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| number = ML14209A847
| number = ML14209A847
| issue date = 07/24/2014
| issue date = 07/24/2014
| title = Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Special Written Report of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material on 05/30/2014
| title = Special Written Report of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material on 05/30/2014
| author name = Gatlin T D
| author name = Gatlin T
| author affiliation = South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
| author affiliation = South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 15: Line 15:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Thomas D. GatlinVice President, Nuclear Operations803.345.4342A SCANA COMPANY July 24, 2014Document Control DeskU. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555
{{#Wiki_filter:Thomas D. Gatlin Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4342 A SCANA COMPANY July 24, 2014 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555


==Dear Sir / Madam:==
==Dear Sir / Madam:==
==Subject:==
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 SPECIAL REPORT (SPR) 2014-005 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company is submitting this report pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2201 (b)(1) Reports of theft or loss of licensed material, written reports. On May 30, 2014, it was determined that one nuclear instrumentation incore detector containing a very small amount of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) could not be located at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). Detectors of this type are used to measure incore neutron flux (intensity of neutron radiation) inside the reactor core vessel. The detector contains a very small amount of Uranium-235 (0.0041 grams), which qualifies it as. SNM. The detector is believed to be located in a temporary disposal location in the Reactor Building (RB). This event was reported to the NRC by event notification (EN) 50229 on June 26, 2014.
The attachment contains the information required by 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1).
Should you have any questions, please call Mr. Bruce Thompson at (803) 931-5042.
Very truly yours, Thomas D. Gatlin WLT/TDG/wm Attachment c:
K. B. Marsh S. A. Williams S. A. Byrne NRC Resident Inspector J. B. Archie K. M. Sutton N. S. Carns INPO Records Center J. H. Hamilton NSRC J. W. Williams RTS (CR-14-03113)
W. M. Cherry File (818.08)
V. M. McCree PRSF (RC-14-0124)
Virgil C. Summer Station -Post Office Box 88.- Jenkinsville, SC.- 29065.- F (803) 941-9776 h
Document Control Desk Attachment CR-14-03113 RC-14-0124 Page 1 of 3 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) Unit 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 SPECIAL REPORT (SPR) 2014-005 ATTACHMENT INFORMATION REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)
(i) A description of the licensed material involved, including kind, quantity, and chemical and physical form:
One incore detector manufactured by Imaging and Sensing Technology is currently unaccounted for. Movable incore detectors are used to measure the neutron flux inside the reactor core. Incore detectors are approximately 2.1 inches in length and 0.188 inches in diameter. The stainless steel detector shell is welded to the leading end of helical wrap drive cable and to stainless steel sheathed coaxial cable. Each detector of this type contains 0.0041 grams of Uranium-235 prior to irradiation; therefore, they are classified as SNM.
(ii) A description of the circumstances under which the loss or theft occurred:
During RF-21, it was determined that seven incore detectors were present in a temporary disposal location within the reactor building (RB). This conflicted with station records indicating that there should be nine. An examination of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) records from 1982 to 2014 identified a series of errors. The examination determined that when various spent detectors stored onsite were consolidated into a single storage location in 2007, a single incore detector was not properly accounted for. This discrepancy was not detected or reported at the actual time of the unaccountability of the incore detector, because an administrative error appears to have obscured the discrepancy.
Document Control Desk Attachment CR-14-03113 RC-14-0124 Page 2 of 3 (iii) A statement of disposition, or probable disposition, of the licensed material involved:
Although the detector could not be physically located, there is a high probability that the detector is onsite within the radiologically controlled area.
(iv) Exposures of individuals to radiation, circumstances under which the exposures occurred, and the possible total effective dose equivalent to persons in unrestricted areas:
There is no known exposure to individuals. It is believed that the detector is located onsite within the radiologically controlled area; therefore, no inadvertent radiation exposures are believed to have occurred as a result of this event.
This material event contains a "less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. Sources that are "Less than International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 3 sources,"
are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
(v) Actions that have been taken, or will be taken, to recover the material:
The remaining spent incore detectors not located in the RB are stored in a single location and container. Station personnel conducted a complete re-inventory of this storage container. No additional incore detectors were found.
The access of the temporary disposal location for incore detectors within the RB was searched for the lost detector during the spring 2014 refueling outage (RF21). This area will be more thoroughly searched with special inspection equipment during the fall 2015 refueling outage (RF22).
(vi) Procedures or measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence of the loss or theft of licensed material:
The programmatic faults and procedure weaknesses that would have allowed this error to occur and continue to remain undetected due to other errors were corrected by more recent program changes.
V.C. Summer Nuclear Station's (VCSNS) SNM procedure and program document was divided into four separate procedures in order to more clearly identify the SNM Program and its basis. Each major function of the SNM program is now described in a separate procedure. This program update also incorporated accountability guidelines from updated ANSI Standard N15.8 - 2009, Methods of Nuclear Material Control - Material


