ML16285A130: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 15: Line 15:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page1of4Revised05/13/2013Plant:PerryDateofEvent:June2,2012SubmittalDate:August16,2012Contact:JohnPelcicTel/email:440 280 5824jfpelcic@firstenergycorp.comNRCContact:MarkMarshfieldTel/email:440 280 5822mark.marshfield@nrc.govPerformanceIndicator:OR01OccupationalExposureControlEffectivenessSiteSpecificFAQ(AppendixD)?No FAQrequestedtobecomeeffectivewhenapproved.ApprovaldateisMay8 th ,2013.QuestionSectionNEI99 02Guidanceneedinginterpretation(includepageandlinecitation):Page62,Lines1622,andassociatedfootnoteTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(>1remperhour)Occurrence-Anonconformance(orconcurrentnon conformances)withtechnicalspecificationsorcomparablerequirementsin10CFR20applicabletotechnicalspecificationhighradiationareas(>1remperhour)thatresultsinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccessorworkactivitieswithintherespectivehigh radiationarea(>1remperhour).Forhighradiationareas(>1remperhour),thisPIdoesnotincludenonconformancewithlicenseeinitiatedcontrolsthatarebeyondwhatisrequiredbytechnicalspecificationsandthecomparableprovisionsin10CFRPart20.
{{#Wiki_filter:NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
Afootnotestatesthat"Concurrent"meansthatthenonconformancesoccurasaresultofthesamecauseandinacommontimeframe.Eventorcircumstancesrequiringguidanceinterpretation:OnJune2,2012,anequipmentfailureresultedinresin/waterslurryflowintothegeneralareahallwayoftheRadwasteBuildingEl.574.Indicationsofchangingradiologicalconditionswereavailable.However,theRadiationProtectionstaffdidnotrecognizetheneedtoconductanewradiologicalsurveyofthearea,whichwaspostedandcontrolledasaHighRadiationArea(HRA)atthetime.ThefailuretoperformatimelyradiologicalsurveyisaperformancedeficiencyandanNRCPerformanceIndicatoroccurrence.Overthenextfewdays,thereweretwoinstancesofindividualsenteringthisareawithoutRadiationProtectioncoverageandoneinstancewhereanindividualwasprovidedaHRAkeybutdidnotenterthearea.OnJune7,2012,aRadiationProtectiontechnicianperformedaradiologicalsurveyoftheareainpreparationfordecontaminationactivities.ThesurveyidentifiedafloorareawheredoseratesmettheTechnicalSpecificationcriteriaforclassificationasaLockedHighRadiationArea(LHRA).Afterthesurvey,theRadwasteBuildingEl.574areawaspostedandcontrolledasaLHRA.ThisPIcountsnonconformances,or"concurrentnon conformances,"withtechnicalspecifications."Concurrentnon conformances"aredefinedasthosethat"occurasaresultofthesamecauseandinacommontimeframe."Inthiscase,thethreeinstanceswereasaresult NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page2of4Revised05/13/2013ofthesamecause-thefailureofRadiationProtectionpersonneltorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurvey."Commontimeframe"isnotdefined;howeverFENOCbelievesthatthesethreeinstancesmeettheintentofa"commontimeframe."Theinstanceswerearesultofasingleperformancedeficiencywiththesamecommoncause.ThefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveypriortoJune7,2012,wasreportedasaPIoccurrence.Additionally,thethreeinstancesofindividualsenteringthearea,orhavingaccesswithoutRadiationProtectioncoverageasaresultofthesingleperformancedeficiencyofnotperformingthetimelysurveywereconservativelyreportedpendingtheoutcomeofthisFAQ.SincethePIcountsnon conformancesthat"resultinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccessorworkactivities"andthenonconformancethatledtothethreeentrieswasthefailureofRadiationProtectiontorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurvey,arethetwosubsequententriesandonepotentialentryconsideredtobe"concurrentnonconformances"boundedbythefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey?
 
