However, this Surveillance may be performed in MODES I, 2, 3, or 4 provided that Vital Battery V is substituted in accordance with LCO Note 1. For the DG DC electrical subsystem, this surveillance may be performed in MODES I, 2, 3, or 4 in conjunction with LCO 3.8.1 .B since the supplied loads are only for the inoperable diesel generator and would not otherwise challenge safety system loads which are supplied (continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-60 (developmental)
B DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.13 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS from vital electrical distribution systems. Additionally, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Examples of unplanned events may include: 1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available; and 2) Post-corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maint 0 ITY or reliability.
SR 3.8.4.14 ,, J "U4 J A battery performance discharge test is test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the es-fethdw-condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.13.
Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.14; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.14 while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.13 at the same time.The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 9) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 5). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer rating. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.(continued)
Watts Bar -Unit 2 B 3.8-61 (developmental)
B ENCLOSURE9 New Regulatory Commitments Prior to implementation of the Unit 2 TS, TVA will: 1. Revise applicable attachment(s) of Technical Instruction TI-1 19, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting, to require that the surveillance interval be evaluated and reduced, when needed, if two or more P&B MDR series relays used for Unit 2 TS LCOs 3.3.2 and 3.3.6 fail within a 12-month interval.2. Confirm the applicability of the WCAP-1 3878, Rev. 1 analyses for P&B MDR series relays.3. Develop a Procurement Engineering Group package for procurement of P&B MDR series relays.This document will ensure TVA's procurement program for P&B MDR relays is adequate for detecting the types of failures that are discussed in References 9, 10, 11 and 12 of WCAP-13878, Revision 1.4. For function 3. of Unit 2 TS Table 3.3.61, revise the calculation and submit a change to the Unit 2 TS using the manufacturer's final detector sensitivity value.}}

Latest revision as of 05:43, 13 January 2025

Response to NRC Staff Comments on Developmental Revisions of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and Technical Specification Bases; Submittal of Developmental Revision F
ML11174A282
Person / Time
Site: Watts Bar Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/21/2011
From: Stinson D
Tennessee Valley Authority
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML11174A282 (356)
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