==Subject:==
Document Control Desk Attachment CR-14-03113 RC-14-0124 Page 3 of 3 Control Systems - Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants. This standard was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 5.29, Revision 2, Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, issued June 2013.
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1DOCKET NO. 50-395OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12SPECIAL REPORT (SPR) 2014-005South Carolina Electric & Gas Company is submitting this report pursuant to therequirements of 10 CFR 20.2201 (b)(1) Reports of theft or loss of licensed material,written reports. On May 30, 2014, it was determined that one nuclear instrumentationincore detector containing a very small amount of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) couldnot be located at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). Detectors of this type areused to measure incore neutron flux (intensity of neutron radiation) inside the reactorcore vessel. The detector contains a very small amount of Uranium-235 (0.0041grams), which qualifies it as. SNM. The detector is believed to be located in a temporarydisposal location in the Reactor Building (RB). This event was reported to the NRC byevent notification (EN) 50229 on June 26, 2014.The attachment contains the information required by 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1).Should you have any questions, please call Mr. Bruce Thompson at (803) 931-5042.Very truly yours,Thomas D. GatlinWLT/TDG/wmAttachmentc: K. B. Marsh S. A. WilliamsS. A. Byrne NRC Resident InspectorJ. B. Archie K. M. SuttonN. S. Carns INPO Records CenterJ. H. Hamilton NSRCJ. W. Williams RTS (CR-14-03113)W. M. Cherry File (818.08)V. M. McCree PRSF (RC-14-0124)Virgil C. Summer Station -Post Office Box 88.- Jenkinsville, SC.- 29065.- F (803) 941-9776 h Document Control DeskAttachmentCR-14-03113RC-14-0124Page 1 of 3VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) Unit 1DOCKET NO. 50-395OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12SPECIAL REPORT (SPR) 2014-005ATTACHMENTINFORMATION REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)(i) A description of the licensed material involved, including kind, quantity, andchemical and physical form:One incore detector manufactured by Imaging and Sensing Technology is currentlyunaccounted for. Movable incore detectors are used to measure the neutron flux insidethe reactor core. Incore detectors are approximately 2.1 inches in length and 0.188inches in diameter. The stainless steel detector shell is welded to the leading end ofhelical wrap drive cable and to stainless steel sheathed coaxial cable. Each detector ofthis type contains 0.0041 grams of Uranium-235 prior to irradiation; therefore, they areclassified as SNM.(ii) A description of the circumstances under which the loss or theft occurred:During RF-21, it was determined that seven incore detectors were present in atemporary disposal location within the reactor building (RB). This conflicted with stationrecords indicating that there should be nine. An examination of Special NuclearMaterials (SNM) records from 1982 to 2014 identified a series of errors. Theexamination determined that when various spent detectors stored onsite wereconsolidated into a single storage location in 2007, a single incore detector was notproperly accounted for. This discrepancy was not detected or reported at the actualtime of the unaccountability of the incore detector, because an administrative errorappears to have obscured the discrepancy.
The VCSNS SNM control procedure was revised to include programmatic requirements for tracking incore detectors with Material Transfer Forms (MTFs).