WhatistheNRCresidentinspector'sposition?TheNRCresidentinspectoragreedwiththefactsandrecommendedthattheFAQprocessbefollowedforresolution.
Page1of4 Revised05/13/2013 Plant:Perry DateofEvent:June2,2012 SubmittalDate:August16,2012
PotentiallyrelevantexistingFAQnumbersFAQ203addressesthefootnoteinquestion.However,inFAQ203,thecausesofthetwoentriesweredifferent;therefore,bothoccurrencescounted.FAQ203didnotaddress"commontimeframe."ResponseSectionProposedResolutionofFAQThefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveyrepresentsalossofcontroloveraccessintoaLHRA.However,sincethesubsequentthreeinstanceswithoutRadiationProtectioncontrolwerearesultofthefailuretoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey,andwerewithinalimitedcommontimeframe,theycanbeconsideredtobe"concurrentnonconformances."OnlyoneTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationAreaPIoccurrenceshouldbereported.
 
Ifappropriate,provideproposedrewordingofguidanceforinclusioninnextrevision.Inthefootnotedefining"concurrent,""commontimeframe"shouldbedefinedtobe"withinthenormalperiodoftimebetweensurveysforthespecificarea."
==Contact:==
NRCResponseTheproposedFAQcorrectlyquotestheapplicableguidanceinNEI99 02forthisevent.Theperformanceindicatoridentifiesanoccurrenceofnonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances)withtechnicalspecificationsinvolvingalossofradiologicalcontrolsoverentriesto(orworkwithin)aTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(TSLHRA,>1remperhour).TheFAQdiscussionnotesthattherewerethreesubsequentinstanceswhereentriesweremadewithoutRadiationProtectioncontrols.
JohnPelcic
NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page3of4Revised05/13/2013AcommontimeframeasusedintheOccupationalRadiationSafetyguidanceinNEI99 02,isnotafixedperiodoftime.Itistheelapsedtimeinwhichanumberofeventsoroccurrencesthatareassociatedwitheachotherhappen.TheeventsdescribedinthisFAQareallwithinacommontimeframe.However,theissuedemonstratedbythisexampleisnotwhetherthesubsequentnonconformancesresultingfromanongoingfailuretoproperlycontrolaTSLHRAarewithinthesame(orcommon)timeframe.Thepertinentissueinthisexampleiswhetherallofthesubsequentnonconformancesresultedfromthesamecause.Inthosecaseswherealicensee,forwhateverreason(e.g.,failuretosurvey,failuretolockthearea,etc.),failstoprovideadequatephysicalcontrolsaroundaTSLHRAforanextendedtime,allofthesubsequentnon conformanceswouldbe"concurrentnon conformances"asdefinedinNEI99 02iftheyweretheresultofthesamecause.Forexample,anoperationaloccurrencethatcreatedanunrecognizedTSLHRA,thesubsequentfailuretopostthearea,failuretopreventunauthorizedaccess(possibleseveralentries),entrynotcontrolledperanRWP,etc.,areallconcurrentnonconformancesiftheyaredirectlyattributabletotheoriginalfailuretosurvey.However,ifduringthetimethatthisTSLHRAisunidentified(oruncontrolled)thereisasubsequentfailurebytheRPProgramtotaketimelyactionthatreasonablywouldhaveendedtheTSHRAnonconformance(e.g.,afailuretoperformaroutineordirectedsurveillancethatwouldhaveidentifiedthenon conformance,orafailuretorespondtonewinformationthatindicatesthepotentialfortheunidentifiedoruncontrolledTSLHRA),thenthesubsequentnon conformancesareconsideredaseparatePIoccurrencebasedonthefailuretoreasonablyactandcorrectthecondition.Insuchacasethenon conformancesthatoccurredbeforethesubsequentfailurewouldbeconcurrentnon conformances(i.e.,onePIoccurrence)withtheinitialTSviolation.Thenon conformancesfollowingthefailuretoactonthenewinformationwouldbeconcurrentwiththisfailuretoact(i.e.,aseparatePIoccurrence).Oncethisnewinformationisobtained,subsequentsharingofthisnewinformationwithotherstaff,orvalidationofthisnewinformationwouldbeconcurrentwiththeseparatePIoccurrence.TheNRCresponsetoFAQ203isaspecificexampleofthisgeneralstaffposition.ThespecificexampleoftheresinspilleventatPerryreferencedinthisFAQwasinspectedundertheNRCBaselineInspectionProgram.AcompletedescriptionoftheeventisprovidedinPERRYINSPECTIONREPORT05000440/2012005AND07200069/2012002(ML13038A702).ThespilleventstartedonthemorningofJune3,2012 ,whentheRadwaste(RW)OperatornotifiedtheRadiationProtection(RP)staffofapotentialresinspill.Theinspectorsidentifiedoneself revealinggreenfindingwiththreeexamplesofthelicensee'sfailuretoperformtimelyradiologicalsurveysandevaluatethepotentialradiologicalhazards.Thesethreefailurestosurveywererelatedtothefollowing;FailuretoadequatelyrespondtotheinitialnotificationofapossibleresinspillintheRadwaste(RW)building,574'level:Atapproximately0400hoursJune3,theRWoperationssupervisorobservedalargerthanexpectedleveldecreaseinCondensateBackwashSettlingTank(CBST)tankinventory.TheRWoperationssupervisorcalledtheRPcontrolpointandinformedtheRPtechniciansthathebelievedtherewasafailedsealontheCBSTtransferpumpwhichcouldindicateaspillofcontaminatedresin.RPdidnotfollowuptosurveythearea.Failuretotaketimelyactiononceitwasrecognized(orshouldhavebeenrecognized)thattheradiologicalconditionsinRW574'werepotentiallymuchworsethaninitiallyassumed:Atapproximately1442hoursJune3,anRPtechnician,coveringanotherjobontheRW574'lookeddowntheeast westcorridorhallwayandobservedresinoutsidetheCBSTroom.Duetoanincompleteshiftturnover,thedayshiftRPtechnicians,andRPsupervisors,wereunawareofthe NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page4of4Revised05/13/2013reportedlossofresininventory,andpossibleradiologicalconditionsofRW574'.Afterleavingthearea,theRPtechnicianreportedtheunexpectedmaterialconditionofthecorridortotheon dutyRPsupervisor.Nosubsequentsurveyswereperformed.Failuretotakeatimelysurveyoncethedecisiontoperformasurveywasmade:OnTuesday,June5,2012,atabout0630hours,inresponsetocontinuedconcernsexpressedtheRPtechniciansabouttheuncharacterizedradiologicalconditionsonRW574',theRPmanagerdirectedthatafullsurveyofRW574'beperformed,includingairsamples.However,theTSLHRAremainedunidentifiedandinadequatelycontrolleduntilThursday,June7,whenthesurveyswereperformedat1514hours.Eachexamplerepresentsnewinformationoridentifiesorganizationalfailurestorespondinatimelymannerthatwouldhaveendedtheon goingnonconformancetostationtechnicalspecifications.Therefore,eachofthesethreefailurestotaketimelyactionandendthenonconformancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationsrepresentsaseparatecauseofthesubsequentnonconformanceandthereforerepresentsaseparatereportablePIoccurrence.}}
 