Document Control DeskAttachmentCR-14-03113RC-14-0124Page 2 of 3(iii) A statement of disposition, or probable disposition, of the licensed materialinvolved:Although the detector could not be physically located, there is a high probability that thedetector is onsite within the radiologically controlled area.(iv) Exposures of individuals to radiation, circumstances under which theexposures occurred, and the possible total effective dose equivalent to personsin unrestricted areas:There is no known exposure to individuals. It is believed that the detector is locatedonsite within the radiologically controlled area; therefore, no inadvertent radiationexposures are believed to have occurred as a result of this event.This material event contains a "less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. Sourcesthat are "Less than International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 3 sources,"are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals orcontain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanentinjury.(v) Actions that have been taken, or will be taken, to recover the material:The remaining spent incore detectors not located in the RB are stored in a singlelocation and container. Station personnel conducted a complete re-inventory of thisstorage container. No additional incore detectors were found.The access of the temporary disposal location for incore detectors within the RB wassearched for the lost detector during the spring 2014 refueling outage (RF21). Thisarea will be more thoroughly searched with special inspection equipment during the fall2015 refueling outage (RF22).(vi) Procedures or measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure againsta recurrence of the loss or theft of licensed material:The programmatic faults and procedure weaknesses that would have allowed this errorto occur and continue to remain undetected due to other errors were corrected by morerecent program changes.V.C. Summer Nuclear Station's (VCSNS) SNM procedure and program document wasdivided into four separate procedures in order to more clearly identify the SNM Programand its basis. Each major function of the SNM program is now described in a separateprocedure. This program update also incorporated accountability guidelines fromupdated ANSI Standard N15.8 -2009, Methods of Nuclear Material Control -Material Document Control DeskAttachmentCR-14-03113RC-14-0124Page 3 of 3Control Systems -Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems forNuclear Power Plants. This standard was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide5.29, Revision 2, Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for NuclearPower Plants, issued June 2013.The VCSNS SNM control procedure was revised to include programmatic requirementsfor tracking incore detectors with Material Transfer Forms (MTFs).The following additional enhancements will be made to the VCSNS SNM physicalinventory procedure and will be tracked by the corrective action program:" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a ledger ofincore detectors broken down by location as part of the non-fuel SNM bookinventory." VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include arequirement that each Item Control Area (ICA) inventory signoff include a verifierinstead of one verifier for the total inventory." VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include arequirement that all SNM material movements be sent to records or put intorecords as part of a work order step." VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include arequirement as acceptance criteria that each annual or complete inventory mustbe compared with and reconciled with the last annual or complete inventory." VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include arequirement to create a unique spreadsheet database file and a pdf version ofthe file for each time an inventory, partial or full, is conducted.}}
The following additional enhancements will be made to the VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure and will be tracked by the corrective action program:
" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a ledger of incore detectors broken down by location as part of the non-fuel SNM book inventory.
" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement that each Item Control Area (ICA) inventory signoff include a verifier instead of one verifier for the total inventory.
" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement that all SNM material movements be sent to records or put into records as part of a work order step.
" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement as acceptance criteria that each annual or complete inventory must be compared with and reconciled with the last annual or complete inventory.
" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement to create a unique spreadsheet database file and a pdf version of the file for each time an inventory, partial or full, is conducted.}}