Tel/email:4402805824jfpelcic@firstenergycorp.com NRCContact:MarkMarshfield Tel/email:4402805822mark.marshfield@nrc.gov
 
PerformanceIndicator:OR01OccupationalExposureControlEffectiveness
 
SiteSpecificFAQ(AppendixD)?No
 
FAQrequestedtobecomeeffectivewhenapproved.ApprovaldateisMay8th,2013.
 
QuestionSection
 
NEI9902Guidanceneedinginterpretation(includepageandlinecitation):
 
Page62,Lines1622,andassociatedfootnote
 
TechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(>1remperhour)Occurrence-Anonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances)withtechnicalspecificationsorcomparable requirementsin10CFR20applicabletotechnicalspecificationhighradiationareas(>1remperhour) thatresultsinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccessorworkactivitieswithintherespectivehigh radiationarea(>1remperhour).Forhighradiationareas(>1remperhour),thisPIdoesnotinclude nonconformancewithlicenseeinitiatedcontrolsthatarebeyondwhatisrequiredbytechnical specificationsandthecomparableprovisionsin10CFRPart20.
 
AfootnotestatesthatConcurrentmeansthatthenonconformancesoccurasaresultofthesame causeandinacommontimeframe.
 
Eventorcircumstancesrequiringguidanceinterpretation:
 
OnJune2,2012,anequipmentfailureresultedinresin/waterslurryflowintothegeneralarea hallwayoftheRadwasteBuildingEl.574.Indicationsofchangingradiologicalconditionswere available.However,theRadiationProtectionstaffdidnotrecognizetheneedtoconductanew radiologicalsurveyofthearea,whichwaspostedandcontrolledasaHighRadiationArea(HRA) atthetime.Thefailuretoperformatimelyradiologicalsurveyisaperformancedeficiencyand anNRCPerformanceIndicatoroccurrence.
Overthenextfewdays,thereweretwoinstancesofindividualsenteringthisareawithout RadiationProtectioncoverageandoneinstancewhereanindividualwasprovidedaHRAkeybut didnotenterthearea.
OnJune7,2012,aRadiationProtectiontechnicianperformedaradiologicalsurveyoftheareain preparationfordecontaminationactivities.Thesurveyidentifiedafloorareawheredoserates mettheTechnicalSpecificationcriteriaforclassificationasaLockedHighRadiationArea(LHRA).
Afterthesurvey,theRadwasteBuildingEl.574areawaspostedandcontrolledasaLHRA.
ThisPIcountsnonconformances,orconcurrentnonconformances,withtechnical specifications.Concurrentnonconformancesaredefinedasthosethatoccurasaresultof thesamecauseandinacommontimeframe.Inthiscase,thethreeinstanceswereasaresult
 
NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
 
Page2of4 Revised05/13/2013 ofthesamecause-thefailureofRadiationProtectionpersonneltorecognizetheneedto performanewradiologicalsurvey.Commontimeframeisnotdefined;howeverFENOC believesthatthesethreeinstancesmeettheintentofacommontimeframe.Theinstances werearesultofasingleperformancedeficiencywiththesamecommoncause.
ThefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveypriortoJune7,2012,was reportedasaPIoccurrence.Additionally,thethreeinstancesofindividualsenteringthearea,or havingaccesswithoutRadiationProtectioncoverageasaresultofthesingleperformance deficiencyofnotperformingthetimelysurveywereconservativelyreportedpendingthe outcomeofthisFAQ.
SincethePIcountsnonconformancesthatresultinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccess orworkactivitiesandthenonconformancethatledtothethreeentrieswasthefailureof RadiationProtectiontorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurvey,arethetwo subsequententriesandonepotentialentryconsideredtobeconcurrentnonconformances boundedbythefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey?
 
WhatistheNRCresidentinspectorsposition?
TheNRCresidentinspectoragreedwiththefactsandrecommendedthattheFAQprocessbe followedforresolution.
 
PotentiallyrelevantexistingFAQnumbers FAQ203addressesthefootnoteinquestion.However,inFAQ203,thecausesofthetwo entriesweredifferent;therefore,bothoccurrencescounted.FAQ203didnotaddress commontimeframe.
 
ResponseSection
 
ProposedResolutionofFAQ
 
Thefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveyrepresentsalossof controloveraccessintoaLHRA.However,sincethesubsequentthreeinstanceswithout RadiationProtectioncontrolwerearesultofthefailuretoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey, andwerewithinalimitedcommontimeframe,theycanbeconsideredtobeconcurrentnon conformances.OnlyoneTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationAreaPIoccurrenceshouldbe reported.
 
Ifappropriate,provideproposedrewordingofguidanceforinclusioninnextrevision.
 
Inthefootnotedefiningconcurrent,commontimeframeshouldbedefinedtobewithin thenormalperiodoftimebetweensurveysforthespecificarea.
 
NRCResponse
 
TheproposedFAQcorrectlyquotestheapplicableguidanceinNEI9902forthisevent.The performanceindicatoridentifiesanoccurrenceofnonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances) withtechnicalspecificationsinvolvingalossofradiologicalcontrolsoverentriesto(orworkwithin)a TechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(TSLHRA,>1remperhour).TheFAQdiscussionnotesthat therewerethreesubsequentinstanceswhereentriesweremadewithoutRadiationProtectioncontrols.
 
NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
 
Page3of4 Revised05/13/2013 AcommontimeframeasusedintheOccupationalRadiationSafetyguidanceinNEI9902,isnotafixed periodoftime.Itistheelapsedtimeinwhichanumberofeventsoroccurrencesthatareassociated witheachotherhappen.TheeventsdescribedinthisFAQareallwithinacommontimeframe.
However,theissuedemonstratedbythisexampleisnotwhetherthesubsequentnonconformances resultingfromanongoingfailuretoproperlycontrolaTSLHRAarewithinthesame(orcommon) timeframe.Thepertinentissueinthisexampleiswhetherallofthesubsequentnonconformances resultedfromthesamecause.
 
Inthosecaseswherealicensee,forwhateverreason(e.g.,failuretosurvey,failuretolockthearea, etc.),failstoprovideadequatephysicalcontrolsaroundaTSLHRAforanextendedtime,allofthe subsequentnonconformanceswouldbeconcurrentnonconformancesasdefinedinNEI9902ifthey weretheresultofthesamecause.Forexample,anoperationaloccurrencethatcreatedan unrecognizedTSLHRA,thesubsequentfailuretopostthearea,failuretopreventunauthorizedaccess (possibleseveralentries),entrynotcontrolledperanRWP,etc.,areallconcurrentnonconformancesif theyaredirectlyattributabletotheoriginalfailuretosurvey.However,ifduringthetimethatthis TSLHRAisunidentified(oruncontrolled)thereisasubsequentfailurebytheRPProgramtotaketimely actionthatreasonablywouldhaveendedtheTSHRAnonconformance(e.g.,afailuretoperforma routineordirectedsurveillancethatwouldhaveidentifiedthenonconformance,orafailuretorespond tonewinformationthatindicatesthepotentialfortheunidentifiedoruncontrolledTSLHRA),thenthe subsequentnonconformancesareconsideredaseparatePIoccurrencebasedonthefailureto reasonablyactandcorrectthecondition.Insuchacasethenonconformancesthatoccurredbeforethe subsequentfailurewouldbeconcurrentnonconformances(i.e.,onePIoccurrence)withtheinitialTS violation.Thenonconformancesfollowingthefailuretoactonthenewinformationwouldbe concurrentwiththisfailuretoact(i.e.,aseparatePIoccurrence).Oncethisnewinformationis obtained,subsequentsharingofthisnewinformationwithotherstaff,orvalidationofthisnew informationwouldbeconcurrentwiththeseparatePIoccurrence.TheNRCresponsetoFAQ203isa specificexampleofthisgeneralstaffposition.
 
ThespecificexampleoftheresinspilleventatPerryreferencedinthisFAQwasinspectedunderthe NRCBaselineInspectionProgram.AcompletedescriptionoftheeventisprovidedinPERRYINSPECTION REPORT05000440/2012005AND07200069/2012002(ML13038A702).Thespilleventstartedonthe morningofJune3,2012,whentheRadwaste(RW)OperatornotifiedtheRadiationProtection(RP)staff ofapotentialresinspill.Theinspectorsidentifiedoneselfrevealinggreenfindingwiththreeexamples ofthelicenseesfailuretoperformtimelyradiologicalsurveysandevaluatethepotentialradiological hazards.Thesethreefailurestosurveywererelatedtothefollowing;
 
FailuretoadequatelyrespondtotheinitialnotificationofapossibleresinspillintheRadwaste (RW)building,574'level:Atapproximately0400hoursJune3,theRWoperationssupervisor observedalargerthanexpectedleveldecreaseinCondensateBackwashSettlingTank(CBST) tankinventory.TheRWoperationssupervisorcalledtheRPcontrolpointandinformedtheRP techniciansthathebelievedtherewasafailedsealontheCBSTtransferpumpwhichcould indicateaspillofcontaminatedresin.RPdidnotfollowuptosurveythearea.
 
Failuretotaketimelyactiononceitwasrecognized(orshouldhavebeenrecognized)thatthe radiologicalconditionsinRW574'werepotentiallymuchworsethaninitiallyassumed:At approximately1442hoursJune3,anRPtechnician,coveringanotherjobontheRW574looked downtheeastwestcorridorhallwayandobservedresinoutsidetheCBSTroom.Duetoan incompleteshiftturnover,thedayshiftRPtechnicians,andRPsupervisors,wereunawareofthe
 
NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
 
Page4of4 Revised05/13/2013 reportedlossofresininventory,andpossibleradiologicalconditionsofRW574'.Afterleaving thearea,theRPtechnicianreportedtheunexpectedmaterialconditionofthecorridortothe ondutyRPsupervisor.Nosubsequentsurveyswereperformed.
 
Failuretotakeatimelysurveyoncethedecisiontoperformasurveywasmade:OnTuesday, June5,2012,atabout0630hours,inresponsetocontinuedconcernsexpressedtheRP techniciansabouttheuncharacterizedradiologicalconditionsonRW574',theRPmanager directedthatafullsurveyofRW574'beperformed,includingairsamples.However,the TSLHRAremainedunidentifiedandinadequatelycontrolleduntilThursday,June7,whenthe surveyswereperformedat1514hours.
 
Eachexamplerepresentsnewinformationoridentifiesorganizationalfailurestorespondinatimely mannerthatwouldhaveendedtheongoingnonconformancetostationtechnicalspecifications.
Therefore,eachofthesethreefailurestotaketimelyactionandendthenonconformancewiththe TechnicalSpecificationsrepresentsaseparatecauseofthesubsequentnonconformanceandtherefore representsaseparatereportablePIoccurrence.}}

Latest revision as of 19:56, 9 January 2025

ROP PI Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs):12-04
ML16285A130
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/02/2016
From:
NRC/NRR/DIRS/IPAB
To:
Anderson M,NRR/DIRS,301-415-8744
References
Download: ML16285A130 (4)


Text

NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)

Page1of4 Revised05/13/2013 Plant:Perry DateofEvent:June2,2012 SubmittalDate:August16,2012

Contact:

JohnPelcic

Tel/email:4402805824jfpelcic@firstenergycorp.com NRCContact:MarkMarshfield Tel/email:4402805822mark.marshfield@nrc.gov

PerformanceIndicator:OR01OccupationalExposureControlEffectiveness

SiteSpecificFAQ(AppendixD)?No

FAQrequestedtobecomeeffectivewhenapproved.ApprovaldateisMay8th,2013.

QuestionSection

NEI9902Guidanceneedinginterpretation(includepageandlinecitation):

Page62,Lines1622,andassociatedfootnote

TechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(>1remperhour)Occurrence-Anonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances)withtechnicalspecificationsorcomparable requirementsin10CFR20applicabletotechnicalspecificationhighradiationareas(>1remperhour) thatresultsinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccessorworkactivitieswithintherespectivehigh radiationarea(>1remperhour).Forhighradiationareas(>1remperhour),thisPIdoesnotinclude nonconformancewithlicenseeinitiatedcontrolsthatarebeyondwhatisrequiredbytechnical specificationsandthecomparableprovisionsin10CFRPart20.

AfootnotestatesthatConcurrentmeansthatthenonconformancesoccurasaresultofthesame causeandinacommontimeframe.

Eventorcircumstancesrequiringguidanceinterpretation:

OnJune2,2012,anequipmentfailureresultedinresin/waterslurryflowintothegeneralarea hallwayoftheRadwasteBuildingEl.574.Indicationsofchangingradiologicalconditionswere available.However,theRadiationProtectionstaffdidnotrecognizetheneedtoconductanew radiologicalsurveyofthearea,whichwaspostedandcontrolledasaHighRadiationArea(HRA) atthetime.Thefailuretoperformatimelyradiologicalsurveyisaperformancedeficiencyand anNRCPerformanceIndicatoroccurrence.

Overthenextfewdays,thereweretwoinstancesofindividualsenteringthisareawithout RadiationProtectioncoverageandoneinstancewhereanindividualwasprovidedaHRAkeybut didnotenterthearea.

OnJune7,2012,aRadiationProtectiontechnicianperformedaradiologicalsurveyoftheareain preparationfordecontaminationactivities.Thesurveyidentifiedafloorareawheredoserates mettheTechnicalSpecificationcriteriaforclassificationasaLockedHighRadiationArea(LHRA).

Afterthesurvey,theRadwasteBuildingEl.574areawaspostedandcontrolledasaLHRA.