Latest revision as of 17:45, 10 January 2025

Special Written Report of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material on 05/30/2014
ML14209A847
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 07/24/2014
From: Gatlin T
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML14209A847 (4)


Text

Thomas D. Gatlin Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4342 A SCANA COMPANY July 24, 2014 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir / Madam:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 SPECIAL REPORT (SPR) 2014-005 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company is submitting this report pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2201 (b)(1) Reports of theft or loss of licensed material, written reports. On May 30, 2014, it was determined that one nuclear instrumentation incore detector containing a very small amount of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) could not be located at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). Detectors of this type are used to measure incore neutron flux (intensity of neutron radiation) inside the reactor core vessel. The detector contains a very small amount of Uranium-235 (0.0041 grams), which qualifies it as. SNM. The detector is believed to be located in a temporary disposal location in the Reactor Building (RB). This event was reported to the NRC by event notification50229 on June 26, 2014.

The attachment contains the information required by 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1).

Should you have any questions, please call Mr. Bruce Thompson at (803) 931-5042.

Very truly yours, Thomas D. Gatlin WLT/TDG/wm Attachment c:

K. B. Marsh S. A. Williams S. A. Byrne NRC Resident Inspector J. B. Archie K. M. Sutton N. S. Carns INPO Records Center J. H. Hamilton NSRC J. W. Williams RTS (CR-14-03113)

W. M. Cherry File (818.08)

V. M. McCree PRSF (RC-14-0124)

Virgil C. Summer Station -Post Office Box 88.- Jenkinsville, SC.- 29065.- F (803) 941-9776 h

Document Control Desk Attachment CR-14-03113 RC-14-0124 Page 1 of 3 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) Unit 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 SPECIAL REPORT (SPR) 2014-005 ATTACHMENT INFORMATION REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)

(i) A description of the licensed material involved, including kind, quantity, and chemical and physical form:

One incore detector manufactured by Imaging and Sensing Technology is currently unaccounted for. Movable incore detectors are used to measure the neutron flux inside the reactor core. Incore detectors are approximately 2.1 inches in length and 0.188 inches in diameter. The stainless steel detector shell is welded to the leading end of helical wrap drive cable and to stainless steel sheathed coaxial cable. Each detector of this type contains 0.0041 grams of Uranium-235 prior to irradiation; therefore, they are classified as SNM.

(ii) A description of the circumstances under which the loss or theft occurred:

During RF-21, it was determined that seven incore detectors were present in a temporary disposal location within the reactor building (RB). This conflicted with station records indicating that there should be nine. An examination of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) records from 1982 to 2014 identified a series of errors. The examination determined that when various spent detectors stored onsite were consolidated into a single storage location in 2007, a single incore detector was not properly accounted for. This discrepancy was not detected or reported at the actual time of the unaccountability of the incore detector, because an administrative error appears to have obscured the discrepancy.

Document Control Desk Attachment CR-14-03113 RC-14-0124 Page 2 of 3 (iii) A statement of disposition, or probable disposition, of the licensed material involved:

Although the detector could not be physically located, there is a high probability that the detector is onsite within the radiologically controlled area.

(iv) Exposures of individuals to radiation, circumstances under which the exposures occurred, and the possible total effective dose equivalent to persons in unrestricted areas:

There is no known exposure to individuals. It is believed that the detector is located onsite within the radiologically controlled area; therefore, no inadvertent radiation exposures are believed to have occurred as a result of this event.

This material event contains a "less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. Sources that are "Less than International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 3 sources,"

are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

(v) Actions that have been taken, or will be taken, to recover the material:

The remaining spent incore detectors not located in the RB are stored in a single location and container. Station personnel conducted a complete re-inventory of this storage container. No additional incore detectors were found.

The access of the temporary disposal location for incore detectors within the RB was searched for the lost detector during the spring 2014 refueling outage (RF21). This area will be more thoroughly searched with special inspection equipment during the fall 2015 refueling outage (RF22).

(vi) Procedures or measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence of the loss or theft of licensed material:

The programmatic faults and procedure weaknesses that would have allowed this error to occur and continue to remain undetected due to other errors were corrected by more recent program changes.

V.C. Summer Nuclear Station's (VCSNS) SNM procedure and program document was divided into four separate procedures in order to more clearly identify the SNM Program and its basis. Each major function of the SNM program is now described in a separate procedure. This program update also incorporated accountability guidelines from updated ANSI Standard N15.8 - 2009, Methods of Nuclear Material Control - Material

Document Control Desk Attachment CR-14-03113 RC-14-0124 Page 3 of 3 Control Systems - Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants. This standard was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 5.29, Revision 2, Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, issued June 2013.

The VCSNS SNM control procedure was revised to include programmatic requirements for tracking incore detectors with Material Transfer Forms (MTFs).

The following additional enhancements will be made to the VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure and will be tracked by the corrective action program:

" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a ledger of incore detectors broken down by location as part of the non-fuel SNM book inventory.

" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement that each Item Control Area (ICA) inventory signoff include a verifier instead of one verifier for the total inventory.

" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement that all SNM material movements be sent to records or put into records as part of a work order step.

" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement as acceptance criteria that each annual or complete inventory must be compared with and reconciled with the last annual or complete inventory.

" VCSNS SNM physical inventory procedure will be revised to include a requirement to create a unique spreadsheet database file and a pdf version of the file for each time an inventory, partial or full, is conducted.