ThisPIcountsnonconformances,orconcurrentnonconformances,withtechnical specifications.Concurrentnonconformancesaredefinedasthosethatoccurasaresultof thesamecauseandinacommontimeframe.Inthiscase,thethreeinstanceswereasaresult

NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)

Page2of4 Revised05/13/2013 ofthesamecause-thefailureofRadiationProtectionpersonneltorecognizetheneedto performanewradiologicalsurvey.Commontimeframeisnotdefined;howeverFENOC believesthatthesethreeinstancesmeettheintentofacommontimeframe.Theinstances werearesultofasingleperformancedeficiencywiththesamecommoncause.

ThefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveypriortoJune7,2012,was reportedasaPIoccurrence.Additionally,thethreeinstancesofindividualsenteringthearea,or havingaccesswithoutRadiationProtectioncoverageasaresultofthesingleperformance deficiencyofnotperformingthetimelysurveywereconservativelyreportedpendingthe outcomeofthisFAQ.

SincethePIcountsnonconformancesthatresultinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccess orworkactivitiesandthenonconformancethatledtothethreeentrieswasthefailureof RadiationProtectiontorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurvey,arethetwo subsequententriesandonepotentialentryconsideredtobeconcurrentnonconformances boundedbythefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey?

WhatistheNRCresidentinspectorsposition?

TheNRCresidentinspectoragreedwiththefactsandrecommendedthattheFAQprocessbe followedforresolution.

PotentiallyrelevantexistingFAQnumbers FAQ203addressesthefootnoteinquestion.However,inFAQ203,thecausesofthetwo entriesweredifferent;therefore,bothoccurrencescounted.FAQ203didnotaddress commontimeframe.

ResponseSection

ProposedResolutionofFAQ

Thefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveyrepresentsalossof controloveraccessintoaLHRA.However,sincethesubsequentthreeinstanceswithout RadiationProtectioncontrolwerearesultofthefailuretoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey, andwerewithinalimitedcommontimeframe,theycanbeconsideredtobeconcurrentnon conformances.OnlyoneTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationAreaPIoccurrenceshouldbe reported.

Ifappropriate,provideproposedrewordingofguidanceforinclusioninnextrevision.

Inthefootnotedefiningconcurrent,commontimeframeshouldbedefinedtobewithin thenormalperiodoftimebetweensurveysforthespecificarea.

NRCResponse

TheproposedFAQcorrectlyquotestheapplicableguidanceinNEI9902forthisevent.The performanceindicatoridentifiesanoccurrenceofnonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances) withtechnicalspecificationsinvolvingalossofradiologicalcontrolsoverentriesto(orworkwithin)a TechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(TSLHRA,>1remperhour).TheFAQdiscussionnotesthat therewerethreesubsequentinstanceswhereentriesweremadewithoutRadiationProtectioncontrols.

NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)

Page3of4 Revised05/13/2013 AcommontimeframeasusedintheOccupationalRadiationSafetyguidanceinNEI9902,isnotafixed periodoftime.Itistheelapsedtimeinwhichanumberofeventsoroccurrencesthatareassociated witheachotherhappen.TheeventsdescribedinthisFAQareallwithinacommontimeframe.

However,theissuedemonstratedbythisexampleisnotwhetherthesubsequentnonconformances resultingfromanongoingfailuretoproperlycontrolaTSLHRAarewithinthesame(orcommon) timeframe.Thepertinentissueinthisexampleiswhetherallofthesubsequentnonconformances resultedfromthesamecause.

Inthosecaseswherealicensee,forwhateverreason(e.g.,failuretosurvey,failuretolockthearea, etc.),failstoprovideadequatephysicalcontrolsaroundaTSLHRAforanextendedtime,allofthe subsequentnonconformanceswouldbeconcurrentnonconformancesasdefinedinNEI9902ifthey weretheresultofthesamecause.Forexample,anoperationaloccurrencethatcreatedan unrecognizedTSLHRA,thesubsequentfailuretopostthearea,failuretopreventunauthorizedaccess (possibleseveralentries),entrynotcontrolledperanRWP,etc.,areallconcurrentnonconformancesif theyaredirectlyattributabletotheoriginalfailuretosurvey.However,ifduringthetimethatthis TSLHRAisunidentified(oruncontrolled)thereisasubsequentfailurebytheRPProgramtotaketimely actionthatreasonablywouldhaveendedtheTSHRAnonconformance(e.g.,afailuretoperforma routineordirectedsurveillancethatwouldhaveidentifiedthenonconformance,orafailuretorespond tonewinformationthatindicatesthepotentialfortheunidentifiedoruncontrolledTSLHRA),thenthe subsequentnonconformancesareconsideredaseparatePIoccurrencebasedonthefailureto reasonablyactandcorrectthecondition.Insuchacasethenonconformancesthatoccurredbeforethe subsequentfailurewouldbeconcurrentnonconformances(i.e.,onePIoccurrence)withtheinitialTS violation.Thenonconformancesfollowingthefailuretoactonthenewinformationwouldbe concurrentwiththisfailuretoact(i.e.,aseparatePIoccurrence).Oncethisnewinformationis obtained,subsequentsharingofthisnewinformationwithotherstaff,orvalidationofthisnew informationwouldbeconcurrentwiththeseparatePIoccurrence.TheNRCresponsetoFAQ203isa specificexampleofthisgeneralstaffposition.

ThespecificexampleoftheresinspilleventatPerryreferencedinthisFAQwasinspectedunderthe NRCBaselineInspectionProgram.AcompletedescriptionoftheeventisprovidedinPERRYINSPECTION REPORT05000440/2012005AND07200069/2012002(ML13038A702).Thespilleventstartedonthe morningofJune3,2012,whentheRadwaste(RW)OperatornotifiedtheRadiationProtection(RP)staff ofapotentialresinspill.Theinspectorsidentifiedoneselfrevealinggreenfindingwiththreeexamples ofthelicenseesfailuretoperformtimelyradiologicalsurveysandevaluatethepotentialradiological hazards.Thesethreefailurestosurveywererelatedtothefollowing;

FailuretoadequatelyrespondtotheinitialnotificationofapossibleresinspillintheRadwaste (RW)building,574'level:Atapproximately0400hoursJune3,theRWoperationssupervisor observedalargerthanexpectedleveldecreaseinCondensateBackwashSettlingTank(CBST) tankinventory.TheRWoperationssupervisorcalledtheRPcontrolpointandinformedtheRP techniciansthathebelievedtherewasafailedsealontheCBSTtransferpumpwhichcould indicateaspillofcontaminatedresin.RPdidnotfollowuptosurveythearea.

Failuretotaketimelyactiononceitwasrecognized(orshouldhavebeenrecognized)thatthe radiologicalconditionsinRW574'werepotentiallymuchworsethaninitiallyassumed:At approximately1442hoursJune3,anRPtechnician,coveringanotherjobontheRW574looked downtheeastwestcorridorhallwayandobservedresinoutsidetheCBSTroom.Duetoan incompleteshiftturnover,thedayshiftRPtechnicians,andRPsupervisors,wereunawareofthe

NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)

Page4of4 Revised05/13/2013 reportedlossofresininventory,andpossibleradiologicalconditionsofRW574'.Afterleaving thearea,theRPtechnicianreportedtheunexpectedmaterialconditionofthecorridortothe ondutyRPsupervisor.Nosubsequentsurveyswereperformed.

Failuretotakeatimelysurveyoncethedecisiontoperformasurveywasmade:OnTuesday, June5,2012,atabout0630hours,inresponsetocontinuedconcernsexpressedtheRP techniciansabouttheuncharacterizedradiologicalconditionsonRW574',theRPmanager directedthatafullsurveyofRW574'beperformed,includingairsamples.However,the TSLHRAremainedunidentifiedandinadequatelycontrolleduntilThursday,June7,whenthe surveyswereperformedat1514hours.

Eachexamplerepresentsnewinformationoridentifiesorganizationalfailurestorespondinatimely mannerthatwouldhaveendedtheongoingnonconformancetostationtechnicalspecifications.

Therefore,eachofthesethreefailurestotaketimelyactionandendthenonconformancewiththe TechnicalSpecificationsrepresentsaseparatecauseofthesubsequentnonconformanceandtherefore representsaseparatereportablePIoccurrence.